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Foreword
This Volume focuses on the major violations of bodily integrity rights that were
committed during the Commission’s mandate period. While most of the violations in this
volume are traditionally defined to require state action – extra judicial killings, enforced
disappearances, detention, torture – the Commission adopted a more expansive view of
these violations. This was for four reasons. First, while as a matter of law the distinction
between state and non-state action is important with respect to many of these violations,
many victims are less concerned about the official status of those who wronged them,
and more with identifying those individuals and addressing the consequences of the
harm they suffered.
Second, if the Commission were to strictly define these violations as requiring state
action, the experience and narratives of many victims would be lost. This would diminish
the ability of the Commission to provide an accurate, complete and historical record of
gross violations of human rights committed during the mandate period.
Third, while some of the violations described in this volume were not directly committed
by state officials, the failure of the state to provide adequate security to many of its
citizens provided an opportunity for such violations to occur. In seeking to understand
the circumstances, factors and causes of violations committed by militias and other nonstate actors, the Commission was inevitably drawn to an analysis of state inaction, and
in particular the failure of the state to provide, and appear to be providing, justice and
security.
Fourth, while the Commission does make recommendations with respect to the law and
legal structures, it is not a court of law, but rather a body dedicated to describing and
explaining historical injustices and gross violations of human rights. While accountability
is part of the Commission’s mandate, justice is one of three equally important pillars,
the other two being truth and reconciliation. In interpreting its mandate, therefore, the
Commission was sensitive to furthering the fulfilment of each of the three pillars, and
not giving undue weight to any one over the other two.
While much of this volume is focused on violations directly committed by the state,
it also includes descriptions of killings, severe injury and violence, sexual violence,
detention, and other similar violations committed by non-state actors.
The volume starts with a general overview of the political history of Kenya. This chapter
provides the overall political context for understanding not only the other specific
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violations in this chapter, but also the violations and other materials in the rest of the
report. Because the political history focuses heavily on the state and its development,
we include it here in the volume that focuses most on some of the worst violations
committed by the state.
In the chapter on political history we also, as in other parts of the report, discuss some
of the practices and violations of the colonial government. While the Commission’s
temporal mandate formally commenced at independence, the Act also required us to
describe and analyze the ‘antecedents, circumstances, factors and context’ of violations
committed during the mandate period. There is no question that in order to understand,
for example, the newly independent government’s reaction to the Shifta War (not
to mention injustices related to land, state abuse of power, corruption, and many of
the other violations discussed in this Report), one needs to understand the policies
and actions of the colonial government, as well as the legal, political, and economic
structures they established and bequeathed to the newly independent government.
This general political overview is then supplemented by a description of the history
of the state security agencies. While other agencies of the state were responsible for
historical injustices and gross violations of human rights during the mandate period (see
e.g. Volume 2B which focuses on land, economic crimes, violations of socio-economic
rights, and corruption), the security agencies were both primarily responsible for many
of the acts of commission discussed in this volume, as well as the acts of omission (the
failure to provide security) that allowed many of the violations committed by non-state
actors to occur.
The next chapter focuses on the major armed conflict (in this case a non-international
armed conflict) within the Commission’s mandate, the Shifta War. As the defining
moment of the independence of the nation, the Shifta War acts as a bridge from the
violations committed by the colonial power prior to independence and the violations
committed by the newly independent government. The Shifta War had a profound
impact on the early development of the state, the effects of which are still being felt
today, not least by the survivors and their descendants in the north eastern part of the
country.
The remaining chapters are organized by class of violations. Unlawful killings and enforced
disappearances are divided into three separate parts: massacres, political assassinations,
and extra judicial killings. Detention, torture and ill treatment were unfortunately
present during all periods of Kenyan history. While the infamous Nyayo House torture
chamber is often the first thing that one thinks of with respect to the Kenyan government
and torture, this chapter illustrates how prevalent illegal detention, torture, and other
similar treatment continues to plague the nation. Finally, the chapter on sexual violence
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describes a particular form of violence committed against men and women, boys and
girls. It is only in the last three decades that the international community has become
more aware of the use of sexual violence as a systematic tool of oppression and armed
conflict. Sexual violence was prevalent during the colonial period, and unfortunately
continued unabated through independence to the present day.
Investigations related to some of the events in this chapter – e.g. the Wagalla Massacre;
the assassinations of, among others, Tom Mboya, J.M. Kariuki, and Robert Ouko – are
some of the most anticipated by many Kenyans. The report of the Task Force reported
the high interest in providing truth and justice with respect to these violations, and
the experience of the Commission was the same. The Commission was able to unearth
some new information regarding some of these events. But there is no question that
the Commission was unable to provide clear answers to all of the questions raised about
these injustices. A major cause of this inability was the difficulty the Commission faced
in securing documents and the cooperation of witnesses and other interested parties
with respect to these events. It is our hope that the information provided here will
re-emphasize the importance of the government coming clean and releasing all of the
information within its possession with respect to these and other historical injustices.
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CHAPTER

ONE

Historical Context:
A General Overview
Introduction
1.

On the eve of Kenya’s Independence Day, the Duke of Edinburgh said the following
to a people that about to become free citizens of a new African nation:
Tomorrow a new volume will be opened and an independent Kenya will start to write
a new story. The pages of this volume are still blank and empty; the story that is to be
written on them is still in the hands and minds of all the people of Kenya.1

2.

1

The next day, 12 December 1963, independence was greeted with jubilation and
celebrations across the entire country. Immediately, Kenyans began to write the
country’s story. Almost 50 years later, Kenya’s story is a success story as it is a sad story.
It is a success story because, despite the many challenges that have bedeviled the
country, Kenyans have made huge strides in achieving the goals that had been set
forth at independence, chief amongst which is the eradication of poverty, diseases
and illiteracy. It is a sad story because it is burdened by ghastly accounts of gross
violations of human rights and historical injustices. It is mainly this sad part of Kenya’s
story that the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission was tasked to examine
and document.
Daily Nation, 13 December 1963.

1
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Kenya’s story is a success story as it is a sad story. It is a
success story because, despite the many challenges that
have bedeviled the country, Kenyans have made huge
strides in achieving the goals that had been set forth at
independence, chief amongst which is the eradication
of poverty, diseases and illiteracy. It is a sad story
because it is burdened by ghastly accounts of gross
violations of human rights and historical injustices.

2

3.

This Chapter locates gross human rights violations and injustices that occurred in
Kenya between 1963 and 2008 in their historical context. It provides a composite
account or historical overview of the dynamics and factors that nurtured an
environment under which these violations and injustices thrived. The overview is
presented in a chronological order beginning from 1895 when the Kenyan state
was created to 2008 when it was at the edge of disintegration.

4.

For analytical purposes, the historical period has been divided into four distinct
epochs. These epochs correspond with the four political administrations that
governed the country during the Commission’s mandate period:


British colonial era (1895 to 1963);



President Jomo Kenyatta’s era (1963 to 1978);



President Daniel arap Moi’s era (1978 to 2002); and



President Mwai Kibaki’s era (2002 to 2008).

5.

As a historical overview, the scope and focus of this Chapter is limited to describing
and explaining key events in the political realm during these four epochs. As
such, it does not describe any particular violations and injustices in great detail.
Comprehensive descriptions of such violations and injustices are covered in
subsequent chapters and volumes of the Report.

6.

In analysing these key events and their historical perspective, it is argued that the
violence generated in the context of colonialism was perpetuated in the postcolonial period through unaltered colonial structures, institutions and mentalities.
Thus Kenya’s relatively long history of human rights violations cannot be explained
nor understood adequately without unravelling the country’s colonial experience.
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British Colonial Era
7.

The creation of modern day Kenya dates back to 1885 when European imperial
powers assembled in Berlin, Germany, to partition Africa among themselves. At the
Berlin conference where these powers met, it was resolved that those interested in
Africa would declare their spheres of influence then follow such declaration with
effective control of the new territories. What followed was the partition of Africa,
with little knowledge of the continent, especially its hinterlands. In the end, some
roughly 10,000 African polities were amalgamated into 40 European colonies and
protectorates. These colonies and protectorates would later provide the basis for
the modern nation-states of Africa including Kenya. Some African societies with a
lot in common were rent apart while others with nothing or little networks were
fused together

8.

To establish and consolidate their rule in Kenya, the British employed violence
on a locally unprecedented scale and with unprecedented singleness of
mind and purpose. The colonial violence was characterized by unimaginable
human rights violations and injustices which reached its zenith in the 1950s,
a time when communities in Kenya staged a fight for political and economic
self-determination.

9.

The British, having earmarked Kenya for control, moved with speed to implement
the Berlin resolution. Within two years, the British East African Protectorate
(where most of the present Kenya falls) had been declared. Henceforth, most laws
applicable in England and its hinter territories such as India would be exerted in
the so-called ’protectorate’.

Rule by proxy: Imperial British East Africa Company
10.

2

Initially, the British chose to administer its newly-acquired territory through a
proxy: the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). The IBEAC was granted
a charter in 1888 to administer and develop the territory as it saw fit. It used this
authority to exploit natural resources such as ivory. The charter was exclusive but
the company faced numerous challenges in establishing its authority in Kenya.
Its agents have been described as ‘alcoholics’ who failed to establish working
relationships with the local populations with whom they were supposed to
trade.2 Moreover, the IBEAC lacked the finances to develop infrastructure and
was therefore unable to make the investments necessary to properly advance its
East African presence.
B Berman Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (1990) 50.
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11.

In early 1890, the company started constructing the Mackinnon-Sclater road, which
was actually little more than cattle-track designed to link Mombasa and Busia.
The company also ordered a large steamship, the SS William Mackinnon, in the
hope that it would crisscross Lake Victoria and further stimulate commerce in the
region. Neither of these projects succeeded. Indeed the failure of these projects,
coupled with high profile political disputes and wrangles in Uganda, eventually
convinced the British government that the IBEAC’s charter should be cancelled.
Consequently, the charter was cancelled on 1 July 1895. Administrative control of
the territory passed from the IBEAC to the British Foreign Office. In effect, Kenya
became a British protectorate.

From British Protectorate to British Colony
12.

The declaration of Kenya as a British protectorate was primarily a diplomatic
gesture, aimed at the Sultan of Zanzibar, Germany, Italy and Ethiopia. It was a
declaration of exclusion of these powers from this political space that ran from
Jubaland to Lake Naivasha.3 This ‘diplomatic gesture’ proved a major obstacle to
the British settlers and the British Colonial Office in their attempts to secure cheap
loans under the Colonial Stock Act of 1900 for the development of the protectorate.
The Colonial Stock Act of 1900 only benefitted British colonies and dominions and
not protectorates.4 The crown agents, therefore, advised the colonial office to look
into ways to change the status of the protectorate to a colony.

13.

It was this desire to change the status of the protectorate to a colony that exposed
the intricate political arrangement of the territory. It became clear that the
incorporation of the 10-mile coastal strip into the colony would arouse international
conflicts from other countries that had entered into trading agreements with the
Sultan of Zanzibar.

14.

The sultanate of Zanzibar for instance had signed treaties with various states:
United States of America in 1833, France in 1862, and Germany in 1886. These
treaties recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan. Of particular importance was
the 1886 Anglo-Germany treaty which internationally recognized the 10-mile
coastal strip as the rightful dominion of the sultanate of Zanzibar.5 As a result of
manipulation, persuasions and coercions, the Sultan accepted the proposal and
acknowledged that he:

3
4
5

4

Atieno-Odhiambo ‘Mugo’s Prophesy’ in W Ochieng’ (ed) Kenya: The Making of a Nation. A Hundred Years of Kenya’s History 18951995 (2000) 7.
M John ‘The Ten Mile Coastal Strip: An Examination of the Intricate Nature of Land Question at Kenyan Coast’ (2011) International
Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 177.
As above.
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was the child of His Majesty’s government and was always ready loyally to carry out its
wishes. If His Majesty’s government considered the alienation desirable, he was quite
prepared to agree to it.6

15.

Thus, in July 1920, the territory of the East Africa Protectorate was annexed to
the British Crown under the new name Kenya Colony. From then onwards, the
former protectorate became the Kenya Colony. The British colonialists imposed
the state structure on collections of ethno-political communities in Kenya that
historically lacked the inter-communal coherence. The communities which lived
independently from each other were forced to live together in newly-created
colonial Kenya7. This imagined or invented political community superimposed into
much older alignments and loyalties has continue to be a fault line of ethnic sociopolitical mobilization and conflict till today.

Resistance and military expeditions
16.

The conquest of state and territory for British settlement and exploitation in Kenya
was achieved through colonial violence.8 To force Africans into submission, the
colonial administration in Kenya conducted ‘punitive expeditions’ in the 1890s
against what they called ‘recalcitrant tribes’. There were military expeditions
against the Nandi in 1901, 1905, and 1906, against the Embu in 1905, against the
Abagusii in 1904, 1908, and 1914, against the Kipsigis in 1905 and against the
Abagishu and Kabras in 1907.

17.

Even the ‘angels’ within the British administration who recommended peaceful
methods of expansion discovered that the majority of the African people were
not willing to forgo their independence without some military show.9 Sir Arthur
Hardinge, the first protectorate commissioner, could even remark: ‘These
people must learn submission by bullets - it’s the only school; after that you
may begin more modern and humane methods of education’.10 The aftermath
of such violence was destruction of property, rape, torture, death, and destruction
to property.

6
7

As above.
N Peter ‘Colonialism and Its Legacies in Kenya’, Lecturer Delivered During Fulbright Hays Group Project, July 6th to August 6th
2009, Moi University-Kenya; O Bethwell “Introduction” in W Ochieng’ (ed) Kenya: The Making of a Nation. A Hundred Years of
Kenya’s History 1895-1995 (2000).
8 This study borrows from Tirop Simatei’s Work “Colonial Violence, Postcolonial Violations: Violence, Landscape and Memory in
Kenyan Fiction”. Here colonial violence is understood to mean relationships, processes, and conditions that attended the practice
of colonialism in Kenya and that violated the physical, social, and/or psychological integrity of the colonized while similarly impacting
on the colonizer.
9 W Ochieng’ A History of Kenya (1985) 89-90
10 For details se J Lonsdale ‘The conquest state, 1895-1904’ in O William (ed) (1989) A Modern History of Kenya, 1895-1980
(1989) 11.
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18.

Having been appointed as the first commissioner, Sir Hardinge later realized
the need to convert the external, costly and destructive force of conquest into
internal, negotiable and productive power.11 In order to set up an administrative
and judicial system, Hardinge fell back on the IBEAC administrators, retaining
people like Charles Hobley and Martin the Maltese. He proceeded to divide the
land into provinces and districts. And since administrative boundaries tended
to be based on ethnic or linguistic units, they froze cultural development and
population mobility at a certain point in time, thus fossilizing situations which
had been fluid.12 But more importantly, the administrative creativity of Hobley
witnessed the planting of seeds for ethnic hatred as communities started to
establish ownership of their territories to the exclusion of others. Hardinge:
had low opinion of the Africans, whom he regarded as barbarous races and he therefore
hoped to rely on the Arabs and to a lesser extent, the Swahili people … who according
to him were a civilizing influence for local administration. The process of dividing the
Kenyan people into primitive tribes and civilized tribes had begun … and intensified as
the administration spread into the interior”13.

19.

Sir Arthur Hardinge was succeeded as a commissioner by Sir Charles Elliot,
who had an even lower opinion of the Africans. His first task was to consolidate
British control within the protectorate and to formulate administrative policies
and structures suitable for white settlers. Unlike his predecessor, his actions
witnessed not only grave injustices against Africans, but also widespread
fighting between different African ‘tribes’ in the second half of the 19th Century.
The tribal units thus created and defined were encased in district boundaries,
but many of these classifications were arbitrary in some cases dividing groups
more sharply than they had been previously while in others they combined
groups that were originally distinct. As Ogot aptly concludes, ‘new and bigger
tribes such as the Luhya, the Kalenjin, and the Mijikenda had been invented …
by the Africans themselves to safeguard the interest and welfare of smaller units
against possible domination by the larger groups’. This kind of balancing action
has tended to intensify ethnic chauvinism and the struggle for the capture of the
post-colonial state14.

20.

On the ground, the British sought to establish alliances and loyalties of Africans.
In so doing, the British sought to manipulate, subvert and at times circumvent
the existing indigenous systems of authority. As Atieno-Odhiambo explains:

11 As above.
12 Ogot Bethwell (2000:21) ‘Boundary Changes and the Invention of Tribes’ in William Ochieng’ (ed) Kenya: The Making of a Nation.
A Hundred Years of Kenya’s History 1895-1995 (2000) 21.
13 As above.
14 As above.
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‘the politics of this time were at one level the politics of conquest, but the more
enduring heritage was the politics of manipulation’.15 Such were evident as the
British manipulated leaders of the Maasai namely Olonona, Ole Galisha, and
Ole Masikonti. The British too manipulated the power equation in Luhya land
by inventing empires for Mumia in Wanga and for Sudi Namachanja in Bukusu.
This was followed by imposition of new leaders such as Karuri wa Gakure and
Kinyanjui wa Gathirimu among the Kikuyu. In the coastal region, the Sultan of
Zanzibar was manipulated by Sir Edward Northey and the British residents in
Zanzibar to allow annexation of his 10-mile coastal strip to be part of the new
colony.16
21.

Practically everywhere in Kenya, as was the case in the rest of Africa, the
imposition of colonial rule was resisted. Such resistance inevitably provoked
military retaliation from the colonial powers. Better armed and employing crack
shot mercenaries, colonial powers imposed their rule by violence and/or military
expeditions. This was particularly the case between 1895 and 1914; a phase of
pacification of ‘recalcitrant tribes’ fighting for the preservation of their political,
cultural and economic independence.17 The period was thus characterized by
an unimaginable degree of human rights abuses against defenceless Africans.
The military expeditions were accompanied by crimes such as theft, rape,
death and destruction of property by the colonial soldiers or their associates.
Such actions defy the view that the British colonialist used humane and
gentle methods to impose their rule in Kenya.18

22.

Examples abound of how the British used brutal force to impose its rule. On the
Kenya coast, Swahili chiefs like Mbaruk were famous for resisting alien rule. When
the British took over Kenya, the Mazrui chiefs resisted British rule as they had
repeatedly done in the past. They knew that they could not win pitched battles
against an enemy who was far more powerful and better armed than they. So
they concentrated on fighting limited engagements and making lightning attacks,
and they sustained a fairly successful resistance movement for some time. But the
British were in Kenya to stay. They therefore imported Baluchistan regiments from
India to crush the African resisters.19 Mbaruk, the leader of the resistance, fled to
Tanzania, only to fall into German hands.

15 Atieno-Odhiambo (2000:7) “Mugo’s Prophesy” in William Ochieng’ (ed) (2000) Kenya: The Making of a Nation. A Hundred Years of
Kenya’s History 1895-1995. Maseno University: Institute of Research and Postgraduate Studies.
16 Mwaruvie John op.cit, pg 177
17 S Kiwanuka From Colonialism to Independence: Reappraisal of Colonial Policies and African Reactions 1870- 1960 (1973) 20.
18 As above, 21.
19 As above, 21.
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23.

He and four other leaders died in exile.20 The same fate befell the Ogaden Somali in 1889,
when they too attempted to resist British rule. Their opposition to British colonialism
forced the British to resort to more violent methods. Convinced that the best ‘tutors’ to
make the Ogaden see reason were bayonets and machine guns, the British in Kenya
moved against the Ogaden with the help of Indian regiments in 1889. Ogaden resisters
were smashed and hundreds of their cattle confiscated by the British.21 Similarly, while
forcing the Taita to submission, Captain Robert H. Nelson remarked:
In a few minutes the men cleared out, leaving some fifteen dead on the spot and I have
no doubt that a good many received fatal wounds. I then marched on to the village of
the men who had been fighting us, burning the surrounding villages and seizing the
sheep and goats belonging to them.22

24.

In the Mount Kenya region, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen also led many bloody
expeditions between 1902 and 1906, in which many Kikuyu and Tharaka people
were killed and about 11,000 head of stock captured.

25.

British soldiers, porters and other associates made more injustices in western
Kenya, particularly among the Kisii and the Luo people. When a message arrived
in 1905 of the Kisii revolt, a detachment of a hundred African Police under Robert
Foran and a company of the Third King’s African Rifles (KAR) under captain
Jenkins were immediately dispatched to quell it. This is how Foran described the
encounter:
The machine gun was kept in action so long during this sharp engagement that it
became almost red-hot to the touch. Before then … they left several hundreds dead
and wounded spearsmen heaped up outside the square of bayonets. This was not so
much a battle as a massacre, but wholly unavoidable under the circumstances. It was an
urgent case of decimating the determined attack or else being completely wiped out by
the Kisii warriors.23

26.

20
21
22
23
24

8

In 1908, the British organized another expedition, when the Kisii ambushed and
speared a colonial administrator, Northcote. One of the relief patrols headed by Foran
sent to Northcote’s aid explained that ‘… the African Rifles were putting in some
strenuous work – burning villages, devastating standing crops, capturing livestock
and hunting down the bolting warriors’24 A series of telegrams conveyed the results
of the expeditions to the colonial office in London. On 1 February 1908, a telegram
received by the colonial office read in part: ‘Result of operations in Kisii to 28 January Ochieng’ William A History of Kenya (1985) 90.
As above.
As above, 91.
For details see W Audrey Rural Rebels: A Study of Two Protest Movements in Kenya (1977) 25.
As above.
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cattle captured 5,636 sheep and goats 3,281 and 100 Kisii killed’. Two days later another
telegram reported the number of Kisii dead had risen to 160.25

Manipulations
27.

The British colonialists’ injustices against the people of Kenya were not only limited
to the 1895-1914 military expeditions. British administrators and functionaries
used manipulation, colonial laws and policies, and continued to use violence
and harassment to appropriate both human and natural resources from Kenya
throughout the colonial period.

28.

Manipulations were more evident in the signing of treaties involving British
administrators and African leaders to create frontiers for European settlers from
Britain, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. One such ‘treaty’ which
easily comes to mind was the first and the second Maasai Treaty of 1904 and 1911.
The first treaty, signed without the knowledge of the Maasai people, agreed to move
the Naivasha Maasai en masse to the Laikipia plateau, together with their cattle.
Such a move enabled white settlers to occupy the whole of the Rift, Zedong and
Gong. But even this grave injustice committed against the Maasai by the colonial
government did not satisfy the appetite of the white settlers for more productive
land. They pressed that the Laikipia Maasai should be moved again to a southern
reserve so that the Maasai tribe could be together in a United Maasai Reserve. On
4 April 1911, the second Maasai agreement was signed according to which the
northern Maasai had agreed to move to the southern reserve. Subsequently, the
new Maasailand was declared a closed area and the policy of reservation for the
new tribe continued throughout the colonial period. As such, attempts to further
alienate Maasai land during the post-colonial period engendered strong ethnic
feeling among the people.26

29.

It was not only the Maasai who suffered colonial manipulations, the same was
the case in the Kiambu-Thika area from 1903 to 1908, central Rift Valley 1904
to 1914, and lastly in the Kericho to Nyeri/Nanyuki areas through the soldier
settlement schemes following the First World War. This last scheme left the
Kipsigis without Kimulot, the Nandi without Kipkarren valley, the Sabaot without
the Trans-Nzoia pastures and made the Samburu, Meru and Kikuyu squatters in
the Timau-Nanyuki areas.27

25 As above.
26 For details, see O Bethwell ‘Boundary Changes and the Invention of Tribes’ in William Ochieng’ (ed) Kenya: The Making of a
Nation. A Hundred Years of Kenya’s History 1895-1995 (2000) 21; Ochieng’ William A History of Kenya (1985) 90.
27 Atieno-Odhiambo (n 3 above) 8.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

9

Volume IIA

Chapter ONE

Chiefs and forced labour
30.

British officials, with African submission to their authority after pacification, were
pressed by the reluctant metropolitan taxpayers to find means of making the
colonial territories self-financing. They achieved this through the creation of
the office of the chief as agents of local administration and tasked them with
the responsibility for tax collection, maintenance of law and order and more
importantly to supply cheap labour for public and settler requirements. It was
the assignment of these tasks which put the colonial chiefs at the forefront in the
abuse of human rights.

31.

During the mobilization of labour for Europeans, chiefs were empowered by a
series of labour laws to call out any number of able-bodied persons to labour
without pay on public works28. This mandate was extended at the outbreak of
World War 1 to finding able-bodied manpower for the First World War, a war that
caused the death of over 50,000 Africans and left thousands more wounded.
Astonishingly, most Africans who were recruited into the war had very limited
understanding of why the Europeans were fighting. In 1919 the Northey Circular
spelt out its extension to embrace the directive on African labourers to work for
settlers at very low wages. These aspects of chief authority were backed by force.
Chiefs had retainers who in the process of tax collection, punitively confiscated
peoples’ animals and produce, seized their women and routinely whipped the
young men.29 Such coercive chiefly authority, supervised and approved by the
district commissioners, brought in the intense hatred of the system, even in the
post-colonial period.

32.

In his 1936 report on Kenya’s finances, Sir Alan Pim identified two potential
opportunities for corruption - the counting of huts for hut tax, and the enforcement
of tax payment by chiefs. The hut counters responsible for determining tax liability
were, certainly not of a type likely to be exempt from the temptation to make a
little money; they used both influence and bribery to exempt some who were
required to pay and to extort taxes from those who were not. Additionally, due to
limited staffing at the district level, collection was largely enforced by employing
the services of the chiefs or headmen with their various satellites. This unavoidably
gave opportunities for the abuse of authority, either in the direction of using
improper means to enforce payment, or in connection with applications for
exemption.

28 Ochieng’ William A History of Kenya. Nairobi (1985) 16.
29 Atieno-Odhiambo (n 3 above) 8
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Land alienation
33.

After the First World War, the colonial administration was keen at increasing the
number of settlers, increasing settler land holding and boosting settler agriculture
by providing them with good infrastructural services. Needless to say, the land
alienated to the settlers was carved out of the most fertile regions, land which
was inhabited by the Africans. Therefore, the main injustice on Africans after
the First World War focused on land alienation and the creation of the African
squatters, both in Central and the Rift Valley regions of colonial Kenya.

34.

In enforcing this injustice, the colonial administration introduced the Crown
Lands Ordinance of 1915,30 which declared all ‘waste and unoccupied’ land in
the protectorate ‘Crown Land’ subject to the governor’s powers of alienation. In
the British imagination, such land included any empty land or any land vacated
by a native.31 The protectorate administration gave no cognizance to customary
tenure systems, and by 1914 nearly 5 million acres (2 million hectares) of land had
been taken away from Kenyan Africans, mostly from the Kikuyu, Maasai and Nandi
communities. It created the reserves for ‘natives’ and located them away from areas
scheduled for European settlement. These developments witnessed the creation
of what Mamdani refers to as ‘citizen’ (settlers) and ‘subject’ (Africans) – a dual
system of land tenure and land administration to consolidate colonial rule.32

35.

Colonial appropriation of land and alienation of a large section of the African people
produced a situation where by 1930, probably more than 15 000 Kiambu Kikuyu had
lost their land ownership, while a similar number lost their communal or ‘tenant at
will’ use of land. Thus, approximately 30,000 Kikuyu had lost land rights in Kiambu
district alone. About half that number lost land rights in Murang'a and Nyeri districts.
The total loss of land among the Kikuyu could therefore involve well over 45,000
people. Annual reports for the period indicate that there were 41,156 Africans in
European-settled areas of Nakuru and Naivasha and these would seem to support
our estimates, given that the majority of Africans in these areas were Kikuyu.33

36.

Other ‘troublesome communities’, like the Talai, were in 1934 forcibly evicted from
Kericho/Nandi areas on accusations of being extortionist and sent to open jails in
Lambwe, a tsetse-flies infected area in a valley where sleeping sickness was rampant.

30 S Wanjala Essays on Land Law: The Reform Debate in Kenya (2002).
31 Syagga Paul (undated) Public Land, Historical Land Injustices and the New Constitution. Society for International Development
(SID): Constitution Working Paper No. 9
32 M Mamdani Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of the Late Colonialism (1996).
33 Alila Patrick Kinyanjui Kabiru, and Wanjoyi Gatheru (Rural Landlessness in Kenya (1985) 2.
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It was described as the ‘Valley of Death’ where 30 years earlier, 60 percent of Lambwe
valley inhabitants had been killed by diseases.34
37.

By 1945, there were about 203,000 people rendered squatters and labourers in
European farms, with 101,000 Kikuyu as resident labourers on European farms and
about 21,000 more employed mainly in the government’s department of forestry. A
substantial number of Africans in the settled area were not enumerated in this labour
census and the total number of the Kikuyu in the alienated area must have been a
lot more than 150,000 by 1945. No wonder, three years later, in 1948, the number of
Kikuyu recorded as living outside their ‘native reserves’ was more than 294,000 or
nearly 29 percent of the total Kikuyu population. Some of them lived in towns or in
other African reserves, but nearly all of them had been effectively uprooted by the
process of alienation. They were outside their reserves in search of work and or new
land as a means of subsistence.35

38.

The creation of reserves in areas deemed unsuitable for European settlement had
far-reaching implications, both for the natives and the colonial administration.
Underlying them was a policy of exploitation and oppression against the
colonized people accentuated by land alienation, forced male labour mobilization,
overcrowding, insecurity, stagnation in African agricultural production, massive
landlessness and rapid land deterioration due to fragmentation, over-stocking
and soil erosion.

39.

In the long term, the problems in the reserves led to unrest and eventually to a
political uprising – the Mau Mau resistance movement that organized around
the issue of foreign rule, land alienation and political and economic inequality.36
The colonial state’s answer to the unrest was to initiate an ambitious project of
land tenure reform in the reserves that would serve as a bulwark against rural
radicalism. The colonial agronomist’s thought about the individualization of land
tenure was first contained in the less well-known JH Ingham Report published in
1950. However, the blueprint that was to destroy the indigenous/communal access
to land was formulated by Roger Swynnerton in what was to be known as the
1954 Swynnerton Plan. The architect of this plan argued persuasively in support of
individualization of tenure in Kenya as a pre-condition for enhanced agricultural
production37.

34
35
36
37
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D Anderson ‘Black Mischief: Crime, Protest and Resistance in Colonial Kenya’ (1993) 36 The Historical Journal 36, 851-877
For details see: A Patrick et al Rural Landlessness in Kenya (1985) 2.
S Okuro Land Reforms in Kenya: The Place of Land Tribunals in Kombewa” in Elisio Macamo ed. Negotiating Modernity (2005).
Studies have shown that those on whose names land was registered as principal landholders-men, assumed exclusive individual
rights in given pieces of land at the expense of women, widows and juniors whose rights to land remained either secondary or
usufruct.
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Mau Mau War
40.

The Mau Mau war, from 1952 to 1955, marked the climax of African resistance to
British colonial rule in Kenya. It was a key event in Kenya’s history. Recent studies
by Caroline Elkins, David Anderson and Charles Hornsby have demonstrated the
extent of British atrocities hitherto undocumented in Kenyan History.

41.

In contrast to the conventional notion that the counter-insurgency was aimed
at the Mau Mau militants, Elkins recognizes that the British interned practically
the entire Kikuyu population as Mau Mau. Key to this was turning the insurgency
inward, into a battle of Kikuyu militants against Kikuyu loyalists, thereby turning
Mau Mau insurgency into civil war. The turning point came on the night of 26
March 1953, at Lari, which was the site of two successive massacres, the first by
the Mau Mau and the second by homeguards. During this massacre, Anderson
describes how the Mau Mau militants herded Kikuyu men, women and children
into huts and set them on fire, hacking down with pangas anyone who attempted
escape, before throwing them back into the burning huts. The vast majority of the
400 killed at Lari were women and children.

42.

But even more importantly, the Mau Mau started to target, less and less the settlers
on the highlands or even less the colonial power itself, but increasingly those they
perceived as local beneficiaries of colonial power, turning neighbours and relatives
against each other in a rapidly brutalizing civil war. This was not the only massacre;
the colonial administration also committed a similar massacre in Hola in 1959 in
which 11 detainees were clubbed to death, with 77 having permanent injuries.38
The submissions of Michael Gerard Sullivan, the colonial officer in-charge of Hola
camp to the commission investigating the death of the detainees revealed the firm
instructions from Compell, the deputy commissioner of prisons, to torture the Mau
Mau detainees by denying them drinking water for a number of hours, weeding
rice fields with bare hands and use of batons on the non-cooperative ones.39

43.

Elkins has indeed demonstrated the injustices meted on the Mau Mau by the colonial
police and the loyalist. For example she argues that electric shock was widely used, as
well as cigarettes and fire. Bottles (often broken), gun barrels, knives, snakes, vermin,
and hot eggs were thrust up men's rectums and women's vaginas. The screening
teams whipped, shot, burned and mutilated Mau Mau suspects, ostensibly to gather
intelligence for military operations and as court evidence.

38 M Wunyabari Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt (1993).
39 KNA, Documents related to the death of 11 detainees at Hola camp in Kenya. Reference No. K967.62
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44.

Between 150,000 and 320,000 Africans were detained for varying lengths of time
in more than 50 detention and work camps. The treatment in the camps, staffed
by little trained non-Kikuyu, loyalists and European settlers, was often brutal. The
information about what was happening there was carefully controlled and the
colonial office and the governor systematically denied reports of mistreatment.
Elkins’ extended descriptions of the regime of torture, one is struck by its
predominantly sexual nature. Male detainees were often sexually abused ‘through
sodomy with foreign objects, animals, and insects, cavity searches, the imposition
of a filthy toilet bucket-system, or forced penetrative sex’. Women had ‘various
foreign objects thrust into their vaginas, and their breasts squeezed and mutilated
with pliers.’ Variations abounded, with sand, pepper, banana leaves, flower bottles
(often broken), gun barrels, knives, snakes, vermin, and hot eggs being thrust up
men’s rectum and women’s vaginas. A common practice during interrogation was
to squeeze testicles with pliers. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki (popularly known as J.M
Kariuki) was detained in 14 detention camps between 1953 and 1960. In his book
‘Mau Mau Detainee’, he wrote that his experience at Kwa Nyangwethu detention
camp was the worst:
Kwa Nyangwethu was, however, particularly bad and was notorious not for mere
beatings, but for castration. I have seen with my own eyes that Kongo Chuma whom
I first met in Nakuru before he was detained and who is now living at Kianga in
Embu district, has been castrated. He had not been like this when he was in Nakuru
but when we met in the detention camp at Athi River he told me it has been done to
him by the screeners at Kwa Nyangwethu. He also told me that bottles of soda water
were opened and pushed into the uterus of some women to make them confess.
Kongo said these things were done by the Africans but the European officers knew
what was going on.40

45.

The Mau Mau fighters were also responsible for unspeakable atrocities. Contrary to
African customs and values, they assaulted old people, women and children. The
horrors they practiced included decapitation and general mutilation of civilians,
torture before murder, bodies bound up in sacks and dropped in wells, burning
victims alive, gouging out of eyes and splitting open the stomachs of pregnant
women41. Mau Mau officially ended with the capture and execution of Dedan
Kimathi, the uprising’s most senior leader in October 1956. While the figures are
debatable, the Mau Mau are said to have caused the death of at least 14,000
Africans, 29 Asians and 95 Europeans.

40 JM Mwangi Mau Mau Detainee (2009) 30.
41 O Bethwell Alan ‘BRITAIN'S GULAG Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. By
DAVID ANDERSON. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005. Pp. viii+406 (ISBN 0-297-84719-8). Britain's Gulag:
The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya. By CAROLINE ELKINS (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005). Pp. xiv+475". The
Journal of African History (Cambridge University Press) 46: 493–505.
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There were also extra-judicial executions by the colonial
police and homeguard units. Moreover, the beating and
torture of Kikuyu suspects was commonplace, and the security
forces murdered hundreds.

46.

To establish the root causes of Mau Mau, the colonial administration appointed
the Corfield Tribunal, which relied extensively on psychologist JC Carothers
and in their report recorded 11,503 Mau Mau dead. It was understandable that
the number was under-estimated to disguise the ferocity of the colonial office
response to Mau Mau. A thousand were hanged upon being convicted by courts,
while more were killed by troops in the forest. There were also extra-judicial
executions by the colonial police and homeguard units. Moreover, the beating
and torture of Kikuyu suspects was commonplace, and the security forces
murdered hundreds. The Mau Mau war did not only mark the end of the African
resistance against colonial rule, but it was the climax of colonial atrocities on
Africans suspected to be members of Mau Mau.

47.

In 1999, a few former fighters calling themselves the Mau Mau Original Group
announced that they would attempt a £5 billion claim against the UK, on behalf
of hundreds of thousands of Kenyans for ill-treatment they said they suffered
during the rebellion. In November 2002, the Mau Mau Trust - a welfare group
for former members of the movement - announced it would attempt to sue the
British government for widespread human rights violations committed against
its members. With the assistance of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, in
2011, the Mau Mau group succeeded in suing the British after a British court
ruled that the Kenyans could sue the British government for their torture.

48.

After the Mau Mau War, the colonial government not only relaxed the ban on
the formation of African political parties, but also attempted to increase African
representation in the colonial administration. The colonial administration
permitted the re-establishment of African district- based political parties and/
or associations and disallowed national organizations. The first to be registered
was the Nairobi District African Congress in April 1956, with Mau Mau lawyer
Argwings Kodhek as the president. The other district-based associations that
emerged at this time were the Mombasa African Democratic Union, the African
District Association, the Abagusii Association of South Nyanza District, the South
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Nyanza District African Political Association, the Taita African Democratic Union,
the Nakuru African Progressive Party, the Nakuru District Congress, the Abaluhya
Peoples Association and the Nyanza North African Congress42.
49.

One of the legacies of these district-based political associations was that the pace
of political developments among the various districts continued to be uneven
and parochialism rooted in ethnic loyalties was encouraged at the expense of
African unity.43 It provided the foundation of alignment of political orientation and
ethnicity. The other effect was the emergence of local powerful figures that would
resist attempts at political centralization by colony wide political organization such
as the Kenya African National Union (KANU).

50.

The process of increasing African and other races’ representation into the colonial
administration was initiated by the British Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttleton
in 1954. In his advice to the administration, he said ‘it is prudent to have all the
inhabitants of the colony to share in the responsibility of government, albeit at a
subservient level’. His advice resulted in the enactment of the Lyttleton Constitution
in 1954, which put in place institutional structures to curb anti-colonial revolts,
establish a multi-racial society and provide a timetable for independence. But
in reality it asserted minority interests while the language of democracy was
employed to hoodwink the majority.44 The War Council created by the constitution
was racially exclusive and emerged as the supreme organ with powers to enact
legislation to deal with the Emergency without reference to the legislative council.
Even the Council of Ministers was by and large in the hands of a handful of settlers.
The contradictions emanating from the dispensation of the Lyttleton Constitution
culminated in protracted political struggle in which Africans, Arabs and Asians
demanded an all-inclusive political process. The political crises after the 1957
general election witnessed the enactment of another constitution, the Lennnox
Boyd Constitution in 1956.

51.

While the Lennox Boyd Constitution increased the number of African representatives
in the Legislative Council, it did not adequately address the Africans’ grievances.
However, it sharpened divisive racial and ethnic political interests that spilled over into
the 1960 Lancaster House Constitutional Conference where a new constitution was
negotiated. Therefore the Lancaster House conferences became a space for contest
by various racial groups and emerging political elites and commitment to democratic
and social change remained abstract.45

42
43
44
45
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Ogot Bethwell and Ochieng William (eds) Decolonization and Independence in Kenya (1995) 52.
As above.
For details see: Samwel Alfayo Nyanchoga et al Constitutionalism and Democratisation in Kenya, 1945- 2007 (2008).
As above.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter ONE

President Jomo Kenyatta’s Era
52.

On 12 December 1963, Kenya got independence from British rule with Jomo
Kenyatta as the Prime Minister. A year later, Kenya became a Republic with Jomo
Kenyatta as the President and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga as the Vice President.
Within a short period into independence, gradually returned to the ways of the
colonial master. The government and the ruling political party, Kenya African
National Union (KANU), not only retained repressive colonial laws, but also became
increasingly intolerant of political dissent and opposition. Political assassinations
and arbitrary detentions were turned into potent tools for silencing dissenting
voices and ultimately for dismantling opposition political parties. For the larger
part of Kenyatta’s reign Kenya was a de facto one-party state.

Official amnesia
53.

The attainment of Kenya’s political independence on the 12 December 1963, with
Jomo Kenyatta as the first Prime Minister, marked the culmination of 68 years of
anti-colonial struggles waged by Kenyan Africans to free themselves from British
domination, oppression and exploitation. However, in his independence speech,
Jomo Kenyatta did not suggest any substantial change in the colonial structures.
The colonial state would remain intact – despite the fact that the fight for national
independence had been dominated by demands for social justice, egalitarian
reforms, participatory democracy, prosecution of those who had committed
mass killings and other forms of crimes during the war of independence, and
the abolition of the colonial state and its oppressive institutions.

54.

Also, in his independence speech, Jomo Kenyatta never mentioned the
heroism of the Mau Mau movement.46 No Mau Mau freedom songs were
sung, no KLFA leaders was allowed to speak during the historic day. Instead,
Kenyatta asked the people to forget the past – to forgive and forget the
atrocities committed against them by the British and their Kenyan supporters
during the war of independence47. He became no radical on nationalization
of foreign-held assets including land and often remarked: “I regard titles as a
private property and they must be respected … I would not like to feel that
my shamba (smallholding) or house belongs to the government. Titles must
be respected and the right of the individual safeguarded48”. In this way, the
Kenyatta administration provided a relief to the settler community that their
land will not be taken away from them without compensation.

46

The usage of KLFA to refer to Mau Mau is rather problematic in literature. KLFA is not simply another name for Mau Mau: it was the
name that Dedan Kimathi used for a coordinating body which he tried to set up for Mau Mau. It was also the name of another militant
group that sprang up briefly in the spring of 1960; the group was broken up during a brief operation from 26 March to 30 April
47 Maina wa Kinyatti (2008:363) History of Resistance in Kenya, 1884-2002 (2008) 63.
48 For details see Daniel Branch Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011 (2011)
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55.

The attainment of political independence shadowed several tensions and
cleavages which occupied the new ruling elites prior to and immediately after
independence.49 For example, the radicals represented by Oginga Odinga and
Bildad Kaggia who favoured nationalization of foreign owned corporations,
seizing of white settler farms without compensation and following more proEastern foreign policy. Odinga persuasively argued that “I understand that
in communist countries the emphasis was on food for all. If that was what
communism meant then there was nothing wrong with that50”. He as his
supporters opted to look to Soviet Union, China and their allies for backing.
On the other hand, conservatives led by Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya - the
nationalists who espoused a constitutionalist and reformist approach and
were after independence concerned with the maintenance of the colonial
legacy. As the struggle raged for control of the state, decisions based on shortterm expediency were interspersed with fundamental directional choices.

56.

Kenya soon returned to a command and control leadership model strikingly
similar to that of the colonial era. Decisions about development, money and
military protection drove foreign relations, domestic policy and land policy,
which in turn drove greater centralization and a conservative social and
political model that combined individual accumulation with a partisan and
interventionist state.51 The struggle for power saw the abandonment of the
Majimbo Constitution, which conceded much autonomy to the regions for a de
facto one party state. The dissolution of the Kenya African Democratic Union
(KADU) was a critical moment, setting the stage for three decades of singleparty dictatorship and prioritisation of the maintenance of public order by the
Kenyatta administration.

Dealing with Mau Mau
57.

Jomo Kenyatta took over power in a country which was already polarized by
the Mau Mau issue over land and more importantly “ownership of the fight for
independence”. The reason for this was the expectation that those who fought
for Uhuru (independence) should exclusively eat the fruits of independence52.
This debate thrived even in the context of the revelations that Kenya had many
powerful voices in the anti-colonial movement. Indeed Bethwell Ogot has
demonstrated the roles and responsibilities of all the communities in Kenya, in
anti-colonial movements53. Therefore the first issue which Jomo Kenyatta had
to deal with was the Mau Mau – a movement whose main agenda revolved

49
50
51
52

For details see: Hornsby Charles Kenya: A History Since Independence (2012)
For details see Branch (n 48 above) 36. 2011
As above.
E Atieno Odhiambo ‘Matunda Ya Uhuru, Fruits of Independence: Seven Theses on Nationalism in Kenya’ in E Atieno Odhiambo
and John Lonsdale (eds) Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration (2003).
53 O Bethwell ‘Mau Mau and Nationhood: Untold Story’ in ES Odhiambo and J Lonsdale (eds) Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms,
Authority and Narration (2003).
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around land and the colonial land alienation among the Kikuyu, which had
created a special group of Kikuyu without land54. Before independence,
Kenyatta had pardoned the remaining Mau Mau detainees in prison and
issued an amnesty for Mau Mau fighters to leave the forest and surrender their
weapons. More than 2,000 did so in the first weeks after independence far more
than the British had expected55. But after the amnesty for Mau Mau expired in
January 1964, the government started treating the remnants as criminals.
58.

By early 1965, most of the remaining Mau Mau hard-core fighters had been
captured and killed by the new independent government. The Mau Mau who
made good their threat to return to the forest under the slogan of ‘Not yet
Uhuru,’ Baimungi, were quickly executed. Kenyatta’s message in the 1960s
was clear - there would be nothing for free. In the 1970s, it was politically
imprudent to be called Mau Mau. Although on paper, Kenya acknowledged the
role Mau Mau had played in the struggle for independence; his government
persistently downgraded its importance and did nothing to reward the those
who had suffered. Despite President Kenyatta’s promise in 1964 that the land
confiscated during the Emergency would be returned, nothing happened.

59.

The British removed and hid most records of the war on the eve of independence to
protect loyalists from reprisals and themselves from demands for compensation
for atrocities. Ex-Mau Mau were given no preferential treatment in access to land
and jobs.56

60.

The ex-Mau Mau fighters were thus short-changed after independence. Even
when the settlement schemes were initiated between 1963 and 1967, the
Maasai who suffered the most got nothing and the Kalenjin received small areas
around Sotik and Nandi. The squatters were not any better in their continued
demand for cultivatable land across the highlands. Those living in the former
White Highlands were evicted. In the majority of the settlement schemes in
Nakuru and Nyandarua, the existing squatters were simply removed by force,
with new claimants chosen to occupy the plots. The situation of the landless
did not improve with the sale of larger farms under the ‘willing buyer, willing
seller’ model. A decade after the implementation, one sixth of the settler lands
were found to have been sold intact to the emerging African elite comprising
Kenyatta, his wife, children and close associates. These elites did not even need
much money to buy settler farms, as they were also able to raise loans from
government bodies such as the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and
the Land and Agriculture Bank.57

54
55
56
57

M Patrick The Land Question and the Mau Mau today (2005) IFRA: Kenya Studies, IFRA ~ Les Cahiers, N° 28
The Times, 19th December 1963
Hornsby Charles (2012: 117) Kenya: A History Since Independence. London I. B. Tauris
As above.
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Shifta War
61.

After dealing with the Mau Mau issue, the next issue that the emergent
fragile state had to deal with was the Shifta War. Before independence, the
Somali had maintained a constant attack on police posts and army camps in
Somali-inhabited regions. Two days after independence, the Somalia staged
five more incursions, forcing the government to declare a state of emergency
on 25 December 1963. The government became convinced that Somalia was
training and providing bases for up to 2,000 shifta (bandit) guerrillas. While the
shifta used guerrilla tactics, including hit-and-run attacks and mining of roads,
the Kenya government adopted British counter-insurgency techniques used
during the Mau Mau uprising, including the establishment of collective villages
surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by troops. There were widespread
beatings and killings of civilians and mass confiscation of livestock. As with
the Kikuyu in 1953 to 1955, every Somali was seen as a potential shifta and
treated accordingly, although, there was no equivalent of the detention camp
pipeline, and the loyalists were not so well rewarded.

62.

The government used its ability to detain without trial anyone it believed
to be helping the shifta. No official death figures were published for the
conflict, which received little international attention. The conflict established
patterns of suspicion and hostility between ethnic Somali and other Kenyans
that has endured for decades. Development in the colonial era in North
Eastern where the Somali live had been non-existent and this changed little
after independence. The state treated the Kenyan Somali as subjects rather
than citizens and the region as a military-ruled colony.

Consolidation of power

20

63.

On 24 January 1964, there was a strike by several hundreds of soldiers of
the Kenya Rifles 11th Battalion, based in Lanet near Nakuru. The mutineers
were driven by disgruntlement over pay, working conditions, and fear of
their future under the KANU government which held on to British expatriate
officers. With increasing internal tensions and external threats, the Kenyatta
regime became even more repressive after the January 1964 mutiny. With no
reference to the cabinet, Kenyatta appealed for and received the support of
the British Army units to restore order without significant bloodshed.

64.

But to make an example to mutineers, 43 soldiers were court-martialed, and
the military court jailed 16 ring leaders for a total of 197 years. To consolidate
power, the Kenyatta regime supported constitutional amendments between
1964 and 1969 whose objective were to destroy democratic institutions while
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protecting the KANU-led government and the interests of the comprador
class.58

Selected constitutional amendments (1963-1969)
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 14 of 1965
This Amendment Act reduced the threshold for amending the Constitution from 90
percent to 65 percent in Senate and 75 percent to 65 percent in the National Assembly.
It also increased the days within which Parliament should approve a state of emergency
from 7 to 21 days. Importantly, it reduced the threshold for approval of state of
emergency from 65 percent to a simple majority
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 1966
The Amendment Act introduced the rule that a Member of Parliament would lose his
seat in Parliament if he missed 8 sittings or was imprisoned for a period of over six
months. This amendment was intended to deal with KANU ‘rebels’ and those who had
joined KPU. The amendment also increased the President’s powers to rule by decree in
North Eastern Province.
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No. 2) Act No. 17 of 1966 (Turn Coat Rule)
Under this Amendment Act, a Member of Parliament would by law lose his parliamentary
seat of he defected to another political party. The amendment was meant to deal with
Members of Parliament who had defected from KANU to KPU.
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No. 3) Act No. 18 of 1966
This Amendment Act increased the period for National Assembly’s review of emergency
orders from 2 to 8 months. It permitted greater and wider derogation powers of
fundamental rights and freedoms. It also removed the provision calling for reasonable
justification for such derogations. This amendment was intended to allow for detention
of KPU members who had defected from KANU.
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 13 of 1967
This Amendment Act was intended to clear doubt over section 42A which spelt out the
Turn Coat Rule. It backdated the effect of the Fifth Amendment to 1963.
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No. 2) Act No. 16 of 1968
Under this Amendment Act, independent candidates were barred from participating in
elections. The amendment also removed parliamentary approval for state of emergency
declaration.
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 5 of 1969
This amendment Act consolidated all the constitutional amendments as at February
1969 thereby resulting in a revised Constitution of Kenya in a single document which
was declared to be the authentic document.
58 For details see: Samwel Alfayo Nyanchoga et al (2008) Constitutionalism and Democratisation in Kenya, 1945- 2007. Catholic
University of Eastern Africa
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65.

The polarization of the country between the radicals and the conservatives
continued to remain a threat which Kenyatta had to handle. The first attempt
to deal with this situation was the development of Sessional Paper Number 10
of 1965, which was a mix of the socialist and capitalist models, rejecting both
Marxism and laissez-faire capitalism, and stressing African traditions, equity and
social justice. Kenyatta made it clear in his introduction to the paper that the
intent was not to stimulate discussions on Kenya’s economic policy, but to end
it. However, Oginga Odinga and his camp instructed Pio Gama Pinto to prepare
a competing paper to mobilize for the rejection of the government sessional
paper. But before Pinto could prepare the parallel paper, he was murdered on
24 February 1965 outside his home in Nairobi by people believed to have been
auxiliaries loyal to Kenyatta. The killing of Pinto marked the process of political
assassinations under the Kenyatta regime.

66.

The year 1966, marked the turning point in Kenya’s political history and
witnessed the introduction of the motion of confidence in the president by Tom
Mboya without the knowledge of Oginga Odinga, who was then the leader
of government business. The year also saw the holding of the KANU National
Delegates Conference in Limuru, which created a new position of eight new
provincial vice-presidents. These actions forced Odinga and his supporters to
pursue the constitutional opposition by forming a political party, the Kenya
Peoples Union (KPU). On 14 April 1966, Odinga resigned as vice-president and
together with his supporters joined KPU. In his resignation statement, Odinga
argued that he refused to be part of a government “ruled by underground
masters serving foreign interests”, and accused the Limuru Conference of being
rigged in favour of Kenyatta and his allies. The Kenyatta regime also passed the
Preservation of Public Security Act in 1966, which provided the state with wide
powers for detention without trial and allowed control of free movement, the
imposition of curfews and press censorship. The Act was used effectively from
1966 to 1968 in dealing with those perceived to be critical of the Kenyatta regime,
particularly in the jailing without trial of Odinga and KPU supporters.

67.

Next was the assassination of Tom Mboya on 5 July 1969 in the current Moi
Avenue.59 As with Pinto’s death, the apparent culprit was a petty crook with
connections to the intelligence service who was charged with the murder on 21
July the same year. Facing a revolt from the Luo and the growing support for
change among many Kenyans horrified by Mboya’s assassination, Kenyatta’s
closest allies reverted to their ethnic bailiwicks, through oathing to force Kikuyu
voters to return sitting members of parliament in the election.

68.

KPU MP Okelo-Odongo claimed that those being oathed were stripped naked,
tied with a rope around their neck and forced to swear to fight the Luo and not

59 Other prominent leaders and academicians who died in politically controversial circumstances included but were not limited to
Argwings Kodhek (1969) and Ronald Ngala (1972)
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to allow any other tribe to lead Kenya.60 The worst came on the 25 October
1969, when Kenyatta visited Kisumu to open the Russia-built Nyanza Provincial
General Hospital. The opening of this health facility coincided with the Kisumu
District sports day, with a huge number of students attending. Odinga was not
invited, but he and his supporters came in force shouting Dume (Bull, the party
symbol of KPU).
69.

In the ensuing commotion, a full-scale riot erupted, the presidential escort
and the dreaded crack paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU surrounded
the president, shot their way through the threatening crowd and continued
shooting 25 kilometres outside the town. When the dust settled, the ‘Kisumu
Massacre’ of 1969 was complete, with many shot dead, including school pupils,
by the presidential security. Virtually all the films of the incident was seized
and destroyed. Odinga and his supporters were arrested and detained without
trial and KPU, the party associated with Odinga was banned. A curfew was
imposed in Central Nyanza and Siaya and hundreds were arrested.

70.

Although KPU was banned and its leaders arrested, after 1969 Kenyatta’s
legitimacy and that of his government was still being questioned by leftwing politicians. Kenyatta himself became more intolerant of dissent and the
centralization of power around him encouraged sycophancy, exploitation
and the creation the so-labeled ’Kiambu Mafia‘ Josiah Mwangi Kariuki was
the government’s most influential critic between 1970 and 1974. ‘J.M’ Kariuki
catalysed the wishes of the poor, landless and those unhappy with the direction
that Kenya was taking. It was Kariuki who coined the phrase “we do not want …
a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million beggars”. He was also at the forefront
of the fight against corruption and the social policies of the government. As
assistant minister for tourism and wildlife, he was probably involved in revelations
about poaching and ivory smuggling.61

71.

Under a state orchestrated fear on 3 March 1975, Maasai herdsmen discovered
JM’s tortured and mutilated corpse on the slopes of Ngong Hills near Nairobi.
His fingers had been cut off and his eyes gouged out before he was shot. The
killers had burnt his face with acid to prevent identification of the body and his
fingerprints were gone. JM’s death also joined the long list of unresolved political
assassinations during the Kenyatta era. To respond to Kariuki’s murder and to
rebuild his authority, the Kenyatta regime continued arresting and jailing those
he labelled troublesome MPs such Jean Marie Seroney, Martin Shikuku, Chelagat
Mutai, Peter Kibisu, Mark Mwithaga and George Anyona on dubious grounds
even within the precincts of Parliament Buildings. As Kenyatta departed from
the political scene with his death in Mombasa in August 1978, he left a handful
of unaddressed issues including: corruption, tribalism, state orchestrated
repression, political assassinations, and land distribution policies.

60 Okelo- Odongo East Africa Standard 12 August 1969.
61 For details see Daniel Branch Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011 (2011)
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President Daniel Arap Moi’s Era
Following in Kenyatta’s footsteps
72.

Daniel arap Moi assumed the presidency after Kenyatta’s death in 1978.
On assuming power, President Moi promised that he would follow in Jomo
Kenyatta’s footsteps. In December 1978, President Moi released all the 26 political
detainees across the ethnic spectrum, most of whom had been languishing
in jail for years (Shikuku, Seroney, Anyona, Koigi wa Wamwere, and Ngugi wa
Thiong’o). He also reassured Kenyans that his administration would not condone
drunkenness, tribalism, corruption and smuggling – problems which were
already deeply entrenched in Kenya under President Kenyatta’s administration.
This was partly a strategy geared towards the achievement of specific objectives,
namely, the control of the state, the consolidation of power, the legitimisation
of his leadership and the broadening of his political base and popular support.62
President Moi was well aware of his own underlying problems, especially the fact
that he was from a minority community. Leading the country to independence
had brought President Kenyatta economic opportunities that had permitted
him to rule over a period of prosperity.63

73.

President Moi’s first priority was to secure his position and to weaken not only
his most vociferous Kikuyu opponents, but also those he perceived to be critics
of his regime. To achieve his objective, President Moi under the cover of an
anti-corruption crusade, systematically started replacing President Kenyatta’s
courtiers with his own to topple the Kikuyu ascendancy. Like his predecessor,
he also resorted used the law to consolidate his power.

74.

To bolster his grip on power, President Moi also embarked on the gradual
‘Kalenjinisation’ of the public and private sectors from the 1980s. President Moi is a
Tugen, one of the smaller Kalenjin ethnic groups. He began to "de-Kikuyunize" the
civil service and the state-owned enterprises previously dominated by the Kikuyu
ethnic group during President Kenyatta's administration. He appointed the Kalenjin
to key posts in, among others, the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC),
Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation
(KPTC), Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE), National Cereals
and Produce Board (NCPB), Nyayo Tea Zones (NTZ), Nyayo Bus Company (NBC),
Nyayo Tea Zones Development Corporation (NTZDC) and the Kenya Grain Growers
Cooperative Union (KGGCU).64 This process marked the rise of the Kalenjin elite,
who strategically positioned themselves to benefit from state resources.

62 Korwa G. Adar and Isaac M. Munyae ‘Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel arap Moi 1978-2001’ (2001) 5 African Studies
Quarterly 1.
63 Hornsby Charles Kenya: A History Since Independence (2012) 334.
64 Ibid
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Constitutional amendments
75.

President Moi’s government sponsored a series of constitutional amendments in a
bid to consolidate power in the presidency. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment)
Act No. 7 of 1982 introduced Section 2(A) which had the effect of transforming
the country into a de jure one-party state. Moreover, Parliament reinstated the
detention laws which had been suspended in 1978. The application of a number
of laws had the effect of denying citizens’ enjoyment of human rights. These laws
included the Chief's Authority Act, the Public Order Act, the Preservation of Public
Security Act, the Public Order Act, and the Penal Code. The parliamentary privilege,
which gave representatives the right to obtain information from the Office of the
President, was also revoked. Parliamentary supremacy became subordinated to
the presidency and the ruling KANU party.65

76.

Moreover, the provincial administration became highly politicized and provincial
administrators wielded wide discretionary powers. In 1981, President Moi banned
all ethnic-centred welfare associations. The president also outlawed the civil
servants union and the university academic staff union.

Selected Constitutional amendments, 1982 -1991
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No 7 of 1982
This Amendment Act introduced Section 2A that changed Kenya from a de facto to de
jure one party state. It also abolished the Turn Coat Rule.
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No 14 of 1986
This Amendment Act removed security of tenure of the Attorney General and Auditor
and Controller General
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No 20 of 1987
This Amendment Act made all capital offences non-bailable
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No 8 of 1988
This Amendment Act made it lawful to detain capital offenders for 14 days before they
could be formally charged in a court of law. It also removed the security of tenure of
constitutional office holders
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act 1990
This Amendment Act reinstated the security of tenure of constitutional office holders
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No 12 of 1991
This Amendment Act repealed Section 2A of the Constitution hence bringing an end
to the de jure one-party rule in Kenya. It also reintroduced the Turn Coat Rule. The
nomination procedure leading to elections of the National Assembly and Presidency
were amended to accommodate multi-party system of governance.
65 Weekly Review, Nairobi, 8 May 1987. See also, Ogot, B. A., "Politics of Populism", pp. 187-213, in Ogot and Ochieng,
op. cit., 187-213.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

25

Volume IIA

Chapter ONE

Attempted Coup and the aftermath
77.

On 1 August 1982 there was a military coup attempt by Kenya Air Force (KAF)
officers. The attempted coup was however brutally quashed by Kenya Army officers
who were loyal to President Moi. It was put down at an estimated cost of 600 to
1,800 lives lost in addition to other human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests,
detention and torture. The coup attempt and the punitive reaction accelerated the
process of the control of the state and solidified President Moi's authoritarian rule.
In 1986, Parliament amended the Constitution to remove the security of tenure of
the Attorney General and of the Auditor and Controller Genera. This was followed
in 1988 by another constitutional amendment that removed security of tenure of
constitutional office holders. The amendment also made it lawful to detain capital
offenders for 14 days before they could be formally charged in a court of law
Limitations on the independence of the judiciary, with far-reaching human rights
violations. By this time, Parliament was functioning largely as a rubber stamp of
policies initiated by the presidency.66

78.

Following the attempted coup, the government resorted to even more vicious and
repressive ways of dealing with dissent. Political activists and individuals who dared
oppose President Moi’s rule were routinely detained and tortured. This led to the
formation of dissident groups whose main focus was to agitate for opening up of the
democratic space, social justice and respect for human rights. The best known of the
dissidents groups is Mwakenya movement. The government moved to quash this
movement with brutal force. In 1986 alone, 100 people were arrested and detained
for their alleged association with Mwakenya. Moreover, between March 1986 and
March 1987, at least 75 journalists, academics, and university students were jailed for
crimes such as the possession of seditious literature. In the 1990s, the government
used the same tactics to denounce and quash the February Eighteenth Movement
(FEM), which was accused of planning attacks on Kenya to be launched from Uganda.

Multi-party and ethnic clashes
79.

But as government’s crackdown of pro-democracy activists intensified so did the
pressure on government increased. In 1991, in response to local and international
pressure prompted by the end of the Cold War, President Moi yielded to demands
for a multi-party state. However, political and ethnic violence, reportedly
orchestrated by the state became integral to multi-party elections held in 1992 and
1997. Ethnicity was used as a political tool for accessing power and state resources
and for fuelling violence.

66 Korwa G. Adar and Isaac M. Munyae ‘Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel arap Moi 1978-2001 (2001) 5 African Studies
Quarterly 1.
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80.

From various independent human rights reports, the 1992 and 1997/1998
ethnic clashes in the Coast, Rift Valley, and Western Provinces were deliberately
inflamed for political purposes by members of the government. Violence spread
in the Likoni-Kwale (Coast Province) prior to and after the 1997 elections, in areas
where opposition to KANU was strong. These clashes led to the displacement of
many people from their lands in the Rift Valley. Reports by the KHRC indicates
that the 1991 to 1997 election-related clashes displaced more than 600,000
people in the Coast, Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western provinces.67

81.

The displacements, which were occasioned by the ethnic clashes in the Rift
Valley has been used to explain the emergence of Mungiki in Kenya.68 Most of the
Mungiki members, are victims of land clashes in the Rift Valley region who were
affected by ethnic conflicts on the eve of the 1992 multi-party General Election
in Kenya, the majority of whom are either Standard Eight or Form Four school
dropouts composed mainly of low-income earners in the Jua Kali (hot sun) sector.
However, in the rest of the country, the ethnic clashes and the use of private
militias witnessed the rise of the so-called “armies of the elders” known at least
to be backed by an ethnic leader. For example, during the multi-party era there
were the Taliban, Jeshi la Mzee, Jeshi la Embakasi, Baghdad Boys, Sungu Sungu,
Amachuma, Chinkororo, Dallas Muslim Youth, Runyenyes Football Club, Jeshi la
King’ole, Kaya Bombo Youth, Sakina Youth, Kuzacha, Kamjesh, Charo Shutu, Sri
Lanka and the Banyamulenge.69

Chapter ONE

President Mwai Kibaki’s Era
Goodwill
82.

On 30 December 2002, Kibaki was inaugurated as Kenya’s third President.
Presidents Kibaki’s NARC government had huge goodwill, both domestically and
internationally. NARC had to come to power on a platform that promised to curb
and ultimately eliminate the political transgressions and human rights violations
that had been regularised during the 39 years of KANU’s rule. NARC had also
pledged to address and rectify historical injustices. The first few months of its
operations the NARC Government initiated numerous legislative and institutional
reforms and a range of activities aimed at redressing past injustices.

67 Kenya Human Rights Commission Justice Delayed: A Status Report on Historical Injustices in Kenya (2011).
68 Grace N Wamue ‘Revisiting Our Indigenous Shrines Through Mungiki” (2001) 100 Africa Affairs (2001) 454.
69 Okuro Samwel “Thinking Through the Chequered History of Mungiki in Kenya. A Historiographical interrogation” (2006) Journal of
Historical Association of Kenya
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Sliding back to old practices
83.

However, before long, President Kibaki’s government started to renege on its
promises.70 The emerging “Mount Kenya Mafia” behaved as its predecessor had done:
corrupt, intolerant and ethnically chauvinistic. As put across by Daniel Branch, “behind
the scenes, the newly-appointed ministers and their supporters had quickly eased
themselves into positions at the top of corruption networks’ and that ‘the apparent
hypocrisy of the government, whose ministers continued to attack Moi’s regime for
its corruption, angered many in KANU”. These corruption networks crystallized into
what became known as the ’Anglo-Leasing Scandal‘. As was the case with President
Moi, the new Kibaki administration soon began to ‘Kikuyunise’ the public service.
In essence, despite NARC’s many promises, the new government soon adopted the
practices of its predecessors, and while the economy improved, it unable to reduce
corruption and human rights abuses.

84.

Moreover, during the first term of President Kibaki’s administration, insecurity
remained high, particularly between 2005 and 2008. In January 2005, more than
50 Kenyans lost their lives in various clashes between communities over grazing,
access to water and cattle raiding. In July the same year, Boran cattle raiders attacked
Gabbra village in Turbi, in which over 50 people were killed (many of them children)
at Turbi primary school.71

2005 Constitutional Referendum
85.

The state of insecurity worsened as the country prepared for the 2005 constitutional
referendum. The constitutional referendum seems to have shattered the dreams
of key players in the NARC coalition. At the Bomas constitutional conference
there were two contentious issues on which the coalition partners sharply
disagreed on - the powers of the president and devolution. In return to Raila
Odinga’s endorsement of Kibaki as the NARC presidential candidate in 2002, he
was promised the position of the prime minister. The coalition collapsed when
the Kibaki side of the coalition reneged on the coalition’s two key pillars.

86.

And when the resultant constitution (with clauses promising devolution and
dilution of presidential powers removed) was put on the referendum in November
2005, it was overwhelmingly defeated. The main architect of the crusade against the
watered down constitution Raila Odinga and his supporters joined with some KANU
leaders and other dissatisfied members of the government and campaigned for a
‘No’ vote. The ‘No’ campaign was triumphant, claiming 57 percent of the vote.

70 See Chapter One of Volume 1 of this Report.
71 For details see Daniel Branch Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011 (2011).
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87.

After the defeat in 2005 constitutional referendum, the Kibaki administration did
not only consolidate his faction’s grasp of power, but also became increasingly
intolerant to opposition. In the early hours of 2 March, a team of armed men
stormed The Standard newspaper offices in central Nairobi, right in the middle
of the central business district. At the same time, another armed group stormed
the newspaper’s printing plant and destroyed copies of that day’s edition, which
were awaiting collection and distribution. As the country approached the 2007
General Election, Kibaki consolidated power in the hands of trusted Kikuyu,
Embu and Meru allies. However, more importantly was the powerful message
which those who surrounded the president shared. In the words of Daniel Branch
‘each had bitter memories of the 1980s and 1990s, when it seemed as though
Kikuyu influence was restricted and the opportunities for wealth limited as a
result. Kibaki supporters were not willing to repeat the experience.72

88.

More disturbing under the Kibaki administration were the rampant extra-judicial
killings targeting Mungiki youths in Central Kenya and parts of Nairobi. In November
2007, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) published a
report on extra-judicial killings. The report concluded that the police could be
complicit in the killing of an estimated 500 individuals suspected to be members
of the outlawed Mungiki sect.73 Thus, the general elections of 27 December 2007
were conducted in a volatile environment in which violence had been normalised
and ethnic relations had become poisoned.

Chapter ONE

2007 General Elections
89.

Kenyan voters went to polls on 27 December 2007. Before the polling, opinion
polls had indicated that Raila’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) had a
considerable lead over Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU). Voting went on
relatively smoothly and peacefully. However, this mood changed as people
moved from polling to vote counting. Delays in announcing presidential results
caused not only frustration, but also suspicion among citizens particularly in
ODM-dominated regions. In the end, Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner with
about 200,000 votes. Immediately after this declaration, violence erupted in
ODM-dominated regions. When a mediation process finally brought the violence
to an end,74 more than 1,300 lives had been lost, thousands were maimed, more
than 300,000 Kenyans were internally displaced and property worth billions of
shillings destroyed.

72 For details see Daniel Branch (2011: 265) Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. London: Yale University Press.
73 KNCHR The cry of blood: Report on extra-judicial killings and disappearances (2008).
74 See Chapter One in Volume 1 of this Report.
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Appendix
Selected major events in Kenya
1963

Kenya gains independence with Kenyatta as Prime Minister

1964

Republic of Kenya formed with Jomo Kenyatta as President and Oginga Odinga
as Vice President
KADU dissolves and joins KANU

1964 - 967

Shifta War

1965

Assassination of Pio Gama Pinto

1966

KANU’s Limuru Conference which proposed eight vice presidents
Oginga Odinga resigns from KANU and forms rival Kenya People’s Union (KPU)

1969

Tom Mboya assassinated, (Assassination sparks ethnic unrest)
Kisumu Massacre
KPU banned and Oginga Odinga arrested. Kenya thereby became a de facto
one-party state under KANU.

1975

Assassination of Josiah Mwangi Kariuki

1975 – 1979

Change the Constitution Movement (seeking to bar Vice President, Daniel Arap
Moi from ascending to power in the event of President Jomo Kenyatta’s death)

1978

President Jomo Kenyatta dies
Daniel Arap Moi becomes the President and releases political prisoners

1980

Bulla Karatasi Massacre

1982

Kenya becomes a de jure single party state
Attempted coup

1984

Wagalla Massacre
Lotirir Massacre

1986-1989

Mwakenya arrests, torture, detention and trials

1986

Constitution amendment meant to remove the security ot tenure of the
Attorney General and Auditor and Controller General

1988

KANU nominations by ‘mlolongo’ (queuing) System

1989

Political prisoners freed
Rubia, Matiba and others expelled from KANU
Muoroto Riots
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Detention of Charles Rubia, Kenneth Matiba and Raila Odinga
Assassination of Robert Ouko
Sabasaba Riots

1991

Section 2A repealed paving way for multi-party political system
Further Sabasaba Riots
Release of political prisoners
Formation of various political parties
Multiparty General Elections
Ethnic/Tribal Clashes
Crackdown on FERA
Ethnic clashes

1997

General elections
Ethnic clashes
IPPG reform package

2001

Murukutwa Massacre

2002

General Elections, NARC dislodges KANU from power

2005

Referendum on the proposed Constitution (Rejected by 57% of Kenyans)
President Mwai Kibaki dissolves Cabinet and forms Government of National
Unity incorporating members of KANU into his new Cabinet
Turbi Massacre

2006

SLDF atrocities in Mt. Elgon
Extra-judicial killings by police of Mungiki suspects

2007

General Elections President Mwai Kibaki is declared elected President
Dispute over the Presidential Results sparks Post Election Violence

2008

Kenya Dialogue and Reconciliation Process
National Accord is adopted forming the basis for formation of Grand Coalition
Government with Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister

2009

Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission is formed

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

31

Volume IIIA
 Chapter ONE

32

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

CHAPTER

TWO

History of Security Agencies:
Focus on Colonial Roots of the
Police and Military Forces
The soldiers killed our men and raped our girls but there was no one to
complain to. When you complained […] they told us that the soldiers
are the law themselves and if they kill you, you have no one to talk to.1

While he was doing that, crying on top of the roof, the neighbours heard
a bullet shot. That gun shot hit my son in the left leg, disabling him and
he fell from the roof. But he was still pleading with the police saying:
“Please, do not kill me.” Instead, the police went ahead and shot him
right in the pelvis. By that time, the police vehicle had also arrived and
they carried the young man to the hospital while he was still speaking. I
am told he was still asking them; “why have you killed me?’’ When they
reached the hospital, he was pronounced dead.2

Introduction
1.

1
2

As institutions, the police and the military forces are at the centre of Kenya’s
history of gross violations of human rights. Across the country, the Commission
heard horror accounts of atrocities committed against innocent citizens by the
police and the military. The history of security operations conducted by these
TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Mandera/26 April 2011/p.4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Busia/1 July 2011/p. 29.
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two institutions, either jointly or severally, is dominated by tales of brutal use of
force, unlawful killings (sometimes in large scale), rape and sexual violence, and
burning and looting of property. In security operations, the police and the military
have known no other means of achieving their goals but through collective
punishment; the indiscriminate rounding of individuals in a specific area, then
brutally punishing them with the hope that this would yield the desired results.
Thus, since independence, the police and the military in Kenya have been viewed
and invariably described as rogue institutions; they are still feared and seen as
perennial violators of human rights rather than protectors of the same.
2.

This Chapter traces the colonial roots of these two institutions with a view to
unearthing the origins of the post-independence mentalities and practices of Kenyan
security agencies. The Chapter explores the colonial organisational arrangements,
structures and attitudes that have influenced and shaped the behaviour of the
Kenyan police and military forces in the post-independence period.

The Police
Policing in Colonial Africa
3.

3

34

In details, specifics and personalities, the history of policing in Kenya has of course
been shaped by features unique to Kenyan history. In its telling of the story of
the police in Kenya, however, the Commission came to understand that Kenya’s
experiences can also be placed within a much larger paradigm: policing in British
colonial Africa. For all its peculiarities, Kenya belongs to an established and broad
approach to the maintenance of law and order in British colonial Africa. Similarities
can also be found in other parts of the Commonwealth (particularly India) but it is
within Africa that the resemblances are most striking. Notwithstanding an almost
century long tradition of policing in Anglophone Africa, historians and others have
been slow to provide the kinds of analyses that would shed light on overall trends
and patterns. Incidentally, the same lack of pace is also found in Kenya studies.
One explanation given for this reticence has been the focus of academic energies
on issues such as the creation of a civil service, taxation, labour, agriculture and
other visible examples of what have been described as “government in action”.3
The other more sinister explanation is that the coercive, forceful and frequently
violent nature of policing in colonial Africa has resisted analysis and has instead
simple listing and describing manifestations of such violence and coercion.
Richard Waller, ‘Towards a contextualisation of policing in colonial Kenya’ Journal of Eastern African Studies 4 2010, 526.
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The Commission benefitted from a number of attempts over the past decade to
shed light on the inner workings of the police. Because of the emptiness of the
field, these attempts have had to start with very basic definitions. The most basic
of these definitions explains who the police are in an African context:
National police forces are the formal conduit through which regime power or authority
is normally channelled. The rationale of the police remains maintaining the order that
the regime sustaining them defines as appropriate.4

5.

Additional definitions have sketched out the primary functions of African policing
as ‘the maintenance of law and order, paramilitary operations, regulatory activities
and regime representation.’5 Finally, some scholars believe that African experiences
also require an preliminary understanding of a ‘police system’. This is a much more
nebulous concept that attempts to explain the overall meshing together of key
individuals and personalities with more formal policing structures and functions:
The police sector…forms a system [defined] as an organization made up of groups and
individuals existing for a specific purpose, employing systems of relatively structured
activity with a structured boundary and driven by actors pursuing their own goals
according to their own incentives and calculations. The complexity of the police sector
results from the interactions between the various parts of the system.6

6.

4
5
6

While these three definitions offer much needed simplicity and clarity, the
Commission remains acutely aware that the overall story of policing in Africa
is deeply rooted in some of the most complex and contested issues in the
continent’s history. For instance, the question of law and order in colonial period
presents a number of fundamental difficulties. It is clear that the arrival of the
British signalled the entrance of an entirely new legal system based on the
situation pertaining in England at the time. Initially, no provisions were made
whatsoever for pre-existing African notions of law, order, crime and punishment.
New authorities, new judicial personnel and new personnel in charged
populating this new English-based system of law and order. These included
judges, magistrates, administrative officers, clerks, messengers and, of course,
policemen. More often than not, all these people were drawn from Britain and
other parts of Commonwealth. In essence, the British introduced an entirely alien
legal system manned almost exclusively by either the British themselves or their
emissaries.

Alice Hill, Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization, 6.
Alice Hill, Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization, 8.
Alice Hill, Policing Africa and Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization, 11.
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7.

The arrival of a formal and codified legal system should not be confused with the
rule of law. If anything, the opposite applied. The primary preoccupation of the
legal system was not the rule of law but the maintenance of colonial authority
over frequently rebellious and recalcitrant Africans. And so it was that the laws
imposed in much of Africa were designed to underpin the colonial presence and
little else. Colonial rule went on to create many new crimes that were mostly crimes
against, as it were, the colonial edifice itself rather than serious transgressions.
Essential features of colonial law and policing became enforcing colonial rules
and punishing those who breached them as opposed, for instance, to curbing and
punishing disputes and crimes committed by one person against another. To make
matters even worse, this deeply skewed and biased edifice was manned by men
(and they were indeed almost always men) with very little professional training
or any local knowledge. The result was what has been described above as rough,
ready and violent. Numerically small, the colonial police and military maintained
their authority almost entirely through superior weaponry. Machine guns, modern
artillery gave them a clear edge in their encounters with African opponents.

8.

The crudeness of colonial law was a continent wide phenomenon. It is also clear that
the nature of colonial law also gave birth to equally crude forms of policing all over
Africa A lack of resources and man power meant that most colonial governments
in Africa could not translate ambitions into reality. In some territories, the British
presence was barely felt as colonial authorities governed indirectly through existing
traditional rulers. These traditional rulers became the conduit through which the
British governed many a far flung territory. A professionalised form of colonial
administration only began to emerge after the First World War. Prior to that, most
colonies were run on a shoestring budget overseen by a skeleton staff. The same
applied to the police, the military and other forces charged with the maintenance of
law and order; Africa was very thinly policed. Hubs of intense police activity coincided
with areas where the colonial government had an interest in protecting European
lives, property and economic interests and infrastructure. Most Anglophone colonies
therefore had police forces dedicated to precisely such duties; there were units
charged with the protection of British settlers and officials. Others were attached to
railways, waterways, mines and other sites of economic value.

9.

The policing of ‘native’ or African matters was limited to municipal police who
regulated and supervised the movement of Africans in towns and other urban
centres. Africans in rural areas were largely left in the hands of traditional authorities.
The two-tier system of policing is a recurrent theme in African history. Kenya was
not the only country characterized by clearly demarcated zones of concentrated
and negligent (if not non-existent) policing. Crime in African townships and in the
country side lay beyond the boundaries of colonial interest. The prevailing ideology
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argued that to the extent that it was possible, African communities needed to
police themselves. Africans themselves knew best what ailed their communities
and were best placed to address their own problems. Transgressions of law and
order only became problematic if they directly impinged on core colonial concerns
and, more seriously, on the security of the state itself. African crime went almost
entirely unchecked by British who lacked the local knowledge about it and the
means to prevent it. What few government police and soldiers only intervened in
the most extreme and pressing cases.
10.

Ultimately, however, this hands off and detached approach to the policing of local
African affairs would prove detrimental to the very security and integrity of the
colonial state that it was meant to promote. In many instances the traditional
authorities charged with the maintenance of law and order turned into predators
who in turn inspired African populations into civil unrest, disorder and even open
rebellion. There are numerous instances of chief and their agents who used their
positions to seize livestock, exploit labour and impose taxes all for their own
personal gain. Others ran protection rackets, created vigilante groups and in
some extreme cases set up their own tribunals, courts and judicial type systems
imposing fines and meting out punishments at will. It became very clear to central
authorities that changes would have to be made and that new conduits would
have to be found for the delivery of colonial law and order. It was at this point that
the idea of ‘tribal’ or ‘native’ police began to sweep across Africa.

A chronology
11.

For the most part, developments and advances in policing were determined by
events within individual colonies. Indeed, it is even possible in some cases to speak
of policing as the response to even more local, sub-regional concerns. A handful
of researchers have, however, tried to impose a broader chronology. They have
emerged with a chronology during which the multitude of experiences can easily
be reduced to just a handful of themes. While broadly general and necessarily
crude, such chronologies are nonetheless useful for comparative purposes. For
the Commission, they offer the opportunity to present policing in Kenya as part
of a larger, continent-wide narrative. The general chronology of Anglo-African
policing, law and order covers the following key phases:

1885-1914
12.

This initial phase was characterized by the creation of small constabularies in central
towns and larger urban centres where the British had established footholds. The
Sierra Leone Frontier Force and the Niger Coast Constabulary are good examples
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of early constabularies. Small, haphazard and lacking in proper mandates, these
constabularies were also often assigned more paramilitary duties related to the
conquest and/or pacification of troublesome hot spots still resisting colonial
impositions.
13.

By 1914, a crucial distinction had been made between military and paramilitary
forces and civilian ones. Constabularies were re-drawn as civilian and completely
separated from the military. Proper, albeit rudimentary, police forces were
established in most colonies. In a handful of colonies, a further separation had
taken place with the creation of the aforementioned Native or African police.
Few were well funded or properly equipped as what money there was funnelled
towards the military forces and their apparently more pressing needs for uniforms
and munitions.

1914 – 1920
14.

Researchers describe this a militarized period during which most energies and
resources were dedicated to the fighting of World War I as it manifested itself in
Africa. Little is known about growth and development of the police during the war
years.

1920 – 1945

38

15.

These two and a half decades are characterized by the rapid intensification of police
work in many parts of Africa. A number of developments drove this trend. Most
fundamentally, while not entirely pacified, most colonies were peaceful enough for
attention to turn to questions of public order and not military conquest. Even so, the
changing nature of the threat to presented a number of challenges to ever fragile
and underfunded African police forces. Most significantly some colonies saw the
rise of civilian unrest over political, labour, agricultural, taxation issues. In some
parts of Sierra Leone, Northern Rhodesia and Nigeria, such unrest was frequent
with police frequently called in to quell sometimes violent demonstrations and
riots. At the same time as the colonial state expanded and entrenched itself in
rural areas, the need for African/Native police and policing services away from
main urban settlements and town centres increased. A number of technological
advances meant that in some cases police departments were better placed to bear
the heavier burdens placed upon them. Forensic laboratories, finger printing and
radios became far more common.

16.

The inter-war years were also characterized by the gradual establishment of
units tasked with investigating the political, civil, religious and labour unrest just
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described. The predecessors of what later became known as ‘Special Branch’ were
set up to keep tabs on agitators, activists and various others deemed threats to
internal security. Elevated concerns about serious and organized crime syndicates
also resulted in the creation of specialized Criminal Investigations Departments.
In some territories, however, the onset of the Second World War once again drew
resources and attention away from the police and to the military.

1945 – 1960s
17.

This period served to both consolidate earlier policing trends and to create new
ones that would persist into the 1960s and 1970s as most colonies in British Africa
attained independence. Both military and police forces gradually increased
both in strength and equipment. Driving the increase was the apparent need
to respond to the political unrest and opposition that had begun to be seen in
the 1940s. New paramilitary forces were proposed and then created throughout
Anglophone Africa at the behest of governors and senior police administrators
worried about the impact of rising political disquiet. Kenya was a key arena for
such beefed up policing. Following a series of disturbances in parts of central
Kenya in 1947, authorities created a Police Emergency Company. The Police
Emergency Company was far more expansively equipped with top of the range
bren and stun guns, grenades, rifles and even armoured cars. The company
undertook preventive crime patrols in Nairobi and parts of central Kenya. In 1949,
as Kenya hurtled towards the Mau Mau uprising, the Police Emergency Company
was replaced with the even more vigorous Kenya Police Emergency Company.

18.

Policing during this era has also been described as increasingly professional
as better qualified and trained personnel gradually edged out the casuals
employed as ‘native’ policemen in the countryside. In essence therefore there
was a narrowing of the gap between policing urban, settled and industrialized
areas and more rural ones. Equipment and techniques previously only seen in
towns now began to feature in more remote regions. But once again, most of
these new improvements and investments were arranged around an old priority:
the security of the colonial state. Researchers have found very little evidence of
an increasing desire to actually extend the net of safety, security, law and order
to poorly served populations. Instead, the need to curtail and repress threats
dominated.

19.

By the late 1950s and early 1960s when it became increasingly clear that British
rule would not persist, discourse changed somewhat to the reforming of the
police service for post-colonial times. Policing entered something of a transition
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period during which forces had to make a difficult change from being—as it
were—agents of colonial control to servants of the independent state. Whether
or not police systems were actually successful in making this transition has been
the focus of many long and vigorous debates. The overall consensus being that
very few successfully made that leap. Contemporaneously, however, police forces
began to prepare for Independence by embarking on a process of Africanisation:
the appointment of indigenous Africans to senior police positions.

The Police in Colonial Kenya

40

20.

The origins of Kenya’s present day police force are irrefutably colonial. Everything
before 1885 can only be described as haphazard, informal and limited by the equally
haphazard and limited nature of the Imperial British East Africa Company’s hold
over Kenya. The only formation in pre-colonial Kenya that has been documented
as responsible for the maintenance of law and order and deterrence were attached
to the Liwali of Mombasa. The Liwali was an important and powerful figure
charged with governing the ten mile coastal strip of mainland Kenya on behalf of
the Omani Sultans of Zanzibar who installed themselves as the rulers of the strip
after a series of small scale wars with the Portuguese who had in turn maintained
a tenuous hold over the coast since their own arrival at the end of the 15th century.
Beginning with Imam Sa’if ibn Sultan in 1698, the Liwalis loosely oversaw the local
Arab and Swahili elites who held sway in coastal towns and settlements. The
presence of British anti-slavery ships in the Indian Ocean from the 19th century
served as precursors that the pendulum would soon shift away from the Omanis
and towards the British. The nature and extent of Omani rule sits at the heart of a
long running and heated secessionist debate during which numerous arguments
have been made for and against the coastal strip as historically distinct from the
rest of Kenya. This is a debate that the Commission considers in other sections of
this report. Here it suffices to identify the coastal strip as the initial focus of modern
policing in Kenya.

21.

When the first emissaries of the Imperial British East Africa Company arrived in
Mombasa in the mid-1880s, the closest thing to a law enforcement unit was a
company of Baluchi soldiers deployed during Sultan Seyyid Bargash’s tenure
(1870-1888). Originally from the plateaus of western Pakistan and eastern Iran,
Baluchi soldiers were held in high regard by the Zanzibari sultans on account of
their military prowess and bravery. Indeed, the Baluchi had been used for at least
a century as the Sultans’ first defense against unrest or threats in their coastal
territories. The Baluchi role was as such largely military but from time to time, they
seemed to feature in more civil and criminal matters. Strictly speaking however, the
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Baluchi company stationed in Mombasa was a military one. Sir William Mackinnon,
IBEAC’s chair and founder, would have found them unsuited to the company’s
civilian policing needs. The Baluchis were decommissioned but were allowed to
remain in Mombasa and were settled in Makadara; a neighbourhood right in the
middle of the island. Mackinnon’s attention then turned to the question of securing
the vital company stores and property that were needed for IBEAC’s launch into
the hinterland.
22.

With 10,000 pounds to be paid to the Sultan in annual rent and various other
expenses, it was vital for the company to quickly exploit the interior for ivory and
whatever other commodities could be funnelled towards settling the bills. The
company’s stores in Mombasa therefore became the hub and the staging post for
inward bound caravans. Their value and centrality to IBEAC’s operations cannot be
understated. Mackinnon had vast business interests in India. His primary holding,
the British India Steam Navigation Company employed thousands. With IBEAC’s
leasing of the coastal strip, staff members were diverted from Indian operations
and to East Africa. On arrival some were quickly organized into a company of
watchmen. Their main duty was to guard company property. Very little information
is available as to how they were supervised or regulated. Even so, historians of
policing in Kenya have taken this lightly documented group of Indian imports
as representing the first time that an organized, sustained attempt was made to
address the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of crime. Some of
these men travelled inland accompanying caravans bound for the interior. Once
again, however, their policing credentials were limited. They are better understood
perhaps as simple armed guards who could also be drafted as porters or general
labourers.

23.

Despite its best efforts, the IBEAC simply could not succeed in East Africa. The
company found itself in a territory with huge potential but almost impossible to
translate into regular and steady profits. The costs of the caravans were immense.
Moreover, as other sections of this report discuss, the caravans themselves were
often caught up in webs of violence that made it very difficult to conduct them
as money making ventures. The IBEAC completely underestimated the expense
of creating and maintaining administrative forts along the caravan routes. There
were salaries to be paid as well as an array of maintenance and construction costs.
For some historians, the collapse of the Company demonstrated the structural
instability of merchant colonialism; a form of colonialism driven by the interests
and priorities of the merchant and business owning classes. This particular school
of thought holds that the drivers of colonialism are not in profit and loss accounts
but more geo-political and cultural reasons that need the underpinning of a state.
In other words, the IBEAC was destined to fail.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

41

Volume IIA

42

Chapter TWO

24.

There is much in the company’s operations to support the notion that
mercantilism and colonialism are fundamentally incompatible. Just two years
after the company was granted its charter, the IBEAC was flirting with bankruptcy.
A humiliated Sir William explained the extent of IBEAC’s woes to the Colonial and
Foreign Offices in London. Without some kind of assistance, Mackinnon warned
that he would no longer be able to fulfil his obligations in Uganda and Kenya.
Spurred into action by the activities of Karl Peters and competition from the
German East Africa Company, a combination of private and public sympathizers
raised 21 000 pounds. This bought the IBEAC another year as bureaucrats
decided what do next. Finally in 1893, the curtain came down on the company’s
operations in Uganda. The Foreign Office took over the administration of the
Uganda Protectorate. Two years later the Foreign Office stepped in and took
over the running of British East Africa. The final transfer was made in 1905 when
the Colonial Office assumed full responsibility for both Uganda and British East
Africa. The IBEAC experiment came to an ignominious end as both territories
were absorbed into the British Empire.

25.

The arrival of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office signalled a complete
overhaul of the rather haphazard arrangements that the Company had made for
the policing of its East African holdings. Simply put, the Indian freelancers who
had guarded IBEAC stores and accompanied the caravans were no longer befitting
of a fully-fledged protectorate. Changes had to be made and they had to be made
quickly.

26.

In 1896, an important appointment was made. A Mr. Ewart was sent from Zanzibar
to Mombasa and named as the Assistant Superintendant of Police. In effect,
however, there was no police force for Ewart to supervise. His main task became
to assemble a credible police force out of the ragtag porters, watchmen and parttimers that greeted him upon his arrival in Mombasa. Ewart’s task was both a
daunting and a pressing one. He drafted in two Inspectors, J. West and A. Hill to
assist him. They immediately set about recruiting the men who would form the
core of the British East Africa Police. By 1901, the force stood at 150 strong. The
stories of these individual recruits are impossible to tell in any great detail.

27.

As with so many Africans in early colonial history, these men have been all but
ignored by official and written records. For administrative purposes, their ethnic
and national origins were recorded. Some were from the Comoros Islands. There
were clutch of Indian and Swahili men drawn from a pool of Mombasa residents
who may well have had previous exposure to police work during the Company
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years. The bulk of this fledgling police force, however, consisted of Somali recruits.
Some were quickly promoted to the rank of Deputy Inspector. Over time, this
early Somali dominance and seniority within the police force developed into
something of a trend. Indeed the Somali community’s understanding of itself
as a professional elite gave rise to very curious form of political activism that
promoted the re-classification of Somalis as non-natives entitled to different tax,
housing and political benefits than other African populations. The question of
Somali nationalism from the 1930s onwards is explored at length elsewhere in
this report.
28.

It would be many years before leadership of the Kenya Police would become an
indigenous affair. For nearly six decades, the force remained exactly as described
above: African and Indian foot officers commanded by European (largely British)
seniors. This was neither unusual nor unique. After all, the very essence of the
colonial project was to impose European norms and ways of doing things on
African ones. With the police force, however, these patterns and structure became
particularly symbolic of European dominance at the cost of African submission.
Simply put, the European hold over the police was unyielding and—as this chapter
will discuss later on--difficult to dismantle. Personnel such as Ewart were not the
only expatriate feature; the legislation used to set up the fledgling police force
was imported directly from India. The Indian Police Act along with the Penal Code,
Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Code were all drafted in by the British
to provide the foundation for law and law enforcement in Kenya. No alterations
were made to the codes to cater for a context and a setting that was African and
not Indian.

29.

The idea of an alien, poorly adjusted regime of law and order run by outside agents
is one that the Commission will return to later. For now it is enough to appreciate
the structural frailties of the British East Africa Police. In both its regulation and
membership, the force seemed ill-suited to the immensity of the task handed it.
Not for the Foreign (and later Colonial) Office were the half-hearted and piecemeal
efforts to govern the territory as attempted by the IBEAC. The colonial project was
a much grander one with aspirations to pacify, govern and modernize British East
Africa as part of the larger British Empire. The ability to provide and guarantee
security and policing was one of the cornerstones of the colonial project. But from
very early on, it was clear that the ambitions of the colonial state could not be
reconciled with the reality on the ground. And reality of the situation was that
the British East Africa Police could not be counted to deliver any kind of security
beyond Mombasa. Even within Mombasa itself, the quality and consistency of
services provided by the police were questionable. An early administrator, a

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

43

Volume IIA

Chapter TWO

Captain Rainsford, described them disparagingly:
I was in those early days somewhat intimately acquainted with the working of this
composite and heterogeneous body. One had to admit that the system and recruitment
and want of training, together with all the other disadvantages from which the
Force suffered, made it extremely unlikely that their activities would prove in any
way satisfactory, but the practical results were somewhat amazing. Burglaries of the
most daring character were committed constantly, almost under their eyes, and went
undetected. The house of every European Government servant, with one exception, was
broken into, or attempted, in the course of a few months. The altar cloth was stolen
from the church and the cashier’s box from the Law Courts without anyone being
apprehended. Indian merchants made constant complaints of the losses they suffered
by robbery and asked piteously if something could not be done.

44

30.

In some ways Rainford’s commentary is enduring. Complaints about the training,
character and professionalism of the police reverberate throughout Kenyan
history. Even so the Commission is wary of drawing a straight line between the
problems facing the police at the beginning and at the end of the 20th century. The
police force of the early 1900s was in a very unique and peculiar position. There
was as Rainford has indicated no formalized program and schedule of training. The
new recruits were simply taken as they were. Trial and error became the only way
to determine what worked and what did not.

31.

Notwithstanding the lack of training and the wanting performance of the
officers, the biggest concerns for British East Africa police lay beyond the force
itself. For all the weight that the colonial state was to eventually acquire, its
origins were halting and humble. What this meant was that it took many years
for the state and its organs to fully establish itself. In essence then the British
East Africa Police operated in a vacuum of sorts that greatly compromised
productivity. Nothing illustrates this point more clearly than the early history of
the Judiciary in Kenya. The establishment of the Judiciary in the new protectorate
occurred at roughly the same time and pace as the police. An 1897 Order in
Council created a three-tier court system. The first tier consisted of so called
Native African courts overseen by administrators and magistrates. The second
category of courts served adherents of Islam. The third and final branch catered
to the small but growing European community resident in Kenya. Cases from
the Native and European courts could be referred upwards to higher courts. As
mentioned above, legislation was hastily imported and tacked on from India. As
with the police, the arrangements and aspirations for the courts far out ran actual
capacity. Properly qualified magistrates and administrators were in short supply.
The Captain Rainsford quoted above was eventually installed as a magistrate.
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In that capacity he found himself presiding over cases involving the very same
police officers that he had earlier railed against:
On several occasions, I have had to convict policemen of robbery from people in the
streets and night, and in a number of other cases to order them punishment for being
the cause of street rows or affrays in which they attempted to screen themselves by
arresting unoffending people and then charging them with riotous conduct.

32.

But while Rainsford poured scorn on the police, there is no indication that the
judiciary was performing at a higher level. The courts themselves had a limited reach
and only served Mombasa Island and its surrounding environs. More conceptually,
there is also no evidence that local Africans either accepted or understood these
new methods of determining right from wrong. The judiciary cannot be presented
as any more functional than the police.

Roots: 1902-1908
33.

It did not take long for it to become clear that the haphazard arrangements made
for policing British East Africa were completely inadequate. The administration’s
hands were forced by a number of important developments in the protectorate. The
most critical of these was the completion of the Uganda Railway in 1901. Initiated in
1985, the railway line connecting the coast with the hinterland became the defining
symbol of British colonialism in Kenya. Another section of this report looks in greater
detail at the centrality of the railway to the unfolding of the colonial project in
Kenya. The line quite literally became the spine for the expansion and establishment
of colonial rule in the Protectorate. Informal trading centres and stations became
morphed into District and sub-District headquarters. Administrators known as
Collectors were posted to these stations and charged with the business of manning
them. In so doing, the railway presented two distinct policing needs.

34.

Firstly, there was the need to police the railway itself. At a cost of nearly five million
pounds—a staggering sum at the time—the railway represented a huge investment
on the part of the British government. The safety and proper functioning of the line
was key; after all the goods transported up and down along the line and the profits
extracted from them represented the only way of recouping that investment. And
so it was that in 1897, the decision was made to establish the Uganda Railway Police
under the stewardship of a Mr. Napier, a railway engineer with no real policing
experience. Once again the British looked to India for resources. Indian labour had
been brought in to construct the railway and Indian labour was also brought in to
secure it. Initially their main job was to protect the line, workers and supplies from
the threats presented by local African communities. The railway police were also
key players in the saga of the man-eating lions of Tsavo that ruptured wok in the
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line in the middle of 1900. When construction ended, the Uganda Railway police
continued to provide protection along these lines.

46

35.

By 1902, the railway police force consisted of some four hundred men commanded
by a dedicated superintendant (G. Farquhar) and an assistant (C. Ryall). Two further
European inspectors were also appointed as well as a number of Indian Deputy
Inspectors. The Railway Police worked independently of the British East Africa
Police. But it is not at all clear from the sources whether they developed their own
operational codes and procedures.

36.

The creation of administrative posts along the line led to the second branch of
policing. The Collectors and Assistant Collectors sent to places like Voi, Makindu,
Sultan Hamud and further up the railway required the services of police more
concerned with broader law and order issues that—for the most part—had very
little to do with the railway itself. These new administrative centres represented
the sharp end of the colonial project; the point at which the British introduced
(imposed) new ideas of right and wrong on a bewildered population. The police
were amongst the first purveyors of the reality that traditional African norms no
longer applied. More literally, the police acted as the eyes and ears for the often
oblivious Collectors and Assistant Collectors. They conducted patrols and carried
out surveillance again for any threats to the nascent new order. Officers were often
recruited locally by the respective Collectors. No central body oversaw this process.

37.

The result was nothing short of chaotic. Each district essentially had its own
autonomous force. Precious little united them. From one district to the next,
uniforms changed as did formations, pay and chains of command. The only
common dominator was an unhappy one: the lack of professionalism and resources.
A Captain Ewart travelling inland from Mombasa to Kiambu in 1904 described all
the units he encountered along the way as ‘an extraordinarily ragged lot, almost
untrained and [with] little in the way uniforms.’ There was also no consistency to the
equipment used by the various forces. In general, however, the guns and weapons
supplied to the police were of very poor quality having already either been used or
rejected by the King’s African Rifles. Indeed, early there was even one extraordinary
instance when guns dumped in the sea because they had outlived their usefulness
were recovered, cleaned and re-issued to the various police units.

38.

The situation persisted until 1904 when a Captain McCaskill, Ewart’s successor,
presented the Foreign Office with a series of proposals and estimates for the long
overdue amalgamation of the various forces into one centrally organized structure.
The proposals were studied and eventually approved by both the Foreign Office
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and the Sir Charles Elliot, the Commissioner of the Protectorate. The entire system
was then overhauled. Sitting at the top was the Inspector General of Police. He
was in overall charge. Beneath him were a Deputy Inspector General, six Assistant
District Superintendants, seven European Inspectors, six Sergeant-Instructors,
Asian Inspectors and sub-Inspectors (about 1800 of them), Asian and African noncommissioned officers and men. Rigid and hierarchical, these reforms brought order
and structure where there had been none. A focused attempt was made to fill all
these positions with men who had previous policing experience. McCaskill remained
as Inspector General. Applications were welcomed from all over the British Empire –
South Africa, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Generous terms of service meant
that by the end of 1904, all the upper level positions were occupied.
39.

Two years later, the Kenya Police Force formally came into being through the Police
Ordinance of 1906. The ordinance built on many of the earlier organisational and
personnel changes described above with the confirmation of the transfer of police
headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi. Soon afterwards there was however
an announcement was made about a key new development: the creation of a
European Police Force. A statement from the Secretary of State for the colonies,
Lord Elgin, explained that this new force was a response to requests from settler
community. The European Force operational area was limited to Nairobi; expansion
was not regarded as feasible:
The duties of officers and men have been defined by the new Police Ordinance,
and in order to meet the wishes of the European inhabitants I have sanctioned the
formation of a small European Police Force for the Nairobi District. The substitution,
however, of European for African Police in other parts of the Protectorate cannot
be contemplated in view not only of the great expenditure involved but also of the
probability that European Police would be less efficient than Africans for service in
the tropical regions of the protectorate.

40.

Small as it was, the creation of the European force would have significant and farreaching implications for overall policing. Those implications will be discussed by
the Commission shortly in a section on the race-driven nature of law enforcement
in Kenya.

41.

Police reform during these early years was characterized by fits and starts of
activity. In 1908 another redrawing took place. Once again, it was described by
contemporaries as an attempt to modernize, rationalize and expand the force. A
Captain W. Edwards arrived from Uganda to take up the post of Inspector General
of Police. The new Commissioner of Police—a separate position--was given to a Mr.
Notley who also had previous Uganda experience. Notley and Edwards embarked
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on yet another round of reform. They bemoaned the militarism that ran rampant in
the Kenya Police Force. Also bothering then was the perennially troublesome issue
of inadequate training:
That a military element had been advanced at the expense of Police training; the Force
is inadequately staffed; the superior officers of the Force have been insufficiently
trained, as also the subordinate ranks; there has been no means of reward for the
zealous and competent; the Force has not received that official recognition and
support which are its due; insufficient attention has been paid to the selection of
recruits; superior officers have exhibited no tendency of sympathy towards the
community and little towards their subordinates; there has been no co-operation with
the Chiefs or Headmen.

42.

The list of woes continued. Like many of their predecessors, Notley and Edwards
found that there was very little that they could do to reverse the rot. One success
they registered was setting the foundations for re-training the police along more
civilian lines and methods. Eventually in 1911, a Training Depot was established
in Nairobi. While the training was still militaristic in nature, it was only offered to
police officers (both European and African). The influence of army was diluted
somewhat with this separation. In 1914, however, increasing demands from the
war effort resulted in the police returning to paramilitary work especially in districts
bordering enemy territory and forces in German East Africa.

Zoned policing: 1920s-1930s

48

43.

The Commission has found it useful to follow the lead of previous studies and to
divide policing in Kenya into different zones of policing intensity. These zones
were very clearly in evidence by the early 1920s. The first and more dominant
zone consisted of main urban centres and the more populated (and developed)
areas of white settlement in the Rift Valley and Central Kenya. These zones were
policed in the sense that the presence of police was both routine and growing.
Crimes were detected and investigated with a certain rigor and attempts were
made to arrest criminals and deal with them through the nascent criminal justice
system. Developments in the policed zone were almost entirely defined by settler
understandings of law, order, crime and punishment.

44.

Beyond this core lay a second zone in which policing thinned out to, in the
most extreme cases, almost nothing. On the frontiers of colonial rule in Kenya,
therefore, it is not possible to speak of a consistent or sizeable police presence.
Indeed, it is difficult to speak of the maintenance and enforcement of colonial
law and order in parts of the country where the concepts of law and order were
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not only contested but irrelevant. The majority of Kenyan communities in the
1920s continued to deal with transgressors and offenders as they always had.
The notion that this function could be taken over by external agents did not
resonate. Similarly, few communities were willing to leave issues concerning
their foes and competitors to be handled by police forces whose legitimacy was
only very poorly understood.
45.

The Northern Frontier District provides the clearest evidence of what policing an
un-policed zone looked like in the 1920s and the 1930s. The NFD was a vast, arid
and sparsely populated district that effectively made up the whole northern half
of Kenya. Exact figures are unavailable but until the early 1930s, it appears that the
district was served by between just 240 and 300 policemen. The burden that these
officers were expected to bear was a heavy one. In just one year, 1931–1932, nearly
180 murders were reported to the police. Several hundred others were simply
never became matters because they took place during the course of violent interethnic encounters between the various communities that occupied the district.
Police success in the processing and handling of these cases was very limited.
Isiolo—a southern corner of the district—recorded nearly 30 murders during
that year. Just 12 arrests resulted with no word as to how prosecutions unfolded.
District officials were unsentimental about the shortcomings and failures of their
policing programs. In 1935, administrators in Samburu expressed surprise that
murder rates in their area were not much higher than they already were.

46.

Lack of personnel and the demands of the territory gave rise to very unconventional
and sometimes alarming forms of law enforcement that the Commission has taken
as the foundations for a long history of questionable policing in the region in
particular and in Kenya in general. In essence, what one finds very early on in the
history of policing in Kenya is a certain readiness to abandon and ignore all norms
under the guise operating in a difficult policing environment. Once again, the
evidence from Samburu is instructive. Conventional police work in any sense of
the word did not exist as administrators and officers readily admitted to ignoring
all crimes other than murder, assault and stock theft. Others were candid about
their treatment of suspects. Sometimes groups of people were held hostage and
forcibly detained until communities produced those believed to be the real culprits.
Witnesses were similarly harshly treated and were kept under armed guard in the
lead up to their testimonies and court appearances.

47.

In some parts of the Northern Frontier District, all pretences at civilian policing
were abandoned. Everything to do with the maintenance of law and order was
abdicated to the King’s African Rifles. Such was the case for instance with the Ilemi
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Triangle. Ilemi was a 5400 square mile triangle of land in the extreme north western
corner of Kenya. With political ownership long contested by Sudan, Ethiopia and
Kenya, Ilemi was characterized further characterized by intense competition
between the Turkana, the Dassanetch, the Didinga, the Topasa, the Nyangatom
and other pastoralists who roamed the land in search of pasture and water for their
livestock. The violence of their gun-dictated encounters were far too intense for the
already stretched police force deputized to the Northern Frontier District. Add to
this international tension over boundaries and frontiers and the police were simply
unable to cope. In the later 1920s, units from the King’s African Rifles were posted
to Lokitaung just south of a key Ilemi boundary. And there they would remain at
the staggering cost of thirty thousand pounds a year. It was a cost that the Treasury
would bear for another two decades. There was never any chance that the triangle
would be left in the care of the police. Any civilians concerns about law, order and
criminal justice were subsumed to the military imperative.

50

48.

While terrain, lack of finances and personnel were all acknowledged as reasons
for the dilapidated state of policing at the frontier, colonials seized on to much
more fundamental existential explanations for the chaos. Many an administrator
argued that African cultures and norms were fundamentally incompatible with
Western notions of crime and punishment. They bemoaned incidents such as
one took place in Gusii in May 1926 when a woman was killed during a brawl.
The killing went entirely unreported as the various parties decided that the
issue was a private one that could be discussed and resolved internally. It took
a concerned neighbour to alert the police. The overall assumption was that in
time, African communities would eventually adjust to the new realities. And
until that adjustment took place, most colonial officials, as exemplified by those
in Samburu, were more or less resigned themselves to tackling the only most
serious of crimes and leaving the rest to traditional systems of disputes and
conflict resolution.

49.

As colonial administrators chided local populations for their resistance and
backwardness, they failed to consider that the piecemeal and haphazard nature
of the policing that they offered held very few attractions for Africans. Officers
rarely showed up to investigate incidents in a timely fashion. They offered no
preventive measures whatsoever. On the very rare occasions when incidents were
carried forward for prosecution, the outcomes were rarely satisfactory. A more
accurate reading of the situation therefore has to be that instead of mindlessly
rejecting colonial policing, Africans deliberately chose to continue using an
indigenous system that worked well for them and was far more responsive to
their needs.
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Racialised policing
50.

Yet another dynamic was at work further distancing African populations in Kenya
from the goals and aspirations of the Kenya Police Force. That dynamic was race.
The security needs of Kenya’s settler population exerted a powerful influence on
policing from 1902 onwards when the territory was thrown open to European
settlers and immigrants as means of paying for the Uganda Railways and other
investments and expenses associated with formal colonization. It is impossible to
understate the centrality of settler concerns to the history of policing in Kenya. The
small European Police Force created in 1906 formed the beating heart of police
system with only one goal: to serve the settler population in Nairobi. As Europeans
spread into what would eventually become known as the White Highlands, the
European Police Force followed to provide coverage. Over time it became even
more explicit to the extent that the Kenya Police Force was in effect banned from
the Reserves where the vast majority of African lived. The Reserves were left to
Tribal Police. Kenya Police were only allowed to cross into the Reserves when they
were in hot pursuit of suspects. And even then they had to seek permission from
the relevant District Commissioners.

51.

Tribal and Administrative Police held sway in the Native Reserves. The Tribal Police
were the product of a pioneering piece of legislation designed to bring African’s
more solidly under colonial influence and rule: the Village Headman Ordinance
of 1902. The ordinance mandated the establishment of the Tribal and then (later)
Administration Police. A great deal of writing has been done on the administration
police in Kenya mainly with the aim of understanding their role and niche in law
enforcement.7 There is a lot of uncertainty as to whether the Tribal/Administration
Police were ever actually envisioned as a vehicle for law enforcement. It seems
clear that they were initially conceptualized as running somewhat parallel to the
British East Africa Police. In this, Tribal Police were handed a rather complex set
of duties. Their job it seems was to cover predominantly rural expanses ensuring
compliance with new regulations and obligations imposed by the new colonial
order. For instance, it became the job of the trial police to enforce the payment
of head and hut taxes. Tribal police were also responsible for the enforcement of
livestock regulations. They also made sure that local populations followed the
many regulations introduced to govern labour, farming and water use. Eventually
the Tribal and Administration would acquire powers that would result in a certain
amount of overlap with the Kenya Police particularly in crime prevention and the
apprehension of offenders and suspects.

7

J Mbuba and F Mugambi ‘Approaches to crime control and order Maintenance: The role of village headmen, chiefs, sub-chiefs, and
administration police in rural Kenya’ (2011) 4 African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies 1 -12.
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52.

The European Force and the Tribal/Administration Police provide the very clearest
examples that law enforcement in Kenya was carried out along solidly racial
terms with each of the dominant groups (African, Asian and European) seen as a
meriting distinctive handling by the police and justice system. African and Indian
police would never be assigned to incidents involving either European suspects or
victims. European settlers demanded nothing else. In Kiambu, settlers even went
as far as donating the materials to construct housing for a permanent contingent
of European officers; the only ones that settlers would trust with their cases. In
some instances, racialisation was born out of sheer necessity. The majority of
Indian officers and labourers did not speak English or Swahili. As such, they could
only be processed by Indian-language speakers. By the early 1900s, it became
increasingly evident that similar arrangements had to be made for the myriad
African populations who were also very poorly served by the services offered by
the British East Africa Police.

53.

At the heart of complaints about inadequately trained and resourced officers were
lay even more fundamental concerns about the actual applicability of Western
models of law and order to societies with very different traditions. The codified and
streamlined approach taken by the British to crime, disputes and conflict was not
always suited to the much more fluid notions in evidence in Africa. Furthermore,
African communities had in place their own indigenous systems that were difficult
to sweep aside simply because of colonial demands. In essence, there remained
an entire raft of African activity that remained beyond the reach of administrators
of colonial law and their agents. Furthermore, as has been mentioned above,
there was very little interest drawing Africans into the colonial fold; only the most
grievous of African crimes elicited reactions from administrators.

54.

There was no question that European interests dominated the hierarchy with a
disproportionate amount of time and money spent addressing the security of
only several thousand people. The main settler concerns were that their lives and
property were under severe threat from the African populations surrounding
them. They were persistent and vocal about expressing their worries. Legislators,
representatives, Colonial Office officials were bombarded with letters, missives and
petitions demanding stiffer legislation, increased surveillance and more rigorous
policing. Certain crimes were almost guaranteed to raise settler temperatures and
set off a firestorm. The rape of European women was one. Murder and stock theft
were others. Panics often swept the community that crime was on the rise with
further demands that something more needed to be done. Single incidents were
often seized upon as evidence that insecurity was rampant and out of control.
Settlers often threatened to take matters into their own hands and to respond
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instantly. As many were armed and easily mobilized, the threat that they would
mete out their own from justice was a very real one and often prompted the police
to act in a timely fashion.
55.

While Kenya’s police force was almost entirely tailored around European needs, the
police themselves were objects of scorn and derision. The European Police Force
itself was very small. More often than not, the officer sent to the scene of a crime
as an immediate response was an African. Some settlers simply refused to accept
their authority. Research has uncovered the case of a settler known as Mrs. Rainbow
who threatened and eventually drove off at gunpoint an African sergeant who was
simply trying to serve a warrant. The opposite also applied in that very few settlers
were prepared to hand over European suspects to officers and a system that many
of them regarded as somewhat inferior. Some have described the vast settler
estates as fiefdoms; private dominions in which settlers could do as they pleased
without fear of retribution and recrimination. The Kenya Police Force therefore
found itself in something of a conundrum with the settler community. On the
one hand, the Force spent inordinate amounts of time trying to resolve the many
issues facing this small but demanding population. No police official—senior or
otherwise—could afford to ignore them and expect not to hear about it. On the
other hand, the police were widely reviled by the very same constituency that they
were attempting to serve. The White Highlands of Kenya eventually distinguished
themselves for the reckless and trigger-happy behaviour of its inhabitants who
seemed to show no fear of either detection or punishment.

Stock theft
56.

The limitations and failures of the Kenya Police Force were, as has been discussed
above, were both many and obvious. But few issues exposed the weakness
of the Force as starkly as stock theft. Stock theft presented successive colonial
administrations with a difficult almost insurmountable problem. The problem
consisted of two fairly distinct trends. Firstly, there was theft that took place as
cattle raiding between various African communities. Culturally sanctioned by
many pastoralists, cattle raids were a feature of African life throughout the Western
Highlands inhabited by the various Kalenjin groups, the Maasai, the Turkana, the
Pokot and others. Secondly, there was theft of livestock from European-owned
farms particularly those in areas already plagued by the first form of stock theft.

57.

Colonial administrations appeared largely helpless in the face of both. The raids
launched by one ethnic community on another were frequently spectacular. Some
of the very earliest ones recorded by European observers could involve up to
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fifty or sixty warriors. They had to be sanctioned by elders; elaborate prayers and
rituals were an essential part of the lead up to the raid itself. Raids were therefore
community-wide affairs. Indeed cattle acquired during a raid were distributed
widely. By the same token, the entire community stood to suffer if their adversaries
decided to take revenge. The violence of the raids was immense. Indeed, the
raids themselves came to symbolize the very chaos of traditional African life that
necessitated a stern reaction from colonisers. And so it was that by the early 1900s,
subduing if not actually eradicating cattle raids became a top priority for the British
as they too expanded into the Western Highlands. Cattle raiding communities
were dealt harshly. The Nandi in particular were on the receiving end of punitive
military expeditions that were also designed to counter their broader opposition
to colonial rule.
58.

By the 1920s, the large scale cattle raids of old had been largely eradicated. But
new forms of stock theft developed to fill the void. Individuals, as opposed to
entire communities, began to engage in smaller scale theft from each other as
well as from European settlers who had by this point had established farms and
settlements throughout Uasin Gishu and other parts of the Western Highlands.
Forest areas were identified as the main lairs for thieves who would then steal into
farms and drive small numbers of cattle back into the woods and then back across
to their home locations either of sale or keeping. While most of the thefts appeared
opportunistic, by the mid-1920s some District Commissioners found evidence of
fairly sophisticated gangs that actually organized the theft and trafficking of cattle
for specific markets.

59.

Colonial administrators enacted various legislations to help tackle the problem. The
primary vehicle was the Stock and Produce Theft Ordinance of 1913. In presenting
the ordinance before the Colonial Office for consideration and eventual approval,
Kenya’s Attorney General explained:
Stock and Produce Theft Ordinance is designed to deal with a class of offence which
is prevalent in the Protectorate and which, if not checked, will ruin a most important
industry. Amongst natives of this Protectorate cattle thieving is considered as an
honourable occupation, provided the thefts are committed in respect of cattle not the
property of any member of the community to which the thief belongs, and it is not only
by creating a public opinion in the Reserves against stock thieving that stock thieving
can be checked. The sentencing of natives convicted of that offence to long terms of
imprisonment has not and will not have the desired effect. If, however, heads of families
and communities can be taught that it is not only their duty but it is to their advantage
to use their parental authority to restrain the young men from committing this offence,
a public opinion against stock thieving will be created.

54
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Reforming sentiments aside, colonial authorities also introduced a formidable
raft of sanctions designed to drive the point home that theft of produce and, in
particular, stock was not going to be tolerated and would be soundly punished.
And so people convicted under the ordinance could be subjected to between one
and five years imprisonment. On top of jail time, there was a fine to be paid as well.
The size of the fine depended on the number and value of the stock stolen. The
ordinance was adamant: if the convicted person could not pay, family members
and even the broader community could be liable. Administrators could also use
the Collective Punishment Ordinance of 1909 to fine the community as whole if it
was believed to have harboured the thief or have otherwise prevented detection
and prosecution.

61.

Settlers were on hand to harangue for the energetic pursuit of all livestock thieves.
As usual, the Kenya Police Force was the focus of most settler efforts. It should come
as no surprise, however, that the police proved spectacularly incapable of handling
the complexities of stock theft. Quite aside from the usual problems of lack of
personnel and equipment, the force was stymied by an even more basic issue:
lack of jurisdiction. The various machinations surrounding the police meant that
in 1911, the Kenya Police was in effect limited to Nairobi and the White Highlands.
What this meant was that the police were banned from the very African Reserves
that formed the hub of a booming but illegal business in stolen animals. Certain
regulations allowed the Police into African Reserves particularly when were in hot
pursuit of suspects. These occasional incursions were far from adequate and did
very little to help police pinpoint key individuals involved in what was by the late
1920s the theft of thousands of animals.

62.

The real responsibility for tackling the problem of stock lay with the much
maligned Tribal/Administration Police as well as government appointed chiefs and
headmen. There was particular pressure on chiefs and headmen. It was to them
that senior administrators turned to for first hand information on the identity of
cattle thieves and the movement of animals in and out of their respective locations.
The Administration Police were tasked with conducting regular patrols as well as
mounting emergency responses to particular incidents. For this they depended
heavily on information and intelligence provided by chiefs and headmen. Over all
of them hung the threat of Stock and Collective Punishment Ordinances which held
that entire communities could be held liable for the crimes of a few. This made for
a very difficult policing and environment. Just as predictably, very few headmen,
chiefs and administration could claim regular success against the livestock
menace. Thefts continued unabated. Some locations such as Tinderet became
particularly notorious for the near complete inability of the local authorities to

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Chapter TWO

55

Volume IIA

Chapter TWO

stamp out the theft and movement of stolen animals. An investigation of Tinderet
and its environs in 1923 found approximately 1500 illegal cows in the forest. A
few years later, further investigation revealed almost 4500 animals. By this stage,
the theft of livestock dovetailed with another colonial concern: the unregulated
settlement of forested areas. Far from combating the trade, chiefs and police were
often suspected of even colluding with criminals.

56

63.

The 1930s were characterized by the theft of livestock place on a vastly expanded
scale. Thieves had organized themselves into much larger and sophisticated gangs
that were even capable of funnelling animals across the borders into Uganda
and Tanganyika. The gangs made a complete mockery of the numerous colonial
regulations surrounding the sale, movement and quarantining of animals. As the
black market boomed and settler woes mounted, it became increasingly obvious
that the Kenya Police could no longer sit on the sidelines and devolve responsibility
to headmen, chiefs and administrative police. In the late 1930’s, a number of senior
Kenya Police officers (Sam Slatter, Jack Tull and Des Conner) turned their attentions
to the vexing issue of stock theft. Detailed investigations resulted in the gathering
of much useful intelligence on the gangs’ membership and behaviour. For instance,
it emerged that many of the gangs had forged working relationships with each
other thereby setting up an intricate chain that allowed for stolen livestock to be
easily transported far away from locations where the thefts first occurred.

64.

European officers called for increased patrols and more frequent raids of known
cattle-raiding areas. They also proposed more radical interventions such as the
creation and maintenance of ‘black lists’ of suspicious characters, their associates
and kin. The list was meant help in surveillance. Another proposal was that it be
circulated widely to prevent those listed from taking up employment on European
farms especially if they had been to prison. By far the most ambitious attempt to
keep track of cattle thieves occurred in Elgeyo, another troubled location in the
West, where a special compound was set up to house known and convicted raiders
under the supervision of trusted chiefs and headmen. The new efforts and energies
directed towards stock theft yielded little. If anything, the police were swimming
against a tide of increased theft brought about by the establishment of a Meat
Marketing Board licensed to buy cattle directly from Africans. The MMB occasioned
a boom in criminality as traders tried to get animals—stolen or not—to the board.

65.

Police administrators returned to the drawing board in order to craft an even
more aggressive response to what was openly described by the mid-1940s as a
very serious crime wave. In essence, concerns about stock theft finally pushed the
Kenya Police into policing parts of the country, the African Reserves, that it had
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studiously ignored before on account of the racial and zoned approach that the
force had taken to law enforcement and the detection and prevention of crime. A
number of regulations and recommendations laid the foundation for the move. In
1943, Provincial Commissioners’ recommended that the Commissioner of Police
consider expanding into Native Reserves. A pilot scheme was approved and the
Kenya Police Force set up shop in Kiambu, Nandi and Narok Districts. Once again
the continuing challenge presented by livestock theft meant that this slow roll out
of police service had to be sped up.
66.

The following year, two cattle rustling hot spots, Kisii and Kipsigis, were also
brought under the Kenya Police as arrangements were made for Nakuru and
Mau Narok. The Auxiliary Police Regulations of 1944 laid the foundation for
additional police posts namely District and Assistant District Commandant and
Senior Auxiliary Officers. At the same time, the Legislative Council passed a
motion directing yet further solutions be found for those areas hardest hit by
livestock theft. The idea of a mounted police force was born. Approximately one
hundred horses and mules were imported from Ethiopia and were distributed to
those police divisions in the Rift Valley and the Highlands where a quick and agile
response to cattle raids was deemed important. Vulnerable divisions were also
equipped with new radio transmitters. The Mounted Unit then went on to form
the foundation of the Anti Stock Theft Unit in 1965. This unit which now consists
of the three platoons continues to form the basis of the Kenya Police’s response
to livestock theft.

67.

The unhappy conclusion of most observers was that very few of these reforms and
innovations could get to grips to the full extent of cattle thieving in the colony. As
Kenya headed towards independence the raiding and theft of livestock became
even more entrenched and audacious than ever before. Indeed, as the Commission
found, the struggle to contain and to respond stock theft sits at the core of several
disturbing incidents and trends surrounding the violation of human rights in
Kenya.

Coercive policing
68.

A central dilemma presents in itself in any historical consideration of the Kenya
Police. For all its weaknesses, lack of resources and oversights, the Kenya Police
was easily one of the most violent and coercive institutions of the colonial era. If
anything, the Police have become emblematic of the very worst excesses of colonial
administration in Kenya and beyond. At once weak and powerful, the Commission
believes that these colonial contradictions in the police force have carried over
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into postcolonial Kenya with disastrous consequences. Part of the Commission’s
work has therefore involved understanding this particular dynamic.
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69.

The weakness of the Kenya Police Force is well established. As has already been
explained above, the force was intrinsically flawed with its racially driven approach
to the cross-racial issue of crime and law enforcement. To these ideological failures,
organisational ones must be added. Understaffing was a chronic problem. In 1925,
nearly two decades after establishment, the force consisted of just 2224 officers
serving in 31 police stations and 15 police posts. Distribution was wildly unequal
with some stations much better served by others. Far from getting larger, the force
actually got smaller over the next two decades. The global depression of the 1930s
hit Kenya hard and compromised the government’s ability to expand services.
Recruitment picked up again in the mid-1940s. By 1945, the force had nearly
doubled. Five thousand men were employed in 59 police stations and 162 posts.
As the force increased its operational areas to cover Native Reserves, the size of the
force increased accordingly.

70.

Increases in efficiency and productivity were not, however, the outcome of a larger
force. The reason for this was an old one: lack of resources and equipment. A 1930
census showed that outside of Nairobi, the transport pool available to the police
consisted of 19 cars, 4 motorcycles and 57 bicycles. Improvements in radio and
telephone communications helped considerably but did not fundamentally alter
the fact that more often than not, the police were rarely able to respond to incidents
in a timely fashion. The ability to launch regular and wide-ranging patrols was also
limited particularly in areas plagued by stock theft.

71.

Puny and under-resourced, the Kenya Police Force was nevertheless capable of
violence on a spectacular scale. Indeed, the argument can and has been made
that the very weakness of the force provided the very impetus for violence and
coercion. A little known but extra-ordinary feature of the Kenya Police Force
and the District Administration was the ability to impose what were known as
Police Levies. Levies were amongst the most powerful tools available to Kenya’s
hapless police. Careful procedures had to be followed for a levy to be imposed
on particular district or location. For starters, an inquiry had to be carried out
to establish whether the location was ‘disturbed’ or ‘dangerous’. In other words,
there had to be an exceptional situation where crime and violence were out of
control and were considered a serious threat to overall security. Having made
this determination, administrators could then ask the Police Commissioner for
temporary reinforcements to be drafted in to assist the local authorities. Their stay
could be extended until such time as the situation was felt to have returned to
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normal. While such operations were not uncommon, they are lightly documented.
So examples appear only rarely in the record. Recent research has uncovered a
1929 operation in Kipsigis country. Nearly 100 extra men were drafted in to the
district on an unspecified law and order mission. Between 1935 and 1936, there
was a similar year-long operation in Samburu. In 1948, another took place in Keiyo
location badly affected by cattle theft.
72.

The procedures and formalities required for police levies belie the fact that in
essence the levy was a sort of tax imposed on host communities. Simply put,
communities had to bear the cost of the very operations launched to pacify them.
Payment was made either in cash or kind (livestock and produce). There is very
little documentation to indicate how the size of the levy was determined. The
suspicion is that it was probably a fairly arbitrary process detached from any proper
consideration of the actual cost of the operation. Of concern, was that the police
were permitted to extract money and goods from the inhabitants of a particular
location set the stage for frequent clashes between the two groups. In essence,
the police simply took to raiding and stealing from local populations under the
guise of imposing levies. Many could not distinguish so-called police operations
from full out military campaigns carried out by the Kings African Rifles. The police
were further informed by the Collective Punishment Ordinance that allowed entire
communities to be held responsible for the crimes of a few. Undergirding almost
all operations was the sense that people had to be punished, harshly treated
and—if necessary—forcefully be made to understand that they had to comply
with colonial rules and regulations. The futility of using such punitive methods to
enforce respect for the law was entirely lost on authorities.

73.

While levies and punitive para-military operations were common features of early
policing in Kenya, things began to change somewhat in the 1930s. A notable
shift took place in the way that the police approached the public; a new era of
somewhat more advanced policing was ushered in as the force attempted to deal
in a more targeted fashion with threats to overall law and order.

Criminal Investigation Department
74.

This new era of policing in Kenya was characterized by establishment of a discrete
unit dedicated to the pursuit of higher value crimes and criminals: the Criminal
Investigation Department (CID). As with so many other aspects of colonial
policing, the story of the CID is a murky, often contradictory one. In 1908, a
committee set up to review the force concluded that a criminal investigation and
criminal records department could not be established because Kenya lacked the
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calibre of [European] officers necessary to properly run such departments. The
following year Captain Edwards—the new Inspector General of Police—offered a
completely different opinion. He was of the view that criminal investigation and
criminal records units were hallmarks of a modern police force. He recommended
that notwithstanding the lack of personnel, the force had to consider creating
them. Edwards was particularly anxious about criminal records describing them
as weapon for detection and against re-offending. However, no movement
was made on the issue. For the next decade, the closest that the force came to
criminal records was a small Finger Print unit run by a single officer.
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75.

The question of a Criminal Investigation Department returned in 1925 when the
Police Commissioner bemoaned the lack of funds and personnel necessary to
handle serious cases. Even so, the decision was made to push ahead with the formal
creation of a specialized unit. It is unclear how this decision came about. One thing
is certain, Nairobi and other settled areas at this stage played host to an expanded
array of crimes—forgery, rape, murders, housebreakings, violent robberies—that
resulted in the usual hue and cry that something needed to be done. The more
sensational cases were reported in the press in lurid detail further creating the
impression that crime was spiralling out of control. More likely than not, the new CID
was a product of the need (and the need to be seen) to respond to the activities of
an increasingly sophisticated criminal class. Few other details about the early history
of the department are available other than attempts were made to recruit the most
qualified African, Asian and European officers. The following year—1926—was spent
giving organisational shape to the department. The Criminal Record Department
was also formalized.

76.

While it got off to a slow start, by the mid-1930s the CID began to be regarded
as something of a success story. The department was credited with developing
a network of informants that finally allowed the police to arrive at some sort of
understanding of the crime and criminals that so plagued the colony. By the
very nature of their work, these agents and informers worked in the shadows
and in anonymity. Very little is known about their identities and their motives
for engaging in such work. Some may well have been criminals themselves or at
the very least, associates. Whatever their identities and their motives informants
helped the police to amass criminal intelligence, make arrests and initiate
prosecution. Statistically, the Police Department began to register impressive
increases in three key areas: the number of cases being reported, conviction rates
and the number of parolees under police supervision. At their simplest, increases
between 70 percent and 80 percent provide evidence of increased efficiency and
productivity in a buffed-up police force. These figures do, however, have to be
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treated with a certain amount of care because they cannot be desegregated
into petty and serious crimes/offenders. In other words, there is no real way to
determine from the statistics alone whether the creation of the CID actually led
to a dent in serious crime. The department’s greatest achievement may well have
been the simple creation of the impression that the police were taking crime
more seriously than they previously had.

Special Branch
77.

The creation of Special Branch represents another attempt by the Kenya Police to
refine and professionalise its operations in the mid-1920s. The unit’s origins were,
however, fairly innocuous in that initially it was simply a part of the larger Criminal
Investigation Department. The Intelligence Branch—as it was then known—sat
unheralded within the CID largely because of a lack of clarity. Nobody could really
say what was that an Intelligence Branch was meant to do.

78.

Modern practitioners and analysts offer a layered definition of the term “intelligence”:
The meaning of the word intelligence varies among people and even within governments.
It certain contexts, it connotes information needed or desired by government in order
to pursue its national interests. It means information or news concerning an enemy or
an area of an agency engaged in obtaining such information. It includes the process
of obtaining, evaluating, protecting and eventually exploiting the same information.
It also encompasses the defense of government’s institutions from penetration and
harm by hostile intelligence services. The term is also used to describe mechanisms and
the bureaucracies that accomplish these activities. Hence intelligence is knowledge,
organization and process. Its four major disciplines (analysis, collection, counter
intelligence and covert action) are interdependent.

79.

By this definition, the Kenya Police of the early colonial era cannot comfortably
be described as an intelligence-oriented body. Out of sheer necessity, however,
police officers performed many intelligence functions. During World War I, the
Kenya Police oversaw an ad hoc intelligence operation that sought to acquire
information on German and Italian activities along Kenya’s borders. A wide cast of
characters was drawn into the effort to establish what Britain’s enemies were up to.
Game rangers, hunters, traders, messengers and even missionaries were all used
to get a sense of troop movements and formations. The police were responsible
for basis processing and analysis of the data and sending it on to the military for
consumption. With the end of the war, the police retreated from issues of national
and external security and returned to their usual fodder of crime and punishment;
law and order. The Intelligence Department appeared somewhat redundant in a
force preoccupied with fairly local concerns.
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80.

In the 1930s, the Intelligence Department began to find its feet again somewhat.
The main reason for this was the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935 – 1936. While Kenyan
territory was never actually threatened by this tussle for autonomy and power
between Italy and Ethiopia, the war had important intelligence implications. There
were well-grounded concerns, for instance, about the threats presented by refugees
and runaway troops. Another worry was the impact that unrest would have on
the already volatile and insecure Northern Frontier District. It therefore became
very important for the Police to run intelligence operations out of outposts like
Mandera and Garissa. The usual network of herdsmen, hunters and tradesmen was
activated to gather whatever information they could about this difficult yet highly
vulnerable terrain. The need for intelligence continued on into the late 1930s as
the tensions that would eventually explode into World War manifested (albeit on
a much smaller scale) in East Africa. In the months before war broke out, both the
Intelligence Department and the military placed an increasingly high premium
on sources who could speak to the activities of Italian troops, their equipment,
weaponry and officers. The department did its best to meet need for this kind of
information.

Policing the emergency
81.

On the 20th of October 1952 the Governor of Kenya, Evelyn Baring, declared a State
of Emergency. For the next seven years, Kenya was effectively at war with itself
as colonial authorities attempted to get to grips with the Mau Mau uprising. Mau
Mau, its origins, unfolding and its implications for the overall story of human rights
violations in Kenya are dealt with at some length in other sections of this report.
This particular section concerns itself with the institutional and organisational
implications of the Emergency for the Police Force. The Commission’s interest stems
from a broad understanding that the Emergency was an extraordinary period that
made extraordinary demands of the police, military, security and intelligence. The
Emergency is a watershed moment in the policing history of Kenya; seven years of
both intense and unconventional warfare changed the force completely.

The lead up
82.

62

The five or so years in the lead up to the Emergency were busy ones for the force
occasioned by the placement of the African Reserves under police jurisdiction. The
size of the force increased. More significantly, efforts were made to improve terms
of service. In 1946, a Governor-appointed committee was established to investigate
such issues as pensions, housing, allowances, promotions, uniforms and other
benefits. A number of the committee’s recommendations were accepted by the
government at the same time that greater investments were made in hardware and
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equipment. Once again, these were increases were pegged to police expansion into
previously neglected regions. New motor vehicles were acquired. The distances
involved in this new policing effort led to a revamping in communication. New radios
were purchased and in 1943, a Signals Branch was established. Run by a European
supervisor and ten African signallers, the Signals Branch became the lifeblood of
such far flung areas as the Northern Frontier District. Small but vital, signals were the
primary means of passing information between various districts and their respective
headquarters. They were absolutely critical to determining police reactions to a
given situation.
83.

In 1948, there was another important development with the opening of a new police
training school in Kiganjo. A small trading centre in the heart of central Kenya, Kiganjo
replaced Nairobi as the location of the national Police Training Depot. Senior police
administrators were proud of their new establishment. The buildings were described
as airy, clean and far more conducive to effective learning than then run-down facilities
that compromised the old depot in Nairobi. Other facilities on the campus included a
clinic, a dispensary and spacious living quarters for faculty. The police were prouder
still of the actual syllabus offered to incoming students. After several decades of trying,
the police were still trying to reduce the militarized nature of the training offered
to new recruits. Many of the instructors at Kiganjo were knowledgeable in modern
methods taught at the Police College in England itself; the hope was that the Kenya
Police Force would finally become much more civilian-oriented in its overall approach.
Optimism aside, the new training school was under considerable pressure. The number
of new recruits in the force was so large that the six month course was slashed to three
months. This was the only way that everyone could be accommodated. With this, of
course, came concerns that the much-vaunted training was being watered down and
that recruits were leaving Kiganjo somewhat prematurely.

84.

Another worry was that incoming recruits had such different levels of education
that it was difficult to standardize the training offered them. Some were completely
illiterate and others were much more proficient. Even so, Kiganjo remained the
jewel in the Kenya Police Force’s crown. Contemporary observers could not hide
their joy at the school’s graduates:
All who have been privileged to watch a Passing Out Parade at the Kenya Police Training
School, Kiganjo, cannot have failed to be impressed greatly by the smartness, precision
and excellence of these parades. The recruits, who have completed their course of
training are posted to units for duty as fully-fledged policemen and they put up a
remarkable performance which reflects the highest possible credit on the School and
its staff of instructors. It is made only too evident that no effort is spared in turning out
thoroughly smart and efficient policemen.
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85.

These new batches of policemen and Kiganjo graduates were draw into a complex
criminal environment that tested their new found skills and training to the limit.
Kenya in the lead up to the Emergency presented a variety of law enforcement
challenges. Crime continued to soar in and around Nairobi. Stock theft continued
to plague outlying and frontier areas. What really distinguished the pre-emergency
years, however, was a steady rise in politically and religiously-driven incidents which,
more often than not, were given to the police to tackle despite the fact these were
not clear-cut law enforcement issues. Discussed at length in another section of this
report, the Kollowa Massacre of 1950 is an example of a complex anti-colonial uprising
turned into a simple policing matter. A company of almost fifty policemen were
posted to a remote part of West Pokot to deal with Louis Pkech and three hundred
of his armed followers. The results of this encounter were spectacularly disastrous;
scores lay dead at end of the fire fight between the police and civilians. Dini ya
Jesu Kristu, a Kikuyu-based sect, posed a similar threat with its complete rejection
of European norms. When in December 1947 sect members attacked police killing
three of them, Dini ya Jesu Kristu became the object of a sustained police operation
that eventually resulted in the arrest and trial of two dozen of them. In both cases the
underlying theme was African rebellion against colonial norms.

86.

The rise of such overtly anti-colonial disquiet prompted a drastic re-drawing of
Special Branch. By the 1950s, it was no longer possible for authorities to ignore
the ever growing tides of unrest sweeping across the country. From trade unions
to trade unions to political associations, various factions and constituencies in
Kenya made their disdain for colonial rule known. The need to understand these
groups and to gather information was what finally pushed police authorities give
Special Branch shape and definition. The unit was removed from underneath the
Criminal Investigation Department. In 1945 Special Branch was assigned its own
director who in turn reported to the Member for Law and Order (the Attorney
General) instead of the Commissioner of Police. Special Branch’s realignment
allowed the unit to turn inwards and focus on individuals and groups deemed to
threaten Kenya’s internal security and cohesion. The revamped unit placed new
emphasis on political rather than strictly criminal activity. Theoretically, therefore,
Special Branch entered the Emergency with an improved ability to keep of political
dissonance and dissidents.

87.

Before the full scale and nature of the uprising dawned on the administration,
government officials tackled Mau Mau incidents disparately. In other words, there
was no structured response with each policing division responding in its own
capacity and in its own time. Some police divisions choose to impose police levies.
Others embarked on a flurry of mass arrests, fines and prosecutions for such offenses
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as illegal assembly and malicious damage to property. In the first few months of
1952, it became clear that what colonial was up against was a movement that was
far more cohesive than they had previously imagined. Oathing was being carried out
on a systematic almost industrial scale. By the middle of 1952, there were carefully
organized raids on settler farms killing hundreds of sheep, goats and cattle. Holdings
in and around Mount Kenya in particular were badly hit. State responses continued
to be largely uncoordinated until May 1952 when a Special Police Bureau was
established. The Bureau’s only job was to work on Mau Mau and Mau related cases. In
August, the Bureau was supplemented with something called the “The Special Effort
Force”. The Special Effort Force was made up of detachments of police officers drawn
in from all over Kenya including Northern Kenya. Seven hundred men were on hand
to assist in anti-Mau Mau campaigns. These initial reforms did very little to stem the
flow of Mau Mau activity. From the end of 1952 onwards, the police were forced to
embark on program of rapid expansion and reorganization. There were several key
elements to this expansion and re-organization:

The General Service Unit
88.

Police administrators had long expressed the need for the Kenya Police to have a
standing emergency force that could be used during extraordinary situations when
regular policing channels were not enough. This was a need that predated the
Emergency as, incidentally, did the response. In 1948, a Police Emergency Company
was created. At first it was little more than a mobile unit consisting of a handful of
armoured cars and an unknown number of men. With the onset of the Emergency,
the Police Company became the object of wholesale reform. It was renamed the
General Services Unit. Forty seven European and just over 1000 African officers were
added to the unit. Platoons consisting of an African and a European Inspector and 40
men were sent to the provincial headquarters of Central, Rift Valley, Nairobi, Nyanza
and the Coast. Each platoon was equipped with a Land Rover, a pick-up, a 3-tonne
lorry, wireless radios, tents and modern arms. The concentration of Mau Mau activity
in Central and Rift Valley meant that these two provinces received extra infusions
from the General Service Unit. Nyeri was assigned a total of 12 platoons with 500
men. Five platoons each were sent to Rift Valley and Nairobi.

Kenya Police Reserve
89.

Like the Emergency Company, the Kenya Police Reserve started life as a fairly
innocuous and low profile branch of the larger police force. The Reserve was
initially concocted as a response to the pressures of World War II and the need for
extra boots on the ground to support the war effort. In 1943, the Legislative Council
passed regulations requiring all male adult Europeans to sign up for basic military
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training. In 1944, these regulations were changed slightly to allow conscripts to
see out their service in auxiliary police units. Three years later, these units were
disbanded but continuing shortages in the police meant that approximately three
hundred men were retained as a force that was known as the Special Police. Its
status was regularized in 1948 with the Kenya Police Reserve Ordinance. At first,
Police Reserve was almost European in its membership. Asian members were
outnumbered by almost four to one. There were no Africans.
90.

The exigencies of the Emergency led to a sharp redrawing of the Kenya Police
Reserve. In 1948 it was opened to Africans again as a means of adding numbers
and bite to the fight against Mau Mau. Very quickly large numbers of Africans
began to join the Reserve. Their training can only described as rudimentary; no
Kiganjo-style lessons were on offer. Instead African reservists were taken through
a very basic program focused on the use of modern rifles and arms. They were then
issued with uniforms and badges and sent out into the field. Their role was loose
and largely undefined. It seems that they were deployed to wherever they were
needed providing extra manpower during sweeps and raids. They also conducted
patrols. Despite their rag-tag training and lack of structure, the Reserve has been
described as having ‘rendered invaluable service to the Force and the Colony.’

The Police Air wing
91.
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The Police Air Wing was formed in 1948. The impetus behind its formation was the
need to enable the police to respond to emergency situations in far flung areas
that could not easily be reached using regular methods. The Air Wing was small
but expensive to run. Pilots and planes were drawn from both public and private
sources. They were also only available on a part-time basis. The typical air wing
incident involved evacuating critically injured or ill people from remote farms,
hospitals or missions. As with other branches of the policing tree in Kenya, the
Emergency wrought a number of changes. Pilots were employed full time and more
planes purchased. Modern radios and sets allowed synchronized communication.
Military and police strategists were quick to realize that the Air Wing gave number
of strategic advantages over the Mau Mau. The Air Wing was quickly pressed into
bombing raids in the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests and ranges. By 1954, these
were regular features of the effort. Planes overflew sites identified as Mau Mau
strongholds and released one thousand pound bombs. It was also not unheard of
for officers to throw grenades out and to shoot out of open plane doors. An air base
at Nanyuki served as the Wing’s main operational base in Central and Rift Valley. In
1957, permanent headquarters was set up at Wilson Airport in Nairobi and the wing
was confirmed as part of the police force.
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Special Branch
92.

The Criminal Investigation Department and Special Branch were also not
immune to the exigencies of the emergency. Both were forced to adjust to the
tremendous security challenges birthed by the Mau Mau crisis. But for Special
Branch in particular, the Emergency was transformational. The Emergency’s
impact was profound on an institution that, up to this point, struggled for identity
and purpose. Special Branch entered the Mau Mau period as a fairly autonomous
body with its own headquarters (in Nairobi) and its own reporting line (through
the Attorney General). As it emerged that the threat facing Kenya was an
overwhelmingly internal one, the focus on externally-oriented intelligence was
dropped. In its place rose strategies and structures dedicated to the acquisition
of information on Mau Mau. The restructuring of Special Branch was overseen
at the very highest levels. In November 1952 the Director-General of Security
Services in Britain (MI5), Sir Percy Sillitoe, arrived in Kenya charged with review
of the prevailing security situation and making whatever recommendations he
saw fit. Sillitoe’s assessment was unsympathetic concluding that Kenya’s security
and intelligence services were simply not fit for purpose. If anything, Sillitoe may
well have agreed with various top officials who argued that weaknesses within
Special Branch may actually have led to a failure to understand and combat Mau
Mau during the early years.

93.

The Sillitoe-authored restructuring was sweeping and ambitious. Its effects
persisted long after the end of the Emergency and can easily be described as the
foundation of modern intelligence and security in Kenya. Sillitoe drew extensively
from Britain’s experiences during the Malayan Emergency which also involved a
guerilla army taking on a traditional colonial army in a war of independence. Sillitoe
recommended the creation of central body responsible for the collection and
analysis of intelligence. This body was named the Kenya Intelligence Committee. In
addition to receiving and analysing intelligence, the Kenya Intelligence Committee
would also give direct advice to the governor regarding based on its reading of the
information that it was privy to. Sitting on the Kenya Intelligence Committee were
the head of Special Branch, the Secretary for Law and Order (the Attorney General)
and members of African Affairs and East African Command Security Liaison.
Stilltoe also recommended the establishment of such Intelligence Committees
at the Provincial and District level with the same collection, analysis and advisory
functions.

94.

Special Branch itself was overhauled to reflect its increased prominence in the new
security/intelligence arrangements. Recruitment was stepped up to fill vacancies in
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Special Branch units set up in all districts and provinces. However, new officers were
not easy to come by and Special Branch was frequently in competition with the CID
for the very best and most highly qualified officers. Efforts were made to harmonize
the handling of files and other security or intelligence material. All districts and
provinces were set up with secret registries and reading rooms for sensitive
documents. As mentioned above, the focus on politically-relevant intelligence was
sharpened. No politically prominent Africans were immune from Special Branch’s
determined and relentless gaze. At the same time a military element was also
integrated with the realization that such intelligence could be used to plan specific
operations and tactics. Field Intelligence Officers (Military Intelligence) were tacked
onto Special Branch. In Mau Mau hotspots, Special Branch, the Police and the Army
were all put into an overarching unit known as JAPOIT (Joint Army Police Intelligence
Team) which became an operational focal point.
95.

By its very nature Special Branch work during the emergency was hidden and
secretive. One issue on which there is a certain amount of openness and pride is the
unit’s use of infiltrators. Special Branch was behind the creation of so-called ‘pseudo
gangs’ that were sent into the forests to gather information and intelligence from
genuine Mau Mau. Pseudo gangs were valuable assets not only for the information
they yielded but also because they were charged with destabilising and confusing
Mau Mau from within. A special unit known as ‘the Bureau’ was set up to handle
and organize the gangs.

Home guards
96.
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Twenty five thousand strong (at their peak) the Home Guards were an important
part of the overall policing response to Mau Mau. Technically speaking, however,
they were not really police. Home Guards were drawn from the parallel Tribal or
Administration Police. Colonial chiefs known as loyalists because of their fidelity
to the colonial government first began to put together teams of home guards in
1952. In a process that is still unclear, Home Guards eventually received official
sanction and approvals. Some of them underwent a very rudimentary training and
were assigned basic weapons and uniforms. Home Guards were not under direct
police control. Instead, their received orders from chiefs, headmen and others in
the parallel system of Native Administration. In the course of their duties—patrols,
guarding of villages, anti-Mau Mau sweeps—home guards worked closely with the
various other branches of the police force described above. Home Guards have
even been described as the most effective weapon that the colonial government
had in the fight against Mau Mau on account of their knowledge of the local culture
and terrain.
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Post-emergency policing
97.

The State of Emergency was not lifted until the very of end 1959. By 1957, however,
authorities were quietly confident that Mau Mau no longer presented the threat
that it once had and that a scaling back of sorts could take place. In 1958, the
military returned to barracks leaving the police in complete charge. A handful of
cells continued to be active necessitating small-scale (but robust) mopping up
operations in the Aberdares, Meru and Embu. Such operations were, however, the
exception rather than the rule. For the most part, official attention began to turn
back to more ordinary policing matters.

98.

One of the most pressing issues was the handling of the thousands of extra men who
had been drafted into the force from 1953. It became very important to decide their
fate as not all of them could be retained. A number of them lost their jobs outright as
police posts and stations in Central and Rift Valley were shut down. Kiganjo School
absorbed some of the overflow as well with some 3600 constables who joined the
force at the beginning of the Emergency undergoing training. Another issue became
the revisiting of crimes that had been left somewhat unattended as the force grappled
with Mau Mau. The frequency and intensity of poaching increased particularly in Hola,
Makindu and Voi. Last seen dropping bombs over the forests of Mount Kenya and the
Aberdares, Kenya Police Force aircraft were re-diverted to surveillance, reconnaissance
and tracking. The perennially troublesome question of livestock continued to plague
frontier districts. In late November 1957, Merille tribesmen from Ethiopia crossed
into Northern Kenya killing almost 180 Turkana villagers. In a response that would lay
down a modern template, a number of police units set of in pursuit of the Merille. Two
companies KAR was also called upon to assist.

99.

The end of the Emergency put to an end to one kind of political activism but it also
marked the rise to others. Mau Mau made it clear that Kenya had no future whatsoever
as a colony of any kind; settler or otherwise. Independence was inevitable. Kenya’s
different political constituencies repositioned and realigned themselves all in readiness
for the handover of power. Unionists, workers, politicians and their followers took to
organizing all manner of rallies, strikes and demonstrations. Because these sometimes
turned violent, the police were anxious to see that they did not. Riot and crowd control
became a top priority as did the monitoring of political luminaries. To this end, both
Special Branch and the Criminal Investigation Department retained the highest levels
of support and funding that could be afforded them. In the middle of 1957, a new
CID training was opened in a Nairobi suburb. Specialized courses were offered in
investigation, detective work and prosecution. Special Branch Training School opened
the following year in the same location with advanced classes for officers.
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100.

Structurally, a number of adjustments were made again with the aim of giving the
department a forward-looking and progressive gloss. One of the most important
interventions was the creation of the new position of Deputy Commissioner (Field).
This was a key bridging post designed to link police officers out in the field more
closely to Police Headquarters. His job was to communicate central policy to those in
the more outlying areas and to make them feel closer to events in Nairobi. Similarly,
the Deputy Commissioner was charged with communicating information and
sentiments in the field back to headquarters. Post-emergency budgeting reflected
the continuing centrality of the police and law enforcement. Hundreds of thousands
of pounds were allocated to the force to embark on an expansive (and expensive)
building scheme. New police stations and new police housing were planned. Most
ambitiously of all, a large modern headquarters was to be constructed in downtown
Nairobi. Completed towards the end of 1957, the new building signified the dawning
of a new era for the police in particular and Kenya in general. Spacious and modern,
the new building finally united all branches of the force under one roof. Plans were
made to add a second block to house Special Branch and the Criminal Investigations
Department.

101.

The immediate run-up to independence found senior police officers in a somber,
reflective mood. Mistakes past and future possibilities were on Commissioner Catling’s
mind as he delivered a seminal speech in October 1960. Catling acknowledged serious
failings during the Emergency and described the police as completely ‘unprepared’
for the storm that would break in the form of Mau Mau. He was also acknowledged
that the force had great difficulty in fighting the emergency and carrying out normal
policing work at the same time. The main thrust of the speech was, however, forward
looking with Catling concentrating on the force’s impending transformation into a
post colonial entity.

102. Two things appeared to concern the Commissioner about the upcoming era. The
first was that police officers develop a reputation for public and citizen-oriented
service. Implicit in this of course was the acceptance that this was something that
the force had previously been unable to do. The hope was that notions of service
would somehow be inculcated:
Kenya policemen exercise their powers and responsibilities on behalf of the citizens of
this country—powers and responsibilities which in essence are shared by all citizens
alike—and not as the agent of a higher authority. These policemen are therefore the
appointed agents of those citizens for ensuring conditions in which the people of
Kenya can go about their lawful occasions in peace and without fear. In other words
we were trying to say that the description of a policeman as an officer of the law
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and a servant of the public should really mean something and that the importance
of this distinction between the policeman and the ordinary Government civil servant
should be realized and understood by the people of the county, no less than by the
policemen themselves.

103. The second issue was, as Catling delicately put it, the selection and training of
local police officers for higher offices and ranks. Otherwise (and simply) put:
Africanisation. Once again, the sub-text was clear in that there was the unspoken
concession that the force was devoid of Africans at the senior levels. According
to Catling, some progress had been made with the promotion of some 200
corporals to various ranks within the overall Inspectorate. The Commissioner was
blunt in his assessment of the poor prospects of further advancement; there were
simply not enough locals to promote without a sharp reduction in the quality
of policing. Compulsory Africanisation would put the police force on a slippery
downward slope unless drastic measures were taken:
We shall not be stuffy, unimaginative or fearful in tackling it but the object cannot be
achieved with reasonable speed or without an acceptable drop in efficiency with reasonable
speed unless training facilities are increased both Kenya and the United Kingdom.

104. In conclusion, Catling sketched out a picture of a meritorious police force populated
by police officers who earned appointments and promotions on the basis of their
work, productivity and results. His vision was for a force that would thus rice to the
policing challenge of independent Kenya:
We have reached our position by basing advancement in the force on a combination
of ability, merit and professional regardless of race, by concentrating on quality and
not quantity and by devoting our resources to the production of quality. I believe that
it would be foolhardy and wrong to desert these principles for anything else. I believe
that we should be doing a disservice to the people of Kenya if we did. Moreover, there
appears to be no reason why we should. There is good material in the Force today which,
by training and experience can be advanced to high responsibility although this will
require time. We face the future therefore with confidence and are not afraid… 8

105. Catling’s smooth optimism was misleading even deceptive. The police force that
marched towards independence in 1963 was, as the Commission has established,
deeply and historically troubled. From the 1890s right through to the late 1950s
and early 1960s, the Kenya police force clearly structured itself around the policing
needs of a small and politically powerful elite and racial minority. Kenya’s police
force was from the outset built to cater to these privileged few. What little money
and few resources it had were channelled towards the protection of a handful.
8

Foran 230.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

71

Volume IIA

Chapter TWO

Most ordinary Africans were left to fend largely for themselves in a parallel policing
universe run by administration police, chiefs and village headmen. Direct links
between these two very different worlds were tenuous and infrequent. When,
however, the Kenya Police Force did encounter African populations it was with a
force, violence and lack of understanding that the Commission has characterized
as devastating. Kenya’s experiences have also made it difficult to argue that the
eventual bringing in of African reserves under the umbrella of the Kenya Police
Force was born of anything other than age-old impulse to protect and guard
the same elite interests that dominated in the White Highlands and larger urban
areas. With the colonial administration itself describing Mau Mau as a policing and
intelligence failure, the Emergency itself represents a mighty effort to re-impose
law and order on the wayward and misguided.
106. Fifty plus years of racialised, elite and coercive policing were not easy to
dislodge. Kenya’s police force would not have found it easy to shed nearly half
a century of such deeply rooted characteristics. Moreover the force had such a
long and stuttering history of reform that few expectations could be attached
to the adjustments made to Kenya Police in anticipation of Independence. For
the Commission then, the Kenya Police Force of 1960 much resembled the Kenya
Police Force of the 1900s: narrow in outlook, unclear in mission and violent
in tendency. It was a deadly combination which, as is discussed elsewhere in
this report, would have stunning consequences for the human rights story of
Independent Kenya.

The Military
107. There are few more visible symbols of the chaos of the colonial project than a
colonial army on the rampage. From Cape to Cairo and beyond, the European
presence in Africa was both established and maintained through the barrel of a
gun. Kenya was no exception to this overall rule of colonial rule as the product
of brute force. From the outset, British exploits in Kenya were defined militarily.
Civilian authority rested almost entirely on the ability to marshal colonial troops
and forces generally (but not always) better organized and equipped than
indigenous ones. The incidents and events that gave rise to military encounters
are in themselves worthy of attention because, again, they clearly demonstrate
the violence of the collision between the conquering and the conquered.
108. The military history of Kenya is the history of an institution that has long dominated
accounts of gross human rights violations in Kenya. For the Commission, therefore,
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the exploration of Kenya’s military past provides an opportunity to explore those
organisational arrangements, structures and attitudes that have shaped the
military present. Apart from continuities, the Commission is also interested in
questions of reinvention, and reform and the various ways that Kenya’ military has
tried to break with its past. The overall story, as the Commission understands it, is
a complex one that intersects with well-known currents in Kenyan history as well
presenting a number of less obvious ones.

Origins
109. While recognizing that many indigenous African societies had sophisticated
and well-organized military systems, most military histories of the continent
begin with colonialism. The Commission follows this convention by beginning
its analysis of Kenya’s military in the late 1870s and 1880s with the arrival of the
Imperial British East African Company. The IBEAC was a purely commercial concern
established to exploit East Africa’s natural resources.9 A primary concern for the
company became the creation of an environment that would allow trade and
commerce to thrive. From the outset then security was an issue with rudimentary
police and military forces established to protect, defend and expand Company
territory. IBEAC police have already been described as unprofessional, poorly
organized and only capable of performing the most basic of tasks.10
110. The IBEAC military and armed forces fit into the same mould.11 They were a
motley bunch. Some were former mercenaries from Baluchistan and Iran.
Originally hired by the Sultan of Zanzibar to take on enemies, threats and revolts
on the mainland, some of these men were taken on in the 1870s by a Lieutenant
Matthews. Matthews was a naval officer mainly responsible for anti-slavery
patrols but he also undertook various expeditions on land. A decade later,
Matthews was in charge of some 1,300 men. The force stood at 850 strong in the
early 1890s and leadership was taken over by a Captain Hatch. Hatch organized
them into 12 companies. A band and drums added a little pomp and ceremony.
Populating the force presented the Company with an ongoing challenge. The
Zanzibari mercenaries continued to feature. There were also discussions about
the wholesale importation of troops from Sierra Leone and from Southern Africa.
These suggestions were dismissed as expensive and unworkable. Eventually, the
Company settled on man power from the Sudan and various other miscellaneous
9

For more on the economic imperatives of the IBEAC, see William Robert Ochieng and Robert Maxon (eds), An Economic History
of Kenya. Nairobi: East African Publishing Company, 1992.
10 See sub-section above on the history of policing in Kenya.
11 The central text on the early history of the King’s African Rifles is Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A
Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1940.
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soldiers who had seen service in Afghanistan and Egypt. The end product was
predictably messy. Different languages, cultures and levels of training were
thrown together into a collection of ‘slipshod, half-clothed and half-drilled’
soldiers.12 Half-clothed and half-drilled though they were, the Company had
no alternatives. These were the only men available for deployment to various
hot and trouble spots along the Kenyan Coast and hinterland. The sultanate
of Witu near Lamu was particularly restive and became the focus of a number
of expeditions. What little is known about these early expeditions is that they
were violent affairs pitting company forces against local ones with frequently
disastrous consequences for the local ones.
111. For reasons that are explained in detail elsewhere, the IBEAC could not administer
its East African holdings. In 1895, the Foreign Office took responsibility for
running the territory that was now referred to as the East African Protectorate.
Sir Arthur Hardinge-, previously the Consul General in Zanzibar--moved to
Mombasa take up a new appointment as the Commissioner of British East Africa.
Hardinge inherited 800-odd soldiers. Half were stationed in Mombasa and the
rest in Jubaland, Tana and surrounding areas. They were as poorly trained and
equipped as they had been during the Company era. In that regard, there was
no change. Hardinge was disparaging about his charges describing them as
‘inclined to drunkenness’.13

East African Rifles
112. Initially, few efforts were made to improve the actual quality of the troops. Issues
of discipline and equipment were put on the back burner. Instead, Hardinge and
his team occupied themselves with questions of re-organizing and re-drawing.
They initiated a number of administrative reforms that would have important
and long standing implications. All the troops were pulled into a single regiment
called the East African Rifles. The erstwhile Captain Hatch was proposed as
the overall commandant. He was assigned two assistants. Both Hardinge and
Hatch were of the opinion that, at the very least, 1000 troops were needed to
garrison the protectorate. But once again the question of actual recruitment
was shelved in favour of more immediate and more administrative concerns.
The Protectorate was divided into three large military districts: Tana/Seyyidieh,
Ukambani and Jubaland. The 800 troops of the East African Rifles were divided
amongst three districts with Hatch and his two assistants at the helm. In 1897,
12 Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1940,
96.
13 Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1940,
104.
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there was another restructuring that resulted in the drafting of a further two
hundred troops bringing the total regiment size to 1000; the figure that Hardinge
had originally recommended.
113. The East Africa Rifles was short-lived. By the early 1900s, it was disbanded to make
way for a new formation. Its life was however, was an eventful one. The regiment was
immediately drawn into the violent and messy task of subduing African resistance
to British rule. A process known as pacification was anything but peaceful. Troops
were dispatched to all corners of the Protectorate to take on the various groups
that were challenging the imposition of colonial rule. Resistance was widespread
but certain regions stood out for the persistence and intensity of their campaigns.
Jubaland, for instance, consistently presented challenge as the various groups
took on the British. In 1901, a campaign was launched against the Ogaden who
had been battling the British since 1893. Crushing the Ogaden had been the goal
of an earlier mission in 1898. Limited success meant that the Ogaden continued to
raid and attack all manner of government expeditions.
114. While the Ogaden were peculiarly dogged fighters, the expedition launched
against them was fairly typical for the time. EAR troops moved into the area with
very little understanding of the fighters that they were up against; they were
very rarely the beneficiaries of local intelligence and espionage. The troops
and their commanders would have been unfamiliar with the unconventional
guerilla tactics used by their opponents. Excessive heat and a desert terrain
made matters very difficult for the EAR and often left them with significant
losses during their encounters with the enemy. Modern weaponry gave the
regiment some advantages and they were also able to inflict damage against
Ogaden who were only equipped with daggers and swords. With time, the EAR
adapted somewhat to the harsh environment that they found themselves in.
The creation of a camel corps for instance helped with mobility and transport in
the thick desert shrubs.
115.

By the middle of 1901, the campaign was winding down. Once again, however,
results were mixed. Despite increases in size and re-organization, the EAR was unable
to completely snuff out the rebellion. The Ogaden, like several other communities
continued to resist the British—both overtly and covertly—for many years. It is
not altogether possible (or even useful) to make assessments about the regiment’s
success of failure. For the Commission, the regiment’s importance lies in highlighting
the difficulties encountered in the creation of a military tradition where none existed.
It was difficult, touch and go work that demanded time, resources and expertise that
were not always available in early colonial Kenya.
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Uganda Rifles
116.

The Uganda Rifles was also important to the overall history of the military in
Kenya. If anything, it was probably much more pivotal than the EAR because of the
controversial nature of the missions that it undertook. Older and larger, the Uganda
Rifles regiment dates back to 1890 when Captain Lugard set off from Mombasa en
route to Buganda. His mission on the face of it was a simple one: to set up shop on
behalf of his employers, the Imperial British East Africa. As it turned out, Lugard’s
actions in the Buganda heartland triggered off a complex chain of events that resulted
in the eventual colonization of the whole of Uganda. That particular narrative lies
beyond the Commission’s mandate (even though the interconnectedness of British
colonialism meant that the conquest of Uganda had direct consequences for Kenya).

117.

What is of interest here is Lugard’s putting together of the fighting force that would
eventually become the Uganda Rifles. Lugard first left Mombasa with some 70
Sudanese soldiers who had recruited by a Captain Williams in Egypt. As he travelled
inland, he added a further 100 Somali and Sudanese recruits. The usual complaints
about lack of discipline and training featured. The 400 porters who were part of
the expedition were described as ‘entirely useless’.14 The following year intensified
recruitment brought the total number of men available to Lugard to 650. Captain
Williams, who by this time was also stationed in Buganda, attempted to raise
standards by basic training and daily drills. The real change in fortunes came in
1891 when Lugard essentially inherited about eight hundred or so men who had
previously served under Emin Pasha in Equatoria Province, Sudan. Once again,
the specifics of Emin Pasha’s story belong to another strand of British colonial
history in East and Central Africa. The Commission’s only interest is in the arrival
of several hundred men described as the ‘best material for soldiery in Africa’.15

118. Actual legal recognition for the regiment would only come in September 1895 with
the Uganda Rifles Ordinance which provided for a Commandant, Chief Officers,
African Officers and under-Officers. But even before that, what Lugard was in fact
in charge of was by far the largest and most sophisticated collection of troops in
East Africa. It should come as no surprise that these were liberally used to take on
the various challenges to IBEAC supremacy. In Uganda itself those challenges were
many and serious. In 1893, for instance, the target became Bunyoro. A powerful
kingdom in the west, Bunyoro refused to accept protectorate status.16 The ruler
of Bunyoro, Kabarega was rumoured to command an army of some 8000 gunmen
and 20 000 spearmen. Unsurprisingly, the threat from Bunyoro elicited a vigorous
response from the IBEAC who marched on the kingdom with a strong force of its
14 Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 194, 49.
15 Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 194, 50.
16 For more on the complicated history of Bunyoro kingdom and its relationship with the British, see M.S.M. Kiwanuka, ‘Bunyoro and
the British: A Reappraisal of the Causes for the Decline of an African Kingdom’, Journal of African History 9 (4), 1968, pp. 603 – 619.
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led by a Colonel Colvile. What followed were two years of fierce fighting and the
eventual subjugation of Bunyoro resistance five years later.
119. One other aspect of the Ugandan Rifles’ early campaigns deserves mentioning:
weaponry. The regiment provides the clearest examples bestowed by superior
weaponry. As Lugard left Mombasa, he took with him a single Maxim gun.
Described in the literature as ‘worn-out’, the Maxim gun nevertheless underscored
that the key difference between the colonial and traditional militaries was the
ability to access modern firearms.17 And in the early 1890s, there was no weapon
more advanced than the Maxim. The gun itself was a re-worked version of the
heavier and more cumbersome Gatling gun and was capable of firing 600 rounds
per minute. A Maxim prototype had been used during the Emin Pasha expedition.
Somehow—it is not clear how—Lugard came to possess the final version of the
gun or why it was in such poor condition. At any rate, the gun had a brief but
starring role in Lugard’s campaign. During the battle of Mengo in January 1892,
the gun was fired for the first time leaving observers and the enemy with no
doubts about the weapon’s power. Weapons such as the Maxim gun were what
gave colonial formations the edge over their enemies. Without such weapons, it is
debatable whether they would have been able to take on African armies that were
often much better organized and disciplined.

Uganda Rifles and the Nandi Expeditions
120. Kenya’s military history is deeply intertwined with Uganda’s not least because until
1902, all land west of Lake Naivasha was actually part of the Uganda Protectorate.
Developments in [modern-day] Uganda had a direct impact on events in [modernday] Kenya. And so it was that was that as the unrest was quelled in Uganda,
attention turned to Kenya which presented similar challenges to British authority.
The Commission has already noted the difficulties that the Company along the
coast in Tana and Jubaland. These troubles followed the British as they moved
further inland with the railway and its attendant administration. As the railway
reached the western edge of the Rift Valley, it ran into very serious trouble with
local inhabitants completely opposed to the British passage and presence in their
lands. Nandi campaigns against the British are a much studied topic in Kenya’s
early colonial history on account of their determined nature.18 For the Commission,
they provide yet further evidence of a military past defined by spectacular and
unequal violence unleashed in the name of colonial pacification.
121.

The Uganda Rifles were central to British efforts to take on the Nandi. The regiment
was, by some distance, the best trained and equipped in the region. It was also much

17 Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 194, 49.
18 For detailed narrative on Nandi resistance see, A. T. Matson, Nandi Resistance to British Rule 1890 – 1906, Nairobi: East African
Publishing House, 1972.
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more battle hardened than, say, the East African Rifles. The dust in Bunyoro had
barely settled when the alarm was raised in Eldama Ravine; a small station deep in
the highlands that was an important stop over for those on their way westwards to
Lake Victoria and Uganda itself. Eldama Ravine and the surrounding areas became
the focus of Nandi campaigns to oust the British from their lands. Sporadic raids
were launched throughout 1895 as warriors attacked caravans stealing supplies and
weapons and inflicting casualties. There was real concern that British influence would
not be able to proceed past Eldama Ravine. After yet another attack in early October
1895 that left nine people dead, the decision was made to take action. Orders were
sent to Major Cunningham, the commanding officer of Uganda Rifles. On the 14th,
Cunningham and about left Kampala bound Kenya. He took with him almost one
thousand Sudanese and Ugandan men as well as the fabled Maxim gun. It took
him two weeks to reach Mumias, another westerly station. There he was joined by
Captain Sitwell and troops from the East African Rifles who had been in the region
since August on a separate excursion. Together they launched what is known in the
literature as the First Nandi expedition.
122. Descriptions of the fighting that ensued are vivid. They paint a picture of attacks
and counter attacks at high altitude and difficult surroundings. Sitwell, the EAR
commander, was an avid diarist and has left detailed accounts between his troops
and an enemy whom he described as determined and formidable. It is quite clear
that many of their encounters were dramatic:
In the valley of the River Kimondi, Cunningham stood to face a sudden attack, delivered
by about 500 tribesmen, who advanced rapidly through the long grass in a formation
resembling three sides of a square. It was the first time that the Sudanese had faced
tossing skin headdresses and flashing, long-bladed spears of the Nandi warriors, but they
stood firm and their fire checked the attack before it reached close quarters, though the
enemy scored a minor success by cutting off and annihilating a party of fourteen men.19

123. The Commission’s interest is in the dark underbelly that made the first Nandi
expedition and the two that followed so problematic. The dominant narrative of
a plucky colonial army against a cunning and deserving enemy is one that has
to be unpacked. Like many other colonial expeditions, the Nandi expeditions
were punitive. Their only goal was to punish the Nandi for their transgressions.
No distinctions were made between the guilty and the innocent or between the
civilian and the military. The tactics used reflected the military mindset. Sitwell’s
accounts are clear: he and his men swept through the countryside burning huts,
villages and crops. Other punitive measures included the confiscation of livestock.
For pastoralists and cattle-owning peoples such as the Nandi this was a painful and
keenly felt punishment. Once again, there is no doubt that such confiscations took
place. Colonial records themselves carefully document how many cows, sheep
19
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and goats were taken during each expedition. The records also show how the
booty was distributed amongst the officers. The confiscation and redistribution of
livestock laid the foundation for expeditions that were less about tackling unrest
and more about enrichment and personal gain. By June 1897, the proceeds of
the expeditions consisted of 238 cattle and 7, 800 sheep and goats.20 These were
distributed by seniority with commanding officers eligible for the highest quality
bulls. African troops were only entitled to the smaller stock (sheep and goats).
124.

It came as no surprise to the Commission that a very low premium was placed on
negotiation and discussion between aggrieved parties. The interaction between the
military and the Nandi was entirely pugilistic. There was no real interest in anything
other than a military solution to the Nandi issue. With the benefit of hindsight, it is
quite clear that no amount of force and militarism would ever resolve the problems
caused by the advent of colonial rule. Nandi concerns about loss of power, prestige,
territory and culture could not be blasted away with a maxim gun. The confusion and
violence surrounding the expeditions rendered all efforts at generating peaceful,
non-military solutions useless. On the 10 February 1896, a group of elders arrived in
Eldama to talk peace. Whether these elders were actually sanctioned to talk peace
is debatable as they lacked the ritual authority to control the younger warriors. That
notwithstanding, some kind of discussions were held and some kind of agreement
reached; the literature is not specific. Soon afterwards, the agreement collapsed. The
reason for the collapse was given as the construction of yet another fort/station in a
place known as Kipture. The stung elders withdrew and hostilities.

125. Fighting inspired yet more fighting. And, if anything sentiments hardened on both
sides. Writing in 1899 after nearly five years of back and forth battling, the District
Commissioner (Hobley) complained that ‘The Wanandi with the exception of a few
in the vicinity of the station, have all along viewed our presence in the country with
veiled repugnance…We were unwittingly living on the edge of a volcano’.21 The
volcano rumbled on and there were two further expeditions launched in 1900
and 1905. These will be discussed shortly.

Mutiny in the Ranks
126. The East African regiments were deeply troubled. The lack of training, money
and proper administration made for a very uneasy operating environment. The
military is by its very nature a highly regimented and stratified institution. People
occupy certain ranks and issue or receive orders accordingly. There is no room
for transgression. And yet such were the difficulties in the Uganda and the East
African rifles that revolt was almost inevitable. In 1897 mutiny broke out and
20

Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1945,
p. 69.
21 Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1945,
p. 86.
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made it starkly clear the levels of disaffection between foot soldiers and their
commanders:
Once again the details fall beyond the Commission’s mandate and as such cannot be
told here. The story itself is a complex one that is intricately tied up with the colonial
geo-politics of the conquest of East-Central Africa. In 1897 an exploratory expedition
was organized for the Sudanese province of Equatoria. The British Government became
convinced of the importance of mapping and investigating the province further. A large
expedition was raised under the command of a Major Macdonald. Three Uganda Rifles
companies were called up even though they had only just come out of many months
of arduous fighting in Bunyoro and in Nandi. Indeed, the plan was for the Uganda Rifles
men to wait in Eldama Ravine for Macdonald and to depart directly for Equatoria from
there. It was too much for the men. Instead of following instructions and waiting for
Macdonald to travel up from the coast, they deserted. After taking ammunition and
other supplies the men—most of them Sudanese—headed westwards for Uganda. What
made the Ugandan Mutiny particularly unusual was what happened next. Upon arrival
in Uganda the mutineers found sympathy and support amongst groups already rising
up against the British presence: the Bunyoro and Muslims. The result was a sprawling
and multifaceted rebellion further complicated by the fact that the Sudanese defectors
were skilful fighters and easily the best troops in East Africa. The British incurred several
losses and were often on the back foot. Lingering concerns about the loyalty of African
troops meant that the decision was made to import Indian troops. Even with these
reinforcements, the mutiny was not fully quashed until 1898.

127.

The British were surprisingly candid about the part they had played in the emergence
of Sudanese unhappiness. Subsequent debates and inquires in the House of
Commons depicted Macdonald as high handed and ‘uncompromisingly strict’ in his
dealings with troops whose language he did not understand.22 He was also criticized
for being tardy in his pursuit of the original group of mutineers from Eldama Ravine to
Uganda. Recognition was also made of underlying structural issues. In 1899, a Military
Ordinance was passed and it greatly improved the terms of service. Sudanese pay
was raised from seven to twenty rupees a month (though this was later scaled back
to eighteen). The more hard-nosed and political calculations was also made to slash
British dependency on what were—in some quarters—described as a mercenary
force. The mutiny had revealed the Sudanese impact on the Ugandan Rifles to be
very inordinately powerful. The Military Ordinance provided for the appointment of
more European officers and the strategic recruitment of larger number of Indian and
indigenous African troops. The Sudanese hold on the regiment was gradually diluted
out of pragmatic necessity.

128. While the need for post-mutiny reform was clear, some British administrators were
open in their admiration and respect for Sudanese services to the Uganda Rifles:
22
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Possibly they are not heroes—heroes are not required; but in endurance, subordination,
patience and cheerfulness, they are a model to be admired and imitated by every army
in the world. They would march twenty miles a day, or more, through long tangled grass
reaching over twenty miles a day, or more, through long tangled grass reaching over
their heads, through swamps and jungles, and at the end go foraging, sometimes for
many miles to fetch food. Crime and punishment were almost unknown; they worked
at parade, at agriculture, or at house-building, from sunrise to sunset, and they did so
cheerfully and well their monthly payment of some four shillings’ worth of white calico.23

King’s African Rifles
129.

While the Ugandan and East African Rifles were central, the starring role in Kenya’s
military history belongs to the King’s African Rifles (KAR). A direct line can be
drawn between the KAR and the current Kenya Defense Forces. The organization
and structure of the KAR provides a much more recognizable predecessor for the
KDF than the older Ugandan and East African formations. The regiment itself was
the product of strategic re-thinking in the War Office in London. Concerns about
fragmented and expensive nature of their Africans forces led top military officials to
embark on sweeping reforms. In the late 1890s, troops from Sierra Leone, Nigeria,
Gold Coast and Gambia were brought consolidated into a single force called the
West African Frontier Force. The first commander of the Frontier Force was none
other the (by now) Colonel Lugard fresh from his numerous adventures in East and
Central Africa.

130. The same need for consolidation was identified on the other side of the continent.
As the Commission has already intimated, the East African formations were in
something of a shambles. There was overlap and uncertain jurisdiction between
the East African and Ugandan Rifles. The confusion was magnified by equally loose
arrangements in the Central African Rifles of Nyasaland (Malawi) and the sporadic
contributions from Indian and Somali contingents. There was the further weight
of a large wage bill occasioned by the mutiny. In short, East Africa was in real need
of urgent reform. The Foreign and War Offices entertained various suggestions
and memoranda but what won out in the end was the proposal for the creation of
a force very similar to the West African one. In November 1901, the Foreign Office
set a dispatch to the Commissioners of Kenya, Malawi, Somaliland and Uganda
explaining what was to happen next: ‘The definite constitution of the armed forces
under this Department as one regiment, to be styled the King’s African Rifles, will
take effect from 1st January next’.24
23
24

Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1945,
p. 86.
Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1945,
p. 129.
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131. As announced and scheduled, on the 1st of January 1902 the King’s African Rifles
came into being. The multi-battalion regiment was organized as follows:25


1st Battalion consisting of 8 companies (formerly 1 Central African Rifles).



2nd Battalion consisting of 6 companies (formerly 2 Central African Rifles).









3rd Battalion consisting of 7 companies and one camel corps (formerly the East
African Rifles).
4th Battalion consisting of 9 companies (formerly the African companies of the
Ugandan Rifles)
5th Battalion consisting of four companies (formerly the Indian section of the
Uganda Rifles.
6th Battalion consisting of three companies, camel corps, militia and mounted
infantry.

132. Added up, the six battalions came to just over 4500 men and 104 officers. Colonel
Manning, a very senior officer with many years of African experience was appointed
Inspector-General.
133.

The regiment’s regulations were not published until 1905. These regulations
formalized a number of practices that had already informed the KAR’s overall
operations and ethos. For starters, the 5th KAR Battalion was confirmed as the
highest ranking in the regiment. 5 KAR was of course compromised exclusively of
the Indian troops sent to Uganda to quell the mutiny. In this, the regiment was just as
racialised as its predecessors and sister institutions such as the police. The regiment’s
relationship with civilian authorities was also clarified.

134. Colony/Protectorate Commissioners were the commanders-in-chief of their
individual battalions and they defined the objectives and scope of operations. But
they did not have actual operational control. That was left to battalion commanders.
The regulations also specified that within a year of their appointment, European
officers had to demonstrate that they possessed a working knowledge of the main
language spoken by their troops. Regulations were changed regularly. In 1908,
a revised manual was issued by which officers were required to compile written
operation reports and maps. A few years later, the regulation manual changed
again to include revisions on deployment; KAR troops could be called on to serve
anywhere in the four colonies/protectorates. For the Commission, the changing
nature and content of the regulations speaks to a regiment that could not afford to
remain static in a difficult, ever-shifting working environment.
25 Adapted from Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central
Africa, 1890 – 1945, p. 129.
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3rd King’s African Rifles Battalion
135. Upon the creation of the King’s African Rifles, the East African Rifles became 3rd
KAR. Its operational area was confirmed as the East African Protectorate, later
Kenya. The Battalion’s seven companies were posted throughout the territory.
Some remained in the older stations (such as Mombasa); others were sent out to
establish new ones in places in Embu and Nyeri. The overall situation in Kenya was
a complicated one. This meant that almost as soon as 3 KAR was commissioned, it
found itself embroiled in ongoing security situations linked—unsurprisingly—to
continuing efforts to establish British control.
136. The Commission’s interest in the battalion goes beyond mere curiosity. 3rd KAR
continues to live on in the minds of some Kenyans as the source and cause of
many of their historical injustices. While long defunct, for some communities and
individuals, 3rd KAR as such continues to wield power as a perpetrator. Sections of
this report explore the battalion’s role in mass killings that resulted in the murder
of hundreds of people along the Coast and in Pokot country.26 This section looks
at the KAR’s role in a smaller but no less shattering incident: the shooting dead of
Koitalel Arap Samoei on the 19th of October 1905. Even today Koitalel’s murder
resonates as an example of one of the most callous abuses of colonial power in
Kenya’s history. More than a century later, the feelings of anger aroused by this
death and the circumstances in which it occurred have not faded.

The King’s African Rifles and the Killing of Koitalel Arap Samoei
137. The story of Koitalel Arap Samoei’s death intertwines with the story of Colonel
Richard Meinertzhagen’s service with the King’s African Rifles. Meinertzhagen was a
deeply divisive and controversial character. The reasons for this will emerge shortly.
A member of a prominent and wealthy British family, Meinertzhagen arrived in
Kenya in 1902 and was assigned as a staff officer in the KAR. Meinertzhagen was a
keen journal keeper and compiled daily notes which were subsequently published
as The Kenya Diary 1902 – 1906.27
138. The diary is revealing. For starters, it vividly shows that despite the elaborate
administrative reforms, the fundamentals of 3 KAR were very much the same as
those of EAR: poor equipment, training and discipline. Meinertzhagen’s company
was in a hapless state and clearly not fit for purpose:
My company is armed with Martini-Henry .450 rifles with old fashioned bayonet, and each
man has a machete, an excellent weapon for cutting bush and incidentally ideal for close
fighting. Every man has two pairs of boots which they always take off on the slightest
26 See Chapter on Massacres.
27 Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, The Kenya Diary 1902 – 1906. London: Oliver and Boyd 1957.
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excuse. I examined the rifles this morning and found every one rusted up and corroded;
in one case the breech mechanism would not work owing to rust and in another case the
barrel was completely blocked by rag. All this is going to take time but in six months’ time,
I am going to have the best company in the battalion. I have already asked for 24 new
rifles but am told there are none and that we shall be re-armed with the .303 service rifle
shortly. I enquired about musketry and a rifle range. Apparently we have not yet reached
that stage.28

139. Poor equipment went hand in hand with indiscipline:
My company is composed of 125 Swahilis with a few Sudanese and 4 Maasai, the latter
being useless. The Swahilis are excellent material, very willing and cheerful but quite
undisciplined and untrained; they have the mentality of children; my first duty is to lean
their language. And then I should have no difficulty in bringing the company up to my
standard, that is, an efficient fighting machine and perfect discipline. The native officers
are not much good and the NCOS have little control but I shall soon alter that.29

140. The diary is a product of its time and makes difficult reading on account of its casual
racism and chauvinism. Even so, for the Commission it was a valuable document
because it gave a direct and first-hand account of the actual workings of 3rd KAR.
141.

Meinertzhagen went further, much further. What he also revealed is that in addition to
the inefficiency and broad technical failings, the Battalion was also characterized by
shocking levels of internal violence towards its very own recruits. As Meinertzhagen
seemed to suggest a constant stream of insubordination had to be swiftly and
firmly dealt with. But even he balked at the beatings meted out as punishment and
wondered about the appropriateness of the 3rd KAR’s disciplinary codes:
Last week I brought up a man to orderly room for insubordination; he told his sergeant
that his mother was a crocodile and his father a hyena. Bailey sentenced him to 25 lashes.
As his company officer, I had to witness the flogging. The culprit was lashed to a triangle,
his breeches were removed, and he was then flogged by a hefty Sudanese with a strip of
hippopotamus hide; he was bleeding horribly when it was over and I was nearly sick. I
hated and resented the punishment so furiously that I went off to the orderly room and
expressed my thorough disgust at such brutal punishment, which I thought should be
ordered only in cases of violence and cruelty; and said that such a flogging should always
be automatically followed by discharge for how can a man have any self-respect left after
such a brutal public flogging. Bailey and Mackay gaped in astonishment, told me that I
was squeamish, that I did not understand the African and that it was gross impertinence
questioning an orderly room punishment. I rejoined that never again would I have any
of my men flogged unless they were discharged; I was then told by Bailey that if I did not
like flogging and that if I made any further complaints I could revert to my regiment; I said
I certainly should. I fear I was very angry, but never again does a man in my company get
flogged as long as I command.30

28 Richard Meinertzhagen, The Kenya Diary 1902 – 1906, p. 10
29 Richard Meinertzhagen, The Kenya Diary 1902 – 1906, p. 10.
30 Richard Meinertzhagen, The Kenya Diary 1902 – 1906, p. 11.
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142. Meinertzhagen’s discomfort about the use of violence did not extend any further
than this. In all other regards, he showed no qualms whatsoever about unleashing
the full force of the 3rd KAR on enemy forces. His war ethic was clear. By any means
necessary and whatever the consequences, the enemy had to be taken on:
As regards the first, a soldier enters a fight to come out on top in the shortest possible time
and lost the fewest possible casualties. In my view any means to achieve those ends are
justified. In the long run, inflicting heavy casualties on an enemy will shorten the duration
of a conflict, it will teach a lesson and will result in a more enduring peace than less violent
measures. War cannot be carried out without some degree of cruelty and suffering; these
curses of war are inevitable, and nobody knows this better than the soldier; but they can
to a large extent be reduced by an iron discipline. Cruelty, unnecessary slaughter and
suffering after victory are almost always the outcome of bad discipline. The strain of war
on the individual will lead to acts of unnecessary suffering if discipline is relaxed.31

143. Once again, Meinertzhagen brought up the issue of discipline. He created a link
between a disciplined force and minimal casualties. In other words, disciplined
troops would be far less inclined to excesses than undisciplined ones. For the
Commission this link was illustrative. That 3rd KAR (and EAR before) were entirely
lacking in a disciplinary tradition has already been established. This then implies
that as a fighting force 3rd KAR was structurally pre-disposed to violence and
casualties on a massive scale. The battalion lacked the internal mechanisms to
operate as anything other than a massive killing machine.
144. In 1905, Meinertzhagen took to his diary again to describe Koitalel Arap Samoei as
‘the root of our trouble’.32 His disdain for Samoei was rooted in a long history. As the
Commission has already described, the arrival of the British in the Western Highlands
triggered the beginning of years of fierce Nandi resistance. The British response to
this resistance was the launching of a series of punitive expeditions. Beginning in
1895, colonial officials set off on a series of elaborate military campaigns designed
to eliminate the Nandi threat to the advance of British colonialism. The conversion
of EAR to 3rd KAR did nothing to change the fundamentals. The British seemed to
be unable to find a lasting solution to a people they regarded as ‘naturally truculent
and unruly’. 33
145. In April 1903, the British adopted a familiar tactic. They put together a fourth
expedition to address the issue of the continued theft of railway supplies as well
as the danger of unrest spreading to previously peaceful areas. A formidable force
was assembled out 3rd KAR troops with support from 4th and 5th KAR. A further 700
“friendly” Nandi were also included. The mission set off towards the end of the
31 Richard Meinertzhagen, The Kenya Diary 1902 – 1906, p. 10.
32 Richard Meinertzhagen, The Kenya Diary 1902 – 1906, p. 223.
33 Lieutenant-Colonel Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890 – 1945,
p. 196
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month. By all descriptions, it was classically punitive. Crops were destroyed and
livestock. The casualty count was one-sided: 100 Nandi fighters killed in contrast to
just 4 colonial troops. At the end of the expedition, administrators were confident
that the issue had been resolved. The new Commissioner of East Africa, Sir Donald
Stewart, concluded that the Nandi issue was dead and that peace would prevail.
Nothing was further than the truth. By 1904, it was as if the fourth expedition had
never taken place. Thefts of cattle and railway supplies resumed. A number of
settlers were also killed. The killing of any Europeans was--as has been discussed
elsewhere in this report—guaranteed to elicit an energetic reaction from security
officials. After another flurry of Nandi-authored unrest, the British had enough. In
the middle of 1905, the fifth expedition was announced. It was by far the largest
and most ambitious of all the expeditions. The whole of 3rd KAR was called up as
well as six companies from 1st KAR, 200 armed police and other assorted Maasai
and Somali auxiliaries. The scale of the force signalled British intent to settle
matters once and for all.
146.

Koitalel Arap Samoei loomed large in the architecture of the fifth Nandi expedition.
While the British regarded the Nandi as inherently warlike, they also believed that
there was a central organisation and purpose to the rebellion. And they credited this
to Koitalel. Colonial literature refers to him as the ‘Supreme’ chief of the Nandi.34 It is a
simplistic description that flattens the nuanced, complex role that Koitalel played in
Nandi society. He was first and foremost an Orkoiyot; a ritual expert and specialist. A
hereditary position (Koitalel inherited it from his father Kimnyole in 1855), Orkoiyots
were infused with considerable spiritual powers. These included powers of prophecy,
divination, witch-finding and healing. Research and writing emphasizes their highly
specialized role; these were not people who played any part in the mundane.35 If
anything fear and respect for the Orkoiyots’ abilities meant they were deliberately
kept at arm’s length from day to day community, social and political affairs.

147.

The Orkoiyot cannot properly be called a paramount chief for the very simple reason
that the Nandi were a chiefless society. Anthropological research has established the
Nandi as a highly egalitarian society organized around age-sets.36 Even so there is
no denying the Orkoiyot’s centrality to key events in the society and the leadership
role that he played during these events. He presided over, for instance, fertility and
rainmaking ceremonies as well as the various rites attached to the transition of age
sets. Orkoiyots also featured during war and conflict. Warriors could not take up arms
without his ritual counsel or his protective herbal potions. With livestock raids, the

34

An early example of colonial writing on the Nandi is Alfred Hollis, The Nandi: Their Language and Folklore. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1909.
35 See for instance, P.K. Magut, “The Rise and Fall of the Nandi Orkoyoit, 1850 – 1957”, Nairobi Historical Studies 1 (1969), pp. 95 – 108.
36 The seminal piece is G. W.B. Huntingford, The Nandi of Kenya. London: Taylor and Francis, 1953.
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Orkoiyot’s intervention was even more direct.37 His divination was used to determine
the timing of raids. He was also was consulted on questions of the conduct and
organisation of raids.
148. It was the Orkoiyot’s militaristic role that led successive British administrators to
conclude that Koitalel was in fact the leader and the person behind the decade
long Nandi resistance. Once again while British readings of the situation were not
entirely incorrect, they are not nuanced enough. Koitalel was almost certainly
centrally involved in the planning of what was a focused, long-running and
determined campaign. Even so, it is important to appreciate that Orkoiyots were
not commanders in the classic [Western] sense and did not have executive powers.
Indeed their decisions—even ritual ones—could be challenged. Furthermore,
Nandi society was also highly militarized with entire age sets dedicated to the
commission of war. They were somewhat self-running with the power to hold
discussions and make decisions within themselves. They did not necessarily
require the hands-on involvement of the Orkoiyot. The British presence in Nandi
country presented a unique and unprecedented problem that demanded a unique
and unprecedented response from Koitalel. In becoming the face and the focal
point of the resistance, he re-defined the Orkoiyot’s mission for the exigencies of
colonialism.

Ket Parak Hill, 19 October 1905
149. Meinertzhagen’s disdain for Koitalel was profound, almost personal. His diary it
makes clear that the only solution to the Nandi problem lay in either capturing or
killing Koitalel:
Koitalel is a wicked old man and at the root of all our trouble. He is a dictator, and as such
must show successes in order to retain power. He is therefore in favour of fighting the
British. Many of his hot-heads support him. My main reason for trying to kill or capture the
laibon is that, if I remove him, this expedition will not be necessary and the Nandi will be
spared all the horrors of military operations. But both the civil and military authorities are
intent on a punitive expedition. The military are keen to gain a new glory and a medal and
the civil people want the Nandi country for the new proposal of the White Highlands—
just brigandage.38

150.

That Meinertzhagen intended to eliminate or kill Koitalel was also evident. In a series
of events that are still very murky, Meinertzhagen managed to arrange a meeting
with Koitalel for the 19th of October 1905 in location known locally as Ket Parak Hill.
The ostensible purpose of the meeting was to discuss a truce of sorts. Two things

37 Details can be found in T. Matson, “Nandi Traditions on Raiding”, Hadith 2 (1970), pp. 61 – 78.
38 Richard Meinertzhagen, The Kenya Diary 1902 – 1906, 223
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were unusual about the meeting. Firstly it is not at all clear how Meinhertzhagen
himself landed this assignment. As has been explained above, the whole of 3rd KAR
was in the field for the expedition. Senior commanders were passed over in favour of
a relative novice and this sensitive job was handed to a man with very little African
experience. Secondly, and just mysteriously, Koitalel agreed to the meeting. Over
more than a decade of fighting, he had steadfastly refused to meet any Europeans.
For reasons unknown, on this particular occasion he assented to British requests.
The meeting was set for Ket Parak Hill. Koitalel was accompanied by several dozen
warriors and Meinertzhagen by 80 3rd KAR men. Meinertzhagen left the bulk of his
men at the behind and went upwards to a small clearing with just five armed men.
151. There are many versions about what happened next but they nearly all converge
around one crucial fact: as Koitalel approached with an outstretched hand, guns
were drawn and fired at nearly point blank range.39 As Nandi warriors rushed
forward a fierce fighting broke out and at the end of it all, a further 25 of them
lay dead. Meinertzhagen and his men escaped unscathed. The colonel presented
his superiors with a simple and straightforward account of what had happened
explaining that he and his men had opened fire in self-defense in the belief that
his interpreter was a double agent and had lured them into a trap. His report was
accepted unchallenged. Meinertzhagen was the recipient of much preliminary
praise. As a result of Koitalel’s death, Nandi resistance quickly crumbled. In the
middle of November 1905, the hostilities were declared over. Koitalel’s supporters
were executed, deported and imprisoned.
152.

As the dust settled on the expedition, questions began to be asked about events on
Ket Parak Hill. The first hints of suspicion and disquiet came from within 3rd KAR itself.
A number of officers openly wondered how just six people (Meinhertzhagen and
his five riflemen) could kill so many warriors without suffering as even as much as a
scratch. Meinertzhagen’s version of events just did not seem credible. Various other
parties joined the fray; missionary groups, humanists and abolitionists included.40 A
powerful and noisy bloc, they also raised the alarm about an incident that increasingly
appeared to them as cold blooded murder not a heroic stand against a dangerous
enemy. Pressure continued to build. Telegrams flew back and forth between the
War Office, the Foreign Office and Nairobi. Eventually, a Court of Inquiry was created
at the end of 1905. The inquiry’s purpose was to investigate the incident. After two
further inquiries in early 1906, Meinertzhagen and his men were eventually declared,
as it were, innocent. Meinertzhagen’s version of the incident was upheld and he was
determined to have upheld the honour and dignity of the 3rd KAR.41

39 Oral sources.
40 For more on the story on public outcry (in Britain) surrounding Meinertzhagen’s killing of Koitalel, see Brian Garfield, The
Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a colossal fraud. Washington D. C: Potomac Books, 2007, p. 66 – 67.
41 From Brian Garfield, The Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Legend of a colossal fraud, p. 67.
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153. The inquiry’s verdict did very little to quell public anger. For the humanists and
reformers, Meinertzhagen represented military excess and violence that could not
be tolerated in the very young Kenya Colony. They continued their letter writing
campaign and petitions. The Foreign Office took a much more pragmatic line:
Meinertzhagen’s continued presence in the 3rd KAR could act as the impetus for
another round of Nandi resistance. The Foreign Office was unwilling to take the
risk of further Nandi unrest on account of a single troublesome officer. Eventually
in May 1906, the War Office issued Meinertzhagen with his marching orders. He
left Kenya for England. His brief career with the King’s African Rifles had come to
an ignominious end. In another humiliating blow to the Nandi, Meinertzhagen
took with him three clubs that symbolized the Orkoiyot’s authority and leadership.
These important artefacts remained in England with the Meinertzhagen family
until 2006. They are currently housed in the Koitalel Arap Samoei museum in Nandi
Hills.

Fall out
154. The impact of Koitalel’s death and the subsequent snuffing out of Nandi
resistance was momentous. Defeat marked the beginning proper of the removal
of the Nandi from their traditional lands and their settlement into a so-called
Native Reserve. The doors were thrown open to European settlement. The
Commission took Koitalel’s murder in October 1905 as a watershed moment in
Kenyan history. There was no returning to a simpler time where the Nandi and
associated groups were free to roam the highlands with their cattle. The Nandi
in defeat were alienated of their lands and their livelihoods. The die was cast
for many decades of confusion, distress and violence surrounding questions of
territory and land ownership. These are issues the Commission explores in detail
in another section of this report.42

Forced Recruitment and Labour Exploitation: The Carrier Corps
155.

The fifth punitive expedition temporarily put the lid on Nandi unrest. The colony was,
however, far from pacified. 3rd KAR companies were dispatched throughout Kenya
to tackle smaller but no less dogged resistance to the arrival of the British. In 1907,
troops were sent against the Kabras in Western Kenya. A year later, 3rd KAR was in
Kisii. November 1912 found the KAR in Sotik and in 1912 it was in Gilgil. The Northern
Frontier Districts and the borderlands with Uganda were particularly restive and
posed a special challenge to the KAR. As the Commission has discussed elsewhere,
Giriama armed resistance from about 1912 onwards placed further demands on
the KAR. As World War I approached, it became clear that Eastern Africa would be
a proxy battleground due to the presence of the Germans and Italians. There is

42 See the Chapter on Land in this Report.
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no understating the subsequent demand in the colonial military set up for huge
amounts of manpower. From 1910 onwards, 3rd KAR turned into a labour-hungry
beast that required constant feeding. The mechanisms used to supply 3rd KAR with
labour were controversial and have contributed much to the battalion’s historical
reputation for ruthlessness and brute force.
156.

The sudden arrival of World War I in the East African theatre caught the military
establishment completely unprepared. All the old frailties—indiscipline, limited
equipment and understaffing—were all cruelly exposed as 3rd KAR geared up to
face immediate threats from German troops in Tanganyika. While KAR’s needs were
many and pressing there was one that dominated the rest: the need for porters and
carriers to ferry equipment and supplies. Transport in the 3rd KAR was completely unmechanised. The battalion did not have any vehicles. And even if it had any, there
were roads. Cattle drawn carts were also not an option because of the widespread
prevalence of tsetse fly. As a news article explained it, the main difficulty lay not in
defeating the enemy but in reaching the enemy.43 There was no other way around
it; equipment had to be transported manually. And so it was that in early 1915,
command orders established the Carrier Corps as a section of the East Africa
Transport Corps.44 In 1916, the Corps was separated from the EATC and assumed its
own autonomous identity.

157.

From the outset, populating the Carrier Corps proved difficult. At first the recruitment
process seemed to rest on goodwill, good timing and volunteerism. District officials
were simply asked to see how many men could be funnelled into the corps. They in
turn depended on the co-operation and efficiency of local headmen and chiefs. In a
handful of locations, the process was a fairly smooth one. But more often than not,
it proved almost impossible to find men who were willing to volunteer for service.
One drive in Malindi in 1915 yielded just three recruits. District officials turned to
subterfuge and trickery to get men to sign up. In a station in Kisii for instance young
men who thought that they were signing up for temporary menial work (such as
cutting grass or general cleaning) were surreptitiously enrolled as porters. In other
instances, officials resorted to force. After the disastrous Malindi drive described
above, district officers took drastic, shocking action which was later described by the
District Commissioner:
Government raided the town by the night under the exigencies of marital law forcibly
collected 200. This 200 was apparently mostly composed of loafers and ‘scally-wags’ living
on the earning of the women, and whilst it were perhaps idle to waste sympathy on the
particular victims, the fact remains that a general exodus immediately took place, with the

43 From Donald Savage and J. Forbes Munro, “Carrier Corps Recruitment in the British East Africa Protectorate 1914 – 1918” Journal
of African History 7 (2) 1966, p. 314.
44 For a complete and detailed history of the Carrier Corps, see Geoffrey Hodges, The Carrier Corps: Military Labour in the East
African Campaign, 1914 – 1918. Westport: 1986.
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result that the appearance of any government officer of whatever standing is even now
the signal for a general and headlong flight of all except women and greybeards.45

158.

The haphazard and unreliable nature of early recruitment frustrated both the
Carrier Corps and the 3rd KAR companies that so depended on them. A more
robust response was required. In August 1915, the Native Followers Recruitment
Ordinance was passed. The act gave the government the power to conscript for the
Carrier Corps. It was stunning in its breadth. All Africans were eligible. Exemptions
were only extended to the elderly, infirm and those able to produce passes/letters
showing that they were employed by settlers.46 The narrowness of choices for African
men—either military or settler labour—were obvious to the Commission. Force and
coercion were inbuilt. The actual job of recruitment fell to headmen and chiefs. Those
judged to be uncooperative could be fine and/or jailed for six months. Conscription
dodgers also faced stiff fines and imprisonment. As soon as the ordinance passed,
recruitment unfolded with a grim efficiency. Recruitment parties to hunt down men
who fled into the bush to try and escape. Deserters were returned to the Carrier
Corps with determined regularity. It has been estimated that by 1918, more than half
of the total male population in the African Reserves had been conscripted.47 It is a
stunning statistic that clearly demonstrates the scale of the conscription effort.

159. The conditions in which these thousands of men found themselves were truly
appalling. Porters and carriers represented the very lowest rung of the colonial
military structure and were treated accordingly. They were paid minimally for
arduous, back-breaking work. Discipline was roughly instilled; whippings and
canings were the order of the day.48 The killer blow was dealt by diseases such
as pneumonia, influenza, dysentery and typhoid which swept through the corps
with fatal consequences. Recent studies have estimated that porters in Tanganyika
subsisted on less than 1000 calories a day.49 Their Kenyan counterparts were
almost certainly on a similar regime. Weak, underfed and overworked, the porters
had virtually no resistance and they died in their thousands. Almost no medical
attention was offered them. As the war wound down so did the conscription effort.
45 Donald Savage and J. Forbes Munro, “Carrier Corps Recruitment in the British East Africa Protectorate 1914 – 1918” Journal of
African History 7 (2) 1966, pp. 316 – 317.
46 There were further almost eugenic considerations at work. Certain communities—such as the Maasai—were deemed too warlike
and unstable to be drafted either into the Carrier Corps or 3rd KAR. For the sake of overall peace and stability in the colony, such
communities were never targeted for recruitment. The Maasai reputation is discussed in Robert Tignor, “The Maasai Warriors:
Pattern Maintenance and Violence in Colonial Kenya” Journal of African History 13 2 (1972), pp. 271 – 290. Conversely, some
communities (such as the Kamba and some Kalenjin sub-groups) were categorized by the British as ‘martial’ and particularly suited
for military work. Special efforts were made to recruit them both for the Carrier Corps and 3rd KAR. For the martialisation of the
Kamba community, see Timothy Parsons, ““Wakamba Warriors are soldiers of the Queen”: The Evolution of the Kamba as a Martial
Race, 1890 – 1970”, Ethnohistory 46 9 (1999), pp. 671 – 701.
47 From David Killingray, “Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa, 1870 – 1940” Journal of Contemporary
History 24 (1989), p. 489.
48 On corporal punishment, see David Killingray, “The ‘Rod of Empire’: The Debate over Corporal Punishment in the British African
Colonial Forces, 1888 – 1946” Journal of African History 35 2 (1994), pp. 201 – 216.
49 David Killingray, “Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa, 1870 – 1940” Journal of Contemporary
History 24 (1989), p. 493
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By 1918, porters and carriers were being formally discharged and being allowed to
return home. In a final irony, scores more died on the journey back to their villages
or soon after their arrival. Over 2000 men died at a camp set up near Nairobi to care
for recently discharged men.
160.

Final and accurate mortality figures will never be known.50 A report known as the
Watkins Report put the total number of porters who died during the British East Africa
campaign at 23, 869. This represented nearly 15% of the total number recruited into
the Carrier Corps. As astonishing as this figure is, it is an underestimate. The number
of men who died after discharge is essentially unknowable. In some ways, the exact
number is unimportant as forced recruitment for the Carrier Corps in support of 3rd
KAR had already distinguished itself as one of the most disastrous events in Kenya’s
military history.

Kenya Defence Force: Settler Politics and the Military
161. The Kenya Defence Force sits at the intersection of settler politics and the military.
This curious, little-known and short lived military formation was the product of
settler efforts to create an all-European armed force.51 The Commission has already
examined settler manipulation of the police force resulting in the Kenya Police
Force which was dedicated almost entirely to the policing of the settler community
and its security needs. The Kenya Defence Force was an attempt to recreate the
same within the military: a strict hierarchy in which European and settler priorities
dominated over all others. The notion of a settler force dates back to the first years
of the Kenya Colony. At an early settler political meeting in 1905, resolutions were
passed requesting the establishment of just such a force. The issue returned to the
fore in 1914 as World War One brewed. This time round settler associations were
joined by various ex-servicemen (former KAR and others from different formations
in the Commonwealth). They passed another resolution recommending the
establishment of a Defence Force. A small committee was created for the purpose
of looking South African precedents. It returned in February 1920 with the
recommendation that a force be established consisting of all European males
between 16 and 60.
162. The proposed Defence Force was a curious beast. It is not at all clear what its
objectives were. Some researchers have explained it as a response to the thousands
of demobilized and discharged African men and concerns that they could rise up
against the settlers. Others have taken the view that it represented deep-seated
settler resentment at the settlers’ inability to control and/or influence 3rd KAR.
50 Efforts (some more successful than others) have been made at overall quantification have been made. See for instance, G.W.T.
Hodges, “African Manpower Statistics for the British Forces in East Africa, 1914 – 1918” Journal of African History 19 1 (1978), pp.
101 – 116.
51 One of the few academic articles on KDF is C. Duder, “An Army of One’s Own: The Politics of the Kenya Defense Force”, Canadian
Journal of African Studies 25 2 (1991), pp. 207 – 225.
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Confusion and scepticism about the overall purpose of the force also reigned at
the Colonial Office delaying its institutionalization. One official put a damper on
the whole idea describing it as ‘an arrangement by which native malcontents are
liable to be shot down…is undesirable’.52 After another five year delay, the force
finally received approval via the Defence Force Bill of 1926. The membership of
force was just as had been proposed in 1920: all European men between the ages
of 16 and 60. Recruits were required to swear an oath of allegiance to the King
and the laws of Kenya. Past that, Functions and operations remained vague. The
Governor could send the force out to any part of the country for any length of time.
Locally, the force would be administered by district commandants.
163.

A decade later the force had been abandoned without, as far as the Commission
can tell, undertaking a single substantial operation. Numerous factors contributed
to the Kenya Defence Force’s demise. There was the sheer inefficiency of the unit.
A government committee found that KDF store keepers could not account for 225
rifles and nearly 90,000 rounds of ammunition! Colonel Fitzgerald, the officer in
charge of overall administration was deemed to have ‘failed signally’. The lack of
preparedness and professionalism in the KDF meant that administrators were highly
unlikely to call them up in the case of any real trouble. The more serious threat was
internal opposition to the force; not all settlers were in favour of it. Indeed there
were some whose hostility was so intense that it doomed the whole project from the
outset. Some sections of the settler community rejected the idea of wholesale and
compulsory conscription. They had livelihoods to earn and simply had ‘no time play
at soldier’.53 Others took issue with the movers and shakers behind the KDF (men like
Lord Delamere) and suspected that the force was merely a vehicle for their personal
political ambitions. All in all, the Kenya Defence won itself very few supporters and
plenty of detractors. Hardly anyone objected when in March 1936, the Governor of
Kenya moved to disband it in favour of another force known as the Kenya Regiment.
3rd KAR was unshaken as the dominant military formation in Kenya.

Kings African Rifles, Mau Mau and the Emergency
164.

The KAR entered the Emergency on the back of long and difficult campaigns during
the Second World War. Because the regiment was part of the British Army it could be
dispatched anywhere that commanders, planners and strategists at the War Office in
London saw fit. This had happened during the First World War and it happened again
with the second with KAR battalions sent as far away as Burma and Japan. There
were a number of changes at the regimental level to accommodate the astonishing
demand for troops. New divisions were assembled drawing in companies from

52 From C. Duder, “An Army of One’s Own: The Politics of the Kenya Defense Force”, Canadian Journal of African Studies 25 2
(1991), p. 213.
53 C. Duder, “An Army of One’s Own: The Politics of the Kenya Defense Force”, Canadian Journal of African Studies 25 2 (1991), p. 215.
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South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana. These were later dismantled. At the end of the war,
administrative attention turned to the tricky question of demobilizing approximately
100 000 KAR men. It was an issue that the administration took very seriously because
of fears that these ex-soldiers would severely destabilise the political and social life of
their home areas.54 Various 3 KAR companies continued to join the police in tackling
security threats in far flung frontier areas. Added up, what all this meant was that 3rd
KAR like the rest of Kenya’s security and intelligence apparatus was caught entirely
of guard by the onset of Mau Mau.
165.

There was never any doubt that the military would form a key part of the government’s
response to Mau Mau.55 In fact, one of the early criticisms made of the Kenyan
administration’s handling of Mau Mau was that it was treated as a law and order and
policing matter instead of military one. When Emergency was declared in October
1952, Sir Evelyn Baring took up the mantle of Commander in Chief coordinating the
police and the army as they carried out joint sweeps. By June 1953, however, another
command and control structure had emerged. It was a multi-faceted one that by
some accounts often clashed and confused. Evelyn Baring was shunted aside for
General Erskine who was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the East Africa
Command. The East Africa Command was an entirely new entity separate from
the Middle Eastern Command that the region previously used to sit under. Erskine
had direct operational control over the Army, the Police, the Air Force and all other
auxiliary formations mobilized to take on Mau Mau. There was a separate civilian
strand occupied by civilian administrators who concerned themselves with the
restoration of law and order in areas affected by the violence. But they too had to
report and implement through Erskine.

166.

The military element consisted of all five companies of 3rd KAR. 5th KAR also saw
battle. An entirely new battalion--7th KAR—was created specifically to take on
Mau Mau. Three further battalions were drafted in from Uganda, Tanganyika and
Mauritius. This amounted to about 4000 KAR men in total. A further 1800 men came
from the Kenya Regiment; the volunteer all-settler force formed in the mid-1930s
to replace the defunct KDF. From 1954 onwards, huge numbers of troops (6000 in
all) were seconded to East Africa Command. They came from as far afield as Britain
itself, Malta and Cyprus. The Royal Air Force also featured running bombing raids
in the Aberdares and other parts of the Highlands. The other contributors to the
armed forces consisted of the police, police reserves and African Home Guards.
Some sources mention 6000 ‘other’ African troops but fail to detail who these troops
were and where they came from. There was a great deal of movement between the
various units. For instance, the Kenya Regiment seconded some 300 men to the KAR.

54 Details on demobilization can be found in Hal Brand, “Wartime Recruiting Practices, Marital Identity and Post World War II
Demobilization in Colonial Kenya” Journal of African History 46, 1 (2005), pp. 103 – 125.
55 All details on security and military arrangements during Mau Mau are drawn from Anthony Clayton, Counter-Insurgency in Kenya:
A study of military operations against Mau Mau. Nairobi: Transafrica, 1976.
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The Army’s role
167.

In some ways, the role played by the KAR and the other military units during Mau
Mau was fairly traditional. Forested areas in the highlands in and around Mount
Kenya were the sites of pitched battles between the various combatants. But
because Mau Mau was a guerilla force, the security forces were pressed into methods
and techniques that went far beyond the bounds of conventional warfare. And it
is these unconventional methods and techniques that form the core of the many
continuing controversies surrounding the part played by the Army in the suppression
of the movement. The central difficulty for the security forces were the issues of
membership and support for Mau Mau. The working assumption was that Mau Mau
enjoyed widespread, practical, tacit and otherwise, favour in the general population.
It became a priority to cast as broad a net as possible and to screen and interrogate
people in order to extract information from them. It is from these twin processes of
screening and interrogation that the most astonishing evidence of widespread and
institutionalized torture has emerged.

168.

The nature and extent of the abuses are discussed at some length elsewhere in this
Report.56 The purpose of this section is to consider the role that the army played in
screening and interrogation. In this the Commission has benefitted from research
and writing that has occurred around civil proceedings that have been instituted by
Kenyan victims of screening and interrogation.57 The Army (and particularly those
units imported into Kenya) has maintained a studious distance from screening,
interrogation and the abuses born of them. The backbone of their argument has
been the claim that screenings and interrogations were carried out by the police,
Special Branch officers, local administrators and Home Guards. The Army describes
its role as limited by operating procedure to throwing and maintaining a cordon
around an area while others (the Police and so on) moved in to continue with the
actual screening.

169.

Current and still-emerging evidence paint a very different picture of an Army,
both local and shipped in, steeped violence. The distinction between cordoning
and screening/interrogating was a spurious one; there was simply too much
cross-pollination. Military Intelligence Officers conducted screenings. Indeed lines
of interrogation were developed around army needs and priorities. The Army
maintained a close relationship between the African Home Guards who are often
blamed for the worst of torture, violence and abuse. In 1953, East Africa Command
headquarters issued a memorandum directing Police and Military to make “full” use
of the Home Guards.58 A number of KAR officers were tried and convicted for crimes
committed during interrogation. Above all, the official British attempts to subvert

56 See chapter on Detention, Torture and ill-Treatment
57 Principally, Huw Bennett, “Soldiers in the Court Room: The British Army’s Part in the Kenya Emergency under the Legal Spotlight”
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39 5 (2011), pp. 717 – 730.
58 Huw Bennett, “Soldiers in the Court Room: The British Army’s Part in the Kenya Emergency under the Legal Spotlight” The Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39 5 (2011), p. 772.
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documents—the ‘Hanslope Park files’—speaks at the very least to a reluctance to
allow proper scrutiny of the Army’s role in the quashing of Mau Mau.59
170.

The Commission’s study of Kenya’s colonial history has turned up a number of trends,
patterns and practices that have endured post-colonially. The military’s assessment
of its role in screening and interrogating Mau Mau suspects provides a particularly
striking continuity. The Kenya Army retained the procedure whereby the function of
the army in security operations [involving civilians] was establishing and maintaining
a cordon. The procedure emerged most spectacularly in February 1984 during a
security operation at the Wagalla Airstrip in Wajir. The same insistence on military
distance from the main action also prevailed in official descriptions of Wagalla
unmasking the army as one of the most fixed and unchanging institutions in Kenya.

Lanet 1964: Mutiny in the Ranks
171.

As the Emergency wound down and it became evident that Mau Mau would
be defeated, the military embarked on the familiar routine of demobilizing
and discharging the hundreds of extra troops raised during the Emergency.
Independence from Britain was fast approaching. De-colonizing the KAR and
handing it over to local [African] administrators and commanders rose to the very
top of the military agenda. It became a difficult issue to address because the army
overseers—like the police ones—had done nothing to engender the development
of a class of African professionals. Basic primary education for recruits was a feature
of the KAR from the 1950s but none of the African enrollees ever progressed into
post secondary education. While promoting Africans was a priority, there were
in effect no Africans to promote to leadership positions. And so it was that in
December 1963--Independence—more than fifty percent of the all senior and noncommissioned officers were still non-Africans.60

172.

Another obstacle was the lack of ethnic diversity. The British had diligently divided
indigenous African communities into the martial and non-martial. The so-called martial
races were regarded as inherently suited to military service. The result was an army
largely populated by a handful of ethnic groups. A 1959 report on the KAR revealed
that 77% of all recruits were drawn from the Kamba, Kalenjin, Samburu and other
communities that had for so long been characterized as martial.61 For an institution
meant to symbolize Kenya’s newfound nationhood and nationalism, the KAR stood
out as a sore reminder of division and colonial stereotypes. Despite all these problems
(and others besides), the KAR was Kenya’s premier military formation; there was no
alternative. Upon Independence on the 12th of December 1963, the KAR became the

59

For more on the Hanslope Park files, see David Anderson, “Mau Mau in the High Court and the “lost” British Empire Archives: Colonial
Conspiracy or Bureaucratic Bungle?” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39 5 (2011), pp. 699 – 716.
60 Timothy Parsons, “The Lanet Incident, 2 – 25 January 1964: Military Unrest and National Amnesia in Kenya” The International
Journal of African Studies 40 1 (2007), p. 61.
61 From Timothy Parsons, “The Lanet Incident, 2 – 25 January 1964: Military Unrest and National Amnesia in Kenya” The International
Journal of African Studies 40 1 (2007), p. 60.
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Kenya Military Forces. The individual battalions were also renamed as 3rd, 7th and 11th
Kenya Rifles.
173.

Kenya’s military faced an immediate and daunting challenge in the form of the Shifta
War which was declared on the 24th of December 1964. Troops were immediately
thrown into a very difficult campaign against secessionists in Northern Kenya. The
conduct of this war resulted in a catalogue of very serious human rights violations.
Many of these violations were committed by the army itself. These violations are
discussed at length in another section of this report. In addition to the external
stresses caused by the Shifta War, Kenya’s army also buckled under the weight of a
number of internal strains. The most pointed of these was issue of military pay. The
question of military wages was a long standing one. From the very earliest days of
the KAR, troops were paid a pittance: a few shillings and a roll of calico. The trend
continued over the decades and by the early 1960s, the rumblings of discontent
were getting louder. In 1961, Oginga Odinga warned the Kenya Legislative Council
about the possible consequences of continuing disquiet about army pay.62 A pay
rise was instituted in 1962 but it appears to have been too small to keep pace with
inflation. Disgruntled soldiers were far from pacified.

174.

Matters finally came to a boil in late January 1964 at Lanet Barracks near Nakuru. The
trigger was indirect one. Troops in Uganda and Tanganyika succeeded in wringing out
substantial pay rises from their respective governments as well as the promise of the
speedy removal of British officers from top army positions. The literature is not precise
on how these promises were extracted. One version of events describes the soldiers
as ‘essentially holding their political masters hostage with the implicit threat of
violence.’63 News of the Ugandan and Tanganyikan developments reached Kenya very
quickly through the old KAR radio network that linked all the East African battalions
together. Army seniors tried to diffuse the situation by calling for meetings and
forums to discuss wages but it was too late; the issue had moved beyond that. Once
again in a series of events that is not exactly clear, troops gathered on the evening
24th of January expecting to hear President Kenyatta announce wage increments. The
president’s speech made no such announcement. Disappointed and incensed, troops
from 11 KR based in Lanet decided to act. They took over the armoury where weapons
were kept and then attempted to barricade the entire barracks.

175. The mutinous men 11th KR were quickly and decisively dealt with assistance from
the 3rd Regiment of the Royal Horse Artillery. The RHA was amongst several British
formations that had remained in Kenya after independence for strategic reasons.
British military intelligence had already warned of possible unrest in the Kenya
Army and so RHA (and others) had already been mobilized and were already on
62 From Timothy Parsons, “The Lanet Incident, 2 – 25 January 1964: Military Unrest and National Amnesia in Kenya” The International
Journal of African Studies 40 1 (2007), p. 59.
63 Timothy Parsons, “The Lanet Incident, 2 – 25 January 1964: Military Unrest and National Amnesia in Kenya” The International
Journal of African Studies 40 1 (2007), pp. 61 – 62.
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alert. The RHA troops surrounded Lanet and used loudspeakers to warn mutineers
that maximum force would be used to sweep through the camp if they did not put
their weapons down. Shots were fired at any 11th KR soldiers who attempted to
break though the perimeter. A Private Simon Kiprop was shot dead in the process;
he was the first casualty of the rebellion. The barricade was maintained into the
following day—the 25th of January—as a core group of about twenty soldiers
apparently made plans to shoot their way out of Lanet at whatever cost. The
rebellion only came to an end when an armoured vehicle was used to barrel into
the camp allowing RHA troops to enter and disarm the 11th KR.
176. President Kenyatta’s handling of the entire incident was nothing short of strident.
The RHA was mobilized with his full knowledge and authorization. The President
also refused all negotiations. On the morning of the 25th of January, he issued a
press statement stating the rigidity of his stand:
Those who took part in the Lanet incident have gravely broken military discipline and
must be dealt with firmly. They will be dealt with according to military law. There will be
no compromise on this, and I do not intend to meet them or to allow any of my Ministers
to negotiate with them.64

177.

After the mutiny was quashed it became clear just how firmly Kenyatta intended to
deal with the rebels. 11 KAR was completely disbanded. Military carried out extensive
investigations of 11th KR eventually classifying the regiment into three colour-coded
categories each representing a different levels of involvement in the mutiny. Three
hundred and forty men were coded green and were allowed to remain in the Army
on account of their limited participation. They were redeployed to a new regiment
designated 1st KR. Yellow consisted of some 100 troops who were discharged and
sent back to their home areas. They were kept under surveillance for any further
signs of possible unrest and trouble that they might cause. The final and most
serious category was red. One hundred troops were charged with mutiny under the
Kenya Military Forces Act. They were then taken forward and prosecuted. Sentences
ranging between five to fourteen years imprisonment were handed down. With that,
11th KR passed unheralded into oblivion. The battalion is not even mentioned in the
Kenya Defence Force’s official version of its history.65

178.

Inevitably perhaps, the Lanet incident was politicized. Part of the vigour of the
President’s response stemmed from the sense that there was more to the mutiny than
met the eye. Suspicions hovered about Oginga Odinga who was—as has just been
mentioned—a long term supporter of higher wages and better conditions for the
Army. Indeed part of the Defence Counsel’s strategy during the court martial became
to argue that the rebelling soldiers were acting on “outside” orders. Although these

64 Timothy Parsons, “The Lanet Incident, 2 – 25 January 1964: Military Unrest and National Amnesia in Kenya” The International
Journal of African Studies 40 1 (2007), p. 63.
65 See Ministry of State for Defence: History of the Kenya Army at http://www.mod.go.ke/army/?page_link=history Accessed
March 28th 2013.
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claims were never proved, the unspoken text of the entire trial became that army
unrest benefitted President Kenyatta’s political opponents and enemies. Conversely,
in his own memoirs Odinga accused the President of using the mutiny as a vehicle
for the re-introduction of British influence over the Kenya Army.66

Fall out, consequences
179. A central reality emerged from the wreckage of Lanet Mutiny: the importance of
stability within the military. Events in the barracks had shown that a small handful
of armed men had the ability to generate a serious security incident. Concerns
that the government had either ignored or downplayed before the incident
were taken up at the very highest levels. In April 1964, pay rises were introduced
across the board for military, police and prisons staff. The painfully slow clear out
of senior British officers picked up pace in the wake of the rebellion. In December
1966, Brigadier Joseph Ndolo was appointed as the first indigenous commander
of the Kenya Army. Content and depoliticized, Kenya’s armed forces retreated to
barracks until the 1980s. Their return to centre stage through the 1982 coup and
mass killings in Garissa and Wajir are discussed elsewhere in this Report. For the
Commission, they mark something of a return to form with displays of violence
and brutality that so characterized the earliest years of Kenya’s military history.

Conclusion
180.

Independent Kenya inherited a police force which was deeply and historically
troubled. From the 1890s right through to the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Kenya
police force clearly structured itself around the policing needs of a small and politically
powerful elite and racial minority. Kenya’s police force was from the outset built to
cater to these privileged few. When, however, the Kenya Police Force did encounter
African populations it was with a force and devastating violence. Throughout the
Commission’s mandate this never changed. The police force remained a law unto
itself. The Kenya Police Force of 1960 much resembled the Kenya Police Force of the
1900s: narrow in outlook, unclear in mission and violent in tendency. The history of
the military paints a similar grim picture. During the colonial period, and especially
during the emergency period, the military was engaged in the screening and
interrogating of people in order to extract information from them concerning Mau
Mau. It is from these twin processes of screening and interrogation that the most
astonishing evidence of widespread and institutionalized torture has emerged. The
military would continue to use similar brutal tactics way into the post-independence
era and as recently as March 2008 during Operation Okoa Maisha in Mt. Elgon.

66 Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (New York: 1969), p. 281
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THREE
The Shifta War

Introduction
1.

On 24 December 1964, faced by a region that was threatening to secede,
President Jomo Kenyatta declared a state of emergency in Northern Kenya.
What followed is what has come to be known as the ‘Shifta War’, and in which,
widespread and systematic violations of human rights were committed by
state security agencies. It is in the Shifta War that the citizens and communities
of the new Kenyan nation experienced state brutality and violence in a large
scale level. Most of the tactics employed by state security agencies during the
Shifta War would endure throughout the Commission’s mandate period, with
only slight variations. For this reason, the Commission paid special attention to
the Shifta War.

2.

For analytical purposes, the Commission categorized the Shifta War as a noninternational armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Under
these Conventions a non-international armed conflict exists when there is (1)
protracted armed violence between government authorities; when there are two
(2) organised armed groups within the state. The intensity and prolonged nature
of the violence and the organisational structure of the parties distinguishes
an armed conflict from banditry, the normal activity of a criminal organisation
and unorganised and short-lived insurrections. As discussed later in this
Chapter, although their organisational structure was loose (in order to adapt to
the environment of the region and the nature of guerrilla warfare), the Shifta
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exhibited the type of organisation that is common among guerrilla forces. Given
the materials available to the Commission, it was difficult to determine the nature
of the organisation of the Shifta forces, including to what extent they operated
under a uniform command and hierarchy. The evidence that was available,
however, including analysis of Shifta activity by the Kenyan government and
by foreign diplomats reporting on the situation, suggests that the Shifta forces
meet the organisational test for qualifying as a party to an armed conflict.
3.

The conflict with the Shifta lasted four years, resulted in the deaths of between
2,000 to 7,000 combatants and civilians and engaged the Kenyan military in
pitched battles throughout the Northern region. These facts satisfy the second
requirement of a prolonged and intense conflict.

4.

There is, however, some evidence that the Shifta War had an international
dimension to it. Traditionally, international armed conflicts involve the military
forces of two separate states. Contemporary jurisprudence developed at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) defines an
international armed conflict as including situations in which a foreign state
plays “a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the
military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing
operational support to that group.”1 The Somali government clearly provided
assistance to the Shifta forces operating in Kenya – in fact it was the agreement
reached between the governments of Kenya and Somalia in 1967 that effectively
ended the Shifta War. However, the information available to the Commission is
not sufficient for it to conclude that the Somali government exercised a level of
control over the Shifta forces that would qualify the conflict as an international
armed conflict.

5.

Whether the Shifta War qualifies as an international or non-international armed
conflict is significant, because it determines which body of international law applies
to the parties to the conflict. However, for most of the work of the Commission, the
significance of whether the Shifta War was an international or non-international
armed conflict was minor. With respect to the Commission’s mandate to establish
an accurate, complete and historical record of human rights violations, the killings,
torture, rape and other atrocities committed during the Shifta War are violations
no matter how the conflict is characterised.

1
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Origins
6.

Few episodes in the post-colonial history of Kenya have been subjected to
scrutiny, including the Shifta War, yet the war is unique in that it represents the
first time that the Kenyan state formally declared war on a section of its territory.
It is hoped that historians and researchers will take up the challenge of placing
that particular period within the larger narrative of Kenya’s modern history.2

7.

For the purposes of this report, however, the main focus will be the relatively
narrow theme of mass killings. With an official death toll of about 2,000 and
unofficial estimates reaching 7,000, the Shifta War represents one of the most
intensive spates of widespread killing that Kenya has ever experienced. Some of
these deaths were legal: the killing of armed combatants and killings that took
place in self-defence. Others were not, such as the deliberate targeting of civilians
by both parties to the conflict. The task of the Commission was to establish how
many of these deaths could be attributed to massacres. A brief review of the
history of unrest in Northern Kenya helps to place this inquiry in a broader social
and political context.

8.

The Shifta War itself arose out of a long history of political unrest in Northern
Kenya. Ethnic Somali and other Northern Kenya communities resisted centralised
rule from the very earliest days of colonialism.

9.

From 1893 to about 1918, various Somali groups engaged in primary resistance to
the colonial powers. Resistance at this stage lacked an explicitly positive political
objective and instead centred on resistance to the British invasion of previously
independent territories.

10.

As in other parts of Kenya, however, not all inhabitants of Northern Kenya took
up arms against the colonialists. One Somali clan, the Herti, for example, adopted
a strategy of cooperation. Collaboration with the British gave the Herti a virtual
monopoly in government employment. Nearly all askaris, scouts and mail runners
were drawn from this small clan. The scattered and sporadic nature of the uprisings
meant that ultimately the resistance did not present a major challenge to the British.
Ethnic Somalis, however, acquired a reputation of being troublesome, difficult to
govern and dangerous as several fairly high-ranking European administrators were
killed in the fighting.

2
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11.

By the 1920s, this initial phase of primary resistance had more or less come to an
end. The locus of Northern activism then moved to Nairobi. The move ushered in
nearly two decades of sustained politicking by a numerically minor clan known
as the Isaq. Notably, Isaq activism revolved around the issue of identity.

12.

The colonial government’s love of taxonomy meant that officials spent a great
deal of time classifying people by race and ethnicity. The Isaq were grouped as
African or native-Africans and were saddled with all the tax, residential and labour
requirements that came with that status. The Isaq resisted this definition of them
as African. Their objections were based on a claim that they were more Arab
than anything else, with the modern-day port of Aden in Yemen often cited as
their original birthplace. Isaq determination to distinguish themselves both from
Africans and other Somali groups fuelled many years of curious yet determined
efforts to exempt themselves from the various regulations governing African life
in Kenya. The particular target of Isaq’s anger was the Native Poll and Hut Tax
Ordinance, which required them to pay the same amount of tax as Kenya’s other
African populations.3 Through various welfare associations, the Isaq sought to be
removed from Native Ordinance and placed under the Non-Native Ordinance. At
30 shillings per year, the non-native tax rate was a hefty 10 shillings more than
the native rate, but this did not seem to concern the Isaq; their only concern was
that they not be equated with a people that were viewed as inferior.

13.

The third phase of pre-independence political activity in Northern Kenya has
more direct connections to the Shifta War. In May 1943, the innocuously named
Somali Youth Club was founded in Mogadishu. Four years later, branches were
opened in Wajir, Mandera and Isiolo. The club changed its name to the Somali
Youth League (SYL). Membership was primarily Somali and more specifically,
Herti. Large numbers of non-Somali Northerners, such as the Burji and the
Borana, were also drawn to the SYL by a seductive and progressive manifesto
that included promises to fight for better educational and health facilities. The
paucity of schools and hospitals in the region was as much a concern in the
1940s as it is today; the roots of social and economic marginalisation ran very
deep. There was a political edge to some of the League’s other objectives. For
instance, SYL leaders sought to “foster Islam”. Although no further information
was available as to what would be done to foster Islam, colonial officials came to
view with a great deal of suspicion any efforts to increase the profile of Islam in
the colonies.

3
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14.

Finally and most critically, the SYL championed the unification of all Somali
populations in the Horn of Africa. As controversial as the issue of Somali unity
would prove in later years, in the 1940s few concerns were raised by the SYL’s
stated objective of bringing all Somalis together into some kind of geo-political
arrangement. It may well have been that administrators hundreds of miles away in
Nairobi did not take the League seriously.

15.

War British Foreign Secretary. During a 1946 meeting held to negotiate the fate
of colonies belonging to the defeated Italians and Germans, Bevin suggested the
creation of a union of Somali territories in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia. Naturally,
British officials would be responsible for governing the new territory. The Bevin
Plan, as it was known, was quickly dismissed, with the Ethiopians raising the
most objections. Ethiopia would not countenance losing the Somali-dominated
southern regions of Ogaden and Haud. The entire plan was dismissed as a naked
and shameless attempt to extend British influence in the region. Nevertheless
Bevin had hit upon a nascent Somali nationalism that could not easily be ignored.
A decade later arguments about a Greater Somalia would resurface with a ferocity
that would result in the Shifta War.

16.

In the interim, the SYL branches in Kenya busied themselves with more local
campaigns. While presenting itself as a social, charitable and quasi-religious
organisation, the League’s activities from 1948 onwards were more overtly political.
SYL leaders began to advocate non-compliance with colonial policies, regulations
and laws. They urged followers not to take orders from government-appointed
headmen. All matters relating to Somali affairs (marriage, disputes, debt, etc.)
would instead be handled by SYL-approved appointees.

17.

The elaborate colonial boundaries that restricted the various communities and their
cattle to prescribed areas were also targeted by the SYL, who called for a return to
more traditional land use patterns. Alarm bells went off when news reached Nairobi
that the League was seeking to recruit Somali askaris, policemen and youths and
subject them to basic paramilitary training organised by the former King’s African
Rifles (KAR). By the early 1950s, when talk of Koranic oaths emerged from Isiolo,
Garissa and other Northern towns, colonial administrators had had enough. The
Somali Youth League was declared a threat to security and proscribed. It is not
immediately clear what happened to its leaders and organisers. Some of them might
have fled to Somalia where they continued to issue pamphlets and treatises that
were occasionally smuggled into Kenya for distribution. There is also some evidence
that League devotees in Isiolo attempted to revive the organisation through an
affiliated group known as the Somali Youth Association. Again, the colonial officials
would have none of this and the Somali Youth Association was refused registration.
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18.

By the late 1950s, the Somali Youth League was most certainly in decline. Its place
at the helm of Somali nationalism in Kenya had been taken over by the Northern
Province People’s Progressive Party. The NPPPP, as it was popularly known, forms
the final link in the chain of events leading up to the Shifta War. As with most other
currents in the history of Northern Kenya, the impulses that inspired the formation
of the NPPPP originated in Somalia proper. In 1960, officials in British Somaliland
sprung something of a surprise. They suddenly declared British Somaliland, the
predecessor of modern-day Somaliland, independent. A few days later, British
Somaliland was united with the Trust Territory of Somalia (formerly Italian
Somaliland) to form the Somali Republic. Administrators in Kenya, Djibouti and
Ethiopia were caught off guard because they had received no notice about a move
that would effectively revive the Bevin Plan.

19.

An article in the Somali independence constitution articulated the imperative
of achieving “the union of Somali territories by legal and peaceful means”.4 The
new state of Somalia adopted a flag in the centre of which was a five-pointed star
symbolizing the union of five areas: Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, French
Somaliland (Djibouti), Ethiopia’s Ogaden Province and Kenya’s Northern Frontier
District.

20.

In a speech to the United Nations, Ali Sharmake, the president of Somalia, went
even further and declared that “[our] neighbours are Somali kinsmen whose
citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary arrangements, so how
we can regard our own brothers as foreigners?”5 These pronouncements from
the newly-independent state of Somalia revived long dormant aspirations in
Northern Kenya. Within months, the NPPPP was up and running. Headquartered
in Wajir, the party was led by Wako Happi and Maalim Stanboul. Happi and
Stanboul made it clear that their primary objective was secession from Kenya.
Their message was wildly popular and the party quickly attracted Somali and
non-Somali members from throughout the region. Somali populations in Nairobi
were drawn into the cause by an NPPPP affiliate organisation known as the
National Political Movement.

21.

How a small, isolated and rural party came to present such a fundamental challenge
to Kenya’s territorial integrity has as much to do with its fortuitous timing as
anything else. The NPPPP came to prominence precisely when outgoing British

4
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administrators and incoming Kenyan ones were engaged in a series of important
conversations about political arrangements for self-governance and, eventually,
independence. An NPPPP-backed delegation was present during the first Lancaster
Conference in 1960 and through its spokesman, Abdirashid Khalif, reiterated
Northern Kenya’s intention and desire to be part of Somalia. The delegation
returned to Kenya and continued to support the idea of a greater Somalia. At the
second Lancaster Conference of 1962, the NPPPP scored something of a victory as
the Colonial Secretary agreed to the establishment of a Northern Frontier District
(NFD) Commission to establish the level of support for secession. That Commission
travelled extensively throughout the Northern region, hearing witnesses and
collecting memoranda. In all, the NFD Commission’s hearings were attended by
nearly 40 000 people, with 134 of them making oral submissions and another 106
depositing written ones. Of the data it received, the NFD Commission concluded in
its report:
The areas in which we found the people supporting the Somali Opinion are the biggest
total in population and size…we found that the people there almost unanimously
favour secession from Kenya of the NFD when Kenya attains Independence, with the
object of ultimately joining the Somali Republic, but they want the NFD to have a
period under British authority in which to build up its machinery of government so
that it can join the Somali Republic as self-governing unit.6

22.

The only exceptions were sections of the Burji, Borana and other non-Somali
populations around Moyale. For the NPPPP, the Commission’s findings were all
the proof they needed to make the final push for independence from Kenya.

23.

Secessionist hopes were severely dashed by what has been characterised as a
betrayal by the British. The Colonial Secretary was simply not prepared to preside
over such a fundamental re-drawing of Kenya’s territory only a few months
before independence. Moreover, the British seemed to believe that Kenya was
capable of developing and functioning as a nation that could cater to diverse
ethnicities, cultures and religions. In language that foreshadows subsequent
debates about the status of Northern Kenya, the Colonial Secretary insisted that
Kenya
... is a country which depends for its future on being able to recognize people of different
races and prove it is capable of providing a home where people of different races can
live honourably and amicably.7

6
7
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24.

And so the Commission’s findings were shelved. The only concession that the
British made to northern aspirations was to re-organise the area into a province.
With this, the Northern Frontier Province became the seventh and largest
province in Kenya, which entitled it to greater resources and attention from the
centre. The reasoning was that this would somehow pacify the secessionists’
demands for greater autonomy.

25.

Meanwhile, politicians from both the main political parties (KANU and KADU)
completely rejected the idea of ceding any territory. Oginga Odinga spoke for
many when he thundered before a 1963 meeting of the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU) that “we shall not give up even one inch of our country to the Somali
tribalists and that is final”.8 Jomo Kenyatta was even more scornful of the NPPPP
and its objectives. In a widely quoted statement attributed to the first president
of Kenya, Mzee Kenyatta is reported to have told the secessionists to “pack their
camels and go to Somalia”.9 At an inter-African meeting, the first President of
Kenya said those in Northern Kenya who want to hold a referendum on the issue
could “vote with their feet”. Consequently, the NPPPP decided to boycott voter
registration and all other preparations in the lead-up to the General Election.
The boycott drew the same contemptuous response from Nairobi. If anything,
by this point, positions had hardened on the idea of majimbo (federalism) as
well. Best described as a loose federal system that envisioned a certain degree
of self-governance for the seven provinces, majimbo was championed by one
party (KADU) and rejected by another (KANU). KANU’s arguments eventually
won the day; Kenya was to remain a highly centralised state governed from the
centre.

26.

For many NPPPP members and supporters, the second half of 1963 was a
deeply unhappy time. In June, Kenya became self-governing. As most citizens
were celebrating this important milestone, pressure was being applied to the
secessionists. Stanboul, Happi and other NPPPP luminaries had already been arrested
and internally exiled. By the end of the year, matters had degenerated further
with the NPPPP abandoning the idea of reaching a solution through peaceful and
political means. The party, with support from Somalia, set up the Northern Frontier
District Liberation Army (NFLDA) and staged a number of attacks on government
institutions and officers. A short two weeks after Kenya gained its independence
on 12 December 1963 President Kenyatta declared a State of Emergency and a
crackdown on the Shifta insurgency began.

8
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27.

The Commission was struck by the overall portrayal of the people of Northern
Kenya as removed - literally and figuratively - from the excitement, optimism
and pride sweeping across the rest of the country as self-government and
independence approached. Part of the reason for Northern antipathy was most
certainly the widespread anxiety about the unresolved and pressing issue of
secession.

28.

Commission witnesses also alluded to much deeper and more fundamental
factors. Some inhabitants of the region were already so far removed from colonial
rule that independence held no meaning for them. In some cases, people were
completely unaware that such a momentous political change was even taking
place. Dayow Ibrahim Mohammed described himself as being “in the bush” when
independence was achieved. His frank assessment was that he and his kin “did not
know much” about what was happening beyond the immediate radius of their
families, livestock and homesteads.10 This dissociation from mainstream political
life in Kenya is instructive for any effort to understand the marginalisation that
continues to be experienced by the inhabitants of Northern Kenya. As fighting
commenced and the war progressed, the sense of Northern Kenya as a neglected
and ignored region became even more acute.

Chapter THREE

Legal Framework
29.

Scholars of Northern Kenya have rightly paid a lot of attention to the legal
environment in which the war was conducted. One of the most extraordinary
characteristics of the Shifta War was the latitude given to the security forces to,
essentially, behave as they pleased. When President Jomo Kenyatta proclaimed
the State of Emergency on the 24 December 1963, he set in motion a process
that would give almost unlimited powers to the government and the military in
Northern Kenya.

30.

Concerns about insecurity and civil unrest (occasioned by the prolonged
resistance described above) meant the region had always been handled quite
differently from other parts of the country. During the colonial period, Northern
Kenya was administered using the Special District (Administrations) Ordinance
and the Outlying Districts Ordinance of 1902. Movement in and out of such
Special Districts as the NFD was tightly controlled with a pass system. Anyone
wishing to visit the NFD had to apply for a pass and more often than not, these

10 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Wajir/ 19 April 2011/ p. 45

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

109

Volume IIA

Chapter THREE

applications were flatly turned down. The only people granted freedom of
movement were military personnel. The 1902 Ordinance was followed in 1933
and 1934 by the Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance and the Special Districts
(Administration) Ordinances, respectively.11 Cumulatively, these Ordinances
gave colonial administrators the power to arrest, restrain and detain members of
“hostile” tribes, including the Somali.
31.

Preparations for independence further demonstrated the State’s preoccupation
with insecurity and threats from the north. Section 19 of the Independence
Constitution provided that the Governor-General
may, by regulations which shall be published in the Kenya Gazette, make such provision
as appears to him to be necessary or expedient for ensuring effective government or
in relation to the North Eastern Region and without prejudice to the generality of that
power, he may by such regulation make such temporary adaptations, modifications or
qualification or exceptions to the Provisions of the Constitution or of any other law as
appear to him to be necessary.12

32.

The President was thus given the enormous power to amend the Constitution (at
least as it applied to the North Eastern Region) unilaterally through regulation.
Section 19 morphed into Section 127 of the Republic of Kenya’s Constitution,
resulting, as some commentators have put it, in a situation whereby the
President could rule Northern Kenya by decree. When the State of Emergency
was declared, the Preservation of Public Security Act was activated allowing
the President to impose curfews and to create a buffer security zone between
Kenya and Somalia. People could be shot on sight or arrested or have their cattle
confiscated if they were found within the five-kilometre buffer security zone. As
the war progressed, additional laws were passed that tightened the screws even
further. An amendment of the Preservation of Public Security Act enlarged the
Government’s emergency powers by removing all existing legislation relating
to parliamentary control over emergency laws and the laws relating to public
order. Existing constitutional provisions were repealed and replaced with what
has been described as a “blank cheque” for the President of Kenya, who was now
permitted to “at any time by order in the Kenya Gazette to bring into operation
generally or in any part of Kenya, part III of the Preservation of Public Security Act
or any part thereof”.13

11

Ahmed Issack Hassan, Legal Impediments to Development in Northern Kenya. http://www.braissac.com/legal_impediments_
to_developement_in_northern_kenya.html Accessed 2nd November 2010.
12 Ahmed Issack Hassan, Legal Impediments to Development in Northern Kenya. http://www.braissac.com/legal_impediments_to_
developement_in_northern_kenya.html Accessed 2nd November 2010
13 Ahmed Issack Hassan, Legal Impediments to Development in Northern Kenya http://www.braissac.com/legal_impediments_
to_developement_in_northern_kenya.html Accessed 2nd November 2010

110

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter THREE

Socio-Economic Policy in Support of The War
33.

The government also developed a handful of socio-economic policies intended
to work in tandem with the military, security and legal efforts to tackle the Shifta.
Rather less attention has been paid to these policies, but for the Commission
they were important in understanding the history of violation of socio-economic
rights in the region. In 1964, through the Ministry of Economic Planning and
Development, Kenya published its inaugural National Development Plan. The 840
000 dollars allocated to Northern Kenya reflected the desperate lack of investment
in the province. Livestock, the mainstay of the northern economy, received the
lion’s share of the allocation, with huge sums set aside for boreholes, paddocks and
improved veterinary services. Schools and health centres were also scheduled to
receive money to help redress such shocking imbalances as the fact that in 1963
there was not a single secondary school in the whole of the North Eastern Province.

34.

In 1966, a very important shift occurred among leading policy makers and thinkers.
The notion of development for development’s sake in Northern Kenya was put on
the back burner. What replaced it was the idea of development as a function of
war. As the military campaign floundered, men like Tom Mboya (who was then
Minister of Economic Planning and Development) began to suggest specific
development initiatives as a direct response to the government’s obvious inability
to contain the Shifta and to neutralise the support that militants received from the
local communities. In other words, the connection was made - albeit belatedly between secessionism and economic neglect in Northern Kenya.

35.

Recognising that government policy would have to change to win over hearts and
minds of the people of the North, the government in 1966 embarked on a flurry of
carefully chosen projects over and above those outlined by the development plan
of 1964. In February, for instance, a standard one classroom for thirty students was
symbolically built in a ‘Balambala’ shop that once belonged to Maalim Stanboul,
the now exiled leader of the NPPPP.14 Ever-present film and newspaper crews
further underscored the fact that most of these activities were undertaken as
much for their propaganda value as they were for their contribution to a carefully
structured development agenda.

36.

Another development policy that also appears to have been driven by security
and military concerns was or, as it is sometimes known, ‘manyattarisation’. The
term villagisation begins to appear in policy documents on Northern Kenya in the

14 Balambala is a small town
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mid-1960s. It refers to the placement of ordinarily nomadic populations into model
villages where modern animal husbandry, health and education techniques would
be taught.
37.

Many who testified before the Commission rejected this utopian reading of
villagisation. The descriptions provided by these witnesses were more reminiscent
of the protected villages created throughout Central Kenya some 15 years earlier
by the colonial authorities. Villagisation during the pre-independence Emergency
was a disruptive process that cannot by any stretch of imagination be described
as progressive. Thousands of people were herded into stockade compounds
surrounded by barbed wire and spike-filled trenches. A single, tightly-monitored
gate controlled access all in the name of protecting villagers and their occupants
from alleged Mau Mau attacks.

38.

Despite these precautions, extensive research has shown that the principal threats
emanated from inside the villages themselves, as squalid and violent conditions
gave rise to murders, rapes and assaults committed in the main by the very
home guards charged with protection. Some of the testimonies presented to the
Commission on the villagisation programme in Northern Kenya during the Shifta
War were eerily reminiscent of the descriptions of the camps created during the
Mau Mau period. Like the colonial officials before them, Kenyan authorities were
absolutely wedded to villagisation as the blanket solution to the twin problems
of unrest and poverty. And so it was that even at a time of limited finances,
overstretched budgets and perennial shortfalls, villagisation programmes in the
North were the beneficiaries of healthy tranches from Treasury. In 1967, over a
million dollars was sent villagisation’s way.15

39.

What the government got in return for its large investment in villagisation is
difficult to say. Some villages (Balambala, Ijara and Modogashe in greater Garissa)
have been described as safe havens in a region badly affected by Shifta attacks on
civilian populations.

40.

Other villages (Garbatulla, Moyale and Isiolo further west and north of Garissa) had
reputations for unrestrained brutality. Some estimates suggest that only about a
fifth of Northern Kenya’s population were resident in the government-controlled
villages. If these figures withstand further scrutiny and research, it would be
impossible to classify villagisation as a success, either in isolating civilians from the
Shifta or as an engine of modernisation.

15 Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity (2005) 157.
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Fighting The War
41.

The declaration of a State of Emergency on 24 December 1963 marked the formal
beginning of an unconventional armed conflict about which very little is known. As
previously mentioned, the Shifta period has attracted very little scholarly attention
and so it was not easy for the Commission to construct a master narrative.16 The
secrecy enveloping some of the military operations carried out during the war
stands in the way of openness and transparency. Attempts to gain access to
relevant documents in the possession of the Kenya government met with limited
success. The Commission was able to gain access to diplomatic dispatches from the
United States and the United Kingdom, though such dispatches obviously come
with their own biases and other limitations. Despite this difficulty in accessing
written documentation, certain facts are well within the public domain.

42.

As soon as the State of Emergency was announced, operational orders were issued
to the 1st, 3rd and 5th Battalions of the Kenya Rifles. These battalions were the postcolonial successors to the infamous Kings African Rifles (KAR). They have a long
tradition of service in Northern Kenya and were regularly deployed for so-called
pacification operations as well as normal tours of duty. The 7th battalion, which is
more commonly associated with modern security operations in the north, was not
formed until 1968 and so did not feature in the Shifta War.

43.

For the newly independent Kenyan army, the Shifta War was a first test of the
abilities of the newly independent armed forces. The war also became something
of a rite of passage as an entire generation of Kenya’s military officers was defined
by its experiences of the war. Some of them (Joseph Ndolo and Jackson Mulinge, for
example) went on to careers at the very highest levels of the military partly based on
acts of bravery and leadership evidenced during the campaign against the Shifta.17

44.

Most accounts of the war characterised it as compromised by personnel, terrain and
finance.18 The cost of the war provided an early shock. Air support alone for the first
few months cost close to 130,000 British pounds.19 It was a staggering amount that
was partially offset by 250,000 pounds of emergency and technical aid from the United
Kingdom. The shortage of fighting men was also a consequence of a cash-strapped
military. From the outset it was common for the army to draw General Service Unit
(GSU) servicemen, regular and administration policemen into joint operations.

16
17
18
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Hostile terrain in Northern Kenya

45.

The immediate problem of a lack of personnel was solved in the short term, but in the
months and years ahead, this impromptu marriage with the police forces would lead
to breakdowns in command, control and discipline that severely compromised the
government’s ability to take on the Shifta effectively. Little could be done to mitigate
the inhospitable terrain of Northern Kenya. Fighting started after particularly heavy
rains in November and early December 1963. The entire landscape was rendered
impassable. When the rains stopped, the heat and the dust returned. Retired Colonel
Frank Muhindi, who saw action in Garbatulla near Isiolo, described the conditions as
intolerable, especially when soldiers had to march for miles on foot.20

46.

For all its problems, however, the Kenya Army was a conventional force. The Northern
Frontier District Liberation Army was not. For starters, command-and-control
structures within the NFLDA were diffuse. There were two fairly separate factions
within the NFLDA. The first was active in a wide swath of territory north of Wajir
and could count on the support from Ethiopian-based renegades. Membership of
this faction was dominated by the Garre, Murulle, Ajuran and Degodia clans. The
second faction’s operational area was the vast flat plains south of Wajir inhabited
by such Darood groups as the Ogaden. Sitting in Mogadishu was a small cohort of
Somali National Army generals and police officers who occasionally issued various
operational commands and developed strategy. Distance from the theatre of war
prevented those in Somalia from having a direct and immediate influence on events
on the ground, although they were responsible for the supply of some arms and,

20 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Nairobi/ 24 June 2011/ p. 3
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later on, mines. The most fundamental unit of the NFDLA was a small guerrilla cell
that consisted of 25 to 30 men who shared kinship on - at the very least - a sub-clan
level. These cells were loosely grouped into battalions of about 600 fighters that fell
under the command of ethnic Somali defectors from the Kenya Army and police.
Once again, however, these battalions were loosely organised. Staged, large-scale
encounters between the NFLDA and the Kenya Army only begin to feature in the
later months of 1964.
47.

This loose organisation and fluidity made the NFLDA a difficult target to pin down.
In the early weeks of the war, the Kenyan military seemed confused about the
nature of the threat posed by the NFDLA fighters. One of the first things to throw
the Kenyan command into a panic was the defection of Somali men with military
experience. Fearing further defections and even mutiny, the decision was made
in 1964 to remove all Somali soldiers from the province and send them to other
parts of the country. Some argue that this denied the army of the local expertise
necessary to take on such a slippery opponent. As it was, the Kenyan military
charged into Northern Kenya lacking cultural and language skills necessary
to gather intelligence from residents or to win hearts and minds over to the
government’s cause. The NFLDA’s hit-and-run tactics also proved effective against
the Kenyan military. Guerrilla cells roamed freely and independently launched
small raids and engaged the security forces in impromptu, unplanned skirmishes.

48.

The guerrillas seemed to melt in and out of the bushy undergrowth at will, while
conventionally trained forces were much less nimble and quick, particularly at night
when most of the raids were staged as the NFLDA engaged them in rudimentary
psychological warfare. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some Kenyan soldiers
were reluctant to pursue NFDLA fighters for fear of genital mutilation and forced
circumcision.21

49.

It was a gruelling strain on the soldiers who served in the Kenya military. Although
the Commission did not hear direct testimony on this particular issue, the
psychological strain caused by service in Northern Kenya was demonstrated by
the powerful testimony of Fred Obachi Machoka.22 A popular Kenyan radio and
television personality over the past three decades, in the 1970s Machoka was a
young serviceman who undertook several tours of duty in the North Eastern
Province. He spoke at some length about the pressures of tracking down and
engaging with former Shifta fighters. He describes himself as suffering from
some kind of post-traumatic stress for which he has never been treated. Unable

21 Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity (2005) 147
22 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ Nairobi/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 55
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to continue, Machoka left the army a broken man, unwilling (until his testimony
before the Commission) to discuss publicly his experiences.
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50.

In 1967, the course of the war changed considerably with the announcement of
Operation Fagia Shifta (Operation wipe out the Shifta). Operation Fagia Shifta was
conceived by the army as a major counter-offensive against the Shifta, who had
enjoyed considerable success in 1965 and 1966. Guerrilla attacks continued to
frustrate the Kenyan military. In addition, the Shifta began to deploy landmines
throughout Northern Kenya. The landmines were rumoured to have originated
from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and found their way to Kenya through Somalia.
Randomly placed and difficult to detect because of a then-innovative plastic casing,
the mines wreaked havoc. Scores of army vehicles were destroyed by the explosives
and an unknown number of soldiers killed. Unintended targets – local traders and
other civilians – were also victims of the landmines. The mines severely limited the
ability of the army to patrol the region in search of the very fighters who were laying
the explosives.

51.

After months of frustration, the army eventually emerged with an ambitious plan to
combat recent Shifta gains. One of the measures proposed by Operation Fagia Shifta
was the creation of incentives to civilians to engage in de-mining. Small payments
were made for all mines turned in to either the police or the military. This proved to
be a popular measure amongst traders who had lost trucks and merchandise to the
explosives. Operation Fagia also saw the launching of more carefully and closelycoordinated patrols supported by expanded air patrols. The Ethiopians were also
drawn into the conflict with the signing of a defence pact that dismantled support
and protection that the Shifta had been receiving from their kin in Ethiopia. A
determined push was made to convert prominent religious, business and political
leaders to the government position. Large barazas were held throughout the
province during which the secessionist cause was roundly condemned. Last, but not
least, amnesty was offered to former and active Shifta fighters.

52.

By the middle of 1967, this multi-pronged operation started to yield results. Valuable
intelligence about guerrilla leaders and tactics was received from surrendering
Shifta fighters. Military planners used this intelligence to pursue the few remaining
cells still involved in active combat. The demise of the Shifta was further hastened
by a growing rift between the southern and northern factions. The northern
faction of Garre, Ajuran, Degodia and Murulle turned in arms and landmines
in huge quantities, leaving the southerners on their own. By October 1967, the
war was effectively over as Kenya and Somalia finally signed a memorandum of
understanding. Mediated by the then President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, the
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memorandum marked the end of formal Somali support for the Shifta. Money,
supplies and technical support that used to flow freely from Mogadishu to fighters
in Kenya stopped. With such an essential conduit shut down, the Shifta were only
able to stage a few lone and incoherent attacks. Surrenders occurred at a fairly
steady rate of about 15 a week and in the six months between October 1967 and
April 1968 about 450 fighters turned in their weapons. The most critical provisions
of the memorandum required Somalia to renounce all claims to Kenyan territory.
By the time that the Somali President and Prime Minister visited Kenya in late 1967,
it was clear that they were no longer actively pursuing the secession of northern
Kenya. Similar declarations by the Somalis were made to the Ethiopians regarding
the Ogaden.
53.

The Shifta War has recently been described as a “small” and a “dirty” war that,
according to official estimates, resulted in the death of about 2 000 people.23
Several witnesses before the Commission believed that the Shifta War reinforced
the foundation upon which the long history of violations and atrocities in Northern
Kenya had been built.

54.

Because of the direct connection made between past and present injustices,
the war is a live issue among the people of Northern Kenya. Scores of people
flocked to the Commission eager to share what had happened to them and
their families during the Shifta War. Entire communities submitted memoranda
to the Commission outlining their version of events. The problem facing the
Commission was not the quantity of sources, but their quality. Almost half a
century later, witness memories are fuzzy and sometimes thin on specifics. Those
interested in further details will most certainly have to carry out additional
inquiries. For now, setting out the broad trends and recurrent patterns will have
to suffice. In the case of the Shifta War, these patterns and trends are marked
by brutality, excessiveness and violence, with massacres and allegations of
massacres, popping up with stunning regularity.

‘The time when misfortune befell us’:24 Violations from the frontline
55.

Because the Shifta War was fought on so many fronts (legal, economic and military),
the stories presented by witnesses were also sprawling and multi-faceted. Even
so, a handful of violations dominated the submissions. For the Commission, these
violations defined the Shifta War; they represented the things that have stuck in
peoples’ memories and the things that they want others to know about this period.

23 Daniel Branch Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963 – 2011 (2011) 27
24 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 April 2011/ Garissa/ p. 4

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

117

Volume IIA

Chapter THREE

56.

While reports and allegations of mass killings feature prominently and are the focus
of this particular chapter, it is important to establish the relationship between mass
killings and other violations. In other words, as extraordinary and unusual as mass
killings are, they are the wholly predictable products of environments that foster
many other atrocities. Mass killings, particularly during the Shifta period, belong
to a large cluster of other gross violations such as rape, abduction and torture.

Daaba: Villagilagisation and poverty
57.

There has long been a tendency to characterise all Shifta experiences as
undifferentiated. What the Commission found, however, was significant subregional diversity. Witnesses were very anxious that we understood that their
histories were specific and varied. The Borana people of Isiolo, for instance, have
a special name for the Shifta War years: Daaba. The simple translation of Daaba is
“when time stopped”.25 The term itself gives some sense of how profoundly the
Shifta War affected the region. The notion of Daaba encompasses the entire period
of forced settlement brought about by the policy of villagisation. Villagisation
was implemented in Isiolo from about 1965 to 1967 with compounds set up in
Garbatulla, Merti and Modogashe.26 Not enough data has emerged to make very
reliable contrasts and comparisons between Isiolo and protected villages in other
districts such as Garissa and Mandera. But from the evidence received, it does seem
that the people of Isiolo were exposed to a more aggressive and destructive form
of villagisation than most.

58.

One of the reasons that Isiolo may have been the focus of such a determined antiShifta campaign was the 1963 assassination of two senior government officials by
suspected bandits: Daudi Dabaso Wabera, the first African District Commissioner
of Isiolo and Galma Diida, a government-appointed chief from a prominent and
wealthy Borana family. Wabera and Diida were gunned down in a dramatic ambush
near Modogashe in June 1963. Even though the killings took place a few months
before the declaration of the State of Emergency, they marked Isiolo District as an
area of particularly intense and high-level Shifta activity.

59.

The testimony of Dura Nuya, an elder from Garbatulla, suggested that even the
process of committing people to villages was a violently disorganised one. In his
case, he was beaten and taken to a protected village without the knowledge of his
parents:

25 Godana Doyo and Hussein Golicha, DAABA: Historical accounts of the People, Pastoralism and Poverty among the Waso
Community (June 2002)
26 For a detailed map of this part of Northern Kenya, see http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
F5F8EDE05525D825C125729D00503ABA-wfp_AGR_ken060228-b.pdf Accessed 30th January 2012.
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In 1965, when I was in grade I of primary school, I used to go home when schools closed.
While at home one day the armed forces raided our residential place. I was brutally
beaten. My parents themselves were not able to know where I was. They had taken me
to Garbatula and they were able to know about my whereabouts after one week.27

60.

Nuya got off far more lightly than another neighbourhood boy caught up in the
same incident and who Mzee Nuya saw at the camp:
The young man, who was a son to a neighbour, had bloodshot eyes and could not speak.
His name was Ordha Jilo Wario Gulio. He went through a high level of trauma. We do not
know whether he went to heaven, or whether he was burnt...28

61.

Such narratives contradict the claim that these villages were places of peace and
progress and reinforce the view of them as brutal, chaotic detention camps. Hussein
Sheikh Adan Golicha, an Isiolo resident with long-standing interests in the history
of Daaba, testified before the Commission.29 Golicha readily admitted that there are
large, gaping holes in the data. For instance, it has never been possible to generate a
census showing the number and the profile of people held in the Isiolo camps. In the
absence of such numbers, Golicha emphasised the importance of understanding the
impact of restricted spaces on people whose existence was predominantly nomadic.
One of the observations that Golicha has made over many years of research is that
Daaba may have resulted in a sharp upswing in mortality rates. His estimates are that
at least 700 people died during Daaba. Estimated deaths per family in Daaba and the
common cause of death are given as: Modogashe Camp (1.1 men per family, Merti
(1.6 men and Garba (1.6 men). Women were 0.4 and children 0.4 in Modogashe,
Merti (1.2 women and 0.7 children and Garbatulla (0.9 women and 0.8 children).30

62.

While only a rough estimate, this claim of 2,700 deaths in the Isiolo camps alone is
an important one, as it is much higher than the official government number of 2 000
dead throughout the northern region during the Shifta period. Golicha’s numbers
are based on the argument that most of the war’s victims were not in fact victims
of direct encounters with the military. Instead, he included those individuals who
may have died as a result of the conditions imposed on them by Daaba; hundreds
of people may have died from malnutrition, poor health and general illness visited
upon them in the villages. The much-trumpeted modern health care and progressive
medicine promised in the villagisation policy never materialised. Indeed, camp
administrators were hard pressed to provide even the most basic services.

27
28
29
30

TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 59
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 59
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 2 – 15
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p.4
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63.

General accounts indicate that dysentery, pneumonia and malaria frequently
swept through the camps. Epidemics of highly contagious, tuberculosis presented
particular problems and quarantine areas (“tuberculosis manhattans”) were
created in the compounds. Starvation was a serious problem. The only food on
offer in the camps was ugali; the stiff maize-based porridge that many Northerners
found unpalatable and unfamiliar. As Hassan Liban plaintively explained it, “they
gave us ugali and we could not eat it.”31

64.

For security reasons, livestock were only allowed to use thin belts of pasture
surrounding the camps. As a result, milk and meat yields plummeted, depriving those
in the camps of much needed nutritional variety. Nearly all villages had makeshift
graveyards where the bodies of the dead were unceremoniously deposited.

65.

As the camps were gradually shut down towards the end of 1967, people were
released to return to their homes. For Garbatulla elders, this long-awaited moment
of freedom marked the beginning of an even more difficult period during which
the full impact of Daaba began to be felt.32 After so many months confined in the
villages, these former inmates could not really say where “home” was. Unlike Central
Kenya, where detainees were systematically released back to their villages and
communities, the nomadic peoples of Isiolo (and elsewhere in the north) found
themselves stranded. They had been displaced. A slow but inexorable drift towards
the towns began to take place. Uncertainty about where to go and what to do forced
many people into urban centres such as Isiolo. The elders’ depiction of town life is
bleak. People started to live unstructured lives characterised by urban poverty,
substance abuse and trauma:
[They] could only find employment as watchmen or night guards or prostitutes. Many
started chewing miraa (khat) as a way of obliterating memories…for some, life was
never the same again…many people complained of pain, headache, depressed mood
and of death and dying.33

66.

Disbandment of the camps did not, therefore, mean a return to the predictability
of pre-village life; an irreversible chain reaction had been set off that nobody could
control.

67.

The idea of Daaba as a total and unwelcome rupture between the past and the present
was brought up again in subsequent discussions about what the elders describe as
forced conversion to Christianity. The complete failure of the government to provide
any services to the people it released from the camps provided an opportunity for

31 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 26 April 2011/ Mandera/ p.9
32 Dying an Invisible Death and Living an Invisible Life: A Memorandum by Garbatulla Elders, February 2011. TJRC/ISL/1.
33 Dying an Invisible Death and Living an Invisible Life: A Memorandum by Garbatulla Elders, February 2011. TJRC/ISL/1.
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others to step into the void. In Isiolo, the task of caring for thousands of sickly and
confused former inmates fell largely to Christian missionaries who set up stations in
Merti, Garbatulla and Modogashe. Although many locals appreciated the feeding
and health centres, there were underlying suspicions about the missionaries’ motives.
Numerous questions were asked about orphaned children and those, as Dura Nuya’s
testimony showed, who were separated from their parents by missionaries:
And Garbatulla was never the same again as generations were wiped out and children
were ferried in missionary vehicles to schools in Meru and Isiolo.34

68.

One topic overshadows all others in discussions with local residents about the
post-Daaba era: the loss of livestock. The heat and emotion raised by this topic
extends far beyond Isiolo; nearly all Northern witnesses and other participants in
the Commission’s process returned to this theme time and again. For example,
witnesses testified of how government agents strategically killed livestock to
hasten the misery of the locals.
During this time when we had the Shifta War, the Kenyan authorities believed that any
camel herder…camel milk can sustain the lives of the people for a long time…so the
soldiers were actually killing the camel and human beings in the same manner35.

69.

Indeed, the story of livestock losses is a complicated one, but Golicha’s testimony
and research proved useful. His central claim is that livestock herds in Northern
Kenya were almost completely obliterated by Daaba and the war. He estimates that
between 1963 and 1970 the camel population of Isiolo declined by a stunning 70
percent. An even sharper decline of 90 percent was recorded in cattle and small stock
(such as sheep and goats). Golicha’s figures seem to originate from a 1971 United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Food and Agricultural Organisation
(FAO) study.36 Similar trends were found in Garissa District, where the losses were in
the region of 93 percent for camels and 68 per cent for cattle, sheep and goats.

70.

Golicha’s research and testimony provided a number of explanations for these
extraordinary statistics. The Preservation of Public Security Act had established a
buffer zone along the Kenya-Somali border in which livestock could be confiscated
(and people shot); no explanations and justifications had to be given, as people
and domestic animals simply did not belong in this security area. Losses that
occurred hundreds of kilometres away from the buffer zone cannot be explained
away using the Preservation of Public Security Act. The brutal reality of the war
was that animals were at once targets and unintended casualties of military
tactics. The most dramatic evidence of the deliberate waging of war on the civilian

34 Dying an Invisible Death and Living an Invisible Life: A Memorandum by Garbatulla Elders, February 2011. TJRC/ISL/1.
35 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p. 18
36 See study details in Richard Hogg, ‘The New Pastoralism: Poverty and Dependency in Northern Kenya’ (1986) 56 Africa: Journal
of the International African Institute, 320 – 333.
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population through their animals came from further north in Moyale. Witnesses
from the minority Sakuye community - which shall be discussed shortly - spoke of
disturbing widespread poisoning of their animals. It is such a well-known story that
has been passed down from one generation to the next such that even relatively
young people like Councillor Alio Adupo of Moyale recite the details:
The only food these people could get was maybe when they slaughtered a camel,
but the camels were injected with poison and anybody consuming it, his or her body
swelled and died at the end of the day.37

71.

Hassan Ali’s evidence was almost identical and specifically pins responsibility on
security officers:
Leader of Evidence: You did indicate that some people were given poisoned meat. Is
what you wrote true? Do you know about this?
Hassan Kuno Ali: It is true. When they came, they injected the animal with poison. They
then slaughtered the animals and gave the meat to the people. When people ate the
meat, they slept and could not wake up. They died.
Leader of Evidence: Who poisoned the meat?
Hassan Kuno Ali: It was the police and the army personnel.38

72.

Archival material from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United
Kingdom suggests that the Government of Kenya was indeed poisoning water
sources as a way of limiting the movement of people and their herds and enabling
security forces to patrol smaller and more contained areas.39

73.

Claims of poisoning and the deliberate withholding of water have resurfaced
in discussions about subsequent security operations in Northern Kenya, such
as Wagalla. These appear to be tactics all too commonly used in government
operations in the Northern region.

74.

Hassan Kuno Ali’s experience exemplified the tactics used during the operation. He
described to the Commission the appalling conditions they were subjected to by
the security officers:
People were dumped together at one place. Some were killed by rain and some died of
the poisoned meat. Those who were very weak, like me, were left in the rain. There were
women and children. We had no animals. Our animals had been taken away. So we were
brought here. We were told to walk. As we walked, the police beat us up. Those who could
not walk properly were beaten and killed on the way. The old people who could not walk
were left to die as we were being taken to Gurar.40

37 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Moyale/ p. 59
38 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Moyale/ p. 50
39 CAB 21/5284 (1965) “Military Assistance to Kenya in North Eastern Region,” 29 May 1964 (indicating British Government interest
in negotiating for Kenyan abandonment of “the more repressive and unpalatable features of the operation (e.g. Evacuation from
Isiolo and poisoning of wells” in return for British military assistance). FO371/178534, ‘British Military Aid to Kenya: Shifta Raids
from Somalia 1964’ from Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity (2005) 149, 170
40 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 50

122

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

75.

Chapter THREE

Several witnesses drew attention to a heavy-handed strategy that involved the
shooting of animals during security operations. From the point of view of the
security agents, camels could and often were, loaded with guns and supplies for
the Shifta and therefore were legitimate targets. As told to the Commission:
There was a mass operation from the border, starting from Kiunga. The soldiers were
being led by somebody whose name I cannot really remember. I think he was called
Godhana. Instructions were given that all camels be finished because the Somalis or
Shiftas were using the camels to carry their loads or as means of transport. The camels
were within the state of Kenya. They were not along the border. They were just coming
from Garissa. That was why they were killed.41

76.

Equally upsetting for the residents of this region was the large-scale confiscation of
livestock also during security sweeps of one sort or another. Testimony suggests it was
fairly common for government officers to arrive in villages and to leave with cattle,
sheep, camels and goats. Owners were never told what happened to their animals.
Nor were they ever compensated for their losses. Many suspected that livestock was
sold and the profits used to line the pockets of the military and civilian officials:
Animals were taken away by the state and the officers who rounded up the animals.
Some of the animals were taken to the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) by the state.42

77.

The 80 to 90 per cent decline in livestock reported by Golicha suggests that the
actual number of cattle lost was huge. Some witnesses tried to quantify the total
amount of the loss:
The livestock that was found in the villages was confiscated by the authorities,
transported and shared amongst themselves. The weak ones were shot dead en masse.
The loss of animals was estimated as follows: 187,000 head of cattle were shot dead;
420,000 were taken away; 10,000 donkeys were shot dead. The loss of livestock and
property was valued at Kenya Shillings 2 billion.43

78.

These estimates are just for Isiolo. The figures for all of Northern Kenya are bound
to be higher. Further complicating the picture was a prolonged drought in the
early 1970s. The end result was what Golicha has described as the reduction of an
entire generation of Northerners from relative prosperity to “penury and chronic
famine” in just a few years. The sudden disappearance of thousands of animals
dealt the economy of Northern Kenya a severe blow. Studies from the early 1970s
estimate that family resources (food, livestock and money) had been at least halved
by the war. Witnesses spoke of lost opportunities as education was put on hold or
abandoned all together.

41 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 12 April 2011/ Garissa / p. 4
42 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 18
43 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 14.
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79.

Daaba presents a slowly unfolding, primarily economic catastrophe that is quite
different from the dramatic explosions of violence so characteristic of mass killings.
For the people of Isiolo, in particular and Northern Kenya, in general, however,
Daaba is the more important cause of deaths emanating from the Shifta War. The
Commission both recognises and acknowledges the depth of the losses caused
directly and indirectly by the forced confinement resulting from the villagisation
policy. At the same time, however, the Commission maintains that while Daaba is a
very specific and painful consequence of the war, its full impact only becomes clear
when villagisation is connected to other violations and atrocities of the Shifta period.

The Sakuye and the Shifta War
80.

The Sakuye are a minority and marginalised community within a region inhabited
by people who describe themselves as minorities and marginalised. Their unusual
ethnic origins place them right at the edge of most stories about Northern Kenya.
Most anthropologists lump the Sakuye together with the Rendille, another small
community also believed to have formed several centuries ago as a result of
interactions between the Borana-Oromo groups from the north and Somalis from the
west. Although they speak Borana, the Sakuye are distinct from the Borana and the
Rendille and have their own unique social and religious norms, including worship of
a supreme being known as Waaq. However, prolonged exposure to Islamic beliefs of
their more numerous and powerful neighbours has meant that most Sakuye are now
Muslim. Numerical weakness has put the Sakuye in an extremely precarious position.
2009 Census figures place the total Sakuye population at about 28,000.44 With such
a small number, the Sakuye live in relative obscurity. One would be hard-pressed to
argue that the Sakuye have had any political and cultural relevance outside their
corner of Moyale - a tiny location known as Dabel.

81.

Their small population defined the Sakuye experience during the Shifta War as
well. A count in 1969 estimated the Sakuye population to be around 4,700. A
review of the literature has produced no evidence that the Sakuye, unlike the
more politically active populations of Wajir, Garissa and Isiolo, played any part
in either formulating or supporting the secessionist agenda. There is also no
direct indication of Sakuye contributions to the fighting forces. Despite their
having no obvious role in the campaign and lacking the numerical weight
to present any serious threat, the Sakuye nevertheless became the focus of
intensive anti-Shifta assaults. The first step was villagisation. Like the Isiolo
Borana further south, the Sakuye were herded into the so-called protected

44 Population by Ethnic Affiliation see http://marsgroupkenya.org/census/?data=ethaf Accessed 14th February 2012.Historically,
there has been a certain degree of undercounting of the Sakuye. Less nuanced censuses from the late 1960s and 1970s have
sometimes categorized them as Borana
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villages in and around Moyale. It was a rough and ready process that in typical
fashion paid little attention to Sakuye property and well-being.
82.

Witnesses testified that the military applied some kind of scorched earth
policy, destroying everything in their wake as Dabel was cleared of its
inhabitants:
Those people were pushed from Dabel up to Moyale…they were pushed all through to
that stretch of Gula Location. All the houses were burned and even the best business
people as of that time…everything that I have mentioned happened at the Dabel
Location…45

83.

Witnesses testified that the Sakuye also suffered the usual loss of livestock on a
grand scale. By the end of the war, the Sakuye were in the same miserable situation
as most other communities in Northern Kenya. They were, in essence, destitute:
All the camels and cows they had were taken by the government and the Sakuye
community was left bankrupt; they had nothing. So many things happened when they
were in those camps. For example, their wealth vanished, poverty dawned on them and
death visited them. The leader who could talk on behalf of the community was arrested
and jailed. There was no way anybody could be asked why he said this or that. So, the
poor Sakuye people just died like that. There is no record to show how many people and
animals died because the government never wanted to know anything of that sort of
thing. They only cared about making their operation successful.46

84.

The Sakuye also experienced extensive loss of life while in the protected villages.
The government drove the Sakuye even further to Somalia.
People from that community died until the government decided to push them to Somalia
and a majority of them died along the way. There is no record to show how many people
and animals died because the government never wanted to know anything of that sort of
thing. They only cared about making their operation successful. It is the same government
that ordered the soldiers to push these people to Somalia by trekking. Nobody has ever
known the number of the people who died on the way. When the poor Sakuye people
arrived in Somalia, they were not taken in as ordinary refugees. They were just taken
as ordinary people who had been in that country and nobody cared for them…but
remember that they came from a country which was independent - Kenya.47

85.

45
46
47
48

We were 18 women and I can even show you the houses where we were put. The
soldiers locked the doors of the houses and they took us as their wives.48 In many
respects, the Sakuye experience of the Shifta War can be described as fairly typical. On
the particular issue of sexual violence against women, however, Sakuye experiences
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ IMoyale / p. 8
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p. 4
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p. 4
TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Wajir/19 April 2011/p. 7.
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take a much more drastic, extreme and unusual turn. When the Commission began to
explore the general question of sexual violence in Northern Kenya there was concern
that a number of religious and cultural considerations would limit the work the
Commission would be able to carry out on this important topic. When investigations,
research and data collection began, however, the extent to which both women and
men from this traditionally conservative region came forward to speak about such
intimate and painful issues surprised the Commission. It may well be that the desire
for the truth to be known and for justice to be pursued trumped both cultural and
religious sensibilities. Several middle-aged women who were violated during the
early 1960s came forward to share their stories.
86.

The testimonies and evidence of such highly motivated respondents from Sakuye
and beyond gave the Commission the material with which to make assessments
about patterns and prevalence of sexual violence in Northern Kenya, particularly
during the Shifta period. A number of important trends emerged from the
Commission’s data. Most fundamentally, among the statements recorded with
the Commission, rape, attempted rape and other forms of sexual violence were
the sixth most common violations reported as taking place during the fouryear war fought in Northern Kenya. The Commission also found that of the five
perpetrator groups identified as responsible for sexual violence by those who
recorded statements with the Commission, the military was named as being
responsible for the largest proportion of incidents. The police were a close
second. The Commission was, therefore, able to link violations with perpetrators.

87.

The information available to the Commission is less clear about the actual
circumstances under which sexual violence took place. Witness testimony suggests
all number of scenarios. Women out herding animals would be set upon by military
men out on patrol.49 Other assaults took place during security operations which
might have involved, for instance, security officers storming into manyattas in
search of Shifta fighters and those giving them refuge. The Commission heard
how people were frequently subjected to severe beatings as they were forced out
of their homes. It is entirely possible that rapes occurred at the same time. Due
to a relatively small sample, the Commission also found itself unable to arrive at
a broad-based understanding of soldiers’ attitudes and actions towards the issue
of sexual violence. In general, military officers and security operatives from the
Shifta era as a whole proved to be a somewhat reticent and elusive lot, willing to
shed light on certain topics but suddenly forgetful on others. One of the officers

49 Recent research in Wajir indicates that women (and young women in particular) who are traditionally charged with the herding of
small livestock such as sheep and goats currently represent more than 80% of all reported rape and sexual assault cases. The
reason for this is quite simple: women and girls in this position are isolated and vulnerable. See Gladys Mwangi and Guyo Jaldessa,
An Assessment of Sexual and Gender Based Violence in Wajir District, North Eastern Kenya. New York: Population Council,
January 2009
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who testified before the Commission was Colonel (retired) Frank Muhindi who
served as a Platoon Commander in Garbatulla in 1965. The retired colonel, it must
be emphasized, spoke entirely in his own capacity; he did not appear before the
Commission on behalf of the Kenya army. Colonel Muhindi denied hearing about
sexual assault of local women by military officers:
Leader of Evidence: When we were in that part of the country we were told that women
were sexually assaulted by security officers. Did you receive such reports?
Col (retired) Frank Kariuki Muhindi: No I did not. All military persons or policemen
knew that the repercussions would be drastic if they were confirmed to have done that.
The repercussions would be very severe.50

88.

When pressed further, Colonel Muhindi conceded that sexual assaults may have
taken place but that they would have been committed by isolated, aberrant officers
and not therefore characteristic of the military as a whole:
Leader of Evidence: Would it surprise you that we had reports from women that there
were many incidents of brutal rapes against women who would be on their way to
attend to basic needs?
Col (retired) Frank Kariuki Muhindi: I would not deny that there would be such
incidents. However, I can assure you that if a military person or a policeman was
discovered to have been involved in that kind of activity, they were severely punished
because that would be outside our code of conduct. There were specific instructions
that that should not happen. We are human beings and it may have happened.51

89.

Colonel Muhindi’s testimony alludes to the existence of a military code of conduct
and subsequent investigations into breaches of that code. The Commission was
unable to establish if, when and how any such investigations took place. What
the Commission arrived at, however, was an appreciation that the military would
have been highly unlikely to accept responsibility for all occurrences of rape and
sexual violence in Northern Kenya. Colonel Muhindi’s testimony indicates - and
evidence collected by the Commission corroborates - that the Shifta fighters
themselves also committed violence against women:
Some of these incidents were even inflicted upon them by their own people. You have
Shifta men and they have hunger for women…52

90.

What the Commission uncovered amongst the Sakuye, however, was an incident
that challenges the prevailing official view that sexual violence during the Shifta
War was infrequent, isolated and unofficial. The Commission’s investigations in
the Sakuye stronghold of Dabel located a small group of now elderly women

50 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 9
51 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 10
52 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 11
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with extraordinary tales of extreme sexual violence and abduction. The women
eventually travelled to Moyale to speak publicly and frankly before the Commission
about their ordeals. Their stories are detailed but they are, unsurprisingly, bereft of
specific dates and locations.
91.

In April 1965 (or thereabouts), a contingent of about four army trucks arrived in
Gula, a settlement of about a dozen manyattas located some distance away from
Moyale. What happened next has remained imprinted on the victims’ memories,
nearly half a century later. The Gula men were taken away. Where they were taken
is unclear, but it seems that they may have been taken to a police station nearer
Bute, a small urban centre south-west of modern-day Moyale. Between 15 and 30
women from the village were also ferried away to a place known as Dhidhanani.53
Not much is known about Dhidhanani, save that it was close to a water pan and
may have been the location of a military encampment. The women were kept in
Dhidhanani for a number of days; some accounts say three and others say five.
During that time, they were raped multiple times by multiple men.

92.

The rapes were extremely violent and the Commission witnesses did not shy away
from describing them in detail. Mama Halima Martille, now an elderly woman but
at the time a young girl, remembers very clearly what happened to her:
Men sat on my head and legs. I could not look left or right. Some were even putting
soil in our private parts saying: “Fill with soil”. They filled us with soil and left us. We
are human beings. We did not die, but we removed the soil and went away. We were
smelly and dirty as a result of what they did to us.54

93.

Although most of the women have long since died, there are still a few survivors
who corroborate and support each other’s stories. Mama Zainabu Hiyesa’s story
was almost identical to Mama Hartille’s:
One soldier held my right hand and the other one held my left hand and another held
my left leg. They just raped us. They did not see us as dead but they just raped us for
six hours. This was until midnight. At some moment they left us for a minute and then
other people raped us. For the first five days, four people were unable to wake up.55

94.

Halima Ado met the same fate as the other Gula women:
I can say truly that there were four trucks and they took us for five days. I was raped. You
can look at my leg. I have some scars which occurred when they were trying to rape me. I
was strong. I was fighting, but they stepped on my legs. One was holding my head down.
They tried to pierce me with some... for five days they were raping us. They only gave us

53 May also be spelt as “Ndhidh Adhani”
54 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p. 33
55 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p. 31
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A woman at a Community forum convened by the Commission.

one hour. We were not able to sit or bring our…I am sorry to say this, but I have seen a
donkey do that, but not a man. They were forcing us to do things that I have never seen.
They would beat us. That is what the government did to us56

95.

At the end of the three to five days, the women were released. Injured and traumatised,
their lives were changed forever. None of them sought any treatment other than
local medicinal and herb washes. Many of the women attributed their subsequent
inability to conceive to injuries sustained during the attack. The Commission was,
unfortunately, unable to investigate in detail the actual physiological damage done
to the women. So many years after the event, such investigations would require a
level of specialised medical inquiry that was not available to the Commission. One
thing is absolutely certain, however: the women continue to suffer today from posttraumatic stress. The delivery of their testimonies given during the Commission
hearings veered from one extreme to the next: cold detachment, on the one hand
and overwhelming emotion on the other.

56 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p. 36
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96.

The impact of these rapes on the Sakuye was profound. Community representatives
explained to the Commission that in the wake of the assault, the decision was made
to leave Kenya altogether and seek safety and refuge in Somalia. Some accounts
of the relocation recast the move as entirely involuntary, with government soldiers
accused of forcing the Sakuye to flee. The journey was a harrowing one as families
were separated and people died along the way. The Sakuye then found themselves
living in Somalia as refugees trying to rebuild their lives in, ironically, the very
country that has itself sent hundreds of thousands of refugees to Kenya. The Sakuye
would remain in Somalia for nearly three decades until an apparent plea for them
to return home was issued by President Mwai Kibaki soon after he took office in
2002.57 Very quickly, the Sakuye ran into another problem: they were unable to prove
Kenyan nationality and so were not issued with identity documents. The matter was
mentioned in Parliament in June 2004 when a Member of Parliament, Dr. Guracha
Boru Galgallo, sought to find out why more than 100 returnees had had to endure
nearly two years of so-called “vetting” to establish their origins.58

97.

The Sakuye returnees had to prove their Kenyan citizenship. Citizenship is the
foundation upon which many other rights (the right to vote, the right to
education and employment, the right to health, the right to own property,
etc.) rests. Inhabitants of Northern Kenya find it very difficult to acquire birth
certificates, passports and, above all, national identity cards that function as proof
of citizenship in almost all facets of Kenyan life. The vetting process to which
the Sakuye were subjected upon their return involved applicants presenting
themselves before a local vetting committee that usually consisted of a District
Officer, a registration officer from the National Registration Bureau, chiefs,
village elders and intelligence officers. The purpose of these committees was to
determine the nationality of the applicant and eligibility for an identity card.

98.

There was no legal basis for this vetting procedure. Nevertheless it has
become de facto policy and practice at the National Registration Bureau.
Despite various legal challenges, vetting remains. Northerners are generally
required to present a staggering variety of documents to the registrars and
the vetting committees. More often than not, these are documents that the
applicants simply do not possess, such as letters of allotment, title deeds,
electricity and water bills, as well as letters of employment. Applicants are
also routinely asked to produce their parents’ and grandparents’ identification
papers. It is a continuing source of both anger and dismay that applicants in
other parts of Kenya do not generally have to meet this burden of proof.

57 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p. 7
58 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 30th June 2004, 2249 – 2250
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It can and undoubtedly will be argued that one incident in one small settlement
cannot be taken as representative. The Commission was of the view that it is
impossible to discount the possibility that the events of Gula and Dhidhanani
were not replicated elsewhere. Indeed, the Commission collected enough data
and heard enough first-hand testimony to suggest that it was more than likely
that sexual violence against women was a frequent occurrence during the Shifta
War. Moreover, sexual violence was frequently accompanied by abduction,
torture and killing on a broad scale. The military’s reluctance to address the
allegations of sexual violence committed by their officers makes it difficult for
the Commission to analyse the structural and other conditions that made such
violence possible. The Commission would have benefitted from a more candid
discussion of these issues from the military, especially since the testimony of
Shifta War veterans, such as Col Muhindi, suggests that the mechanisms existed
within the military for the investigation of sexual and other crimes. Like many
analysts of the Indemnity Act of 1970 (which grants amnesty to Kenyan security
forces for crimes committed during the Shifta War) the Commission believes that
the Indemnity Act itself was both a tacit and overt admission of the existence of
a broad raft of very serious violations, including sexual violence.

100. Meanwhile, the Sakuye victims continue to live a precarious existence. Husbands
and relatives shun the women on account of the mistaken (but common) belief that
they somehow collaborated with their violators. It would not be an exaggeration
to describe their lives as both helpless and hopeless. The women feel completely
abandoned by both the state and the wider society. Mama Hiyesa described the
women as “cows who have been running and crying for such a long time that they
can neither run nor cry any more”.

Massacres During The Shifta War
101.

The third and final theme the Commission chose to highlight with respect to the
Shifta War is mass killings. The issue of mass killings during the Shifta War presented
the Commission with the familiar but daunting problem of limited and sketchy data.
Faced with the above limitation relating to data, the Commission directly analysed
the personal stories, reminiscences and testimonies provided through statements
and hearings about this very difficult issue. It is primarily these primary sources that
provide the basis for the Commission’s analysis of mass killing during the Shifta War.

102. An additional challenge faced by the Commission in analysing mass killings related
to the manner in which the war was fought. As discussed above, the difficulty with
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the Shifta War revolved around the central players. On the one hand, there was the
Kenyan military, a traditional fighting force with all the usual trappings of a modern
army at war. On the other hand, there were the highly unconventional Shifta forces
that included within their ranks some men with paramilitary experience (as soldiers,
regular and administration police and so on). Most Shifta fighters, however, were
ordinary civilians. Also associated with the Shifta were non-fighting civilians who
provided food, shelter and intelligence. Another less frequently mentioned group
consisted of those who claimed that they had been forced to join (or otherwise
support) the Shifta against their will. Most residents of Northern Kenya, however,
describe themselves as non-actors whose only interests lay in keeping themselves
and their families safe from both the Shifta and Kenyan military forces. The heart of
the problem for the Commission was to disentangle these separate but intertwined
groups and to assess the extent of their roles in mass killings.
103. The first issue of the nature of the Shifta forces was easiest to resolve. The Shifta
tended to operate in small units of about 25 to 30 men who staged guerrillatype skirmishes that typically produced a fairly small body count per encounter.
Preliminary analysis of materials held at the Kenya National Archives reveals that
the typical run-in between Shifta and the military ended with two, three or four
insurgents dead. Crucially, there is little reference to army fatalities and casualties,
suggesting that the Shifta tended to be on the losing end of these encounters. It
was relatively rare for the Shifta to engage in the kind of large-scale battles that
would typically result in a larger loss of life.
104. One such encounter took place near Mandera in April 1967.59 Eight hundred
insurgents took a stand against the military and fierce fighting left 40 dead. Over
the course of the next few days, a further 24 were killed. This represents one of the
very few occasions during the entire campaign when battle-related fatalities were
in the double digits.
105. The typical incident, based upon testimony provided to the Commission, involved
the arrival of security forces in a given village or manyatta. Residents would then
be asked any of a number of questions relating to the insurgency. Had they seen
any fighters in their area? Were they harbouring any Shifta? Or feeding them? Did
they have any information on imminent raids or attacks? A search would then be
conducted. Depending on the response, security forces would either leave emptyhanded or rampage through the village. Those unfortunate enough to witness such
rampages have been left with the memories of terrible scenes. During hearings in
Wajir, Ibrahim Dayow Mohammed described the events in Hadado in 1966:
59 Hannah Whittaker ‘Pursuing Pastoralists: the Stigma of Shifta during the ‘Shifta War’ in Kenya 1963 – 1968’ (2008) 10 Eras
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Community members at a Commission forum.

The most shocking day for me was in 1966 when the Kenyan army came to Hadado.
The military came to us in more than 30 trucks and they surrounded us. They did not
ask us anything. They opened fire on us without any concern. They killed women, men,
children, old men and animals. Nothing was left. I remember relatives who were there,
most of them died, but only a few escaped. The most painful thing is that I saw my
father, Dayow Mohammed Ali.......... I also remember Hussein and Mohammed were killed
during that time. Three of my brothers died there. These were Ahmed, Jilo and Hassan.
When I remember that day, I feel like a dead man. It was the most shocking experience
of my life. The worst thing was I could not report this incident to anybody. Some of our
animals were all killed. Others were taken away from us. Houses were burnt. How did
they expect us to continue living? I slept in the bush for three days. I was shocked and
did not know what to do. That is the worst experience I had in my life.60

106. The Commission heard similar stories from witnesses further north in Mandera
border town:
In June 1964 there were killings of innocent citizens and their livestock was forcefully
taken away. The livestock composed of 500 camels, 1000 cattle and 5000 sheep and
goats. Seven people were killed, that is, Salat Osman Aligal; Isaak Ibrahim Osman;
Mohamed Ibrahim Osman; Ilow Abagubow; Adam Balaya Adawu; Ibrahim Musa Malishe;
and Issak Abdow Abdikadir Abudalahi Hussein of Wante, Godha.61
60 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 19 April 2011/ Wajir/ p. 45
61 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 25 April 2011/ Mandera/ p. 5
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107. The stories in Mandera were further corroborated by witnesses to the Commission.
Guliye Musa Mohamed, one of the witnesses, described the inhuman conditions
they were subjected to:
We were beaten. Those other two people were not beaten like us. I was thoroughly
beaten because I was strong. This was a very traumatising experience. Sometimes they
would tie my legs. At times, I could feel pain in the head. They would tightly hold my
testicles. Pull my penis. They would tie it. I never thought the penis could be pulled
like that. There was an SSP from the police who gave orders that I be burnt to death.
Sometimes I was electrocuted. I had undergone so much pain. The Ogaden people
heard about the suffering I had undergone when they were taken to a concentration
camp. They used to take fathers and taken the daughters away62.

108. Commission witnesses described innocent civilians going about their normal
activities and then somehow getting caught up in a whirlwind of violence far
beyond their control and understanding:
How can a person who was taking care of his camels be a Shifta? He has no gun, panga or
axe. He does not even have a knife. So how can that person be a Shifta? Forty four young
men were killed at a place called Afkar without being questioned. They did not have any
guns or arms. Their camels were drinking water at a borehole and they just died like that.63

109.

The Commission was informed that even places of worship offered no sanctuary.
In 1967 (the exact date and month are unknown) – administration police burst into
Jamia mosque in Isiolo in apparent pursuit of suspected militants. At the end of the
raid at least seven people lay dead. Sheikh Ahmed Nassir witnessed the entire scene:
At that time, I was a Borana teacher at a primary school which has been elevated to a
secondary school. I was a teacher there in 1967. During lunchtime, I used to come to
Jamia mosque which is the biggest in town. One day, when I was almost getting out of
the mosque after the afternoon prayers, the Kenya military officers entered the mosque.
We were almost eight people. Before we got out, those officers came in front of us. The
soldiers sprayed bullets at us. I fell down, pretending that I was shot and the remaining
seven died. I was the only survivor. I ran.64

110. Another witness, Hassan Sheikh Omar, lost his father in Jamia Mosque. Like Sheikh
Ahmed Nassir, he describes a disturbing and tension-filled scene:
When people were praying, my father was not in Jamia mosque for the initial
congregational prayers. He came to the mosque quite late. He went there and
started praying and then the Administration Police (AP) officials sent by the District
Commissioner came there. They sat outside the mosque. When they saw the army going
inside the mosque, they went back to the DC. They killed everybody.65
62
63
64
65
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TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 10 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 26

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter THREE

111. In Garbatulla, the Commission encountered a slightly different pattern. There most
killings seemed to take place in or around the protected villages. For whatever
reason, villagisation was much more volatile in Garbatulla than in other parts of
the region. Witnesses and statements repeatedly refer to “The Day of Killings”
in Garbatulla.66 The details are thin simply because no one can be certain about
the day, month or even the year. But all indications are that the Kenya Army
was responsible for a particularly violent incident that took place in the camps
in response to an attack on a convoy of military trucks between Modogashe and
Garbatulla. On the morning of the killing, the army swept through the camp.
Witnesses describe soldiers jumping out of trucks and indiscriminately opening
fire. Men and boys out with their animals were shot in the back and legs. Women
described the burning of huts, beatings and rapes. How many people died on this
day will never be known. But a large number of people must have been killed,
given the ferocity of violence described.
112. Even though he admits that his own understanding is limited, Golicha proved to
be one of the Commission’s most important sources on the disturbing and elusive
issue of the day of killing in Garbatulla:
I would like to mention one of the biggest happenings in Daaba. It was called ‘Guyaua’
which means “The Day of Lamentations.” On that day, the calls “Ua! Ua!” (Kill!, Kill!) rang
around all the camps. This was the day the camp was literally turned upside down.
Between 30 and 60 men were taken away in military lorries and shot at point blank
range. That action was supposedly triggered by the Shifta blowing up three military
vehicles between Garbatulla and Modogashe.67

113. Golicha continued:
that morning people in the camps were woken up and pushed to a central position and
some people were taken out. Those who were believed to have their sons in Shifta were
taken in military vehicles; specifically the Garbatulla situation, people were shot and our
respondents saw the remains…we actually saw bones at a place called Taiboto of the
people who were killed.68

114. As with the Gula rapes previously described, ‘The Day of Killings’ triggered a mass
exodus of Isiolo residents to Somalia. Like the Sakuye, many Isiolo people found
themselves unable to obtain proper documentation when they returned to Kenya.
The effects of a long-hidden mass killing in an isolated camp have thus been
incredibly profound and long-lasting.
66 Also sometimes referred to as ‘Day of Ua’ or Guyaua which means “day of lamentations “in Oromo
67 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 4
68 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 9 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 9
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115. Garbatulla was also the location of yet another mass killing that deviated
somewhat from the script in that there was a certain amount of selection of
victims. The story of this particular killing was told to the Commission by Adano
Diba, currently a resident of Moyale but originally from Garbatulla. In 1967, Diba
was just seven years old, but he clearly remembers a local meeting (baraza)
presided over by the various administration and security officials. The experience
of testifying before the Commission was extremely emotional for the doctor, but
somehow he managed to compose himself enough to share his memories of that
difficult day:
On that day, people were called together for a baraza by administration officials. I
happened to be in the crowd. The security and administrative officials started calling
names from a list. People were called to the dais and I saw my father among them. When
his name was called, that was the last time that I saw him. As a child of seven years, I was
not following the proceedings but when I went back to where I lived, I remember telling
people who were around me that I saw my father among the group that was called. I was
then told that he had been killed by security forces 69

116. Many years later, Diba would learn that his father’s name was on the list because
he was suspected of being a supporter of Shifta. His father’s elder brother - also
labelled a Shifta - was somehow spared a similar fate. Like so many other victims
and survivors of such killings throughout Northern Kenya, Diba could not reconcile
such descriptions with the man that he knew and loved:
My father was a herdsman tending goats, sheep, cattle and camels. From what I remember,
I had never seen him with a gun, even when the security forces took all our livestock, except
two camels. He was always by my side and I lived with him up to the day of his death.70

117. Diba was unable to say whether his father’s inclusion on the list was the consequence
of any proper investigation. Indeed, if the broad pattern from other parts of Northern
Kenya holds true in Garbatulla, the Commission regards it as highly unlikely that
any such inquiry took place. Informants were quite regularly used by the military
to gather intelligence about local Shifta plans and movements. However, their
usefulness seems to have been compromised by the fact that their information
was frequently tainted by what one Wajir District Commissioner described as “the
usual tribal animosity and blood feuds”.71 What Diba’s case illustrates is that not all
mass killings in the region were randomly executed; there appears to be a class of
mass killings where the victims were selected and killed according to some kind
of criteria. The Commission was not at all convinced that the military criteria for
the selection of men like Diba’s father are founded on anything other than vague
69 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p. 55
70 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p. 57
71 From Hannah Whittaker ‘Pursuing Pastoralists: the Stigma of Shifta during the ‘Shifta War’ in Kenya 1963 – 1968’ (2008) 10 Eras
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suspicions and fairly random associations. That is certainly the perception of Diba
and others who suffered similar losses in Northern Kenya.
118.

While mass killings are the focus here, it is important to acknowledge that individual
extra-judicial killings and murders took place at a high rate during the same period. A
Balambala resident’s story is fairly typical in that he was witness to what he described
as the sudden and unprovoked shooting of an unarmed herdsman:
Looking far east to the field, a man with two goats appeared and a group of soldiers had
passed by just before I saw him. When they were like 200 steps from where I was, I heard
gun shots. The man whom I saw with the two goats was already down on the ground
dead.72

119. More often than not, men were the targets of such random shootings but women
were also caught up in them as well; a fact that makes it even more difficult to attach
military and tactical legitimacy to some of these killings. Speaking in camera, an
Isiolo man described the discovery of his wife’s dead body near a watering point.73
She had apparently been shot dead by a passing military patrol. It is difficult
to imagine under what circumstances a solitary young woman watering her
animals could be a legitimate military target.

Assigning Responsibilty
120. The nature and circumstances of mass killings during the Shifta War presented the
Commission with the extraordinarily difficult task of assigning responsibility. In
most instances, the hurdles were insurmountable. A defining characteristic of the
mass killings of Northern Kenya is the anonymity of both victim and perpetrator.
The soldiers ambushing the wells and villages of Northern Kenya were just as
unknowable as those being ambushed.
121.

As the Commission discovered from its hearings, investigations and statement-taking,
half a century has essentially wiped away the names, ranks and other details that could
have helped identify particular individuals. Fading memories, however, was only one
of the obstacles faced by the Commission on the particular issue of identification. The
Indemnity Act of 1970 protected those acting on behalf of the state during the Shifta
War from any form of accountability in incidents involving harm to victims or damages
to their property; it also precluded any form of inquiry into the events during that
period. Thus there are no contemporaneous investigations available into the events
described by the witnesses who testified before the Commission.

72 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 April 2011/ Garissa/ p. 3
73 TJRC/ Hansard/ In-camera Hearing/ 10 May 2011/ Isiolo/ p. 19
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122.

In the absence of the identification of specific individuals or even organisations,
the Commission had to paint a much more general picture of whom or what
organisations are responsible for the atrocities described. Firstly and most obviously,
there are the security forces. In addition to the regular military and the General
Service Unit (GSU), a specialised paramilitary wing of the Kenya Police was also
involved, though its role was initially a supplementary one. Serving in the military or
the GSU during the Shifta War became a stepping stone; many officers who served in
Northern Kenya eventually rose to the very highest ranks of Kenya’s armed forces. It
is a well-known fact of Kenyan military history that the seeds of Kenya’s military elite
were sown in Northern Kenya. It is these men and the institutions they served that
bear ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the Shifta campaign, including all the
crimes, atrocities and violations perpetrated as part of that campaign.

123. The Commander of the Kenya Army during the Shifta War was (then) Brigadier
Joseph Ndolo. Brigadier Ndolo’s military career came to a sudden and ignominious
end in July 1971 when he resigned in the wake of a coup plot uncovered a few
months earlier.74 The prosecution of those accused of involvement in the coup
attempt revealed a link to Major-General Ndolo, who by that time had been
promoted to the rank of Major-General (unprecedented for a Kenyan African) and
the Chief of Defence Staff. To the surprise and shock of many, a series of testimonies
revealed that Ndolo not only knew about the planned coup, but also had assured
the plotters of military success. Once this became public, his position at the very
apex of Kenya’s combined defence forces became untenable; he had to leave.
124.

The Commission found absolutely no connection between the implosion of the
Major-General’s career and the war. The Shifta campaign was probably the high
water-mark of Ndolo’s military service. Lavishly commended for “maintaining the
Kenya Army at the highest pitch of operational efficiency as well for the training of
fighting units”, at the end of the war, Ndolo was awarded the Chief of the Order of
the Burning Spear.75 As Commander - and a highly regarded one at that - the MajorGeneral could not claim ignorance or a lack of responsibility for the conduct of his
troops in the plains and deserts of Northern Kenya. This conclusion does not mean that
the finer operational details of every single mission carried out during the war rested
with Ndolo. The overall tenor and tone of the campaign, however, was formulated
by and flowed from the army high command. Foot soldiers and patrol men did not
create their own operational orders. Those orders were the result of careful planning
sessions held, literally and figuratively, in Ndolo’s office. As was clearly established by

74

Documentation of this attempted coup is limited. For a copy of a Hilary Ngweno article see http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/
multimedia/cache/cache_c21f969b5f03d33d43e04f8f136e7682_9003c1b45d3605e00f541e2326c7b4ec accessed 25th
February 2012.
75 From First Honours List, the Kenya Gazette Vol LXIX – 28a (Ist June 1967) 594a.
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the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals after World War II, commanders are ultimately
responsible for the actions of their subordinates.
125.

When Ndolo resigned in 1971, he was replaced as Chief of Defence Staff by Brigadier
(later Major-General) Jackson Mulinge. Like his predecessor, Mulinge belongs to the
group of those with direct responsibility for the conduct of the war. As LieutenantColonel, Mulinge led the 3rd Battalion of the Kenya Rifles into the war. Mulinge was
much closer to battlefield action than Ndolo and won much respect for the way that
he handled himself in the theatre of war:
He has spent more time in the operational area than any other senior officer, never
relaxing in his efforts to attain peak military efficiency and bring the Shifta to battle.
Despite numerous difficulties, he has remained indomitable in spirit, setting for the
Army a magnificent personal example of smartness, loyalty and devotion to duty.76

126

The Commission’s references to Mulinge and other top officials should not be seen as
ignoring the great personal sacrifices made by military men as they defended Kenya
against what was a threat to its territorial integrity. Such sacrifices and contributions
to the defence of the nation cannot be used to minimize responsibility for violations
of the laws of armed conflict and other gross human rights violations. As is often the
case, individuals who are involved in gross human rights violations may also have
made positive contributions to their community and nation. We thus distinguish
between efforts to evaluate the overall character of an individual and efforts to
evaluate specific actions or omissions of an individual. It is the latter that is the
focus of the Commission and not the former. In many ways the Kenya Army today
is a much-changed institution. Current military officers probably feel quite distant
from the policies and strategies of their predecessors. The question of responsibility,
however, is one that still has to be addressed and sought at the very highest levels.

127.

The police were also involved in the Shifta War. They too need to be called to account,
even though the police did not feature as regularly and as prominently as the army in
most witness accounts presented to the Commission. The police, it appears, played
a somewhat specialised role. They occupied the space between civilians and the
military. What this meant in the field was that when, for instance, a military patrol
approached a manyatta, the police accompanied them and were the ones charged
with questioning and interrogating its residents. Retired Colonel Muhindi confirms
this operational practice:
If you found people away from these manyattas then you became suspicious and you
had to interrogate them to know what they were going. Normally as military we were
accompanied by the police and the police did the duty of interrogating them…77

76 From First Honours List the, Kenya Gazette Vol LXIX – 28a (Ist June 1967) 594a.
77 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 8
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128. Based on evidence and testimonies presented to the Commission about operations
in Northern Kenya, it does not appear to be the case that the police restricted their
activities to interrogation. The interactions between security officers and civilians
during these operations were highly charged, chaotic and violent affairs that
often ended in bloodshed. The unpredictability surrounding these encounters
makes it difficult to dismiss the police from scenes of violence simply on account
of their technical and formal designation as interrogators. Police culpability
indeed becomes quite clear when one examines the convincing evidence that the
interrogations conducted by the police were little more than extended and brutal
torture sessions.
129.

The General Service Unit (GSU) of the Kenya Police came up almost as regularly in
Commission hearings and statements as the army itself. One of the claims repeatedly
made in Northern Kenya is that the GSU was “banned” from the region in the 1970s,
1980s and 1990s on account of crimes and atrocities committed during the war.
When pressed, however, witnesses were unable to provide the Commission with any
meaningful details about GSU activities. The unit’s official history was also unhelpful,
only confirming that the unit did indeed serve in Northern Kenya between 1964 and
1967 under the command of one R.J. Angel, a senior superintendant of police.78 The
GSU is widely described as the most militarised and best trained wing of the police
force, specifically charged with “special operations and civil disorder”. What this
meant within the context of the Shifta war remains something of a mystery. Given
their paramilitary training, however, GSU officers probably played much more of an
operational role than the regular police.

130. The Commission also paid very close attention to the role of the civilian
administrators of Northern Kenya during this period. The general assessment
is that civilian administrators played an important role alongside members of
the security forces in a number of areas, including the controversial villagisation
policy that has been examined in detail elsewhere in this chapter. Villagisation
was above all, a policy driven by the imperatives of the war and the need to contain
and control a nomadic population. The provincial and district administrators
were the ultimate supervisors of these camps, although provincial and district
authorities may not have been involved in the planning of every single raid or
incursion into protected compounds. Indeed, it is altogether possible that they
had very little (if any) knowledge of the operational side of things. Nevertheless
the civilian administrators were part and parcel of the State apparatus responsible
for the creation and maintenance of these camps.
78 The General Service Unit, http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/general%20service%20unit.asp Accessed 26th February 2012.
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131. Diba’s account of his father’s death in Garbatulla suggested that, in some cases,
administrators may have played a more direct and ominous role in the death
of an unknown number of civilians. To recap, Diba’s father was shot dead in
Garbatulla with several other men. What was so unusual about this incident
compared to others described to the Commission was that before the shooting,
a public meeting was held in the town and a list of names read out. The named
men were then loaded onto trucks and driven some distance out of town before
being killed. Diba’s testimony suggested that administration officials may have
convened the baraza and even read out the list of names of those to be killed. If
true, civilian authorities facilitated the killing of large groups of probably innocent
people. The Commission noted, however, that Diba’s account was exceptional
and was not repeated anywhere else in the region. As a single incident, it could
not be described as part of a broader trend or policy.
132. Some of the angriest and most emotional testimonies heard by the Commission
were from bereaved family members unable to understand why disciplinary
or legal action had never been taken against individual officers responsible
for the death of their family members. These testimonies were challenging
for the Commission. They indicated that expectations were very high that the
Commission would be able to deliver a highly personalised form of justice. This
is unlikely to happen. Quite aside from the continuing uncertainties surrounding
the Indemnity Act, there is the dilemma of not being able to identify those directly
responsible when only the scantiest of details are available. The nicknames, first
names and aliases that witnesses and survivors gave in evidence could not be
used to initiate specific searches for individuals or to recommend prosecution.
133. The Commission was thus only able to assign responsibility at a general level and
concluded that the security forces were involved in committing brutal atrocities
against the civilian population in Northern Kenya.
134. Finally, in addition to the State security forces, the Shifta themselves also committed
atrocities. The Commission found the Shifta fighters difficult to document. The
sense today is that because the movement was so thoroughly defeated, stigma
attaches to anyone who would publicly acknowledge having associated with
the secessionists or to admit having fought with them. Even so, the Commission
unearthed certain reluctance on the part of the general public in the region to
condemn the fighters. A number of witnesses portrayed them as fairly harmless:
Leader of Evidence: Kenyan soldiers were killing indiscriminately. Would the Shifta
cause any harm to the people or it was only the Kenyan soldiers that would cause harm?
Were the Shifta also involved in the killings or destruction of property?
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Mr Ibrahim Dayow Mohammed: The Shifta never used to kill people. They would ask
for food; eat and leave. That is what the Shifta would do. They never used to kill people.79

135.

Others had much more menacing stories to tell. Edwin Jilo of Moyale lived in an area
prone to Shifta attacks. As Jilo, described them, these attacks were extremely violent:
The first manyatta that was attacked was called Kochore. By that time, it belonged to
the Guracho Sacco of the people. There was another manyatta called Rabale. I think by
then it was in Oda Location. It was attacked by the Shiftas and 20 people were killed
and 30 injured. Some of those who were injured could be present here. Women were
raped, men castrated and camels shot. It was difficult for us to take our camels out in
the open.80

136. This account of a Shifta raid, with its extreme and indiscriminate violence against
the civilian population, echoed many of the accounts summarised above of raids
by the security forces. The overall story of atrocities during the war against civilians
cannot be told without some consideration of Shifta responsibility. Commission
research on the issue was not detailed enough to allow for a fuller exploration. Of
the 788 instances of war-time extra-judicial killings and murder reported to the
Commission, only two identified members of the Shifta forces as responsible. The
statistics collected on sexual violence suggest a similar trend, with just 2 per cent
blamed on Shifta fighters. The Commission believed that as small as these numbers
were, if the incidents involved crimes and atrocities as serious as those outlined by
Jilo, then they needed to be further investigated. It is possible that supporters of
secession refused to report atrocities committed by Shifta forces.

Mass Graves, Burial Sites and Forensic Possibilities
137. With official and unofficial claims of between 2 000 and 7 000 dead, the Commission
had to confront the issue of what had happened to the bodies of the dead.
Concerned residents wanted the Commission to establish what had happened to
all of these bodies. Research and evidence suggest various answers. Nene Mburu’s
description of the protected compounds pointed to the digging of crude graves
just beyond the thorn fences encircling the manyattas.81 These graves would have
accommodated the bodies of those who died of natural causes, such as disease
or old age, albeit at the elevated rate occasioned by the poor conditions in the
camps. But as has been discussed, the protected villages themselves were the
scenes of astonishing violence, including mass killings. It is, therefore, likely
79 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 19 April 2011/ Wajir/ p. 45
80 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p. 37
81 Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity (2005), 220 – 221
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that the victims of such incidents would have been buried in and around the
compounds. Indeed, during a field visit to Garbatulla on the May 12 2011,
the Commission was shown the location of several very large graves apparently
containing hundreds of bodies.
138. The Commission lacked the capacity and specialist pathological expertise to
carry out any investigations into the bodies buried at Garbatulla and other sites.
However, it recognised the need for proper excavation and forensic investigation.
The Commission recognised the enormity of such a task, considering the
possibility of thousands of bodies being in a state of advanced decomposition.
The issue of identification posed an even more daunting challenge, given the
prohibitive costs of DNA testing on such a scale. One way out of this dilemma
would be to conduct a number of preliminary searches and mapping of sites
throughout the country using surviving locals who may know the sites and the
people buried in them. In Moyale, for instance, the Commission heard testimony
from Abdullahi Laffa, a former administration policeman who claimed to have
precisely such knowledge:
The dead bodies were thrown into mass graves in three different locations. The first one
was below the Kilta Hill, the second one was at the old road at Odha and the third place
is on the way and I cannot remember the exact name. It was a government directive to
get all the Sakuyes on allegations that they were Shiftas…I inquired about the killings
and why government vehicles were carrying the corpses, but the then DO asked me to
stop being nosy and stop prying into those operations. Approximately 20 to 30 persons
died. Ministry of Works vehicles would carry the corpses and dump them. 82

139.

Another witness, Councillor Alio Tepo Apudo, substantiates this claim of the existence
of mass graves, asserting:
These mass graves, at that time…Sakuye did not have people who were free and could
bury their people anywhere they wished, because all their leaders were in prison. But the
official information we have, the mass grave is just near the big mosque, according to the
information that I know and I have. Because there is no individual person of Sakuye who
could do that, because the government would be able to release a public works vehicle
to be able to carry out the operation…this was done in two main areas; one area is called
Kausera or Kaushaba and the other area is at the old mosque… that is where the mass
burials were done.83

140.

Time is running out. The war broke out nearly a half a century ago. The number
of direct witnesses and survivors able to direct and assist in such inquiries are few
and dying out. Therefore, a real sense of urgency needs to inform any forensic
undertakings.

82 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p.15
83 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 30 April 2011/ Moyale/ p.7

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

143

Volume IIA

Chapter THREE

War’s End - October 1967
141. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in Arusha, Tanzania on 28 October
1967 between the governments of Kenya and Somalia marked the formal end of
the war. Then Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda mediated talks between Kenya
and Somalia, resulting in the announcement of a ceasefire and a gradual winding
down of hostilities.
142. Finally, in April 1968, all - and this was a critical distinction - large-scale military
operations in Northern Kenya came to an end. Diplomatic relations between the
two countries were restored and later in 1968 Kenya hosted President Sharmarke
and Prime Minister Egal of Somalia on a full state visit to Kenya.
143. Events in Northern Kenya do not normally form part of the mainstream narrative
of Kenyan history and the Arusha MoU does not elicit much interest outside of
Northern Kenya. Commission witnesses in the region thus demonstrated detailed
knowledge of an otherwise obscure event. The Commission was left with the
impression that there was a great deal of ambivalence among the peoples of
Northern Kenya about the Arusha MoU and the cessation of hostilities. Most
civilians were quite happy for the war to end as they had routinely been caught
in the crossfire between the military and Shifta fighters. While the Arusha
agreement offered the chance of a return to a simple pre-war normality for some,
for others it opened a humiliating chapter in the region’s history. Although most
Commission witnesses did not describe themselves as secessionists – the collapse
of Somalia as a coherent state over the past 20 years makes that an unrealistic
position to adopt. They blame the Arusha agreement for the incorporation of
their region into a hostile, unwelcoming Kenya.
144. Some Commission witnesses complained that they had no idea what was decided
during the bilateral negotiations between Somali and Kenyan government
officials that led to the Arusha agreement. Suleiman Mahmud Isaak of Mandera
said: “The contents of the agreement were not revealed to the people of the NFD.”
84
Isaak went on to argue before the Commission that as the two governments
buried the hatchet, very little concern was paid to the priorities of ordinary
people and that, if anything, they continued to be “punished” for their stand
during the war.85

84 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 25 April 2011/ Mandera/ p.3
85 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 25 April 2011/ Mandera/ p.4
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145. Testimonies such as Isaak’s support the view that the Shifta War was primarily a
proxy war between Somalia and Kenya and that without the logistical support
of Somalia it could not be sustained. At the same time, it underscored the point
that the formal end of the Shifta War did nothing to address the anxieties (underdevelopment, neglect and discrimination) that drove them to demand autonomy
and secession and that made them susceptible to Somali influence and support.
146.

Northern Kenya remains today a politically marginalised, culturally unfamiliar and
geographically distant territory seemingly doomed to play host to some of the very
worst of the Kenyan state’s excesses. Defeated, divided and poor, the people of the
region presented the Commission with a complex mix of victims and perpetrators
with unresolved historical grievances.

147.

Put together, these elements would create a combustible and unstable foundation
for the post-Shifta era. Such an unstable mix continues today, complicated by more
modern developments, such as the emergence of Al-Shabaab and other similar
militant organisations. Deliberate interventions by the State to acknowledge,
address and correct past injustices and neglect would go a long way to reverse this
historical legacy.
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The animal which is only found in Northern Kenya
(TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Mandera/27 April 2011)

‘Thank you very much Commissioners for coming here to listen to our views. Whatever you have been listening to from
yesterday, I thought of putting all those things into a diagram. This is a picture of an animal which is only found in northern Kenya.
It cannot live in cold places. It lives in hot and dry places. It is a very large mammal. One leg is in Garissa and the other in Mandera.
The other leg is in Isiolo and the other one in Moyale. So, it is as large as that. It has two heads and each head takes one other human
being. This animal, for your information is security and corruption. Each head takes one person per day in normal circumstances, if
it is not disturbed.
For your information each head rotates. Each head has four eyes. This animal is 48 years old and has three children. The first
born is 15 years old. It counts its years differently. So, we shall just take it like that. If I may explain, it is 15 years of Kenyatta regime,
24 years of Moi regime and eight and a half years of Kibaki regime. So, you will find that this animal is called ‘security and corruption’.
You will find that in this region, there are many soldiers. There are Kenya army camps, Administration Police, and regular Police. On
top of that we have people called ‘homeguards’ and their work is to maintain security. I wonder who is fighting with us. I have not
seen that enemy. So, security people have turned into wild animals and started eating human beings. So, for the last 48 years, it eats
two adults per day times 365 days. That is about 35,000 people and it is not disturbed. But if it disturbed it can cause massacres.’
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Massacres
Introduction
The history of Kenya is replete with horrific accounts of massacres
committed by state security agencies in what they traditionally call
security operations. Most of these massacres have been committed in
Northern Kenya, particularly in North Eastern Province and in the
North Rift. Section 5(c) of the TJR Act, therefore, specifically required
the Commission to investigate massacres as part of its broader mandate
to establish an accurate, complete and historical record of gross
violations of human rights committed in Kenya from 1963 to 2008.

1.

The term ‘massacre’ was not defined in the Act, nor is the term defined in Kenyan
or international law. It was left to the Commission to elaborate an appropriate
definition for a massacre.

2.

In developing a definition, the Commission considered several issues. First, it
looked at popular references to the term ‘massacre’. This included consideration of
testimonies of people affected by a security operation or an attack the aftermath
of which they considered a massacre. The Commission also considered references
by the media. While it is difficult to determine cause and effect, the use of the term
‘massacre’ by the media influences public discourse around an event. People are
more likely to refer to an incident as a massacre if that is how the media first reports
the incident.

3.

Secondly, the Commission considered the work of academics and institutions
that have dealt with the subject of massacres. The simplest definition of the term
massacre is found in the dictionary. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary
defines a massacre as ‘the killing of a large number of people, especially in a cruel
way’.1 This seemingly simple definition highlights one of the contentious issues
inherent in defining the term ‘massacre’. How many people must be killed for an
incident to qualify as a massacre? One scholar has observed that:

1

Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, International Students Edition, 8th Edition

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

149

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

a massacre implies the death of several people, although it is impossible to specify a
minimum figure. There is nevertheless a difference in magnitude between the series of
‘small-scale massacres’ such as those that took place in Algeria or Colombia, and a very
large-scale massacre such as in Rwanda.2

4.

A United Nations commission conducting an inquiry on human rights violations
after the Guatemalan Civil War defined massacres as a mass killing resulting in three
or more deaths. This numerical threshold is considered by many experts as too low.

5.

While it is clear that the number of deaths is an important element in defining
massacre, the numbers alone cannot adequately distinguish a massacre from
a ‘normal killing’. To define massacre, therefore, one needs to look beyond mere
numbers. A commonly used definition of massacre that is not dependent on a
specific numerical threshold was developed by Jacques Semelin. According to
Semelin, the term massacre refers to
a form of action, usually collective, aimed at the elimination of civilians or non-combatants,
including men, women, children or elderly people unable to defend themselves. The
definition may also include the killing of soldiers who have been disarmed.3

6.

The definition adopted by Semelin raises the issue of the connection between armed
conflict and massacres. Semelin’s definition appears to assume that massacres
only happen within the context of an armed conflict. However, historical examples
from Kenya and other countries indicate that killings which people describe as
massacres can be perpetrated in relatively peaceful times. For Kenya, save for the
killings committed during the Shifta War, most of the killings that are described as
massacres occurred during peace time. Armed conflict can create conditions that
engender massacres, since it radically reduces human relations to that of friends
and enemies. Hence, a massacre can be looked at from different perspectives: as
an extension of armed conflict, as in the case of mass killings during the so-called
‘Shifta War’ (1963-1967) or as an extension of political conflict.

7.

More importantly, Semelin’s definition includes an element of intent. He considers a
massacre as ‘a form of action, usually collective, aimed at the elimination of civilians
or non-combatants’. The dictionary definition quoted above did not include the
element of intent, but did suggest that to qualify as a massacre, the killings must
occur in a cruel way. Therefore, the accidental killing of a large number of people
would not qualify as a massacre under Semelin’s definition, although if the accident
led to a particularly painful or cruel form of death, it might qualify as a massacre.

2
3
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Semelin, Jacques (2007): Purify and Destroy. The political uses of massacres and genocide. p. 323
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8.

Thirdly, the Commission looked to international criminal law, international human
rights law, and international humanitarian law for guidance in developing a
definition of massacre. As already noted, the term ‘massacre’ is not defined under
international law. Depending on its context, however, a massacre may qualify as a
crime under international criminal law or international humanitarian law, or as a
violation under international human rights law.

9.

Massacres are often confused with the international crime of genocide. While
genocide may be committed by way of a massacre, many massacres do not meet
the strict legal definition of genocide. The definition of genocide under the TJR Act
is consistent with the definition of genocide under international law. A massacre can
only qualify as genocide when it is evident that the perpetrators of the massacre
killed the victims specifically because of their ethnicity, religion, nationality or race.
This ‘specific intent’ requirement of genocide is often difficult to prove. Whether there
is evidence of such specific intent with respect to any of the massacres investigated
by the Commission is a point that is discussed later in this report.

10.

A massacre may also qualify as ‘crimes against humanity’. The definition of crimes
against humanity provided in the TJR Act is consistent with the international law
definition and requires a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population’. In addition, the massacre would need to be conducted by
individuals who had knowledge of that widespread or systematic attack. While
massacres are often directed against a civilian population – and that is certainly
the case for the vast majority of massacres investigated by the Commission – it is
often difficult to show that a massacre is part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against such a civilian population.

11.

A massacre may also sometimes be described as a war crime. To qualify as a war
crime a massacre needs to be committed as part of, and linked to, armed conflict,
whether that armed conflict is international or non-international. Finally, a massacre
will always qualify as a violation of a fundamental human right – in this case, the
right to life. Deliberate killing by state agents without due process and not in selfdefence violates the right to life. The TJR Act defines ‘killing and severe ill treatment
of any person’ as a gross human rights violation. All massacres thus violate the right
to life of the victims and may violate other fundamental human rights (for instance,
the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment).
However, not all killings qualify as a massacre.

12.

Having considered the above issues and approaches, the Commission developed
a simple definition of the term ‘massacre’ that does not establish a precise
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numerical threshold and one which is contextual to Kenya. In this regard, the
Commission defined a massacre as the deliberate killing of several members
a particular targeted group on a single occasion. While there have been many
massacres in Kenya, the Commission focused on a just a few due to strictures of
time. Firstly, the Commission focused on massacres committed during the colonial
period (Kedong Massacre, Kollowa Massacre, Giriama Massacres, Lari Massacre,
and Hola Massacre). Secondly, the Commission focused on massacres committed
in Northern Kenya (North Eastern Province, Upper Eastern and North Rift). This
was in recognition of the fact that Northern Kenya has been the epicentre of
massacres and gross violations of human rights. In this regard, the massacres
documented here are as follows: Bulla Karatasi Massacre, Wagalla Massacre,
Malka Mari Massacre, Turbi Massacre, Lotirir Massacre, Murkutwa Massacre and
Loteteleit. The Chapter on Shifta War deals with massacres committed during the
Shifta War.

Historical Antecedents
13.

Massacres have occurred throughout the history of Kenya. While they increased
during and as a result of colonialism, massacres predate the colonial period. In
the 19th century and at the start of the colonial period, the hinterland witnessed
a series of extremely bloody inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic attacks that left
scores of victims in their wake. The so-called ‘Maasai Wars’ of the 1840s, 1850s
and 1860s are but one example of internal unrest that resulted in the killings of
large populations as various Maasai groups went to war with each other over
territory, pasture and succession. Further west, the Kenyan countryside was also
characterised by intensive conflict between the Kalenjin, Wanga, Kisii and Luo.
Once again, killing on a large scale was the outcome. Lack of documentation
makes it difficult to put a number on the actual loss of life.

14.

These massacres occurred just as Arab, Swahili and European traders began to
lay claim to parts of Kenya. Caravans that crossed Kenya as various emissaries of
the British Empire tried to work their way inland were both the cause and subject
of violence. The presence of the caravans was undeniably provocative. Joseph
Thompson, renowned for his early exploration of Maasai territory, observed that in
the early 1880s, hundreds of men were frequently lost in the attempt to open up
the Kenyan hinterland to missionary, economic and eventually imperial activity.4
Despite the frequency and intensity of these episodes, those interested in Kenya’s
past have been unable to explore them in any great detail. There is no way to know

4
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how many lives were lost as a result of what were undoubtedly heated encounters
between the invaders and the invaded.
15.

In the late 1880s, Kenya was placed under the control of the Imperial British East
Africa Company (IBEAC). The company had been granted a charter in 1888 which
gave it the right under British law to administer and develop the territory as it saw
fit. On 1 July 1895, administrative control passed from the IBEAC to the Foreign
Office and the East Africa Protectorate was formed. In 1902, there was another
transfer of responsibility from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, with the
transformation of present-day Kenya (except for the coastal strip) into a British
Crown Colony.

16.

Kenya’s new status as a colony had important implications. Kenya was placed
under a professional and modern bureaucracy that would align it with other
parts of the British empire. The British insistence on the three C’s of colonialism
– commerce, civilization and Christianity – also meant that previously neglected
local populations were drawn into the net of European influence, which involved
coercion and also resulted in bloodshed. Colonisation opened fresh horizons for
mass violence to occur on an unprecedented scale. The British advance inspired
indigenous populations to take up arms and resist the imposition of new social
and political norms. As in other parts of the British empire, colonial officials in
Kenya became experts in implementing a policy of ‘divide and rule’. Differences
between different communities were ruthlessly exploited in order to further
colonial agendas. Some communities were designated allies and others enemies;
previous alliances were discarded and new ones forged. All of this made for a
volatile and unpredictable environment prone to outbreaks of extreme violence.

Kedong Massacre: Valley of Death
17.

The ‘Kedong Massacre’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Kedong’) is the first properly
documented large-scale killing in Kenya’s colonial history. Kedong may seem
too distant and remote to be relevant to the issue of modern-day massacres. To
a certain extent, it belongs to a bygone era of lawlessness and adventurism that
could not easily be replicated today. However, Kedong’s importance stems not
from the actual events of 26 November 1895, but from its illustration of broader
trends and patterns that recur with some regularity throughout the history of mass
violence in Kenya.
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18.

The central facts of the Kedong Massacre are that in November 1895, a large caravan
consisting of about 1 100 men left Murang’a destined for the up-country station of
Eldama Ravine. The caravan delivered supplies without incident and quickly turned
around for the return journey. Trouble struck when the caravan reached Kedong,
a few kilometres outside Naivasha. The details of the various accounts differ, but
it seems that the head of the caravan lost control of his men who kidnapped two
young women from a Maasai manyatta. Contemporary accounts are silent about
what happened to the women, but they were almost certainly raped. Despite
numerous appeals from Maasai elders for the caravan to move on and to avoid any
further provocation, some of the porters with the caravan tried to steal cattle and
milk.

19.

Retaliation came swiftly. On the morning of 26 November 1895, a group of Maasai
came down from Mount Margaret and headed for Kedong where the caravan was
based. After a few initial skirmishes, the warriors set upon the unsuspecting porters
with horrifying results. A total of 555 people were killed. Most (456) of the victims
were Kikuyu porters recruited from around Murang’a. The rest were Swahili.

20.

Matters did not end there. Andrew Dick was a hold-over from the IBEAC days who
had stayed on in Kenya to operate a fairly successful transport and provisions
business. When news of events at Kedong reached him, Dick immediately recruited
a French explorer, Versepuit, to assist him in pursuing the warriors responsible for
the massacre. Dick and Versepuit were warned to leave the issue to the relevant
authorities, but they would have none of this. They set off in hot pursuit. The exact
date is unknown, but at some point after 26 November 1895, Dick and Versepuit
caught up with the apparently victorious party of Maasai celebrating their success.
Dick opened fire and killed approximately 100 of them on the spot. Dick was
eventually killed by the Maasai as he tried to escape.
The initial attack on the caravan combined with the retaliatory attack by Dick and
Versepuit, resulted in over 600 people being killed in a matter of days. People who
visited the scene were shaken to the core. Dr Ansorge, a medical officer, wrote that
‘by the way-side, bodies lay in some places by the dozen, where frightened and
wounded men had huddled together in the vain hope of finding mercy or safety.5

21.

22.

Accounts written in the immediate aftermath are even more graphic. One traveller
who arrived five weeks afterwards observed:
When I passed along the road there were skeletons everywhere. The road itself was
strewn with basket-work hamper lids (used in their donkey transport when moving to

5
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fresh grounds), stooks, dressed leather garments – all loot. It is interesting to note that
the majority of the skeletons seen by myself were quite perfect, even to the first joints
of their fingers and toes. This showed clearly that while the vultures and ravens were
able to deal with them, hyenas and jackals had not been numerous enough to do so.6

23.

While many colonial administrators were quite used to violence, the scale and
intensity of Kedong still took them by surprise. Their reaction was one that will strike
most Kenyans as very familiar: a commission of inquiry was established to investigate
the causes and the circumstances of both the massacre and counter-massacre.

24.

The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission could not trace any direct
documentation on the Kedong inquiry, but its findings have been circulated by
secondary writers. Members of the caravan initiated the cycle of violence when they
abducted (and presumably raped) the Maasai women, and when they stole cattle
and milk. The Maasai response, however, was clearly disproportionate resulting in
over 500 deaths. While the Kikuyu and Swahili porters bore the brunt of the violence,
the Kedong commission of inquiry concluded that they should be held responsible
for provoking the Maasai into responding in the manner that they did.

25.

The apparent one-sidedness of the commission’s findings as reported by secondary
writers suggested that the entire exercise was a cosmetic one designed to somehow
appease the Maasai, who had openly threatened to avenge the loss of their warriors
during the retaliatory attack. It has been argued that the British could ill afford to
further antagonise such a powerful community and decided not to pursue the issue
any further.7 Sure enough, within a matter of weeks, the British and Maasai would
enter into a series of treaties outlining the safe passage of caravans and the railway
through Maasai lands. As part of these agreements, a buffer zone was created to
protect the Maasai from future attacks by the members of such caravans.
There is much to learn from the Kedong Massacre. It demonstrated that massacres
are usually the product of long-running and deeply felt social and economic
antagonisms. In the case of Kedong, Maasai, Arab and Swahili relationships
were obviously strained by the new economic forces unleashed by colonialism.
Massacres were also the product of the unplanned and the unexpected. In other
words, there was always an immediate trigger that set off the chain reaction of
events that culminated in massive loss of life. In the case of Kedong, the triggers
were obvious: the abduction (and probably rape) of Maasai women and theft of
property. That investigations were carried out and official commissions of inquiry
created in the wake of mass killings came as no surprise; the instinct to find
answers to difficult questions is deeply human. The subsequent politicisation of

26.

6
7

http://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/sanders/sandersindex.htm (accessed 3rd November 2011)
AT Mason Nandi Resistance to British rule 1890 – 1906 (1972) 164 179
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such commissions was also far from unusual. The very nature of mass killings made
objective neutrality a difficult goal to achieve. Kedong demonstrated the extent to
which external concerns can find their way into the very heart of an inquiry and
influence outcomes: in this case, the colonial government’s desire to placate the
Maasai in order to reach an advantageous agreement regarding future caravans
and railways.

Giriama Massacres: Death by the Sea
27.

Kenya’s colonial history witnessed a large number of mass killings that occurred
in the context of colonial resistance. This sub-section provides an account
of the massacres committed during the Giriama Rebellion which took place
between 1912 and 1914. Tales of this rebellion continue to be passed down from
generation to generation. The rebellion was unusually led by a woman: Mekatilili
wa Menza.

28.

The first contacts between the Giriama and the British took place in the 1840s
through the Church Missionary Society (CMS) mission in Rabai. In 1890, another
mission station opened further up the coast at Jilore. Despite their best efforts
over nearly half a century, CMS found it difficult to convert more than a few
Giriama to Christianity. The IBEAC was largely uninterested in Giriama territories
as they did not seem to offer much commercial potential. No development
occurred outside the main urban areas of Mombasa and, to a lesser extent,
Malindi.

29.

Initially, British administrators adopted the same detached approach to the
Giriama as their predecessors. Their main focus was on the pacification of larger
and much more troublesome inland communities such as the Nandi. The transfer
of Kenya’s capital from Mombasa to Nairobi drew attention and resources inland.
As long as things remained calm, the British were happy to administer the coastal
region indirectly using existing Arab-Swahili personnel inherited from the Mazruis,
the former rulers of the coastal strip.

30.

Everything changed in 1912 when Arthur Champion was posted to the region as
Assistant District Commissioner. He set up his headquarters at Mount Mangea.8

8
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Champion pronounced himself shocked by the lack of British influence on the
Giriama. He immediately set about bringing them under much firmer control. One
of his first priorities was to impose taxes on the Giriama. The imposition of taxes
was a common method by which the British forced Africans into the labour market.
In this particular instance, nearby large-scale rubber plantations (Magarini and
Sokoke) were in danger of collapse on account of the refusal of members of the
Giriama community to take up employment there.
31.

Public works in the area faced the same fate. Early in his posting, Champion
began a census and mapping exercise that would be used to determine who
would pay tax and how much. Champion immediately encountered resistance.
People would run and hide in the forests and bushes when headcounters were
spotted. Public works projects were sabotaged. A few taxpayers were added to
the roll but their payments came not from wages from employment in the local
labour market, but from Arab-Swahili money lenders. Champion became more
aggressive. Huts belonging to tax evaders were burnt down and their livestock
confiscated. Stiff fines and prison sentences were imposed on more persistent
offenders.

32.

The Giriama resistance was under the direct influence and inspiration of Mekatilili
wa Menza, assisted by her son-in-law Wanje wa Mwadarikola. Mekatilili was at this
stage a seventy-year-old woman who had already shown a talent for activism.
When she was younger, her brother was kidnapped by Arab slave traders. She
spent many years organising small pockets of Giriama to hide away from slave
traders. Despite her age, Mekatilili took on Champion and the interests he
represented. In 1913 she organised a large meeting in Chakama, deep in Giriama
territory near the Sabaki River. The plan was to convince people to reject paying
taxes and to resist the recruitment of Giriama men into the King’s African Rifles
(KAR), the main military instrument of the British colonial regime. Champion was
informed of the impending meeting and headed to Chakama. When he arrived,
there was a confrontation that resulted in one Giriama warrior being shot dead.
Some versions of the story suggest that Champion was hit in the face by Mekatilili
herself and then, humiliatingly, forced to hide in a nearby granary with nothing
to eat other than fermented ugali for several days. Mekatilili fled into the forest.
The rebellion was on.

33.

The Giriama uprising employed guerrilla-style skirmishes during which warriors
targeted the homes and properties of converts to Christianity and government
employees. They also cut telegraph lines. On at least two occasions, however,
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the Giriama were drawn into open encounters with the KAR. It was during these
encounters that mass killings took place. The first took place near Jilore that
may have been a point of interest because it hosted a large mission station.
About 1 000 Giriama were assembling when they were ambushed by a small
contingent of KAR forces under the command of one Captain Carew. Carew and
his men opened fire. Official reports list 30 fatalities and an unspecified number
of casualties. Some Giriama would have succumbed to their injuries later and
the death toll was thus probably higher than 30. KAR operations in and around
Giriama country were characterised by a casual brutality. There are accounts
of, for instance, soldiers simply emerging from river banks and shooting at
anything that moved; they made no attempts to determine whether they were
firing at combatants or civilians. There are also reports of KAR firing into the
backs of fleeing civilians. Seven were killed in this manner in a village known as
Magogeni.9
34.

Details of another massacre came to light through Giriama legends. The Gohu
are Giriama elders respected for their ability to communicate with ancestral
spirits. Mekatilili was quick to recruit the Gohu to the rebellion. She needed their
authority to draw in wider members of their community. More importantly, she
needed their skills for the preparation of poisons, spells and potions for warriors
as they went into battle. As with many other African societies, the Giriama
believed that their cultural and religious beliefs offered them protection against
the Europeans.

35.

The Gohu quickly became central to the resistance. Indeed after Mekatilili’s capture
(in either late 1913 or 1914) and subsequent detention in Kisii, the Gohu became
the fulcrum around which the uprising revolved. By the time Mekatilili escaped
detention (again, the date is uncertain), the elders were central to the Giriama
rebellion. They thus became the target of the administration’s military campaigns.
A British officer known locally as Mugamara summoned members of the Gohu for
a meeting near Kilifi. That meeting turned into a bloodbath with several Gohu shot
dead and their bodies apparently burned in a heap that also contained the remains
of dead sheep and goats.

36.

What happened at Kilifi is so notorious not for the number of deaths but the impact
that these deaths had. The Giriama were severely affected by Mugamara and his
men attacking their spiritual elders. The fact that the killings took place in a kaya
caused even more distress.

9
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Kayas are the spiritual or sacred places of the Giriama community. They are
clearings that are typically found deep inside a forest. Prayers and other religious
ceremonies take place in kayas. Kayas are also politically important as they are
the places where significant decisions relating to governance and justice are
made. The desecration of this particular kaya and the burning of the others10
were identified as key factors in forcing the Giriama into peace negotiations with
the British at the end of 1914. The passage of time did very little to lessen Giriama
pain even though the kayas were beautifully restored and recognised as a World
Heritage Site by UNESCO.11 Ceremonies are regularly held to commemorate the
loss of life in these sacred spaces, as well as the achievements of Mekatilili wa
Menza.12

38.

Official estimates put the total number of Giriama killed during the entire
uprising at 500. The behaviour of the KAR and its commanding officers pointed
to an emergent pattern; many of the deaths occurred as a result of arbitrary and
indiscriminate shootings.13 Nothing demonstrated this trend more than a shooting
that took place in January 1915 after the British and the Giriama had agreed to a
cessation of hostilities. The KAR were sent up the Sabaki River to collect animals
and money as a fine imposed on the Giriama as part of the peace treaty. This
turned into another bloodbath. Instead of simply collecting what was due to them,
the KAR stormed into villages with their guns blazing. One patrol killed 19 people
in addition to burning down 400 huts. Such were the tactics employed by the KAR
during peaceful times.

Chapter FOUR

Kollowa Massacre: Dying to Believe
39.

By the early 1920s, the Giriama, Bukusu, Kisii, Nandi and other communities that
had taken up the military option had, to use the colonial description, been pacified.
Some fighting continued through the 1930s and the 1940s, but it was sporadic and
limited to far-flung locations in Northern Kenya.14

40.

The absence of fighting should not, however, be taken as evidence of a lack of
conflict. Many of the tensions that gave birth to Kedong and the Giriama uprising
were still present decades later. If anything, fears and suspicions about the British
intensified as the full implications of the colonial mission became obvious to the

10 There are nine kayas in all each representing a different Mjikenda community. They were all destroyed during the rebellion. C
Brantley The Giriama and colonial resistance in Kenya 1800 – 1920 110 - 111
11 http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1231 Accessed 10th November 2011
12 http://www.mekatilili.com/ Accessed 10th November 2011
13 Meinertzhagen
14 E Turton ‘Somali resistance to colonial rule and the development of Somali political activity in Kenya 1893 – 1960’ (1972) 13 Journal
of African History
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African people. People who thought the European presence was only going to be
temporary had to re-evaluate their positions as did those who believed that their
lives would not be affected by that presence. As the realisation that the British were
in Kenya to stay sunk in, the context of violence changed, with clashes beginning
to emerge over culture and ideas.

160

41.

The ‘Kollowa Massacre’ occurred for ideological reasons. Kollowa itself is a small dusty
settlement in the far west of Baringo District. Kollowa is a very remote place with the
feel of an ungoverned frontier. It is sparsely populated and has long suffered from
security problems associated with the proliferation of small arms and cattle raids.
This semi-arid environment is occupied mostly by the Pokot people. Other than a
monument in the shape of a small dove and a cross on the site of the massacre, there
is nothing about Kollowa to suggest the horrific events of six decades ago.

42.

The Pokot experience of colonial rule was dominated by marginalisation, poverty
and insecurity. The British made no secret of the fact that Pokot territories held few
attractions for them. They were far more interested in the valuable, fertile and wellwatered fields of Trans Nzoia in the south that had been opened up to European
settlement. British attentions were also drawn to the Turkana, the northern
neighbours of the Pokot, who between 1910 and 1918 staged a long and spirited
fight against the imposition of colonial rule.

43.

The British were so pre-occupied with Trans Nzoia and Turkana that the Pokot
were, at first, largely ignored. Chiefs were not introduced until the early 1920s. The
first census followed a few years afterwards. This is not to suggest, however, that
the Pokot way of life was left untouched. The irony of the situation was that even as
the British neglected the Pokot, colonialism had a profoundly negative impact on
the region. A key problem arose from the annexing of Trans Nzoia for the exclusive
use of European farmers. This deprived the Pokot of their historic grazing areas and
forced them further upwards into much drier and unproductive lands that could
not support livestock. This also pushed the Pokot into direct contact, and conflict,
with their traditional enemies, the Turkana.

44.

Colonial administrators had a sudden change of heart in the early 1940s and
transformed their attitude from disinterested neglect to high-handed interference.
While no single reason explained this shift, the British could no longer ignore
the disastrous impact of European settlement in Pokot lands. With Pokot herds
squeezing into smaller and smaller acreages, administrators began to express
alarm at the resulting environmental degradation.

45.

After some experimentation, the British eventually proposed livestock quotas as

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

the solution to overgrazing. The Pokot would have to sell off their animals if they
overshot the quota. In 1945, grazing schemes were introduced under the auspices of
the African Land Development Board. Grazing schemes were essentially a refinement
of the quotas. The government fenced off large tracts of land and constructed cattle
dips and watering points. For a small fee, vaccination of livestock was also provided.
A cap was set on the number of cattle that could be admitted into these government
facilities; the remainder had to be sold or otherwise off-loaded. Preliminary attempts
were made to introduce the Pokot to settled agriculture as a way of weaning
them away from the uncertainty of nomadic cattle rearing. Farms were set up to
demonstrate the proper techniques for growing bananas and other crops.
46.

It should come as no surprise that these innovations were poorly received by the
Pokot, who were at their core, pastoralists. The cultural, religious and economic
value that the Pokot placed on cattle and other livestock was such that they were
simply unable to accept the concept of not having too many animals. Predictably,
the new regulations were ignored as no self-respecting Pokot livestock owner
would ever agree to the sale of the so-called extra animals.

47.

Some estimates have it that about 20 percent of Pokot-owned sheep, cattle and
goats entered the government-sanctioned schemes. This left the vast majority
on the fringes where environmental degradation continued apace. British efforts
to seek a lasting solution to the issue of overgrazing failed. Crop cultivation was
also a non-starter. The Pokot had no tradition of cultivation and there was very
little uptake for the demonstration farms. The farms fell into a state of disrepair
and under-use almost as soon as they were opened to the public. With the Pokot
unwilling to accept the colonial vision of land use and the British determined
to forge ahead, the foundations were laid for a major and potentially violent
confrontation. This is precisely what happened at Kollowa on 24 April 1950.

48.

The story of Kollowa Massacre revolved around an unlikely character known as
Lukas Pkech, a former pupil at the Catholic mission school in West Suk. Not much
is known about Pkech’s early life but it is assumed that his education gave him
a certain amount of exposure to European ways and beliefs. Pkech’s name came
to the fore at some point in the mid-1940s when he began to associate with and
eventually became an adherent of Dini ya Msambwa, a religious movement that
emerged amongst the Bukusu who occupy territories just south of the Pokot. The
movement was based on the visions and teachings of Elijah Masinde. Like Pkech,
Masinde was the product of a rigidly conventional Quaker mission education. In the
1940s, Masinde declared himself prophet urging his people to abandon European
customs and return to their traditional ways. Dini ya Msambwa translates roughly
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as “religion of ancestral customs”. Masinde’s message soon began to acquire more
militant connotations. He called for the destruction of European property. To
protect them from bullets in their encounters with the British, Masinde anointed
his followers with waters from a lake on Mount Elgon.
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49.

Colonial administrators watched Masinde closely. He was jailed in 1944 after being
accused of interfering with the recruitment of men for employment. While in jail,
he was diagnosed as insane and sent to a mental institution. This did not deter
Masinde. Soon after his release, he led a large group to Malakisi police station.
His goal was to break Dini members out of jail. The police were waiting and in the
resulting melee, shots were fired. Eleven people died of their injuries. That incident
marked the end of whatever tolerance the British had for Dini ya Msambwa and the
colonial administration immediately declared it an illegal organisation. Masinde
was sent back to prison where he would remain for many years.

50.

Although Dini ya Msambwa’s activities and impact were limited to a fairly small
corner of Western Kenya, Lukas Pkech was somehow drawn into the movement’s
circle of influence. By the late 1940s, Pkech was an ardent and active member of
Dini ya Msambwa. In August 1948, Pkech and 15 others were arrested and charged
with belonging to an unlawful society. They were found guilty and sentenced to 30
months hard labour. After less than a year in custody, Pkech sensationally escaped
from prison and returned to Pokot. Far from going underground or keeping a low
profile, he travelled the length of the countryside spreading a hard-line message:
Europeans and their ideas were not welcome among the Pokot.

51.

Pkech and his anti-colonialist sentiments found an appreciative audience in
young Pokot men who felt particularly victimised by British attempts at redefining
traditional notions of land and cattle ownership. Like his mentor Elijah Masinde,
Pkech eventually decided that words were not enough and that the British had
to be taken on directly. First attempts were limited to intermittent and smallscale ambushes of schools, police and mission stations. After a few months of
these sporadic raids, Pkech launched a spectacular plan. He began to arm his
followers with bows, arrows and other traditional weapons. On the morning of the
24 April 1950 he and around 300 men gathered in Kollowa to embark on what
has been described as “a pilgrimage”. The British were waiting for them. A violent
confrontation ensued.

52.

By the time that the dust settled, the records indicate that 50 people lay dead,
including Pkech himself and three colonial officers. In keeping with a broader
trend in Kenyan history, however, the number of fatalities has been debated,
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with few people agreeing on the final tally. Some versions of the Kollowa story
put the death toll at over 1,000.15 The fallout from the events at Kollowa was
immense and far-reaching. The British were determined to exact punishment
for the death of the three officers. Fourteen of the Kollowa survivors were tried,
found guilty and hanged. A further group was found guilty and sentenced to 20year terms. Finally, a fine of 2 000 head of cattle was handed down on the entire
Pokot community.
53.

Few other incidents in Kenya’s history illustrate how mass violence can arise when
people differ over fundamental ideas. At its heart, Kollowa is a clash over which
vision should have prevailed in the region: the carefully controlled and managed
one of the British, or the traditional, time-honoured one of the Pokot. Like the
Giriama, the Pokot keep the memory of the massacre alive; a monument has been
constructed on the site of the killings. Community elders have also signalled their
intention to seek reparations from the British government.16

54.

Above all, many people from the Pokot community claim that the massacre is the
root of their continued marginalisation from mainstream Kenya. Their argument is
that colonial attitudes towards the Pokot have carried on into the post-colonial era.
The Pokot view their relationship with modern-day authorities as characterised by
the same lack of respect and consideration for Pokot conventions. Reverend Simon
Alew, Samson Akasile and John Luchakai speak for many others when they describe
Kollowa as a sore that has never quite healed.17 The Pokot draw a direct line between
the rampantly indiscriminate behaviour of the security forces at Kollowa and the
Chemulunjo operations of 1979 during which at least seven people were thought
to have died at the hands of General Service Unit (GSU) officers as attempts were
made to disarm the community of unregistered firearms.18

Mau Mau Massacres
55.

15
16
17
18

At about the same time that the Kollowa Massacre happened, the ‘Mau Mau
War’ also erupted in Central and Rift Valley provinces. The Mau Mau movement
so dominates the study of Kenyan history that very few aspects of it remain
unexplored. Nevertheless the movement, and the brutal response of the colonial
authorities to it, occupies an important place in the trajectory of mass killings that
stretches from the pre-colonial past to the present.
For instance, Asman Kamama, Member of Parliament Baringo East http://westfm.co.ke/mobile/index.php?page=news&id=2455
http://oaic.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=111 Accessed 17th November 2011
See generally TJRC/Hansard/ Public Hearing/Kapenguria/ 14 October 2011.
Reverend Simon Alew, Chemlunjo in 1979, TJRC/KAP/002
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56.

The Mau Mau uprising peaked between 1952 and 1959. These seven years of
intense and often brutal fighting witnessed a number of mass killings that fit the
Commission’s definition of massacre. The choice of only two for consideration by
this report—Lari and Hola—is not meant to denigrate or ignore the diversity of
Mau Mau experiences. Rather, the analysis of Lari and Hola is offered to illustrate
specific trends and characteristics of mass killings that are, in turn, important for
the understanding of subsequent massacres in Kenya’s history.

Lari Massacre: The Night of the Long Knives

19

57.

Somewhere in the region of 400 people were killed in Lari on the night of the 26
and the morning of the 27 March 1953.20 It was the bloodiest incident in the entire
history of the Mau Mau. The number of people who died, as well as the manner in
which they met their death, guaranteed Lari a unique chapter in Kenyan history.
Sixty years on, Lari continues to impact peoples’ lives in very direct ways. In some
quarters, debates about responsibility, justice and compensation rage unabated.

58.

While Lari falls just outside the Commission’s temporal mandate, like all of the
massacres discussed in this historical analysis, it plays an important part in
establishing independent Kenya as a state deeply rooted in mass killings. Because
of the massacre, long-standing divides between victims and victimisers mean
that even now some Lari residents do not speak to each other and harbour great
resentments about their respective roles.21 For these reasons, it is important to have
some understanding of the disturbing events that took place on this “night of the
long knives”.

59.

Lari is a fairly typical Central Kenyan town which, from the late 1940s onwards,
received hundreds of squatters evicted from the Rift Valley estates, also known as
the ’White Highlands‘. Workers at the Uplands bacon factory on the outskirts of Lari
were restless and hankering to strike.

60.

It was not all doom and gloom though. As in other parts of the country, a good
number of people prospered under the colonial system. In Lari, this cadre
included wealthy Kikuyu elders who owned and controlled large tracts of land.

19 The ‘Night of the Long Knives’ is widely and popularly used to refer to events at Lari; no further details on the origins of the phrase
20 There are no definite figures for Lari. This estimate of four hundred is the product of a contemporary account written by an Irish lawyer
called Peter Evans. Most other accounts cluster around two hundred and two hundred fatalities. David Anderson Histories of the
Hanged (2005) 130
21 http://www.trinityafer.com/en/index.php/news/5168-the-massacre-58-years-ago-today-that-still-divides-lari-kenyaAccessed 29th November 2011
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It also included Africans directly employed by the colonial administration as
chiefs, headmen and the like, who were referred to by the local population as
‘loyalists’. The local chief’s name was Makimei. Both he and his predecessor,
Luka wa Kahangara, have been described as unrepentant loyalists and had been
threatened by the Mau Mau. Lari, therefore, became one of the first places where
the British colonialists intensified their recruitment of so-called home guards:
men who had undergone basic training and who were usually called in to support
the police and the army.
61.

A couple of factors distinguished Lari from its neighbours. From 1939, it had been
the focus of a bitter and extremely divisive land dispute. The dispute’s origins lie in
nearby Tigoni, which was an early centre of European settlement in the Highlands.
As land was alienated for settler use, the problem of what to do with the indigenous
Africans presented itself. In May 1928, Lari was proposed as a place to move the
displaced Africans. The 600 or so evictees were offered one-and-a-half acres of Lari
land for every one acre they had held in Tigoni. Some of the Tigoni elders held out
for two acres. Another group headed by Luka wa Kahangara agreed to the European
terms and, in 1939, headed for Lari. The move ignited a firestorm, with the holdouts describing wa Kahangara and his group as traitors. He was also accused of
all kinds of trickery in the distribution of Lari land. People who were not provided
for in the initial counts were mysteriously awarded allotments. In the same way,
legitimate claimants were disenfranchised. The choicest plots (well-watered and
close to transport links) all ended up in the elders’ hands. To make matters worse,
Lari was already densely occupied and had been witnessing conflicts between the
landed and landless.

Dusk
62.

The evening of the 26 March 1953 saw Lari home guards set off on their usual patrol.
The unpredictable security situation in Central Kenya meant that such patrols were
critical. About an hour into their rounds, the guards came across a badly mutilated
body nailed to a tree. The dead man was identified as a local loyalist. At around
9.00pm that evening, the guards noticed that a number of huts were ablaze in the
direction of Central Lari.

63.

As the guards turned around heading towards the fires it became clear that Lari
was under attack. It was close to 10.00pm by the time they arrived in the main
village. The scene that greeted their return was gruesome. As they found 75
people had been shot, hacked, strangled, burned and beaten to death. A further
50 people suffered severe injuries including slashed limbs that eventually had
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to be amputated. Others exhibited second and third degree burns. Women and
children were among the dead and injured.
64.

This initial phase of the massacre was documented in graphic detail. Sources of
information included survivors who recorded statements that were later used
in the Lari trials. A handful of survivors were alive and available to speak to the
press on the 58th anniversary of the Lari Massacre on 26 March 2011. Philomena
Nduta and Jacinta Wairuiru spoke of masked armed men who were lying in wait villagers mistook them for “black dogs” - for the home guards to go out on patrol.22
The women described extraordinary levels of violence. Attackers are said to have
licked their pangas clean of their victims’ blood. A number of decapitations took
place and the detached heads were triumphantly displayed.

65.

Because Lari is so close to Nairobi, journalists were quick to arrive and document
the atrocities.23 While it is difficult to exaggerate the horrors of Lari, some scholars
have characterised British coverage as luridly sensationalistic and tailored to
the anti-Mau Mau propaganda market. Within days, the story of Lari had been
splashed across world media and Kenya’s image as a happy-go-lucky European
outpost was shattered. Questions about the intruders could not be readily
answered as victims were traumatised and the home guards arrived in Lari at the
tail end of the ambush. The guards pursued the attackers but by this point most
had melted away into the surrounding darkness.

66.

Terrified survivors suggested that between five to six gangs consisting of 100 men
each had carried out the attack. Nobody could be sure who they were because
their faces were masked. It was clear though that the men came well prepared and
were determined to inflict as much damage as possible. They were heavily armed
with an assortment of ropes, swords and spears. Some were heard telling their
victims that they were all to be “finished”.

Dawn
67.

22
23
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The rising sun exposed a further 200 or so bodies strewn all over Lari and its
immediate environs. Dead men, women and children were everywhere: in the
bushes, in the rivers, in the streams and by the roadside. The tiny local mortuary
was groaning under the weight of scores of bodies. A second massacre had taken
place in Lari in the early hours of 27 March 1953. Little-known, little-discussed,
little-acknowledged and yet undeniable, the perpetrators of this massacre were
http://www.the-star.co.ke/lifestyle/128-lifestyle/18591-the-night-of-long-knives-slain-colonial-chiefs-widows-recall-larimassacre Accessed 29th November 2011
Selected original clips of contemporary coverage of Lari are available at http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=30923

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

almost certainly home guards, reservists and police who may have been under the
direct command of European police officers.
68.

A curious, almost oppressive, silence surrounds this second massacre. Historians
and various other interested parties have found it difficult to construct a firm
chronology. From the few details available, it seems that the conditions for the
second massacre began at about 10.00pm the night before, shortly after the
arrival of the home guards in Lari. They rushed off in hot pursuit of the attackers,
firing shots as they ran. Eye-witness reports indicate that the gangs had largely
disappeared by the time the guards arrived. Sporadic skirmishes between home
guards and the remnants of the gangs could not then have been responsible
for the more than 200 bodies discovered on the morning of the 27 March 1953.
Most of these people were more likely to have been killed later when the then
Lari District Commissioner John Cumber ordered all male suspects rounded up.
Notwithstanding the fairly vague nature of Cumber’s instructions, the home guards
(who by this time had been joined by the police and reservists) combed through
greater Lari. Men, women and children were pulled out of their homes, beaten and
killed.

69.

This version of events is corroborated, admittedly long after the event, by Kimani
Njuguna who was interviewed by a Daily Nation reporter in March 2011. Njuguna
recalled how he “lost ten members of my family when the colonialists struck the
following morning, including my two parents and uncles”.24 He added: “These raids
were led by African home guards. Colonial police went door to door searching for
those suspected to have taken the (Mau Mau) oath, rounded them up and took
them to police stations, where they were tortured, brutalised and killed.”25

70.

Lari’s proximity to Nairobi meant that a number of people were on site to document
and record the atrocities. Karigo Muchai, for instance, was a Kenya African Union
(KAU) member who arrived in Lari very early that morning after receiving reports
of upheaval from his associates in nearby Kiambaa. He hid up in the hills to observe
what was happening.26 He saw for himself the burning huts. More importantly,
Muchai claims to have witnessed people actually being shot. He remained in Lari
for a further three days, speaking to shell-shocked residents who confirmed what
he already suspected: mass killings at the hands of the security officers. Muchai
would later write that “in Lari there was a massacre on 26 March 1953, but most of

24 http://www.trinityafer.com/en/index.php/news/5168-the-massacre-58-years-ago-today-that-still-divides-lari-kenyaAccessed 29th November 2011
25 http://www.trinityafer.com/en/index.php/news/5168-the-massacre-58-years-ago-today-that-still-divides-lari-kenyaAccessed 29th November 2011
26 For further details on Muchai’s trip to Lari, see Marshall Clough Mau Mau Memoirs: History Memory and Politics (1998) 157
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the blood was on government hands.’27 The most convincing evidence, however,
comes directly from the government itself. A fortnight after the attack, an official
statement was published in the East African Standard. Short on specifics, the notice
simply stated that “the security forces had killed 150 people alleged to have been
involved in the massacre.”28 No further details, no official inquiries, no files, no
arrests; the second Lari massacre simply slipped out of official discourse.

The dead
71.

The number of people who died in Lari will never be known. The lowest estimates
for the first episode are in the mid-70s. This figure is based on a count apparently
carried out by an independent lawyer, Patrick Evans. Other estimates hit an outer
limit of 120. The death toll from the second incident is even more difficult to
establish because of the secrecy and the silence. David Anderson suggests that for
every one person killed in the first massacre, at least two were killed in the second.
This suggests the official death toll of 150 represents the lower end of the scale,
with 400 given as a more reasonable estimation of the deaths involved, especially
as it includes a number of people who reported their family members missing.

72.

The description of massacres often emphasise the indiscriminate nature of the
killings. Lari deviated from this traditional script. A survey of the victims of the first
massacre showed that they were carefully targeted and deliberately chosen. Nearly all
the dead were relatives, dependents or associates of the Lari loyalist community. One
of the first people to be killed was wa Kahangara, the prominent government chief.
Two of his widows (the Philomena and Nduta mentioned above) somehow survived
and subsequently provided the accounts that spoke to the attackers’ determination
not only to kill wa Kahangara, but to kill him in the most gruesome way possible.29
The home guards themselves were out on patrol and so they too survived. Their
families, however, were among the first to be killed. The killing of certain villagers
and the sparing of others demonstrates an intimacy and knowledge of the victims
that is not usually associated with the anonymity of a mass killing such as that of
Kedowa. Very little information has emerged about the victims of the second set
of killings. Government reticence at the time means that the victims’ names were
never recorded. Indeed, Lari people received no official assistance whatsoever in the
handling of hundreds of corpses. They were left to collect bodies from all across the
countryside and to identify and bury them as best as they could.

27 Marshall Clough Mau Mau Memoirs: History Memory and Politics (1998) 157.
28 David Anderson Histories of the Hanged (2005) 130
29 The widows describe Luka’s beheading and the detachment of his limbs. http://www.the-star.co.ke/lifestyle/128lifestyle/18591-the-night-of-long-knives-slain-colonial-chiefs-widows-recall-lari-massacre Accessed 29th November
2011
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Survivors and descendants demonstrate that the passage of time has done
very little to lessen the pain occasioned by the loss of so many people in such
traumatic circumstances. Lari is in many ways as divided and fractured today as it
was on the 27 March 1953, and along the same lines. People on either side of the
Lari divide speak openly about the fact that six decades on, marriage between
loyalists and Mau Mau families is strongly discouraged. People will even cross
the street to avoid interacting with one another. Further contributing to the
problem, no formal efforts have been made to honour the memories of the dead.
The task of remembrance has been left to private individuals and groups, such as
the Lari Memorial Peace Museum and Cultural Resource Centre that organises an
annual prayer service.30

Lari trials
74.

Some sections of the community may have drawn comfort and a sense of justice
from the eventual hanging of 70 people found guilty of the Lari killings after a
series of trials held in the months following the killings. For others, however, the
Lari trials and their verdicts represent the very worst of victors’ justice: rushed,
partial and poorly considered.

75.

Recent historical research and analysis supported the view that the Lari trials
were, at the very least, ambiguous. The majority of the 2 000 suspects presented
for trial emerged as a result of the dragnet cast over Lari just before dawn on
27 March 1953. To put this in perspective, the suspects were rounded up at the
very same time that hundreds of others were shot to death - also as suspects.
Because the second Lari massacre was only acknowledged in passing by the
colonial government, the prosecutors for the Crown proceeded without any
further investigation of the extreme brutality that accompanied the round-up.
Some of the remaining suspects were identified by highly-traumatised victims
of the mass violence. In a significant minority of the cases, the suspects were
identified by children who were hauled before identification parades and asked
to pick out the men responsible for the deaths of their parents, siblings and
loved ones. Large groups of suspects were also indicted on the testimony of an
individual witness. Machune Kiranga, a home guard who lost two children in the
attack, submitted the names of 50 men he identified as having taken part in the
slaughter. Despite the well-established timeline that puts the arrival of the home
guards at the tail end of the carnage, Kiranga insisted that he had seen the 50
men kill his children as well as another man and set fire to a number of huts.

30 http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/ferguson-centre/memorialisation/lari-memorial.pdf
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76.

The 2 000 suspects were funnelled into a criminal justice system that lacked the
capacity to handle anywhere near such huge numbers. The government was
absolutely determined to respond firmly and quickly to the Mau Mau threat. Within
weeks of the Lari attack, Governor Sir Evelyn Baring fired off a detailed proposal to
the Colonial Office in London proposing the establishment of Special Emergency
Assize Courts in Nairobi, Githunguri, Nyeri, Nakuru and other areas experiencing
Mau Mau activity. All Mau Mau cases would be fast-tracked through these special
courts. In addition to establishing special courts, the proposal expanded criminal
offences related to Mau Mau. For instance, it became a capital offence to consort
with people likely to carry out acts of public disorder. Lawyers appearing for the
Lari suspects were up in arms over the looseness of the terms ‘consorting’ and
‘likely’, but colonial authorities were undeterred. By June 1953, these proposals
had come into force.31

77.

Another troubling aspect of the colonial justice system was its vulnerability to
settler pressure and other blatantly political forces. Just before declaring the State
of Emergency, Governor Baring wrote to the Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttleton,
privately expressing concern about the settlers’ propensity for retaliatory
violence.32 The settler community was so enraged by the events in Lari that
an armed reaction was a real possibility as plans were made to hunt down the
attackers. The government found itself in the uncomfortable position of placating
the settlers by giving in to their often outrageous demands. A prominent settler
leader, Michael Blundell, happened to be in London when the Lari Massacre took
place. He immediately rushed to the Colonial Office to make known the settlers’
expectations that suspects would find their way to the gallows as soon as possible.
He suggested that magistrates be given the power to hear capital cases and that
the appeals process be sharply curtailed. Astonishingly, Blundell represented the
so-called ‘minority progressive wing’ of the settler community. Back in Kenya, most
settlers called for the complete abolition of the appeals process and execution
within 24 hours of conviction. While colonial officials were able to resist the settlers’
more extreme requests, the issue of speedy trials with limited options for appeal
was incorporated into the Emergency Assize Courts.

78.

On 15 October – seven months after the massacre – twelve men were executed
for the murder of one Penina Ikenya, the wife of a Lari headman. Over the next few
months a further 58 men would meet the same end. Since then numerous attempts
have been made to answer questions of guilt, innocence and motivation with limited

31 An early generation of human and civil rights lawyers including Chiedo More, Gem Argwings-Kodhek and A. R. Kapila represented
the Lari defendants. For more Argwings-Kodhek and Lari see E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo and John Lonsdale Mau Mau and Nationhood:
Arms, Authority and Narration (2003) 27 – 28
32 John Lonsdale ‘Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya’ (1990) 31 Journal of African History 409
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success. Overall, Lari illustrates the terrible complexity surrounding massacres in
Kenya. Such sudden and massive explosions of violence can rarely be attributed to
one cause. While Lari is undoubtedly a massacre related to Mau Mau, the social and
economic forces that eventually tore the community apart pre-dated the emergence
of Mau Mau itself. Similarly, the crushing of Mau Mau and the end of the Emergency
did nothing to resolve the fundamental social and economic tensions in Lari and left
the community equally open to the possibility of further violence. This is underscored
by the continuing low-level animosity that still exists among the people of Lari. The
role of the colonial state in the Lari Massacre is easier to categorise. State agents were
among the perpetrators and state agencies were responsible for the staging of a legal
process that almost certainly sent innocent men to the gallows. The more lasting and
insidious consequence of the state’s behaviour during and immediately after Lari was
the creation of a legal and political environment in which the suspension of civil and
human rights were permitted to maintain security under the rubric of fighting, in this
case, the Mau Mau. This was a lesson that the post-independence Kenyan government
would not easily forget.

Hola Massacre: Of Conspiracies and Cover-Ups
79.

Towards the end of the Emergency, another massacre took place in Hola, a small
town on the banks of the River Tana. Hola was most recently the headquarters
of Tana River District. During the Emergency, however, Hola was home to one of
the camps in Kenya’s infamous ’Pipeline‘ system of detention centres set up for
the supposed rehabilitation of Mau Mau adherents. On 4 March 1959, news of the
death of 11 Hola detainees became public. The men were said to have died after
having “drunk from a water cart.”33 Readers were left to conclude that the water
was somehow contaminated, a not unreasonable assumption with respect to the
Pipeline’s filthy and overcrowded camps. Initially, therefore, there was nothing at
all unusual in the report from Hola and nothing to cause any alarm. Eight days later,
however, would come the news that the men had not died as a result of drinking
tainted water, but from blunt force injuries. They had been beaten to death with
clubs and heavy instruments.

80.

The killing of the 11 men was immediately dubbed ’The Hola Massacre' and 'The
Hola Scandal' by the international media.34 In numerical terms, the Hola Massacre
is completely overshadowed by Lari and the other mass killings that have been

33 For the press release in its entirety, see The Truth about Mau Mau: State Murder in Kenya http://www.troopsoutmovement.com/
oliversarmychap6.htm Accessed 10th December 2011
34 The Hola Scandal http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,892578-1,00.html Accessed 10th December 2011
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considered so far in this report. Few other colonial massacres lay bare the politics
of mass killings as starkly and as openly as Hola. The politics of late colonial Kenya
was such that a web of untruths and half-truths were spun around the killing
of these 11 men. Hola presents a unique opportunity to examine the colonial
legacy of what is a dominant and recurrent theme in the story of massacres in
Kenya - state attempts to minimise, cover-up or flatly deny their occurrence.
81.

From the outset, the official reaction to the Hola killings was characterised by
an almost complete absence of openness and honesty. The very first report to
come out from the camp about the deaths was an elaborate one outlining how
a group of 100 detainees were out digging irrigation trenches when they drank
water from a water truck. Two of them collapsed and died immediately after
drinking the water. The remaining nine were said to have died either on the way
to or upon arrival at the hospital. Not one word of this statement was true and
its originator - a Mr Sullivan, the camp commandant - was well aware of this.
As with all cover-ups, success therefore depended on Sullivan’s word remaining
unchallenged.

82.

For a while, Hola officials were able to maintain the façade despite obvious
evidence suggesting that the men had met a much more violent end. None
other than District Commissioner Willoughby Thompson found the death by
contaminated water tale to be an “improbable” because when he visited the
camp, he not only saw the corpses for himself, but also found scores of badly
beaten men in extreme distress.35 Sullivan’s presentation of events at Hola
nevertheless prevailed and found acceptance at the highest levels of the colonial
administration. Neither Governor Baring nor Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd
deviated from this script, even though they were almost certainly in receipt of
the findings of the initial autopsy that described the injuries suffered by the dead
as “due to violence”.36

83.

Cracks began to appear in the foundation that Hola officials had built for
themselves when results of the autopsy were leaked to Barbara Castle, a Labour
Member of Parliament and a vociferous and persistent critic of the ‘Pipeline’. Castle
immediately demanded that the Secretary of State table the inquest documents
before the House of Commons. Baring and Lennox-Boyd tried to neutralise Castle
by releasing a second statement acknowledging the possibility of violent deaths.
They also announced the creation of a limited inquiry under the stewardship of
Senior Resident Magistrate W.H. Goudie. If the hope was that Goudie’s inquiry

35 David Anderson Histories of the Hanged (2005) 326
36 Caroline Elkins Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (2005) 345
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would cool temperatures, a serious miscalculation had been made. Goudie
proceeded to Hola on 18 March 1959 to carry out on-site investigations. His final
report put to rest all notions of accidental or provoked deaths:
In each case, death was found to have been caused by shock and haemorrhage due to
multiple bruising caused by violence. There was no serious combined attempt by the
detainees to attack warders and…there was a very considerable amount of beating by
warders with batons solely for the purpose of compelling them to work or punishing
them for refusing to work.37

84.

Historians of Hola have uncovered and preserved the experiences of Hola
survivors and have revealed a level of violence that Goudie was unwilling, unable
or uninterested in including in his final write-up. Paul Mahehu, for instance, spoke
of broken skulls and splattered brain matter. Even though it was written in the
dry and distant tone of a detached outsider, the impact of Goudie’s report was
electric. Energised Labour politicians leapt into action seeking the establishment
of a more comprehensive public inquiry with the powers to look deeper into the
running of Hola Camp.

85.

In a long and fairly convoluted series of events, Baring and Lennox-Boyd then
attempted to stave off the possibility of more rigorous investigations into the Hola
killings. The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan also became embroiled in
the affair. Part of Baring’s offensive involved inviting the press to visit Hola. They
found a clean and orderly setup that contrasted sharply with the bloody hell-hole
described in the aftermath of the massacre. This did nothing to pacify opposition
Labour members and a growing number of politicians within the Prime Minister’s
own party, the Conservatives. A full blown House of Commons debate was
scheduled for the middle of June 1959.

86.

During an extraordinary and apparently fiery Cabinet meeting to prepare for the
debate, a number of top officials, including Reginald Manningham-Buller, the
Attorney-General, suggested that the entire Colonial Office be formally censured on
the issue and that, if necessary, disciplinary action should be taken against Sullivan
and any other “men on the ground”. Despite the private acknowledgement by the
Prime Minister that the Colonial Office was “a badly run office”, no move was made to
pin any kind of responsibility on Lennox-Boyd, Baring or any of their subordinates in
the Colonial Office.38 The most that Macmillan would commit to was the creation of
the so-called Fairn Commission that was mandated to generate recommendations
and guidelines for the future management of the camps. The Hola Massacre and

��������������������
Caroline Elkins Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (2005) 349
38 Caroline Elkins Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (2005) 349
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historical issues relating to the camps would not be touched; the Prime Minister
went into the debate with this as a red line that he would not cross.
87.

In the face of such persistent attempts to rebuff all attempts to investigate
Hola, one simple question must be asked: why was the colonial government so
determined not to reveal the facts about Hola? This is the same question that
ultimately must be asked about all cover-ups. It is important to understand what
drives states to treat the truth with such reckless abandon. In the case of Hola,
the desire to cover up derived in part from the gradual realisation that the grand
experiment to rehabilitate Mau Mau adherents through the ‘Pipeline’ had all but
imploded. Not only was there no rehabilitation, policies ostensibly developed for
further rehabilitation instead spawned a murderous and abusive regime seemingly
sanctioned by all levels of the colonial and metropolitan administration.

88.

There is a large body of literature dedicated to the study of rehabilitation.39 What this
literature makes clear is that right from the beginning, colonial efforts at rehabilitation
were destined for failure or, at the very most, limited success. The policy itself began
to come together at the beginning of the Emergency when thousands of men were
rounded up because of their suspected ties to Mau Mau. By the end of 1954, close to
52,000 men were in government custody.40 The vast majority of these men were not
considered hard-core Mau Mau militants who could be detained without trial under
the Emergency orders. Instead, they were described as low-level sympathisers and
adherents of Mau Mau; men (and a few women) who might have taken an oath but
whose support of the movement had yet to translate into anything more pro-active.
It was these men who became the focus of rehabilitation.

89.

The main goal of the entire process was to totally obliterate all things Mau Mau
and remake these men into loyal, productive and trustworthy members of colonial
society. To achieve this, detainees were held in camps where they would be
screened (in order to establish the full extent of their Mau Mau beliefs), cleanse
them of their oath and expose them to honest labour in a development project
of some kind. Christian classes were on offer every evening. Finally, the detainees
would be released and returned to their home districts where monitoring would
continue under chiefs and headmen. The centrepiece of this 'Pipeline' doctrine
was the setting up of a series of camps and centres dotted all over Kenya from
Lokitaung to Lamu and Mageta to Mara.41

39 For a review of this literature, see AR Baggallay ‘Myths of Mau Mau expanded: rehabilitation in Kenya’s detention camps 1954 – 60’
(2011) 553 – 578 Journal of Eastern African Studies
40 Most of these men were rounded up during Operation Anvil of May – June 1954. Security officials swept through Nairobi and its
environs in search of Mau Mau suspects. For operational details, see Anthony Clayton The Killing Fields of Kenya 1952 – 1960
(2006) 21 – 32
41 For a map showing locations of the camps, see Caroline Elkins Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (2005) 150
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90.

On paper, the Pipeline’s rehabilitation purposes read beautifully. Emphasising the
voluntary nature of the work, colonial officials were able to avoid early concerns
that they were acting in direct violation of the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) conventions on Forced and Communal Labour.42 It did not take long, however,
for the harsh realities of the Pipeline to come bubbling to the surface and to put
colonial officials on defensive footing. Severe overcrowding and the associated
phenomena of cholera, typhoid and tuberculosis were commonplace. A single
outbreak of typhoid in Manyani Camp (200 kilometres south of Hola) killed about
60 inmates. The much vaunted re-education classes crumbled under the sheer
weight of the system and most of the teachers fell far short of the ideal espoused
by the Department of Rehabilitation: “Christian, idealistic, practical, with a keen
desire to help the Kikuyu to adjust themselves to the new conditions”.43 Most of
the camp employees were basically trained staffers seconded to rehabilitation
from prison departments as far away as Malawi and Tanzania. They showed no
inclination or propensity for inspirational or rehabilitative work of any kind.

91.

The worst product of the Pipeline project was a steady stream of dead and
brutalised bodies that came to symbolise the entire process of rehabilitation.
The question of torture is addressed in detail in the Chapter on torture in this
Report. It is enough to note here that the issue of rising death rates was key to
unlocking the Hola conspiracy. Death from infectious disease was an accepted
feature of camp life. It was not something that colonial officials were proud of
because it belied the whole notion of the camps as modern and carefully run.
For the most part, camp administrators found it easy to maintain that they were
always working to improve food, water supply and other facets of hygiene and
sanitation. Much more difficult to explain were deaths that resulted from the
beatings and torture inflicted on inmates by detention camp staff. That such
beatings and torture were informed by deliberate and specific government
policy was essentially indefensible.

92.

A year into rehabilitation, it became obvious that the Pipeline infrastructure could
not cater for tens of thousands of low-value detainees. The Colonial Office and the
Kenya Administration then decided to make a very drastic change. Lesser value
inmates would be released, leaving the Pipeline to concentrate on a recalcitrant
population of about 30,000 detainees who had refused to either confess or to
cooperate. In early 1957, both Baring and Lennox-Boyd signed off on a release
form that set about 50,000 men free to return to their homes.

Chapter FOUR

42 The ILO convention on Forced Labour states that people incarcerated without trial cannot be made to work. The convention on
Communal Labour only allows communal labour for sixty days a year. For more on the colonial government and the ILO, see
Caroline Elkins Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (2005) 117, 129 – 131
43 Caroline Elkins Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (2005) 148
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93.

What was not made clear is that at the same time, officials agreed on the adoption
and implementation of drastic new strategies designed to break the resistance of the
core group of so-called “black” detainees.44 Two new positions were created: Special
Commissioner and District Officer in Charge of Rehabilitation. The Commissioner
and his District Officer were, essentially, left free to take whatever measures they
needed in order to get detainees to confess their oaths. They reported directly to
the Governor, which meant that no other administrators were privy to their plans
and no one could ask them to make revisions or alterations of any kind. “Monkey”
Johnston and Terence Gavaghan were appointed Commissioner and District Officer
respectively.

94.

Johnston and Gavaghan recruited a highly regarded prison officer from Mwea
known as John Cowan and together they developed something known as the
‘dilution technique’. Dilution was the euphemistic term given to a process that
involved gathering detainees into small groups, isolating them from the general
camp population, and then physically beating them with fists, clubs, whips, bats
or any other weapons at the wardens’ disposal until they became submissive
or confessed. As crude as this technique was, it became the apex of Operation
Progress sold by Gavaghan, Cowan and Johnston as the answer to continued
resistance and indiscipline in the camps. Dilution would be systematically applied
throughout the Pipeline by groups of specially trained African guards overseen by
European superiors.

95.

Dilution and Operation Progress marked an extraordinary hardening of the
colonial position. The Colonial Secretary was said to harbour concerns about the
institutionalisation of violence and force. It would take a series of legal refinements
clarifying that the dilution technique was based on “compelling,” not “punitive”
force for the Secretary to eventually sign off on Dilution and Operation Progress.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to see how administrators ever thought
that such brutal techniques would bear positive results. Within a matter of weeks,
reports about the excesses of Dilution began to filter out of the camps. The sources
were the detainees themselves who somehow smuggled out letters addressed to
British Members of Parliament, the Colonial Secretary and even Queen Elizabeth.
The catalogue of abuse was stunning as was the apparent inability of officials to
rein in the excesses of the supposedly well-trained enforcers of Dilution.

96.

The death of Michuri Githumu encapsulates the many tensions surrounding
the dilution policy. Githumu died in early 1957 in Gathigirigiri Camp. The cause
of his death was a prolonged and severe beating supposedly administered by

44 The Rehabilitation Department used a colour-coded system to classify inmates with black representing the most un-cooperative
and white representing those most willing to submit to the system
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prison staff. Both the Governor and the Colonial Secretary were made aware of
the circumstances of Githumu’s demise, but seemed fairly unmoved until the
news hit London. Once again, the redoubtable Barbara Castle was on the case.
She immediately wrote to the Colonial Secretary demanding further details.
The response was quintessentially evasive. Lennox-Boyd wrote back to explain
that no Europeans had been involved in the incident, as though that was the
information Castle was seeking. Eventually, charges of murder were laid against
several “Rehabilitation Assistants”. Some of the defendants were found guilty on
the lesser charge of assault causing bodily harm and sentenced to a few months
of hard labour. During the trial, information about 37 other cases of assault at
Gathigirigiri surfaced. The Colonial Secretary accepted that the information was
correct, but Operation Progress proceeded undisturbed. This kind of violence was
by no means limited to Mwea camp. The much-used excuse that Mwea was an
exception that could be blamed on a few bad apples cracked under the weight of
similar occurrences in Athi River, Murang’a, Lokitaung and many other camps in
the Pipeline.
97.

Part of the irony of the Hola Massacre was that it occurred at the same time that
the colonial administration had essentially declared both Operation Progress and
Dilution successes. By 1959, officials were telling anyone who would listen that the
number of detainees in the system was down to only a few thousand hold-outs, who
would be speedily processed. Once again, however, what the authorities proclaimed
in public was much different than what they knew was the case in private. Privately,
the administration prepared to implement a harsher programme because the
remaining detainees were seen as the hardest of the hard-core; men whose
resistance had continued over many months and years. Far from winding down,
the Rehabilitation Department was actually intensifying and refining Dilution. Hola
stood at the centre of this final restructuring. The infamous John Cowan of Operation
Progress was assigned to Hola in early February 1959 and asked to find a lasting
solution to the problem.

98.

Cowan arrived to find that the camp had already been divided into two separate
spaces: closed and open areas for the un-cooperative and cooperative inmates
respectively. All this was in keeping with previous policy. So too were instructions
to use a certain amount of force to compel inmates to work and to confess. What
was different about Hola was the chilling acknowledgement that people “might
even get killed”, but beatings should continue regardless until the desired results
were achieved. This was the policy that the colonial administration signed up to
just days before the massacre took place. And this was Hola’s dirty little secret:
state-sanctioned assaults, brutality and, eventually, murder.
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99.

Conspiracies and cover-ups are, over the long run, very difficult to sustain and so it
was with Hola. Although Macmillan, Lennox-Boyd and Baring were able to dodge
the bullet of a formal inquiry, the cat was out of the bag. Too many people knew
what had happened for the status quo to remain. It was simply no longer possible
to continue with either Dilution or Operation Progress. The further irony is that
these two strategies, originally conceived to support the entrenchment of colonial
rule in Kenya in fact played a large part in the final dismantling of British power. The
questions that arose after Hola were not the specifics of the massacre, but whether
Great Britain could continue to represent itself as morally and ethically fit to run an
empire. By the end of the year, both supporters and opponents had arrived at the
same answer: No. Discussions then turned to the complicated but unavoidable issue
of decolonisation.

100. The Commission carefully combed Kenya’s pre-colonial and colonial past to find
mass killings that help provide context for mass killings after independence. The
difficulty with massacres is that in some respects they are so localised in their
origins and dynamics that it is difficult to draw conclusions from one mass killing
and apply them to another. As has been explained, the causes and consequences
of Kedowa are distinct from the causes and consequences of Lari.
101. When, however, a country’s history plays host to a series of violent massacres,
serious attempts must be made to think about continuity and the particular
elements that link one incident to another. Clearly, competition is at the core of all
the massacres presented here. From Kedowa to Hola, what the Kenyan experience
illustrates is that when two or more groups find themselves in competition
over what they consider, rightly or wrongly, as an existential issue over which
no compromise can be made, the potential for an explosion of mass violence
is always present. It is tempting to reach for firm and fixed understandings of
“competition” but more fluid ones are more appropriate.
102. The groups that have been examined here have competed over ideas, territory,
and political, social and economic power with disastrous results. Groups locked
in such vicious struggles do not require much of a push to descend into such
fatal encounters. All it may take is a single spark such as the stealing of a goat,
while the underlying competition was often the product of long-standing and
deeply-rooted forces that even the warring parties may not fully understand,
much less control. Late 19th and 20th century Kenya and Kenyans were sucked into
a global vortex of capitalism that impacted their lives in new, unexpected and
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ultimately violent ways. The Arabs, Swahili and Maasai of the Kedong Massacre,
for instance, can easily be seen as unwitting actors in a larger drama about the
expansion of European trade into the Kenyan hinterland. Similarly, there are
analyses of Mau Mau that understand the protagonists not as loyalists and rebels
but as beneficiaries and losers in the economics of colonialism.
103. The other connecting link among these massacres is the role of the state. In
each of the mass killings analysed here, the state is present. The only issue up
for debate is the breadth and depth of the state’s presence. Once again, the preindependence massacres offer a broad spectrum. On the one end is Kedowa,
where the state distinguishes itself with a near total absence from the events of
26 November 1895. No state agents or emissaries were anywhere near Kedowa on
that fateful day. They only showed up much later to conduct investigations. Yet
it is not sufficient to simply conclude that the Kedowa Massacre excluded state
actors. The more provocative and potentially insightful line of inquiry asks: What
kind of state creates the conditions for the massacre of hundreds of innocent
people to take place? In the case of Kedowa, a combination of negligence and
ignorance seems to be most applicable. State responsibility for massacres cannot
therefore only be assessed based on the presence or absence of government
officers.
104. At the other end of the spectrum, the role of the state was much more visible and
obvious. From the time of the Giriama Massacre onwards, the state appears as the
unapologetic perpetrator of violence. King’s African Rifles (KAR) officers, prison
wardens and home guards and various other paramilitary forces have rampaged
through Kenyan history, inflicting death, injury, and destruction on hundreds (if
not thousands) of people. For the most part, these individuals appear to have acted
with the full approval and knowledge of civilian colonial authorities. Remorse and
remonstration do not feature at all.
105. Other than the half-hearted prosecution of apparently deviant or errant officers,
the history of massacres in colonial Kenya offers very little to demonstrate that
the state accepted any kind of responsibility. Instead, state practice for years has
been diminishment, deflection and, ultimately, denial. Thus Kenya on the eve of
independence was a blood-drenched state showing little or no willingness to tackle
the wrongs of the past and entering the future with heavy historical baggage that
would inevitably affect future events.
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Massacres in North Eastern
General Background
106. More than a decade after the ‘Shifta War’ ended, North Eastern Province was the
setting for at least three violent security operations that resulted in the massacres
and injury of tens of hundreds of people. These incidents took place between 1980
and 1984, in Bulla Karatasi, Malka Mari and Wagalla.
107. Bulla Karatasi, Malka Mari and Wagalla massacres stand at the intersection of a
number of important political, economic and legal currents. The Commission was,
however, most interested in understanding the relationship between security
operations and mass killings in Kenya. In its simplest form, the Commission saw this
relationship as direct and unmediated: security-oriented operations have had the
tendency to quickly degenerate into mass killings in Kenya since the very earliest
days of the colonial state. State attempts to contain and neutralise security threats
regularly have resulted in an unusually large number of casualties. The need to
restore a sense of stability has often trumped all other considerations surrounding
the sanctity of human life.
108.

The challenge the Commission faced when examining the mass killings in Bulla
Karatasi, Malka Mari and Wagalla was the sheer number of analyses and readings
that have been generated around these incidents for nearly 30 years. Efforts to
understand the killings have resulted in a stunning array of interpretations and
explanations. The Commission was convinced, on the basis of evidence, testimonies,
investigations, and research, that a particular approach to security was the chain that
linked Bulla Karatasi, Malka Mari and Wagalla to each other and to other mass killings
in Kenya.

Banditry and cattle rustling
109.

180

The end of active military activities in Northern Kenya after the Arusha Agreement
was signed by the governments of Kenya and Somalia, did not signal the onset of
peace; far from it. Indeed, the formal cessation of fighting ushered in a new and
troubled era of local and sub-regional insecurity that would lead to the mass killings
in Bulla Karatasi, Malka Mari and, most dramatically, Wagalla. Research has identified
various reasons for this tragic state of affairs. As with most conflicts, the end of the
Shifta War left thousands of former fighters with nothing to do. The government of
Kenya did not seem to have a formal demobilisation programme. The plan, such as
it was, appeared to have consisted of former Shifta fighters reporting to the nearest
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chief or government representative. Fighters surrendered, but at a very slow rate;
only about a dozen a week. The covert and underground nature of the Shifta force
meant that it was difficult to speak authoritatively about its size. Even so, it can be
said with some degree of certainty that the few hundred men who complied with
orders to surrender represented a minority. The majority of former Shifta fighters
resisted government attempts to get them to surrender. This armed Shifta group
formed the core of the debate about security in North Eastern.
110. These elusive former Shifta were not easy to pin down. Nene Mburu described
them as “disgruntled” ex-fighters who were in effect armed and uncontrollable.45
With absolutely no prospects for employment or education, they quickly turned to
banditry and cattle-rustling.
111. Inter-clan relations also suffered as a result of these former fighters, who quickly
transformed into a quasi-mercenary force available for hire during encounters
against enemy clans. With armed groups as participants, traditional clashes over
territory, water and pasture degenerated into deadly encounters. Elders and chiefs
were powerless in the face of a new social order in which young men with guns
were setting the agenda.

The Ogaden War
112. In 1977, this already bad situation took a drastic turn for the worse with the
outbreak of war between Ethiopia and Somalia. While complicated by the Cold
War politics of the time, the ‘Ogaden War’, as it came to be known, was rooted in
the same soil as the Shifta War before it: the desire of the government of Somalia
to incorporate ethnic Somalis living in the Ethiopian province of Ogaden into
Somalia proper. Some residents of the Ogaden region of south-eastern Ethiopia
supported the project.46 In July 1977, almost the entire Somali army crossed into
Ethiopia to join forces with the secessionist Western Somali Liberation Front. It was
an audacious and provocative move that drew an immediate reaction from the
central Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Mariam.
113.

The two years of intensive fighting that followed resulted in the loss of more than 12
000 lives. The war ended not only with Somalia’s defeat, but also saw the beginning of
the collapse of the Somalia state which descended into anarchy after President Siad
Barre was ousted from power a decade later. The Ogaden Liberation Front continued

45 Nene Mburu ‘Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History and Political Implications’ (1999) 8 Nordic Journal of
African Studies 100
46 For detailed work on the background to and the conduct of the war see Joseph Nkaissery ‘The Ogaden War: an analysis and its
impact on regional peace on the horn of Africa’ at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA326941&Location=U2&d
oc=GetTRDoc.pdf. Accessed 3rd March 2012
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its limited efforts at secession and engaged in skirmishes with the Ethiopian army.
The Ogaden War had a profound effect on Northern Kenya as well. It triggered,
for instance, the southward migration of refugees from the Ogaden, as well as the
defeated Somali army troops into both Wajir and Mandera districts.47 Alongside
the refugees flowed a current of sophisticated, illegal and unregistered weapons.
When these weapons found their way into the hands of the disenfranchised and
increasingly criminal former Shifta, the stage was set for serious instability.
114. It was important therefore for the Commission to establish how such instability
manifested itself on the ground. As has been mentioned earlier, it was difficult to
get a full understanding of the role of former Shifta fighters; witnesses did not
speak about them in very precise ways. Many, however, testified about violations
committed by civilian gunmen. While it is impossible to be completely certain, it
is possible to attribute a good number of these incidents to ex-Shifta. The attacks
were violent, random and seemed to serve no other purpose than to prey upon
local residents. The Commission heard a disturbing, but not particularly unusual,
case in Garissa. An Ijara family’s hut was invaded by a gang of two gunmen.
After a brief struggle, the mother was shot dead. The men attempted to rape the
young women of the household but were chased away by the arrival of friends
and neighbours alerted by their screams. Nearly 30 years later, the family is still
traumatised by the event as told by one of the surviving daughters:
My father was working for the government of Kenya by then. During the time that my
mother was killed, he was on leave and was in the house. When he heard what had
happened, he was shocked and became mentally disabled. My two brothers also
became mentally disabled. They were the only sons that my mother had.
Later, nobody came to ask about what had happened to us. Nobody bothered to know
about the calamity that had befallen us. I had to start taking care of the younger ones.48

115. Such stories were a common feature of life in North Eastern in the 1970s and 1980s.
An already traumatised population was subjected to further bouts of violence and
criminality.
116.

The state’s response to the rising wave of insecurity during this period was weak and
uncoordinated. Many of these attacks did not prompt any kind of sustained police
investigations, criminal charges or anything along those lines. Generally, it was
difficult for the police and local administrations to take action in response to every
single raid. The scale and frequency of the banditry, coupled with the large distances
involved, made that kind of follow-up impossible. Even so, the Commission’s overall

47 Jennifer Hyndman ‘A post-cold war geography of forced migration in Kenya and Somalia’ (1999) 51 Professional Geographer 104
48 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 13 April 2011/ Garissa/ p.2
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impression was that the government could have been more energetic in pursuing
security for the residents of the region. There is little evidence to indicate that even
the most preliminary of efforts were made to address banditry and its impact on
the civilian population. The Ijara family, for example, has never had any interaction
with government representatives over the death of their mother. Again, it is highly
unlikely that the Ijara case was exceptional.
Government reactions seem only to have become more focused when Shifta banditry
began to engulf targets more closely associated with the government itself. The
government was only moved into action when the issues, targets and victims mattered
to the state itself. Organised poaching illustrates this approach.

Poaching
117. Few things raised government temperatures more reliably than the Shifta-driven
trade in ivory, rhino horns, leopard skins and other valuable animal trophies. The
1970s and 1980s were characterised by a surge in such activity. Poaching had,
however, been a fact of the economic life of Northern Kenya even during the
colonial period. Somali hunters and traders created a formidable network that
trafficked horns, tusks and skins through the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD)
and to the coastal ports of Kismayu, Lamu and Mogadishu.49 An under-staffed
and under-financed Kenya Game Department could do little to curb a trade that
in the 1930s was valued at hundreds of thousands of rupees (the currency used
at that time). The introduction of a series of hunting licenses and fines for noncompliance had very little impact. Ironically, the very profitability of poaching was
what eventually drove the poachers out of business. Herds in Northern Kenya were
severely depleted, leaving the hunters with little left to poach.
118. The outbreak of the Shifta War in the 1960s had a chilling effect on the trade in
game trophies. Very little hunting could take place in an atmosphere of all-out
fighting. As soon as the war ended, however, the hunters returned to re-establish
their networks. The armed bandits spread throughout the region would prove to
be their natural allies. In the late 1980s, raiders and bandits from Somalia proper
would also join the fray. It did not take long for this new and highly aggressive breed
of hunters and fighters to make an impact. In the early 1970s, parliamentarians
from Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit, Meru and the Tana River Basin were up in arms
at the sudden appearance of violent gangs of armed men in their constituencies’
parks and game reserves.50
49 For descriptions, see Peter Dalleo ‘The Somali role in organized poaching in northeastern Kenya c.1909 – 1939 (1979) 12
International Journal of African Historical Studies 472
50 For an example of such exchanges, see Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 5 May 1970, 201 – 202
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119. With thousands of elephants and rhinos killed, conservationists began to
speak openly about the complete disappearance of these animals from Kenya’s
ecosystems.51 Anxieties surrounded the continued viability of Kenya’s vital tourist
industry. The export of violent poaching to other parts of the country triggered
an outcry. With one outrageous attack after another on animals, tourists and
game rangers, public anger at government inaction reached a fever pitch. Mr.
Kholkholle, the member of parliament for Marsabit South, spoke for many Kenyans
when he questioned the ineffective response from the Ministry of Wildlife and the
government as a whole:
I am very surprised for the Assistant Minister to say that these poachers have automatic
weapons and, therefore, probably his ministry is unable to deal with these people. If the
government has dealt with Shifta, who were many in numbers and also very powerful,
why not these few poachers?52

120. In early 1975, then Vice President Daniel arap Moi declared that “no effort will be
spared to stamp [poaching] out”.53 Three years later, President Kenyatta banned all
forms of hunting.
121. The second branch of Shifta violence to elicit a reaction from the government
was violence aimed directly at government employees, property, installations
and the like. Like poaching, such attacks were depicted as intolerable. During
the war, strikes against the government were, of course, deliberate. The postwar situation was much more opportunistic. Government convoys, for instance,
were a favourite target. If the raiders were lucky, the cars might be carrying civil
servants’ salaries. So it was in 1989 in Hulugho, a tiny Garissa town, when three
policemen were killed while transporting the payroll. While not unusual, such
incidents had the capacity to both shock and anger the administration. And
as Hulugho again shows, fairly determined attempts were made to track down
bandits involved in such incidents.

External threat
122.

Another element of the security equation in post-Shifta Northern Kenya was external.
Long, porous borders and shared ethnic identities have long meant that the region’s
connections to Somalia and southern Ethiopia go far beyond the superficial. Indeed,
deeply held beliefs about Somali identity and the Somali nation were at the core of
the war. The end of the war put an end to Somalia’s territorial ambitions in Kenya. It

51 See for instance, David Western ‘Patterns of Depletion in a Kenya Rhino Population and the Conservation Implications’ (1982) 24
Biological Conservation 147
52 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 14th June 1972, 75
53 Quoted in John Tinker, ‘Who’s killing Kenya’s jumbos?’(1975) 22 New Scientist 452
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did not, however, mark the end of informal border crossings of family members and
those related to the booming trade in khat, the mildly narcotic leaf grown in Kenya
and exported to Somalia. More ominously, there were always groups of fighters
ready to cross the border in one direction or the other to lend support to their clan
members in times of conflict with their clan enemies. There is enough anecdotal
evidence to suggest that a good number of the poachers who wreaked such havoc
on Kenya’s wildlife were Somali nationals with reputations for being expert hunters.
The catastrophic collapse of the central government in Somalia, and the subsequent
influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and militia men into Kenya, started in
1991. The war between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1970s further contributed to
insecurity in the region. A torrent of arms and refugees were sent southwards into
Kenya by two years of intensive fighting.
123. Top-level administrators and civil servants in Nairobi were well aware of these
troubling developments up north. James Stanley Mathenge, the Permanent
Secretary for Internal Security in the early 1980s, monitored the region closely in
the wake of the Ogaden conflict:
We knew the issues which concerned the people on a day-to-day basis. We knew that
immediately after the Ogaden War, there was a lot of influx of people from Ogaden to
this area. That influx created pressure, particularly in Wajir.54

An endless emergency
124. As already noted, Government responses to events in Northern Kenya was weak
and uncoordinated. They were half-hearted in some cases and fast-moving in
others. But this description does not adequately explain the entire spectrum of
government reactions to the complex security situation in Northern Kenya. Many
of the issues affecting Northern Kenya find their roots in the Shifta War. The link is
strong, obvious and incontestable as the construction of a legal framework that
effectively placed the entire region under a state of emergency demonstrates.
125. Collectively, the Preservation of Public Security Act, North Eastern Province and
Contiguous Districts Regulations Act of 1966 and the suspension of sections 386
and 387 of the Civil Procedure Code set Northern Kenya aside as a special and
entirely different region that could be governed directly by presidential decree.
Restrictions were placed on movement in and out of the province, a burden that
has never been imposed on any other region of the country. The suspension of
the Civil Procedure Code was accompanied by the assigning of judicial powers to
military and administrative officers. Broad powers of arrest and detention were
54 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 15 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 14
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also conferred on the military. It was an extraordinary and highly unusual state of
affairs that was the focus of many embittered submissions to the Commission.
126. The end of the Shifta War did not result in the lifting of the emergency. The end
of the war only meant the cessation of fighting and not the restoration of civil
liberties so radically stripped away by emergency legislation. If anything, the state’s
position with respect to the region hardened with the passage of the Indemnity
Act on 5 June 1970. This, as the Commission heard, was another Northern Kenyaspecific piece of legislation that was, and still is, highly resented in the region as
it shields the crimes of government agents and military officers from legal inquiry
and accountability. “Militarised” is a word often used by residents to describe the
resultant situation. To the extent that militarised refers to a situation in which military
priorities define and dominate civilian ones, this is a term that the Commission also
found useful. The continued state of emergency in Northern Kenya has attracted a
good deal of scholarly attention. While the Commission benefited from the various
exchanges and analyses, the situation may be explained simply: The government’s
assessment of the security situation in the region was the basis upon which the
state of emergency remained intact until 1991.
127.

The Commission also examined in great detail other components of the security
infrastructure of Northern Kenya. Under Kenya’s old system of provincial administration,
all provinces were required to develop an ‘Internal Security Scheme’. The scheme was
a fairly routine document periodically produced as a means of providing guidelines
for exceptional emergency and security situations. These schemes were then shared
across all the different provinces and districts, creating in the process a national
template for internal security. The Commission was provided with an Internal Security
Scheme for North Eastern Province compiled by Benson Kaaria, who served as the
Provincial Commissioner between 1980 and 1984.55 In testimony, Kaaria explained the
document in precisely these terms: a “standard” manual that he compiled soon after
taking office in April 1980.56

128. The Internal Security Scheme might have been a routine document, but for the
Commission it was a vital one because of the light it shed on a number of key issues.
The scheme began by clearly defining events and circumstances that constituted
an emergency:
Internal unrest and organised aggression by Somalis either within or outside the
province, aided by other tribes who prophesy the same religion for political reasons or
any other cause;
55 Benson Kaaria, North Eastern Province Internal Security Scheme, Kenya National Archives (KNA)
56 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.11
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Lawlessness and civil disobedience amongst the Somalis who still pursue the secessions;
Unrest and lawlessness stemming from inter-tribal or sectional disputes between the
Somali themselves or inter-racial or Trade Union disputes;
Large scale raiding by Somalia/Ethiopia Nationals;
Organised and large scale banditry promoted by grievances, criminal activities or any
other cause;
General uprising involving violence and destruction of property;

Civil disobedience.57
129. All the usual government anxieties about security are reflected in this document,
with large-scale raids by Somali and Ethiopian nationals, ex-Shifta, criminal
elements and inter-clan conflicts featuring most prominently.
130. The document spells out exactly what was expected of the armed forces. Traditionally,
the Province was home to three Kenya army companies based in Mandera, Wajir
and Garissa. Garissa also functioned as the army’s territorial headquarters. The
regular police and administration police were deployed throughout the region,
from the provincial down to the divisional and location levels. Both the police and
the military were listed under what the scheme describes as “resources” available
for deployment in case of an emergency. There were, however, key procedural
differences. The police were part of the stock response. No special regulations or
procedures were required to activate them other than a direct request to police
headquarters in Nairobi (channelled through the Provincial Security Committee in
Garissa) for extra policemen, as required by the particular operation.
131. While military forces were fully integrated and factored into the Internal Security
Scheme, their actual deployment and mobilisation was more complicated. For
starters, the military could only be called up “in aid of the civil power”.58 Military
involvement was not automatic; it had to be specifically requested by the
civilian authorities for back-up and assistance. This had important implications
for determining who was in charge of a particular operation. Once a request for
military assistance was deemed necessary, it was forwarded to the ‘Operations
Room’.59 The Operations Room was located in the police headquarters in Nairobi
and seemed to act as a clearing house for security issues nationwide. The normal
procedure was for all requests for military assistance to be “passed” to the President.
As that happened, the ministers for Home Affairs and Defence would be informed,
57 Benson Kaaria, North Eastern Province Internal Security Scheme p. 2, KNA.
58 Benson Kaaria, North Eastern Province Internal Security Scheme p. 3, KNA.
59 Benson Kaaria, North Eastern Province Internal Security Scheme p. 3, KNA.
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as would the Armed Forces Commanders and the Commissioner of Police. The
scheme specified that any alterations to the original request also needed to be
channelled through the Operations Room. Requests for withdrawal of the military
had to follow the same route.
132. When, however, the emergency was what the scheme described as “sudden and
urgent”, the formalised procedures just described were abandoned in favour of
a much more speedy approach.60 In such cases, either the District or Provincial
Commissioner could ask any commander of any branch of the Armed Forces in the
area for assistance. The request was immediate and direct, with no engagement of
the Operations Room. The scheme makes it clear that in such cases, the commander
on the ground was the ultimate decision-maker about the extent and duration of
his troops’ involvement until such a time as he was able to speak to his superiors.
It was a responsibility he assumed, as the scheme specified, regardless of his rank.
133.

While the scheme served as yet further evidence of the importance of the military
to the internal security of the province, it also described a command-and-control
structure that was run almost entirely by civil servants. Sitting at the very top
was the Provincial Security Committee made up of the Provincial Commissioner,
the Provincial Police Officer and the Provincial Special Branch Officer. The District
Security Committee occupied the next tier and it comprised the same officers, but
at the district level, that is the District Commissioner, the District Police Officer, and
the District Special Branch Officer. Military representatives were included on the
committees as and when necessary. The chain of command described in the scheme
was again a fairly simple and straightforward one. Concerns, decisions and queries
from the District and Provincial Security Committees made their way upwards to the
Kenya Security Committee, the National Security Council and the President. Thus
decision-making and control by civil servants was controlled by the centre, even in
such a militarised province as North Eastern.

134. As will also become clearer in subsequent discussions, there was yet a further
distribution of powers and responsibilities between the District and Provincial
Security Committees. There were certain decisions that could only be made at
either the district or provincial level. For instance, the power to move people
in an emergency lay with the District Security Committee and Internal Security
Schemes generated at the district level:
Depending on the nature of the emergency, it may be necessary in order to protect life, to
concentrate part of the population in certain areas and this possibility must be considered
in District Schemes.61
60 Benson Kaaria, North Eastern Province Internal Security Scheme p. 4, KNA.
61 Benson Kaaria, North Eastern Province Internal Security Scheme p. 6, KNA
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135. Because it shed rare light on the administration of a security-obsessed and
somewhat secretive province, the Internal Security Scheme was a critical
document analysed by the Commission to establish of the link between the
government security apparatus and the killings. As investigations into Bulla
Karatasi, Malka Mari and Wagalla continued, the Commission found itself moving
away from an interest in the mere existence and content of internal security
schemes and to the more fundamental question of application: the scheme as it
worked in practice.

Development and security
136. Like many before them, post-war administrators and officials linked security and
development in a direct, causal and reciprocal relationship in which security
fostered development, and development increased security. The opposite, of
course, also applied in that a lack of development could increase insecurity.
137.

By any measure, the social and economic situation in Northern Kenya after the war was
grim. The chapter on the Shifta War has described at length the multi-dimensional
and disastrous impact of the war on the region. Villagisation - a policy ostensibly
introduced to both secure and settle nomads into permanent compounds with
modern health and social facilities - failed miserably. These protected villages instead
became centres for extreme brutality and violence. The imposition of sedentary
ways of life on a nomadic people and their animals had an equally devastating
effect on animal husbandry. Confined cattle keepers were no longer able to care
for animals in their traditional and environmentally appropriate manner. Inevitably,
limited access to water and pasture in the villages and large-scale confiscation and
killing of livestock by security forces led to an alarming decline in livestock. It came
as no surprise to the Commission that many witnesses and respondents felt that
the development of the region was frozen in time. Ibrahim Ali Hussein, a former
Member of Parliament for Wajir West, testified that just one school was added to his
constituency during the entire period of the war. This brought the number of schools
in the constituency to two, with the first having been constructed in 1948 by the
British colonial government.62

138. Former Permanent Secretary for Internal Security James Mathenge was among
those who believed that increased resources and spending on roads, wells and
hospitals was the answer to eliminating the underlying causes of conflict:
I wanted to solve a security problem and my solution was to put development. The more
development you put, the less insecurity you get. If I give people in North Eastern a lot
of water, there will be less movement of cattle. I improve the grazing and roads so that
they can sell their ng’ombe (cows) quickly when drought appears I have solved it...Security
62 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p. 48
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must protect life and property, but, please the permanent issue is to provide more schools
and infrastructure in North Eastern. These are the permanent issues.63

Political transition
139.

The period under consideration here overlaps with the death of President Jomo
Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi’s ascendancy to the presidency in August 1978. Even
though Northern Kenya is distant from the political centre, the changeover from
Kenyatta to Moi had important consequences for the region. These consequences
were at once both stylistic and substantive. President Kenyatta’s stance towards
Northern Kenya could perhaps best be described as unsympathetic. Many of his
public pronouncements reflected this lack of interest. Early on, he dismissed the
secessionists as “hooligans” and people who “go raiding here and there”.64 President
Kenyatta was also reported to have told the secessionists to “pack their camels and to
return to Somalia”. This statement is often repeated in the region as evidence of the
first Kenyan president’s disdain for the Somali and other inhabitants of the province.

140. The end of the war appeared to do nothing to soften his attitude towards the
region. The public insults and scorn he previously heaped on the Shifta were
simply transferred to the poachers and illegal hunters who, as has just been
discussed, were widely taken to be Somali. Few witnesses who appeared before
the Commission had anything kind to say about President Kenyatta. Many blame
him personally for some of the bleakest years in the region’s bleak history. As one
speaker in Wajir put it, Kenyatta “finished us in the wilderness.’65
141. President Moi’s ascent to power was initially characterised by a different tone.
With his early calls for hard work, discipline and nationhood, the new president
seemed to be setting the stage for a much more united country focused on the
ever-important issue of economic growth. It was an inclusive approach that, in
theory at least, created room even for those on the margins. There were a number
of other signs that suggested a much higher political profile for the region during
the Moi years. In 1979, the President nominated Hussein Maalim Mohammed to
Parliament. After he ran and won the race for Garissa Central constituency in 1983,
Maalim was appointed to the Cabinet. With this, Mohammed became the first
Northerner (and first Muslim) to serve as a minister. Mohammed went on to win
elections in 1988, 1992, 1997 and 2002.
142.

As Maalim Mohammed was consolidating his position as the most powerful elected
politician in Northern Kenya, his older brother General Mohamud Mohammed
was completing his own astonishing rise through the ranks to become Chief of

63 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 15 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.16
64 From Hannah Whittaker ‘Pursuing Pastoralists: the Stigma of Shifta during the ‘Shifta War’ in Kenya 1963 – 1968’ (2008) 10 Eras.
65 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Wajir/18 April 2011/p. 49.
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North Eastern legislators meeting with the Commission on historical human rights violations in their region.

the General Services of the Armed Forces of Kenya. It is widely acknowledged that
the appointment of General Mohammed to the highest military office in Kenya
was a reward for acts of loyalty and bravery during the suppression of the 1982
coup attempt. As the head of the Kenya Army, General Mohammed commanded
battalions that fought through the streets of Nairobi and eventually reclaimed the
Voice of Kenya (VoK) - the precursor of the present Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
(KBC) - headquarters and other key installations from the mutinous soldiers. The
dominance of the Mohammed family has given rise to complaints about nepotism
and favouritism. In a region riven by clan-driven conflicts and competition, the
Ogaden clan (to which the Mohammed brothers belong) were seen to enjoy Moi’s
patronage at the expense of other clans, such as the Degodia and the Ajuran.
Anxieties about Ogaden dominance were compounded with the gradual ascent to
prominence of Mohammed Yusuf Haji, a long-term administrator with a long record
of service in Western and Rift Valley provinces. In 1997, he was eventually appointed
commissioner of the largest province in the country. It was an immensely powerful
position that eventually propelled him to even greater political heights as an elected
Member of Parliament and to a number of Cabinet positions, including his most
recent post as the Minister of Defence.
143. Like Kenyatta, Moi had to address disruptive and destabilising influences from
Somalia. As Moi took power in 1978, the Ogaden War was ending with the ejection
of invading Somali troops from southern Ethiopia. Kenya felt the impact of the
war primarily through the influx of thousands of refugees and weapons. Somalia
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then began a slow but steady march to collapse.66 After 22 years of increasingly
repressive military rule and near-economic ruin, a coalition of opposition generals
came together to topple President Siad Barre. The clan-based nature of this
coalition, however, worked against long-term unity, and soon after Barre’s ouster,
the groups turned against each other. A catastrophic civil war broke out, driven
largely by vicious fighting between heavily armed clan militias bankrolled by
warlords seeking to control the territory.
144.

Kenya took several direct hits from the ensuing violence with fighting in Somalia
occasionally spilling over into border towns, such as Mandera and El Wak.67 The scale
of the refugee flows triggered by fighting within Somalia itself was unprecedented.
Thousands of desperately vulnerable men, women, and children fled Somalia for
Kenya where they were placed into hurriedly constructed refugee camps, such as
Dadaab. Two decades on, the crisis in Somalia still rages on, and with a population
of nearly half a million, Dadaab is now easily one of the largest refugee camps in the
world, and continues to grow.

145. With so many guns circulating in Somalia, it was only a matter of time before
some of these weapons found their way into Kenya. Long, porous borders and
the unregulated movement of people created the ideal environment for the
extensive smuggling of firearms by small-time traders and middlemen who
made a good living from the contraband. The guns were sold freely in the
towns and settlements of North Eastern. A good proportion of these guns
ended up in Nairobi and other parts of the country where they were used to
commit various crimes. There is no real way to quantify the number of weapons
that arrived in Northern Kenya from Somalia. A Human Rights Watch report
estimated that there were 40,000 guns in the region in the year 2002.68 It is
difficult to overstate the wide-ranging and devastating impact the presence
of weapons had on life in Northern Kenya. Ordinary inter-ethnic and inter-clan
conflicts were transformed into deadly encounters. An imam (Muslim preacher)
interviewed by Human Rights Watch bemoaned the fact that people were no
longer interested in traditional forms of conflict resolution; all disputes were
instead resolved with the brute force of the gun.69
66 There is large body of literature dedicated to the study of the collapse of the Somali state. Part of it is summarized in Lidwein
Kaptejeins ‘The Disintegration of Somalia: A Historiographical Essay’ (2001) 1 Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies
67 A thorough and comprehensive assessment of the impact of the break-up of Somalia on Kenya’s borders can be found in Ken
Menkhaus, Kenya-Somalia Border Conflict Analysis (2005) at http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Kenya-Somalia%20
Menkhaus%20(2).pdf accessed 12th March 2012.
68 Playing With Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya (2002) at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2002/kenya/accessed 12th March 2012
69 Playing With Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya (2002) at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2002/kenya/accessed 12th March 2012
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146. President Moi reacted sharply to the rapidly degenerating situation. He
dismissed those fighting for power in Somalia as “an international crime
syndicate ranging from drug barons and religious extremists to international
fugitives’.70 In 1999, Moi stunned the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
and other associated bodies with the demand that all Somali refugees be removed
from Kenya immediately.71 He made the announcement during a tour of Wajir, a
district that he described as suffering greatly as a result of the insecurity wrought
by the arrival of the refugees. Moi also asked the local administration to deal firmly
with any refugees they found sneaking out of the camps and into local villages
and towns. He followed this up with a ban on trade between Somalia and Kenya.72
The reasons given were security-oriented, with the President arguing that guns
and criminals were being smuggled into Kenya under the guise of legitimate trade
in khat and food. Moi’s apparently stalwart and resolute defence of the people of
North Eastern Province against the malign influence of Somalia yielded political
rewards. The region became what is known in Kenyan discourse as a “KANU zone”
on account of its regular and overwhelming backing of Moi and his party, the
Kenya African National Union. In the 1992 General Elections, for instance, KANU’s
share of the vote in the province stood at a staggering 78 per cent.
147. A central irony of the region’s continued support for KANU is that the years when
KANU was at its zenith were also characterised by a series of controversial security
operations that have, in turn, become almost synonymous with the equally
controversial history of massacres in Kenya: Bulla Karatasi, Malka Mari and Wagalla.

Bulla Karatasi Massacre
It was a place of death
In the place called Bulla Kamor where we lived, we learnt about the violence that was
going on at 7.00am. Houses were being burnt and we heard the commotion due to the
skirmishes. The violence reached us at noon. Our house was burnt at that time and we
ran away. Our last-born was with my husband then. They hit my husband with the butt
of a gun and he told them to stop that. They hit him on the shoulder and spinal cord. The
children ran all over. I had a small child then. I ran away and I was told to come back. They
said that they wanted to beat me up. But they disagreed among themselves. Some said
that it was wrong to kill me. That is how I was rescued. I was told to run to Garissa town.
In the first call of prayers in the morning, we were told to come out of our houses. We
went to Garissa primary school grounds. It was a place of death. People were beaten up,
tortured and killed. My son was brought to me when I was there. There were dead bodies.
70 The Sunday Times, 28th November 2001
71 See ‘Kenya’s Moi orders Somali refugees back home’ 4th May 1999 at http://reliefweb.int/node/46572 accessed 12th March 2012
72 ‘Kenya bans trade with Somalia’ 30th July 2001 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1464503.stm accessed 12th March 2012
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At 1.00pm, women and children were allowed to return. Those who were left there were
only Somalis. I could not even get water to give the children. I left them under a tree and
went back, only to find that the father was among the people who were killed by the
police. I witnessed his body being put in a car. They threw the dead body into the river.
Men were in the field, while women and children were at home. The women were raped,
girls were crying for help and no one could help them. Some people died and those who
did not die were released after three days. The issue is very painful. It affected very many
people. Many women were raped. We give thanks to God that some people survived.73

148. This testimony is from Fatuma Abdi Anshur, who was caught up in a security
operation that resulted in what came to be popularly known as ‘Bulla Karatasi’ or
the ‘Garissa Gubai Massacre’. Bulla Karatasi refers to the bulla (village) in Garissa
town that was badly hit by a security operation carried out in Garissa in November
1980. The Commission received more than 40 statements from individuals who
were affected during this security operation.
149. On the morning of 9 November 1980 Fatuma and other residents of Garissa’s
villages remember waking up to scenes of great confusion as their usual routines
were interrupted by the stormy arrival of policemen, administration policemen
and army officers. The police were the easiest to identify on account of their
instantly recognisable uniforms. It was not immediately clear to Fatuma what
these security personnel were after. As she explained in her testimony, the sudden
appearance of the uniformed men was baffling: “We were not expecting anything.
It just happened. It just happened unexpectedly”.74 The security officers were on
a rampage, beating up everyone as they flushed them out of their huts. Ahmed
Sheikh Mohamed, for instance, remembers been beaten up mercilessly.75
150. Residents of the villages soon noticed smoke; their homes were on fire. Fatuma’s
own hut was razed to the ground by the flames. She would later find out from
neighbours and friends that in some parts of Garissa fires had actually been
burning since about 7.00 or 8.00pm the previous evening. Witnesses closer to the
action provided explanations for the fires: security forces were setting houses
alight. It also emerged that houses were burned down in the full knowledge that
people might still be inside them. The recollection of Hawa Waheliya was that
security officials locked doors from the outside and then set them on fire: “They
were locking the houses from outside and burning them ruthlessly with people
inside them.”76 Anyone caught on the inside was either burnt or suffocated to
death. Kiosks, shops and commercial holdings were not spared either as property
worth hundreds of thousands of shillings went up in flames. Some people like
73
74
75
76

194

TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 12 April 2011/ Garissa p.36-37.
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 12 April 2011/ Garissa p.36
TJRC/Statement/41007.
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 12 April 2011/ Garissa p.43

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

Abdia Abdi Somo ran to the Garissa police station to seek refuge but he was
turned away.77 He then rushed to the mosque where he spent the night. Back in
the village, his house and properties were burnt to ashes. He remained internally
displaced for one year.
151.

As the fires spread, the women of Garissa’s bullas were subjected to sexual attacks.
Reports of rape came to the surface through women like Waheliya who heard or knew
directly of women who had been violated in this manner by members of the security
forces. In the three decades since the operation, some of the women who were
attacked have told detailed stories of rape, gang rape and extreme violence carried
out by police and army men seemingly unconcerned about detection, consequences
or punishment. With the rapes came the attendant traumas, with a number of
women alluding to long-standing gynaecological and obstetric conditions that they
attributed to the attacks visited upon them in 1980. Medical attention, either in the
immediate aftermath or later on, was not an option for many of the victims. Rape
in a traditional and conservative society like that of Garissa in 1980 carries a stigma,
and thus violated women fully expected a certain degree of social isolation from their
families and loved ones, and often did not seek medical help.

152. Many survivors of the security operations developed mental illness. Dubai Olow
Dege’s wife was pregnant during the operation. She suffered massive shock that
left her with a mental illness after she was beaten up by police officers.78 Another
survivor was seven months pregnant during the operation. She miscarried after
she was beaten up by security officers.79
153.

Because the security forces entered the villages armed with guns, an already bad
situation quickly got worse. Shooting broke out and people were either deliberately
shot or caught in the crossfire. Fatuma’s husband was the victim of such a shooting.
The melee and general chaos made it impossible for her to establish the circumstances
of his shooting. Her husband’s body was eventually disposed of in the nearby River
Tana. Others have told similar stories of burned and bullet-ridden corpses simply
being tossed into the river. Hawa Waheliye remembers that ‘If a person died, the
body was taken and thrown into the river’.80 Such bodies were ultimately untraceable.
Waheliye recalls that in a neighbouring house, 7 people were killed and their bodies
were carried away in a ‘government vehicle’.81

154. While this was happening, residents were also being directed towards Garissa
primary school. Torches, spotlights and microphones were used to herd people
77
78
79
80
81

TJRC/Statement/39433.
TJRC/Statement/41018.
TJRC/Statement/41041.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Garissa/12 April 2011/p. 41.
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in the direction of the school’s playing grounds. Planes were also heard flying
overhead. Once in the school, the residents were surprised to find out that most
of them could not leave. Instead they were held at the school for a further three
days and nights. Exceptions were made for women, children, the elderly and the
sick. Conditions at the school got steadily worse. No provisions had been made
for either food or water. A missionary came to the field with a few bottles of
water, but they were quickly snatched up, forcing some people to drink their own
urine in order to quench their thirst. There are reports that several people might
have died within the school grounds either from the heat, exhaustion or hunger.
155. After the third day, the people were released and told to return to their homes.
Wahaliye could not and would not return to her bulla. She left Garissa and
moved nearly 100 kilometres away to Dadaab. Some moved even further beyond
into Somalia.82 Like other women widowed as a result of Bulla Karatasi, Fatuma
embarked on a life of struggle and sacrifice to care for her children. Life would
never be the same again for those who had been beaten up, assaulted or bereaved
in Garissa in November 1980. Fatuma described her situation in the following
words:
It was a difficult venture. My children were very young then and it was quite difficult.
I tried my best and a man called Hajj Athan Kundhe helped us with shelter. I was
advised to sell miraa. I survived the hard way. It was difficult raising children without
a husband. It is difficult to be a single parent, but I tried my best. My husband had
advised me earlier to let them stay in town where they could survive. I took that advice
and God helped me. I educated them, but I did not get any help apart from Haj Athan
Kundhe. We did not get much help from the government or other institutions.83

156. Another victim, who was hit with the butt of a gun, indicated in his statement
that following the incident he ”was in bed for three months since they hit me
with the gun and until now I have that problem which prevents me from doing
any work”.84 Moreover, he added: ”I constantly become depressed whenever I
remember that incident”.
157. For many survivors of the Bulla Karatasi Massacre like Fatuma, the grounds
on which Garissa primary school remains to them what it was in 1980: a place
of death. Others remember that dark November as a ‘frightening and harsh’
period.85
82
83
84
85
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Genesis of the security operation
158

The rationale for the Bulla Karatasi operation dates back to early November
1980 to a place known as Liboi. Liboi was in 1980 the same as it is today: a small
town in Garissa District just 20 kilometres west of the border with Somalia. On 4
November 1980, national newspapers reported the shooting to death of District
Officer Johnson Welimo.86 Welimo was caught in an ambush as he rode in a
vehicle from Liboi to Garissa on official duties. The attack on Welimo was a classic
North Eastern one, with armed men melting out of the bushes, opening fire
and then melting back into the bushes. There was no way to trace the attackers
or to interrogate their motives. The whole incident was chalked down to that
most convenient of catch-alls: the Shifta. On the 8 November 1980 Provincial
Commissioner Benson Kaaria called a public meeting in Baraza Park to address
the issue of insecurity. His assessments of the region and its inhabitants were
uncompromising and blunt. During the Baraza Park meeting, Benson Kaaria
was in his typically combative form. With members of the Provincial Security
Committee, District Security Committee and various heads of local government
departments in attendance, Kaaria did not mince his words. The gathered Garissa
residents were warned that their apparent shielding of and co-operation with
Shifta bandits would not be tolerated by the administration.

159. Newspaper reports of the baraza indicate that in addition to the general
warnings about growing impatience with the perceived links between the public
and Shifta, the Provincial Commissioner intimated that the government was
well aware that the Shifta had, to use his word, “collaborators” among the local
population.87 Kaaria went on to state that certain responses were available to
him. Protected villagisation, a relic of the Shifta past, was one option:
There is a demand that the people of Garissa produce the Shifta gangsters and an
ultimatum that unless the Shifta is produced, the government will have no alternative
but to round up all Somalis and put them in restricted villages.88

160.

86
87
88
89

He was also reported as saying that he was in a position to withdraw food aid and
livestock services. Instructions were also issued to stop the digging and maintenance
of boreholes. A 14-day ultimatum was issued to those who might be harbouring or
otherwise assisting the Shifta. Kaaria warned his audience that the leaders and people
of the Province “had gone too far” and were “playing with fire” in their continued
provocation of government.89 He then went on to issue another of those statements
that has gone on to live in the memories of many Northerners: “Since you are 678

‘District Officer Shot dead by Shifta’ The Standard 4th November 1980
‘Report Shifta, Somalis Ordered’ Daily Nation 10th November (1980) 5
‘State Acts on Shiftas’ Sunday Standard 9th November (1980).
Report Shifta, Somalis Ordered’ Daily Nation 10th November (1980) 5

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

197

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

000 people in the province, all of you would be eliminated and Kenyans would be
left living in peace.”90 Garissa folk left the baraza with those words still ringing in their
ears. “We will shoot to kill, PC warns”, blared the following day’s newspapers.91
161. Civil servants also attended the baraza. They were privy to more detailed
information about the fighting talk emanating from their superiors. David Rabasi
is a former government employee of the Ministry of Works who has spoken to the
press about some of the events surrounding Bulla Karatasi.92 Rabasi’s version of
the story has it that Benson Kaaria had mentioned intelligence he had received
about impending Shifta attacks:
The PC told us that they had received intelligence reports that there would be Shifta
attacks. Apparently, the Shiftas had written to him personally and informed him they
would strike but they did not indicate where they would strike.93

162. This notion of an advance warning from the Shifta is something that Kaaria himself
vehemently denies. His testimony before the Commission was that he had received
no such information.94
163. Within hours of the public meeting, the threats of an attack had turned into a
grim reality. Mama Wanjiru’s was a local Garissa bar popular with civil servants.
On 9 November 1980, Rabasi was at Mama Wanjiru’s enjoying in the company
of friends and colleagues.95 At around 8.00 pm that evening, their routine was
rudely interrupted when a side door burst open and at least three heavily-armed
and possibly masked men entered the bar. Rabasi clearly remembers shots being
fired into the air. This was then followed by a round of gunfire aimed directly into
the bar. The gunmen left almost as quickly and mysteriously as they had arrived.
In their wake they left four men dead. They were later described in the press as
senior civil servants from the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) and the Ministry of
Works.96 Three others later succumbed to their injuries.

The operation
164. Within the hour, news of the shooting of the civil servants had reached both
the Garissa District Security Committee and the Provincial Security Committee,
which swung quickly into action. Kaaria described what happened next:
90 ‘State Acts on Shiftas’ Sunday Standard 9th November 1980
91 ‘We shoot to Kill, PC Warns’ Sunday Nation 9th November 1980
92 Civil servant who witnessed Garissa Massacre speaks out’ 11th March 2011 at http://www.propertykenya.com/news/1436640civil-servant-who-witnessed-garissa-massacre-speaks-out Accessed 14th March 2012
93 ‘Civil servant who witnessed Garissa Massacre speaks out’ 11th March 2011 at http://www.propertykenya.com/news/1436640civil-servant-who-witnessed-garissa-massacre-speaks-out Accessed 14th March 2012
94 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.25
95 Rabasi’s account gives the 4November 1980 as the date of the attack on Mama Wanjiru’s but this is incorrect based on account
of the date of the baraza addressed by Benson Kaaria: 8 November 1980.
96 ‘Shiftas kill Four Civil Servants’ Daily Nation November 10th 1980 p. 1
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On receiving this information, both the District Security Committee and the Provincial
Security Committee held an emergency security meeting to assess the situation. It was
then decided that the bandits must be pursued. An operation order was to be drawn
in order to flush out the culprits. We prepared an operational order, rounded up all the
adults and took them to the open primary school for interrogation and screening in
order to know who the perpetrators were.97

165.

The police and the administration police swung into action almost immediately. The
involvement of the army was not immediately evident. By the time that Fatuma and
Wahaliye woke up the next morning, the operation was actually several hours old.

166. In addition to the operational orders for the pursuit of the gunmen, a curfew was
also imposed. Kaaria invoked the power of the Preservation of Public Security Act,
Cap 57 to announce an absolute clampdown on all movement between 7.00pm
and 6.00am. The curfew was not limited to Garissa alone; Wajir and Mandera
districts were also subjected to the same restrictions. Concern about possible
incursions from Somalia was the reason given for the province-wide curfew:
The PSC was of the view that maybe that was one of the attacks aimed at the Kenya
government by the Somali militia from across the border. If so, the incident could have
occurred simultaneously in both Wajir and Mandera districts. In order to contain the
situation, the movement of civilians had to be curtailed somehow in the whole province.98

167

Kaaria spoke to a reporter from the Daily Nation soon after the shooting. His
remarks appeared in the following day’s edition. It was clear the PC was furious at
what had happened the night before. He accused Garissa locals of providing cover
for the bandits despite calls for cooperation issued at Baraza Park. Somalia came
in for harsh criticism as Kaaria accused remnants of the secessionist movement of
trying to sow discord in Kenya itself:
They seem to want to kill the people who are working so hard to develop this part of
Kenya. This means we are now back to the 1963 situation whereby the Somalis thought
that a large part of our country belonged to them.99

168. He followed this up with a final flourish that was in essence a re-working of
Kenyatta’s infamous “pack your camels and go back to Somalia” remark. The Kaaria
version was that those residents with loyalty to Somalia should pack up and leave.
169. The field at Garissa primary school became the site of a large-scale screening
exercise proposed by the District and Provincial Security Committee as operation
orders were being drawn up on 9 November 1980. Male adults were the ostensible
targets of the interrogation to gather information about the identity, whereabouts
97 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.5
98 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.5
99 ‘Shiftas kill Four Civil Servants’ Daily Nation November 10th 1980 p. 1
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and movements of the raiders. By noon on 10 November 1980, it became evident
that a number of women and children had been caught up in the dragnet. A
number of civil servants, including Rabasi, found themselves at the field as well.
Government employees, women and children were released soon after Kaaria and
his team arrived to tour the grounds. The rest were to remain there as questioning
continued. Special Branch officers and the police were seen to be at the forefront of
the actual questioning and handling of civilians. There was also a military presence
of some kind. Rabasi recalls seeing a number of military men dotted through the
field. They were heavily-armed but had no direct interactions with the gathered
men. Their “mean-looking faces” were a source of great concern not least to Rabasi
himself. He also spotted four military personnel carriers strategically parked at the
corners of the field.
170.

After his tour of the field on 10 November 1980 Kaaria issued yet another statement
that was reported in the newspapers of 11 November 1980.100 There was no sign
of any softening of the government position. If anything, Kaaria intensified the
crackdown, with the disbandment of the provincial, district and location committees
that were so central to administration. He reiterated that the government would not
tolerate any form of what he referred to as “terrorism and banditry”. The screening
continued with scores of men all individually subjected to a barrage of questions
about the said terrorism and banditry. Even as conditions deteriorated due to the
lack of water and food, the men would remain detained at the field until the exercise
wound down over the next couple of days.

Main state actors
171.

As discussed earlier, security operations require permissions and authorisations.
These permissions are key determinants of how, when, and by whom an operation
is to be carried out. What Bulla Karatasi quite clearly demonstrated was that these
permissions and authorisations were generated at the District and Provincial
Security Committee level in Garissa itself. Kaaria’s testimony was unequivocal on this
particular issue: the decision to conduct the rounding up, holding and screening
operation came out of a joint District and Provincial Security Committee meeting
held less than an hour after the shooting in the bar. No go-ahead or green light was
needed or sought from Nairobi or from anywhere else. All approvals required to
launch the operation were local. In this sense, Bulla Karatasi provided a text book
example of an operation executed in accordance with the guidelines set out in
the province’s Internal Security Scheme or, as Kaaria sometimes referred to it, the
[Security] Charter. As described above, the charter identifies both the Provincial

100 Thousands Rounded Up’ The Standard 11th November 2011 1
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and District Security Committees as the central decision-making bodies of most
operations. These committees had been vested with the powers to craft whatever
responses were deemed necessary to combat even fairly serious emergencies and
internal security situations.
172. The Commission has thus far represented the District and Provincial Security
Committees as marching together in lockstep and bearing equal responsibility for
the planning and execution of the Garissa operation. After all, the members of the
District and Provincial Security Committees sat in the same emergency meeting
convened immediately after the shooting in the bar. Under further questioning
and somewhat circuitously, however, Kaaria revealed a critical divergence: the
Provincial Commissioner was not bound by the Security Charter. The District
Commissioner was. As he put it:
Leader of Evidence: So it was not a binding document on the DC.
Benson Kaaria: Not on the PC but on the DC.
Leader of Evidence: The DC was not bound and he could act outside of this scheme?
Benson Kaaria: My understanding is that he could not. It has never happened.101

173. It is not clear whether this also applied to the rest of the Provincial Security
Committee and the District Security Committee.
174. Kaaria’s testimony could be taken to suggest that the charter placed a particular
and specific load on the District Commissioner and the District Security
Committee. Kariuki’s submissions flowed along very similar lines in creating
the impression that while the two security committees worked very closely
together, many (if not most) of the initial calls about the need for an operation
were actually made by the District Security Committee alone. Decisions and
assessments generated at the district level then flowed up the administrative
chain to the Provincial Security Committee and beyond:
Leader of Evidence: Therefore, in terms of defining whether there was insecurity or
whether there was need for an operation, those were decisions that would be made by
your ministry.
G.G. Kariuki: It does not work that way. When a situation has happened like it happened
in Garissa that time, it is the local security committee and the officers in charge of
maintaining law and order to immediately decide which direction they want to take
to stop whatever incident which was against the law and also an incident which was
against public security.
101 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.12-13
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Leader of Evidence: When you talk about the local security body, in this instance you
would we be talking about the District Security Committee (DSC)?
G.G. Kariuki: That one evaluates day-to-day business of security nature. You must
appreciate that the Government only anticipates that something may happen and
sometimes it does not happen. The criminals do not report that they are going to attack
at a certain time. You should appreciate that all actions are taken immediately after an
incident has occurred.
Leader of Evidence: After the local DSC analyses a situation, do they respond to the
situation or are they required to consult a higher office?
G.G. Kariuki: No more security action is taken immediately if something has
happened…102

175. Further responses from the former minister continued to stress that, more often
than not, it was the District Security Committee that occupied the core of the
average security operation:
Leader of Evidence: Thank you, Sir. Because we have said that when it is normal the
District Security Committee can make a decision and respond to the situation that
appears to suggest that there are situations that are not normal?
G.G. Kariuki Which ones are not normal? I did not get you!
The Commission Secretary: You said that when there is a normal situation, and there is
a normal security issue, then the District Security Committee will be able to respond to
the issue. So, in my thinking, then there are issues that you would define as not normal
security issues.
G.G. Kariuki The District Security Committee is in charge of the entire maintenance of
law and order in that district. That is the job of the security committee. I am using the
word abnormal to mean, if it is a bigger crime that they are unable to control, they ask
for assistance from their seniors outside the district.103

176.

The presence of the Provincial and (especially) the District Security Committees as
the primary decision-makers in Bulla Karatasi provided evidence of the displacement
of other organs and individuals. Kariuki was at pains to de-link himself from both the
decisions and actions of the two committees. Both Kaaria’s and Kariuki’s testimonies
suggested that even the President of Kenya was left largely on the sidelines as the
Provincial and District Security Committees quickly mobilised security forces to
track down the raiders of Mama Wanjiru’s bar. The president’s permission was not
required and was not sought to launch the part of the operation that concerned
itself with the rounding up, confinement and screening of citizens at Garissa primary

102 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 18
103 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.19
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school. The president’s permission was only needed for the imposition of the curfew.
And even then, as Kaaria’s testimony indicated, it was the security committees that
determined whether the curfew was necessary and then sought what appeared to
be fairly technical approvals from the president:
In order to contain the situation, the movement of civilians had to be curtailed
somehow in the whole province. The PSC felt the need to invoke the Preservation
of Public Security Act, Cap 57, which provides for an imposition of a curfew order. I
was then mandated by the PSC to seek the approval of the Head of State to declare a
curfew in the whole province, which I did and the Head of State gave a nod. I made the
order that limited movement from 7.00pm. to 6.00am until further notice.104

177. Kariuki presented a similar description of President Moi’s role in the Bulla Karatasi
operation. The president was only involved after decisions and logistical details
were tabled at the district and provincial levels:
When the District Security Committee advises the Provincial Security Committee that
the situation warrants a curfew so that they can deal with the situation effectively
than normal, the PC has two persons to inform or seek authority or concurrence, that
is the president, and sometimes they can ask the minister what they think. They have
the authority to do all these things in terms of maintaining law and order. But in this
case the provincial commissioner did not seek permission from me but he got it directly
from the president. In fact, even with the President, it is kind of consultation. Before the
provincial commissioner and others impose a curfew, they have to seek concurrence
from the president.105

178. The president’s formal role seemed to be limited to signing off on the curfew
orders as requested by the security committees. He, however, continued to
engage in a more informal and more political capacity. President Moi dispatched
Kariuki to Garissa along with several other senior political figures and charged
them with fact-finding and explaining the government stand. As the British
correspondence also indicates, the president was also busy on the diplomatic
front as he lashed out against Somalia, whose leaders he held responsible for
Shifta attacks and raids. Because few (if any) of the interactions between the
president and the Provincial and District Security Committee have ever been
published, it is difficult to say whether the president ever returned to the issue of
Bulla Karatasi at a later point.
179.

Another component of Bulla Karatasi relates to the issue of military participation. The
charter on which the operation was based created room for military involvement in
what were otherwise classified as purely civilian affairs. The Internal Security Scheme

104 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.5
105 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.30
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specified that the Kenya Army companies based in Garissa, Wajir and Mandera could
only be drafted into an operation at the request of the District or Provincial Security
Committee. Such requests had to follow an elaborate and hierarchical path that
wound all the way up to the Ministry of Defence headquarters in Nairobi. Exceptions
could be made in emergency situations, but even then there were strict procedures
to be followed. Kaaria strenuously denied any involvement of the military in the Bulla
Karatasi operation. Kariuki was more circumspect, but was unwilling or unable to
say if the military had been involved. Their recollections and testimonies suggested
that military officers were not present as people were flushed out of their homes
and herded towards the school. Kariuki and Kaaria also denied claims and refuted
testimonies to the effect that army men were responsible for patrolling the perimeter
of the field and ensuring that nobody left or escaped interrogation.
180.

Statements received from victims of the security operation strongly suggest that
the military participated in the operation. A victim indicated that he could generally
identify the perpetrators because ‘they were military men because I saw them
wearing their uniform and also using military vehicles’.106

181. Despite the denials and uncertainty about a military component in the operation,
the commander of the Kenya Army flew to Garissa the day after the operation.
Major General John Sawe was part of the so-called fact-finding mission that
arrived from Nairobi. It is difficult to see what would have necessitated the Major
General’s presence other than some level of military involvement in the operation.
The highest ranking officer in the Kenya Army would not have gone to Garissa to
investigate and assess, as it were, the non-participation of his men. If anything, the
history of Northern Kenya suggests that it was unusual for the military not to be
involved in such security operations. There may have been something of a lull in
the decade and a half between the end of the Shifta War and Bulla Karatasi, but the
continuing state of emergency and the overall security situation in the province
no doubt meant that Kenya army companies in the North were at a high state of
alert and ready to be incorporated into an operation at a moment’s notice. This was
more likely to have been the case with Bulla Karatasi than not.
182. Collective punishment was a key component of the Bulla Karatasi operation. The
operation, conceived in the wake of the raid on the bar, cannot be described as
targeted or investigation-driven. The police had no suspects and they had no names.
They developed no profile other than the ubiquitous Shifta. As the Commission
established, however, the problem facing the people of Garissa was that they were
all classified by the administration as either Shifta or Shifta supporters. This meant
106 TJRC/Statement/31569. See also TJRC/Statement/31573; TJRC/Statement/41042.
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that the entire population of the town was assumed to be somehow responsible
for the actions of a handful of rogue and criminal gunmen. And it was on this basis
that men, women and children were indiscriminately collected onto the field at
the primary school. A sifting of sorts took place at the playing fields. Non-Somalis,
such as Randiki, who had been caught up in the swoop were apparently allowed to
leave; the assumption of course being that their very ethnic identity was a marker
of their ignorance of and innocence in the entire affair. Women, children, the sick
and elderly were also released following Kaaria’s tour of Garissa Primary School.
183. This left a cohort of men of Somali origin who were subjected to a screening and
interrogation process conducted by the police and the administration police.
Special Branch officers spearheaded the questioning of the people caught in the
indiscriminate dragnet thrown over Garissa on the night and the early morning
of the 9 and 10 November. None of the witness testimonies suggested anything
other than a crude sweep through Garissa’s bullas, streets and alleys. The collective
and undifferentiated approach applied to Garissa residents was a hallmark of the
Bulla Karatasi operation.

The stage for a massacre
184. Localised decision-making, military involvement and collective punishment were
the three components of the Bulla Karatasi operation that created the conditions
for a massacre. While it was not been possible to quantify the number of people
injured and killed at Bulla Karatasi in any meaningful way, it was nonetheless
possible to think about the conditions which might have given rise to killings on
the scale suggested by witness testimonies and other descriptions that have come
out of Garissa over the past three decades. The highly localised decision-making
process used for the Bulla Karatasi operation could be somewhat problematic, even
though locally generated decisions can, in some respects, be highly responsive to
local conditions.
185.

Provincial and district administrators on the ground were in a position to immediately
tackle emergency situations that required quick responses. Because the district and
provincial security committees were largely autonomous, their members could
assemble operations and responses without being slowed down by a need to
consult or communicate with their colleagues in Nairobi. It could also be argued that
these Garissa-based officials were best placed to assess the security needs presented
by emergencies in their areas. They knew the terrain, issues, personalities and
challenges better than an official in distant Nairobi. Notwithstanding the obvious
logistical advantages of locally-driven security operations, the fact that the Bulla
Karatasi operation was conceived and carried out with little initial involvement from
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Nairobi raises the question of whether that autonomy and isolation created the preconditions for mass violence and mass killings.
186. With limited input into the discussions and the overall decision-making on security
operations, district and provincial officials were essentially left free to react as they
saw fit with little apparent guidance or accountability. The security committees
were more like self-regulating bodies, unfettered by a system of checks, balances
and inputs that might have resulted in a focused, targeted, restrained, and,
ultimately, more effective response to the shootout in the bar. This self-contained
and localised approach was also highly personalised and placed ultimate and
sole responsibility for security operations into the hands of a very small group of
administrators with a particular approach to security matters. With Bulla Karatasi,
this group of administrators was led by Benson Kaaria, who adopted a particularly
harsh approach to local security issues. With Kaaria and a small cohort of likeminded colleagues setting the security agenda in Garissa, it was not surprising
that the security committees reacted the way they did that November night.
187. The presence of the military in Bulla Karatasi was yet another factor that made it
more likely that the operation would result in mass violence and killings. There
were two reasons for this: (1) training and reputation; and (2) the secretive nature
of military activities in Northern Kenya.
188. First, military forces are not trained and equipped to undertake civilian policing
operations. As has been discussed at some length above, the history of the military’s
entanglement with the people of Northern Kenya was characterised by episodes
of large-scale violence that may have resulted in the loss of thousands of lives.
Witness testimonies dating back to the Shifta period suggest that of all the security
personnel - the police, administration police, General Service Unit (GSU) officers
and the military - it was the military that the people feared and resented the most.
Army officers from that period were rarely described by the people of the region as
anything other than brutal and uncommunicative; men who seemed uninterested
in fostering any positive relationship with the local populations. With the end of
the war, Kenya Army companies returned to their barracks in Wajir, Garissa and
Mandera. Their reputations amongst civilians, however, remained intact.
189. Second, a cloak of silence had been thrown around army activities in Northern
Kenya. The Indemnity Act had made research concerning the Shifta War extremely
difficult. The Commission’s experience was that the post-war years were similarly
protected by a culture of military secrecy and non-disclosure that proved difficult
to surmount. And so it was with Bulla Karatasi. If army officers are responsible
for any deaths during this period in Garissa, their involvement was firmly hidden
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within an institution that lacked a tradition of openness. Investigations, reports
and assessments of the operation were inaccessible. The operational orders would
give the clearest indication of the scope of the role assigned to the Garissa-based
military forces. But the operational orders were unavailable. There was thus no way
to establish what was expected of the officers. Also unknown was whether any
officers were disciplined for disobeying what orders they may have been given.
190. Notwithstanding the unwillingness of the military to reveal information about an
operation conducted over 30 years ago or perhaps because of that unwillingness,
it was not difficult to make an educated guess regarding the consequences of an
operation that may have been carried out by officers who were, and continue to
be, shielded from public scrutiny and accountability. With no apparent means of
holding them publicly to account for their actions, the possibility that such officers
might adopt an aggressive and belligerent approach to a particular mission
cannot be dismissed. The army’s portrayal of itself as a modern, professionallytrained fighting force is inconsistent with soldiers rampaging through Garissa as
reported by some witnesses. If military documentation and evidence had been
made available to the Commission, it would have been possible to provide a more
accurate assessment of the army’s role in Bulla Karatasi. In the absence of such
material, however, an assessment of military involvement in civilian operations
must be based on witness testimony and on educated speculation based in part
on a previous history and tradition of excesses and brutality.
191. The third and final component of the Bulla Karatasi operation was collective
punishment, which is the factor most likely to have ensured that an operation
resulted in mass violence and killings. As described above, collective punishment
during Bulla Karatasi took the form of an indiscriminate and violent circuit through
Garissa by security forces. Hundreds, and possibly thousands, of people were
wrenched from their homes, made to march to the primary school and held there.
Later on it emerged that all the residents of Garissa were being considered as
sympathisers, if not suspects, in the bar shooting. The indiscriminate rounding up
of scores of frightened people provided the conditions for a massacre to take place
with the slightest of provocations. As a victim of the operation observed: "They
were saying they were looking for the bandits, but they killed innocent citizens”.107

Post-operation
192. The initial operation launched on the night of the shooting at Mama Wanjiru’s did
not yield any quick results as the attackers were not caught. The interrogations
at the field, however, produced a well-known name: Abdi Madhobe. Madhobe
107 TJRC/Statement/11278.
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was described by the police and the administration as a notorious Somalia-born
gangster and poacher with extensive connections to the criminal underworld. On
the other hand, Madhobe was portrayed in a very different light by some sections
of the local population. He emerged from some accounts as an almost virtuous,
legendary figure whose life in crime sought to avenge his alleged castration at the
hands of policemen who had caught him with illegal ivory.108 Madhobe’s image
as some kind of Northern anti-hero was only enhanced by his apparent escape
from police custody several times. Because Madhobe was so well known, it did
not take very long for reasons behind the shooting to emerge. Madhobe and
the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) officers that he was meant to have killed are
described in popular accounts as trading in illegal ivory. When a deal turned sour,
a short-changed Madhobe went looking for his former partners at Mama Wanjiku’s
with fatal results. Madhobe was not suspected of having anything to do with the
shooting of District Officer Welimo in Liboi at the beginning of November.
193. Once Madhobe’s name had emerged, the screening and interrogation halted.
The attention of the police and Special Branch then turned to his capture and
prosecution. Little is known about what happened next. Some sources suggested
that Madhobe was eventually captured and jailed, but made a sensational escape.
He then is rumoured to have returned to a life of crime and violence before being
killed by game rangers as he attempted to row across River Tana.
194. On Friday 14 November 1980, the still shaken and traumatised residents of
Garissa were summoned back to Baraza Park. The occasion was yet another
public meeting. The guests of honour this time round were highly placed officials
from Nairobi: The Minister of Internal Security, G.G. Kariuki; a Minister of State
in the Office of President, Nicholas Biwott; an Assistant Minister in the Office
of the President, Justus ole Tipis; a nominated Member of Parliament, Ezekiel
Bargetuny; the Commissioner of Police, Ben Gethi; and Major General John Sawe,
the commander of the Kenya Army.
195.

Described by subsequent newspaper reports as wearing “traditional Somali
attire”, G.G. Kariuki was the first to address the audience.109 His speech started out
optimistically enough. The ban on the distribution of famine relief food would be
immediately lifted because it was causing “unnecessary hardship” for the people of
the region. Another hopeful note was struck when he announced a relaxing of the
curfew in Garissa and a complete lifting of restrictions further afield in Mandera and
Wajir. He also instructed the police not to harass residents on account of the curfew.
Attempts would be made to assist those who had lost their property to the fires.

108 See for instance ‘Congratulations for killing the bandit’ http://duqow.stormloader.com/massacre.html Accessed 11th March 2012
109 ‘Famine aid to continue’ Sunday Nation 16 November 1980, 1.
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196. It did not take very long, however, for the mood to shift and for the officials to begin
addressing the recurrent themes of insecurity in North Eastern Kenya. Bargetuny
promised “execution” of Madhobe. Biwott struck an equally combative note when
he assured potential trouble-makers of a tough government response:
If we find that the peace our president has so firmly blended in our midst is threatened by a
person or persons, we shall move in full swing and crush that element wherever it may be. 110

197. By the time that Kariuki told the “Doubting Thomases” in the crowd that they were
free to leave Kenya, the message was incontrovertible: The government was in no
mood to entertain or tolerate any further unrest.

The count
198. The shadowy and undocumented nature of the Garissa operation makes it difficult
to quantify the dead, the injured and the assaulted. No official counts have emerged
in the over three decades since the event. In the absence of a contemporary count,
what has emerged are differing estimates.
199.

One end of the scale is represented by people like Randiki, who believe that as many
as 3000 people may have died in Bulla Karatasi. Randiki’s impressions are based on
what he saw on the night of 9 of November 1980 and what he has heard since. When
the shooting in the bar had stopped, Randiki somehow found his way back home.
In keeping with the timeline, about an hour afterwards Randiki heard gunshots and
loud screams from his neighours’ compounds and beyond. This was followed by
announcements on a public address system ordering people to leave their homes
and make their way to Garissa primary school. Between his home and the school,
Randiki claimed to have seen scores of dead bodies all over the streets and alley ways
of the town. As he described it, “we were literally jumping over human bodies lying
in pools of blood on the way to the stadium. It was the most horrific sight I have ever
seen.”111 Randiki also believed that scores of bodies were either thrown into the
river or hurriedly incinerated. He claimed that bodies disposed of this way might
have accounted for the bulk of the 3 000 dead. While Randiki speaks of such a
high death toll, he never saw any bodies other than those he said he almost
stumbled over as he ran towards the primary school during the initial stage of
the operation. After his release from the school grounds, he tried to establish
the whereabouts of some of his missing friends and colleagues. He went to the
Garissa mortuary but found nothing. Not only were his friends nowhere to be
seen, but the mortuary itself had not received any new bodies at all.

110 ‘Famine aid to continue’ Sunday Nation November 16th 1980 4
111 ‘Civil servant who witnessed Garissa Massacre speaks out’ 11th March 2011 at http://www.propertykenya.com/news/1436640civil-servant-who-witnessed-garissa-massacre-speaks-out Accessed 14th March 2012
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200. At the other end of the spectrum lies the testimony provided by Kaaria, who claimed
that nobody was killed as a result of the operation. His claims were apparently
based on inquiries and investigations carried out after the initial operation and
the screening. Kaaria believes that the Provincial and District Security Committees
must have produced a report but he did not remember what it said, other than
that no deaths occurred as a result of the operation.112 Kaaria said he knew of no
bodies that were disposed of either in the river or elsewhere. He also had nothing
to say concerning the possibility that people may have died later from their injuries
during the operation. The former PC’s testimony ended with the final observation
that he received no reports of rape or any other sexual violence. Again, this was
based on a report compiled by the security committees, but not recalled in any
great detail by Kaaria. The only aspect of the operation that Kaaria confirmed as
appearing in the post-operation report was the burning down of houses, huts,
kiosks and shops. But he blamed the fleeing criminals, not the security forces. The
Commission was unable to locate a copy of such a report.
201.

Other estimates indicate that the number of people killed was not as high as
that suggested by Randiki and neither was it as low as that claimed by Kaaria. As
shall be discussed shortly, the British High Commission and the British Foreign
and Commonwealth Office developed a keen interest in monitoring the security
situation in North Eastern. Correspondence was sent back and forth between
Nairobi and London as diplomats tried to understand the confusing and potentially
dangerous situation. One cable mentioned the Member of Parliament for Wajir East,
Mohammed Sheikh Abdi, as a source of the middle-of-the-spectrum estimate of 300
people dead.113 The letter did not explain how Abdi arrived at this figure. It was not
even clear where or when this claim was made. Even so, 300 has since become the
number that is most widely attached to Bulla Karatasi. It is also the number that the
Commission heard most often in Garissa itself from witnesses and statement givers:
In November 1980, the worst massacre took place in Garissa County. That was Garissa
Gubai Massacre. It was the worst massacre. Almost 300 people were killed and others
went missing.114

International reaction
202.

As news about events in Bulla Karatasi filtered out, Nairobi-based foreign
representatives began to make their own assessments of what they were hearing
and reading. Kenya’s historical ties to Britain meant that British diplomats were
particularly quick to write to London about Garissa. Initially their primary concerns

112 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.23-25
113 Breton (British High Commission Nairobi) to Raferty (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Nairobi), November 1980. PRO/
FCO/31.2864.
114 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 12 April 2011/ Nairobi/ p.4
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seemed to revolve around the implications of the operation (and the Shifta attacks
that preceded them) for the perennially touchy and problematic relationship
between Somalia and Kenya. If the British reactions can be taken as representative,
Bulla Karatasi first appeared on the international radar as a foreign affairs concern
and not as a human rights one. At the time British diplomats were almost certainly
speaking to Kenyan political and intelligence insiders and the impressions they
developed were of a Kenyan government pre-occupied, if not obsessed, with the
idea of continuing Somali aspirations on Kenyan territory:
The Kenyans firmly believe that there is an organised fifth column among the Kenyan
Somalis who are dedicated to bringing the province under the umbrella of the ‘Greater
Somalia’ concept which is enshrined in the Somali constitution.115

203. Correspondence from the first few months of 1980 suggest that the British were
willing to present themselves as an arbiter of sorts as tensions continued to simmer
between Somalia and Kenya. It was a role they had assigned themselves since 1977
when a Somali delegation visited London on a fence-mending mission in the wake
of the Ogaden war. The cables portrayed Kenyan officials as open to the idea of
either British or American intervention:
The Kenyans would naturally welcome anything we could do to persuade the Somalis to
renounce their claim on Kenyan territory. We keep in very close touch with the Americans
on all these matters and I have no doubt that Kenya’s relations with her neighbours will
be addressed during President Moi’s current visit to Washington.116

204. While the British appeared eager to assist, Kenyan reactions to the Somali threat
were characterised as “unduly suspicious”.117 This, the argument went, led Kenyan
officials to factor Somali government involvement into raids and attacks that were
simple robberies.
205. In the lead up to Bulla Karatasi, British analysts expressed increasing concerns
about the impact of Kenya’s approach to the Somali nation on its own ethnic Somali
populations. This represented something of a variation on the more geo-political
concerns that had dominated discussions up to that point. The British found these
developments alarming and worried about the implications on growing insecurity
in Northern Kenya and other regional issues:
Our own plans were knocked on the head by the conclusion on the 31st of the 10-year
Kenya/Ethiopian Cooperation Treaty during President Moi’s visit to Addis Ababa and
a certain hardening of Kenyan attitudes towards Somalia illustrated by the harsher
treatment of ethnic Somalis in Kenya.118
115
116
117
118

PRO/FCO/31.2864
Robson to Luce and Aspin, 20th February 1980. PRO/FCO/31.2864
Jarrold, 10th June 1980. PRO/FCO/31.2864
Jarrold, 10th June 1980. PRO/FCO/31.2864
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206.

Once again, however, there appeared no particular interest on the part of the British
to delve further into the “harsher treatment” of ethnic Somali. There did not appear
to have been any attempt to push for explanations from the Kenya government
about its handling of its Somali populations. Even in the days and weeks after Bulla
Karatasi, a detailed picture of what had happened in Garissa did not emerge. British
correspondences seemed to draw mainly from the same newspaper sources available
to the public. These were presented without much commentary and analysis.

207. While some of their work could easily be described as routine, the British High
Commission in Nairobi excelled at creating and maintaining contact with important
political personalities. And so it was that in the wake of Bulla Karatasi, British
diplomats were able to speak directly to President Moi as early as 11 November
1980; only hours after people were first rounded up and taken to Garissa primary
school. The British Minister for Africa, Lord Luce, found the President in a trenchant,
unforgiving mood occasioned, once again, by an understanding that the Somalis
had something to do with the Shifta attacks in Liboi and in Garissa. Luce’s reporting
of the meetings gives some sense of the President’s stand:
Moi started off the talk with a strong denunciation of the Somalis whom he said were
masters of deception. He said that recently the Ethiopians had crossed a corner of Kenya
without the knowledge of the Kenyan authorities to attack Somalis in the Ogaden. The
Somalis were now taking their revenge against the Kenyans. He was convinced that the
Somalia government was behind the Shifta attacks and was worried that public opinion
would become increasingly critical of United States military co-operation with Somalia.119

208. Moi’s outrage filtered downwards. According to further communications, the
Kenyan High Commissioner in London displayed similar impatience with the
Somalis:
The Kenyan Ambassador, normally fairly relaxed, said his government had “proof” that the
Somali Government had been involved, but would not be drawn on the nature of that
proof.120

209.

The British did not seem entirely convinced by the Kenyan arguments surrounding
Somalia’s involvement in these particular Shifta attacks. Their line continued to be
that Kenyan dealings with the Somali were grounded more in fear and exaggeration
than anything else. As November drew to a close, British correspondences on Bulla
Karatasi gradually petered out. Diplomats ended their assessments of the episode
on very much the same note with which they had begun, namely, emphasising the
need for greater understanding and cooperation between Kenya and Somalia. Joint
Kenyan and Somali border patrols were proposed but they never materialised. The
Somalis showed some enthusiasm, but Kenyan officials would hear nothing of it.

119 Internal Security in North East Province, 11th November PRO/FCO/31.2864.
120 Internal Security in North East Province, 13th November PRO/FCO/31.2864.
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They understandably, given the history between the two countries, flatly refused to
give the Somalis access to such sensitive and contested territory.

Deflections and denials
210.

Thirty years on, many of the personalities involved in Bulla Karatasi are either
untraceable or dead. Benson Kaaria and G.G. Kariuki are among the few people still
available to speak directly to the events of November 1980. The Commission received
submissions from Kaaria and Kariuki on 14 June and the 17 May 2011, respectively.
And it is from their testimonies that the Commission reconstructed recurring strands
of deflection and denial that have long characterised state and official treatment of
Bulla Karatasi.

211. These two were mentioned as the government officials who headed the operation.
In his testimony before the commission Mohamed Ibrahim Elmi singled them out;
In October, 1980, the worst massacre took place in Garissa County. That was Garissa
Gua Massacre. It was the worst massacre. Almost 300 people were killed and others
went missing. Women were raped and killed and some of the people ran off to the
neighbouring country, Somalia. These massacres have been extended to the divisional
level. The operation was headed by the former provincial commissioner, Benson Kaaria
and the then Minister for Internal Security, G.G. Kariuki121

Another witness singled them out too:
In 1980, after the death of a district officer who was killed by bandits at Daadab, a
curfew was imposed in the North Eastern Province by the then Minister of State, Internal
Security, Hon G.G. Kariuki, and the curfew order was implemented by the former
Provincial Commissioner of North Eastern Province, Mr Benson Kaaria.122

Benson Kaaria
212. Benson Kaaria was asked to testify before the Commission because he was the
Provincial Commissioner of North Eastern Province in 1980 when the Bulla Karatasi
incident took place. Kaaria is one of a handful of officials who were directly involved
in decision-making on this particular operation. He has long had a reputation
for plain speaking and directness. And on some of the issues surrounding Bulla
Karatasi, he lived up to his reputation.
213.

The former PC was blunt about his public pronouncements in the lead up to the
operation itself. Kaaria stood by the controversial threat to confine all Somalis to
restricted villages if they did not turn in gunmen and raiders. He made these remarks
at the Baraza Park meeting held after Welimo’s shooting in Liboi but before the

121 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 4
122 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 25 April 2011/ mandera/ p. 6

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

213

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

Madhobe raid. Kaaria maintained that it was necessary for him to take such a firm
line because of overriding suspicions about civilian support and protection for the
Shifta. “I had”, he said, “to give a terse statement to the people, and it worked.”123 Not
only did Kaaria stand by the necessity of the statement, he was also unequivocal that
both the Internal Security Scheme and the Preservation of Public Security Act gave
him the power to make good on his threat and actually put people into restricted
compounds:
Leader of Evidence: Now when you said that you had the power to put them into
restricted villages, were you referring to the power that you had under the Internal
Security Scheme?
Benson Kaaria: Yes, and in relation to the Preservation of Public Security Act. It had
provisions.
Leader of Evidence: For rounding up people and putting them into villages?
Benson Kaaria: Yes it had happened before.124

214. Kaaria also admitted making the controversial comment ordering disloyal elements
to relocate to Somalia. It was a variation of the “pack your camels” remark that has
been attributed to President Kenyatta:
Leader of Evidence: There is a statement that says that Mr Kaaria said that those residents
whose loyalty was in Somalia should pack and go. Do you recollect saying that?
Benson Kaaria: That is true. If you did not want to be under the Kenya government, you
could pack up and go elsewhere. This was a warning to people who would understand.125

215. Along very similar lines, the former PC confirmed that he was prepared to carry
out large-scale security operations that could potentially result in the loss of life:
Leader of Evidence: There are other remarks that are attributed to you again at that
baraza. You said in the end “since you are 678 000 people in that province, all of you
would be eliminated and Kenyans would be left living in peace.” Do you recollect making
those remarks?
Benson Kaaria: That was taken out of context. If you finish people, whom do you rule?
You would remain with empty land.
Leader of Evidence: So what exactly did you say?
Benson Kaaria: I said that action would be taken by the government.
Leader of Evidence: Did you state exactly how many people the action would be taken
against?
123 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.15
124 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.15 –16
125 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.17
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Benson Kaaria: I did not. I do not even know whether they were exactly that number.
Leader of Evidence: Did you, during that baraza, indicate that action taken would
resort into loss of life?
Benson Kaaria: Yes126

216.

Kaaria’s confirmations give some sense of the official thinking in the immediate runup to the operation. And while Kaaria cannot speak for all administrators, his position
at the very top of North Eastern officialdom could be taken as fairly representative.
Officials were in no mood to entertain any further security breaches. Their language
and intentions demonstrated a certain resolute determination to get to the bottom
of the Shifta issue in Garissa and its environs.

217. Kaaria did not contest the general objectives and shape of the operation. He
confirmed that an operation did indeed take place on the 8 November 1980. That
operation was prompted by the raid on Mama Wanjiku’s bar and the subsequent
decision by the District and Provincial Security Committees to immediately
pursue the bandits. The rounding up and confinement of Garissa residents were
adopted as the primary means to that end. Again, these were not issues that
Kaaria regarded as controversial in any way; he embraced them in their entirety.
Both his statement and testimony before the Commission confirmed this.
218. The former PC disowned a number of comments attributed to him by newspapers.
One of the remarks that Kaaria disowned was a “shoot to kill’ threat apparently
issued at the Baraza Park gathering. The Sunday Nation newspaper of 9 November
1980 carried a front page story headlined ‘We will shoot to kill, PC warns’.127 Kaaria’s
testified that he did not recall issuing a “shoot to kill” threat. He also claimed not to
remember threatening to withdraw government food and famine relief supplies
from North Eastern Kenya. The same explanation, total lack of recall, was given by
Kaaria for another stern warning that the people of the province and their leaders
were “playing with fire”.128 On some operational specifics, Kaaria also drew a blank
and claimed either not to know or to remember a number of details that the
Commission regarded as vital.
219. For instance, he did not know how many people were rounded up, taken to and
held at Garissa primary school. All he could say was that when he went to the
grounds the next day, he found the field “half filled” with people sitting down
126 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 17
127 ‘We Shoot to Kill, PC Warns’ Sunday Nation 9th November 1980 1
128 ‘We Shoot to Kill, PC Warns’ Sunday Nation 9th November 1980 1
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on the grass.129 The former PC also was unable to say either when the rounding
up of residents had started or when it had finished. The Commission was struck
by the contrast between the lucidity of Kaaria’s memory on some issues and
fogginess on others. Three issues elicited particularly sharp denials from him.
First, he denied any army involvement in the operation. Kaaria claimed that only
the police and the administration police were involved in flushing people out
of their homes and shepherding them to the school grounds. In direct contrast
to Randiki’s claim that both army men and vehicles were present at the school
and were responsible for somehow making sure that people remained within the
field, Kaaria’s insistence was that no military officers were at the scene. Not only
were they not at the school, he testified, they were also not involved in any other
aspect of the operation.
220. Second, as has been mentioned above, Kaaria was certain that the Bulla
Karatasi operation did not result in any deaths. He denied that there had been
any shooting. He also disagreed with the testimony of others that bodies were
thrown into River Tana. Kaaria was certain that not even livestock had been lost
during the operation.
221. Third, Kaaria also dismissed all evidence and reports about rape. His testimony
was that no rapes took place and that no rapes were ever reported. In so doing,
Kaaria’s was a disturbing attempt to set aside a substantial body of evidence that
outlined the occurrence of a number of rapes and attempted rapes.

G.G Kariuki
222. G.G. Kariuki’s testimony was defined primarily by his attempts to distance himself
from the main centres of decision-making in the operation. Authorization
and planning for the operation came from the District and Provincial Security
Committees. While he had been informed of the raid on the bar by the Commissioner
of Police, Kariuki testified that his ministry nothing to do with the chain of events
that followed:
Leader of Evidence: So, when you received this report from the Commissioner of Police,
as the minister, what action did you take?
G.G. Kariuki: They had already taken action. The Provincial Security Committee had
already taken action; they had imposed a curfew which would run from 5.00pm to
6.00am. in the morning.130
129 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.20
130 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.20
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223. In defining the District and Provincial Security Committees as responsible for
the operation, Kariuki gave a limited and modest explanation for his subsequent
appearance in Garissa a couple of days afterwards:
All I was to do was to go to Garissa and for a fact-finding mission to understand what
had happened and what action had been taken. That is what I did and I went there the
following day.131

224. Despite the minister’s insistence on the autonomy of the security committees,
Kariuki’s first order of business when he arrived in Garissa was to attend a Provincial
Security Committee meeting. Even there, however, the former minister emphasised
his outsider and observer status, underscoring that he was only there to receive
updates. As a result, Kariuki’s testimony displayed a certain level of disinterest in
and ignorance of the finer details of the operation. He appeared to know nothing
of the personalities involved in the operation and seemed not to care about the
result of the operation. The impression he gave was that he returned to Nairobi
none the wiser about events in Garissa:
Leader of Evidence: Did you, for instance, seek to find out who was in charge of the
operation, how many officers had been assigned to do that operation and what their
instructions were?
G.G. Kariuki: I cannot remember who was in charge of that particular operation, but
the person who was in charge of the district or the Provincial Police Officer (PPO), were
supposed to be on charge, it was their responsibility.
Leader of Evidence: Yes, Sir. I am just trying to imagine, on your flight back to Nairobi,
you would want to be settled in your mind that the people you have left in Garissa will
handle the situation well. That is the reason I am asking you whether you sought to
satisfy yourself that based on the situation on the ground, adequate arrangements had
been made to deal with the situation.
G.G. Kariuki: Yes. As far as they were concerned, the arrangements which had been
made to deal with that matter were sufficient. I was given to understand that it was
effective. Mark you these are the people trained to do this kind of job and the minister
is not trained to deal with situations like the security ones.
Leader of Evidence: Okay. What did they share with you that assured you that the
measures taken would be effective?
G.G. Kariuki: I am not sure whether you are asking relevant questions because I have
already said that I was satisfied and I was given to understand that whatever measures
which had been put in place were capable of dealing with that situation.132
131 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.20
132 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.21-22
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225.

As with Kaaria, Kariuki denied all knowledge of any killings, deaths or rapes. On the
question of military involvement, which Kaaria strongly refuted, the former minister
was more circumspect in that he did not confirm or deny military participation.
Instead, he emphasised that it would not be unusual or unprecedented for the
military to be involved in such an operation. The history of Northern Kenya was that
the military and the police often launched joint operations:
Leader of Evidence: Thank you very much. Mr Kariuki, when we were in Garissa, the
witnesses who came before us mentioned that the military and the police were involved
in this operation. I just wish to seek to confirm from you that when you got the briefing
you advised that the military was participating in the operation and the police were also
to participate in the operation.
G.G. Kariuki: That issue should not come up because before 1963, the military and the
police used to do joint operations in the area. So, I assumed they were doing the same.
So, I did not get confirmation whether the army or the police did this work together, but
it was in my mind that even before independence, the military and the police used to
do operations together.
Leader of Evidence: So, in fact, we can conclude that when you were in Garissa on
9 November 1980, there was nothing suggested to you that either the military or the
police were not involved in this operation? There was no contradiction and, therefore,
you understood that as had been the position from 1963, this operation was conducted
in the same manner and with the same people?
G.G. Kariuki: That would depend on whether the police are not able to control the
situation. May be they could get support from the army in those areas not in the other
areas, but the whole of Northern Frontier Districts, and that was before Independence.
There were a lot of threats from our neighbours and the job of the military is to maintain
international boundaries and make sure that our boundaries are secure and the police
deal with internal law and order. In an area like that one, the operations sometimes
could be held jointly. I cannot just remember when and what kind of operations took
place during a certain period where the army was invited.133

226. Kariuki presented himself during his testimony as a sort of official emissary
whose only responsibility in Garissa was to listen and speak to the people and
then explain the government position. And that, according to the minister, is
exactly what he did:
G.G. Kariuki: We were to be introduced by the PC and then the local politicians were
there. Before the minister who was in charge of the whole programme stood to speak,
others had already spoken, right from the local people to the administration and the
politicians who might have been there. And then finally, I took over the platform.
133 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.21-23
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Leader of Evidence: Thank you Mr Kariuki. Would you remember the address or the
statement made by any of the other persons you were and really what it was that you
were communicating to the people at the baraza?
G.G. Kariuki: I think there were two issues here: The local people were very concerned of
their security and what they said was happening from the armed forces. They said that
the armed forces were harassing people who had not committed any crime. That was the
local people’s stand and then the provincial commissioner and others would say what
they were doing and what had brought that kind of menace. Then the minister would
come and give a government statement after having listened to all the issues given by
everybody; he just stands and speaks what he thinks would be the Government policy.134

227. The former minister also emphasised the largely political nature of this job and
what was expected of him during times of insecurity:
The Minister for Internal Security works under the direct control of the President. You
will appreciate the President will not have come to Parliament to answer questions
regarding security problems in some areas. The main job of the minister is to make sure
that he satisfies Members of Parliament and the country at large that what happened,
the government has taken action in the manner that he would have explained to
Parliament or to any other invitation which he may have required to be given the same
answer. This is because it is not within the docket of the Permanent Secretary or the
Commissioner of Police to go to public meetings to explain what happened. It is the
minister who appears to carry the responsibility of talking to the masses or the public.135

228.

When he was asked to clarify what government policy was in this particular instance,
Kariuki was reticent and would not be drawn on the issue. He provided no comments
or insights on the contents of his speech, which was widely reported in local
newspapers. That reporting suggested that Kariuki had made a hard-line address
very much along the lines of Kaaria’s remarks at Baraza Park the day before, warning
Garissa residents that the government was prepared to take tough measures against
the Shifta and their supporters. Newspaper reports made it clear that the minister
had also arrived at a fairly detailed understanding about what had taken place in
Bulla Karatasi. For instance, he is reported to have suggested that the government
would consider compensating the owners of properties destroyed in the fires.

229.

In front of the Commission, however, Kariuki retreated. He claimed not to remember
what he had said during the baraza and only admitted to giving general assessments
of the security situation:
The government position is from the minister himself having listened to all the sides.
So you just explain to the people what you have heard and from the government side
you have to give confidence to the people and give them hope; that if the government

134 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.25-26
135 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.19-20
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finds anybody harassing them for no reason, the government would take action. It was
up to the government to maintain peace and make sure that criminals do not hide in
their midst. So, such kinds of statements are what the minister normally gives to the
people.136

230. As his testimony continued to unfold, the former minister distanced himself even
further from the operation. He claimed that even the name ’Bulla Karatasi‘ was
new to him and that he had never visited it during his tour of Garissa or at any
time since then. He never heard Bulla Karatasi spoken of elsewhere or ever read
about it in any kind of report, official or otherwise. The only other action that
Kariuki was prepared to acknowledge was a subsequent phone call made to the
Provincial Security Committee for a quick update on post-operation Garissa:
We communicated to find out what was happening. We did this by telephone: “We
are just calling you to say that we have done A, B, C and D” but we also continued
cautioning them: “It must be done the way you are doing it, in terms of making sure
that people are not harassed. Look for the criminals and do not harass ordinary
persons”.137

231. When asked to clarify what he meant by ‘A, B, C and D’, the former minister was
unhelpful, pointing the Commission instead in the direction of the Provincial
Security Committee and the PC himself:
Commissioner: You have called the conversations that you had “A, B, C and D”. I am
just wondering what the details of the conversations that you were having with the PC
are when he told you that there was a certain action they were taking.
G.G. Kariuki: I do not know whether you will actually get anything from me to that
effect, because at the time I started talking here, I said that the PC would sit down with
you, together with his committee, and explain to you what had happened. I have said
what I told them. So, any other conversation may not be…138

232. Kariuki’s submission emphasised the limited nature of his and his ministry’s
involvement in events at Bulla Karatasi. He passed on nearly all responsibility
for the operation towards the District and Provincial Security Committees that
were also reticent to speak openly about what did and did not happen that day
in November. Yet, he was the minister in charge of internal security with political
responsibility for all matters relating to internal security in the country. It is utterly
disturbing that he did not and still does not see that the political responsibility
for a security operation and the consequences thereof rests, in the first instance,
with the minister in charge of internal security.
136 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.26
137 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.30
138 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.30
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Wagalla Massacre
During that short period that we stood there, what I saw and what has remained very
distinctly in mind today is a pile of bodies to my right and two naked people carrying yet
another body to put on the pile.139

233. By far, the ‘Wagalla Massacre’ of February 1984 is the most spoken about massacre
in Kenya and represents a tragic story of how a government can turn against and
massacre its own citizens. According to one victim of the excesses of the security
operation, ‘[t]he government that should protect us ate us like a hyena eats a
goat’.140 The Commission conducted its hearings in Wajir on three separate days
in April 2011. Commissioners also had an opportunity to visit Wagalla Airstrip, the
site of the Wagalla Massacre. At the site, survivors demonstrated how they were
treated during their detention at the airstrip in February 1984.

Background
234. The Wagalla Massacre must be understood in the broader context of clan relations
in Wajir, and North Eastern Province in general, and the politicisation of these
relations.

Clan relations in Wajir
235. Wajir District is dominated by three main clans - the Ajuran, the Degodia and the
Ogaden. The Garre and Murulle are also present in Wajir, but in smaller numbers.
Clan issues among the Somali are complex and have been the focus of much
historical and anthropological attention as scholars have sought to understand
how a people united by ethnicity and religion have fallen out so spectacularly over
clan identity.141 Somali clans are best described as the largest possible grouping of
families, sub-clans and lineages who claim a common ancestry.
236. There are six distinct Somali clans: the Darood, Isaaq, Hawiye, Dir, Digil and
Rahanwayn. While the Ajuran and the Degodia are generally understood and
referred to as separate clans, they are in fact sub-clans of the larger Hawiye clan. The
Ogaden are a sub-group of the Darood. Sub-clans are further divided by a castelike system that determines such issues as marriage and access to land and political
power. In a further complication, clan identities are neither fixed nor immutable.
Dominant clans have a long tradition of absorbing weaker and more subservient
ones. Entire clans can and have been known to define and redefine themselves
139 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/18 May 2011/p. 4.
140 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Wajir/19 May 2011/p. 3.
141 For a detailed discussion on the formation and evolution of clan identity amongst the Somali, see Lee Cassanelli, The Shaping of
Somali Society (1982).
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primarily for economic and political reasons. Recent research argues that both the
Ajuran and Degodia have since the 1980s been engaged in an intricate pattern of
cultural association and disassociation with Borana communities in neighbouring
Marsabit, Moyale and Isiolo districts.142
237. The clan is particularly important in the context of nomadic culture, particularly
among people who live in harsh environments, because it is the people’s most
valuable asset, especially in times of uncertainty. In nomadic culture, clan identity
is “the last refuge one uses in order to safeguard one’s life and property”.143 Clan
identity in Somalia was strengthened after the country collapsed in 1991; it is
possible that state neglect and marginalisation of ethnic Somalis in Northern
Kenya had a similar impact.
238.

However, critics of clan-based analyses of Somali society have argued that the clan is
a colonial construct that has tended to benefit the political elite who use clan identity
to advance their own political and commercial interests. They argue that Somali
society should not be viewed through the prism of clan identity or clan competition
but rather should be seen as a consequence of uneven development. Some Somali
academics refer to clan as an “anthropological fossil” that is not part of traditional
Somali identity but a legacy of the colonial strategy of “divide and rule”. They argue
that ethnic Somalis are culturally homogenous and are identified as members of
the Cushitic race in the Horn of Africa; each genealogical group (often referred to
as clan) does not have a distinct history that distinguishes it from other Somalis.
Somali identity is thus “a product of several mutually constitutive forces whose roles
are historically and socially contingent”.144 These forces include language, genealogy,
Islam and a customary social contract known as Xeer. Over time, new forces and
elements were added to Somali identity, while others were de-emphasised.

239. Though there is a certain cultural fluidity to clan identity, ideas about territory are
much more fixed. In other words, there is a very clear understanding that clans are
meant to occupy certain areas and not others. This is most certainly the case in Wajir
District, which has been carved up between the Ogaden in the south, the Ajuran
in the north and west, and the Degodia in the east and west. The sub-clans are
seen as being bounded to their assigned areas and, as shall be discussed shortly,
transgressions of these boundaries have been the primary causes of serious and
prolonged conflicts in Wajir.
142 Gunther Schlee, ‘Brothers of the Boran once again: On the fading popularity of certain Somali identities in Northern Kenya’ (2007)
1 Journal of Eastern African Studies 417 435
143 Elmi, A.A. (2010), Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding, London and New York:
Pluto Press
144 Samatar, A.I., “Debating Somali identity in a British Tribunal: The case of the BBC Somali Service”, Bildhaan, Vol. 10
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It is curious that such classically nomadic people should so strongly tie themselves
to such fixed understandings of territory. As with so many other aspects of Northern
Kenya’s present, explanations must be sought in the colonial history of the region.
When the British created an administrative outpost in Wajir in 1912, they encountered
various groups who called the area home, including the Ogaden sub-clan known
as Mohammed Zubeir, who were concentrated in and around Wajir town itself. It is
difficult to be precise about inter-clan relationships in early colonial Wajir. The main
reason for this is that the British (and therefore their records and historians) were
much more preoccupied with the broader theme of Somali resistance to the arrival
of colonial rule.

241.

Recent research suggests, however, that clan interactions during this era were
probably characterised by tension and bouts of intensive violence over the
perennially troublesome issues of access to pasture and water. Competition in Wajir
was particularly intense as the various groups – the Boran, the Ajuran, the Degodia,
and the Darood – jockeyed to access the Wajir wells that offered a permanent source
of water in an otherwise parched land.145 These groups went back and forth in
battle as they had done for many generations; the presence of the British did not
fundamentally alter the long-standing patterns of inter-clan conflict.

Chapter FOUR

242. As the British tried and failed to stamp their authority over Northern Kenya, it
became increasingly obvious to them that the incessant cycles of clan violence were
to blame. In 1934, they came up with a solution in the form of the Special Districts
Ordinance (SDO). The SDO, in both its colonial and post-colonial incarnations, has
been described as the centrepiece of Northern Kenya’s security framework. The SDO
is usually highlighted for its establishment of Northern Kenya as a closed district
requiring special permits for outsiders to move in and out of. What many people
do not realise, however, is that the ordinance also created ethnically bounded
blocks of land and territory that continue to fuel inter-clan conflict in Wajir and
beyond. British administrators in the late 1920s and early 1930s thought long and
hard about possible remedies for the fighting. They decided that they needed to
physically separate the various clans as best as they could. The district ordinance
went on to create a number of internal borders designed to limit interaction. The
main division was a north-south divide that separated the Somali from the
Oromo. This is the so-called “Somali-Galla” line that was drawn east of Moyale
and west of Wajir and ended up in the vicinity of Garissa. The primary objective
of this line was to create a buffer zone between the Somali and non-Somali
Oromo peoples, such as the Borana.
145 For more on the Wajir Wells and conflicts surrounding them, see Gufu Oba, ‘Colonial Resource Capture: Triggers of Ethnic Conflicts
in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, 1903-1930s” (2011) 5 Journal of Eastern African Studies 505, 534
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243. Lands on the Somali side were then carved up even further. A sliver of territory
north-west of Wajir town was allocated to the Ajuran. To their immediate east
were the Degodia, and just south of them both were the Ogaden. Territory in and
around Garissa and Mandera was similarly divided up. The SDO referred to the
resulting zones as “tribal grazing areas”. The boundaries were strictly enforced.
People caught on the wrong side of their prescribed areas could be fined up to
10 percent of their herds. With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to see how
the British expected that this scheme would work with people who had no real
understanding or experience of borders or restricted spaces.
244. Indeed it did not take very long for the solution - tribal grazing areas - to turn
into the problem as the different clans sought to access their traditional patches
of land and water regardless of the new restrictions and boundaries. It did not
help that the boundaries themselves were “imprecise in breadth and length”.146
The issue of enforcement was also fraught with difficulties as a skeleton staff of
overworked district administrators and so-called ‘tribal policemen’ attempted
to patrol hundreds of kilometres. Worse, it appears that the ’tribal boundaries'
might even have been responsible for rapid environmental degradation in a
region that was already dry. Obsessed with the notion of over-crowding and
unwieldy animal herds, colonial administrators became convinced that strictlymanaged 'tribal grazing areas' would temper soil erosion and ease pressure
on vegetation. It took only a few seasons, however, for it to emerge that the
bounded grazing areas were having a disastrous impact. Pastures that were
previously allowed to rest and recover as herds moved from one region to the
next were now exposed to round-the-clock use. The results were inevitable:
steep and rapid environmental decline that continues to plague rangeland
management in Northern Kenya to date.147
245. Upon independence in 1963, the whole idea of bounded areas was abandoned,
with officials blaming this particular policy for over-grazing and for fostering
conflict over disputed borders. Northerners were instead advised to prepare
for land adjudication whereby the only boundaries the government would
recognise would be those defined by individuals and groups that had bought
land and had registered titles. Land adjudication, however, never arrived in
Northern Kenya due to a number of reasons that are addressed elsewhere in
this report.148 What is important to understand is that far from dying the natural
death that the post-colonial government predicted, the idea of bounded
146 Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity (2005), 63.
147 For an overview of current approaches towards the management of livestock and pasture in Northern Kenya, see Guyo Haro
‘Linkages between community, environmental and conflict management: experiences from Northern Kenya’ (2005) 33 World
Development 285.
148 See Chapter on Land.
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ethnic territories grew even stronger. Politicians of all backgrounds were at the
forefront of championing the notion that certain lands and natural resources
(such as water and pasture) belonged to certain peoples and that all others were
intruders.
246. In Wajir, debates about land, territory and boundaries are conducted
almost entirely along clan-based notions of ownership and entitlement.
The modern history of the district is such that none of the clans – major or
minor – can be described as content with the ethnic geography of Wajir.
Further, evidence and testimonies presented to the Commission suggested
that all the Wajir protagonists felt deeply aggrieved. The Ajuran community
submitted a memorandum detailing their long-running concerns about the
situation in which they found themselves on account of clan conflict and
ethnic boundaries in the district.149 Their main issues seemed to stem from a
belief that the Ajuran were the original owners and occupiers of most land
in Wajir. The Ajuran date their claims all the way back to 1700 AD, when they
apparently first appeared in Northern Kenya after a series of complicated
wars in a part of Somalia known as Benaadir. The community represents itself
as honouring the Somali tradition of Shegat that entails hosting outside clans
in need of help, protection and patronage.
247. This, Ajuran elders argued, was how the Degodia ended up residing in what
were traditionally and rightfully Ajuran lands. In language that portrayed
the depth of their anger, the Ajuran memorandum went on to accuse the
Degodia of “instigating fracas and mischief” and generally abusing their
hosts’ generosity and hospitality.150 The colonial grazing areas that have been
described above as unworkable and poorly thought out were welcomed
by sections of the Ajuran community, who saw them as restoring (and
recognising) something close to their original claims to Wajir lands. The
Ajuran also seemed to be grateful for the protection that colonial security
offered them against Degodia incursions from Somalia and Ethiopia.
248. Degodia representations of their place in the district’s history were dominated
by similar feelings of loss and unfairness, especially due to the treatment
handed out to them by the Borana along the Isiolo-Wajir district borders.
Because the Ajuran also speak the Borana language, Degodia discourses on
Ajuran identity tend to emphasise these affiliations with non-Somali groups.151
149 Memorandum on Past Injustices Submitted to TJRC by the Ajuran Community of Wajir County
150 Memorandum on Past Injustices Submitted to TJRC by the Ajuran Community of Wajir County, 3.
151 See Gunther Schlee, ‘Brothers of the Boran once again: On the fading popularity of certain Somali identities in Northern Kenya’
(2007) 1 Journal of Eastern African Studies 424 425.
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249. The Commission came to understand that none of the clans seemed entirely
pleased with their lot in Wajir; all felt aggrieved by the continued fissures and
tensions. Similarly, none of the communities seemed entirely convinced by
either colonial or post-colonial responses to the continuing story of inter-clan
conflict. The decision to dismantle the tribal grazing areas in 1963, for instance,
proved deeply unpopular with a number of clans, including the Ajuran. They
argued that the removal of the colonial systems of fines and restrictions
allowed Degodia herdsmen to move into Ajuran grazing grounds. As Ibrahim
Ali Hussein, the second Member of Parliament for Wajir West constituency and
an Ajuran, put it, the Degodia were “roaming at will throughout” the district.152
Even as the region was struggling under the weight of the Shifta War, the issue
of inter-clan unrest bubbled away until it reached a boiling point.
250. Archival material from Wajir indicates that by 1970 the Ajuran community –
led by the MP Ibrahim Ali Hussein – had had enough of Degodia incursions. A
letter was written to the Office of the President and to Provincial Commissioner
John Mburu, asking for the “tribal grazing areas” to be reinstated and for
“intermingling” between the clans to be prohibited.153 For Ibrahim Ali and his
Ajuran constituents only a return to the security of colonial boundaries could
stem the tide. Hussein’s letter briefly mentioned that a government team had
been sent to Wajir in 1969 to re-investigate the issue of “tribal grazing areas.”
No further evidence of such an inquiry appeared in the correspondence. At
any rate, Mburu’s response firmly shut the door on the revival of the grazing
areas as they were in the government’s view the source of tussles over land and
livestock. The PC warned Hussein and “his people” that they had to reconcile
themselves to the reality of official policy:
You and your people need to come to terms with the fact that land will only be owned
by groups with registered titles and legally defined boundaries. This is the way that
government is using to control movement from one area to another. Groups will be
assisted in keeping out intruders.154

251. Mburu was of the opinion that the re-organisation of land tenure systems in
Northern Kenya would happen fairly quickly as both the Ministry of Lands
and the relevant county councils were at an advanced stage of sorting out
the “modalities”. The Ajuran and the Degodia were advised to wait a little
while longer; a new age was dawning. However, that new age did not dawn.
The process of land adjudication did not take place in Northern Kenya. The
152 Ali Ibrahim Hussein to Office of the President, 2nd October 1970, Somali Border Affairs and Independence Administration File, Wajir
Registry
153 Ali Ibrahim Hussein to Office of the President, 2nd October 1970, Somali Border Affairs and Independence Administration File, Wajir
Registry
154 J. G. Mburu to Ibrahim Ali Hussein, 12th October 1970 Somali Border Affairs and Independence Administration File, Wajir Registry.
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implications of this failure for the region were immense. It meant that one of
the main causes of clan conflict was not addressed. The inhabitants of Wajir
and other districts were essentially left to sort out access to land, pasture and
water among themselves. This hardening of community positions on access to
resources took place against a backdrop of weapons proliferation and political
unrest in both Ethiopia and Somalia.

Politics and clan relations
252. Research indicates that the 1970s and early 1980s in Wajir were characterised
by the slow but inexorable politicisation of inter-clan conflicts and tensions. An
inverse relationship began to emerge between the decline in security and the
rising role of politics and politicians. At independence, only three constituencies
existed in Wajir: Wajir East, Wajir West and Wajir South. From the outset, Wajir
South was an Ogaden stronghold; no other clan has ever represented the
constituency. Similarly, Wajir East was traditionally Degodia. Wajir West was
much more contested and complicated. The constituency was carved out
of territory the Ajuran regarded as theirs. And sure enough Abdi Nur Ali, the
first independence era Member of Parliament for Wajir West, was an Ajuran. So
too was Ibrahim Ali Hussein, who won the seat after the second 1969 General
Election.
253. While Ajuran hegemony appeared secure in those early years, several Ajuran
elders (including Ibrahim Ali Hussein) now charge that the Degodia were
engaging in all manner of political mischief and fraud aimed at capturing Wajir
West. The Degodia were said to have used “young and carefree ladies” to befriend
and compromise local Ajuran chiefs who were then replaced with Degodia ones.
Others were said to have resorted to bribery to secure government posts. By the
time that Hussein wrote to Mburu in 1970, many of his concerns transcended
the more basic issue of tribal grazing lands. Hussein accused the government
of showering the Degodia with favours and official jobs. He also stated that the
Degodia were reaping numerous political benefits from the appointment to the
Cabinet of Honourable Khalif (the winner in the 1969 race to represent Wajir
East) as an Assistant Minister for Housing.
254. Mburu’s rejoinder could not have been more unsympathetic. He brushed
aside Hussein, saying that the Ajuran were simply jealous that the Degodia
had earned government recognition as well as political and economic power
purely on merit and through hard work.155 Mburu’s reaction demonstrated a
worrying trend: administrators in Northern Kenya were unable to grasp the
155 J. G. Mburu to Ibrahim Ali Hussein, 12th October 1970 Somali Border Affairs and Independence Administration File, Wajir Registry.
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depth of local concerns about clan competition and conflict. They were far too
quick to view these issues as either petty or irrational. As shall be discussed
shortly, this was an approach that was to serve Wajir poorly as the district
hurtled towards the Wagalla Massacre.
255. The 1974 General Election resulted in victory for another Ajuran candidate,
Abdullahi Abdi Noor. Five years later though, the Ajuran establishment was
shocked with the election of Ahmed Khalif Mohammed of the Degodia
community as the representative from Wajir West. It was at this point that clan
conflicts in Wajir became overtly political. It was an important turning point.
Stung by the loss, the Ajuran emerged with a long list of complaints about
the political conduct of the Degodia. At the top of that list were complaints
about the wholesale importation and illegal registration of Degodia kinsmen
from Ethiopia and Somalia. Accusations of bribery and undercover payments
were also levelled against the Degodia campaign machine in Wajir West.
256. The foundations were laid for pitched battles that combined three explosive
elements: clan, resources and politically-driven conflicts. With Wajir more
polarised than ever, Mohammed went on to recapture the seat in the election
of September 1983. On this occasion, the Ajuran response to electoral defeat
went beyond mere political sniping.
257. The Garre were a minority Wajir clan who sometimes voted in a bloc with
the Degodia against the Ajuran. In 1983 the Garre supported the incumbent
Ahmed Khalif Mohammed. This supposedly earned them the wrath of the
Ajuran who apparently embarked on an orgy of retaliatory violence in those
parts of Northern Wajir with significant Garre populations.156 The Ajuran were
also said to have hit out at the Degodia in a series of raids and attacks peppered
throughout the district. When the Garre and the Degodia responded, Wajir
West descended into all-out violence.
258. Wajir in the early 1980s was one of the most unstable parts of Kenya. The
district has been blamed for plunging much of Northern Kenya into almost total
anarchy a full decade before the break-up of neighbouring Somalia. Yet the
Commission found that an awkward silence hovers over this time. Few witnesses
came forward to discuss the period and the impact that inter-clan and political
violence had on their lives and livelihoods. Wajir stories tended to cluster around
much more high profile issues, such as the Shifta War and Wagalla Massacre.
156 For descriptions of Garre/Ajuran violence see Abdulwahab H. Korre & D. A. Hassan, ‘The Gharri Experience in Northern Kenya’
available at http://www.africanewsonline.com/The%20Gharri%20Eperience%20In%20Kenya.htm Accessed 13th March
2012.
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Antecedents to the Massacre
259. Wagalla Massacre was the final product of a series of events that happened over a
period of about one year preceding the massacre itself. The antecedents leading to
the massacre are described below.

Wajir in 1983: Restless and troubled
260. A number of administrative and official documents paint a detailed picture of life in
the district in the six to eight months leading up to the Wagalla Massacre. Most of
these files were drawn from the government registry in Wajir. The Commission also
heard testimony from Joshua Matui, the District Commissioner in Wajir between
1982 and 1985. Indeed, Matui was the author of many of the documents used
by the Commission in constructing its narrative. The broad and basic impression
created by the documents and Matui’s evidence was that Wajir was explosive. As
Matui took office in October 1982, he immediately realised that the situation was
volatile and complicated:
I have stated that I was posted to Wajir as a District Commissioner in October 1982.
When I arrived there, I found a district which was in turmoil due to clan conflicts and
clashes. When I enquired why they are fighting and why people were stealing each
other’s livestock and killing each other, I was told that primarily, the clashes were due to
watering facilities, grazing facilities and even parliamentary seats.157

261.

Nobody seemed safe or immune from the violence. The year before Matui took office,
a District Officer had been shot dead in Wajir. Coincidentally, at that point Matui was
serving as the District Commissioner in Kisii, the home district of the slain officer.
Matui received the body and assisted in the funeral and burial arrangements, little
knowing that within a matter of months he too would be in Wajir.

262. Matui detected a sudden spike in the violence in March 1983. By that time the
fighting was largely retaliatory in that a single attack could spawn several revenge
attacks. The violence had acquired a life of its own. The DC admitted that he
felt helpless in the face of tit-for-tat raids. His testimony was that of a powerless
onlooker unable to impact the cycle of violence:
The administration used to campaign by holding public barazas using clan elders, but it
was very tedious work because the clan elders would undertake to the government and
tell them that, actually, they would cease fights. However within a very short time, you
would hear that very many people from one clan had been killed.158

157 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.5
158 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
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263. No investigations or follow-ups were possible for the simple reason that Matui and
his team were apparently overwhelmed by the steady stream of dead bodies:
We were advised by leaders that there was no point in taking the dead to the Wajir
District Hospital for post mortem examination because, already, we knew that they had
died of gun wounds.159

264. By the same token, the police seemed unable to make any arrests. Attackers were
generally nameless and faceless men who could not be identified by victims.
And yet somehow it was always clear that the raiders came from an enemy clan.
Although the entire district was unsettled, Wajir Town and its environs were
especially vulnerable on account of a large and diverse population. Reports of
violence in other parts of the district would trickle into Wajir and tempers would,
as Matui put it, “flare,” bringing people out on to the streets in demonstrations that
sometimes turned ugly.160
265.

Matui’s testimony and the documents unearthed by the Commission both point to
a steady deterioration in inter-clan relationships and security in Wajir throughout
1983. By September, things were approaching crisis point, with three armed groups
– the Degodia, the Ajuran and the Garre – carrying out raids against each other. Matui
commented on the emergence of militias controlled by and attached to the various
clans. These militia groups were often heavily armed with weapons coming from
Ethiopia and Somalia; the entire region was awash with guns after the Ogaden War.
The militia escalated the violence to unprecedented levels. Early November brought
something of a reprieve after a series of peace meetings were held in Moyale with
Ajuran, Degodia and Garre elders. After apparently admitting to hosting Degodia
militia in their fight against the Ajuran, the Garre stepped back a little from the main
action. Garre militia seemed to heed their elders’ calls to rein in their attacks on the
Ajuran. This meant that the violence was now limited to the Degodia and the Ajuran.

266.

Whatever optimism Matui may have had on account of the Garre withdrawal
quickly turned to despair. Days after the Moyale meeting, Ajuran fighters launched
a daring attack on 18 Degodia manyattas in a remote part of Wajir known as West
Eldas. One man died and 2 000 camels were stolen.

267. Matui’s assessment was that the raid was fuelled by Ajuran anger at the revelation
that the Degodia had been fighting them while impersonating the Garre. Matui
realised that the ferocity of the West Eldas attack would trigger a response. He did
not have to wait long for this to happen. On 11 November 1983, militiamen turned
up in Eldas at the home of a prominent Ajuran elder and KANU official. The fighting
159 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
160 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
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that followed left the man dead along with five female members of the household.
Approximately 1 000 cows, sheep and goats were also taken. On 16 November
1980, Matui wrote to the North Eastern Provincial Commissioner Benson Kaaria,
explaining the deaths in Eldas.161
268. The details were graphic. Matui described how officers who visited the home
encountered a blood-drenched scene. Two babies were found still latched onto
their dead mothers’ breasts. Degodia militiamen were believed to have been
responsible. Matui portrayed himself as shocked and shaken by the killings. On
22 November 1983, he summoned Ajuran and Degodia elders to the Wajir Court,
pleading with them to stop the violence and the killings:
When those babies were collected, they were found suckling their dead mothers. I think
it was as a result of that episode that I asked them whether they have ever heard of
babies suckling dead mothers. I asked them: “Why are you killing each other? If it is
stealing, you could steal livestock from each other but surely, spare the lives.”162

269. The elders seemed responsive and committed themselves to a formal peace
ceremony – Subein – and to halting the hostilities.
270. Meanwhile a number of Degodia leaders met in Wajir, ostensibly to prepare for
the Subein. Pledges were made to deal firmly with Degodia luminaries seen to be
instigating violence. The Subein was an elaborate affair full of cultural and religious
symbolism. Seven lambs were slaughtered, with the manner of their deaths ritually
interpreted for good or bad tidings:
We were told that if the elders from both sides were genuinely after peace and if they
were genuinely true to what they were seeking then the seven lambs would die on the
right side. For sure, those seven lambs went and died on the right hand side and there
was jubilation. The people said: “We have now started peace”.163

271.

The Ajuran agreed to return the 2 000 camels stolen from West Eldas. The Degodia
promised to pay ‘blood money’ to the relatives of the family of six also killed in Eldas.
The solemnity of the occasion and the promises made by both communities gave
Matui hope that Wajir’s troubles were drawing to a close. However, he worried that
despite their public pronouncements, the Degodia were privately insincere about
calling off their fighters. He even commented on their reluctance to handle the Koran
during the Subein, which in effect reduced the potency of their oaths and promises.
Meanwhile, the Ajuran did not appear to be doing anything to help the situation.
As of 15 December 1984, the 2 000 camels that were meant to be returned to the
Degodia were instead driven northwards towards Buna and Moyale. The failure to

161 Districter to Provincer, 16th November 1983 District Intelligence File, Wajir Registry
162 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
163 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
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return the camels was a sore point. Matui remembered that a Degodia woman had
apparently been heard saying that “the work of the Ajuran would be to bury their
dead as long as they continued milking the stolen camels from the Degodia”.164
272. December also brought news of the apparent arrival in Wajir of perhaps as many as
500 Degodia fighters from Odo, a part of Ethiopia already suspected of supplying
Degodia politicians with illegal voters. These fighters were said to be under the
command of a “notorious” Shifta commander called Bulbul.165 Notwithstanding
the Subein, the attempts to recover cattle and pay blood money, it seems that
Bulbul and his men were preparing for a major offensive in the northern part of
the district. Most correspondence about Bulbul’s group was coded, so it was not
possible to decipher it in its entirety. It was quite clear, however, that major security
concerns surrounded this incursion.166 At the same time, there were intelligence
reports about the return of Ajuran fighters and herdsmen from neighbouring
Eastern Province. They were also believed to be preparing for a major showdown
with the Degodia. Matui was of the opinion that both clans were waiting for the
end of the November and December rains to resume hostilities.

Wajir in early 1984
273.

The year 1984 in Wajir begun on the same note as the end of 1983 as yet another
round of clan-based raids, attacks and murders were entered into district records.
Almost without fail the victims were described as Ajuran and the perpetrators as
Degodia. On 29 January 1984, an Ajuran woman travelling between Wajir town and
Eldas was violently raped, beaten and left for dead after the two attackers first asked
her what clan she belonged to. Two days later – on 31 January 1984 – another Ajuran
woman had her house broken into by armed men who stole money and property. On
the same day, five camels were stolen near another Wajir settlement known as Griftu.
Such incidents continued into February 1984. On 3 February 1984, Yusuf Ali Omar, a
50-year-old Ajuran man, was shot dead at a village known as Tula just outside Griftu.
Four other people were injured in the attack and a number of camels stolen by the
gunmen. This was followed on 6 February 1984 with a raid on another small Ajuran
settlement in the Griftu area. Three armed men beat up the villagers and stole four
camels. On 9 February 1984 news broke of the killing of one man and six women
in a village known as Yukho. The Yukho raid also resulted in the injury of two other
people and the shooting dead of a number of camels. The Yukho raid defines the
‘point of no return’ in the march towards Wagalla.

164 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
165 Districter to Provincer 7th December District Intelligence File, Wajir Registry
166 Districter to Provincer 7th December District Intelligence File, Wajir Registry
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274. Matui described his main task in Wajir as “cooling the temperatures” in a district
that was super-heated by clan conflict, violence and tension. He represented
himself as having very little time to do anything else. Despite the enormity of the
problem, he described himself as being up to the task. Even so, his options were
fairly limited. Matui travelled through the district convening public meetings
(barazas) during which he urged the warring Wajir communities to put down
their weapons and to concentrate instead on livestock, health, education and
other development issues. But as the former DC himself described it, these public
meetings were thanklessly tedious and ultimately yielded very little. Within days
or weeks after a baraza, fighting would break out again and Matui would find
himself back where he started. Matui also tried to approach elders, opinion
leaders and others he believed had some kind of influence over the fighters. Here
again his efforts and energies seemed misplaced as some of the elders seemed
as baffled and as powerless as he was:
I would like to say that even the clan elders at one point were confused as to who was
actually perpetuating those killings because amongst themselves they would say: “There
would be no further killings’, and yet after a day or two there would be an attack.167

275. Documents examined by the Commission suggested that an important shift
took place in August 1983 with the tacit acceptance that public barazas and
consultations with elders would no longer be enough to tackle the rapidly
worsening situation. Matui decided to take a broader, more consultative approach
to the matter. He wrote to the heads of all government departments in Wajir and
asked them to submit ideas on how to tackle insecurity in the district.168 Matui
explained that this was something that the District Security Committee (DSC) was
already thinking about, but that he was very interested in hearing what others
outside the security committee had to say on the matter. He sifted through the
responses he got from the field and compiled them into a single document he
titled Suggestions and Recommendations for Wajir District Security.
276. Suggestions and Recommendations for Wajir District Security was a key document
for understanding the Wagalla Massacre. It raised questions about when the
operation at Wagalla was planned. While the document has been infused with a
number of meanings over the years, it needed to be understood in context, as a
product of its time. When the District Commissioner compiled the document, what
was uppermost in his mind was the violence sweeping through Wajir in and around
the middle of 1983. Suggestions and Recommendations is a curious compilation, a
mix of the practical and the aspirational. A theme that runs through the entire
167 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.10
168 J.K Matui to All Department Heads, 24th August 1983, District Intelligence File, Wajir Registry
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document is that insecurity in Wajir was caused by a lack of loyalty to Kenya, not
only on the part of the gunmen, but also on the part of the general population
as a whole. One of the items on Matui’s list was a “concentrated and ruthless”
programme designed to “instil” Kenyan Somalis (and specifically the residents of
Wajir) with a sense of patriotism.
277. It is difficult to see how a ruthlessly instilled sense of patriotism could be described
as patriotism. Matui’s suggestions included jamming Radio Mogadishu’s signals
which would force residents to listen to the Voice of Kenya instead. Patriotic
music and programmes would be featured and listeners would also have to
communicate in Kiswahili, the national language, instead of local dialects. At the
same time, however, the DC proposed continued engagement with both Somalia
and Ethiopia. He did not want Kenya to disassociate herself from neighbours that
had such a direct influence on her internal affairs.
278. Matui was also an enthusiastic supporter of some kind of affirmative action. He
called for national schools to set aside a quota for ethnic Somali students from
North Eastern Province. Along similar lines, he wanted to see more investment
and resources in local schools, health and social facilities. Matui was in essence
revisiting the relationships between security and development that had
dominated discourses in and about Northern Kenya for at least half a century.
279. Despite his obvious appreciation of the social and cultural roots of insecurity, DC
Matui was well aware that the persistent and pervasive nature of the violence also
required pragmatic interventions. One of the proposals floated in Suggestions
and Recommendations was an expanded role for the military. The military, the
document read, would need to “work more closely” with the police and the
administration police. Another suggestion and recommendation was that the
military be given powers of arrest in operational areas. These proposals were not
novel or unprecedented; the military already enjoyed such powers under the
Preservation of Public Security Act. The only other reference to the state of the
security forces in Wajir in 1983 came in July 1983 when in response to a query
from Matui, the Inspector of Administration Police clarified that 500 of his men
were stationed in the district.169
280. The document Suggestions and Recommendations was sent to PC Benson Kaaria
a fortnight after its compilation.170 As far as the Commission could tell, nothing
much was done with the document and its recommendations for the next
169 Inspector of Administration Police to Matui, 19th July 1983 Internal Security File Wajir
170 Matui to Kaaria, 14th September 1983, District Intelligence File, Wajir Registry
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couple of months. Matui returned to the day-to-day business of running his
troubled district. He did not appear to have taken any further steps towards the
development of a specific operation during this period.

Disarmament
281. Illegal weapons have circulated in Northern Kenya for many years, with predictably
disastrous results for the region. The Shifta, militia and other criminal elements
have been able to acquire sophisticated weapons with minimal trouble and
expense. Wajir was no exception to this general rule. Soon after taking up office in
late 1982, Matui was faced with the issue of easy access to guns and other kinds
of firearms which were, quite literally, providing ammunition for clan and political
conflicts in the district:
I also realised that there were very many illegally acquired firearms among the clans.
You could easily get firearms from neighbouring countries and each clan more or
less had its own organised groups which had guns.171

282. Matui made it clear that ridding Wajir of guns was a top priority for him and
the District Security Committee. Indeed, this was the priority throughout the
province. He described “systematic campaigns” designed to collect illegal arms
from residents. The typical campaign consisted of calling people to a baraza and
appealing to them to hand over guns to their local chiefs, policemen or any other
suitable government representative.
283. In early August 1983, the District Security Committee flexed its powers under the
Preservation of Public Security Act and attempted to confiscate Ajuran, Degodia,
Gabbra and Garre animals as a way of coercing these communities to surrender
their armouries.172 The security committee was outfoxed by large Garre herds
moving northwards into Ethiopia. Ultimately, the success of such campaigns
depended almost entirely on securing the cooperation and goodwill of the people.
It was thus vitally important for the DC to win the hearts and minds of the public.
Given the seriousness of the situation in Wajir, Matui convened a number of public
barazas from the beginning of his tenure. He did not appear to have enjoyed much
success. By the middle of 1983, Wajir was more violent and gun-riddled than it had
ever been before.
284. In mid November 1983, a large and prominent Ajuran family in Eldas was killed. Even
in a district used to extreme violence, the murder of these seven people convinced
171 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.5
172 From Wajir DSC Brief to KIC During Its Visit to Wajir District on 8th February 1984, 1st February 1984, 2
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Matui of the need to launch a much more energetic and determined round of
disarmament. The following month, on 16 December 1983, Maalim Mohammed,
the Minister of State, and easily the most senior and prominent politician in North
Eastern Kenya at the time, arrived in Wajir. During a well-attended rally that some
residents described as the largest that they had ever seen, the minister delivered
a single and direct message to the people of Wajir: Surrender your weapons and
hand in your guns. He gave the residents 10 days in which to respond to the
appeal. The firm and unprecedented nature of the announcement gave Matui and
his team some hope of an enthusiastic response. Unfortunately, it was not to be.
285.

Mohammed’s deadline for the surrender of the weapons expired on 26 December
1983 Matui and his team then assessed the level of compliance. The Ajuran had
surrendered 11 guns. The Degodia had surrendered just one. For a district that
was supposedly awash with weapons, this haul of just a dozen guns was a major
disappointment. The DC could not hide his frustration. His suspicion was that the
very same clan elders that the government was depending on to lead their individual
communities into surrendering their armouries were, in fact, doing precisely the
opposite: “There were some leaders who were discouraging their fellow men from
surrendering their guns”.173 By January 1984, the District Security Committee in Wajir
had had enough of people they referred to as “known instigators of tribal feuds”. The
committee once again invoked the Preservation of Public Security Act to detain four
prominent Degodia leaders seen as obstacles to disarmament:
1. Abdi Sirat Khalif (Former Member of Parliament);
2. Mohamed Ali Noor (Chairman Wajir County Council);
3. Omar Ali Birik (former Councillor of Wajir County Council); and
4. Ahmed Elmi Daudi.174

286.

These four individuals were detained at Wajir police station for the maximum 28 days
permitted by the Act. The hope was that this would spur the wider community into
compliance.175 Matui accepted that the clans may have been reluctant to hand in all
their guns for legitimate and valid reasons. Men out with livestock were frequently
armed to protect them and their animals from cattle rustlers; they would have been
reluctant to part with their weapons without other guarantees of security. Even so,
Matui was clearly expecting a much more enthusiastic response and so, quite clearly,
was the provincial administration. On 27 December 1983 Benson Kaaria and the
entire Provincial Security Committee (PSC) announced an extension for the handing
in of weapons. The new deadline was set for 21 January 1984.

173 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.17
174 Names drawn from Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and
the way Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, p.7.
175 From Min5/84., Minutes of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office
on Thursday 26th January beginning at 2.30 p.m, 28th January 1984, p. 4.
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287. Matui described the subsequent response as “poor”. The District Security
Committee assessed the situation in the third week of January. The Ajuran had
surrendered a further 15 firearms. The Degodia had surrendered seven. Over the
course of the disarmament period then, the Ajuran handed in 26 guns and the
Degodia handed in 8. The total number of guns yielded from Wajir was thus 34.
It was a disappointing result from a district believed to hold, at the very least,
hundreds of weapons.
288. There is no doubt that the Degodia emerged as the villains in the eyes of the
government in the faltering story of disarmament in Wajir. Security officials were
far from impressed with the total of 8 guns handed in on their behalf. To make
matters even worse, the Degodia were blamed for the parade of criminal incidents
described above, with nearly every one of them involving serious gun violence.
Matui was personally dismayed at their conduct and general demeanour:
The Degodia appeared completely unconcerned. The Ajuran were being convinced
easily by the government to surrender their firearms, unlike the Degodia who were
very difficult.176

289. If the Degodia were the villains in government’s eyes, then the Ajuran were the
victims. They were portrayed as a community who had obeyed the government
directive even though this had apparently exposed them to further attacks from
the Degodia:
The Ajuran were openly blaming the government for its failure to offer them protection
for their lives and their property, especially after they had heeded the government’s
appeal to surrender their firearms which they would have used to protect themselves
against the Degodia-instigated criminals.177

290. To make matters even more complicated, Provincial Security Committee minutes
indicated that by late January 1984, concerns about the Wajir Degodia were
beginning to spread to other parts of the province:
In view of the widespread influx of Degodia tribesmen from Wajir to various places, the
PSC advises that when Degodia tribesmen infiltrate other people’s areas, they should
be driven out. Apparently the Degodia tribesmen appear to be the aggressors virtually
against all other tribes and nobody appears to like them.178

291. At around the same time, brief mention was made of large numbers of Ajuran who
had crossed into neighbouring Eastern Province, and who were also being pushed
back to Wajir. A company from 7 Kenya Rifles (7KR) had apparently been part of
that effort.
176 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.16
177 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.11
178 Ex-Min. 14/84 Influx of Degodia Tribesmen from Wajir into Garissa, Minutes of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee
Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Thursday 23.2.84. at 10.00 am.
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While the PSC Eastern commends the efforts of the Marsabit DSC in driving out the Ajuran
tribesmen back to Wajir District, the North Eastern PSC wishes to record that the effort of
the CO. 7KR in driving out the Ajurans from the Eastern Province side should not escape
a mention.179

292

All these groups were being forcibly driven back to a district wracked by drought
and instability.

293. By the end of January 1984, the attempt to disarm the Degodia had all but
collapsed. The Provincial Security Committee was kept informed. Discussions in
Garissa about the situation ran along precisely the same lines as in Wajir in that the
Ajuran were cooperating and the Degodia were not:
The PSC noted with appreciation that the Ajuran group has co-operated with the
security forces and this has made it possible for the recovery of 31 firearms and a
number of assorted ammunitions. This move is very encouraging. Contrarily (sic),
Degodia have proved very adamant in surrendering of arms. The PSC pointed out that
apart from refusing to surrender the firearms; they are concealing and harbouring
destructive elements who are constantly harassing the Ajuran. They have not shown
any willingness to co-operate with the security personnel.180

294. The Provincial Security Committee’s discussion of Wajir ended with an important
recommendation:
Consequently the PSC recommended that to realise effectiveness, stiffer measures
should be deployed against the Degodia. Action: Wajir DSC.181

295. In early February, the Wajir District Security Committee raised the stakes. The
decision was made to shut the Degodia and their herds of livestock out of accessing
wells and watering holes in Wajir District. Along with the detention of the four
prominent Degodia leaders earlier in January 1984, the closing off of the wells was
intended as a collective punishment that would speed up compliance with the
earlier order to disarm:
As part of surrender of firearms, the DSC suggested that those suspected to be in
possession of illegally acquired firearms were reluctant to surrender them. They further
thought of another punishment whereby they were not allowed to have access to
watering points, which is very important in a place like Wajir and nearly all of North
Eastern Province.182
179 Ex-Min. Marsabit DSC Held on 16.11.83 as a follow-up to Ex-Min.130/83: Northern Eastern Residents in Eastern Province, Minutes
of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Thursday 23.2.84. at
10.00 a.m.
180 Ex-Min. 3/84 (ii) Tribal Tension Between Degodia and Ajuran in Wajir, Minutes of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee
Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Thursday 23.2.84. at 10.00 a.m.
181 Ex-Min. 3/84 (ii) Tribal Tension Between Degodia and Ajuran in Wajir Minutes of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee
Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Thursday 23.2.84. at 10.00 a.m.
182 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.5
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296. The closing off of the wells was something that many Wajir residents remembered
because it took place at the height of a crippling drought. Abdi Ismael Hilowle’s
memories are particularly sharp because he worked with the Ministry of Livestock
at the time and so the issue fell under his docket:
I happened to go to the police officer in charge at the division and inquired on what
was happening. He told me these are orders which have come from the Divisional
Security Committee, which was not in his jurisdiction. That is why he deployed his
askaris to go and stop the community from accessing water. I had nothing to say
because the orders were from above. I had to do my level best to get any assistance
that I could get for the community. This was because I was living in a government camp
which is almost as large as this site where we are at Red Cross Hall. It had water which
was being pumped from the wells in that area. It had enough water taps all round with
my subordinate staff living in the area. I told my colleagues to be a bit lenient and give
water to the community that is coming right from the bush. Approximately 300 wells
were closed for the Degodias. All the people were running away saying that they had
been denied access to water.183

297. With hundreds of people and animals roaming the Wajir countryside in search of
water and few arms being turned in, a process originally intended to pacify and
secure the area ended up having precisely the opposite effect. Wajir was unstable,
the Ajuran and Degodia remained as divided as ever and the government position
was hardening. Worse was to follow.

February 1984 Security Operation
298.

February has always been a difficult month in Wajir. The rain and cooler weather of
November and December give way to unrelenting heat. Wajir residents usually have
to brace themselves for days and weeks of very uncomfortable conditions. February
1984 was even more uncomfortable and difficult than usual. The rains had been poor
and drought stalked the land. Temperatures were soaring in more ways than one. With
the failure of disarmament, continuing clan tensions, and government intransigence,
the district was a literal and figurative tinderbox waiting to explode. This is precisely
what happened between the 8 and 14 February 1984 in an extraordinary week for
Wajir. The Commission pieced together the events of those seven days by examining
a range of previously classified material. It was not an easy story to tell and its
production was fraught with difficulty. Nonetheless, it is hoped that its telling will
shed light on one of the most troubling episodes in Kenya’s history.

Main Actors
299. The week in Wajir between 8 and 14 February 1984 was characterised by intensive
interactions involving a number of important people and committees from the
overlapping and sometimes confusing world of internal security in Kenya during
183 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Nairobi/ p.36

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

239

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

the 1980s. While some of their names may be familiar their functions are particular
to the time period under consideration.

District Security Committee
300.

District Security Committees are a standard feature of the internal security
arrangements of all districts in Kenya. The membership of the District Security
Committee was unchanging and consisted of the District Commissioner, the OCPD
(Officer Commanding Police Division) who was the ranking police officer in the
district, and the District Special Branch Officer, who was the ranking Special Branch
officer in the district. Because North Eastern was what is known as an “operational
area”, the officer commanding the Army Division was also a member of the District
Security Committee. The function of the District Security Committee was clearly
spelt out in the Security Charter:
To keep under regular review measures for the maintenance and review of law and
order in the provinces and districts, to meet normally once a month for this purpose,
and to refer to the Provincial Security Committee concerned or to the Kenya Security
Committee as appropriate any problems in the internal security field, which, in their
view requires attention and cannot be solved locally. Subject to the overall control of
the President advised by the National Security Council, the direction of an emergency in
a province or district lies with the Provincial or District Security Committee.184

301.

The Wajir District Security Committee was in a state of flux in February 1984 and in
the months that followed. Matui, the District Commissioner, was on leave. He had
not taken annual leave since he arrived in Wajir in October 1983. The first person
to hold brief for Matui while he, as he put it, “enjoyed” a much-needed break on his
small farm in Eastern Kenya, was Mr Godow,185 his District Officer. Godow, however,
was described by both Kaaria and Matui as frail and sickly. In the third week of
January he came down with malaria. It was at this point that Mr Manasseh Tiema,
who was an Administrative Officer in Garissa, was sent to Wajir. Tiema arrived in Wajir
on 24 January 1984 and served as the acting District Commissioner throughout the
operational period. Matui returned briefly to the district in February but left shortly
afterwards for a short course in the United Kingdom. Upon completion, Matui took
up his post again until December 1984. He was then replaced by David Mativo.

302. Another member of the District Security Committee in Wajir in 1984 was Mr
Wabwire, the OCPD. Major Mudogo was the officer in command of the Kenya Army
company in Wajir. The District Special Branch Officer was a Mr Kibere, though there
is some question as to whether he was actually in the district throughout the week
in question. His deputy, Mr Mbole, may have stepped in at some point.
184 Benson Kaaria, North Eastern Province Internal Security Scheme, p. 8.
185 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
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Some of the government officials who were in office at the time when Wagalla massacre took place appearing
before the Commission.

Provincial Security Committee
303.

The Provincial Security Committee (PSC) mirrored the District Security Committee
(DSC). Its membership consisted of virtually the same officials serving at the
provincial level and based in Garissa. The PSC’s functions and tasks were identical.
The committee was headed by Provincial Commissioner Benson Kaaria, the longserving administrator with many years of public service. Kaaria also had the dubious
distinction of direct involvement in at least one other large security operation in
North Eastern Kenya - Bulla Karatasi.

304. The exigencies of the security situation in North Eastern Province meant that the
Deputy Provincial Commissioner was also a member of the PSC. Alexander Njue
had held that post since July 1981. The Provincial Police Officer (PPO) was Mr Aswani
but he was absent for most of that week. His place on the committee was taken by
his deputy, Mr Gaturuku. The Commanding Officer of 7KR Battalion headquartered
in Garissa was Lt Colonel Frank Muhindi, who was a long-serving army officer with
many years of experience in Northern Kenya. He was also a member of the PSC.
The Provincial Special Branch Officer sat on the committee as well. Mr Okello was
the usual occupant of that position but he was also away on leave during February.
His deputy, Mr Joseph Muthui Ndirangu, filled in for him after having recently been
transferred from Rift Valley Province.
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Provincial and District Intelligence Committees
305. The Provincial and District Intelligence Committees were closely related to the
District and Provincial Security Committees. Membership was similar to the
security committees. The Provincial Intelligence Committee, for instance, was
headed by the PC. The PPO served as the secretary. The Provincial Special Branch
Officer (PSBO) was a member of the Intelligence Committee as well.186 Provincial
Intelligence Committees have been described as being “led” by the PSBOs, in that
their intelligence reports were used to structure meetings. This distinguished them
from PS meetings, which were run and set by the PC.
306. The other unique characteristic of the Provincial Intelligence Committee was
that their meetings were never minuted and rarely recorded. Members simply
met before the Provincial Security Committee and discussed anything in the
Special Branch Officer’s briefing that had security implications. If necessary,
recommendations and proposals were carried into the main security committee
meeting. Provincial Intelligence Committee members have described their role
as ‘advisory’.187 District Intelligence Committees played the same function at the
district level.

Kenya Intelligence Committee
307.

The Kenya Intelligence Committee (KIC) was another intelligence-related body
that was involved in Wajir during the week of the 8 to 14 February 1984. Unlike the
District and Provincial Intelligence and Security Committees which were somewhat
straightforward (in composition and function), the functions and powers of the Kenya
Intelligence Committee are more difficult to establish. The colonial predecessor to this
committee may have participated in the processing of intelligence and information
that went on to form the core of anti-Mau Mau policies. The committee seems to
have retreated in importance in the decade or so after independence. Whether it
made any contributions to intelligence efforts during the Shifta War is unknown.
The Kenya Intelligence Committee of the 1980s was described as an intelligence
gathering body by James Stanley Mathenge, the Permanent Secretary in the Office
of the President in charge of Internal Security and Provincial Administration at the
time. As the PS, Internal Security and Provincial Administration, Mathenge served
as the head of the Kenya Intelligence Committee. This was an ex officio position,
meaning that the PS also served as the head of the KIC.

186 In the 1990s, membership of the Provisional Intelligence Committee was re-drawn to include the Provincial Criminal Investigation
Officer and (eventually) the Military Commander in charge of the particular region. Under General Tonje, Kenya was divided into two
military command regions: Eastern Command and Western Command. In this new system, North Eastern Province fell under Eastern
Command. From TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 8 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.45
187 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 8 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.67
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308. The rest of the committee consisted of a small and fairly select group of people:
Permanent Secretaries drawn from the ministries of Information, Foreign Affairs,
Defence, Home Affairs, the Director of Intelligence, the Commissioner of Police
and the officer in charge of Intelligence in the Army. In February 1984 the persons
occupying those posts were Mr Gituma, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Mr Muliro,
David Mwiraria, James Kanyotu, Bernard Njinu and Brigadier (later General) Joseph
Raymond Kibwana, respectively.
309.

In a fairly convoluted arrangement that Mathenge laid out before the Commission,
the KIC had its own secretariat (but no actual office) housed within the Office of the
President. Secretariat staff included the Deputy Security Finance (Mr Kamenchu)
and the Deputy Secretary Security (Mr Mwangovya) who acted as secretary and
scheduler, respectively. From Mathenge’s description, it appears that the committee’s
primary role was to receive intelligence and, if and when necessary, to give advice
and suggestions that were then passed up to two more senior bodies: the Kenya
Security Committee and the National Security Council (NSC). Minutes of meetings of
the Kenya Intelligence Committee acquired by the Commission confirm that it often
made suggestions to other relevant security organs. While the KIC does not appear
to have had direct operational powers, there is no question that it was an important
and influential body in the national security structure of the time.

310. It is useful to understand the Kenya Intelligence Committee as a counterpart to
the District and Provincial Intelligence Committees described above. Mathenge
and other members who appeared before the Commission emphasised the
committee’s advisory role; actual implementation rested with the KIC. It must
also be remembered, however, that in another replication of the Provincial
Intelligence/Provincial Security Committee divide, all the members of the Kenya
Intelligence Committee were also members of the Kenya Security Committee.
Their respective ministers were members as well and the committee was chaired
by the Vice-President and Minister for Home Affairs. In February 1984, the Vice
President and chair of the Kenya Intelligence Committee was Mwai Kibaki (who
would later become President). The National Security Council sat at the apex of
the security pyramid in Kenya at the time. It was made up of the President, his
ministers, the Director of Intelligence, the Commissioner of Police and the Chief
of General Staff.

7th Kenya Rifles Battalion
311. In February 1984, the Kenya Army battalion based in North Eastern Province was
the 7th Battalion. Popularly referred to as 7KR, the battalion was a relative newcomer
to the region. It was only created in 1968 and so had not participated in the Shifta
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War, unlike the 1st, 3rd and 5th battalions. The battalion was headquartered in Garissa
under the Command of Frank Muhindi.
312. Three companies were stationed in Garissa, Wajir and Mandera; each company
had an officer in command. Major Mudogo was in charge of Wajir and Major (now
retired Brigadier) Phillip Chebet commanded the company in Garissa. A Major
Kamau was in Mandera.
313. The second in charge of the battalion and a few remnants were “in the rear”, back
in Nairobi at Lang’ata Barracks. Platoons, which are smaller, were also available to
be deployed when and where needed throughout the province. Battalions were
rotated in and out of the province every six months or so. In March 1984, 7KR left
Garissa and was replaced with 3KR; an old North Eastern hand.

Seven dreadful days in February 1984
An eye-witness account, Mohamed Ibrahim Elmi
(TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nairobi/18 May 2011/p.)

At the time I was a nursing officer in
charge of TB, Manyatta dispensary. During the week of the operation, I was doing
night rotation and in charge of the District
Hospital. This was Thursday 9 February,
1984. I was on night duty at the hospital
which is adjacent to the police station
and the police lines. Sometime, between
2.00am and 3.00am there was a police
alarm which is usually a signal to call all
policemen to duty. I know it because I
was brought up in the police lines. A lot
of movement of vehicles, followed until
morning. On Friday, 10 February, 1984,
that is that morning between 7.00am and
8.00am having handed over my duties, I was passing in front of the police station and found a
lot of men being kept outside and being herded into lorries. At the very moment when I was
passing by with colleagues from the hospital, my elder brother, Hassan Ibrahim Elmi, who was
a retired police officer, was being put on one of the lorries. I stopped to ask why. The officer
was rude and told me to go away. However, I persisted and managed to talk to my brother. He
was able to give me the keys to his shop, which I took to his family to be able to open the shop.
One of the staff, Abdi Ibrahim, who was walking with me, was a night watchman at the
hospital. He chose to go ahead while I engaged the police and my brother. Later in the day,
I learnt that he was picked up on his way home and taken to the airstrip where he died. I
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continued to walk home and found different people in small groups. I learnt that my other
elder brother, Ugaz Ibrahim, was among those who were also picked up. There were soldiers
and KANU youth wingers all over the place identifying male Degodias. On being asked to
identify themselves, anyone who said that they were Degodia were arrested. By mid-morning, most people were aware that the soldiers were looking for Degodias and were not identifying themselves as such any more.
However, a few KANU youth wingers and some local chiefs continued to identify some
men. On that Friday, I learnt that similar operations targeting the Degodia were taking place
in all the adjacent trading centres as far as Buna and Modogashe, which are hundreds of kilometres away. Anyone who was identified as such was picked up and taken to the airstrip. There
were reports that herders who had brought their animals to watering points were also picked
up and the livestock left without people to herd them. Some livestock were taken by some
security forces. In a number of trading centres, herders were refused access to water. Women
and children were beaten up very badly. On the whole of that Friday, people continued to be
brought from all over Wajir to the airstrip. By the end of that day, we witnessed a lot of lorries
with additional military personnel said to have come from Moyale, Mandera and Garissa, join
the operation.
On Saturday, 11 February, 1984, the operation continued. It was particularly bad in Bulla
Jogoo in Wajir town, where all non-permanent houses called herios belonging to the Degodia were torched and burnt down. That was when women were raped. I distinctly remember
that a disabled person was burnt in one of those houses. My colleague at TB Manyatta dispensary, Sister Annalena Tonelli, went to remove the remains for burial on Sunday morning.
Three Degodia men who were remaining in town stayed hiding for the whole of this period.
On Sunday, 12 February, a public baraza was called by the acting District Commissioner, Mr
Ndiema, in which he asked among many things for those whose houses were burnt to go back
to where they came from. At the time, it was understood that he meant people should leave
Kenya and go to Ethiopia.
On Monday, 12 February, I learnt that on the previous day, a number of those who were
kept at the airstrip had escaped and many of them had been killed. The story I was told was
that a security team visited the airstrip and the majority of the people learnt that they had
no hope of surviving. They were told that all of them would die until they brought back the
guns. In their desperation, people started running away. A number of the wounded came
into town. I first saw people in the morning at the hospital brought by the headmaster of
Sabule secondary school, Mr Ibrahim Wude. Sabule is on the side of Wagalla in the town.
Many students went out and helped some of the people they saw. After I saw this man, there
was information going round that people had been released, which later proved to be false.
Sister Annalena and I went to see the DO, Central, whose name I do not remember, and told
him that the people had been released and that a lot of them were wounded and that we
wanted to provide assistance. He offered to accompany us.
We went to the airstrip while he was preparing to join us. I remember it was mid-morning. As soon as we went up to the gates of the airstrip and got out of the vehicles, the soldiers at the gate looked at us a bit bewildered. It took them a few seconds to realise that we
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were there. During that short period that we stood there, what I saw and what has remained
etched very distinctly in mind today is a pile of bodies to my right and two naked people
carrying yet another body to put on the pile. On the left side of the field, I saw a young man
who ran to a water bowser, where water was leaking and flowing to the ground. Two soldiers
came from two different directions with sticks; beat him up like an animal until he ran back to
the crowd at the centre of the field.
By then, the military officer in charge ran up to us and started asking us why we were
there. Sister Annalena said that we had been told that people had been released and we
were coming to help them. He asked: Who told you that? At this point, it dawned upon me
that I had put the sister at risk. So, I told him that I was the one who told her and that I was
a member of the International Red Cross. Actually I was a member of the local one. But I
said this to give her some protection. I said that I had heard that information from injured
people who had come to the hospital. When we said that we had come to look for injured
people, I remember him saying that then he would give us soldiers to accompany us and to
bring back those people because they had escaped. At that point, the DO Central arrived,
which I believed is what saved us. The army officer quarrelled with him telling him that he
did not know what he was doing. They all cocked their guns and told us to leave the place
and we left. That DO was very pained and upset. I believe he was a very good man.
When we reached town, we learnt that there had been a breakout and many people were
shot while attempting to escape. We also learnt that many were wounded and were hiding
in the bush. So, we went back later that day scouting for those who were injured during the
escape of the previous night. We moved around the area. I remember we were joined by two
Norwegian volunteers. I remember in particular, there was one man we found sitting under
a shade who was naked, whose legs were burnt up to the knees. His story was that as many
people came off the lorries they were told to remove their clothes. A number of these clothes
were put aside and set on fire. They were told to step on them. This is how he got burned. We
took him to the hospital.
As we were searching, we came across many women. These women were moving around
carrying water and looking for their loved ones. We spent the whole of that day combing the
bushes and collecting injured people, especially those identified by some of the women. But
it was not easy because people were running away from vehicles. In my view, many people
died that day.
On 14 February, between 4.00am and 5.00am - I cannot remember exactly, I was woken
up by one of my brother’s children to say that my elder brother Hassan, the ex-policeman,
had come home. I went there and he told me how he got off the lorry on the Wajir-Mandera
road, somewhere not far from Wajir town. He told me that all the people who were alive were
put in lorries and taken to different routes. The vehicles were moving very slowly because
their lights were off. So, he managed to lower himself down with the help of another expoliceman. He was totally naked and walked all the way to his house. I ran to Sister Annalena’s
compound and we went off to the route that he mentioned and started picking people. You
might want to know why I kept going back to Sister Annalena.
This is because she is a foreigner and that accorded her some protection; and, of course
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she was also a very brave woman. We stopped public vehicles and they helped us to collect
and bring people to the hospital. We took the very injured to the hospital, which quickly
became very full. At the time, the hospital had only one male ward. We took the rest to her
compound for treatment.
We mobilised the hospital staff to start treating them. Some volunteered to work even
day and night. They were many, but I want just to mention a few. These were Dabo Diriye,
Anashiago is deceased, Dabar Abdi, the Medical Office of Health at the time was called Jawor,
Sister Panasero and many other nurses. By the end of Tuesday, both the hospital’s only male
ward and Sister Annalena’s compound were full of sick and injured people who had been
beaten. On the same day, between 10.00am and 11.00am, by then we had collected most of
the ones on the Wajir-Mandera road. I remember there was an international delegation from
the leader of Red Cross Societies, Switzerland led by C.E. Aquest. They were visiting the local branch. I believe this visit was organised earlier and they had somehow managed to get
through the net. The security was determined to control the visit. They were taken from the
airport to the DC’s office and not allowed to see anything. However, Sister Annalena went
with me to the DC’s office. She went in to the meeting and told the visitors that there are a lot
of people dying and that we needed assistance. When she called me, she heard the DC saying
that was not true. I believe those sisters were taken back to the airport without interacting
with the people in the town.
While I was waiting outside in the car, I was confronted by the OCPD, Mr Baobera, who
insisted that I remove the Red Cross emblem that we had put on the vehicle which we did afterwards. In the late afternoon of the same day, we got word that another group of survivors
had been dumped along the Wajir-Moyale road at a placed called Dela. We got a guide and
left with two vehicles. One was driven by a Norwegian aid worker accompanied by Ahmed
Jele and Ibrahim Khamisi. The other was driven by Annalena Tonelli, myself and the guide.
The guide was very good and he managed to make us avoid the roadblocks and eventually
we ended up on the main road of Moyale at a place after the roadblocks when it was getting
dark. After a while, we picked up an elder who was among those who had been dumped
there. He had survived and tried to walk back to the road. He explained to us how the site
looked like and in his description, there were dead people there. We went there and found
in the first week dead bodies before we reached the main place. As we parked our cars with
their doors open, two military vehicles came to us. The soldiers asked us for directions. I remember them asking us where Eldas was. They were wearing masks, more like handkerchiefs
on their noses. They told us to remove our vehicle from the road so that they could pass. They
went ahead and as they passed, there was a stench coming from the lorries. We later learnt
that they were the ones dropping the dead bodies and one of the sites not far from that
area was visited by the senior investigating officer from Nairobi, Superintendent Amarati.
We went ahead and eventually brought back 16 people alive in our vehicles, although one
of them died on our way back. We saw many dead bodies in that general area. At that point,
we were only interested in rescuing people rather than counting dead bodies. We came back
and took the injured to Annalena’s compound for treatment. The one who died was buried at
Annalena’s compound. One of those who survived out of those 16 is now a councillor in Wajir
and he is called Abdullahi. I know of some who died later on Wednesday 15 February 1994.
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On the following day, we went to
Girftu Eldas in that general direction,
because we were told that people who
were dropped in that area walked in
that general direction. We told the public that it was safe and people could be
brought to the hospital. By then, many
people had joined the rescue. After we
came back, we went to Wagalla that afternoon through a back route because
the main roads of the town were also
blocked. We went back behind the
fence on the other side of the airstrip where a lot of people who had been shot had been
scattered around the place. We spread out into the bush to look for bodies with the intention
of burying them. They were all over and very many. At that point, we decided that because
there was a lot of disbelief in that part of the town, that we should carry some of the bodies into town so that they could be buried there. There was total denial by the police that
anything was happening even at that point. Ex-police Sergeant Bashe who had a pick-up,
volunteered to drive the bodies from Wagalla through town to the Catholic compound of
Sister Annalena. Commissioners, you might wonder why Muslims were driven to a Catholic
compound but at the time, it looked the only safe place because people were not being allowed to bury the dead. Because the bodies were decomposed, the vehicle could only carry
about twelve of them.
They were driven and we deliberately did it in the police station until they were eventually buried at Annalena’s rehabilitation centre compound. On Thursday, 16 February, the
following day, we returned with grave diggers and buried the rest. We dug one mass grave
and started pulling some of the bodies there. However, by then, it got dark and so we agreed
to finish the work the following day. This time round, we decided to go through the main
road because it was dark. There were several of us in two vehicles but they had set up several
ambushes and right at the entrance of Wagalla town, we were ambushed, beaten thoroughly
and taken to Wajir police station.
We spent the night in the cells and we were released the following morning without any
charges. We were not allowed to go back to Wagalla to continue the burials, which was left
for others to do. Those mass graves remain unmarked behind the airstrip. Now, comes the
period of cover-up where people are continuously being killed. By the middle of the week
beginning February 13th, we were overwhelmed at the hospital. Because of the high volume
of supplies that we asked from AMREF, they did not have enough and I am told they went
to the Ministry of Health (MoH). I am told the MoH wondered why they were asked for this
high volume of supplies. I learnt from Dr Nancy Caroline who was the head of medical wing
of AMREF at the time that the Ministry of Health had to ask for clearance from the Office of
the President (OP) to send the supplies. At this time, OP stopped them, including getting
supplies for Sir Michael Wood who was the founder of AMREF, I am told they mobilised a
number of European countries to come to Wajir to assess the situation but this was blocked.

248

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

They reached Habaswein but they were forced to turn back. So, a lot of people died weeks
and months after the operation for lack of adequate supplies. It was some time before any
outsider was allowed to come to Wajir, mainly Red Cross, AMREF and Oxfam and even then,
they said they were there because of the drought. Every move of theirs was covered by the
Special Branch. Weeks after the operation, Dr Daba Abdi and some other hospital workers
and I were arrested and taken before the District Security Committee. The questions we were
asked were largely geared towards finding out my knowledge of things and I got again from
one of the corporals who arrested me that they would check what I knew and if I knew too
much I would be detained or the worst could happen. This was another good officer. Therefore, I was generally truthful about what I described to them and I would have displayed the
numbers that I saw. Subsequently, I was told by the nomadic pastoralists that a team of soldiers went out and poured chemicals on the dead bodies that completely decimated them
and even the bone structure. That is why it was subsequently hard to find them.
Superintendent SP Amariati was sent from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID)
Headquarters in Nairobi to carry out the investigation almost a month later, which could
hardly be independent. I remember organising a number of people to see him to give their
testimony at Annalena’s rehabilitation centre. I remember bringing my elder brother, the expoliceman. I sat through the first preliminary parts when he was asking my brother’s opinion on what were the numbers at the airstrip by the second day when everyone had been
brought in. As someone who was used to estimating crowds, my brother said that he thought
they were up to 5,000 people. To this day, the people of Wajir have never seen a report of that
investigation.
The government has continuously denied that a massacre took place. However, in October 1992, just before the elections, the former President Moi indirectly admitted it by promising to set up a Wagalla Trust Fund. I attach three sample letters sent to ten persons. I was
one of them and the local Member of Parliament, A.D.M. Amin, who were supposed to be
members of the trust fund. After the elections, the fund was never established. It is this during this period that we were rescuing people and, therefore, heard a lot of testimonies of
survivors on the kind of things that had happened to the people at the airstrip. There were
those who were burnt, beaten up and sodomised. They had no food and water all through
that period. The worst thing is that, that day at 3.00pm, there was a water bowser which was
just pouring water into the ground and nobody was being given any. Clubs, sticks, machetes
and gun butts were used. On Sunday, the people who broke out were shot. Here are some
of the stories that have stuck with me over the years. The testimony of Hassan Gure who is
currently a DLPO in Rhamu, Mandera and how he survived during the breakout is very telling. He says whichever way he ran, bodies were falling around him as they were shot. Then
there is the story of the hospital watchman whose Maasai machete was used by an infamous
sergeant whose name kept coming up.
He killed him and many others using his machete. The sergeant was so brutal that he
killed very many people. There is a captain who put a pistol in people’s mouths and blew their
heads up. There is the story of a young man, and this one is still alive since I saw him recently
on Sunday, when he could not hold his thirst any longer. He pretended that he had a gun and
led them back to town to their homes, went in, drank water, came out and said: “I do not have
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a gun and take me back at which point they took him back to the airstrip.”
The story of that particular young man showed how desperate people were. His family
was very upset with him for bringing the soldiers to their home because then they did worse
things at their home. That shows you the desperation. Another was the murderous stint of a
soldier who beat up a young man with the butt of his gun and got tired and then just decided
to catch him and bite him. He had a bite mark on his left arm. I believe that young man joined
the Kenya Army a few months later. Then there was the story of many civil servants picked up
from their work places who died there and whose families had to contend with the fact that
their departmental heads were told to declare them as having absconded from duty. Then
there is the story of the many people who have not been found even today. Rumours circulated for months after the massacre which gave people hope that their loved ones would
still be alive somewhere. My brother, Hugas Ibrahim Elmi, is one of those whose bodies have
never been found.
My recommendations are that in my view, that was a systematic, well-planned operation
which was well covered-up later. To date, no serious investigation or inquiry has been done
until this process. I and the people I represent were affected by this incident seek the following: First and foremost, to know the truth and, therefore, urge all those who were involved
to come forward and testify to this Commission so that once and for all we can close this
chapter. Two, an additional judicial inquest to carry out an in-depth investigation, something
we have been asking from the courts since 2005. The purpose is to establish precisely how
many people died, what happened and at what point. To date, it is impossible to establish the
exact number of people who died. I would like to give the example of an old man who was
visiting his son who had come from abroad and was returning to Mandera. The bus stopped
there and he slept in a lodging. He was picked up from there and he died there. There were
many people who were picked up from faraway places or towns and so it is very difficult for
the elders to know exactly how many people died. Thirdly, we want justice and justice can
take many forms and, therefore, that is what we ask for. We ask for reparations both general
and individual. We ask for memorialisation to ensure that events like those never happen
anywhere in Kenya again, as the motto of the Commission says: 'Never Again!'
On a personal note, I would like to say that Sister Annalena did extraordinary things. Without her, many lives would have been lost. She has since died. Apart from ways to remember
her service to humanity, I would like her to be posthumously cleared of the false allegations
that I am aware of that were made by the district security committees as part of their cover up
by telling the headquarters that she was a spy and all that. I can without doubt under oath say
that Sister Annalena was very forthright and did her things very professionally. She was interested only in service. For the many years until she died, I have known her. She had refused to
talk to journalists. She told me that she would talk to only the proper authority. I wish she was
alive today to talk to this Commission. She had told her story to the ASP who had come and,
therefore, I was very sure that she was there to serve and help the sick. A year after the massacre
and when her work permit came to an end, she was declared a persona non grata and given 24
hours to leave the country – a callous decision that caused her great pain as well as suffering to
the children and patients for whom she was caring.
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Wednesday 8 February 1984
314. On the morning of 8 February 1984, a large military aircraft took off from Nairobi’s
Eastleigh Airport and headed for Garissa before landing at Wajir’s military airstrip
at around 9.00am. On board were guests from Nairobi and Garissa. The Kenya
Intelligence Committee and the Provincial Security Committee members were in
town on an important trip that had already been postponed at least once before.
The visit was originally slated to take place from the 28 to 1 December 1983.188 This
earlier trip had been cancelled on account of numerous scheduling difficulties.
Eventually new dates were agreed upon and as a result both committees were
represented in their entirety.189 The visiting delegation was met by the District
Security Committee under the leadership of the acting District Commissioner,
Mr Tiema.
315. A former military officer recounted receiving a delegation from Nairobi at Wagalla
airstrip on 8th February 1984:
When I was a corporal in the military, I was told on 8 February that there were some
intelligence people from Nairobi who were coming. So, I took a Land rover Registration
No. 04 KA 89. I was told to go to the airstrip to take Brigadier Kibwana. When I reached
the airport, I found Brigadier Kibwana and the Battalion Commander who was then
Francis (Frank) Muhindi I saw them when they were alighting from the flight; they were
with Mr (Bethuel) Kiplagat and the DC, Garissa.190
From the airport, which was also sometimes referred to as the ‘Forward Operation Base’,
the team was driven to the DC’s office, which sits in a dusty complex in the centre of the
town. The DC’s office proper, which would ordinarily have been used, was too small for the
entire delegation, so everyone was ushered into the much larger boardroom just opposite.

316. Signing the visitor’s book was (and continues to be) part of the routine for all
visitors to government offices in Kenya. And this is what the delegation did when
presented with the book by Tiema. Gituma, Kibwana, Kiplagat, Mathenge, Mwiraria
and Njinu all signed in as members of the Kenya Intelligence Committee. Aswani,
Kaaria, Muhindi and Ndirangu all appended their signatures as members of the
Provincial Security Committee. The others present who also signed the visitor’s
book represented a number of departments and government offices which, at first
glance, appeared to have very little to do with either security or intelligence. They
included Mr Kinyanjui of Land Adjudication; Mr Okumu, the Chief Aerodromes
188 Notification of this trip was circulated through PC Garissa to DCs Garissa, Mandera and Wajir KIC Visit to North Eastern Province
16th November 1983, District Intelligence File Wajir Registry
189 Confirmation of the new trip dates was made during the Provincial Security Committee meeting of 26th January 1984. See Min 6/84,
Minutes of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held In The Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Thursday
26th January Beginning at 2.30 p.m., 28th January 1984, p. 4 – 5
190 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 19 April 2011/ p. 27
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Engineer; and Mr Kiwura from Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation.191
The reason for their presence would become clearer as the meeting unfolded.
317.

Following a few preliminary comments from Mathenge and Kaaria, Tiema then
stood up to present a report prepared specially for the meeting. The Commission
acquired a copy of this much-talked about but elusive document.192 As with so many
other issues surrounding Wagalla, understanding the contents of the brief required
understanding the prevailing situation in Wajir at that time.

318.

The brief was initially produced and compiled on 1 February 1984 by the District
Security Committee and while the document was signed by Tiema, he did not
actually prepare it as he had arrived in Wajir only a week earlier. He thus lacked the
local knowledge necessary to assemble such a document. The actual compilation
of the brief was thus left to other members of the DSC under the direction of David
Matui, who was described by Mr Tiema in his testimony as the substantive District
Commissioner.193

319.

The end product was a far-ranging overview of the security situation in Wajir on
a constituency by constituency basis. Wajir South was described as “extremely
quiet” on account of the fact that the constituency was occupied by just one clan:
the Ogaden.194 Wajir East was seen as more problematic because of the apparent
prevalence of Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian bandits in transit through it on the way
to Wajir West and back. Wajir West itself was represented as nothing less than the
main stage of inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflict. The grim series of attacks, counterattacks and failed peace efforts in Wajir West were covered in detail by the brief.

320. After describing the security problems in the region, Tiema’s presentation went
on to cover the issue of short and long-term solutions to insecurity in Wajir. The
short-term picture presented to the Kenya Intelligence Committee (KIC) was of a
District Security Committee hampered in its fight against insecurity by old and
dilapidated equipment. The KIC was informed of the need for new radios, a mineplated Mercedes lorry, a Land Rover, and a water truck. While the committee was
not empowered to purchase such equipment, the Commission established that
it could and did regularly pass requests like this on to the relevant government
authorities. The next section of the document consisted of a long analysis of
the main causes of banditry in North Eastern and possible solutions. The entire
discussion was presented under the heading Recommendations for Long-Term Policy
191 The list is drawn from Mwangovya K.I.C Secretariat to Department of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Commissioner of Police, Director of Intelligence, Department of Defence KIC Tour of
North Eastern Province 24th May 1984
192 Wajir DSC Brief to KIC during Its Visit to Wajir District on 8th February 1984, 1st February 1984.
193 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.11
194 Wajir DSC Brief to KIC During Its Visit to Wajir District on 8th February 1984, 1st February 1984, 1
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to Eradicate Banditry Activities in the Province.195 The District Security Committee
identified three main causes of banditry as:
i.

Political or ideological

ii.

Tribal animosity and

iii.

Robbery for personal gain which is perpetuated by the poverty of the
province.196

321. The solutions presented during this meeting on 8 February 1984 were, essentially, a
close re-working of proposals that had been generated six months earlier in August
1983 when District Commissioner Matui had written to his officers asking for their
views on insecurity. That document was titled Suggestions and Recommendations
for Wajir District Security and it was sent to Kaaria in September 1983.197 It may have
been sent to Garissa again in November of that same year when Kaaria wrote to
his district commissioners asking them to prepare briefs for the upcoming Kenya
Intelligence Committee visit. Whatever the case, Suggestions and Recommendations
for Wajir District Security was clearly the inspiration for Recommendations for
Long-Term Policy to Eradicate Banditry Activities in the Province. The proposal for
a “concentrated and ruthless effort” to instil patriotism remained intact; Kenyan
Somalis had to be made to understand that they had to tune into, both literally and
figuratively, the Voice of Kenya instead of Radio Modagishu. The proposal to build
more and better schools and other social interventions were also included. New
proposals not in the earlier documents were also included, such as an energised
recruitment drive to sign up new members for KANU, the ruling political party, and
the banning of Somali currency.
322. All of this added up to a long presentation by Tiema which, for reasons that will
be discussed in a subsequent section, was handily forgotten and only partially
remembered by almost all surviving members of the KIC, the PSC and others who
were present at the meeting in Wajir on 8 February 1984. What followed next
was a discussion of some sort on the issues that had been presented in the brief.
Tiema estimated that the meeting could have taken several hours; it may have
stretched from ten in the morning to about three in the afternoon.198 The meeting
was not minuted in the formal sense. Two reports were written afterwards. The
Commission had copies of both, but they only gave a fleeting, general sense of
the discussions and exchanges that took place.199 The Commission was unable to
195
196
197
198
199

Wajir DSC Brief to KIC During Its Visit to Wajir District on 8th February 1984, 1st February 1984, 8
Wajir DSC Brief to KIC During Its Visit to Wajir District on 8th February 1984, 1st February 1984, 8
Matui to Kaaria, 14th September 1983, District Intelligence File, Wajir Registry
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.40
The two reports are Mwangovya K.I.C Secretariat to Department of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Commissioner of Police, Director of Intelligence, Department of Defence KIC Tour of North
Eastern Province 24th May 1984 and Paul Murimi to Director of Intelligence, KIC Tour of North Eastern Province 16th February 1984.
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establish whether the presentation itself or subsequent discussions touched on
the fact that the District Security Committee had shut down the wells, though it
would be odd for this not to be raised given that most of the briefing and thus
most of the meeting focused on banditry and insecurity in the area and what
steps had and should be taken to increase security in the area.
323. When the meeting ended, the group went on a tour of development-type
installations in and around Wajir. Brigadier Chebet of the 7KR company in
Garissa, who was providing security for the delegation, clearly remembered this
particular part of the programme:
Yes, I remember after the briefing, the DC took the KIC to tour some of these projects.
I remember two or three places which we visited or took the team and one was a
borehole which was stalled. There was a problem with the engine and I remember
when the team got there, they were asking the question why the engine had not
repaired so that the locals could benefit from the water…Another place we went was
the KPLC (Kenya Power and Lighting Company) generating station, where there were
two or three generators, one was functioning and it was directed that the other one
be repaired.200

324. The third stop involved inspection of what are known as the “police lines,” which
house police and administration police. The lines were apparently in poor
condition and police welfare was suffering as a result. The DC served lunch back
at the military base. This was in the late afternoon. Immediately afterwards,
the KIC, the PSC and their entourage flew out of Wajir for an overnight stay in
Mandera.

Thursday 9 February 1984
325. Thursday morning found the Kenya Intelligence and Provincial Security Committees
in Mandera following a familiar schedule: a briefing from the district security team
and a tour of various development projects, including a recently inaugurated
irrigation scheme on the banks of the River Daua.
326. In Wajir itself, however, things were anything but ordinary as the District Security
Committee held an unscheduled meeting convened to discuss an unusual
situation: the murder at six that morning of six people in a village known as Yukho
by a group identified as “ten Degodia armed with firearms.”201 The news took several
hours to reach Wajir itself but once it did, district authorities reacted with speed.
200 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 7 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
201 See Min 16/84/ii, Minutes of the Special DSC Wajir Meeting held on 9/2/84 in the District Commissioner’s Office Starting at 3.00P
P.M., 9th February 1984, p. 2.
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Once again, the Commission benefitted from the location and emergence of a
number of documents and evidence that have enabled the construction of a fairly
detailed narrative. The narrative begins with the minutes of the DSC meeting of 9
February 1984 compiled by Mr Wabwire, the OCPD who was acting as secretary.
Tiema, Wabwire, Kibere, Mudogo and Situma started their deliberations at 3.00pm.
Tiema wasted no time in explaining why they were there:
The chairman informed the members that the purpose of calling for the meeting was
to review the security situation to keep ourselves well informed of the situation as it
was now in the district. He expressed his pleasure in the way members get things done
and the consultation they have continued as they arise and asked them to continue
with that spirit. The members agreed wholesale with the idea and observation.202

327. Before moving to the main focus of the meeting, Tiema also “thanked the members
for their contribution for the brief to the KIC” the day before. With that out of the
way, the DC then went on to list the incidences of robbery, rape and murders visited
upon the Ajuran and blamed them on the Degodia. The killing six days earlier of a
50-year-old Ajuran man in Tula was mentioned, but the most immediate reason for
the committee’s concern were the early morning murders:
And today (9/2/84) at about 0600hrs an Ajuran manyatta at Yukho was again attacked
by ten Degodia bandits who were armed with firearms, rounded up everybody in the
manyatta and killed by firearms (a) Ahmed Ibrahim (b) Hassan Mohammed Sori (c) Abdia
Huka (d) Tume Idhow (burned to death in her hut) (e) Muhia Hassan (f) and Habiba
Hussein all female adults. The total number shot dead in this incident were six and all were
Ajurans. Three camels were shot dead and three aerials burnt to the ground. The following
were injured (a) Abdi Karim Ibrahim and (b) Abdi Aziz Mohammed, both admitted at Wajir
District Hospital. Two empty cartridges were collected from the scene.203

328. The sentiments expressed by the District Security Committee made it clear that
they had had enough of this litany of violence attributed to the Degodia:
(a) Degodia tribesmen have become unnecessarily troublesome by killing
innocent lives despite the warning by the Minister of State in the Office
of the President Hon Hussein Maalim Mohammed on the 16/12/83 to stop
killing and stock raids followed by a series of barazas by PC N/E appealing
to them to surrender arms and live in harmony
(b) At the end of the ten days given for Degodias and Ajuran to surrender firearms,
Degodia had surrendered only one rifle and two rounds of ammunition.
Ajurans had surrendered six rifles and 74 rounds of ammunitions. And as at
202 See Min 15/84, Minutes of the Special DSC Wajir Meeting held on 9/2/84 in the District Commissioner’s Office Starting at 3.00P
P.M., 9th February 1984, p. 1
203 See Min 16/84/ii, Minutes of the Special DSC Wajir Meeting held on 9/2/84 in the District Commissioner’s Office Starting at 3.00P
P.M., 9th February 1984, p. 2
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the time of this meeting, Degodia had surrendered eight rifles and Ajurans 25
rifles.204
329. It was at this point that the District Security Committee decided to act:
After discussion it was resolved that
(a) An immediate joint operation of the Kenya Police, Army and Administration
Police be mounted to be commanded by the OC ‘A’ (COY 7KR) to spread all
over the district to look and arrest the brutal killers of the incidents as per this
(b) Since the killers identification would be difficult as they (killers) could
mingle up with their relatives, sympathizers and harbourers, it was resolved
that all the Degodia tribesmen be rounded up and interrogated with a view
of identifying the killers [for] prosecution.
(c) Since this exercise is a big one, the security personnel in the district will not
be able to cover it adequately, the OC ‘A’ COY 7KR and OCPD were asked to
request for manpower from their respective superiors.205
330. The District Security Committee also addressed the issue of the so-called inciters of
violence:
The DSC has the view of extending the detention of the four inciters of violence
earlier detained namely:
(a) Abdi Sirat Khalif
(b) Mohamed Ali Noor
(c) Omar Ali Birik
(d) Ahmed Elmi Daudi
And the following new inciters of violence namely:
(a) Garey Omar Dore
(b) Hussein Ali Shoda
(c) Abdi Subdow Noor206
204 See Min 16/84/iii, Minutes of the Special DSC Wajir Meeting held on 9/2/84 in the District Commissioner’s Office Starting at 3.00P
P.M., 9th February 1984, p. 2
205 See Min 16/84/iii, Minutes of the Special DSC Wajir Meeting held on 9/2/84 in the District Commissioner’s Office Starting at
3.00P.M., 9th February 1984, p. 2 – 3
206 Mr Abdi Subdow Noor appeared before the Commission on the 19th of April 2011 in Wajir.
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(d) Mohammed Ali Shoda
(e) Daudi Shibil
(f ) Isack Ali Shaoda
(g) Hussein Bure Noor
331. All these done under section 11 (I) (b) of the preservation of public security (North
Eastern Province and contiguous District Regulations) for interrogation.207
332. The meeting ended at 4.50pm. With Major Mudogo, the officer in command of the
7KR company in charge of all the operational details, the Wajir District Security
Committee moved into action.
333. An hour later, at about 6.00pm, communication (“a signal”) was sent to Mr Aswani,
then the Garissa PPO. The signal sent details about the situation in Griftu and
requested reinforcements for the operation. The Commission’s reconstruction of
what happened next draws heavily from the testimony of then Provincial Special
Branch Officer Joseph Ndirangu.208
334. The Kenya Intelligence Committee and the Provincial Security Committee members
landed in Garissa from the Mandera leg of their trip between 6.00 and 6.30pm in
the evening of the 9 February. The delegation gathered for a dinner hosted by PC
Kaaria. As people were milling around waiting to have dinner, the signal arrived
in the Garissa Operation Room from Wajir. It was addressed to Aswani, who then
passed the information on to Kaaria, Ndirangu and the rest of the members of the
group who were involved in security in a fairly informal fashion; no meeting of the
Provincial Security Committee was held at this point.
335. As Ndirangu explained it:
Joseph Muthui Ndirangu: The briefing from the PPO was on individual lines. We did not
make it a security meeting or a meeting at that time because we were congregating for
a meal. Therefore it was relayed to us on individual lines. So he told me about the signal
from Wajir calling for reinforcement and that there was an attack somewhere in Griftu. I
think he could have done the same to…
Leader of Evidence: That is all I needed to know. How was the message conveyed? Did
he just walk up to you and tell you individually or were you all seated at table and then
he shared?
207 See Min 19/84/iii, Minutes of the Special DSC Wajir Meeting held on 9/2/84 in the District Commissioner’s Office Starting at 3.00P
P.M., 9th February 1984, p. 3
208 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6 and TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/
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Joseph Muthui Ndirangu: No, it was not a meeting because obviously the people who
were in that dinner were not all security men. There were other people. Therefore this
was conveyed to us individually.209

336. The rest of the group seemed to carry on with their meal. Those members of the
delegation who were not part of the security establishment did not seem to have
been told about developments in Wajir. It seemed unlikely that no mention of an
unfolding operation was made even in passing during the dinner, but members
of both the Provincial Security and Kenya Intelligence Committees maintained
that this was indeed what happened. According to their testimony, they enjoyed
their meal in apparent ignorance of what was happening some 200 kilometres
up the road. If the testimony of many of those who attended the dinner is to be
believed, the intelligence committee was supposedly kept out of the loop even as
the situation got steadily more serious.
337. At 8:20pm, a signal was sent from Garissa to Wajir. That signal read:
All Degodias plus stock in Griftu division plus adjacent divisions will be rounded-up and
will be treated mercilessly, everybody plus stock will be confined in the area. No mercy
will be exercised. You will get more instructions from this HQ in another two days time.
No nonsense will be accepted. Further instructions will follow on the relief of the stock.
Report progress daily210

338. While Kaaria and Ndirangu both confirm that this signal was indeed transmitted, it
seemed that they were far from happy about its overall tone and content. Kaaria’s
testimony before the Commission was that the signal represented the personal
views of the individual who sent it: Aswani, the PPO. And so when Aswani told
Kaaria and the other members of the Provincial Security Committee about the
signal, there was some disquiet and - for the first time that evening - they came
together for an impromptu discussion. Kaaria wanted the signal revised. His
concern was that its sentiments needed to be toned down:
Benson Kaaria: On the evening of the 9th the PPO told me that he had sent a signal to
Wajir who had told him that they were going to have an operation. When he showed me
the signal, I thought it was very strongly worded. It said that they were going to mount
an operation covering all men, women and animals. We met as the PSC and revised the
signal. We said the operation should not include wives, children and animals.
209 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 5 - 6
210 From Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, p. 8.
From Min5/84., Minutes of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office
on Thursday 26th January beginning at 2.30 p.m., 28th January 1984, 8.
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Leader of Evidence: When did you hold the meeting?
Benson Kaaria: We did not meet as such. We agreed because we were together. We said
we must revise.211

339. So the signal was revised. The new one read:
All Degodias in Griftu Division and surrounding areas will be rounded-up. Women,
children and animals not affected. Deputy PPO is visiting with further instructions.212

340.

The signal was revised but not transmitted that evening; it was eventually transmitted
near dawn the next morning, twelve hours after the earlier one and a few hours after
the operation had already commenced. The only other signal issued that evening
was again sent by Aswani requesting the deployment from Mandera and Garissa to
Wajir of police and military reinforcement (of about 100 men).

Friday 10 February 1984
341. In 1984, Abdulrahman Elmi Daudi was a corporal with the Kenya Army.213 He testified
that on the first day of the operation he was awakened by Captain Njeru Mugo, an
officer with the 7KR company based in Wajir. The wake-up call on 10 February 1984
came early, at around 3.30am. By 4.00am, the men were boarding vehicles and
driving down the road towards Wajir town. On arrival in Wajir, they were joined
by administration and regular policemen. Daudi and his army colleagues were
stationed near Bulla Jogoo, a Wajir neighbourhood, and given strict instructions
that nobody should move inside or outside it. Dozens of witness testimonies and
statements from Wajir further confirm that by 6.00am the operation was well
underway.
342. Once again, a very consistent pattern emerged from the scores of survivors in and
around Wajir who remember that day very clearly. People woke up to noise and
general commotion. Uniformed police and administration policemen were on
their doorsteps and in their compounds demanding to know to what clan they
belonged. The experience of Abdi Ismael Hilowle, then a government employee
and resident of Griftu, was typical:
On the 10th at around 5.00am in the morning, some askaris came to my house where
I was living in a government camp. They knocked on the door. I asked my wife to go
and see what was happening on the door. She came and told me that there were a lot
of askaris standing in front of the house. So, I came out dressed in only one kikoi and a
211 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.48
212 From Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, p. 8.
213 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 19 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.20
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bed sheet wrapped on my shoulders and asked the askaris what the problem was. They
asked me: “Are you Degodia?” I told them unfortunately, this is not a place where we
keep tribes. This is a government quarter and we harbour all tribes. There are Kikuyus,
Kambas and Somalis of all clans, among other people. So, it is not only Degodia who are
staying here.214

343. Hilowe did not reply directly to the question of whether he was Degodia. He was
then bundled into a lorry and driven to Griftu Division police station. The Provincial
Security Committee had been silent overnight. Their last communications were
the two signals sent on the evening of 9 February 1984. At 8.40am the following
morning, the PSC transmitted a message requesting officials in Wajir to scale back
and tone down their operations:
All Degodias in Griftu Division and surrounding areas will be rounded-up. Women,
children and animals not affected. Deputy PPO is visiting with further instructions.215

344. As has just been mentioned, this particular signal was crafted on 9 February 1984,
but it did not go out for several hours. Another signal travelled in the opposite
direction. Tiema sent a message to Garissa again outlining events in Griftu. He
also gave some kind of update on the progress of the operation. Unfortunately,
there was no time stamp on Tiema’s Garissa-bound signal. It may have been sent
as a reply to the 8.40am communication from the PSC revising the operation. If
that were the case, Tiema would not have that much to report other than the
early morning round-up and initial transfers to Wagalla Airstrip.
345. But that was not all. Tiema’s signal of 10 February 1984 contained another
astonishing detail that introduced a new element to the operation, which was
incompatible with the request to scale the operation downwards. Tiema signalled
his intent to “push Degodias back to their traditional grazing grounds”.216
346. There were other channels of communication flowing between Wajir and Garissa
on 10 February 1984. Joseph Ndirangu, the Provincial Special Branch Officer in
Garissa, testified that he received a number of signals from Mr Kibere, his Special
Branch counterpart in Wajir. Ndirangu’s recollection is that Kibere’s messages were
in themselves vague and non-specific. Other than the fact that an operation was
underway, those who testified before the Commission suggested that few details
emerged from Wajir that Friday:
214 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.36
215 From Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, p. 8.
216 From Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, p. 8.
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After I learnt of the operation, we continued talking with him [Mr Kibere]. However,
he was just reporting that there was no progress and that they had not recovered any
firearm[s]. He did not say the details of the operation or the outcome of the interrogation.
That was on the 10th.217

347. A clarification needs to be made. When Ndirangu said that he and Kibere were
“talking” what he actually meant was that they were exchanging coded radio calls:
I stated that communication in the North Eastern Province at the time was very poor
because we depended very much on radio calls. Most of the information, especially
on secret matters, was coded. It was just not transferred like that. It was coded to give
security to the message because there were interceptions from neighbouring countries.
Also some people had some gadgets for intercepting communication between the
security forces on the ground.218

348. During all of this, the Kenya Intelligence Committee was still present in Garissa until
the middle of the morning of 10 February 1984. A three-way Kenya Intelligence
Committee, Provincial Security Committee and Garissa District Security Committee
meeting had been scheduled. All of the participants who testified maintained that
not a word was spoken about the unfolding situation in Wajir. The delegation was
then flown back to Nairobi, with the Provincial Police Officer escorting them back
as the situation in Wajir was escalating.
349. Meanwhile, back in Wajir itself, residents were caught up in a bewildering
whirlwind. Other than security officers patrolling the streets, nobody seemed to
know what was happening and why. After the shock of being awakened and
ferried away from his home in Griftu, Hilowle found himself at the police station
surrounded by scores of equally mystified and, by then, increasingly frightened
men. Hilowle was somewhat fortunate in that as a government employee, he had
non-Somali friends and colleagues, including the officer in charge of the police
station:
The OCS (Officer Commanding Station) who was there told me to sit down. He told me
to sit down and that there was no problem. He told me that it was a government order
that had come from Wajir and above. I sat down because we knew one another. I had
to join my colleagues and sit there. The OCS gave us a brief speech because he also
knew most of the traders who were there, some of the workers who were there, and
most of the local residents who were living there who had all been removed from their
houses at night. He said: “My colleagues, I cannot help you today. There is something
somewhere. You will all go to Wajir and there is something that will be clarified to you.
Screening will be done and you will be screened there.”219
217 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.76
218 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.4
219 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.37
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350. Far from being over, Hilowle’s woes had just started. Members of the Degodia
community from Griftu town and beyond were loaded back up on to the trucks.
Destination: Wagalla.
351.

Wajir town itself was developing into something of a flashpoint. Bulla Jogoo, one
of the larger Wajir neighbourhoods, was amongst the first targeted by security
personnel. Testimony from Corporal Daudi confirmed that he and his unit encircled
Bulla Jogoo long before sunrise. Combing through Bulla Jogoo proved difficult
for reasons that the Commission was not able to pin down; it may have been the
more densely populated and more urbanised nature of the setting. While there was
nothing peaceful or orderly about the rounding up exercise as a whole, in Bulla Jogoo
it was especially traumatic. Bulla Jogoo experienced some of the worst excesses of
the Wagalla operation, including a number of violent rapes and sexual assaults, on
the morning of 10 February as security forces surrounded the area and evacuated
the men, leaving the women behind, exposed and vulnerable. Bulla Jogoo was also
unique in that direct and traceable orders were given by Major Mudogo to set fire to
private huts and other property.220
It was particularly bad in Bulla Jogoo in Wajir town where all non-permanent houses called
herios belonging to the Degodia were torched and burnt. That was when women were
raped. I distinctly remember that a disabled person was burnt in one of those houses.221

352. A female victim recalls the situation during that dark February:
We all suffered terribly because we did not have any huts where we could sleep. There
was no shop where we could buy anything and there was no hospital or station where
we could give statements or report to. The women were bleeding and all we could do to
the injured men was put some glucose on their tongues and we could see them dying
right in front of our eyes.222

353. Security personnel entering Bulla Jogoo were apparently unable to flush people
out of their homes as quickly or as efficiently as they had hoped. Major Mudogo
gave residents until two in the afternoon to dismantle their huts and leave Bulla
Jogoo. Any huts found standing after the deadline would be burnt down. And
this is exactly what happened, with tragic results. At least one death of a disabled
person occurred as a result of huts set alight in Bulla Jogoo with no regard as to
whether these huts were occupied or not. The injuries and financial losses caused
by the Bulla Jogoo fires can only be estimated.
220 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 9.
221 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 4
222 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Wajir/19 April 2011/p. 3.
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354. Most accounts heard by the Commission suggested that by mid-morning of 10
February, Wagalla Airstrip began to fill up with scores of men from Wajir, Griftu
and beyond. Some might even have arrived earlier. Hilowle, whose sharp memory
and ability to remember details made him an invaluable witness, estimated that
the truck that he was travelling in must have reached Wagalla at around 7.30am.
While today Wagalla, for many, is a place of great sadness and unspeakable
memories, in February 1984 the District Security Committee settled on Wagalla
as the nerve centre of the entire operation for coldly practical reasons:
The choice of Wagalla Airstrip was decided because we did not have any other secure
place where those people could be put. We thought that since Wagalla was a fenced
ground, it would be suitable.223

355. Children - though not as many as older men - were not spared either, as one witness
who was a young boy at the time of the massacre recounted:
In fact, it was at 4.00pm when I was first taken to Wagalla Airstrip. By then I was very
young; just after primary school. So, I cannot exactly estimate or know the exact number
but I can remember people being brought every day and the number increasing day
and night. Lorries were just ferrying people and bringing them to Wagalla Airstrip.
People increased every minute and every hour.224

356. There had been some talk about taking the men to the army camp. Major Mudogo
apparently was in favour of that as a location. The other members of the District
Security Committee rejected this suggestion, choosing Wagalla instead because, as
Tiema explained it, “it is neutral and it is not a military facility and it looked secure
because it is fenced.”225 “Suitable” is a relative and highly subjective term. The men
gathered at Wagalla found it to be a forbidding location completely lacking in even
the most basic of amenities. There were (and still are) no structures of any kind at
Wagalla airstrip. No preparations of any kind had been made for the airstrip to
receive hundreds of men. There was little for them to do other than sit and wait to
see what would happen next; they sat there for hours:
There was nothing we could do, but just to go there on the ground. We were kept on the
murram stones. We were told to stay there and we stayed there for the whole of Friday
on that murram. There was a lot of sun, no water, no food, no shade, nothing was there.
We sweated there. To make it worse, the sun was very hot at that time. We stayed there
the whole day.226
223
224
225
226

TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.32
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 19 April/ Wajir/ p. 17
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.41
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.37
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357. By his own admission, Tiema did not arrive at Wagalla until about five in the evening
of this first day. He was accompanied by the OCPD, Mr Wabwire. He claimed that
they found about 500 men gathered there. The detained men had apparently been
arranged by sub-clan and area of origin. The District Commissioner spoke to them:
On the same day of 10 February 1984 at around 5.00pm, I visited Wagalla Airstrip where
people were gathered and grouped into their clans by security agents. I addressed them
and emphasised the reasons why the operation had to be carried out and what was
expected of them and left them under the security men there.227

358. The men were clearly in a very difficult situation on the evening of Friday the 10th.
They had not been provided with any food. They had not been given any water.
They had no idea when they were going to leave. They knew nothing about the
fate of their families they had left behind that morning. A lucky few had been
released from the airstrip on the promise that they knew and could show the
security officers where weapons had been hidden. Two guns were retrieved in this
way. Screening and interrogation continued into the night.
359. After the men were taken to Wagalla Airstrip, the soldiers took the opportunity to
torture, rape and sexually violate women and girls who had been left behind in the
villages.
When they had picked all the men they could find, they took them to the airstrip and the
soldiers came back to us. They told us that they were now our men. We do not know their
names or where they came from, but they came and picked up all the women though I
cannot recall the exact number. No woman was spared; all the beautiful girls were each
raped by ten or more men, others by three and others by seven. Some women ran away
and some were killed in the incident or at the wheels of the trucks. I was also a victim; I
had just come out of labour and others who were pregnant gave birth prematurely. I can
remember that no woman or girl was spared.228

360. A victim of gang rape told the Commission the following horrific tale:
On the same day, Wednesday, the soldiers came back. Hundreds of girls were asked:
“Do you want your men back?” They said: “Yes.” Every little girl or woman was taken
away. They told us to follow them so that they could show us where our men were.
So, when we went with them to Makaror, the soldiers turned on us when we reached
the place called Makaror and said: “Today, there are no men for you. We are your men.”
No woman was spared. They did not care whether some were pregnant. They did not
care when some women told them they were about to give birth. They did not care
that some women were old. Every soldier came. They were so many soldiers. They were
uncountable. There were no prostitutes those days, so these men were sexually starved.
227 Mr. Tiema, Personal Statement, 28th March 2011.
228 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Wajir/19 April 2011/p. 2.
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By then, I was nine months pregnant. They raped me again and again until my unborn
child came out. Twenty women who were raped died. I saw them with my own eyes.
Some women resisted them. They struggled with them and because of that struggle,
they were beaten to death. During the night, the place became a camp for only women
to be raped. The dead bodies were taken away. We do not know where they took them.229

361. Surai Abdille Gurre was a little girl in 1984. She remembers that after the men
were taken to Wagalla Airstrip, the soldiers returned to the villages where they
indiscriminately attacked the women and burnt down their homes.
I was at home in Griftu when our brothers and husbands were all taken on a Friday night.
On Saturday, many soldiers came and they found my sick mother and I seated outside.
Five soldiers came with a match box and they torched my mother’s house. While I was
taking out the mattresses, five men caught me and threw me next to a big stone. As I
was crying, another one came, tied my mouth and covered my face.230

362. For Fatuma Jele, her experience of the operation and the violations she witnessed
are etched in her memory. She recalled close friends who were subjected to
unspeakable atrocities:
Many people died in Wajir and I cannot forget since I personally knew them. Among the
women who were arrested and tortured was Markabo, who was pregnant with twins
and she was stepped on until she miscarried. There was also Habiba who was newlywedded. She cannot give birth now because of the way she was violated. I was next to
Markabo and Habiba and I cannot forget them.231

Saturday 11 February 1984
363. The flow of information between Wajir and the outside world appears to have been
reduced to a trickle on 11 February. The District and Provincial Security Committees
appear to have retreated into near total silence. The only people who seemed to
be in touch with each other were the Special Branch Officers: Ndirangu in Garissa
and Kibere in Wajir. Ndirangu claimed that he and his counterpart were signalling
but they were not signalling about the operation. According to Ndirangu, “other
intelligence issues were coming in”.232 The reason for this appeared to be that,
according to the Special Branch, nothing of note was happening at Wagalla.233 The
operation had apparently reached some kind of impasse with no further weapons
being turned in and no new information being received on the recent spate of
killings in Griftu. The team in Wajir had, in Ndirangu’s view, nothing to report:
229
230
231
232
233

TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Wajir/20 April 2011/p. 4.
TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Wajir/19 April 2011/p. 5.
TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Wajir/19 April 2011/p. 7.
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.8
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.8
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We would ask and they would tell us: “No we have got nothing material to report.”…We
used to get information that: “We have not achieved anything as per what they had told
us. As per their intention, they had not got anything material.234

364

In another twist, Kibere seemed to have left Wajir right in the middle of the
operation. Ndirangu had no explanation as to why that happened. He speculated
that Kibere might have had a sick child in Garissa. His place was taken by a Mr
Mbole who it seemed continued to brief Ndirangu along very much the same lines
until the 12th of February.

365. Although the official channels of communication appeared to be quiet, the
Commission received testimony from a number of people to suggest that by 11
February, the men at the airstrip felt that they were in grave danger. Evidence from
Hilowle painted a picture of a situation that actually started degenerating on the
night of 10 February and into the morning of 11 February. Tiema and Wabwire
departed from the airstrip on the evening of the 10th and left the men in the hands
of junior army and police officers. Unsupervised, the security officers set about
inflicting further pain and humiliation:
In the evening at around 5.00pm, an army officer whose name I have forgotten, plus
all his soldiers came there. We were told to sleep on our stomachs on that soil. There
is murram and soil on Wagalla Airstrip. We were told to sleep on that sand. Everybody
was told to sleep on his stomach. In the night, there was a lot of torture. When people
requested for water or something of the kind, the soldiers would clobber them. Some
were hitting us with stones. I think you all know the Maasai panga is normally sharpened
on both sides. The soldiers could just use these weapons on you without any mercy. We
were told to sleep on bricks which were on the soil. They were walking on us as if we
were the hard ground. This happened until early in the morning.235

366. By Saturday morning, it was clear that things were going to get much worse. The
security men present began to strip the men of their clothing:
Commissioner: We have heard that when people were brought there, after one or two
days, they were stripped of their clothes. Do you remember what happened after the
first and the second day?
Mr Isaak Abdi Noor: Yes.
Commissioner: You arrived there on Friday, then after a period of time all your clothes
were taken away. Do you remember when that happened? Was it immediately when
you got there, or was it after a day or two?
234 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.8
235 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.37
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Mr Isaak Abdi Noor: No! Some people were made to strip their clothes on Saturday. But
almost all people were stripped off their clothes on Sunday.236

367. The men of Wagalla were half-naked on the airstrip for most of Saturday. Their
torsos were bare. Thin sheets of cotton covered their bodies from the waist
downwards. In essence, they were almost completely exposed to the heat and
the sun of Wajir in February. The Commission also learned that by this point (that
is, by Saturday morning) no food or water of any kind had been provided. This
meant that the men had received no nourishment or liquid for more than 24
hours. The Commission heard testimony that people held at that airstrip resorted
to drinking their own urine. A witness who testified remembers seeing his father
drinking his own urine:
So I left in the evening and I went there; I saw my father drinking his own urine. The
soldiers saw me carrying my father and they shot me.237

368. Another witness recalls:
There is a story of a young man, and this one is still alive since I saw him recently on
Sunday, when he could not hold his thirst any longer. He pretended that he had a gun
and led them back to town to their homes, went in, drank water, came out and said: “I do
not have a gun and take me back... at which point they took him back to the airstrip.”238

369. There continued to be no food or water whatsoever until the evening of the 11th
when Tiema finally made arrangements for supplies to be sent to the field:
I instructed my acting DO1 to get two bags of maize, one bag of beans and take them
to the assistant chief, Wagalla, to have it cooked for those at the airstrip together with
water. We had to use a water bowser from the police. He came and assured me that
the instruction had been carried out. We got the foodstuff from National Cereals and
Produce Board store in Wajir.239

370. Yet, even when the water bowser had been brought to the Airstrip, the soldiers and
policemen restricted access to it. Mohamed Elmi remembers a man being brutally
beaten when he tried to access it:
On the left side of the field, I saw a young man who ran to a water bowser where water
was leaking and flowing to the ground. Two soldiers came from two different directions
with sticks; beat him up like an animal until he ran back to the crowd which was at the
centre of the field.240
236
237
238
239
240
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371. These three bags of food (90 kilos each) were meant to feed a crowd which, due to
continuous inflows on Friday and Saturday, had swelled to at least 1,000. Tiema’s
involvement with the operation on this particular day was limited to the provision
of food. He did not visit the field to see if there had been any developments
overnight at the airstrip. He also did not find it necessary to check on the operation
during the afternoon. The explanation he provided was that he was receiving
updates from Wabwire that there was little progress; no guns were being turned in
and no information was emerging. In his mind, therefore, no trips to the field were
warranted.
372.

Small numbers of people were being released from the field throughout the
operation at the discretion of the commanders and the security personnel. On
Friday, some people were let out on the promise that they would lead officers to
guns. By Saturday, that particular conduit had been shut down because the security
men found that people were “playing tricks” and had no useful information on the
location of firearms.241 From then on, the only people allowed out were those with
some kind of personal connection to the commanders. Everyone else had to stay put
and wait to see what the night of the 11th and the morning of the 12th would bring.

Sunday 12 February 1984
373. The penultimate day of the operation was characterised by a sudden and tragic
surge in levels of violence. A public baraza was held in Wajir that Sunday morning.
The Member of Parliament for Wajir West, Ahmed Khalif, was in attendance as
were a large group of Wajir locals eager to establish what had happened to family,
friends and loved ones they had last seen 48 hours earlier. Tiema described to the
Commission how he addressed the assembled crowd:
On the 12th of February 1984, I held a big baraza at the stadium near the DC’s office
which was attended by the late Hon Ahmed Khalif and councillors and explained to
them the purpose of the operation, and assured them that those who had relatives
rounded up, they would be released. I welcomed the late Hon Khalif to address the
baraza and emphasise the same to the public.242

374. Few were likely to have been convinced by Tiema’s assurances; levels of anxiety
were far too high. Those who attended this baraza also remembered Tiema’s visit
and his address. Their testimony suggested that the DC’s remarks might have
been much more aggressive than he portrayed them as being. Some remember
him as telling the people whose huts had been burnt down that they would have
241 Matui to Kaaria, Report Regarding the Recent Operation which resulted to rounding up of Male Degodia adults at Wagalla Airstrip
from 10.2.84 to 13.2.84, 27th February 1984, p. 3.
242 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
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to go back home; that was interpreted as a threat to return them to Ethiopia or
Somalia.243
375. As soon as the public meeting was over, Tiema and Wabwire left and headed the
nine miles up the road towards the airstrip. The two men were accompanied by the
acting District Special Branch Officer, Mr Mbole. Kibere, who had earlier on in the
operation been in contact with Ndirangu, had by this point departed for Garissa.
Why Kibere left Wajir right in the middle of such a crucial operation was unclear.
At any rate, these members of the District Security Committee drove to the airstrip
in the DC’s familiar and instantly recognisable Land Rover. The purpose of the trip
was to assess the situation. Tiema himself had not been to the airstrip since the first
day of the operation and had received nothing other than verbal updates from the
police and the army.
376.

His arrival at the field triggered a rapid succession of events that have long muddied
understandings of what did and did not happen at Wagalla. At its most basic, Tiema’s
version of events was straightforward: he arrived at the field, there was some kind of
commotion in the crowd, the security commanders asked him to leave and he left.
That essentially was and continues to be his story three decades on:
At around 11.00am, I accompanied the OCPD and the DSBO to assess the situation but
when the crowd saw us they started shouting. They were agitated somehow. Those who
were sitting stood up and started shouting in their vernacular and the security men told
them to sit down. Some obeyed and others did not obey; they refused. They started running
in different directions and the situation became chaotic. With such confusion going on, I
was advised to leave the ground and left security agents to handle the situation. However,
I later learnt that some people lost their lives in the course of that stampede. I think the
visitors who were there can bear me witness. This is the report that I had.244

377. All this, by Tiema’s estimate, happened very quickly; in less than five minutes it was
all over. He said he was later told by the District Special Branch Officer (DSBO) that
a total of 57 people had died as a result of what he described as “the stampede”
and other events associated with the broader operation.245
378. Since Tiema claimed that he was absent when Wagalla finally exploded in
violence, the Commission tried to obtain from him further details about what
he saw and heard in those crucial minutes while he was actually there. Tiema’s
memory, however, was far from specific. He remembered seeing 500 to 800 men.
Some of them were apparently in a state of undress because their clothes had
243 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.4
244 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
245 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.24
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been torn, but he did not recall that any were completely naked. He accepted
that there might have been people within the crowd who had no clothes on. Pots
and various other cooking implements were strewn all over. Armed military men
were clearly visible among the civilians.
379. The former District Commissioner’s description of the men’s demeanour was
once again based on a fairly fleeting assessment. In his view, they were “tired and
desperate”.246 Their mood apparently seemed to change as Tiema approached
them. The men surged forward. They seemed angry. Under further questioning,
Tiema revealed that he had seen people break out of the main cluster and run
towards the fence:
Those were people who were trying to run away and the security shouted to them to
stop running away because they realised that they were going towards the fence so that
they can sneak out before we finished the exercise.247

380. It is an important detail that severely tested Tiema’s claim that he was away from
the field as the military and police attempted to handle a quickly evolving security
situation.
381. The recollections of men like Hilowle and others who were detained at the
airstrip were in part consistent with, and in other parts very different from, the
version presented by Tiema. The Commission’s impression was that the late night
and early morning of 11 and 12 February respectively, were just as difficult as that
of the previous day. If anything, things might have become even more violent:
On 11th, we were still sleeping on the sand. The sun was hot. We were not wearing any
clothes; we were not given food or shelter. They continued beating us up, slashing us with
knives, pangas and hitting us with rungus. This went on throughout the night. At night,
soldiers hit us with big stones. I remember someone called Mohammed Jilo who was well
known in Wajir. He asked them: “Why are you playing with us? Are we not Kenyan citizens?
Why are you doing this to us? Are you not government soldiers? Are you not Africans like
us? Why are you mistreating us? Two soldiers took a very big stone and started hitting him
with it. The man was smashed on the ground. 248

382. Hilowle did not remember the arrival of Tiema on the 12th. He did remember the
arrival of a group of uniformed administrator-types but he did not recognise
Tiema. This was perhaps not surprising as Tiema was new to the district. Hilowle
said that upon seeing these government officials, some sections of the crowd
started singing the National Anthem. This account was corroborated by Bishar
Ismail Ibrahim, a former chief in Wagalla, who testified as follows:
246 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.43
247 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.30
248 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.38
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In the morning of 12th, again, the DC and his team came back. I was not accompanying
them in an official manner, but I was, again, following them while I was not in uniform.
I just wanted to see what my friends were going to do to my location. I am a practical
witness. When they went there, the people there stood up and sang the National
Anthem. I could hear them. They stood up and sang the National Anthem, expecting
sympathy from the security committees. They expected that they would be assisted.249

383.

The appeal to nationalism and patriotism did not, however, work. Instead chaos
broke out. What Tiema euphemistically referred to as a stampede, others termed
as a shooting that took place as the men rose and approached the DC for answers.
According to Hilowle, the bullets flew out of nowhere; people tried to run towards
the fence:
Since it was the third day and there was no alternative, people started jumping and
running away. Half of the people stood up and started running away. The soldiers
started firing at us. So many people were killed with bullets. So many of them started
rushing and they were put on the wires which surrounded Wagalla Airstrip.250

384. Bishar Ismail Ibrahim seems to have been some distance from the main action.
Nonetheless, he claimed he was close enough to hear OCPD Wabwire issue
specific instructions to the soldiers: “Anybody who is not seated should be shot”
and they left. So, there followed shooting here and there, without control.’251
When the gunfire died down, Hilowle counted ten dead bodies. How many
people died is one of the most vexed, contentious parts of the Wagalla story.
Most victims and survivors are clear in their minds that the shooting resulted in
many more deaths than those initially reported by the District Special Branch
Officer and more than the official tallies resulting from subsequent government
assessments of Wagalla. Their explanation was that the shooting was prolonged;
nobody remembered hearing any orders for soldiers to stop shooting.
385.

The hours following the shooting proved difficult to reconstruct on account of the
secrecy and confusion that surrounded them. In essence, Wajir seemed to shut down
even further. Kaaria and Ndirangu in Garissa claimed that no operation-specific
signals arrived in Garissa at the Provincial Security Committee level. As Ndirangu
explained it, he was in the very unusual position of receiving signals that had nothing
to do with the actual operation itself. There was, however, one important exception
to the overall rule of non-communication. It appears that messages were getting to
Garissa through army channels.

249 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.22
250 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.38
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386.

On the evening of 12 February, Colonel Frank Muhindi, the commanding officer
of the 7KR battalion stationed in Garissa, was approached by an officer with some
startling news:
So, the officer, whether he was a duty officer or whoever it was, came to the club and
he sent for me. I went out and I met him, and he told me, “Sir, I think that something has
happened in Wajir, but I do not know the details.”252

387. Colonel Muhindi remembered quickly going to the army base and trying to get
hold of the officer commanding the unit in Wajir, Major Mudogo. Unable to reach
him, Muhindi then approached Kaaria with the news:
I went back to the club and I called aside the PC, Mr Kaaria, and I told him that “I have
heard something from one of our officers and I do not know how to take this information,
but I think that things may not be okay in Wajir.” 253

388. News about Wagalla seeped out of Wajir on the evening of the 12th but in a manner
that was unofficial and incomplete.
389. After his visit to the airstrip was cut short, the whereabouts of the District
Commissioner were unclear. Tiema’s own testimony provided almost no clarification
as to where he went and what he did. All that he testified about this critical period
was that he was aware that some men were taken away from the airstrip on the
12th. When asked for further details he said that the men were transported back to
their homes:
Tiema: …On the morning of the 13th and some were taken away on that same day of
12th when I visited there.
Leader of Evidence: Mr Tiema, when you said they were taken away, who took them
away and by what means?
Tiema: We had some military vehicles which were to be used because the DO did not
have transport facilities. But the police and military vehicles helped to transport those
people back to their respective areas.254

390. Testimony from the airstrip suggested that there was indeed a great deal of
movement on the field following the shooting. Hilowle was not among those to
be released that evening. He was instead left at the airstrip where he claimed to
have witnessed the loading of dead bodies on to trucks. His testimony was that
the survivors themselves were sent to collect the bodies of their clansmen and put
them into military vehicles that then drove off:
252 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.21
253 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.21
254 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.18
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At around 8.00pm or 9.00pm, those people who could walk were told to come and
collect all the corpses which were around there. Vehicles were brought and all the
corpses were ferried to the bush.255

391. Hilowle was not in a position to say how many bodies were loaded onto the trucks
or how many trucks were loaded up with bodies. The Commission spoke to a
former army corporal who claimed that he drove people to the field on the first
and second day of the operation. He seemed not to have been involved in any of
the transport on the 12th so he was unable to shed any light on the movement of
men and bodies that Sunday night.
392. The Commission’s assessment was that for the third night in a row, the men at
Wagalla had to endure extraordinarily difficult conditions. There was no talk of
replenished supplies. This meant that the men had to make do with the meagre
provisions of maize, beans and water that Tiema had sent to the airstrip the day
before. Because Wagalla Airstrip was effectively sealed off, no news could filter in or
out; this undoubtedly heightened the levels of anxiety as nobody was in a position
to send news about fatalities that had occurred as a result of the shooting. The
Commission heard no testimony and received no other evidence that the injured
were attended to in any way. Above all, the men at Wagalla remained at the field
overnight in the custody of the very security personnel who just hours before had
shot, killed and injured scores of their clansmen. One can only imagine the distress
this must have caused for the survivors.

Monday 13 February 1984
393.

Monday 13 February brought with it a flurry of activity. Garissa became a centre
of action as the Provincial Security Committee wondered and then worried about
the continued lack of communication from Wajir. As Ndirangu outlined in his
testimony, although the District Special Branch Officer was signalling, his messages
relayed no information about the operation itself. Officials in Garissa testified to the
Commission that at the time they had no idea how the operation was progressing.
Kaaria explained the Provincial Security Committee’s position as of the morning of 13
February:
We did not remain updated because the DSC Wajir decided to put us off. We do not
know for what reason, but we did not know what had transpired, how they arrested
people, where they had taken them and the action they were taking until after two
days.256

255 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.38
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394. Come Monday morning the Provincial Security Committee felt, as Ndirangu put it,
“forced by circumstances” to organise a fact-finding mission to Wajir to establish
what was going on. Ndirangu, Gaturuku and Colonel Muhindi, the acting Provincial
Special Branch Officer, Provincial Police Officer and the Commanding Officer of the
7KR Battalion, respectively, were assigned the task. Kaaria remained in Garissa. No
invitation or plea for help was issued from Wajir; Garissa officials emphasised that
the mission emanated entirely out of concerns about the lack of communication,
as well as the alarming but general alerts sent out by the army.
395. The Commission established that there were actually two fact-finding missions to
Wajir on Monday 13 February. One mission was headed by Ndirangu, and another
by Colonel Muhindi. After a slight delay that pushed their departure from Garissa
into the late morning or early afternoon, Ndirangu remembered flying with the
now deceased Gaturuku and one other officer. They landed at the military airbase
where they were met by various members of the Wajir administration: Tiema,
Wabwire, Major Mudogo and Mbole. The visitors from Garissa were then taken to
a small office within the complex. A short meeting followed. Ndirangu’s testimony
was that it was during this meeting that a nervous-looking team explained what
had been happening in Wajir since 10 February when information about the
operation had last been signalled:
We just asked them to brief us on what was on the ground. They looked panicky and
you could tell from their faces that there was something wrong. That was the time they
disclosed that the DSC had gone to Wagalla Airstrip and there was a stampede. Some
prisoners tried to escape through the wire fence; some of them were coming towards
the DC and his team with stones and, as a result, there was fire. We fired at them and 13
people died.257

396.

District officials also spoke about the ongoing clearance of the airstrip and the
return of the men. The need to investigate further was obvious and Ndirangu and
his colleagues apparently made it clear that it was important for them to visit the
airstrip itself. The District Security Committee, however, was of a different view and
ruled this out. Ndirangu’s recollection was that the Tiema-led team was adamant
that going to Wagalla was not a good idea:
We wanted to go to the field and see for ourselves but they discouraged us completely.
They told us that the field was not good, and if we went there, we could also escalate
the violence that had already been experienced. At the same time, the people who
were there had already made the place worse. The place was not conducive for us.258

257 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.11
258 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.12
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397. The Commission pushed Ndirangu to explain how junior officers were able to
redefine the entire fact-finding mission by insisting that Wagalla was out of
bounds. The former Special Branch Officer maintained that the safety and security
argument presented by the Wajir District Committee won the day: Wagalla was
too unsafe and too insecure to access. Moreover, Wagalla was presented as an
operational area where considerable weight was attached to the opinions of those
on the ground. In the end, the group from Garissa did not go to Wagalla. Instead,
they overflew the airstrip and peered out of their windows at the scene below:
Leader of Evidence: So when you looked down from the aeroplane, what were you able
to see at the airstrip?
Joseph Muthui Ndirangu: As a person, I only saw the security men’s cordon along
the fence. I saw some clothes and fabrics hung on the fence, but I did not see human
beings, that is, those who had assembled there. When we talked in the aircraft, most of
us confirmed the same, but there was only one who said he saw some people, but we
had already passed the airstrip.259

398.

And after that, according to Ndirangu, they flew back to Garissa. The other mission
was carried out by Colonel Muhindi who had independently decided the night
before that he was going to travel to Wajir and thus informed PC Kaaria. On the
morning of the 13th Muhindi set off for Wajir determined to establish contact with
Major Mudogo. Other than the military pilot, Muhindi was travelling alone. He arrived
at the Air Force base several hours before the Ndirangu group, which by its own
admission left Garissa much later than originally planned. The Commission believed
that Wajir’s civilian administrators had no knowledge of or control over Colonel
Muhindi’s visit because it was an entirely military affair. Muhindi was picked up at the
base by a military Land Rover. Captain Njeru Mugo, who Muhindi describes as Major
Mudogo’s deputy, accompanied him. Unencumbered by the security concerns that
would curtail Ndirangu’s mission later on, Muhindi drove straight to Wagalla.

399. He arrived to find a raw and disturbing scene. By his estimate between 70 and
100 men were still being held at the airstrip. They were half-naked: bare torsos on
the top and light sheets of cotton covering them from the waist downwards. They
were lying on the ground. There were clear signs of violence; pools of blood dotted
the runway. Muhindi did not speak to any of the men. Instead, he described their
situation as desperate:
Leader of Evidence: Did you talk to the people who were lying down there?
Col (rtd) Frank Kariuki Muhindi: They were traumatised. It was a sight that you would
not want to see again. They were weak and traumatised.260
259 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.13
260 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.30

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

275

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

400. Muhindi was also told, presumably by Captain Mugo, that a number of people had
been killed although he did not see any dead bodies at the airstrip. The colonel
described what he saw as “disturbing”. And yet, nobody seemed able or ready to fill
him in on the details. Captain Mugo could not provide any answers:
Leader of Evidence: When you were seeing all this, you were with Captain Mugo. Did
you ask him to explain to you why people were lying naked and why there was blood?
Col (rtd) Frank Kariuki Muhindi: He could not explain to me why people were in that
situation because he might not have been there that morning or the situation the
previous day may have been different. The only thing that I asked is how those people
were being looked after.261

401. The only others at the airstrip were the policemen who appeared to be standing
guard over the premises. They too proved unhelpful. There was no sign of Major
Mudogo, the one person Colonel Muhindi really wanted to see because he
was, after all, in overall charge of Wajir. But Mudogo was nowhere to be seen.
Incidentally, Captain Mugo remains silent on the issue of his own involvement
in the operation. Commission witnesses have portrayed him as one of the more
aggressive and more prolific interrogators who might even have been involved
in torture at the airstrip. Njeru Mugo has also been identified by witnesses as the
person responsible for cordoning off Bulla Jogoo.
402. The major’s absence was troubling because it was clear that only he was in a
position to provide the answers and explanations Muhindi was seeking:
I was sad because he was not on the ground and yet he was my right hand man. So
obviously his brief to me on how they planned the operation and how they determined
that it should be executed; I would have appreciated if it was him briefing me. That
would have been helpful to me. At that point, I actually felt bad.262

403. It is not clear why Major Mudogo was unable to meet with Colonel Muhindi. The
suspicion is that he was engaged in the disposal of the dead. Two officers, Lieutenant
Chungo of the army and Inspector Wachira of the police, were identified as being
involved in the burial of bodies in and around Wajir.263 It is possible that Mudogo
might have been supervising or somehow assisting in this. Colonel Muhindi denied
direct knowledge of the burials although he does admit that this is something that
Mudogo might have been involved in. Once again, however, the colonel’s primary
issue was that Mudogo was unavailable to answer his questions:
261 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.29
262 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.28
263 From Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, p. 13.
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The reason I was sad when I could not communicate with my officer commanding, Major
Mudogo, is because he is the one who would have told me how they disposed of those
bodies, but I did not get him.264

404. Like Ndirangu and his team would a few hours later, Colonel Muhindi left Wajir
with only a partial understanding of what had happened at Wagalla, and flew
back to Garissa. For the men who had remained on the field overnight, the
morning of the 13th brought some measure of relief as the operation began to
wind down. After limited releases on the 12th, Wajir administrators stepped up
their attempts to evacuate people from the airstrip. Tiema’s testimony was that
the operation was formally terminated on the 13th of February and the District
Security Committee’s attention turned to clearing Wagalla. Military and some
police vehicles were used for this because the district office had no transport to
speak of. Not everybody left in this way.
405. The Commission heard evidence suggesting that some people might have left of
their own accord. In 1984, Mohammed Ibrahim Elmi was a young nursing officer
who was caught up in the Wagalla operation from the outset when he saw men,
his own family members included, being loaded on to trucks parked outside
the police station.265 He attended Tiema’s baraza on the 12th. On the morning of
the 13th, Elmi was at the hospital when some Wagalla wounded began to drift in
assisted by teachers and staff members from nearby Sabunley secondary school.
He came to understand that these were people who had somehow escaped from
the airstrip either that morning or the night before. Whatever the case, they had
not departed Wagalla on the military vehicles arranged for that purpose.
406. It was clear to the Commission that as the trickle out of Wagalla turned into a flood,
district officials were no longer able to control or contain information about what
was happening. As the word spread, civilian, private and non-state actors started
to play a much greater role. One such actor was Sister Annalena Tonelli, an Italian
missionary who had been based in Wajir for 15 years. Her work revolved around the
tuberculosis ward (popularly known as TB Manyatta) of the district hospital, as well
a small rehabilitation centre for the physically disabled. She was clearly a muchloved figure within the region on account of her dedication to the less fortunate
members of the community. She also seemed to enjoy the support of both the
provincial and district administration, with the Provincial Security Committee
donating 50 000 shillings to her centre at the end of 1983.266
264 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.30. Mohamed Elmi would years later become the Member of Parliament
for Wajir East and Minister in the Coalition Government (2008-2013).
265 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May2011/ Nairobi/ p.3
266 Provincial Commissioner to Wajir, 24th November 1983, District Intelligence File, Wajir Registry
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407. All this changed with the Wagalla incident. On the morning of the 12th of
February, Sister Annalena apparently collected the body of the disabled person
who had been burnt to death on the first day of the operation as Bulla Jogoo was
surrounded by Njeru Mugo and his men.267 As wounded men streamed into the
hospital on the 13th, Sister Annalena sprung into action. According to Elmi, who
was with her at that point, she rushed to the district headquarters where she met
with an unnamed officer who agreed to take them to the airstrip to assess the
injured.
408. Mohamed Elmi did not recall what time they got to Wagalla. As with Colonel
Muhindi, they arrived to find that the airstrip was still active and populated by an
assortment of victims and guards. Because Elmi remembered seeing a number of
bodies in a small pile, the Commission’s assessment was that he and Sister Annalena
must have been at the airstrip early on the morning of the 13th. They were almost
certainly there before Muhindi was; the colonel claimed he saw no dead bodies at
the time of his visit and concluded that whatever bodies might have been there
had already been removed.
409. The other impression created by Elmi’s testimony was that of squabbling and
disunited officials jostling to manage the airstrip. The District Officer who
accompanied Elmi and Sister Annalena found himself in a dangerous standoff with
the security officials. The issue at hand was an apparent plan to go after some of the
people who had escaped from the airstrip. The DO disagreed with this suggestion
vehemently:
The army officer quarrelled with him telling him that he did not know what he was
doing. They all cocked their guns and told us to leave the place and we left. That DO was
very pained and upset. I believe he was a very good man.268

410. By the time that Elmi and Sister Annalena turned around and went back to town,
they saw evidence of a full-blown search for survivors. Women carrying plastic
containers filled with water were combing the countryside around Wagalla looking
for their loved ones. Isaak Abdi Noor, a witness, was found sitting on the side of the
road exhausted, hungry and confused. Noor and others like him were then taken
to the Wajir District Hospital and, as the hospital filled up, to Sister Annalena’s
rehabilitation centre. Elmi remembered staff and facilities being completely
overstretched as patients continued to arrive with serious injuries. Among those
in most immediate need of treatment were men suffering from burns to their legs
caused by the setting alight of piles of discarded clothes.
267 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 4
268 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 5
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411. Releases from Wagalla were stepped up on the 13th but the Commission heard
evidence that not everyone was set free then. A number of people would remain
at the airstrip for the fourth consecutive night. Abdi Ismael Hilowle was one such
unfortunate person. He testified that he was simply held there and not allowed to
leave on the 13th as others were ferried away from the airstrip. Hilowle described
himself as being completely helpless and hopeless at that point. He had no idea
when his ordeal would end.

Tuesday 14 February 1984
412. Tuesday the 14th was characterised by a flurry of activity on several fronts. A
series of declassified minutes gave the Commission a good sense of the official
perception of events in Wajir and in Garissa. At 10.30 in the morning, members
of the Wajir District Security Committee assembled at Wajir police station. This
was the first time that Tiema, Wabwire, Situma, Mudogo and Mbole met formally
since the 9th of February. Tiema opened the proceedings:
The chairman informed the members that the purpose of the meeting was to review the
action we have taken on the security situation and make a follow-up of the operation as
per the meeting held on 9/2/84 and make observations.269

413.

What followed was a meeting that, if the minutes are accurate, was unable to
speak plainly and directly about what had happened at Wagalla just hours before.
Committee members described the operation as ongoing in that three people were
still being held by the police and assisting them with interrogations into criminal
activity in Wajir. Three hundred and seventy eight men had apparently been released
on the 13th of February after being cleared because they had no useful information.
No mention was made during the meeting of the number of weapons acquired from
the operation. Even so, Tiema and his colleagues called the operation a success.

414. The only hint that something may have gone wrong in Wagalla and that Wajir
was in fact in a state of crisis came towards the very end of the meeting when the
District Security Committee talked about the prevailing security situation:
The security situation is still violative (sic) and there are two possibilities. Degodias
retaliating…will hit back at either Ajurans or civil servants. We are keeping very close
surveillance in case of any eventuality.270

415. The security committee’s resolutions also demonstrated continuing concerns
about matters in Wajir, as well as awareness that tensions were still very high.
District officials were also clearly anxious to prevent any flare-ups and to remain
on an emergency footing:
269 Min. 21/84., Minutes of the Special DSC Wajir Meeting Held on 14/2/84 in the OCPD’s office starting at 10.30 AM, 1.
270 Min.24/84., Minutes of the Special DSC Wajir Meeting Held on 14/2/84 in the OCPD’s office starting at 10.30 AM, 2.
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After discussions, it was resolved that:The operation to continue aimed at arresting the murders who killed the seven Ajurans
and injured many others who to date have not been traced.
Reinforce police posts and AP camps so that they may be able to deal with any situation
which may arise.
The patrols to continue in the areas occupied by Ajurans and Degodias.271

416. The meeting ended one hour later. Tiema and his colleagues appeared to have left
the police station without once discussing the dead and the injured, the conduct
of the forces, the escapees, Muhindi and Ndirangu’s mission, or indeed any other
issue relating to the specific operation in Wagalla. It is possible that the committee
spoke about such matters and that these discussions were not minuted. Tiema’s
testimony was also vague and lacking in details about the security committee’s
activities in the days and hours following the operation. All he could confirm was
that at some point the district security team had met to compile a report that was
subsequently sent to the Provincial Commissioner.
417.

Officials in Garissa adopted a much more direct approach to the news coming out of
Wajir. Muhindi’s and Ndirangu’s return prompted the convening of two extraordinary
meetings. The first was a meeting of the Provincial Security Committee that included
Kaaria, Muhindi, Gaturuku, Ndirangu and Njue in the Provincial Commissioner’s office
from 8.45am. It was followed three hours later by a joint meeting of the Provincial
Security and the Garissa District Security Committee.272 The Garissa meetings differed
from their counterparts in Wajir.

418.

Minutes of the two Garissa meetings clearly indicated a determination to discuss the
operation in much greater detail than their district counterparts. They had, after all,
been in what Ndirangu described as a “blackout” since the 9th of February. The PSC
was thus playing catch-up. They spoke of the many months of Ajuran and Degodia
tension that the DSC identified as giving rise to the need for an operation. Of course
these were not issues that were entirely new to the provincial authorities; they had
been kept abreast of unrest in Wajir from November onwards. What was new about
the meeting of the 14th was the frank assessment that indeed action had to be taken:
The Degodia tribesmen were becoming aggressively hostile and the situation was
reaching alarming proportion and something had to be done to quell it.273

271 Min 25/84., Minutes of the Special DSC Wajir Meeting Held on 14/2/84 in the OCPD’s office starting at 10.30 AM, 2.
272 The members of the Garissa District Security Committee were Mr. Lidambisa, Major Chebet, Mr. Muthuri and Mr. Joel, the District
Commissioner, Officer Commanding 7KR, the OCPD and the DSBO respectively. From Minutes of a Special Joint PSC/Garissa
DSC Meeting held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Tuesday 14th February 1984, 1.
273 Min.13/84., Minutes of the North Eastern Special PSC meeting held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Tuesday 14th
February 1984, 2.
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419. The other thing that was new was the charge that the Degodia were apparently
targeting civil servants for assassination: “confirmed reports also indicated that
the Degodia were planning to extinguish some civil servants by assassinating
them”.274 This information presumably came from Wajir and was absorbed into
the broader justification for the operation. This reference to assassination of civil
servants could only be dated the 14th of February; no reference or evidence of
plans appeared in any of the evidence and testimonies before this date.
420. Much of what the PSC discussed on this Tuesday was, however, broadly familiar.
PC Kaaria and his team showed the same level of concern for post-operation
security in Wajir as the District Security Committee. The irony was that an
operation intended to dampen and pacify clan tensions in fact increased them
tremendously. In the hours and days afterwards, Wajir was judged as ready
to explode into open warfare between the Ajuran and Degodia. Provincial
authorities came up with a number of measures designed to complement those
generated in Wajir itself:
The PSC can foresee the danger of major conflict between Degodia tribesmen
and the Ajuran on one hand, and bitter feelings against the civil servants on the
other. The PSC, therefore, feels that besides exhaustive investigations into this
incident being carried out, the following measures should in addition be taken:i.

Address civil servants and warn them against unescorted safaris by armed
personnel and unnecessary movement in case of an attack by Degodia
bandits in retaliation.

ii.

Consider transferring all Degodia and Ajuran Kenya Policemen and
Administration Policemen should the situation so warrant.

iii. Maintain extra vigilance in the event of the Degodia bandits striking in
retaliation to avoid further loss of life of innocent citizens and any nature of
retaliation.
iv. DSC Wajir to be on alert and ensure that there is no unnecessary movement
particularly after 6.00pm.
v.

Continuous operation should be stepped up with the increased reinforcement
of:

100 extra men already drawn from Mandera to assist.
a)

45 extra men from Garissa to assist in this operation.

274 Min.13/84., Minutes of the North Eastern Special PSC meeting held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Tuesday 14th
February 1984, 2.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

281

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

b)

1 Army Platoon from Moyale also reinforcing the troops on the ground.

c)

1 Army Platoon from Garissa also reinforcing the ongoing operation.

421. The Commission heard directly from Major Chebet and Colonel Muhindi on the
last point: the reinforcement of security and army personnel in Wajir. They both
remembered this quite clearly and remember mobilising troops in Garissa for this
very purpose:
Leader of Evidence: I will go directly to where it says: “One Army platoon from Garissa
also reinforcing the ongoing operation.” Were you aware of this one army platoon?
Retired Brigadier Phillip Chebet: Yes. As a member of the DSC Garissa, I was aware.
Leader of Evidence: You were aware of this one army platoon that had to go and
reinforce the operations in Wajir? So why were they going to reinforce the operation?
What were the reasons for the PSC to seek reinforcement in Wajir yet we have an able
team of armed officers also in Wajir? Why would they seek reinforcement from Garissa
and Mandera?
Retired Brigadier Phillip Chebet: I remember that after the unfortunate incident, the
fear of some was that reprisal from the community might step up or might escalate
and they needed troops to stabilise the situation. Also, take note that the operation
was still ongoing in the mopping up of the arms which were in the possession of the
locals. So, that was one of the aims of reinforcing the police in the region. It was just
to stabilise the situation and not for any other operation. This is precisely what they
were doing.275

422. Back in Wajir itself, it was clear that by the 14th of February that the entire
district was in a state of flux occasioned primarily by the combined escape and
release from the airstrip of detainees that started the day before. The District
Security Committee seemed to melt away after their meeting; the Commission
found nothing to shed any light on what they did that afternoon. In terms of
coordinating a rescue mission, Tiema and company were de facto replaced by
the young medic Mohammed Elmi and Sister Annalena Tonelli. On the 13th they
were at the frontline of caring for the injured. By the 14th, that role had expanded
considerably to include searching for survivors, and more gruesomely, the dead.
423. Elmi’s recollection of the 14th was that early that morning, even before dawn, he
received news of missing friends and family who had been simply deposited on
the main Wajir-Mandera road by a slow-moving truck driving with its lights off. The
trucks were laden with half-naked, hungry and traumatized men who by that point
275 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 7 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 8
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had spent nearly four nights at the airstrip. Elmi ran to Sister Tonnelli’s compound
with the news. They commandeered a number of private and public vehicles and
set off down the road in search of survivors who they took back to the District
Hospital and Rehabilitation Centre for treatment. A few hours later, word came in
of more survivors even further away near a place called Dela. Once again, Annalena
and Elmi mobilised this time with the assistance of a local guide. They attached a
Red Cross emblem to their car and headed off in the direction of Dela.
424. Elmi testified that the drive towards Dela yielded 16 survivors whom they brought
back to Wajir with them. One of them was very badly injured and did not last the
journey; he died along the way and was buried in Sister Annalena’s compound.
Elmi also reported to have seen evidence that the disposal of dead bodies was
still continuing. His testimony was that as they stopped at a road block, two
military vehicles pulled up beside them and asked for directions to Eldas. Elmi
immediately smelt the overpowering and unmistakable stench of death:
As we parked our cars with their doors open, two military vehicles came to us. The soldiers
asked us for directions. I remember them asking where Eldas is. They were wearing masks
more like handkerchiefs on their noses. They told us to remove our vehicles from the road
so that they could pass. They went ahead and as they passed there was a stench coming
from the lorries. We later learnt that they were the ones dropping the dead bodies and one
of the sites was not far from that area.276

425.

At some point (perhaps after the initial early morning drive towards Mandera
and before the Dela mission), Sister Annalena and Elmi went back to the District
Commissioner’s complex where they had another heated encounter with unnamed
officials. It seemed that a delegation from the Swiss Red Cross happened to be in
Wajir on the 14th. It was, according to Elmi, a pre-arranged visit designed to familiarise
the Swiss with activities of the local branch. The visitors (one of whom Elmi named
as a C.E. Aquest) was apparently received at the airport and driven to the DC’s offices
for a meeting. They were not allowed to make a wider tour of Wajir by security
officials who were by then in complete control of their schedule and movements.
Sister Annalena was then meant to have burst into the meeting uninvited with the
dramatic announcement that “a lot of people were dying” and that assistance was
needed.277 It is unclear what happened next. Elmi described an abrupt ending of the
meeting and the immediate return of the Swiss back to Nairobi.

426. The most heartfelt accounts of the 14th of February came from men such as
Hilowle, who were finally released from Wagalla after nearly four days and four
nights trapped at the airstrip in the most challenging of circumstances. At the
276 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.6
277 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ Nairobi/18 May 2011/p. 6
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end of it all, Hilowle’s release was a strange anti-climax. As night fell, he was
simply ordered into one of the army vehicles and dropped on another of the
roads leading out of Wajir. He was found in shock and hungry by Sister Annalena
and Elmi. They took him back into town, dressed the wounds on his legs, gave
him some medicine and then sent him home. He found his wife and family in
an abject state. They had heard nothing from or of him since the 9th of February.
With all manner of stories swirling around Wajir, his family was in a state of
trauma.
427. The difficulties facing those who were fortunate to survive Wagalla was
illustrated by Hilowle; his return home signalled the onset of a series of problems
and misfortunes that he linked directly to the operation. Part of his home was
destroyed during the round-up. Money and personal belongings were also
stolen. Hilowle’s injuries were much more serious than was initially thought. The
need for extended treatment kept him in hospital for another three months. In
the end, however, all that Hilowle could do was express gratitude for the miracle
of his survival. Many of his friends and his clansmen had not been so lucky.
According to a female victim:
We do not have houses because they were burnt down and we have been poor from
the day of Wagalla up to now. We have not had any assistance from the government.
We were stigmatized and we were told that we were “the rape women”. We did not get
married and even the daughters we bore before are also stigmatized. They are suffering
because of that.278

428. Another female victim remained disabled due to the injuries she sustained during
the operation:
They cut my leg, burnt part of my house and asked me about Wagalla. The Kenyan
soldiers cut off my leg, injured my sister and killed my mother. My sister and I were in
hospital for five months and you can even see the leg that was cut. Since that day, I am
crippled and it is the government that did this to me.279

278 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Wajir/19 May 2011/p. 3-4.
279 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Wajir/19 May 2011/p. 4.
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‘What happened to us, I have never heard of it anywhere else’
(Women’s In-Camera Hearing, Wajir)

We were the people who were born in the town and who witnessed what happened. Since I
was raped, I have never gone back to that place. Before that, my mother and father never used to
go outside our house to drink water. We were living in a very peaceful state. It was after the night
of Friday that everything changed. According to our Somali culture, the night before Friday is like
a holiday. We feel happy to welcome the holiday. We were in a very happy state because of that.
On that day, at 5.00am, I came out of the house to warm bathing water for my husband and the
men who were sleeping outside so that they could go for prayers. When I was trying to light fire,
and I was holding a matchstick, I turned behind and saw soldiers. They shouted at me: “Wewe!”
When I realised what was happening, the men were already inside the house.
They went to where the men were sleeping. My husband Adan Abdulla, my father Keynan
Abdi Hassan, my brother Adan Keynan, a cousin called Mohammed Harif Keynan and my two
maternal uncles who came from a place called Afmadhur, who were visiting at that moment,
were all among the men who were in the house. The men were all picked up. They requested: “At
least let us pray before you take us,” but nobody listened to their plea. They were taken out of the
house. Each one of them was lifted and thrown into the back of the truck like sacks of potatoes.
Every hut around us experienced the same thing. No man was left. No man could hide as we were
not expecting this kind of attack. Had we known, we could have hidden them, even if it meant
throwing them into wells, so that nobody could find them. We could even have told them to run
into the bush, but we were not expecting this kind of thing.
So, early in the morning at about 6.00am, every man was taken away. We kept seeing men
being taken away from all over the place from 6.00am to 6.00pm. Others were picked up from
one place. The men sustained injuries and some were bleeding and you could see blood flowing
out of the trucks. All these men were taken to an open field. They kept coming to collect men
between Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday. These men were not given any food or water.
Nobody could dare take food or anything to them. If they saw you taking a bottle of water to the
men, they would pick you up and take you to the field too.
They tricked us because we would not have allowed them to take away our men. They told
us that this field was meant for aeroplanes that would help us export our cattle and livestock. So,
we allowed them to construct an airstrip. We were not aware that they were preparing the field for
the aeroplanes to come and pick our men and people. After Saturday and Sunday, they brought
a truck full of water. By this time, these men were hungry and dehydrated and anyone who drank
the water dropped dead because it was poisoned. Nobody knew that at that time, but later on
people told us about it. We, ladies did not know that the water had been laced with poison. The
men who escaped later on testified and told us that story. So, in the field some men were told
to remove their shirts and hot stones were placed on their backs. The ground had very hot sand
because it was very dry. It was a very hot day.
After this, there were very many dead bodies and men were in a desperate situation. On
Wednesday, the bodies were collected. On the same day, Wednesday, the soldiers came back.
Thousands of girls were asked: “Do you want your men back?” They said: “Yes.” Every little girl or
woman was taken away. They told us to follow them so that they could show us where our men
were. So, when we went with them to Makaror, the soldiers turned on us when we reached the
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place called Makaror and said: “Today, there are no men for you. We are your men.”
No woman was spared. They did not care whether some were pregnant. They did not care
when some women told them they were about to give birth. They did not care that some women
were old. Every soldier came. They were so many soldiers. They were uncountable. There were no
prostitutes those days, so these men were sexually starved. By then, I was nine months pregnant.
They raped me again and again until my unborn child came out. Twenty women who were raped
died. I saw them with my own eyes.
Some women resisted them. They struggled with them and because of that struggle, they
were beaten to death. During the night, the place became a camp for only women to be raped.
The dead bodies were taken away. We do not know where they took them.
The men’s bodies were taken to Moyale. One day, as I was travelling to Godhane, which is
across the border, I saw two trucks full of skeletons. A man pointed out that to me and said: “Those
are the bones of the Degodia men.” They were also taken to a place called Bandu, which is close
to Marsabit. There is another place called Sahara close to Mandera. There is also another place
called Wajirbora. Our bones were thrown in these places. What remained were the huts. Nobody
questioned whom they belonged to. They just took petrol and set them on fire. We were not intelligent. Those days, women were very poor, but today the state of women has changed. I can see
that we are able to write. By then, the Degodia women were in a desperate state. Even the Kikuyu
women sympathised with us. Other Kenyan ladies came and cried with us. They donated to us
clothes when this calamity befell us.
[…] We could not help ourselves. We were absolutely helpless. All I could see was my father
who was cut into pieces. My father and brother were on top of each other. Both were dead. They
died in a very bad way. We were just watching. No tear could drop out of my eyes that day. Today,
I can cry because there is a change in the situation of women. We did not get any help that day.
We did not get someone to help us.
We lost wealth and relatives, but still we are alive today. We did not feed on the dead bodies
or the carcasses. The government “ate” us that day.
About three months after that incident, we were eating the bark of trees by scratching the
top parts and eating the inner parts, because we could not come to town since we were afraid.
We could not even access health care because they would ask: “Where are you taking this injured
Shifta?” If we told them that our people were massacred in Wagalla, they told us: “You go away.” I
personally remember I went seven times to the police station. They locked me up in prison seven
times. After my child came out prematurely, I screamed. I was shocked. I was mentally disturbed. I
was screaming hysterically every time, so they took me to prison and said that I needed help. They
took me to prison and sent me back after seven days. They had a name for us: “wolves or hyenas.”
They said we did not have any people. They said we were just roaming around in groups aimlessly.
So they called us “the crazy pack of hyenas.”
As to the calamity that befell us, only God can answer us. We were born in Kenya. I have never
seen any other flag other than the Kenyan flag. I am 67 years old. I used to drink a bottle of milk
which I used to buy for 50 cents in those days. Today if you need a bottle of milk, you buy it for
KSh100. I have lived for that long. What happened to us, I have never heard of it anywhere else.
When we heard about the TJRC we were frightened because we thought that you would identify
those of us with injuries and information and then we would be put in prison. But when we heard
that ladies are part of the TJRC, we felt better because we knew the compassion of women.
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Victims of the Wagalla massacre during public hearing in Wajir.

Back in Nairobi
429. The Commission found that events in Nairobi over the Wagalla period tended to
reflect the confusion in Wajir and, to a lesser extent, Garissa. The impression of
limited and sporadic interaction between Nairobi and the province dominated
the evidence gathered by the Commission. Submissions from former members of
the Kenya Intelligence Committee painted a picture of near-total silence between
their Nairobi-based committee and those based in Wajir and Garissa from the 9th
of February onwards. This appeared strange to the Commission as the start of the
operation coincided with the KIC’s grand tour of Northern Kenya. The group insisted
that they had heard nothing of the Wajir District Security Committee signalling its
intention to carry out the operation beginning on the 10th. They maintained that
they spent the evening of the 9th enjoying a pleasant dinner arranged by their host,
PC Benson Kaaria.
430.

Because the KIC members claimed that they had not heard and knew nothing of the
operation, they also claimed that they had no news of the events that were taking
place as they flew back to Nairobi on the 10th. Again this was despite the fact that
they were accompanied all the way to the capital by Aswani, the Provincial Police
Officer and the first Garissa person to receive a signal about the District Security
Committee’s plans for Wagalla. Even after they returned to Nairobi, the members
claimed that they remained ignorant of events in Wajir. They testified that they were
told nothing either as individuals or in their professional capacities. The testimony of
David Mwiraria, the then Permanent Secretary in charge of Home Affairs, was that he
only heard of Wagalla through newspaper reports that surfaced weeks afterwards.280

280 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 54
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431. The Commission found evidence that news about Wagalla reached Nairobi much
faster than Mwiraria and his colleagues claimed in their testimony. Moreover, at
least one member of the national intelligence service was aware of the operation
from its outset; that is from the 10th onwards. In 1984, Brigadier Joseph Kibwana was
the Director of Military Intelligence, and thus a member of the Kenya Intelligence
Committee. Kibwana was part of the large group that embarked on the tour of
Northern Kenya. As with all other members of the team, Kibwana’s testimony was
that he knew nothing of Wagalla as the operation began on the 9th of February. But
Kibwana parted company with the rest of the KIC in that he clearly stated that he
was told about the start of the operation on the 10th after arriving at Moi Air Base
in Nairobi:
Commissioner: Can you recall when the first time was that you heard about the Wagalla
Massacre?
General Joseph Raymond Kibwana: When we landed at the Moi Air Base on our return,
I would have been briefed by the duty officer at the military intelligence.
Commissioner: What would that date have been?
General Joseph Raymond Kibwana: That would have been on the 10th, I believe.
Commissioner: On the 10th of February you would have been briefed on the initiation
of that operation. Is that correct?
General Joseph Raymond Kibwana: I would have been briefed on the outcome of the
operation.281

432. The briefing was given by the duty military intelligence officer who met Kibwana
at the airport. What this meant was that information about the operation had
also been funnelled through army channels to the Department of Defence (DoD)
headquarters in Nairobi. Kibwana underscored what the Commission established
through Colonel Frank Muhindi’s testimony: the army had its own reporting
systems for what Kibwana described as “all incidents that had any military
connotations.”282The Directorate of Intelligence appeared to have been well
aware of the operation from the 9th onwards. Paul Murimi, a senior intelligence
officer who also travelled on the Kenya Intelligence Committee trip, testified as
much:
Commissioner: If I assume that the Directorate had received intelligence beginning
from the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th February and whatever, every day from Wajir through Garissa,
would I be right?
Mr Paul Murimi: Yes.
281 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 73
282 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 74
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Commissioner: In that case, this being a very important development in Wajir, a big
operation, would that reach the desk of the Director or Manager?
Mr Paul Murimi: It would!283

433.

For the Commission, the implications of this were that certain military and civilian
authorities in Nairobi were kept in the loop about events in Wajir from the 9th onwards.
The extent and depth of the briefings that they received, however, remain hidden.
The minutes of the Provincial Security Committee meeting of the 14th is important as
it indicated that Kaaria subsequently notified the Permanent Secretary in the Office
of the President, James Mathenge, of the Wagalla operation. Mathenge’s testimony
differed from this narrative. He said that he heard the news from Parliament. The
Wajir West Member of Parliament had apparently rushed to Nairobi to attend the
Tuesday session. Mathenge was mistaken because the 5th Parliament was on recess
from its first session and did not return for the second session until the 20th of March.
It was thus unlikely that he could have been informed through that route.

434.

In Nairobi news about a large operation in Wajir set off a chain of events. Another
fact-finding team was rapidly assembled. This time round the team consisted of
(mainly) Nairobi officials quickly put together, it appears, after consultations among
the military, the Office of the President, and the police. The team was a high profile
one and included the highest ranking military officer in Kenya, the Chief of General
Staff General Jackson Mulinge. Like many military officers of a certain generation,
Mulinge participated in the Shifta War and knew the region well. Also on the team
was a Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mr Gatui. Mulinge and Gatui were joined by
Kaaria and a representative of the Provincial Criminal Investigations Department.284

435. As with the previous trips the mission had one overriding objective, and that was
to find out what had happened in Wajir. The composition of the team meant that
the previously elusive members of the District Security Committee (who were last
heard from on Monday the 13th of February) were required to put in an appearance
and lead the tour of the operational area. Highlights included a stop at the army
base. From there the group went to the Wagalla Airstrip itself. The airstrip stood
empty and there was no sign of the hundreds (and possibly thousands) of men who
had been held there for several days and nights. There was, however, in Kaaria’s
description, incontrovertible evidence that something quite disturbing had taken
place at Wagalla:
283 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 22
284 There is some confusion about the representation from the Provincial Criminal Investigations Office. Paul Kingori is listed in the
minutes as having been part of this team as the Provincial Criminal Investigations Officer. His evidence was that following last-minute
orders from Nairobi, he was replaced with a Mr. Ombati. See Min. 20/83, Minutes of the Special North Eastern Provincial Security
Committee Meeting held in the Provincial Commissioners Office on Wednesday 15th 1984 beginning at 9.30. Also, TJRC/ Hansard/
Public Hearing/ 9 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 27
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Leader of Evidence: What did you find at the airstrip?
Benson Kaaria: We found the airstrip. We found the side of the fence which was broken
and we could see traces of footprints in the runway.
Leader of Evidence: Inside or outside the enclosure?
Benson Kaaria: Inside the airstrip there were traces of maize and beans scattered.
Leader of Evidence: On plates or on the ground?
Benson Kaaria: On the ground.285

436. That marked the end of the trip. The team did not seem interested in assessing
any other aspects of the operation and its impact. Kaaria, Mulinge and company
did not, for example, visit the district hospital to inquire about the injured and
the wounded. They also made no inquiries into the fate of the dead. Once they
were told by the District Security Committee that the bodies had, in their words,
been “dumped”, nothing else happened. They did not visit the sites and indeed
did not ask to visit the sites.286 Instead, they flew back to Nairobi through Garissa.
Kaaria went directly into a late night emergency meeting of the Provincial Security
Committee, during which the latest developments in Wajir were discussed.
437.

Only a handful of people outside of government circles knew about Wagalla during
these early days. The main reason for this was a lag in the reporting of the incident
in the papers and other local media. This meant that Nairobi was curiously silent
in the days and weeks after the operation; there was no public hue and cry and
no commentary. Witnesses testified that attempts were made to send medicine
and other humanitarian supplies from Nairobi to Wajir. Elmi stated that requests
for assistance were sent to AMREF (African Medical and Research Foundation),
more popularly referred to as the Flying Doctors. These requests in turn triggered
something of a tug-of-war in Nairobi pitting AMREF, the Ministry of Health and
the Office of the President. The problem, it seemed, was that the large amount of
supplies needed in Wajir required permissions and clearances. These clearances were
not processed. If anything, it appeared that they may have even been rejected. Aid
workers trying to get to Wajir were apparently stopped at roadblocks in Habaswein.
One hundred kilometres south of their destination, they were forced to turn back.

438.

Documents obtained by the Commission from the government of the United
Kingdom shed additional light on these early efforts to provide relief to the victims
of Wagalla. In a series of reports and meetings, representatives of AMREF, Oxfam,
and other relief agencies began to report on the situation in Wagalla. These reports

285 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 53
286 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 53
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were kept secret from the Kenya government for fear that the presence of foreign
aid organizations on the ground would lead to further restrictions on their ability
to address what was immediately clear was an emergency situation. In these early
reports, the aid agencies stated that they had seen 700 to 800 bodies that had
been dumped in the bush, and that on 14 February, approximately 3 500 people
had flooded the local hospitals and other medical facilities. Almost immediately the
hospitals were ordered not to treat the injured; the medical facilities were ordered to
evict any Degodia who had sought treatment; and the mission sisters were ordered
to provide no medical treatment on penalty of the mission being burnt down.287
439. The aid agencies documented an alarming picture of a medical and humanitarian
disaster:
A body count revealed 1 400 dead so far, 472 of which were known by name and
ID number to AMREF. This resulted from body counts 10 days ago. Many had been
obliterated in fires and many had died since. The total count could be double. Taking
the average number of dependents as 5, which was conservative, at least 7 000 people
were without support, without homes, without water and without livestock. A medical
examination of those children being fed at missions, that is the most fortunate children,
showed at least one-third were dangerously close to starvation.

440.

Nancy Caroline was an American doctor who worked with AMREF. In a dramatic
turn of events, she resigned from the organisation in order to side-step the ban. She
then somehow organised for a charter plane filled with food and medicine to fly
from Nairobi to Wajir. She remained in Wajir for two weeks assisting Sister Annalena
in the provision of emergency care. The Commission was unable to determine the
exact dates of Caroline’s extraordinary mission, but the assumption was that it must
have taken place soon after the operation itself, because, as Elmi described it, she
was subject to close surveillance by still suspicious intelligence and police officers.
Aid and relief workers were not admitted back into Wajir until May 1984 when an
extended drought necessitated the staging of a large-scale humanitarian mission.

Reporting Wagalla
441.

In stark contrast to the Bulla Karatasi operation that was reported within hours, it
took about three weeks for the Wagalla story to hit the newspapers. It was a lapse
that was part of the wall of silence that had slowly but inexorably been constructed
around the operation. Wagalla, to put it simply, was weakly reported particularly by
the local press who latched onto the events long after international correspondents.
One of the first reports about the operation was filed by United Press International
(UPI). The report was a fairly basic one and did not delve into details:

287 Confidential Briefing by AMREF, attached to Tel 106 of 29 March 1984, paragraph 5.
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Two local officials charged today that soldiers and policemen shot, bludgeoned and
burned to death at least 300 people among more than 5 000 forced to lie naked
outdoors for five days without food or water. The two officials, Sugal Unshur, a town
councillor, and Abdi Sheik, a member of the Kenyan Parliament, said more than 1 000
Degodia tribesmen were taken into the bush by security forces after the massacre and
were missing and feared dead. They accused security forces of dumping bodies in the
bush to conceal the incident in the Wajir District, about 320 miles northeast of Nairobi.
Mr Sheik said police arrested an Italian missionary, Annalena Tonelli, who searched the
bush for survivors for several days. The Italian Embassy said it was investigating.
A Norwegian Embassy spokesman said aid workers in Wajir had reported charges
similar to those by the two local officials. The staff of at least one foreign embassy
has sent medical supplies to the area for the injured, said a diplomat who asked not
to be identified. A spokesman for President Daniel arap Moi said the government had
''no comment at this time'' on the charges. Mr Sheik and Mr Unshur said the massacre
occurred from February 10 to February 14 as part of an apparent government drive to
wipe out the 140 000- member Degodia tribe, which is of Somali origin, because of past
links with Somali guerrillas.288

442. The Kenya government reacted swiftly to this piece through the Kenya Times, a
newspaper owned and operated by the ruling party, KANU. The government
line was aggressive, accusing both the foreign press and their sources in Wajir of
mischief and falsehoods. As reported by Reuters:
The official newspaper of Kenya's ruling party said today that some local politicians
and the foreign press had exaggerated and distorted reports of a purported massacre
by security forces in northeast Kenya. ''It is regrettable that some local leaders and
the foreign press have set it upon themselves to distort the truth about the situation
in Wajir,'' The Kenya Times said in an editorial. On Wednesday a councillor for the
area accused Kenyan security forces of killing at least 300 people last month in Wajir
township, a desert region inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Referring to local leaders and
foreign reporters, the newspaper, owned by the Kenya African National Union party,
said: ''They have deliberately exaggerated the magnitude of the conflict and made false
claims.'' The newspaper criticized local politicians for bringing the purported incidents
to the notice of foreign journalists, saying that they had blown up a minor quarrel and
that Kenya's enemies abroad would use the information for destructive purposes. 289

443. As far as the Commission could tell, the story then went back underground for the
next three weeks. Discussion of Wagalla became unavoidable on the 21st of March
when Ahmed Khalif, the Member of Parliament for Wajir East, made an extraordinary
and charged appearance in Parliament. Members of the 5th Parliament returned
from recess on the 20th of March. The first seven days of new sessions of Parliament
288 UPI, “2 Kenyan Officials Make Massacre Charges,” The New York Times, 1st March 1984.
289 Reuters, “Kenyans Assail Press for Massacre Reports,” The New York Times, 3 March 1984.
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are usually dedicated to the fairly routine debate of the presidential address, with
each member allocated ten minutes to speak. When Khalif’s turn came, he plunged
straight into the Wagalla operation. Before his stunned colleagues - many of whom
would be hearing of the operation for the first time - he described what had taken
place in Wajir more than a month earlier:
I would like to take the opportunity of this brief period given to me to talk about some
very serious matters that have happened in my constituency and Wajir District as a
whole. From the 10th February, up to the 14th February, the security forces, that is the
police and the military, arrested more than 5 000 men and put them into concentration
camps…where all the people were stripped naked and kept there for five consecutive
days being persistently denied water and food. They were all nude or stripped naked.
Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, during this time those people who tried - in keeping with their
religious obligations - to say their prayers they stood up - because they were all forced
to lie on their bellies - were shot dead.290

444. Khalif went on to detail the dead:
Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, those people were killed through beatings, shootings, and some
of them were burned alive. Now, I have a list of more than 300 people, including a former
Member of this House, who was among those people who were killed. He is a former
senator and also a former Nominated Member. Twenty civil servants were among those
who were killed; former members of the Civil Service like chiefs were among the people
who were killed…291

445.

290
291
292
293
294

With his remarks, Khalif ensured that the story of the Wagalla massacre rocketed
from obscurity to front page news. The following day, Khalif’s descriptions of the
operation were reported by all the local newspapers. “Kenyan security forces
accused of mass-killing” headlined the Daily Nation.292 The papers also reported the
reactions that Khalif’s submissions elicited among members of the house. Charles
Muthura said the statement was irrelevant because it was not a response to the
presidential address. Others asked Khalif to substantiate his claims. The then VicePresident and Minister for Home Affairs Mwai Kibaki asked for substantiation that
people had been stripped naked. The Daily Nation also reported that yet another
Member of Parliament, Parmenas Munyasia (Kitui West), demanded that Khalif
attach a name to his description of “the person” who had “threatened to wipe out the
whole population of the Somalis.”293 That was, of course, a thinly veiled reference to
Kaaria and comments made four years earlier during the Bulla Karatasi operation.294
Khalif had also presented a number of photographs in the House showing the dead,
the injured, the security forces and their vehicles. These were not reproduced in

Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 21st March 1984, 44 – 45.
Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 21st March 1984, 45
‘Kenyan security forces accused of mass-killing’, Daily Nation March 22nd 1984.
‘Kenyan security forces accused of mass-killing’, Daily Nation 22nd March 1984.
‘State Acts on Shiftas’ Sunday Standard 9th November 1980.
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the newspapers. It was, however, obvious that in Parliament at least, Wagalla was
now an open and live issue. The Daily Nation reported Khalif’s intention to seek the
establishment of a committee to investigate the operation more fully.
446.

Exactly a week later, Wagalla was back in the news in an even more sensational fashion.
On the 27th of March, the Minister for Defence and Internal Security in the Office of
the President appeared in Parliament to present a ministerial statement in response
to Khalif’s claims of the 21st of March. The national newspapers gave Justus ole Tipis’
statement prominent coverage under the headings “57 killed by troops in Wajir” in
the Daily Nation and “59 killed in violence” in The Standard.295 The importance of ole
Tipis’ appearance in Parliament cannot be downplayed. For the Commission it and
his subsequent appearance a few weeks later represented one of the government’s
most complete statements on Wagalla to date, and formed the foundation of most
official representations of the operation over the past three decades. Ole Tipis began
his statement in Parliament by claiming that the government:
“Does not and will not condone any acts of lawlessness or atrocities whether by bandits,
individuals or ill-intentioned persons against the humble, peace-loving and law-abiding
citizens of this nation.”296

447. With this as an introduction, the minister went on to supply the by now familiar
explanation for the start of the operation: the troubled state of inter-clan
relationships in Wajir West, in particular, and Wajir District in general. Once again,
it was not difficult to pick up on the depiction of the Ajuran, Degodia and Gurre as
engaged in an unending cycle of violence, driven largely by political interests:
Ethnic squabbles and rivalries have been a common feature in North Eastern Province
and Wajir District in particular. Some leaders from that area, particularly during the life
of the last Parliament, appear to have specialised in perpetuating clannism for their own
selfish ends. This was clearly evident during the last Parliamentary Elections when the
Ajuran clan was virtually driven out of a constituency to pave the way for an easy victory
of a candidate from the Degodia clan. Such are the tribal politics in some parts of the
North Eastern Province.297

448. Ole Tipis sketched out a history of failed barazas, piecemeal disarmament, and
spiralling crime where the Ajuran featured as victims and the Degodia, more
often than not, were the aggressors. The killing of six Ajuran near Griftu on the
9th of February was presented as the last straw that finally prompted the district
authorities to take action:
295 ’57 killed by troops in Wajir – Tipis’, Daily Nation 28th March 1984 1 and ‘59 killed in violence – Tipis’, The Standard 28th March 1984 2.
296 Ministerial Statement Loss of Life-Government Operations against clashes between Degodia and Ajuran Somalia, Kenya National
Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 27th March 1984, 146.
297 Ministerial Statement Loss of Life-Government Operations against clashes between Degodia and Ajuran Somalia, Kenya National
Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 27th March 1984, 147.
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As a result of repeated tribal feuds between the Degodia and the Ajuran tribes and the
consequential loss of life in Wajir District of North Eastern Province, the government
found it necessary to intervene and restore peace and order. The operation by the
security forces was mounted, as a result of which a number of illegal firearms were
recovered and it was necessary to question several suspects.298

449. Those expecting to hear more about the actual details and specifics of the operation
were disappointed, as the minister’s statement addressed none of these issues.
Instead the minister gave only a three-tiered explanation about the operation’s
outcomes. Firstly, ole Tipis gave the number of dead as 57 which was, in his words,
“far less than the number alleged,” presumably by Khalif and other interlocutors.
Secondly, he stated that the government did not condone any “excessive force”
that might have been used during the operation. Thirdly, ole Tipis explained that
force had nonetheless been necessary on account of resistance, violence and
negative attitudes encountered from the people rounded up during the operation.
Ole Tipis informed members that the government’s findings were based on already
complete investigations and a subsequent report. The minister ended on a stern
note and reiterated the government’s commitment to the maintenance of law and
order.
450. Other than The Standard, which put the death toll at 59, the newspapers presented
relatively straightforward accounts of the minister’s statement without any
commentary or editorialising. What the articles could not capture, however, was
the intensity and heat of the debate that followed the minister’s statement. On the
same day that ole Tipis presented the government’s version of events at Wagalla,
Khalif returned to Parliament (as promised) with further information on the 300
victims about which he had spoken the week before. Khalif read out a list of 20
names of civil servants apparently killed during the operation. He also formally
tabled the photographs of the airstrip.
451. It was all too much for the representative from Wajir East, Honourable Abdi. He
rose the next day to make an impassioned submission about the hundreds of
people who had, in his description, been butchered. He said that he was capable
of producing the skeletons of the dead to prove the killings. Abdi also said that
600 people were still missing. His comments provoked a firestorm as members of
Parliament took issue with their colleague’s claims and charges. The Minister of
Labour at the time, Dr Robert Ouko, asked Hon Abdi to clarify whether he was
claiming that the statement presented by the minister was written by the same
298 Ministerial Statement Loss of Life-Government Operations against clashes between Degodia and Ajuran Somalia, Kenya National
Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 27th March 1984, 147.
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people he was accusing of murder. Ndolo Ayah, the acting Deputy Speaker, urged
Hon Abdi to be cautious and to substantiate his claims. An Assistant Minister in the
Office of the President, Isaac Salat, went further and demanded that Abdi withdraw
his remarks as well as apologise for them. The session ended with the Member for
Wajir East neither withdrawing nor apologizing.
452. Sitting through the entire exchange was ole Tipis. He remained tight-lipped
and only spoke several hours later to complain about the press coverage of his
ministerial statement on Wagalla.299 Specifically, he took the Daily Nation to task,
accusing the paper of misrepresentation. He was particularly upset with the
introductory paragraph which read:
Government security forces killed 57 people in Wajir District in an operation to quell
tribal feuds and take possession of illegally acquired arms, Mr Justus ole Tipis said
yesterday.300

453. The minister’s issue seemed to be that he had neither claimed nor implied any
such thing. His explanation was that 57 people had been killed in the course of
the operation and that their deaths were the result of excessive force and not
deliberate intent. He alerted his colleagues to what he had actually had said:
The government does not condone the excessive force which might have been meted
out during the operation. However, during the exercise of questioning, resistance
and violence on the part of the suspects were encountered and in the course of the
encounter 57 people were killed.301

454. Ole Tipis had harsh words for the Daily Nation, which he described as having
a long history of “putting words into the mouths” of parliamentarians.302 The
minister clearly felt that the Wagalla episode required much more sensitive and
diligent reporting:
Since the situation there is so very serious and very bad, indeed we expect that what
we talk here is correctly reported, truthfully with fairness on either side. I hope we will
get the Chair’s guidance and protection, especially when a matter of such magnitude
and seriousness, affecting the lives of our people, is misreported and the Press tries to
mislead the general public and instilling into their minds that the government is part of
these killings.303
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455. The Daily Nation reported Ole Tipis’ remarks but did not retract or correct its
original article.304International coverage of Wagalla was faster-moving than local
coverage. The Commission also found that international coverage was much more
victim and impact-oriented. An article from the Philadelphia Inquirer of 8 April 1984
clearly illustrated this tendency. Robert Rosenthal, the staff writer, put together a
detailed piece that was quite clearly constructed around sources with direct, firsthand knowledge of the operation, if not actual survivors and eyewitnesses. The
article contained all the elements of the Wagalla story, beginning with the predawn roundup of Wajir residents and their transfer to the airstrip:
A 34-year old man Rahman, a teacher of Arabic and the Koran in Wajir, said he was
sleeping in a house he shared with two other teachers when, at 3.00am, there was a
heavy pounding on the door.
When the door was opened, police barged in and dragged the men outside to an open
area where hundreds of other men squatted in the darkness, surrounded by soldiers and
police. Rahman was interviewed weeks later in the Eastleigh section of Nairobi where
many Somalis live. He said that at 7.30am on February 10, the Degodia men in Wajir
were put into army trucks and driven nine miles to an airstrip at a place called Wakala
(Wagalla) (sic).305

456. Based on the interview with Rahman, the article also provided a detailed description
of events at the airstrip itself:
“The people at Wagalla were business, religious (teachers), students and bush people.
We were all together,” said Rahman. “An officer told us that we would soon know why we
were there and that if we did not turn over our guns, we would be buried where we sat.”
The men - he estimated their number to be 4 000 to 5 000 - sat all day in the sun without
food or water.

457. Rosenthal’s account continues:
That night, according to many of those interviewed, the soldiers ordered the Degodia
men to lie on their stomachs. Those who refused to do so were beaten with clubs and
rifle butts. The soldiers began walking on Degodias, and when they found men with
money or watches, they stole them, the witnesses said.
They said that some who resisted were dragged off, clubbed to death, shot or stabbed
with bayonets.
“When it was dawn,” Rahman recalled, “people got up and started praying and asking
why they were kept in such a situation. The army commander came and said, ‘Sit down
and we will tell you why you are here.’ Then they asked us to reveal who had guns.” “Later,
as the day became very hot, the soldiers told all people to take off their clothes. Some
304 ‘Tipis statement on killing is criticized’ Daily Nation 29th March 1984 5
305 ‘Kenyans Recount Army Massacre’ Philadelphia Inquirer 8th April 1984
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were religious people and refused. Those that refused, they came with kerosene and
poured it on them and set them afire. When the people saw what was happening to the
religious men who refused, they started screaming and praying to God.”306

458.

The article dismissed the government’s estimates of the number of dead and instead
suggested that over 1 000 people may have been killed in the operation. The Inquirer
went further to describe ole Tipis’ statement of the week before as “oblique”:
But last week a high-ranking member of the cabinet seemed to offer an oblique
justification for what happened. Justus ole Tipis, the minister of state in the office of the
president, told the Kenyan parliament that the various Somali clans in the northeast had
been warring and squabbling, and he cited the Degodia as particularly troublesome.307

459. Rosenthal’s piece included the emerging suspicion among the Degodia that the
operation was planned long in advance:
A Degodia clan leader said he did not know the reason for the killings but that he
thought the operation had been planned. Five days before the massacre, he said, the
army closed many of the wells around Wajir to the Degodias, forcing them to a central
well near the town and making it easier for the army to round them up. The clan leader
discounted the killings of Ajuran women and children as a catalyst for the operation,
saying that nothing happened that had not happened before.308

460. Aid workers and missionaries quoted by the author offered yet another depiction
of Wagalla as an operation gone terribly wrong:
Aid officials and missionaries familiar with what happened in Wajir believe that a
security operation aimed at interrogation simply got tragically out of control. They
blame the poor training of the troops and officers and the inherent tribal and racial
differences between the Chinic Somalis and black Kenyans who come from areas
far south of Wajir.309

461. The Inquirer article was detailed, specific and far from bashful about its assessment
of the operation. The Commission was in no doubt that government officials would
have seen it and would have felt the need to react to it. Two days after its publication,
Justus ole Tipis returned to Parliament. He had an important ministerial statement
to make on Wagalla. Ole Tipis’ statement of the 12th of April was considerably more
detailed than that of the 27th of March. Not only did the minister supply new details
about the security situation in the run-up to the operation, but he also, for the first
time, tackled the context of the operation itself. In this, ole Tipis’ April presentation
was unprecedented:
306
307
308
309
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The operation started on Friday, 10th February 1984, at 0004 hours and covered the
following areas: Elben, Dambas, Butehelu, Eldas, Griftu and Bulla Jogoo. The operation
was composed of the army, police and administration police. At Bulla Jogoo, the security
forces surrounded the area at 0500 hours. The residents were given an order to leave
their huts, but they refused to do so. However by 1400 hours, the order had not yet
been complied with and the commander gave the order for the huts to be destroyed.
Three hundred and eighty-one male adult Degodia were rounded up and collected and
transported to Wagalla Airstrip which is nine miles west of Wajir Township for screening
and interrogation.310

462. Ole Tipis continued with his statement providing what for Parliament would have
been largely unknown information about the circumstances of the killing of the 57
people:
On 12th February 1984, the Wajir Acting District Commissioner addressed a baraza at
Wajir Township and explained to the residents what was going on to avoid panic. After
the baraza the District Commissioner visited the airstrip, in the company of the Officer
Commanding Police Division (OCPD), to view progress of the interrogation. When the
District Commissioner was leaving, part of the crowd started shouting, moving toward
him and others attempted to escape. During the stampede, confusion arose and in the
melee fire was opened and 29 people died of gun wounds or were trampled upon.
During the operation, the security forces met resistance and 28 other persons were
killed. This brings the death toll to 57 persons dead.311

463. The minister’s statement attracted considerable press attention, particularly from
the very paper that he had so roundly condemned a couple of weeks earlier. Out
of the detailed historical material that the minister provided as context, the Daily
Nation started by giving prominence to a single issue: political dissonance in Wajir
District:
The general security situation in Wajir District is politically motivated and leaders have
involved themselves in divisive strategies planned along ethnic considerations. This
was revealed in a government statement issued last night by the Minister of State in
the Office of President, Mr Justus ole Tipis, as a result of investigations into the violent
incidents that resulted in loss of life and destruction of property in Wajir District, early
this year312.

464. The Daily Nation’s article then went on to capture what ole Tipis and the government
were proposing as solutions to the problem of insecurity in Wajir:
And in order to ensure that law and order in the district is maintained, Mr Tipis told
Parliament the following measures would be taken:
310 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 12th April 1984 819
311 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 12th April 1984 820
312 ‘Wajir troubles political – Tipis’ Daily Nation 13th April 1984 1
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The government will select six elders from each section and meet at Wajir with the aim
of bringing about reconciliation and stop the wanton loss of life and property.
Any lawlessness in the district will continue to be dealt with firmness as armed bandits
will not be handled with soft gloves.
The solution to the security of Wajir lies squarely in the hands of the leaders. Old rivalries
must be changed to co-operation and understanding.
The government will continue to give relief in the form of medicines and food to families
in need; special care will be taken to look after the aged and children.313

465. Perhaps to ensure that there were no further misunderstandings about their
reporting, the paper reproduced the minister’s statement in its entirety. This
article of the 13th of April 1984 represented the end of the immediate and
contemporary coverage of the Wagalla operation. Ole Tipis’ statement presented
a certain finality that put a lid on public discussions for another decade or so.
As the ten-year anniversary approached in 1994, individuals and groups slowly
began to come forward to talk about further investigations.314 Others debated
the broader issues of clan and ethnic strife in the region.315 There were occasional
reports and articles in the press but nothing else. It would take another few years
before Wagalla became an issue that the Kenya media would speak about with
any kind of regularity.

Investigating Wagalla
466. Ole Tipis’ presentations, statements, and reports in Parliament in March and April
were based on a series of government-initiated investigations into the Wagalla
operation. The Commission found it vital to develop a clear understanding of the
sequence of these investigations, the investigators, and their findings on account
of their centrality to government perceptions and understandings about Wagalla
over the past 30 years. Simply put, these investigations have come to form the
foundation of almost everything the government has said about Wagalla since 1984;
they cannot be ignored. The Commission identified five discreet investigations and
inquiries undertaken during February and March 1984 into the events at Wagalla.
It was also given access to a remarkable internal inquiry undertaken by the military
concerning the events of Wagalla, prepared in direct response to the creation of
the Commission.
313 ‘Wajir troubles political – Tipis’ Daily Nation 13th April 1984 1
314 ’15 leaders defect from Kanu over ‘massacre’’ Daily Nation 12th January 1992
315 See for instance ‘Arrest inciters of Wajir clashes’ Daily Nation July 15th 1993. Also ‘Clan not to blame for Wajir clashes’ Daily Nation
August 10th 1993
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Inquiry by Colonel Muhindi
467. Colonel Frank Muhindi’s arrival in Wajir on the morning of the 13th of February
has already been discussed at some length previously in this chapter. As the
officer in overall command of 7KR Battalion in North Eastern Kenya, the colonel
was, the Commission believed, the first outsider to visit Wagalla after the
shootings of the 12th. His early morning flight was prompted by information he
was receiving through military channels that continued to function even as the
District Security Committee shut down communication from the 10th onwards.
By his own admission and testimony, Colonel Muhindi had been furnished
with only the barest of details by his sources. His information was, as he put it,
“scanty”.316 This meant that Muhindi’s inquiries were unstructured; he did not go
to Wajir with a clear understanding of the people with whom he needed to speak,
questions he needed answered, or sites he needed to visit. Indeed, Muhindi’s
efforts to understand what happened at Wagalla were almost entirely derailed by
the absence of Major Mudogo, the officer in command of the army unit and the
man in overall charge of the operation at Wagalla. In effect, Muhindi seemed to
have only one source in Wagalla: Captain Njeru Mugo.
468. The temptation exists, therefore, to dismiss Muhindi’s excursion to Wajir as
irrelevant. This would be true except for the fact that, notwithstanding the various
shortcomings of his investigation, Muhindi was conducting his inquiries as the
operation was ongoing. Civilians were still being held at the field, waiting to be
transported back to their homes. Speculation is rife that the reason Mudogo could
not be traced was because he was busy disposing of the dead bodies. Unlike some
of the investigators who arrived later on, therefore, Muhindi’s encounter of Wagalla
was unvarnished and unedited; because nobody knew he was visiting, nothing
had been moved around and nothing had been altered. The Commission was also
of the opinion that the briefing he received from Mugo was equally unprocessed.
469. In contrast, the Commission believed that the more sanitised official District
Security Committee version of events began to be put together and streamlined
during the committee meeting of Tuesday the 14th of February. Muhindi’s
unannounced arrival at the airstrip meant that he may have been given a less
polished and, perhaps, more authentic version of events. After several hours
in Wajir, Muhindi flew back to Garissa, carrying important information and
impressions of the operation. He had been told, for instance, that people died in
the operation and the circumstances in which they had died; he saw for himself
pools of blood and other evidence of extreme violence. He was also aware that
316 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 24 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.21
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the military had been involved in most (if not all) aspects of the operation,
starting with the rounding up of the men. It was also clear to the colonel that
army officers, led by Mudogo, were also actively engaged in post-operational
activities, such as the disposal of dead bodies and return of survivors to their
homes. The informality of Muhindi’s inquiry did, however, pose a number of
challenges for the Commission. Principally, it appeared as if the colonel did not
produce a written report. As such, there was no paper trail to follow and study.
The Commission only has Muhindi’s testimony that he came back and gave an
oral briefing to Provincial Commissioner Kaaria. He presumably would also have
passed his findings onwards and upwards to his military superiors.

Inquiry by Joseph Ndirangu
470. Joseph Ndirangu, the Provincial Special Branch Officer, and Gaturuku, the Deputy
Police Provincial Officer, left Garissa either late in the morning of the 13th or early
in the afternoon of the same day. Either way, they would have left after Muhindi
did. Ndirangu described himself as even less informed than Muhindi as he set off.
The signals he had been receiving from his men on the ground (Kibere and later
Mbole) since the 10th of February were unrevealing; there was nothing in them
concerning the progress and outcome of the operation. Ndirangu and Gaturuku
were dispatched to the district by Kaaria with direct instructions to find out
what had been happening in Wajir over the weekend. Like Muhindi, Ndirangu
and Gaturuku were provided with an aircraft to make the short flight between
Garissa and Wajir.
471. Their reception, however, was markedly different. Where Muhindi arrived
anonymously and was driven straight to the airstrip, Ndirangu and Gaturuku were
met at the military airstrip by Tiema and Wabwire, and this put an end to any plans
to visit the airstrip. The Wajir officials portrayed Wagalla as unstable, possibly
dangerous, and thus off limits to outsiders. Tiema and Wabwire immediately
ruled out a visit to the site. Instead, Gaturuku and Ndirangu were directed into
a small office within the complex for what Ndirangu himself described as a “not
so long meeting”.317 Incidentally, Mudogo was also present; presumably back from
whatever mission that had kept him from meeting with Muhindi earlier that day.
472. In Ndirangu’s estimation, a “panicky” Tiema gave a quick run-down of events at
the airstrip. By now the Wagalla chronology was beginning to coalesce into a
solid, unchanging narrative revolving around certain key events. There were, of
course, the origins of the operation that were located in the many months of
clan tension and violence in Wajir and the failed disarmament. This was followed
317 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.11
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by the operation itself that consisted of the initial round-up and transportation
to Wagalla that started on the 10th of February. Ndirangu was aware of all of
this because he had been receiving regular signals. The burning question then
became what happened once the men were gathered at the airstrip; this was
the issue that needed to be addressed. Tiema’s explanation was that the men
had been questioned by security forces on the twin issue of guns and crime
in the district. When the District Security Committee paid a visit to the airstrip
to assess progress, some kind of commotion, “a stampede”, broke out.318 As a
result, a number of people were killed.
473. Ndirangu’s trip seemed to yield more details than Muhindi’s. He was told that
the stampede was triggered by the fact that some of the men were apparently
carrying stones and approached the district officials in a supposedly hostile
fashion. Ndirangu also emerged with a more detailed version about the number
of people killed and the manner in which they were killed. At that point - that
is, on the afternoon of the 13th - the District Security Committee gave the total
number of dead as 29. Thirteen of those 29 were apparently shot during the socalled stampede that occurred as a result of stone-wielding men. The remaining
16 were an entirely new category of dead people that was discovered in the
aftermath of the shooting. As district officials explained it, these 16 people had
died between the 11th and the 13th of February from dehydration and prolonged
exposure to the sun and the heat. Ndirangu also came away from Wajir with an
understanding that a total of four weapons had been surrendered during the
operation.
474. There is little doubt that Ndirangu’s excursion was in many regards a useful one.
His findings fed directly into the Provincial Security Committee discussions. The
decision to send military reinforcements to Wajir was no doubt based on the
Special Branch Officer’s assessment of the situation. Once the briefing was over,
Tiema and his officials once again declared Wagalla as out of bounds. Ndirangu
boarded his plane and headed back to Garissa. His plane made a cursory
flypast over the airstrip. As they peered out their windows, they saw clothing
strewn on the surrounding fences. The Commission found it disturbing that the
junior officials of the District Security Committee so completely overruled their
superiors in this matter. Ndirangu and Gaturuku clearly wanted to visit Wagalla
and recognised the importance of such a visit, but they seemed powerless in the
face of the District Commissioner’s insistence that they stay away.
475. While the Commission accepted that the airstrip may still have been volatile on the
13th, Ndirangu’s and Gaturuku’s inability to visit the location of the subject of their
318 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.11
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inquiry was unusual, especially since there seemed to have been no discussions,
not even preliminary ones, about securing the airstrip for a possible tour. The
Commission wondered whether it ever occurred to the provincial officers that
their district counterparts may have been keeping them away from the airstrip for
entirely different reasons. Once again, Ndirangu’s own account of his trip gave no
indication that he believed anything other than the District Security Committee’s
assessment of the operation. No outsiders, independents, civilians, victims or
survivors were spoken to. Ndirangu’s was a singly-sourced version of events
imbued with all the problems inherent in an investigation built around limited
data sourced from interested parties.

Inquiry by Benson Kaaria and Joseph Mulinge
476. Benson Kaaria and Joseph Mulinge arrived in Wajir on the 15th of February for
the third in a series of fact-finding missions into Wagalla. This particular trip was
prompted by Muhindi’s and Ndirangu’s return to Garissa and an assessment
that the situation on the ground in Wajir was ‘very serious’.319 After the pivotal
Provincial Security Committee meeting of the 14th, Benson Kaaria sent word to the
Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President in Nairobi and arrangements
were quickly made for travel to Wajir the next day. The chronology of the visit is
described above. Like Muhindi and Ndirangu before them, the Mulinge-Kaaria
group flew into the Air Force base. Unlike Muhindi and Ndirangu, they were
received by the full DSC, including the previously elusive Major Mudogo. Their
first stop was the Wajir Army Camp where brief discussions were held. From
there, they drove the nine miles up the road for a site visit.
477.

The Commission’s reservations about the Mulinge-Kaaria excursion were similar to
those expressed about the Muhindi and Ndirangu trips. While Mulinge and Kaaria
were guided around Wajir by apparently cooperative, open and helpful district
officials, the Commission continued to be disturbed by the fact that no efforts were
made to expand the scope of the investigations beyond the security committee.
There was, even with such seasoned and experienced men as Kaaria and Mulinge, an
extraordinary lack of interest in alternative and unofficial versions of the operation.
Victims and survivors were never approached. The wounded and injured men lying
in Wajir District Hospital were not asked what they had seen or heard. Instead, Kaaria
and Mulinge went back to Nairobi (via Garissa) seemingly happy with the assurance
that Tiema and his team were well on their way to containing the situation in Wajir. If
Kaaria harboured any doubts or suspicions about the story told to him by Tiema on
the 15th of February, his testimony before the Commission did not reflect them.

319 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.49
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478. There was, the Commission established, an incremental quality to the inquiries. In
other words, each trip to Wajir uncovered fresh information. It may even be that
none of the investigating teams were ever given the complete story. Minutes of
a special Provincial Security Committee meeting held immediately upon Kaaria’s
return from Wajir revealed details that had not been shared with either Muhindi
or Ndirangu. One of the issues that only came to light after the Kaaria visit was the
disarmament of administration and regular police of Degodia origin because the
authorities feared they were planning to assassinate senior civil servants, and thus
questions were raised about their loyalty:
As the tensions were mounting rather high, and the DSC having had information that
the Degodia tribesmen were scheming a secret plan to assassinate some leaders in
the province, including senior civil servants using our own security personnel, the DSC
decided to disarm the Administration Policemen and Kenya Policemen and some 52
Administration Policemen and 7 Kenya Policemen were disarmed.320

479.

News of the disarmament jolted the Provincial Security Committee into immediate
action. The provincial authorities were anxious that the disarmed men not be seen
to “lose face” in the community, thereby triggering further unrest.321 They quickly
engineered a massive swap of 200 Somali and non-Somali police between Garissa,
Mandera and Wajir in order to disguise the fact that only Degodia officers had been
disarmed.

480. Why district officials withheld this information from Ndirangu and Muhindi was
unknown, particularly given the obvious security implications. Perhaps they felt
that it was too sensitive a topic, or perhaps disarmament was simply overlooked
in the rush to explain other aspects of the operation. This omission was yet further
evidence of the piecemeal nature of the investigations carried out in the immediate
aftermath of the operation. It was also a demonstration of another tendency that
had serious implications for the Commission’s work: events as complex and as
layered as the Wagalla Massacre rarely result in straightforward, unidirectional
accounts, even from primary witnesses and participants.

Inquiry by Joshua Matui
481. The arrival of Joshua Matui marked an important shift in attempts to understand
and investigate the operation at Wagalla. Matui had been last seen in Wajir in
December 1983 as he tried, largely in vain, to enforce the order for disarmament.
Eventually he left the district on his scheduled annual leave and was in early 1984,
320 Min.22/84, Minutes of the Special North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting held in the Provincial Commissioners Office
on Wednesday 15th 1984 beginning at 9.30.
321 Min.22/84, Minutes of the Special North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting held in the Provincial Commissioners Office
on Wednesday 15th 1984 beginning at 9.30.
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by his own testimony, enjoying a much-needed break on his farm in Eastern Kenya.
Wajir in January and February was very much in the hands of Tiema, the acting
District Commissioner, and the other members of the District Security Committee.
Matui submitted a statement to the Commission indicating that he heard and
knew nothing about Wajir over the month that he was away.
482. The first indication that all was not well at his work station came on the 14th of
February when he was picked up from his home and driven to the Office of the
President in downtown Nairobi. He was then told that he would be travelling
immediately to Wajir via Garissa. He was taken to Moi Air Base where a chartered
aircraft awaited him. He still had no idea why he had been recalled from his leave
and was being asked to return to Wajir at such short notice. Only in Garissa was he
brought up to speed by Provincial Commissioner Benson Kaaria: there had been an
operation in Wajir and it had gone badly wrong. Matui was thus returned to duty.322
The District Commissioner found his station in turmoil. His graphic description was
that Wajir “smelled of blood”.323 His officers openly welcomed his return. Some
expressed the sentiment that if he (Matui) had been in charge, the operation
would not have unfolded as it had. “Bwana DC” they said “if you had been around,
we know this would not have happened.”324
483. Over the next few days Matui re-acquainted himself with his traumatised district,
trying to establish what had happened while he was away. His main sources of
information seemed to be Godfrey Mate who briefly stood in as DC during the
immediate post-operation period, and Mr Godow, the officer whose malariainduced absence from duty led to Tiema’s posting to the district. These briefings
were informal and oral and that was the case until the 25th of February when
a signal was received from Garissa. A furious Provincial Security Committee
demanded a written report. Minutes of a meeting held on the 23rd of February
revealed the extent of their anger at the lack of documentation:
The Provincial Security Committee could not apprehead (sic) why the District Security
Committee decided to keep the authority uninformed of the incident, until when the
PSC visited Wajir on Monday. The Provincial Security Committee demands a detailed
written incident report on what went wrong and why the report was kept “secret” to
the District Security Committee alone. 325

322 Confusingly, however, Tiema continued to be referred to as the acting District Commissioner until May 1984 when he was sent a
signal instructing him to proceed on leave.
323 JPK Matui, TJRC Research, 13th May 2011.
324 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.23
325 Emphasis their own. Ex-Min 2/84., Minutes of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held in the Provincial
Commissioner’s Officer on Thursday 23rd February at 10.00 a.m.
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484. It was at that point that Matui was informed that no briefs or reports had been
written, much less transmitted, over the entire period:
That was when I asked Mr Mate if they had not been briefing the Provincial Commissioner
on a daily basis; because it appeared that he was asking for a detailed report from us
as to what actually happened and what led to the Wagalla Operation and how the
operation was conducted. He told me that he was told by Mr Tiema that things were
happening so fast that they were unable to instantly brief the PC…even when I passed
at Garissa to see the PC, he did not have those details and that was the reason he sent
me a signal demanding for a detailed report.326

485. Shocked by the turn of events, but anxious to comply with Kaaria’s demand, Matui
then began work on what was in effect the first official written report on Wagalla
from the field.327The resulting document tread the same territory as its unofficial
and oral predecessors in that Matui located the origins of the operation in the
volatile and violent state of clan interactions in Wajir.
486. The report covered the long-standing conflicts associated with the AjuranDegodia-Garre triangle in great detail, reflecting the central preoccupation
of Matui’s tenure. The District Commissioner’s write-up of the murders, rapes
and shootings in the weeks and days leading up to the operation were equally
detailed, and provided new information about some of the victims and the loss of
property. The access that Matui had to the minutes of the special District Security
Committee meeting held on the 9th of February also allowed him to report, for the
first time, the actual discussions that led to the decision to stage the operation.
As far as the Commission could tell, the DSC also stopped forwarding its minutes
to Garissa; Matui’s capture of their deliberations became vital reading for Kaaria
and his team.
487. The Commission found little new information in Matui’s version of the operation
itself. In essence it was a representation of the standard Wagalla story of roundup,
confinement, a stampede and then shooting. The only exception was a far more
detailed description of events in Bulla Jogoo, which was for the first time identified
as a special target of the security forces:
Another aspect of the operation to look for firearms was to strip the huts or herios of the
Degodia at Bulla Jogoo in Wajir Town. We had known of armed people coming to town
and getting shelter in some of those huts as they belong to their clansmen. Owners of
these huts were given to strip their huts of their grass so as to show that they do not
326 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.19
327 Matui to Kaaria, Report regarding the recent operation which resulted to rounding up of male Degodia adults at Wagalla Airstrip
from 10.2.84 to 13.2.84, 27th February 1984.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

307

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

have firearms hidden in the grass. Those who complied with the orders did not have
their huts burnt, but those who disobeyed the orders had their huts burnt down. All
these punitive measures where part of the operation to search for the murderers and
recover the illegally acquired firearms which were being used to take the lives of innocent
people from another tribe.328

488. Matui made no mention of the dead body collected from Bulla Jogoo by Sister
Annalena on Sunday the 12th of February. Like the others before him, he gave the
total number of dead as 29: the 13 shot and killed as a result of the stampede
and the 16 victims of sunstroke and dehydration. Matui’s report also discussed
post-Wagalla Wajir. This attempt to analyse the broader impact of the operation
made his report unique; none of the other investigators expanded their inquiries
to address this issue. The conclusion that the DC reached was, however, a rather
depressing one: Wajir in the days and weeks after Wagalla was as riven by ethnic
violence and crime as ever. Matui listed a number of incidents where once again
the Degodia were the aggressors and the Ajuran and government installations
were the victims.
1.

On the night of 21/22 February 1984 at a place 10 miles east of Buna
towards Ajawa, Degodia bandits attacked an Ajuran manyatta and killed
five people, injured one, stole 150 goats, eight camels, with all the herios
of the manyatta, only a child survived the onslaught in that Ajuran
manyatta.

2.

On the night of 22/23 February 1984 an attack at Ajawa Caompa where 20
bandits attacked the AP Camp at night from 11.30pm to 1.00am.
There was no casualty among our men but the bandits broke into two houses
and stole some 200 shillings cash, sugar and other shop good and books. This
was a direct confrontation with a government institution and can be interpreted
as the beginning of a systematic revenge against the government.329

489. Matui ended his report by describing it as the “bitter truth” of the Wagalla operation
as told to him by Tiema and all the other members of the Wajir District Security
Committee.330 For the Commission, however, the real weight of Matui’s report lay
in the fact that some of his information and material came from beyond the DSC.
In speaking to non-DSC members, such as Godow and Mate, Matui expanded the
range of voices contributing to the Wagalla story.
328 Matui to Kaaria, Report regarding the recent operation which resulted to rounding up of male Degodia adults at Wagalla Airstrip
from 10.2.84 to 13.2.84, 27th February 1984, 4.
329 Matui to Kaaria, Report regarding the recent operation which resulted to rounding up of male Degodia adults at Wagalla Airstrip
from 10.2.84 to 13.2.84, 27th February 1984, 4 5.
330 Matui to Kaaria, Report regarding the recent operation which resulted to rounding up of male Degodia adults at Wagalla Airstrip
from 10.2.84 to 13.2.84, 27th February 1984, 4.
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490. The Commission believed that Matui may have been one of the first government
officials to start thinking beyond the confines of the DSC version of events. The
Commission also believed, however, that the nature of the reporting process was
such that Matui was not able to include his personal impressions. And so the DC
could not evaluate and assess the actions and decisions of the people in charge of
the district. He could not express then the kind of sentiments he openly expressed
to the Commission. In his testimony, 27 years after the event, he acknowledged
that certain mistakes were made during the operation, and that he would have
done things differently if he had been in charge:
In all sincerity, I think that something went wrong during the operation. The operation
was not done professionally. Firstly, what I would say is that, if I were there, I would have
insisted that those suspects be fed and be given water. I would have insisted on that! I
would have insisted that those people be fed as they are being interrogated. But I was
not there!331

491. Provincial Security Committee minutes do not say what happened to Matui’s
report once Kaaria received it. The Commission suspected, but could not confirm,
that the report was sent to the Office of the President.

The Etemesi-led inquiry
492.

On 23 February 1984, the then Chief Secretary and the Head of the Civil Service
Jeremiah Kiereni appointed a committee charged with the task of investigating “the
circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue”.332 While the Chief Secretary was the convenor, according
to James Mathenge, the Kenya Intelligence Committee had an occasion to meet
beforehand on the issue of investigating Wagalla.333 Mathenge himself framed the
actual terms of reference. This committee and the report it produced represented
the pinnacle of the government’s attempts to investigate the Wagalla operation. The
committee was chaired by John Etemesi, the Provincial Commissioner of Eastern
Province, which had also had a long history of insecurity, ethnic violence and the
proliferation of weapons. The other members were Mr Serem from the Police, and
Colonel Thirimu and Major Githiri of the Kenya Army. Unlike the previous groups who
had visited Wajir and inquired into Wagalla fairly casually, the Etemesi committee
had formal and detailed terms of reference:
1.

To look into the background of the incidents which have caused
restlessness in Wajir.

331 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.23-24
332 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 1.
333 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 15 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.22
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2.

To scrutinise the instructions given to the Wajir DSC by the North
Eastern Province PSC regarding the incidents which took place in Griftu
Division between 3rd and 9th February 1984.

3.

To scrutinise all the details of the operational orders which took effect
from 10th February 1984 and look into how the same were carried out
and by who[m]..

4.

To identify the officers responsible for the welfare of the prisoners
while under interrogations and in particular who was responsible for
the supply of food, water and shelter.

5.

To look into the methods applied during interrogation.

6.

To establish the cause of death of the 29 people and the manner in
which the bodies were handled and disposed of.

7.

To gather and analyse any other relevant information related to the
incident.334

493. Etemesi and his team were also asked to:
Make concrete conclusions on all matters pertaining to the incident and recommend any
action to be taken on those responsible for any misconduct or omission. The Committee was
also to propose, if necessary, any changes in the present operational procedures.335

494.

The Commission found out that from the outset the Etemesi-led inquiry was different
from its predecessors. Its terms of reference more than suggested that previous
investigations were seen as lacking and limited and that a much more rigorous
approach was needed. Etemesi and his team had a much better understanding of
the outstanding and contentious issues and were thus able to structure their inquiry
accordingly.

495. The outcome was a report that was not only much more detailed than its
predecessors, but also much more probing. After a quick (and conventional)
assessment of the underlying ethnic and political situation in Wajir District,
Etemesi zeroed in on the critical issue of the actual operation. Etemesi uncovered
the trail of signals that emanated from Wajir and Garissa on the 9th and the 10th of
February. He even attached copies of the actual signals to his report. As directed by
the terms of reference, the team then directed their attention to the situation on
the field itself. He uncovered facts that no witnesses in the present - Tiema, Kaaria
and others - spoke about candidly:
334 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 1-2.
335 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 2.
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The Committee on questioning the DSC on how the prisoners were fed, the DSC clearly
admitted that the 381 Degodias rounded up at the airstrip were neither given food nor
water. These were some of the punitive measures applied to force them to talk and to
surrender their illegal firearms. The prisoners unfortunately, in spite of all the measures
applied, were very uncooperative. It is due to this attitude of the prisoners that all
comforts were denied.336

496. Further probing of the DSC produced an elaborate account of the interrogation
process:
Due to the large number of people rounded up, the DSC explained that it was not possible
to apply the normal interrogation procedures; hence the people were dealt with as a
group, that is in sub-sections. The interrogation was communal. The prisoners were made
to strip completely naked and to lay head down on the sand. They were also subjected to
physical beating. These measures coupled with the denial of water and food was meant to
force the people to surrender their arms or give the names of the group of 10 bandits who
killed the family of six at Griftu. This unfortunately did not work.337

497.

The Committee dug further. What they came up with next was a completely new
death count. Before Etemesi, the figure in circulation was the District Security
Committee-originated one of 29. Thirteen were identified as having been shot on
the 12th as a consequence of the reported stone-throwing incident. The remaining
16 were described as having been found dead on the morning of the 13th as the
men were being organised for travel back to their home areas. Etemesi came up
with a further 28 deaths directly attributable to the operation. The breakdown for
those deaths was given as 15 bodies collected and buried by Sister Annalena in
her compound, 12 bodies left in the bushes, also by Sister Annalena, and one body
buried in a public cemetery:
She currently has a total of 15 bodies buried in her compound. These are: The cripple
burnt in the manyatta, two (2) others who died in the hospital and twelve (12) more
who she says she collected from the vicinity of Wagalla Airstrip. These are however not
among the 29 killed and disposed of by the security forces.
Sister Annalena also claimed that she had left twelve (12) other dead bodies under a tree
approximately 4 miles from Griftu. This it is suspected were those who were weak and
died on the way after being released from the airstrip.338

498. This revised death count was the direct result of an expanded inquiry that included,
as Etemesi put it, “quiet side-line investigations” with unofficial sources.339 And in
336 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 11.
337 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 11.
338 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 13.
339 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 14.
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this regard, no source was more important than Sister Annalena. The story of the
28 additional victims came entirely from her. According to the Etemesi report,
there was a further sub-set of four deaths that may or may not have been included
in the final tally. These four people died in circumstances that the Committee (and
the Commission) have seen as shrouded in mystery:
On the night of 11th/12th February 1984, four prisoners were alleged to have died at
Wagalla Airstrip and were taken away to an unidentified area. The DSC has also not
admitted this fact neither have they clarified whether the four were among the 29
confirmed dead.340

499. Once again, this information came to light as a result of the team’s use of “sideline investigations”. The Etemesi Committee also spoke to the Medical Officer, Dr
Jawuor, at the Wajir District Hospital. As a result of this interview there was, for the
first time, a specific picture of the injured and their treatment:
Dr Jawuor confirmed that there was no alarming number of casualties at the hospital
during the period of the incident. He said that there were only 30 in patients out of which
20 were normal patients filtered in through the casualty department. Among them seven
had bullet wounds, five were Ajuran shot at Griftu by Degodias and two were Degodias.
All the seven patients had been brought in by Annalena.341

Jawuor continued:
The Doctor also confirmed that only three people died at the hospital. Two died out
of broken ribs and one due to a bullet wound on the leg. The other four patients at
Annalena’s place had cuts on the face, hand and thighs only. They were treated and
discharged.342

500. With Etemesi exploring issues that Kaaria, Muhindi and company ignored, even
more layers were added to an already complex story. It emerged, for instance, that
one of the things that the District Security Committee did was to take identification
cards and other important documents from the men held at the field. Even as
Etemesi conducted his inquiries, those documents had not been returned.
501. A large section of the Etemesi report was dedicated to evaluating the district and
provincial authorities’ performance during the operation. Once again, this served to
create a document that was very different in both tone and content from previous
writings on Wagalla. Indeed, some of the observations made about some of the
officials involved were unusual in their frankness. The District Security Committee
came in for special condemnation:
340 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 17.
341 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 14.
342 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 14
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The Committee also observed that, after the shooting incident, the DSC did panic and
the Acting DC, Deputy DSBO and OCPD immediately left the area without due concern of
what was happening. This cowardly move and lack of any sense of responsibility left the
situation to get out of hand, since only junior officers were left in the area, i.e. Army and
Police Sergeant.343

502. Etemesi also criticised Tiema and his group for the lack of expertise and organisation:
The Committee also observed that most of the DSC officers lacked the operational
experience. This possibly accounts for the poor planning and execution of the operation.
The officers also unfortunately did panic and over-reacted at the airstrip. This fear, panic
and confusion made the officers unable to verify what took place at the airstrip and how
many people died.344

503. The members of the Provincial Security Committee were not spared either, and
were taken to task for their “vague, harsh and unprofessional” conduct during the
operation.345 Etemesi’s findings and assessments were later used to discipline both
district and provincial officials for their action (and inaction) during the operation.
The Commission took this as further evidence that the Etemesi report carried
much greater weight than any of the earlier attempts to investigate Wagalla. Of
course, it was not lost on the Commission that the Muhindi, Ndirangu and Kaaria
versions were authored by people who were directly involved in the operation and
thus may have had something to hide. Nor was it lost on the Commission that even
the Etemesi report, which was investigating one of the single worst human rights
violations committed by the government during the period of the Commission’s
mandate, may also have been designed to highlight the responsibility of some
individuals and institutions and downplay that of others.
504. The Etemesi report was completed on 15 March 1984 and submitted to Jeremiah
Kiereni, the Chief Secretary and Head of Civil Service. James Mathenge also
received the document. Two things seemed to happen next. First, it seemed
that the report was absorbed into the Office of the President for review and
circulated among the various ministries and arms of government that, according
to Mathenge, were the primary consumers of the report. After editing and
extracting the more contentious sections regarding the conduct of the provincial
and district officers, the Office of the President produced a slimmed down and
tamer version of the report for the minister to deliver in Parliament. Ole Tipis’
presentation of April 13th was in essence a presentation of the Etemesi report,
although it was not referred to as such. Secondly, as Mathenge explained in
343 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 18.
344 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 16.
345 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 15.
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his testimony before the Commission, the report was studied closely for its
conclusions and disciplinary recommendations. The Etemesi report stands out
for its blunt, even brutal, observations of the conduct of the provincial and
district officials. Little wonder that it was a document which, 30 years on, Benson
Kaaria claimed he had never been given access to:
Leader of Evidence: Now in terms of the details of the operation, are you saying that
after Mr Etemesi prepared this report, you have never seen the final report?
Benson Kaaria: No. This is the first time that I am seeing it.
Leader of Evidence: This is the first time you are seeing it?
Benson Kaaria: Maybe he had to hand it over to the Office of the President which had
appointed him before circulating to us.346

505.

The process of transferring and demoting district and provincial officials as per
Etemesi’s recommendations started shortly after the report was published. By April
and May most of the officers had already been dispatched to other posts outside
the province. Once again, for the Commission the almost wholesale adoption of
Etemesi’s suggestions served as an indication of the power and the weight of the
report, as well as the high regard in which it was held within the government. The
Commission found no subsequent attempts by successive governments to re-visit
the Etemesi report until the time of its creation. In other words, Etemesi’s findings
have, until quite recently, never been seen as open to revision or questioning;
they were, in the Commission’s view, treated with a finality that made successive
governments impervious to repeated calls for further investigation. By centring
responsibility at the district committee and, to a lesser extent, provincial committee
level, the Etemesi report succeeded in keeping the focus on those officials on the
ground with immediate responsibility for the massacre, and away from those higher
up who may have known about, or even ordered, such an operation.

506. The failure of any other official body to undertake an investigation made the
Etemesi report immune to criticism. The Commission took particular note of
Parliament’s inability to establish any kind of inquiry into the operation. When
Khalif appeared in Parliament on the 21st of March with the news about Wagalla, he
pleaded with his colleagues to establish a probe into his allegations that more than
300 people had been killed in the most desperate and brutal of circumstances:
Mr Deputy Speaker Sir, I have submitted a Motion to the Speaker of the National
Assembly, and it should be with the Sessional Committee. This Motion is seeking
or requesting the House to elect a probe committee to establish the truth of my
346 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.60
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allegation. I have said that and I hope that this Motion is going to be given priority by
the members of the Sessional Committee because this matter is very grave; it is very
urgent.347

507. Khalif openly expressed his fear that his efforts would be, as he put it, “frustrated,”
especially by “Members of the Sessional Committee in the House” who would
ultimately determine the shape and form of any probe committee. His fears were
justified. As the Commission has already established, many of Khalif’s submissions
raised hackles with several members of Parliament, some of whom accused him
of not following proper parliamentary procedures. More fundamentally, there
were concerns about the veracity of his claims and the overall authenticity of his
information and material. The photographs he tabled as evidence of the carnage
were openly questioned by a number of his colleagues, including the Minister for
Internal Security Justus ole Tipis, who charged that the images had somehow been
“taken from different angles” and were not in fact true pictures of the scene.348
Khalif tried to counter the accusations levelled against him with further evidence
and documentation. On the 28th of March, he returned to the House with a list
containing the names of 300 people killed during the operation; he read out
the names of some 20 civil servants. None of this would sway his colleagues; the
accusations of unreliable and possibly doctored evidence remained:
Order Mr Khalif! You had an opportunity here of speaking at length and producing the
documents you produced. Now what Mr Tipis said was that after looking at the pictures,
he saw that those pictures were one picture taken from one angle. That is what he saw,
but you are not going to revive that whole issue again.349

508. Khalif struggled to counter these accusations but to no avail. The Speaker had had
enough, and made a ruling that would shut down all discussion on the matter: “No,
I do not think that we should continue with this issue, next, order.” And that was
that. There was no further discussion of Wagalla in Parliament for another 16 years.
There was no discussion of establishing a probe committee, and no semblance of
a debate. On 18 October 2000, Nahashon Muchiri, the Member of Parliament for
Kasarani, rose to ask the following questions of the Minister of State in the Office of
the President:
(a) How many Kenyans were detained in March 1984 at Wagalla Airstrip after being
arrested by the security forces and what offences had they committed;
(b) Whether he was aware that some of the detainees were shot dead by the
Kenyan security forces;
347 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 21st March 1984, 46
348 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 4th April 1984, 458
349 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 4th April 1984, 459
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(c) What action has been taken to punish the security officers involved in the
killings?350
509. An Assistant Minister (in the Office of the President), William Samoei Ruto, was
present to supply the following answers to those questions:
(a) Three hundred and eighty one (381) people were detained at Wagalla
Airstrip in Wajir District in 1984. They were arrested and detained pending
screening of those in possession of illegal firearms and those involved in
banditry activities.
(b) I am also aware that some of the suspects were shot dead when they tried
to attack the security personnel with the intention of escaping from lawful
custody.
(c) Since the officers then at the District Security Committee (DSC) were charged
with the task of maintaining law and order in the district, no criminal charges
were preferred against them.351
510. Ruto’s response was greeted with both anger and scepticism in the House, with
members clearly disagreeing with the Assistant Minister’s response. The main
issue, as it turned out, was the re-opening of Wagalla to the kind of investigation
that would resolve outstanding questions and controversies. Professor Peter
Anyang’ Nyong’o, then a nominated Member of Parliament, captured the
prevailing mood:
Mr Temporary Deputy Speaker Sir, it appears to this house that the Wagalla Massacre,
as Hon (Elias Barre) Shill said, is an incident which is very difficult to wipe out of the
memory of the society as well as the conscience of the government. The Assistant
Minister has said before this House that the government regards this incident as very
unfortunate, and that it was not properly treated. Since the government is on the
defensive, and people have been wronged and, we as a House are looking for justice,
why is it difficult for the government to establish a commission of inquiry to look into
this matter?’352

511. Nyong’o went on to specify what such a commission should look like:
The commission of inquiry should be composed of people who can stand in between
the government and the people of Wajir District to establish exactly what happened, so
that justice cannot only be done but seen to be done.353
350
351
352
353
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512. Ruto stood firm and unyielding from the position that the government had held
for the past 16 years. The Wagalla operation had already been investigated to the
satisfaction of the government by the Etemesi team:
Mr Temporary Deputy Speaker Sir, in good faith, in February 1984, indeed a committee
was appointed to investigate the circumstances that led to that incident. It was that
committee that, that particular incident was in fact for. Mr Temporary Deputy Speaker
Sir, I was saying that indeed a committee was appointed then. In fact, it was that
committee’s [recommendation] that the then North Eastern Provincial Commissioner
(PC) be dismissed from government service.
I think it was not possible for the government to take any more drastic action than what
was taken then because the provincial administration personnel in that area then were
facing threats on their lives from the perpetrators of insecurity incidents. I believe the
best was done out of that situation.354

513.

The exchange between the Assistant Minister and other MPs ended on a premature
and entirely unsatisfactory note for those interested in re-opening Wagalla. The
Speaker shut down the debate and moved on to the next question. The Etemesi
report’s status as the primordial source of government information and investigation
on Wagalla remained intact.

Military board of inquiry
514.

As the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was being established in
2009 to investigate, among other things, the Wagalla Massacre, a board of inquiry
was established within the military to undertake an audit of those issues involving
the military that fell within the Commission’s mandate. Despite a number of attempts,
the Commission was never able to secure a full copy of the report of that board of
inquiry. It is possible that the TJRC was to receive the report, or at least a summary
of its contents. When the Commissioners paid a courtesy visit to the Kenya Defence
Forces (KDF) a presentation had been prepared for us. Ambassador (Bethuel) Kiplagat
(the TJRC Chairman), then left the room with the officer in charge to have a private
conversation, after which the presentation was cancelled.

515. Although the Commission never received a full copy of the report prepared by
the military in preparation for the Commission’s work, it did secure a copy of that
section of the report devoted to the Wagalla Massacre.355 It is a remarkably candid
document, at times acknowledging clear violations of the rights of the residents
354 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 18th October 2000, 2190
355 The section of the report provided to the Commission is titled “Wagalla Incident – 1984,” and consists of pages 42-46, and
paragraphs 100 to 120, of the larger report.
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of Wajir, suggesting strategy for dealing with the Commission’s inevitable inquiry
into the matter, and concluding with lessons learnt.
516. The military board’s narrative was similar to that of the earlier inquiries: a brief
history of the conflict between the Degodia and Ajuran; the efforts to disarm both
clans; and the ensuing operation that resulted in a number of dead. There were
three significant, and for the Commission important, differences between this
narrative and all of the previous ones made available to the Commission. First, the
report for the first time introduced national security as an element of concern that
gave rise to the operation. Second, and related to the first point, the report for the
first time introduced two additional institutions as players in the Wagalla saga: the
National Security Council (NSC) and the Kenya Intelligence Committee (KIC). Third,
the report was candid and up front about how the operation was conducted in
a way that violated the constitutional and human rights of the Kenyan citizens
caught up in it.
517. In the background to the analysis of the Wagalla Massacre, the report quickly
noted the national security concerns raised by the conflict between the Degodia
and Ajuran, recording that “[t]he rivalry between the two clans was threatening
national security because of the foreign Degodia militia that had infiltrated Wajir
West from Somalia following the events in that country….”356 The report then
sets out in detail how the highest levels of the national security apparatus of the
government was brought to bear on this problem:
[T]he National Security Council (NSC) held a meeting in Nairobi in Jan 84 where it was
decided that all male Degodia be disarmed by force. The NSC further resolved that the
NEP Security Committee (NEP SC) study and forward recommendations as to how this
was to be realized. On 25 Jan 84, the PSC met in Garissa under the chairmanship of Mr
Benson Kaaria PC NEP to consider the requirements of the NSC. The Acting Wajir DC
Mr M M Tiema was charged with the responsibility of carrying out the operations. The
Kenya Intelligence Committee (KIC) accompanied by the PSC NEP visited Wajir on 8 Feb
84 where they were briefed on [the] security situation in the district during their NEP
tour.
On 9 Feb 84, A Special Wajir DSC was convened at Wajir DC’s office under the
chairmanship of the Acting DC. The meeting resolved to carry out an operation with the
objectives of disarming the Degodia and force them to provide names of bandits who
were committing crimes in the district. Once the operation was authorities, it began in
earnest on 10 Feb 84 at 0400 hrs and it involved the Police, the Administration Police
and the Armed Forces. The operation covered Elben, Dambas, Butehelu, Eldas, Griftu,
and Bulla Jogoo villages.357
356 Army Board of Inquiry, “Wagalla Incident – 1984”, para 101.
357 Army Board of Inquiry, pp. 42-3, para. 103.
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518. The Commission was unable to confirm the above version of the events leading up
to the massacre. Despite repeated requests, the Commission was never given any
minutes of the meetings of the National Security Council. It did receive selected
minutes from the DSC, PSC, and KIC meetings around the time of Wagalla, but
even those were in places missing pages or were otherwise incomplete. There are,
however, some indications in the minutes made available that support this version
of events. For example, minutes were received of a meeting of the PSC held on 26
January 1984 in which the PC noted that proposals developed by the PSC on longterm policy to address armed banditry had been circulated to the recipients of
the PSC minutes.358 In addition, as discussed below, the Commission obtained the
briefing paper used by the DSC to brief the KIC on security matters in the region,
which is consistent with the version of events disclosed above.
519. From this report, it appears that the NSC originated the idea of forcibly disarming
the Degodia. The specifics of the operation were then developed by the PSC and
DSC, and the KIC was then briefed on the upcoming operation when it took the
unprecedented step of leaving Nairobi and meeting on site with the local DSC and
PSC. While the Commission was not given access to documents that could either
corroborate or refute this version of events, the Commission noted that it would
be unusual for such a large operation, involving different branches of the security
forces and different branches of the military, to be undertaken without authority
and coordination at the national level.
520.

In addition to filling in some of the information regarding the higher authorities
involved in the operation, this report candidly assessed which parts of the operation
were conducted consistent with the law, and which parts violated the law. The report
noted, for example, that while the existing laws at the time permitted detention
without trial,
holding the detainees at the airstrip without food and water violates the constitutional
protection against inhumane and cruel treatment which is non-derogable. Furthermore
the use of gunfire which ended in fatalities when the detainees were unarmed
contravenes the Constitution.
The indiscriminate burning of manyattas by the security forces to compel the inhabitants
to move to the airstrip was in violation of the constitutional protection of private property.
The indiscriminate burning of manyattas was not based on any evidence of possession of
firearms.
The operation by the security forces was in violation of the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which protects against inhumane treatment and arbitrary
deprivation of property.359

358 Minutes of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Thursday, 26
January 1984, Beginning at 2:30 P.M., B.6/Vol.VI/21, Min. 3/84(i).
359 Army Board of Inquiry, pp 45-6, paras. 114 -116.
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521. While the earlier reports indicated some missteps by members of the provincial
and district administration, this more recent report for the first time evaluates the
effects of the operation on the rights of the victims. The Etemesi report, for example,
criticized the unprofessionalism of those involved in the operation, the lack of clear
operational guidelines, and other problems related to the implementation of the
operation as it related to its success. At no point did the Etemesi report, or any
of the previous reports, indicate that the rights of those affected may have been
violated, much less that any efforts should be made to compensate or otherwise
provide reparations to such victims.
522.

Finally, the Army Board inquiry notes that “[t]here is need to harmonize the evidence
to be given to the TJRC with other security agencies as the disparity affects the
credibility of the evidence.”360 It was not clear to the Commission what was meant
by “harmonizing” the evidence. There may of course be value in different agencies
and witnesses comparing their notes and assisting in their recollection and
reconstruction of events that occurred almost three decades ago. There is, of course,
a fine line between such efforts aimed at unearthing a more accurate truth about
the past, and efforts to create a common story of the past that may brush over or
suppress certain inconsistencies or other facts in a way to conceal the truth of what
happened. As the Commission notes below, there was other evidence suggesting
that some of those involved in the Wagalla operation attempted to harmonize their
evidence in a way that distorted or even hid the truth.

The Wagalla dead
523. Sitting at the heart of the Wagalla story is the still painful issue of the loss of life. For
survivors and victims alike, no other aspect of the operation generated as much
sorrow and anger. And as the Commission tracked down documents, pored over
reports and heard testimonies, it became increasingly clear that the one question
that most people wanted addressed was, quite simply: how many died in Wagalla?
While the question is simple and straightforward, the answer is not. As with Bulla
Karatasi and Malka Mari, the Commission’s inquiries uncovered wildly different
understandings of the Wagalla dead.

Fifty seven (57)
524. The official death toll for the Wagalla operation has been given as 57. While it is
clear that the death toll was greater – even the recent military inquiry puts the toll
at least 300 and perhaps as high as 1,000 – the government has never officially
revised the figure of 57. The Commission went to great lengths to understand the
360 Army Board of Inquiry, p. 46, para. 119.
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origins of this number as well as the controversies surrounding it. The official toll
of 57 dead was the outcome of inquiries and investigations carried out during
February and March 1984. For the Commission, the fact that it took several weeks
to compile this number was an early indication of the difficulties inherent to the
issue of the Wagalla dead.
525.

Part of the difficulty seemed to be that 57 is actually a composite number that
consists of 57 people who died in different ways, at different times and at different
locations. The testimony of Tiema was that the first people to die at Wagalla were the
13 people shot dead as a result of the so-called stampede that took place on Saturday
12 February 1984. These 13 would have died on the spot in full view of the security
forces (who, obviously, carried out the shooting) and the hundreds of others detained
at the field for disarmament and interrogation. Theirs was in essence a very public
and open death even though they have remained anonymous; the Commission was
unable to identify them by name. From the 12th onwards, the situation surrounding
the dead became much murkier and more difficult to understand. Monday the 13th
brought with it the discovery of a further 16 bodies. The discovery was recorded in
the Provincial Security Committee minutes of the 14th:
After the rounding up of male persons at the airstrip, it appears that those rounded up and
taken to the airstrip were exposed to the ‘harsh heat of the sun’ for far too long, resulting
in some 16 people dying because of sun stroke between 11th, 12th and 13th February, 1984,
reportedly without the DSC immediately knowing that some people had died. 361

526. The Etemesi report of March 1984 repeated the story of the discovery:
The DSC explained that on Monday 13th February, 1984 as the crowd was being sorted
out so that they could be transported to their respective areas, a total of 16 other dead
bodies were discovered to the surprise of everybody. The DSC could not verify as to how
or what may have been the cause of the death. It is however believed that they may
have died as a result of dehydration, hunger and excessive exposure to the sun.362

527. The officially acknowledged death toll stood at 29 for two more weeks. The
Commission understood this from a number of sources including, most notably,
Matui’s report of 27 February. The former DC fell in with the dominant line out
of Wajir, maintaining the breakdown of 13 shot dead and 16 succumbing to the
deprivations at the airstrip.
528.

The arrival of the Etemesi team in Wajir at the end of February led to a drastic revision
of the Wagalla dead. In a sequence of inquiries and field trips described above,
Etemesi emerged with an estimate of 57 dead. The 28 extra deaths were products

361 Min.13/84., Minutes of the North Eastern Special PSC meeting held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Tuesday 14th
February 1984, 2.
362 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 12
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of what were described as “quiet, side-line investigations” beyond the confines of
the District Security Committee officials. In this regard, Sister Annalena was a key
source. It was only through her that Etemesi came to learn of the additional fatalities.
She had personally buried 15 victims in the grounds of the rehabilitation centre. Of
those 15, 12 had died close to the airstrip itself and had been carried back into town
for burial. Two others had died in the hospital and one was burnt to death in Bulla
Jogoo. Sister Annalena apparently left a further 12 bodies out in the bush and knew
of one other person who had died and was buried at the hospital. All these added up
to the 28 dead that were eventually incorporated into the final total of 57.
529. The Commission had serious reservations about this figure, with concerns rooted
in the security committee’s history of non-disclosure before, during and after
the operation. While Etemesi’s findings had been processed and represented as
definitive, the report itself was much more circumspect and reflected the sense
that more than 57 people may have died. Four deaths in particular left the Etemesi
team stumped. Almost all accounts of the Wagalla dead began with the shooting
that took place on 12 February and the killing of 13 people on the spot. But
Etemesi uncovered little-known and barely-mentioned killings that took place the
day before. On the 11th of February (or very early on the morning of the 12th) four
people died in the most mysterious of circumstances:
On the night of the 11th/12th February, 1984 four (4) prisoners were alleged to have died
at Wagalla Airstrip and were taken away to an unidentified area. The DSC has also not
admitted this fact, neither have they clarified whether the four (4) were among the
twenty-nine (29) confirmed dead.363

530. While very little is known about them, these four deaths are pivotal to the Wagalla
chronology. The Commission believed that the deaths were probably the cause
of the shooting on the 13th. Tiema’s arrival on the field on the morning of the 13th
sparked a reaction from men who, in the Commission’s view, had either seen or
were aware of these four initial killings. The Commission agreed with the Etemesi
team that these four deaths were almost certainly the reason that the Wajir
District Security Committee officials stopped communicating with Garissa:
The committee also learned reliably that there was no communication between PSC and
DSC between the night of 11th to 13th February 1984 morning when the PSC less the PC
decided to visit Wajir to find out the progress of the operation. The committee suspects
that this lack of communication could have been caused by the sudden death of the
four prisoners on the night of 11th February, 1984.364
363 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 17.
364 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 17.
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531. The actual cause of the deaths remains unknown. The Commission, however,
heard numerous and graphic testimonies about violent beatings inflicted by
the security forces from the outset of the operation. Nothing was said about
the disposal of these bodies. The enduring question for was whether these four
bodies were included in the death toll of 29 presented by the Wajir officials. And
if they were not, the District Security Committee total must go up to 33. This, in
turn, would revise Etemesi’s total upwards to 60.
532. The fate of 18 civil servants is also unresolved and presented reasonable grounds
for the immediate upward revision of the official death toll to 78.365 As Hilowle’s
experiences indicated, a number of Degodia civil servants and government
employees were also included in the swoop. Protestations of innocence fell on
deaf ears and they found themselves at Wagalla along with everyone else. Nobody
seemed to know what happened to them next. Some, like Hilowle, survived the
operation and returned to their families. Matui’s testimony also spoke to the
detention and subsequent release of a number of civil servants:
Leader of Evidence: Now in the briefing you were given, were you advised that civil
servants from the Degodia community.
Mr. Joshua Peter Matui: I was aware that some civil servants were detained for some
time, but I think that they were later released. In fact when I reported, I recall a certain
teacher came to my office and he was briefing me and he was breaking down every
time he was narrating to me what had happened. So I know some civil servants who
happened to be from the Degodia community were gathered at the airstrip.366

533. By the third of week March, however, questions began to be asked about the
whereabouts of 18 men who not had been seen either at home or at work since
the start of the operation on the 10th of February. The issue was discussed by the
Provincial Security Committee:
The PSC now learns from reliable sources that 18 civil servants from Wajir are missing
since the incident. The DSC should carry out a thorough investigation to identify the
officers concerned; whether they had actually died or might have defected for fear of
their lives. They should also identify them and their respective ministries.367

534. All other civil servants had earlier on been warned to be vigilant and not to travel
without extra security.368 No protections of any kind were extended to Degodia
365 Secondary writing claims that a total of 55 civil servants were reported missing from work in the days and weeks following the
operation. The Commission has not, however, seen the documents upon which this claim is based. S. Abdi Sheikh, Blood on the
Runway: The Wagalla Massacre of 1984 (2007), 109.
366 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.25
367 Ex-Min. 26/84 (i), Minutes of North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on
Monday 26th March 1984 commencing at 10.00 a.m.
368 Min 13/84, Minutes of the North Eastern Special Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s
Office on Tuesday, 14th February 1984 beginning at 8.45 a.m.
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employees and so they were caught up in the Wagalla whirlwind with apparently
disastrous consequences. Despite conducting the most thorough of all the Wagalla
investigations, the Etemesi team did not seem to pick up on the disappearance of
these 18 men. When the Etemesi report was submitted in the middle of March, no
mention was made of them.
535.

On the 27th of March, Khalif made an emotional appearance in Parliament during
which he read out the names of the still-missing employees. He also listed the
departments that they were attached to. The Wajir District Security Committee,
which had been asked to look into the issue, seemed not to have made any progress.
And as of the 25th of April, the Provincial Security Committee in Garissa was in the
dark:
The PSC is still awaiting for the DSC report on government officers allegedly missing;
whether they have been identified, and their respective ministries/departments and
confirmation whether they actually died or whether they ran away for fear of their
lives.369

536. Like the four people killed on the 11th of February, these 18 civil servants have
disappeared without a trace and without any evidence as to what happened to
them. If they were indeed killed and buried, nobody has ever come forward to
say where. Conversely, none of these men came forward to confirm that they
were alive and well. Subsequent writings on the Wagalla incident have described
the efforts of Ibrahim Khamis Adan and Ali Noor Yussuf to access their fathers’
terminal dues.370 Their fathers, who were Ministry of Health and Wajir County
Council employees, were apparently among the 18 listed as having disappeared
in the wake of the operation. The ministry and county council were said to
have accused the men of desertion and consequently refused to pay out what
was owed to them. Adan and Yussuf made no headway whatsoever, as they
were unable to supply details on the time and manner of death. Had this case
moved forward, the State Counsel might also have been forced to respond to
family members’ demands for answers. As it stands, however, Adan and Yussuf’s
proceedings seemed to have ground to a halt in early 1985 without any further
information emerging.
537. The difficulty in establishing what happened to the 18 civil servants and the four
people killed on the 11th of February exposed the void at the core of the Wagalla
operation: the failure to identify, count and document. The District Security
Committee made no attempts whatsoever to process the victims and the injured.
369 Ex-Min 38/84, Minutes of North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on
Wednesday, 25th April 1984
370 S. Abdi Sheikh, Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla Massacre of 1984 (2007), 100 – 101.
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There was no register as a point of reference or information. The Etemesi team
bemoaned the absence of such records:
The committee also observed that the officers should have struggled to get the details;
that is the names of those arrested and the dead. This would have greatly assisted to
authenticate any future allegations.371

538. The Commission found it difficult to understand the failure to perform such a
basic administrative function. Etemesi described panic and confusion within the
District Security Committee. The first priority it seemed was the disposal of the
bodies followed by clearing of the field; compilation and completion of lists came
a distant second:
Leader of Evidence: Were you also able to confirm the numbers of the people who died
while attempting to leave the camp?
Manasseh Tiema: I did not confirm the number and that is why I said I heard some
people lost their lives but eventually, we got the whole list of the figure of the people
who died during the operation. It was compiled by the Special Branch officers.372

539. How the Special Branch Officers, Kibere and Mbole went about compiling the list can
only be guessed at. The Commission learnt that the men at the field were stripped
of documentation and so it was impossible to carry out formal identification. There
was no sense that the security committee list took any account of people who
might have died later on from their injuries. There was no indication that anyone
from the Special Branch (or from the DSC for that matter) consulted with either the
district hospital or Sister Annalena’s rehabilitation centre which, as Etemesi later
showed, housed a significant number of victims. Kibere and Mbole’s only sources
of information were most likely to have been the very same security personnel
responsible for the killings in the first instance. Over the following weeks and
months, Tiema himself seemed to accept that there were shortcomings with the
list and that there may well have been victims uncaptured by the official counts.
Once again, however, the former District Commissioner placed himself at some
distance from the controversy surrounding the numbers with the claim that he was
too busy to carry out any further investigations:
Commissioner: Did you subsequently learn before you were transferred that the figure
could be higher?
Manasseh Tiema: I did not have time to move out of the office to know what happened.
I said it was a very busy moment or period of giving reports for various incidences and
so forth, and the situation was not calm.373
371 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 16.
372 Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.19
373 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.25

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

325

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

Three to four hundred
540.

Fifty seven dead is the lowest number on the spectrum of the Wagalla dead as
understood by the Commission. The middle of the spectrum is represented by
estimates ranging from between 300 and 400. These are estimates that appear
with some regularity in writings, analyses and secondary sources. One such source
is Rodolfo Stavenhagen’s report of the situation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms of indigenous people. Stavenhagen visited Kenya at the end of 2006 and
wrote of Wagalla:
The 1984 Wagalla Massacre in Wajir stands as the worst episode of human rights
violations in Kenyan history. In the course of three days, security forces detained,
tortured and brutally killed many hundreds of Degodia Somali. While the government
recently acknowledged the loss of 360 lives, other sources interviewed by the Special
Rapporteur estimate that there were 2 000 to 3 000 victims.

541. Another prominent and often cited source that treads the same territory is the
2003 annual report of the Argentinian Forensic Anthropology Team. Members of
that team were in Wajir in September 2003 and later wrote:
The government officially claimed that they had taken “necessary action” against “intertribal fighting” and had killed 57 people. In October 2000, the government raised that
number to 381.374

542. What these and other sources all have in common is that they are based on the
understanding that in October 2000, the government officially adjusted the
Wagalla death toll from 57 to 381. The Commission found no evidence whatsoever
of such an adjustment. Instead what it uncovered was a clear trail of misreporting
that had in turn given rise to incorrect analyses and interpretations.
543. As already discussed above, on the morning of Wednesday the 18 October 2000,
William Ruto Samoei stood to answer a series of questions relating to the Wagalla
Massacre. What followed was a heated debate driven primarily by frustration in
the House at the government’s failure to investigate Wagalla further in light of
continuing controversies raging around the Wagalla dead. Under a persistent
and determined line of questioning, Ruto presented the government’s stand
which, as the Commission found out, came directly out of the Etemesi report:
Mr (Adan) Keynan: …What we have heard is deliberate misinformation. It is unfortunate
that 15 years down the line, first of all, the government has not established any
Commission of Inquiry to find out exactly what happened. Secondly this did not happen
the way that the Assistant Minister is reporting. The people who were killed were over 5
000. Their skulls are still lying at Wagalla Airstrip.…
374 Kenya, EAAF Annual Report (2003), 113
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Mr William Samoei [Ruto]: …I confirm that 13 people were shot dead at that particular
incident but in total, 57 and not 5 000, as the Hon Member is alleging, died as a result
of that exercise.375

544. Moments later, Ruto was back on his feet with yet another submission on the
Wagalla numbers:
I still maintain that 57 people died as a result of that incident. Indeed 13 people were
shot dead and the rest died from excessive sunshine.376

545. At 8.20pm that evening, the BBC News website published a story under the
heading “Kenya admits mistakes over ‘Massacre’”.377 The item, a brief one, reported
the Wagalla debate that had taken place only a few hours before:
The Kenyan government has for the first time admitted making mistakes 16 years ago
when hundreds of ethnic Somalis were killed in the north-east of the country. A Kenyan
minister in the Office of the President, William Ruto, told Parliament that 380 people had
died in what's been called the Wagalla massacre, which took place during a drive by the
security forces against shifta bandits. Previously, the government had said that only 57
people had died. The parliamentarian who raised the issue, Ellias Barre Shill, said the
minister was trying to avoid crucial questions as he charged that more than 1 000 ethnic
Somalis were victims of the killings.

546. The Commission found that this BBC report was the prime source of the incorrect
claim that the government officially changed the death toll from 57 to 381.
Hansard records from the 18th of October quite clearly show that Mr Ruto made no
such revision. He stuck to and indeed repeated Etemesi’s long-standing estimate
of 57 dead. Furthermore, the BBC website was the first and only news outlet to
report Ruto’s contributions to the debate in this manner. No local newspapers
repeated this claim when they went to press the following day. The Daily Nation
portrayed the debate as heated and disbelieving of the minister’s submissions
but made no mention whatsoever of 381 dead:
Mr Ruto told the House that 381 suspects were held "to be screened for gun-holding",
but he angered members when he said 13 of them were shot dead and a further 44 died
in the ensuing commotion.378

547. What the BBC did report accurately was Ruto’s admission in Parliament that the
operation had not been handled correctly:
The chronology of events that led to this unfortunate incident speaks for itself. The arrest
and rounding up of those people and their presence at Wagalla Airstrip was as a result
375 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 18th October 2000, 2189
376 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 18th October 2000, 2190
377 Kenya Admits Mistakes Over ‘Massacre’, 18th October 2000 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/978922.stm
Accessed 25th June 2011.
378 ‘Wagalla issue causes uproar in the House’ Daily Nation 19th October 2000, 17.
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of earlier events that had taken place; that is the fighting between the clans in North
Eastern Province. Subsequent appeals by the government that all those involved in that
fighting should surrender firearms were not heeded. Some of the members, especially
the Ajuran community, did surrender their arms. But the Degodia community refused
adamantly. The DSC did take action…I do admit that the way that the operation was
handled did not meet the security requirements then. It was unfortunate. I do admit
that incident was unfortunate.379

548. The BBC story was never corrected, clarified or retracted. It was also never
subjected to scrutiny; the BBC and the BBC Somali service in particular have a
reputation for solid and reliable coverage of the region. Indeed, sections of a
community of activists and advocates that developed around Wagalla have even
described the BBC Somali Service as sympathetic to their cause:
Yalahow and others continued with petitions and media attacks on the Kenyan
government employing especially the services of BBC Somali Service, which was and
still is sympathetic to the coverage of the issues in the Somali-dominated North Eastern
Province of Kenya.380

549. Press releases were crafted around the BBC story and it passed unchallenged
and unverified.381 The story continues to sit on the internet as an easily accessible
source of information on Wagalla. For the Commission, the BBC story represented
a clear instance of rushed and somewhat careless reporting. Even so, the story
resonated and gained traction mainly because it fell in line with previous
estimates about the number of people who had died at Wagalla. Khalif was one
of the initial and most consistent proponents of a position that held that the
operation had resulted in about 300 deaths. Khalif stuck to this number since
his first appearance in parliament on the 21st of March 1984. Through Khalif, 300
became a baseline figure of sorts that was integrated into such early writings on
Wagalla as Amnesty International’s Annual Report of 1985.382
550. During hearings in Wajir, the Commission heard testimony that also placed the
death toll in the low to mid-hundreds. Osman Noor Abdille is a life-long resident
of Wajir who in February 1984 found himself on the Wagalla frontline. A Degodia
from Bulla Jogoo, Abdille somehow escaped transfer to the airstrip. He spent
Friday, Saturday and Sunday in hiding and in fear that he too would be caught
and sent to Wagalla. From Monday the 13th February, he was co-opted into Sister
Annalena’s attempts to retrieve the dead and the injured. He worked alongside
Elmi who he described as a distant relative. Abdille spoke of seeing and counting
379 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 18th October 2000, 2188
380 S. Abdi Sheikh, Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla Massacre of 1984 (2007), 100.
381 Omar Abdi, “At Last the Kenya Government Admits the Wajir Massacre Occurred”. Kenya-Somali Community in Canada, October
2000 from Kenya, EAAF Annual Report (2003), 113
382 Amnesty International Report 1985 (1985) 55 – 56.
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193 bodies spread out over a number of locations, including Sarmanta in Griftu
and in Tarbaj. The specificity of his count came, he says, from grouping the dead
bodies into batches of 25 to facilitate the taking of the photographs that Khalif
attempted to table before Parliament in March 1984:
Then we looked for the dead bodies. Abdirizak told me to put the dead bodies in
50s. So, after we arranged 50 bodies, Abdirizak said that if I take 50 bodies in one
photograph, they would not fit in [the frame of ] one camera. So, he said that we
arrange and put them in 25s in one snap shot. I tried to arrange the dead bodies
putting them in rows and Abdirizak was taking the snap shots of the bodies. We got
193 bodies. I tried to arrange the bodies in 25s…we arranged 193 bodies and then we
started taking snapshots.383

551. The pictures that Abdille said he helped to take were later discredited as staged by
disbelieving parliamentarians. The fundamentals of Abdille’s story have, however,
remained constant: he personally knows of 193 dead.
552. Most recently, the Wagalla Foundation Trust has emerged with an estimate of
475 dead.384 The trust divides this estimate into two sections. The first section
consists of a list of 335 people who were said to have died between the 10th
and the 14th of February. These 335 were primary victims of the operation itself.
The second section consists of 140 people who died from injuries and medical
ailments attributed to Wagalla. The foundation’s estimates spring from a deep
and intimate knowledge of both Wajir and Wagalla, as well as a direct experience
of the operation as both victims and survivors.
553. The conundrum for the Commission was the continuing insistence that the
total number of people rounded up during the operation was just 381. The first
note of a specific number of detainees, 381, appeared in the minutes of the PSC
meeting of 15th February.385 The number of detainees remained unvaried through
the various reports and investigations including the Etemesi-led inquiry.
554.

Three hundred and eighty one detainees cannot be reconciled with estimates of
several hundred dead; either the death toll was lower or the number of detainees
was higher. The Commission received testimony to easily support both possibilities.
Fifty seven is of course the long-standing and much discussed official death count.
The notion of just 381 men rounded up was consistently challenged by witnesses
and survivors who gave estimates of 3 000 to 4 000 people crammed into the field.
In Wajir itself, the Commission heard from Abdulrahman Elmi Daudi, a former army
corporal, who remembered hundreds of men arriving at the airstrip by foot and in

383 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.61-62
384 Families and Survivors Wagalla Massacre Lists of Victims, 29th March 2012, TJRC-NAIROBI
385 Min. 20/84., Minutes of the Special North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting held in the Provincial Commissioners
Office on Wednesday 15th 1984 beginning at 9.30.
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military vehicles from the morning of the 10th of February onwards.386 Elmi’s claim was
that he was part of the unit that flushed scores of men out of Bulla Jogoo. Tellingly,
Elmi described the round-up as a continuous process that spilled into Saturday.
555

For the Commission this raised the spectre of an ever-burgeoning operation that
grew larger with time. Thus 381 men may have been brought and counted at
some point on the first day of the operation but that number almost certainly
increased with further influxes. Certainly by Sunday the 12th even Tiema was of
the view that there were “between 500 and 800” men at the field.387 This was at
least double what was presented as the official number of detainees.

One thousand plus
556. At the top end of the Wagalla scale lie estimates that begin at 1 000 and climb
upwards to 3 000, 4 000 and even 5 000. One of the more prolific and persistent
purveyors of this position is S. Abdi Sheikh’s Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla
Massacre of 1984. Sheikh writes of 5 000 dead in Wagalla alongside a much larger
group of victims, survivors and family members:
More than five thousand of them (Degodia) were dead, injured, or unaccounted for. Four
thousand widows and more than fifteen thousand orphans…388

557. Sheikh’s estimates hail from a long tradition of estimates that have always given the
number of Wagalla dead in the thousands. Such figures have been in circulation for
very many years. This number - though not with exactness - was corroborated by a
witness to the Commission in the following manner:
I remember bringing my elder brother, the ex-policeman. I sat through the first
preliminary parts when he was asking my brother’s opinion on what were the numbers
at the airstrip by the second day when everyone had been brought in. As someone who
was used to estimating crowds, my brother said that he thought they were up to 5 000
people.389

558. A Philadelphia Inquirer article from the 8th of April 1984 was among the first to state
that more than a thousand people had died:
On February 10, in the town of Wajir, Kenyan government forces killed more than 1
000 members of the troublesome Degodia tribe, according to members of the tribe,
missionaries and relief workers.390

559. The Inquirer piece rested on a number of sources. Information was drawn from
American missionaries who had apparently visited Wajir in late March and early
386
387
388
389
390
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TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 17 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.17
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April and were told of widows and families of the disappeared numbering about 1
200. Rosenthal, the author of the article, also cited a Wajir teacher called Rahman
who had fled to Eastleigh, the predominantly Somali section of Nairobi that hosted
a large number of Wagalla survivors.
560. The report from the missionaries appears to come from a report compiled by
Dr Michael Wood and Dr Nancy Caroline of AMREF. It appears that as early as 16
March 1984 that Dr Nancy Caroline had visited Wajir during her leave. Her visit
was unauthorised and apparently unknown to the government. In that report Dr
Caroline concluded that at least 1 400 had been killed as a result of the operation,
and an additional 7,000 were homeless and destitute. The missionaries were more
concerned with facilitating relief to the survivors in Wajir, and thus were careful
not to go public with the information they had compiled. Instead AMREF and the
other relief agencies decided to try to secure an audience with President Moi to
both share with him the information and urge him to facilitate the provision of
relief to the survivors. President Moi was at the time in Mombasa, so a meeting
was instead secured with the then Vice-President and chair of the National
Security Committee, Mwai Kibaki:
In the President’s absence in Mombasa, Dr Wood of AMREF had seen Kibaki. He had
given Kibaki Dr Caroline’s report and had emphasised that AMREF had not been and
would not go to the press. Their aim was to help with the relief and not to generate
criticism of Kenya. Kibaki had been grateful for the report as he did not know the
details of what had happened. He thought that Moi would wish to see Wood. Moi
is out of town until the evening of 27 March and no summons has yet come. Wood
had asked Kibaki for permission to mount a relief effort. Kibaki had said he thought
permission would be given but this would depend on the President. The agencies are
standing by and are ready to launch both an appeal and instant relief from 28 March
if authorized.391

561. Also in Eastleigh were people who Rosenthal described as Degodia “clan elders”.
They provided additional information not only on the operation itself but on the
broader questions of planning, as well as motives and consequences:
A Degodia clan leader said that he did not know the reason for the killings but that
he thought that the operation had been planned. Five days before the massacre, he
said, the army closed many of the wells around Wajir to the Degodias, forcing them to
a central well near the town and making it easier for the army to round them up. The
clan leader discounted the killings of Ajuran women and children as a catalyst for the
operation, saying that nothing happened that had not happened before. He said that
the government’s closing the wells cost the Degodia thousands of camels, cattle and
goats, the basis of wealth and prestige in the region.392
391 Tel. No. 106 of 29 March 1984, from Howe, para. 3. FM FCO 291742Z Mar 84
392 Kenyans Recount Army Massacre’ Philadelphia Inquirer 8th April 1984.
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562. Rosenthal did not name the Degodia elder who was one of his primary informants
but the Commission believed that he might have been spoken to Councillor
Abdullahi Unshur from Wajir Town East Ward. Unshur was a well-known and
apparently vocal figure in local Wajir politics. In the days and weeks after the
operation, Unshur seemed to have developed into something of a spokesman for
sections of the Degodia community. In so doing, Unshur came to the attention
of the District Security Committee as an agitator of sorts determined to cultivate
the post-Wagalla tensions that Matui described in his report:
Despite the operation, Degodias…people have continued to cause breach of peace.
Already the Degodias have threatened to severely revenge against the Ajurans, Ogadens
and government senior civil servants, especially during the forthcoming April rains393.

563. Etemesi’s team came across as suspicious of Unshur. They characterised his motives
and activities as questionable:
The committee also during its quiet side-line investigations found out that there are
currently a lot of rumours and exaggerations about the incident. It is apparent that
some Degodia elders are ready to go to any extreme to capitalise on the incident, mainly
to tarnish the good name of the government. Most vocal is Councilllor Abdullahi Unshur
of Wajir Town East Ward, who has since left for Nairobi. Councilllor Abdullahi, with the
assistance of Sheikh Abass Adan Musa, are believed to be compiling a list of all people
who allegedly died as a result of the incident.394

564. Like Matui before him, Etemesi then portrayed Wagalla as being spun and modified
for largely political reasons:
The committee also found out that the general situation in Wajir District is purely politicallymotivated. The local leaders have involved themselves in these divisive political strategies
mainly planned on clan basis. This should be discouraged. This incident is currently being
interpreted as a political move by Ogaden and Ajuran leaders to finish Degodias. Hon
Minister Maalim Mohamed and Hon Ahmed Abdi Ogle Member of Parliament for Wajir
South are being directly implicated as they are Ogadens.395

565. In July 1984, Unshur was discussed by the PSC. Levels of discomfort and concern
had escalated because it seemed that by this point Unshur had published and
distributed a pamphlet giving figures of 1 000 dead and 5 000 rounded up. PSC
members urged immediate investigation of both the pamphlet and Unshur:
The meeting discussed the Kenya News pamphlet of April 1984 Issue No.3. It is a very
subversive and damaging pamphlet. It alleges that about 5 000 men who included
ordinary wananchi, businessmen, religious leaders and even civil servants were rounded
393 Matui to Kaaria, Report regarding the recent operation which resulted to rounding up of male Degodia adults at Wagalla Airstrip
from 10.2.84 to 13.2.84, 27th February 1984, 4.
394 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 14.
395 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 14.
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TJRC staff visiting the mass graves at the site of the Wagalla massacre in Wajir.

up, stripped naked and forced to lie on their bellies under the hot sun by our Security
Forces. It also talks of 1 000 people missing and believed to be dead. The author of the
article is said to be Councillor Sugal A Unshur of Wajir, who gave the information in the
form of a press release. The DSC Wajir should interview this councillor and he should state
the source of his information about the 1 000 people who are “believed to be dead”. If any
offence is disclosed against him then appropriate action should be taken.396

566. The Commission found no evidence to indicate that the Wajir District Security
Committee investigated Unshur. The councillor himself went on to solidify his
reputation as an energetic champion of the Wajir Degodia until his death in
either 1993 or 1994. However, the issue of his material and information on the
magnitude of the Wagalla operation has never been interrogated, evaluated
or verified. In the three decades since the operation, there have not been
explorations, investigations or inquiries that could serve to prove or disprove
Unshur’s claim of 1 000 dead. In other words, there is no forensic material of any
kind to support any part of the Wagalla dead spectrum. From the lowest official
estimates of 57 to the intermediate ones of 400 to the highest of 1,000-plus, all
the Wagalla numbers are bereft of the kind of physical or biological evidence that
could act as verification.
567. The failure to carry out any kind of forensic work is a curious one, particularly
since the location of the supposed burial sites has been known since 1984. The
Etemesi report was clear about where some of the bodies had been deposited:
396 Min 91/84, Minutes of North Eastern Special PSC Meeting Provincial Commissioner’s Office Tuesday, 10th July 1984.
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A total of 20 bodies were thrown into the bush near Korodile 100 miles north-west of
Wajir Town while the other 9 were buried at an area 6 to 10 miles from Wagalla Airstrip
on the way to Griftu.397

569. The majority of the 28 bodies credited to Sister Annalena’s search and rescue
efforts were also found in and around Griftu. It would have been an obvious
starting point for any mission to retrieve remains that could in turn have gone
towards quantifying and - for the sake of the families - identifying the Wagalla
dead. The hundreds or thousands dead that have also been associated with the
operation would have needed to have been disposed of somehow. The numbers
alone suggested the existence of several large sites; sites which even after so
many years could present forensic potential. Once again, however, no formal or
sustained attempts seemed to have been made to locate or otherwise map the
graves.
569, Meanwhile, time is running out. A very small and decreasing group of middleaged men are the only ones with actual knowledge of the grave sites. This group
includes Osman Noor Abdille, who has testified about photographing and
burying some of the 193 bodies discovered from the 13th of February onwards
as the operation was called off and as survivors started streaming back to Wajir
with news about the dead and the injured. Abdille represents the very last of a
generation of participants, survivors and witnesses able to give such direct input.
Urgency therefore needs to inform any plans that would require his input on
possible locations to explore and excavate.
570. It will never be possible to be definitive about the number who died at Wagalla
because of the closed nature of the operation and the deliberate attempt to conceal
bodies and evidence. While the Commission believed that forensic investigations
were still possible, the passage of time and the almost certain degradation of the
sites meant that such investigations might not yield the specific and concrete
results that the victims and survivors both demand and deserve. The TJRC fully
acknowledged the unsatisfactory nature of this outcome for families who still have
no idea what happened to their loved ones, including that of the parliamentarian
Elmi:
Then there is the story of the many people who have not been found even today.
Rumours circulated for months after the massacre which gave people hope that their
loved ones would still be alive somewhere. My brother, Hugas Ibrahim Elmi, is one of
those whose bodies have never been found.398
397 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 13.
398 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.9
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The photographs
571. Several accounts of the Wagalla dead make reference to photographs of some
of the dead bodies. Abdille’s testimony was that he was directly involved
in the taking of a series of pictures in and around Wagalla and beyond. The
circumstances, as Abdille explained, were dramatic as he and his partner, a man
known as Abdirizak, sought to document the scene to avoid being detected by
the authorities:
Abdirizak and I were told to leave town and take the vehicle and a camera, so that we
go and get photographs of the bodies which were thrown in the countryside. We were
to come with photographs that were to be used as evidence or to be shown to the
international community. Three of us were told to bring as many photos as possible.
We looked for a camera but we did not get a camera to buy. We went to the American
volunteer teachers who were in Sabunley and also those from Norway helped us.
Norway is the only country in the world that reacted to what happened in Wagalla. We
went to the American volunteer teachers and got different cameras and there was one
that could take 48 photos. The issue was that if the police saw you with the camera,
they would have killed us. We got three cameras from them. We asked women who
brought milk to town to help us to hide the cameras in the container. Then I put water
on the car. We decided to cheat the police that this was water that we were taking
to the people living in the outskirts. Then we met with the ladies who we had given
the cameras. Then we looked for the dead bodies. Abdirizak told me to put the dead
bodies in 50s. The bodies were there for 9 days and so parts of the bodies had been
eaten by vultures and hyenas. I tried to put the head onto the other parts of the body.
After we arranged 50 bodies, Abdirizak said that if I take 50 bodies in one photograph,
they would not fit in one [frame of the] camera. So, he said that we arrange and put
them in 25s in one snap shot. I tried to arrange the dead bodies putting them in rows
and Abdirizak was taking the snap shots of the bodies. We got 193 bodies. I tried to
arrange the bodies in 25s.399

572. The Commission believed that the idea to take the pictures came from Sister
Annalena, the Norwegian volunteer, and others involved in the search, rescue and
retrieval of the bodies. But it was not possible to ascertain when the pictures were
taken and if they were all taken in the same location. It was also not established
about how many pictures were taken. The story of the pictures’ distribution is
equally dramatic. Still fearing discovery, Abdille and Abdirizak waited for several
days before taking action. They first hid the pictures and negatives in a torch that
had the batteries removed. They then had to find a way to leave Wajir without
raising suspicion:
399 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.61-62
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For six days, our car could not come to town. We sent somebody on a donkey cart to
bring us petrol because if we came to town, we would have been arrested. We had to
hide the cameras and the photos. We were told to take the photos to Ahmed Khalif who
was in Nairobi. We gave out the photos to Ahmed Khalif and he then took the photos to
Parliament. He took the photos and said that they were documents of Parliament. We tried
to process the photo. Abdirizak and I took a torch and removed the batteries and put the
negatives into the torch and then we went somewhere; there was a car that ferried goats,
so we hid the torch inside that lorry and that is how we took the photos to Nairobi.400

573. Abdille also described efforts to get the pictures to consulates and diplomatic
missions:
We were hiding in Nairobi. He [Ahmed Khalif ] gave the photos to a man and they were
processed. Then the embassies in Ethiopia were given the photos. That is how the world
knew about Wagalla.401

574. Other sources suggested a different scenario whereby the pictures and written
documents were somehow smuggled out of Wajir by Sister Annalena herself to
people like Barbara Lefkow, the American diplomat’s wife. Eventually, the pictures
got to AMREF’s Flying Doctors Service well known for its work in remote and
inaccessible parts of Kenya. At AMREF the pictures came to the attention of Nancy
Caroline, a specialist in emergency medicine and the agency’s chief medical officer.
In a sequence described above, Caroline then began to organise for medicine and
other supplies to be sent to Wajir, and arranged an unofficial visit to Wajir.
575.

This report describes the ambiguous reception that the photographs were given
in Parliament when Ahmed Khalif attempted to table them in March 1984. Some
members dismissed the images as staged. The pictures themselves then seemed to
disappear entirely. Unable to table them before Parliament, Khalif appeared to have
simply held onto them as part of his own personal records and documentation. As
far as the Commission could tell, it appears they were never shared with newspapers
or any other media outlets or if they were, the newspapers declined to publish them.

576. The Commission, however, saw and acquired two images of body dumps in Wajir in
1984. The pictures came to light as a result of recent interest and research into the
life and work of Sister Annalena Tonelli and Dr Nancy Caroline.402 Dr Caroline died
in 2002. Her personal papers and records are housed at the Schlesinger Library at
Radcliffe College, which is part of Harvard University in the United States. And it is
from her collection that the following pictures were drawn.
400 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.62
401 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.62
402 Karen Smith, Massacre in Wajir, 1984: Western Relief Organizations Clash with Government Authorities in Post-Colonial
Kenya. Geographies of Volunteerism and Philanthropy II, Association of American Geographers, 25th February 1984,
New York City
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Source: Nancy L Caroline Papers 1905 - 2005, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe University

Source: Nancy L Caroline Papers 1905 - 2005, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe University

After the operation, reverberations and repercussions
577. Formally, Wagalla came to an end on the 13th of February 1984. The reverberations
and repercussions of this extraordinary operation unfolded several weeks, months
and even years later, and were felt in Wajir and beyond. As with the build-up to the
operation and the operation itself, the story of Wagalla revolves around a small
number of actors that the Commission followed and analysed.
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District Security Committee
578. When the Etemesi team was formed towards the end of February 1984, it was
asked to make specific recommendations based on its investigations and findings:
The Committee should hence make concrete conclusions on all matters pertaining
to the incident and recommend any action to be taken on those responsible for any
omission. The Committee was also to propose, if necessary, any changes in the present
operational procedures.403

579.

And so the team embarked upon its inquiries with this in mind. Occupying as it did a
place at the core of the operation; the Wajir District Security Committee became the
subject of Etemesi’s conclusions and, eventually, a number of recommendations. As
has been explained above, Etemesi and his team did not shirk away from making frank
assessments of the DSC’s conduct and decision-making.

580. Tiema and his colleagues were blamed for a number of serious failures. Most
fundamentally, Etemesi found the operation to be poorly conceptualised and even
more poorly implemented:
In view of the security situation in Wajir, currently worsened by the numerous
Ajuran/Degodia conflicts coupled with the large number of illegal firearms, with the
uncooperative attitude of the Degodia, the committee observed that the need to carry
out the operation was done in a hurry. Due to this fact, there was no time to write any
detailed operational orders.404

581. Etemesi further described the impact of the lack of operational orders:
Due to the lack of proper orders, no specific instructions were given to the subordinate
commanders; hence nobody was responsible for any specific action. Delegation of
responsibilities should have been more specific especially on the control, guard-system
and interrogation at the airstrip. It is due to the lack of these details that the situation
got out of hand and the unfortunate incident occurred at Wagalla Airstrip. The system of
interrogation used at the airport left a lot to be desired and was very unprofessional.405

582.

In addition to the operation’s structural deficiencies, Etemesi could find nothing
exemplary in the behaviour and demeanour of the officers in charge of the operation:
The committee also observed that most of the DSC officers lacked the operational
experience. This possibly accounts for the poor planning and execution of the operation.
The officers also unfortunately did panic and over-reacted at the airstrip. This fear, panic

403 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 2.
404 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 15.
405 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
government officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 15.
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and confusion made the officers unable to verify what took place at the airstrip and how
many people died…406

583. Etemesi’s raking of the District Security Committee ended in his description of the
Wajir group as “cowardly” and irresponsible for their abrupt departure from the
field in the wake of the shooting:
The committee also observed that, after the shooting incident, the DSC did panic and
the Acting DC, Deputy DSBO and OCPD immediately left the area without due concern
of what was happening. This cowardly move and lack of any sense of responsibility left
the situation to get out of hand, since only the junior officers were left in the area; that
is the Army soldiers and Police Sergeant.407

584. Upon its completion in the middle of March 1984, the Etemesi report was absorbed
into the Office of the President. Then Permanent Secretary in the Office of the
President James Mathenge clearly remembered receiving the document and
studying it for its recommendations.
585. The centrality of the District Security Committee to the action meant that it could
not escape Etemesi’s gaze. As such, Tiema and his men featured prominently in the
recommendations:
To avoid any adverse effect the incident may have on the locals and the civil servants, the
committee recommends that small-scale transfers be effected. The officers, especially
Officer Commanding Army Unit at Wajir – Major Mudogo, Acting DC Mr Tiema and OCPD
Mr Wabwire should be given severe reprimand departmentally.408

586. Simply put, the DSC members had to leave on account of their failures during the
operation itself as well the destabilising impact that their continued presence
might have in Wajir. These recommendations had been presented to, and found
agreement with, President Moi himself. In a telegram dated 29 March 1984, the
British High Commissioner noted:
Moi said that those involved [in the Wagalla Massacre] had greatly exceeded their
authority and the operation had got out of control. MPs had greatly exaggerated
the scale of the trouble and the numbers of deaths but this did not excuse what had
happened. He particularly criticized the Provincial Commissioner Benson Kaaria….
and said that a number of people involved would be removed and replaced. 409
406 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 16.
407 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 18.
408 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 19.
409 Tel No. 431 of 29 March 1984 to Priority FCO from Allinson.
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587. In fact the donor countries who had met a number of times concerning the
provision of relief aid to Wajir after the massacre had been informed of the Kenya
government’s reaction to the massacre:
The officials responsible would be punished, but privately in order not to provide
ammunition for those in North Eastern Province who sought to undermine the
Kenya government.410

588. And so it was that on the 4 May 1984, Tiema received a signal from Nairobi through
Garissa instructing him to leave Wajir. The Commission saw a copy of this document,
which states:
Divspec Wajir for Districter Instruction from Rais stop acting Districter to proceed on
leave with effect from today 4th May stop message from Provincer stop.411

589. While there is much about the operation itself that Tiema did not seem able to
remember, his memory of the signal and the circumstances under which he left
Wajir was lucid and sharp:
Commissioner: You received the signal at 2.00pm on 4th May?
Manasseh Tiema: By 3.00pm on the same day, my successor had arrived with his
luggage, ready to take over the station.
Commissioner: You left 12 hours later at 3:00am, were you given more time before you
left or were you just required to leave?
Manasseh Tiema: I was not given any time. I was just told to leave that same day.412

590.

Tiema attributed his hurried departure from Wajir to the arrival the next day of a top
government official: Minister of State in the Office of the President Justus ole Tipis.
He speculated that his presence might have proven awkward because of his role in
the operation:
I do not know whether it was done for me to give way for them to perform the necessary
investigation or if they felt that my presence there would not give them access to the
information they wanted. As I said, there was a high-ranking officer who was supposed
to come the next day and I was not supposed to be there when that person came. That
was why I had to leave before sunrise.413

591.

410
411
412
413
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What followed next were 12 months of what Tiema portrayed as mental anguish and
deep confusion because, as it turned out, he received no additional communication
of any kind from his employers. He remained at home in limbo. And although he still
received his monthly pay, he heard nothing further about his fate:

Tel. No. 457 of 10 April 1984 to Immediate FCO from Allinson.
Provspec Garissa for Provincer NEP Divspec Wajir for Districter Wajir, 4/5/84.
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.35
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.34
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My salary was not stopped. It was coming and I was taking it uncomfortably. I was
subjected to psychological torture somehow. Here I am staying idle at home and being
paid with no reasons being given why I should be at home when I should be on duty. It
went on for almost a year.414

592. Just as suddenly, after twelve months and just as his leave ended, Tiema received
news of a new posting:
After my leave I was instructed to report to the Provincial Commissioner Nyanza
Province for deployment. When I reported, I was posted to Kisii District as the District
Commissioner, Manga Division.415

593. The Commission believed that Tiema’s 12-month stay was occasioned by continuing
uncertainty within the Office of the President as to what to do with him. Etemesi
had quite clearly recommended transfer and “severe reprimand departmentally”
for Tiema and the rest of the District Security Committee.416 Even so, there was
a certain hesitation at taking more drastic action against Tiema, in particular,
who was increasingly portrayed as a novice administrator lacking in operational
experience. Etemesi had already intimated this:
Whenever possible, career background and operational experience should always be put
in consideration whenever postings of officers to the operational areas are being done.417

594. The discussion continued at the Office of the President. As Mathenge explained, it
appeared that eventually it was decided that Tiema could return from his forced
leave. The reasons given once again seemed to revolve around his inexperience
and his overall suitability for the Wajir posting:
Tiema was suspended and later on his case was reviewed. This was a person who was put
in a job and was very new to it. He was not an operations officer and we chose the position
of getting him out the area and later posted him to Nyanza. He ended up in Kisii.418

595. What the Commission found so unusual was the fact that government had made
no contact whatsoever with Tiema during the period of his forced leave. No officials
ever explained his predicament to him. Even more puzzling was the fact that no
one ever returned to Tiema for additional information or evidence, even as debates
and controversies flared up over Wagalla in the weeks and months following the
operation. Officially, Tiema never spoke formally to anyone ever again about the
Wagalla tragedy:
414 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Wajir/ p.22
415 Further Statement by Manasseh Birika Tiema, 28th March 2011, TJRC, Nairobi
416 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 18.
417 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 20.
418 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 15 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.24
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I did not get into any official conversation with anyone and even privately, I was shying
away from talking about this matter with people not within the service. We would chat
with those who were in the service, but it was an informal chat.419

596. There was a single exception which Tiema was unable to put an exact date on.
Some time after being posted to Kisii, Tiema was asked to travel to the Office of the
President in Nairobi:
After I had been reinstated and posted to Kisii District…that is when I was called by the
District Commissioner, Kisii and he told me that I was required to report to somebody in
the Office of the President by the name Hola, about the incident that took place in Wajir.
I went to see M. Hola and he took me to the AG’s Chambers and that was where we met
a State Counsel who talked to me and then told me I could go back to my station.420

597. This summoning of Tiema to Nairobi may well certainly have related to the case
filed by Ibrahim Khamis Adan and Ali Noor Yussuf. As explained above, that case
fizzled out at some point in 1985. As with so much related to the Wagalla incident,
Tiema went largely unheard, unseen and unnoticed for almost three decades.

Provincial Security Committee
598.

While the specific manner of the implementation of the operation origins lay in Wajir
itself, the Provincial Security Committee was nonetheless pulled into the specific
details of the Wagalla operation from the very outset when the District Security
Committee signalled Garissa on the 9th of February with news about the intention
to round up all Degodias for disarmament and interrogation. What followed next
was, as has been described at length, three days of almost no communication
between the District and Provincial Security Committee. Channels only opened
up again between the two committees on 13 February. Notwithstanding the very
limited interaction between Garissa and Wajir, the Etemesi-led team concluded that
the Provincial Security Committee had much to answer for the manner in which the
operation had unfolded. Indeed, it was this very failure to communicate regularly
and explicitly with which Etemesi took issue:
The PSC should also be able to be held responsible for giving vague and unprofessional
operational instructions…The PSC should in future be in full control of the situation and
should give proper guidelines and directives.421

599. This “vague and unprofessional order” was the signal sent from Garissa to Wajir
on the 9th of February. This order was followed by another one the next day.
419 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.36
420 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.35
421 Report of a committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way government
officials handled the issue, 15th March 1984, 15 19.
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Etemesi located the ultimate responsibility for limiting and defining the size of the
operation within the Provincial Security Committee:
Due to the fact that most of the incidents had taken place in Griftu, the initial stage of the
operation should have concentrated on the Degodias in that area and all Degodia elders
who should have been forced to produce the killers of the family of six in Griftu. However,
this assessment, direction and decision making should have been exercised by the PSC.422

600. For Etemesi, the Provincial Security Committee’s failure to provide any such
assessment, direction or definition meant that its members could not escape
sanction. And so it was that in April 1984, the entire PSC was sent on compulsory
leave. They never went back to Garissa. Benson Kaaria met a very particular fate.
He did not go back to the service. Instead, he was deployed to the Post Office and
Savings Bank. In Kaaria’s eyes, this was a demotion. Chairmanship of a bank was in no
way commensurate with the power, prestige and influence of heading a province.
James Mathenge makes the same point. In all respects, Kaaria’s deployment to the
bank and subsequently to the Kenya Tea Research Foundation was a demotion. It
was not in that sense the transfer that Etemesi had recommended:
Mr Kaaria got more than that. It was not a transfer but really a demotion. The PPO was
also demoted and the person from the Army was retired. So I thought we went even
beyond what the report was recommending.423

601. To be certain, even today Kaaria still seems to find it difficult to accept his removal
from office. He continues to maintain that under the Security Charter and the
Internal Security Scheme, the Wajir District Security Committee was in essence
a self-starting, self-regulating autonomous body over which he had little (if any)
control. In this Kaaria returned to a theme and a point that he made emphatically
during his submissions on the Bulla Karatasi operation in Garissa at the end of
1980. But with Wagalla, Kaaria was even more explicit: once the District Security
Committee decided to launch the operation, the powers it enjoyed under the
Security Charter meant that a process was set in motion that could not be
stopped:
Commissioner: Now I am asking you or I am assuming - correct me if my understanding
is not correct - that if you or when you learnt about the operation that was undertaken
on the night of the 9th and the morning of the 10th February, the rounding up of the
Degodia at the airstrip; you had the power to change the operation and even change
that operation, is that correct?
Benson Kaaria: No, I cannot.424
422 From Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, 17.
423 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 15 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.24
424 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.83
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602. Kaaria painted a picture of an unstoppable District Security Committee, even in the
midst of concerns, questions or doubts:
Commissioner: What I am trying to understand is, if the DSC engaged in an illegal act
then, if I understood you correctly before, you as the PSC had power to stop that act?
Benson Kaaria: No.
Commissioner: You did not? You had no power over the DSC?
Benson Kaaria: No. If I did that, I would dilute the authority of the DSC.
Commissioner: Okay.
Benson Kaaria: They would not be there.425

603. In later exchanges, however, Kaaria himself seemed to suggest that far from
sitting helplessly on the sidelines as Wajir behaved as it pleased, both he (as the
Provincial Commissioner) and the Provincial Security Committee could and did
wield influence over the District Security Committee. The Commission heard this
information through a line of questioning that began by asking Kaaria for his
opinion on the Wajir District Security Committee’s controversial shutting off of the
wells and water to the Degodia in the days before the operation:
Commissioner: If this had come to your attention - they say that it started on the 5th
of February, let us say on the 6th of February - if you were informed that the DSC had
embarked on this, what would your reaction be to that?
Benson Kaaria: I would have gone there and changed the order.
Commissioner: So you would have reversed that order and said “stop this”?
Benson Kaaria: Immediately.
Commissioner: Because that would have been illegal in terms of…so, is that you as the
PC or is that the PSC?
Benson Kaaria: As the PSC.
Commissioner: So the PC had the power…
Benson Kaaria: That is coming to the heart…
Commissioner: So you could reverse the…
Benson Kaaria: There is the softer one and a harsh one.
Commissioner: And the PC is the softer one?
Benson Kaaria: Softer one.
Commissioner: That is the soft one. So, using your softer heart, you had the powers to
reverse a decision of the PSC?
425 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.84
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Benson Kaaria: Exactly.
Commissioner: That means a decision of the DSC on 9th of February, 1984, to round
up all the Degodias and take them to the airstrip; you had the power to reverse that
decision? Is that correct?
Benson Kaaria: I would have reversed it on the spot.

604. Along the same lines, in another exchange Kaaria also eventually seemed to
accept that the two signals issued by the Provincial Security Committee on 9
and 10 February were not merely modifications of operational orders crafted in
Wajir. They were instead the very permissions and authorisations that allowed
the operation to go ahead:
Commissioner: Is it true that the PSC sanctioned or sent a signal confirming that
Degodia male tribesmen be arrested? You were correcting a previous signal which you
thought was very…
Benson Kaaria: The first signal was wrong because it was not authorised by us, but by
the PSC. The second signal was to correct the other one.
Commissioner: Is it as a result of that signal that the operation occurred?
Benson Kaaria: The operation was on. It was the DSC that had mentioned what they
would do.

Commissioner: So it is you, Mr Kaaria and your team in the PSC that gave the final
word to the operation?
Mr Benson Kaaria: Yes, to say it should go on.426

605.

Notwithstanding his earlier testimony, it appears that Kaaria and the PSC had
authority to affect operational decisions taken by the DSC. This, for the Commission,
was what put Kaaria in the Office of the President’s firing line in the weeks and
months following Wagalla: the PC and the Provincial PSC had much more ownership
than they were prepared to admit. This superior authority to affect operations in the
field did not stop at the PSC. James Mathenge indicated that not only the PSC but
other superior bodies could raise questions and even alter a decision to undertaken
an operation:
Leader of Evidence: When Mr Kaaria was here yesterday, he informed us that at that
time, it was accepted that the DSC, in carrying out operations, had full authority. In
fact, no one could stop them in their tracks….Can you confirm that this is how we were
operating as a country? Now because the issue was raised by a PC and he says that
once a DSC was in conduct of an operation, he did not think that he could stop them.
Actually his statement was that as even as the PSC, they were running an operation

426 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.65
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and no higher authority other than maybe the President could have stopped them. In
1984 was that the situation obtaining?
James Mathenge: I think I have very clearly said that that was not the situation at the
time. The higher body could have an input. The way things would go is that you would
raise a question: Why have an operation now? They will tell you the reason and you
can go ahead. You could also say that “it is not timely because of this and that.” As a
higher authority I have no means of swaying something with my junior. Even if the law
is supporting him to do it, it is good to be realistic.
But in these times we are very flexible and pragmatic. You take issues on the spot. Even
with that authority as a senior, I can improve that approach and do it differently427.

606. Once again, the former Provincial Commissioner did not accept such apportioning
of responsibility. For him blame belonged in Wajir, with incompetent district
officers who bungled the execution of the operation itself and also made a mess
of post-operation formalities, such as reporting, documenting and handling of the
dead.
607. The closest that Kaaria came to embracing any kind of responsibility for events in
Wajir was acknowledging the confusion and problems surrounding the signal sent
on 9 February. Kaaria testified that this signal was the product of one person and
one person alone: the Provincial Police Officer, Aswani Kaaria’s version of events
was backed up by the then Provincial Special Branch Officer Joseph Ndirangu, who
clearly remembers how the signal came about:
Leader of Evidence: When you heard there was to be an operation, what part did you
play? Did you contact your colleagues at the district level maybe to know exactly what
was going on or the kind of operation they were talking about?
Joseph Ndirangu: I said earlier on that the report was received by the PPO, because
most of the signals came through the PPO. As he received this report, he acted swiftly,
before even we met to discuss this issue.428

608. Aswani then briefed Provincial Security Committee members individually about
his actions (that is the sending of the signal):
The briefing from the PPO was on individual lines. We did not make it a security meeting
or a meeting at that time because we were congregating for a meal. Therefore, it was
relayed to us on individual lines.429

609. The impression created by Kaaria and Ndirangu was of a rogue Provincial Police
Officer roaming outside the PSC and dealing directly with the authorities in Wajir.
Aswani and, more importantly, his operational orders, had to be brought back
427 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 15 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.23
428 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 2 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.75
429 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 3 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.5
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into line with the overall sentiments of his colleagues in the security committee.
The Aswani-authored signal that envisioned the sweeping up of women, children
and animals had, therefore, to be quickly revised:
Benson Kaaria: On the evening of the 9th the PPO told me that he had sent a signal to
Wajir who had told him that they were going to have an operation. When he showed
the signal, I thought it was very strongly worded. It said that they were going to mount
an operation covering all men, women and animals. We met as the PSC and revised the
signal. We said the operation should not include wives, children and animals.
Leader of Evidence: When did you hold the meeting?
Benson Kaaria: We did not meet as such. We agreed because we were together. We said
we must revise...
Leader of Evidence: All the members of the PSC were there? This was the night when
there was the dinner at your house?
Mr. Benson Kaaria. Yes.
Leader of Evidence: We thought it was strong and did not convey the decision of the
PSC. It was an individual’s view.430

610. For the part he played in the Wagalla operation, Aswani was also demoted.

Kenya Intelligence Committee
611.

Lack of involvement, detachment and distance were the overriding themes of the
evidence received from the former Kenya Intelligence Committee (KIC) on Wagalla.
The members of the KIC who testified before the Commission were near unanimous
in their testimony, viz. the KIC tour was focused on development and not security,
and as such the members of the KIC did not participate in any discussions related
to security, much less anything touching on the security operation that would
result in the Wagalla massacre. The documents made available to the Commission,
including those made available by some of those testifying, painted a much more
complex picture of the purpose of the KIC tour of the area. Not only the briefing
materials provided to the KIC by the DSC during their meeting on 8 February, but
also the minutes and summaries of the KIC tour produced by the secretary of the KIC
indicated that the KIC tour was focused on development and security, and related
matters.

612. The Commission was struck by how many KIC members who testified tried to
argue against what was clear in the documents concerning the purpose of their
trip. The harmonizing of their testimony became clear, however, when one of
430 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.48

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

347

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

the members testified that a number of them had met prior to their testimony to
remind themselves of the events of over 27 years ago:
Commissioner: Thank you. You have mentioned what you remember happened in 1984
and that your memory is completely erased. That is understandable because it is 27
years ago. You have had the benefit of seeing some of the documents that we have to
refresh your memory. You have also had an opportunity to speak with other individuals
who were around at that time. I am wondering if you could tell us about that process
and how that helped you, particularly regarding the conversations that you had with
other individuals who were around at that time. How helpful was that in refreshing your
memory?
David Mwiraria (the former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs):
Quite honestly, the only document that I have looked at before today contained minutes
of the meeting of May, 1984. We tried to get most of those other documents but we
were told that they are still part of government secrets and have not been released to
the public. If I read some of the minutes, I can remember some of the visits but not all of
them. I must be very honest.
Commissioner: Will meetings with other individuals help you to remember about the
visits, the purpose of the visit and content of the visit?
David Mwiraria: Yes, they will.
Commissioner: Would you mind sharing with us with whom you had those
conversations?
David Mwiraria: We met a few times to brief our lawyers and individuals would make
contributions which helped some of us remember some things that we had forgotten
completely.
Commissioner: When you met with lawyers to brief them you would all meet together
and speak as a group?
David Mwiraria: Yes.431

613. It was clear from this testimony that many of those who testified before the
Commission had met “a few times” to refresh their memories of things that some of
them may have “forgotten completely.” In fact the same counsel, Mr Kioko Kilukumi,
assisted by Mr Elijah Mwangi, represented Mr Mwiraria and the following additional
individuals: Mr A.J. Njue, David Mutemi, J.K. Kaguthi, D.K. Mativo, J.P. Mwangovya,
Benson Kaaria, Amb B.A. Kiplagat, John Gituma, James ole Serian, Gen (rtd) Joseph
Kibwana, Major Phillip Chebet, Lieutenant Murungi, Joshua Matui, J.M. Ndirangu,
and P.N. King’ori. It was thus apparent to the Commission that many if not all of
these individuals had met a number of times prior to testifying concerning their
testimony.
431 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/7 June 2011, page 71.

348

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

614. Mwiraria, for example, echoed the other members of the KIC that the purpose
of their trip to North Eastern Province was limited to development. Under
questioning, however, he admitted that he had come to that conclusion only after
having reviewed one set of minutes from May 1984 that provided a summary of
the KIC tour that took place three months earlier, and based upon “the little I
could remember.”432 As Mwiraria made it clear to the Commission, the little he
could remember had been aided by the meetings he had attended in his lawyer’s
office with the other members of the KIC prior to the Commission’s hearings.
615. Curiously, the summary of the KIC tour dated 24 May 1984 and that was relied
upon by Mwiraria and others to argue that the tour was limited to development
issues itself refers often to issues of security. For example, the report notes that the
meeting with the DSC in Mandera “dwelt on the security situation in the district and
the border area with Somalia and Ethiopia.”433 More importantly, and surprisingly
given the testimony of Mwiraria and others, these same minutes described the
briefing made by the Acting DC (Tiema) to the KIC in Wajir as focusing on “the
security situation in the district.”434
616. The Commission was particularly surprised that Ambassador Kiplagat in his
testimony repeatedly insisted that the KIC tour was limited to development
issues and did not have security issues in the region as one of its objectives. It
was not lost to the Commission, however, that earlier on when issues relating
to his suitability as Chairperson of the Commission were raised, Ambassador
Kiplagat said in a televised interview that “I doubt, I find it extremely difficult,
no government worth its salt plans to massacre its people”. In his testimony
Ambassador Kiplagat insisted that he had very little memory of what had occurred
more than 27 years earlier, and thus indicated that “[t]he only recollection I have
is what is captured in the final minutes of our tour [the minutes collected in
the 24 May 1984 document].”435 It is presumably based on that document that
Ambassador Kiplagat stated a number of times that “the objective of that trip…
as clearly stated, indicates that we were going there for development.”436
432 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/7 June 2011, page. 72.
433 Mwangovya K.I.C Secretariat to Department of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting, Commissioner of Police, Director of Intelligence, Department of Defence KIC Tour of North Eastern Province 24th
May 1984, page 2.
434 Mwangovya K.I.C Secretariat to Department of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting, Commissioner of Police, Director of Intelligence, Department of Defence KIC Tour of North Eastern Province 24th
May 1984, page 5.
435 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/ 6 June 2011/p. 32. See also page 43 (“I do not remember. I am using the Minutes to recollect.”)
436 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/6 June 2011/ p. 36. See also page 42 (“to acquaint ourselves with the problems in North Eastern
Province in terms of development and the welfare of the people.”); 72 (the objective of the tour was development; “the main emphasis
was on welfare and development.”); 85 (“the delegation went purposely to look at the possibilities of development in northern Kenya.”).
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617. As already noted, the same documents on which Ambassador Kiplagat insisted
the Commission focus themselves on underscored how the KIC was briefed on
security matters throughout its tour of the region, including during the meeting of
8 February in Wajir. Ambassador Kiplagat would simply not be drawn on when and
if the Kenya Intelligence Committee ever even spoke about Wajir or Wagalla:
Commissioner: Was the Wagalla Massacre discussed in the March KIC meeting?
Bethwel Kiplagat: That we have to consult the minutes of the KIC meeting.
Commissioner: How about April?
Bethwel Kiplagat: I say we can consult those minutes.
Commissioner: Or even May, if we may put it that way.
Bethuel Kiplagat: Let me repeat. I think that it will be good if we can check the
minutes of the KIC for those months and then we can confirm whether they were
discussed.

618. While Ambassador Kiplagat and others made clear that minutes of KIC meetings
were taken, the Commission was never given copies of the minutes of any such
meetings, nor was it ever given any minutes of the meetings of the National
Security Council (NSC), including the NSC meeting in January 1984 where it was
decided that all male Degodia were to be disarmed by force. Ambassador Kiplagat’s
referencing of minutes that were not given to the Commission and that may not
even exist was unhelpful, if not diversionary.
619. The role of the KIC generally, and in particular with respect to the Wagalla
operation, was thus difficult to pin down. Members of the KIC understandably
had little actual memory of meetings that occurred almost three decades ago,
though they were able to meet among themselves to discuss and confirm the
little that they did remember. While the Commission was able to secure some
of the minutes and other documents related to the operation, there are clear
gaps, including no minutes from the KIC and the NSC other than minutes of the
KIC tour compiled over three months after the fact. The testimony from other
players in the Wagalla operation were not much more helpful. On the Provincial
Security Committee’s independence from the Kenya Intelligence Committee,
Kaaria testified:
Commissioner: Does that also mean that you, as the PSC, and you as a member
of the PSC had power to do anything and that could not be stopped by the Kenya
Intelligence Committee? Or could the KIC come in and say to you, “Do not do that” or
they would order you to stop that or “we think you should do this, but in a different
way?”
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Benson Kaaria: The KIC would not do that.
Commissioner: What about the PS (Permanent Secretary) in the OP (Office of the
President)?
Benson Kaaria: For your information…
Commissioner: Would the PS in the OP do that?
Benson Kaaria: He could plead with us to see whether he could assist; otherwise we
would tell him, “Come and do it yourself.” Things do not work like that! The KIC or the
KSC cannot order the PSC to do something.

620. Thus emerged the curious situation whereby the entire Kenya Intelligence
Committee was sitting in Garissa with the Provincial Security Committee at the
very instance that the operation was being put together and yet they were not
briefed on the start of an operation to deal with the very security issues they had
discussed with the DSC the day before:
Commissioner: When you were asked whether on 9 February 1984 you briefed the KIC
what the PPO briefed you, you said it was not their business. Why did you not brief them
and yet they were with you at your home?
Benson Kaaria: The signal said that the operation would be done tomorrow. There
was no need for me to tell all the members of the KIC when they were eating that the
operation was to be done the following day. We did not require anything from them
because the operation was to be done in Wajir and those in Wajir had set it up, so they
were to operate.437
Commissioner: You have already sent the recommendations on how to solve these
problems on a long-term basis. So this would have been just an element of that and you
could have exchanged information or ideas to help them in approving that proposal.
Benson Kaaria: We did not brief them!438

621. The documents provided to the Commission, however, suggested that at least
the PSC viewed the KIC as a powerful force with respect to security operations.
When, after the Wagalla Massacre, a directive came down from the Office of the
President requiring tighter control and coordination between security operations
on the ground and the security establishment in Nairobi, the PSC both looked to
the KIC to alter that directive or, in the alternative, to have the KIC take on the
closer supervisory role:
Min 54/84 Operation by Security Forces
The contents of the letter OP.3/29A/IV/101 of 29th March 1984 were noted. Whilst the
PSC does not want to dispute the directive, it is worth recording that the operations by
437 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.97
438 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.97
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security forces here are the daily routine and patrols have to be organized on a daily
basis to search or track down bandits. Seeking for the approval of the Minister before an
operation is mounted will seriously delay action, hence too late to save a situation. The
alternative would be to withdraw all the security forces and confine them to barracks.
The PSC requests the KIC to review the directive. In the meantime the DSC requests
clearance to continue with operations as before but to keep KIC informed of the progress
of such operations.439

622. David Mwiraria, the former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs,
was a little more forthcoming in that he suggested that the Kenya Intelligence
Committee may have formally been updated about the operation during their
March meeting. Mwiraria’s testimony drew attention to another astonishing detail
about the post-operation period: no extraordinary meetings were ever held to
discuss the extra-ordinary situation that was Wagalla. The committee did not
engage any other security or intelligence bodies on the matter. Instead, Mwiraria
described the KIC as having some tentative discussions but generally being content
to let functionaries within the Office of the President handle the matter:
David Mwiraria: I do not remember calling an extraordinary meeting, but we talked
about what action needed to be taken. We needed to get full information and that
is how the Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, had appointed a group to
investigate the matter.
Commissioner: Even after one month, what did the KIC do?
David Mwiraria: I think the KIC just confirmed the action of the Permanent Secretary.
Commissioner: What did they advise? They are the advisory body and here is something
very tragic which had happened with national consequences, what advice did they give
the National Security Committee?
David Mwiraria: There I cannot say exactly what happened, but we would have advised
that the matter be investigated quickly and a report given.440

623. Some members encountered the operation outside the Kenya Intelligence
Committee and through their, as it were, home ministries. As the Permanent
Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Kiplagat would have
been on the receiving end of international expressions of concern about Wagalla.
Articles in such newspapers as the Miami Herald and, more particularly, the
Philadelphia Inquirer, had raised alarm about the operation itself and the resulting
humanitarian situation. Once again, however, the KIC’s reticence and failures of
memory prevented the Commission from making in-roads into Ambassador
Kiplagat’s handling of foreign missions seeking answers and explanations:
439 Min 54/84., Minutes of the Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Wednesday 25th
April 1984.
440 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 7 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.66
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Leader of Evidence: The other information that we have received is that as the PS,
Foreign Affairs, you received a protest note from 19 foreign missions in the country. Do
you have a recollection of this?
Bethwel Kiplagat: I do not remember that.
Leader of Evidence: My assumption is that it is not a common occurrence for foreign
missions to protest.
Bethwel Kiplagat: Did the 19 come to our office?
Leader of Evidence: There is an allegation that you received protest notes from them.
Bethwel Kiplagat: I do not remember.

624. In fact in a private conversation between Ambassador Kiplagat and the British
High Commissioner, Sir Leonard Allinson, on 25 June 1984, Sir Allinson noted :
Kiplagat said that he had felt isolated and ganged up against when not only the 10, but
also all other major aid donors (save the US who had made separate representations)
had made a joint demarche to him on the subject of the atrocities in Wajir and the need
for relief in the area.441

625. Ambassador Kiplagat may also have had to deal with Kenyan diplomats. The
Commission received information indicating that a number of them may have
confronted Kiplagat - their boss - seeking direction on how to answer awkward
questions that were coming their way. This confrontation may have happened
during the 1986 biennial conference that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held
for ambassadors. That conference was attended by Zakayo Kamenchu, who
travelled to Wajir as the Deputy Secretary Finance in the Office of the President. He
remembered Kiplagat’s Wagalla briefing which, incidentally, contained a reference
to the very letters of protest later denied:
Zakayo Kamenchu: Some years later when I was in Foreign Affairs, Bethuel Kiplagat
who was our PS briefed us on how we should be treating our people properly because
this affects our image. He was giving us an example of the Western bloc based in Nairobi
who had called on him to protest about the Wajir Massacre.
Leader of Evidence: I believe as ambassadors you may have had very many issues to
tackle. I am very interested to know and to understand when Ambassador Kiplagat was
giving you directions that we must treat our people well, what did you understand that
to mean?
Mr Zakayo Kamenchu: The purpose of the Foreign Service of any country is to create a
good image for that country. So it was within his responsibility to tell us how we should
create a proper image in the world community.442
441 Teleletter dated 29 June 1984 from Sir L. Allinson, LZH NR 892/29.
442 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 May June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.28
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Kenya National Security Council
626. As noted above, the internal report prepared by the military in anticipation of the
Commission’s investigation into, among other atrocities, the Wagalla Massacre,
stated that there was a National Security Council (NSC) meeting in January 1984,
“where it was decided that all male Degodia be disarmed by force.”443 This account
of the planning of the operation suggested a coordinated effort involving the
NSC, KIC, PSC, and DSC, with respect to addressing the increasingly severe security
concerns in the region:
The NSC further resolved that the NEP Security Committee (NEP SC) study and forward
recommendations as to how this [the disarming of all male Degodia by force] was to
be realized. On 25 Jan 84, the PSC met in Garissa under the chairmanship of Mr Benson
Kaaria PC NEP to consider the requirements of the NSC. The Acting Wajir DC Mr M. M.
Tiema was charged with the responsibility of carrying out the operations. The Kenya
Intelligence Committee (KIC) accompanied by the PSC NEP visited Wajir on 8 Feb
84 where they were briefed on the security situation in the district during their NEP
tour. On 9 Feb 84, a Special Wajir DSC was convened at the Wajir DC’s office under the
chairmanship of the Acting DC. The meeting resolved to carry out an operation with the
objectives of disarming the Degodia and force them to provide names of bandits who
were committing crimes in the district.444

627. As noted previously, despite numerous requests, the Commission was never given
the minutes of any NSC meeting, including the meeting of 25 January 1984. The
Commission did receive a copy of minutes of the PSC from 26 January 1984. Under
the heading of ’Recommendations on long-term policy as a solution to the armed
banditry activities’, the minutes record:
The Chairman informed the meeting that the PSC proposals had now been circulated to
the recipients of the PSC minutes.445

628. This item referred to the minutes of a PSC meeting of 28 December 1983. The
Commission never received copies of the minutes of the 28 December 1983
meeting of the PSC, even though it did receive copies of PSC minutes from
November 1983 and January 1984. Despite repeated inquiries the Commission
was unable to secure a copy of the minutes from the 28 December PSC meeting.
629. In his testimony before the Commission, Benson Kaaria indicated that the minutes
of PSC meetings were circulated to the KIC.446 It would appear from these minutes
therefore that, pursuant to the NSC request for recommendations on how to disarm
443 Army Board of Inquiry, “Wagalla Incident – 1984,” p. 42, para. 103.
444 Army Board of Inquiry, “Wagalla Incident – 1984,” pp. 42-3, para. 103.
445 Minutes of the North Eastern Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Thursday, 26
January 1984, Beginning at 2:30 P.M., B.6/Vol.VI/21, Min. 3/84(i).
446 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearings/ 14 June 2011/ p. 27.
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the Degodia by force, the PSC studied the matter, made some recommendations,
and then forwarded those recommendations to, among others, the KIC. Without
the missing minutes of the PSC, or any minutes from the KIC and NSC meetings,
it was impossible for the Commission to determine both the content of the
recommendations made and any action that may have been taken by the KIC or
NSC based upon those recommendations.

New directives
630.

On 25 April 1984, the Provincial Security Committee of North Eastern Province held
its usual monthly meeting in the Garissa office of its chairman, PC Benson Kaaria. As
discussed, this particular incarnation of the PSC was soon to be dismantled. Etemesi’s
recommendation that all officers involved with the operation be transferred was
effected soon afterwards. By the next PSC meeting on the 23 May 1984, an entirely
new cast of actors had been installed, with Amos Bore as the new Provincial
Commissioner. The new PC saw the meeting of 25 April as marking the end of an era,
not least because of the departure of Benson Kaaria, the powerful personality who
had so defined life in the province for nearly four years.

631

Underpinning Kaaria’s departure was an even deeper, more structural and ideological
change that marked the demise of the near-legendary autonomy of District and
Provincial Security Committees in North Eastern Kenya. That change was signalled by
a brief and fairly innocuous-looking minute sandwiched between longer discussions
about much more pressing discussions concerning continuing conflict between the
Garre and Murulle further up north in Mandera District. The minute read:
Min 54/84 Operation by Security Forces
The contents of the letter OP.3/29A/IV/101 of 29th March 1984 were noted. Whilst the
PSC does not want to dispute the directive, it is worth recording that the operations by
security forces here are the daily routine and patrols have to be organized on a daily
basis to search or track down bandits. Seeking for the approval of the minister before an
operation is mounted will seriously delay action, hence too late to save a situation. The
alternative would be to withdraw all the security forces and confine them to barracks.
The PSC requests the KIC to review the directive. In the meantime the DSC requests
clearance to continue with operations as before but to keep KIC informed of the progress
of such operations.447

632. The Commission was unable to acquire the letter itself but heard testimony
confirming its existence from James Mathenge from whose ministry, the Office of
the President, it originated:
447 Min 54/84., Minutes of the Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Wednesday 25th
April 1984.
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Commissioner: After the Wagalla Massacre, do you remember a letter from the KIC, actually
from your own officer which directed the PC North Eastern Province not to conduct any
more operations without the minister’s approval. Do you remember that letter?
James Stanley Mathenge: I remember that letter.448

633. Even in the absence of the actual document, the Commission concluded that a
simple and clear message was delivered to North Eastern administrators: all security
operations had to pass through the Office of the President for authorisation and
approval. Once again, it was not difficult for the Commission to detect Etemesi’s
influence in the new directive. His report was just as clear about the team’s
discomfort with the Security Committees’ unfettered ability to launch operations
as and when they saw fit and the need for reform:
In the case of any future major joint operation being conducted, which more often than
not are inevitable, proper planning and detailed operation orders should be issued. In
case of emergency, this may be over-looked. Details of any operation and decisions
taken either by the PSC or the DSC should always be communicated to the next higher
command. As much as possible, standing operational procedures should be followed.
During operations, situation reports covering 12 hours duration and giving detailed
progress and future intentions must be sent to the next higher HQ.449

634. Embedded within the recommendation that notice of impending operations had
to be given well in advance was the possibility that operations could be altered or
even rejected, especially if, as in the case with Wagalla, they were seen as being
poorly thought out. Etemesi’s report clearly spelt out the need for operations to
adopt more stringent thresholds.450

The aftermath
635. While larger Wajir can be said to have returned to normal, the same cannot be
said of the community of survivors and victims. For them things had changed
completely and irrevocably. A central concern of the government was that victims,
targets and subjects of the operation, the Degodia, were to have ‘their confidence
in the government restored as a matter of priority.’451 But the government could
not have anticipated the upheaval and instability that the operation itself had
caused and the complexity involved in returning to a pre-operation normality.
448 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 15 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.29
449 From Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, 20.
450 From Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, 20.
451 From Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way
Government Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, 21.
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636. It appeared to the Commission that the government’s central problem quickly
became the restoration of trust and authority in a community of people who
had experienced and witnessed government-authorized violence first-hand.
Wajir District officials who were overwhelmingly outsiders from other parts of
the country could find few local allies. Bishar Ismail Ibrahim, the Chief of Wagalla
location, was dismissed from service on the 29 August 1984 after weeks of
wrangling about the nature and content of his attempts to help Wagalla victims,
survivors and residents.452 As he described them, his efforts were wide-ranging:
Immediately after 14/02/1984, multiple problems were witnessed in that a good
number of breadwinners died. Animals, which are the source of livelihood of Somalis
died when water point places were closed and herders were kept at the airstrip. It was
also a time of droughts, there was not enough grazing pasture. As the chief of the area,
I foresaw that as a big problem. The vulnerable groups that are women and children
would die of hunger. Therefore in order to overcome the problem, I instructed these
people to come and settle in Wagalla with their portable huts and 401 families were
settled.453

537. Distribution of food aid in Wagalla put Bishar in even more trouble with senior
administrators in the district:
Recently you have been known to make secret appeals for donations from foreigners
who are operating within the district. The donations are aimed at servicing the
interests of a small section of people or your close relatives within your location.
You have even appealed for them to continue to settle in one area so that they may
benefit from your secret deals. To be more specific, on 26th May 1984, without prior
permission or knowledge from your District Officer or this office, you secretly got
a donation of four bags of maize and one bag of sugar among other things from a
foreigner who is operating within the district. The said foodstuff was transported
to Wagalla with instructions that it must be divided at night and to R/Muhammed
section to which you belong. This annoyed residents of your location and motivated
tribal tension. As of now your people are very bitter as a result of this incident. It is
even going to be too difficult to unite them because they have realized you are not
an honest chief.454

638. Bishar was eventually dismissed from service. “The foreigner operating within the
district” was, Sister Annalena Tonelli and she too met a similar fate on account of her
work in and with the Wagalla community. Sister Annalena played a key role in the
search and rescue efforts that took place after the operation. She was also central
to the difficult issue of quantifying the dead. While she was initially praised for her
contributions, it was also clear to the Commission that the government was not
452 Matui to Ismail, Dismissal from Service, 29th August 1984.
453 Bishar Ismail Ibrahim, Witness Statement, 7th June 2011, TJRC NAIROBI.
454 Mate to Ismail, Gross Misconduct, 4th June 1984, 2.
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entirely comfortable with the nature of her involvement. Etemesi recommended
that she be put under surveillance:
The committee having noted the role Sister Annalena played in this incident wishes to
recommend that her activities and her involvement in the TB Manyatta be observed.455

639. By the end of March 1984, the Wajir District Security Committee had gone further
and recommended that Sister Annalena be declared a security risk:
The PSC notes that the DSC has recommended that Miss Annalena who is running the
rehabilitation centre be declared a security risk person but they have not given details
of her anti-government activities since she started running the centre. The DSC should
do more homework rather than base their case on her stand in the recent Wagalla
incident.456

640. Sister Annalena had long been understood in the broader Wagalla literature as
the person responsible for the internationalisation of the story. In particular,
she was said to have smuggled a list of the dead out of Wajir to the Nairobibased wife of an American diplomat, Barbara Lefkow. Lefkow then apparently
used various channels to carry news of the operation to various international
outlets. This, in turn, prompted the diplomatic hue and cry that put Ambassador
Kiplagat and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the receiving end of a number of
formal protest notes. After a year of surveillance, Sister Annalena was eventually
declared persona non grata and deported from Kenya.
641. The Commission also found evidence to suggest growing government mistrust of
yet another section of the Wagalla population: the widows. The District Security
Committee’s decision to secretly dispose of the bodies robbed the bereaved
women of the opportunity to bury their husbands. As the women sought
answers, they were portrayed less as victims and more like rabble rousers using
the disappearance of their husbands to make trouble for the government. In April
1984 the Minister of State Justus ole Sunkuli visited Wajir and was, according to
Provincial Security Committee minutes, accosted by a number of such women:
The Members of Parliament for the area had responded well and were at Wajir to
attend the meeting, but they had organised some four women to embarrass the
minister by asking questions as to the whereabouts of their husbands arising out of
the Wajir Wagalla incident. The women have since been picked up for questioning. The
DSC should establish whether there were other leaders involved and take necessary
action.
455 Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way Government
Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, 21.
456 Min.33/84., Minutes of the Provincial Security Committee Meeting held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Monday 26th
March 1984.
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Remorse
642.

Many of the submissions received on Wagalla revolved around the victims’ and
survivors’ need for expressions of remorse, sorrow and apology. Mohammed Osman
spoke for many in Wajir when he said “we want first and foremost an official apology.
I think that if I wrong you, the first thing is to tell you sorry.”457 The Commission found,
however, that remorse, sorrow and regret were in short supply among many of the
Wagalla story’s central actors because of the association of these sentiments with
responsibility, guilt and culpability for the operation and its conduct.

643.

Tiema apologised for the loss of at least 57 lives that emanated from an operation that
was conceived and executed by him and the other members of the District Security
Committee. His feelings of regret extended to an admission that the operation could
have been handled differently and could have had a different outcome:
The administrative approach would have been better where you talk to people, let them
see the need for surrendering these firearms, tell them the reasons and then provide
them with alternative protection. That would have helped rather than going forcefully
because maybe these weapons were buried and after we left, you took them out. If we
talked to them, they would have understood that a civilian approach could have been
better than the armed and forceful approach.458

644. As discussed above, however, Tiema placed a certain distance between himself
and the shooting. He maintained that responsibility for that part of the operation
lay with security men under the command of Major Mudogo; security men whom
he described as “serpents”. His apology may stem from a sense that he was not a
military man and that he had restrained himself and behaved appropriately even
amidst the chaos. The Etemesi document, however, suggested a different scenario
in that Tiema’s appearance may not have been as straightforward and as neutral as
he has made it out to be. Tiema may, in fact, have been engaged in taunting and
threatening the men held at Wagalla:
The committee also learnt that when the Acting District Commissioner arrived at
Wagalla Airstrip he went around the various groups; that is the sub-sections. During this
visit, he reiterated his earlier warning that if the people did not name the gang of ten
who killed the family of six at Griftu or volunteer to produce their illegal firearms, they
were going to remain at the airstrip indefinitely.459

645. Like Etemesi, the Commission believed that the Acting District Commissioner’s
presence at the field was far more incendiary and provocative than Tiema was
prepared to admit or accept. In a sense, therefore, Tiema’s apology was therefore
457 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 18 April 2011/ Wajir/ p.15
458 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.44
459 Report of a Committee appointed to investigate circumstances leading to the recent unrest in Wajir District and the way Government
Officials handled the Issue, 15th March 1984, 19.
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one that stopped short of acknowledgement. The former DC’s apology was even
further compromised by his description of the operation as a success on account
of the retrieval of seven weapons from the men gathered at the airstrip:
Commissioner: Do you in your view think that this operation was successful in getting
arms from the communities?
Manasseh Tiema: It was successful because according to the firearms that were
surrendered physically. The response was okay. I saw the firearms at the police station
and I think it improved the situation to some extent
Commissioner: Mr Tiema, that is despite the loss of lives?
Tiema: I am very sorry for the loss of lives despite the fact that we were able to get most
of these firearms from the wrong hands.460

646. The Provincial Security Committee also described Wagalla as a success. Indeed,
this was the assessment made barely 24 hours after the operation was called off:
In the course of the interrogations, 4 firearms were surrendered by some of those who
were being interrogated. This was indeed commendable since the interrogations were
yielding the desired results though the unfortunate incident regarding those who died
in the entire process is regrettable.461

647. Benson Kaaria continues to describe the operation as worthwhile. If anything,
the former Provincial Commissioner was typically forthright in his defence of the
operation as successful. That at least 57 lives were lost and only four firearms were
recovered did not strike Kaaria as tragic and a sign of failure.
Commissioner: Mr Kaaria did I hear you say it was a success?
Kaaria: After what they did, it was a success. Other than the incident of people dying,
it was a success.
Commissioner: So, the operation was a success and the death of the people was an
incident?
Kaaria: It was a success according to us. They had achieved what they wanted. The other
one was unfortunate.462

648. Kaaria expressed sympathy for the overall loss of life during the operation but he
would not be drawn into issuing an apology. The former Provincial Commissioner
was absolutely categorical on this. He would not apologise because he had
nothing to apologise for. In this Kaaria returned to the underlying theme of all
460 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 16 May 2011/ Nairobi/ p.23-24
461 Min. 13/84., The Degodia Defiance Tribesmen Defiance of Government Appeal to Surrender Illegally Acquired Firearms, Minutes
of the North Eastern Special Provincial Security Committee Meeting Held in the Provincial Commissioner’s Office on Tuesday, 14th
February 1984 Beginning at 8:45 am.
462 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.69
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his submissions and representations to the Commission. Responsibility for the
operation belonged not with the Provincial Security Committee, but with the
District Security Committee:
Commissioner: Would you take full responsibility for the wrong things that occurred
during operation?
Benson Kaaria: I cannot. Everybody has to carry his own cross.
Commissioner: In this case, who should carry the cross, Mr Kaaria?
Benson Kaaria: The DSC Wajir.463

649.

The exchange continued and Kaaria consolidated his position as sympathetic but
unapologetic:
Commissioner: You have no apologies about the deaths; do you have any Mr Kaaria?
Mr Benson Kaaria: Even if I do, I cannot revive…
Commissioner: No! Do you have any?
Benson Kaaria: I sympathise, it was very sad.
Commissioner: You have no apologies as a member of the PSC for having authorised an
operation in which people died?
Benson Kaaria: I cannot apologise.
Commissioner: You cannot!
Benson Kaaria: On behalf of the DC, I cannot.464

650. Ambassador Kiplagat began his testimony by acknowledging the enormity of the
tragedy that occurred at Wagalla:
I would like to state here that the events that happened at Wagalla Airstrip on that fateful
day, 8th February, 1984, can only be described as tragic, where human lives were lost. It
was, indeed, a great loss to the families. But that loss was, not only to them alone, but
it was a loss to the community and our country. That loss was the loss of the whole of
humanity.465

651. This was, in fact, the strongest expression of condemnation of the tragic events
of February 1984 that led to the death of over 1,000 people, not to mention that
systematic rapes, killing of livestock, and destruction of homes and other property.
Yet even Ambassador Kiplagat could not be convinced that the government
should apologize for the wrongs committed. In questioning from three separate
Commissioners, he danced around the issue:
463 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.65
464 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ 14 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p.70
465 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/ 6 June 2011/ Nairobi/ p. 4.
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Commissioner: Do you think at the institutional level, the government should officially
apologize because I believe they have not done so to date?
Amb Bethuel Kiplagat: It is good to look at the total picture to see what kind of response
the government can make in that whole situation. We have to be very careful in what we do,
so that we do not cause more problems. So, I think it is important to see the bigger picture.
Commissioner: So, do I understand that you are not sure whether the government
should apologize? We will need to have a better understanding or a more sophisticated
understanding of what the effect of that apology would be.
Amb Bethuel Kiplagat: Not necessarily; I have not said so. However, we need to gather
more information which will inform us on what we need to do.
Commissioner: Let me ask that question in another way. What sort of information to
your mind, would be sufficient to say that the government should apologize?
Amb Bethuel Kiplagat: Let us continue receiving a lot of these documents so that we
determine the truth and the facts as they happened. It is possible that we will discover
other documents which can throw greater light into this incident and know exactly
what happened. So, I am being cautious. Let us gather all the information and then with
all the wisdom, we see what is it that we can do in order to heal all the people and to
heal Northern Kenya.
Commissioner: I apologize. Maybe, I am beating this horse a little harder, but let me
ask a similar question in a different way. Let us take this as hypothetical. If we find that
57 people died and seven weapons were recovered...let us leave aside people harmed,
people raped, people kept outside for five days in the heat and so on. So, let us just
say what we know; that, 57 people died and seven weapons were recovered. That was
done by the government. We may not know exactly who from the government did it,
but it was done by the government. Given that situation, would you suggest that the
government should apologize for the loss of lives?
Amb Bethuel Kiplagat: It was a terrible loss of lives. The first thing is to determine who
made the decision to carry out that operation. So far, we have not yet done so. I think it
is absolutely essential to know which individual made that decision.
Commissioner: I think we all agree with you on that point. Assuming that, that body
was a governmental.
Amb Bethuel Kiplagat: Then the government should apologize. First and foremost, we
should ask ourselves: Who made the decision to carry out that operation?
Commissioner: So, I understand that if it was a government body that ordered the
operation, then obviously, the individuals, the body involved and also the government
should apologize? To your mind we do not really understand yet who did order it or who
was responsible. We need to keep our minds open with respect to where that specific
apology at a lower level should come from. But at the government level, which the
question is and particularly where...
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Amb Bethuel Kiplagat: For this case, let us wait. Collect more information and with
hindsight, let us look at it and see what specifically we need to do. Something needs
to be done; I am very clear in my own mind. As I said here, that was a terrible tragedy.

652. And,
Commissioner: Thank you very much Ambassador Kiplagat, for your testimony. Just as a
follow-up, you have been asked by Commissioner Slye whether you think the government
should give an apology and you have answered that, there is need to understand the
underlying causes of the Wagalla Massacre before a decision can be made and an
unreserved apology can be given. I just want to quote from the Hansard report, particularly
the speech by the minister. He said in Parliament, and this is in the record of Parliament,
that the Wagalla operation was undertaken by the Army, the Police and the Administration
Police. I think that is a common ground. Just as a follow-up question, if that were the case
and these being security organs of the government, should the government apologize to
the persons who lost their loved ones during this operation?
Amb Bethuel Kiplagat: We are in the process of collecting information. We are doing that.
I am not saying that the government should not apologize; not at all. But I think we need,
first of all, to determine the person or the institution that made the decision to carry out
that operation. That I think is very vital. Secondly, for us to have a global understanding of
what was going on there... I do not want just an apology; it is not enough. We may have to
do more after getting that information. Maybe, we can do much more. So I am expecting
to do much more than just giving a simply apology.

653. And,
Commissioner: I recall Commissioner Ojienda had asked you if the government
was responsible for the protection of its citizens and you said “yes”, which is a good
answer. Now, when it came to apology, you said we should find out who did what,
which is also good. I am going to ask you if failure to protect the people - it does not
matter the culprit, or who did it... According to government figures, there were 57
deaths, property was destroyed, houses burnt and women killed and raped. Does
that non-protection of its citizens not warrant an apology from the Government?
Amb Bethuel Kiplagat: Let me repeat, it is very important that we determine who
was responsible for the decision to organize and carry out that event. That must be
done. Again, as I have repeated, let us look at the complete picture and see what
recommendation we can make which might even go beyond an apology.
Commissioner: Criminal acts were committed by individuals, for which they are liable
and there is no question about that. I am talking about the general, political and
legal principle that the government is responsible for the protection of the security
of its citizens. In this case, it failed miserably. It has not done anything before to
protect them, and to compensate them or apologize to them. Is there a need for the
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government to do something while we search for the people who ordered atrocities
to be committed?
Amb Bethuel Kiplagat: I believe this is why the TJRC was set up. We can come up with
proposals as to what needs to be done.

654. It was sobering for the Commission to realize that almost three decades after the
event, not only were those directly involved in the operation reluctant to apologize
for what in the best of circumstances was a well-meaning operation gone terribly
wrong, but that even those who acknowledged the event as a tragic crime against
humanity were reluctant to recommend that the government should officially
apologize to the survivors and their family members.
655. Expressions of remorse and regret are no more forthcoming from higher and indeed - the very highest levels of government and administration. President
Daniel arap Moi described the security operations of Northern Kenya, of which
Wagalla was one, as successful: “The security operations of Northern Kenya were
successful and the region eventually joined forces with the rest of the country
in nation-building.” Little in the former President’s responses to the Commission
indicated any kind of concern for the conduct and outcome of Wagalla and Wagallatype security exercises. Instead, the former President portrayed operations as the
natural, even inevitable, result of a difficult security environment:
The events leading to security operations are deeply related to the insecurity that
characterised Northern Kenya following the Shifta insurgency in that part of the
country. There were many illegal arms in the hands of civilians who posed security
threats. Moreover there are clan rivalries which have caused many deaths.466

856. The former President did not seem to share the Commission’s concerns about
the involvement of the military in operations involving civilians and the repeated
propensity for such operations to result in mass killings. His depiction and
understanding of the forces was of disciplined, professional, carefully instructed
and professional men at work:
Any security operations are often, as a matter of rule, handled in the most responsible
and humane manner. Instructions are often given to minimise loss of civilian lives. I
can assure you that there is no command that authorises cruelty, torture or even rape
of civilians. Security forces are cautioned to restrain themselves from such extreme
action.467

656. He also drew the Commission’s attention to the collaborative nature of such
operations with military and civilian authorities working together to respond to
security situations:
466 Daniel T. arap Moi, My views to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 21st May 2012, 15
467 Daniel T. arap Moi, My views to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 21st May 2012, 15
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The Armed Forces Act provides for the military to support internal police forces in
emergency cases of insurgency, or extraordinary cases of threat of bloodshed and civilian
security. Where the threat has been confirmed as warranting support by the military,
the military takes command and they operate in collaboration with the police and the
paramilitary unit. Civilian authority is the local provincial administration which chairs the
District Intelligence Committee whose membership comprises of the Officer Commanding
Police Division, District Intelligence Officer and the Officer Commanding nearest Military
Detachment. This committee evaluates the danger posed by a conflict and recommends
remedial action.468

657. The former President’s positioning of himself in the Wagalla saga was noncommittal. He would not provide any specific information on how news about the
operation reached him. Instead, he would only offer an overview about military
channels of communication:
Reports of use of military reach the President through regular intelligence briefings.
Reports of military and police operations from Wagalla, Garissa Gubai, Malka Mari and
Bagalla would have reached the President’s office as a matter of urgency.469

658. Through the testimonies of Major General Kibwana and Colonel Frank Muhindi,
the Commission has established that news about the operation filtered out of
Wajir through military sources who continued to signal even as other outlets
collapsed into silence. The difficulty was to establish precisely when the former
President was told about Wagalla. Clearly structures were in place for him to have
been informed right from the 9th of February when the Wajir District Security
Committee met and decided to stage an operation.
659. The Commission did not, however, find any evidence to suggest that news about
the intention to round up the Degodia made it to the highest level of government
that day, though as noted, the Commission did receive some evidence that the
events leading up to the operation began with the NSC. During the operation
itself, all the documents and the evidence made available to the Commission
points in the direction of exchanges, and limited ones at that, between Garissa
and Wajir and back. The Commission believed, but cannot demonstrate, that
President Moi may only have been brought up to speed from the 12th of February
onwards when the field finally erupted in the gunfire that resulted in the deaths
of at least 57 people. His sources were most likely to have been military ones.
660. As of the 13th of February, the President may also have been hearing from Provincial
Commissioner Benson Kaaria. The testimony of a former Minister of Internal Security
was that it was common for Provincial Commissioners to bypass all other channels
and simply speak to the President as and when they needed to. Even ministers
were locked out of such conversations. Silences surrounding communication have
468 Daniel T. arap Moi, My views to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 21st May 2012, 15
469 Daniel T. arap Moi, My views to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 21st May 2012, 15
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also prevented the Commission from exploring what happened once the President
received news of the operation. Whether he responded with a set of instructions
for the Provincial and District Security Committees was not established. Nor was
it possible to be definitive whether Moi himself was behind such high-profile
interventions as the dispatching of General Mulinge to Wajir.
661.

The former President’s submissions did not suggest that he played a more direct
operational role in Wagalla. Instead he seemed to place responsibility for overall
conduct and control of the operation in the hands of the district and provincial
administrators. In this, Moi clearly aligned himself with the likes of Mathenge and
other top-level civil servants in the Provincial Administration and Internal Security.
The former President, therefore, did not portray himself as personally answerable for
decisions made about the operation. In his view, those responsible for Wagalla had
been appropriately disciplined.
I am aware that certain disciplinary measures were taken against confirmed misdemeanour
by public officers during those operations.470

662. For the former President, only those officers directly involved in the shootings
needed to apologise:
If the commission has received credible evidence of deliberate and heartless actions by
officers which exceeded the prevailing circumstances and led to grave violations, then
the culprit should take personal responsibility.

663. He also had nothing to offer on the issue of reparations:
“The question of reparations has never cropped up at least in my administration.”471

664.

If there is a central theme to the former President’s thinking about the security
operations of Northern Kenya, it is that he does not appear to understand them as
problematic. To the contrary, Moi seemed to view security operations as conduits
for development because they allowed authorities to tackle impediments to the
region’s growth; and far from fomenting clan conflict, Wagalla actually created a
foundation for more progressive and productive relationships between the different
Wajir communities:
The whole saga came to a happy ending. The different warring clans have forgiven each
other. I know this through their evident joint regional approaches to various issues of
development.472

665. For the Commission, it is shocking, disturbing and unbelievable that President Moi
would describe an event that culminated in the loss of at least 57 lives as a saga
that ‘came to a happy ending’.
470 Daniel T. arap Moi, My views to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 21st May 2012, 16
471 Daniel T. arap Moi, My views to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 21st May 2012, 16
472 Daniel T. arap Moi, My views to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 21st May 2012, 16
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Malka Mari Massacre
The backdrop
666.

Malka Mari is a remote location in what used to be Mandera district. Little distinguishes
Malka Mari other than a small Kenya Wildlife Service national park that is apparently
home to relatively large concentrations of unique plant and animal life supported by
a near-permanent supply of water from the nearby Daua River that flows along the
Kenya-Ethiopia border. Security concerns have meant that the park has gone largely
unexplored and largely unvisited since its establishment in 1989. Wildlife experts
have expressed concern about the fate of Malka Mari’s elephant population because
of its exposure to human threats such as poaching.473 But in the face of continuing
worries about insecurity, little has been done either to develop the park or to engage
in sustained conservation and protection activities.

667. Malka Mari is also unusual for a colonial era-fort perched high on a hill overlooking
the main settlement. The fort was built to protect government troops in a part of
the Northern Frontier District that the British found very difficult to bring under
administrative control. The fort came into play during the Shifta War when Malka
Mari hosted a permanent military detachment. Along with Buna, Gurar and Moyale
where other army posts were also established, Malka Mari became part of the
northern defense against shifta activity.474 Malka Mari fort was the location of an
undocumented incident that may have taken place towards the end of the war. As
far as the Commission can tell, a number of military officers were attacked by shifta
fighters. Fierce fighting ensued. The bullet holes in the old fort’s walls bear silent
testimony to a rare instance of a pitched battle between security forces and the
shifta. Mandera became one of the first districts to abandon the secessionist cause.
668. Angered and dismayed by shifta attacks on the civilian population, Mandera elders
and political leaders featured prominently in a delegation that visited State House
to assure President Kenyatta of their loyalty and co-operation.475 However, Mandera
did not reap much of a peace dividend from its conciliatory approach. At the end
of the war, the district found itself in the same dispirited circumstances as the rest
of the region. The economic outlook was bleak on account of widespread livestock
losses. Levels of investment in health, education and infrastructure were extremely
low. The onset of drought in the early 1970s further extinguished any hope of a
rapid recovery. Mandera’s proximity to both Ethiopia and Somalia presented the
district with grave security problems particularly during the Ogaden War (1988-78)
between the two countries. Mandera, like Wajir, was on the receiving end of a large
473 Patrick Omondi et al ‘Managing human-elephant conflicts: the Kenyan experience’ (2004) 36 Pachyderm 80.
474 Major HK Biwott, ‘Post-Independence Low Intensity Conflict in Kenya’ (1992) at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/
report/1992/BHK.htm Accessed 2nd March 2012.
475 Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity (2005), 163.
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and steady flow of refugees and arms. As the Ogaden war wound down, raids and
banditry began to emerge as the primary challenge to the overall prosperity and
stability of the district.
669. Once again, Mandera’s location dealt it something of a double blow. Bandits with
connections to Somalia were active along one part of the border. On another
part there were incursions from southern Ethiopia; a region that has been
described as ‘apocalyptic’ because of the frequency and intensity of the levels of
banditry spawned by prolonged political instability and outright criminality with
links to those across the border in Ethiopia. Mandera District was caught up in
these currents. It was a continuing source of distress and alarm for all levels of
government. Kenyan officials were also concerned about the frequency of Somali
and Ethiopian troops criss-crossing Mandera in order to engage each other as the
Ogaden issue rumbled on despite the formal end of the war. According to a British
cable, President Moi brought this issue up during the November 1980 visit of Lord
Luce, the United Kingdom Minister for Africa:
He said that recently the Ethiopians had crossed a corner of Kenya without the
knowledge of the Kenyan authorities to attack Somalis in the Ogaden. The Somalis were
now taking their revenge on the Kenyans.476

670. Mandera in the early 1980s was, quite clearly, vulnerable to a number of external
security threats. Internally, however, the district has been described as somewhat
peaceful. The different communities and clans maintained a steady co-existence
that belied many decades of conflict and tension over pasture and water. In years
to come, competition between the Garre and the Murulle – the main Mandera
clans – would drive the district to the brink of disaster.477 But in the 1980s their
relationship was characterized by a functional (if not cordial) co-operation.

In the shadows: Malka Mari Operation of 1981
671. Sometime in 1981, a security operation took place in and around Malka Mari. The
undocumented nature of this operation is such that the Commission is not certain
when this operation actually took place. The best guess is that the operation took
place in 1981, but research and testimony have unearthed an array of dates from
1970 onwards. Nene Mburu, for instance, writes of the Malka Mari massacre of
1975.478 Even Commission witnesses have not offered any clarity or consistency.
Some appeared, for instance, to conflate Malka Mari with Bulla Karatasi:
476 Internal Security in North East Province, 11th November PRO/FCO/31.2864
477 For details on colonial and post-colonial clan conflict in Mandera, see Ozonnia Ojielo, Dynamics and Trends of Conflict in Greater
Mandera Amani Papers May 2010 available at http://www.ke.undp.org/index.php/projects/amani-papers Accessed 4th
March 2012.
478 Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity (2005), 244.
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In 1980, after the death of a district officer who was killed by bandits at Daadab, a curfew
was imposed on the North Eastern Province by the then Minister of State, Internal
Security, Hon. G. G. Kariuki, and the curfew order was implemented by the former
Provincial Commissioner of North Eastern Province, Mr. Benson Kaaria. This curfew led
to the Mandera Massacre and the Malka Mari massacre of 336 persons.479

672

The Commission has settled on 1981 because this is the year around which most
popular accounts of the operation cluster. It has not been possible, however, to
specify a month, much less a specific day. Because the Commission—like many
others with an interest in Malka Mari—is dependent on failing memories and fuzzy
recollections, it accepts that it may never be possible to arrive at a more accurate
understanding of when the operation actually took place. Most accounts of the
operation begin with reports of bandits in the Malka Mari area.480 When news of
the bandits reached the security forces, a two-pronged operation was launched.
The first stage consisted of giving chase to the bandits. Then the security agents
turned their attention to Malka Mari civilians whom they accused of sheltering
and supporting the bandits. It was at this stage that the operation was said to
have degenerated into violence. Forces were said to have set upon the civilian
population with a brutal determination as they sought information on the bandits’
whereabouts. The security forces also asked the local population to surrender
guns and other weapons.481Those who did not comply were dealt with ruthlessly.
Men’s skulls were said to have been crushed with boulders. Others were reported
to have been hung from trees. Rape and other sexual violence were also said to
have featured prominently. Mothers were said to have pleaded with soldiers to
rape them instead of their daughters.482 It is possible that an element of rounding
up was also involved in the operation. Some Commission witnesses spoke of
people from as far afield as Banisa, Takaba and Bute being caught up in some kind
of swoop on the local population.483

673. Witnesses to events in Malka Mari are few and far in between. Their stories do
not integrate into a single coherent narrative. The nature of the operation itself
may have been such that it was difficult for people to develop a more coherent
understanding of what happened. Even so, the remaining victims retain a strong
sense of identity as a group of people who have collectively undergone a terrible
ordeal. Malka Mari survivors from Banisa District wrote a memorandum to the
Commission outlining the lasting impact the operation had on them.484 Women
479 Sulemain Mahmud Isaak, Verbatim Record of Oral Submissions made to TJRC 25th April 2011 Youth Centre Hall Mandera, 6.
480 See for instance S. Abdi Sheikh, Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla Massacre of 1984. Nairobi: Northern Publishing House, 2007,
26.
481 Memorandum presented to TJRC on Malka Mari Massacre 16th February 2011. TJRC/MO460.
482 Report of TJRC Research and Investigations Trip to Mandera and Wajir, 30th January - 12th February 2011, 7.
483 From Report of TJRC Research and Investigations Trip to Mandera and Wajir, 30th January - 12th February 2011, 7.
484 Memorandum on Malka Mari, Banisa District, 28th March 2011. TJRC/M1355
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raped and assaulted by security officers were shunned by their communities; some
of them have never married as a result. Others have suffered very serious injuries,
including the loss of limbs.

The count
674. Malka Mari is treated as a massacre because of the number of people who are
said to have been killed during the operation. And yet the biggest unknown
surrounding the issue of Malka Mari are the number of dead and, possibly, the
disappeared. As with Bulla Karatasi, current estimates cover a broad range. On
the lower end are figures of between 60 and 70 dead.485 The upper end of the
scale is at least 200.486 It is difficult to say how authoritative any of these estimates
are. In the absence of verifiable and traceable source material, these estimates
should be treated as signposts and signifiers of a death toll that is difficult to tell.
675. In addition to the dead, Malka Mari witnesses also spoke about another category
of victim: people who they never saw again after the operation.487 Three
decades later, the disappeared may now have to be thought of as deceased.
These presumed dead would need to be added to the overall death toll, as
would those who succumbed to injuries they sustained during the course of the
operation. Once again, however, specific numbers of those who disappeared are
unavailable.

The sound of silence: Official reactions
676. Officially, the Malka Mari operation does not exist. The Commission found no
government documents, no reports, no investigations, no minutes, no briefing
papers and no retired officers able to shed any kind of light on Malka Mari—and
indeed—on any other operation in any part of Mandera in 1981. Simply put, there
is no official acknowledgement of events at Malka Mari. For the Commission,
this represented a step backwards from Bulla Karatasi which, while also poorly
documented, is accepted as an operation carried out by state security agents who
were in turn carrying out operational orders drawn up by the Security Committees.
The absence of an official version of Malka Mari closed several lines of inquiry off
to the Commission. It was not possible, for instance, to say where and how this
operation was planned. With Bulla Karatasi, it was clear that security forces swung
485 Hassan Jelle Hussein, a public commentator on Northern Kenya issues, has said that 68 people were killed during Malka Mari.
See ‘Kenya is there a Ray of Hope for the Northern Region?’ East African Standard 6th February 2007. An International Centre
for Transitional Justice research team has spoken to a witness who apparently counted 73 dead bodies. Simon Robins, To live as
other Kenyans do: A Study of the Reparative Demands of Kenyan Victims of Human Rights Violations (2011) 17. Available at http://
ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Reparations-Demands-2011-English.pdf Accessed 4th March 2012.
486 S. Abdi Sheikh, Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla Massacre of 1984. Nairobi: Northern Publishing House, 2007, 26.
487 Memorandum on Malka Mari, Banisa District, 28th March 2011. TJRC/M1355
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into action following decisions made at the district and provincial levels. It also
remains unknown what kind of operation was launched and whether it adopted
the three pronged approach seen in Bulla Karatasi: giving chase to the attackers,
rounding up of civilians, screening and interrogation. No light can be shed on the
forces involved in the operation and the operational orders given to them.
677. Searches of material from Kenya National Archives holdings were unsuccessful.
The Commission cast a wide net and combed through files from the early 1970s
to the late 1990s looking for any reference to any kind of operation. There was
initial excitement about a Mandera District file containing monthly intelligence
reports dating back to 1963 and continuing on up to 1992. This excitement
quickly turned into disappointment when it emerged that the only information
contained in the file was from 1992.488 The reason for this is that monthly
intelligence reports were routinely destroyed every three months. What this has
meant is that a large cache of raw intelligence data has entirely disappeared. It
is a loss that goes far beyond the immediate issue of Malka Mari. Research and
further inquiry into security and intelligence issues on, for instance, the Shifta
War have also been seriously compromised by the destruction of such material.
There is another file which overlaps with KNA/PR/4/63. This file is KNA/PR/4/85
which contains monthly security reports from Garissa from 1980 to 1996.489
Once again however, the reality of the file was that it was dormant on the earlier
years (that is the 1980s) and only partially active in later ones with sporadic and
intermittent references to uneventful security patrols.
678. The Commission’s search took in a number of files generated at the provincial level
in the hope that they might have captured pertinent correspondence between the
Provincial Commissioner in Garissa and the District Commissioner in Mandera.490
The pattern continued with total silence on the occurrence of a large scale security
operation in Malka Mari. With no official information the Commission is unable to
identify those individuals responsible for the operation. The District Commissioner
in Mandera was not identified. Neither were any of the other members of the
District Security Committee. The most obvious result of their continued anonymity
is that they could not be asked to appear and testify before the Commission. With
Benson Kaaria, however, the Commission had the person in charge of the province
if, and this is crucial, if the Malka Mari operation took place between 1980 and
1984. Mr. Kaaria’s testimony was that other than Bulla Karatasi in 1980 and Wagalla
in 1984, no other operation took place during his tenure:
488 Mandera Secret Monthly Intelligence Report 19th April 1963 to 3rd November 1992, KNA/PR/4/63.
489 Monthly Intelligence Security Reports Mandera District 21st June 1980 to 10th April 1996, KNA/PR/4/85.
490 Security for PC Only 7th December 1976 to 13th January 1981, KNA/PR/8/15. Also, Security for PC Only 16th March 1981 to 16th
March 1982, KNA/PR/8/16.
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Leader of Evidence: Between 1980 and 1984, in your recollection, were there
other situations within the province that would have required the conducting of an
operation?
Benson Kaaria: I do not remember but as I can recollect there was none.
Leader of Evidence: So, are you saying, as the PC, between 1980 and 1984 your region
was peaceful and there was no need for an operation.
Benson Kaaria: If it were not for these killings of the DO and the other officers, the
province was peaceful.491

679. The testimony and timeline of retired Colonel Frank Muhindi may support Kaaria’s
insistence that Malka Mari was an earlier operation. Muhindi was a long-serving
army officer who like many military men had become familiar with northern Kenya
during the Shifta War. Muhindi returned to the region for four months in 1979 as
the second-in-command of the 9th Battalion of the Kenya Rifles which had a unit
in Moyale. Muhindi’s testimony was very unclear and he seems to suggest two
scenarios. The first involved his and his battalion’s participation in an operation
near Malka Mari:
As the Battalion Commander in NEP [North Eastern Province], what I can say is that we
have general operations and we had a unit in Moyale in Northern Kenya. We carried out
a large operation in Moyale where there was cross border conflict and internal ethnic
clashes. We used to believe that the local community was getting support from their
kinsmen in Ethiopia. I remember I went to a place known as Malka Mari where there was
an attack on a Kenya Army unit, but I cannot remember the details. I want to mention
that Kenya Army lost soldiers in the course of duty, although I cannot remember the
number. They were killed by shiftas and it was sometimes difficult to distinguish whether
the attackers were Kenyan shiftas or Ethiopian militia.492

680. In the second scenario, Muhindi suggests that the operation did indeed take place
but that neither he nor his battalion had anything to do with it:
Leader of Evidence: And you have said that there was an incident at a place called
Malka Mari that resulted in loss of lives?
Col (Rtd) Frank Kariuki Muhindi: Yes.
Leader of Evidence: While we were in the northern region, we did receive evidence
from a number of witnesses who also spoke of this incident and their recollection is
that the army again moved in and confined people in their manyattas and interrogated
them. Do you have a recollection of engaging in that operation?
491 Benson Kaaria, Verbatim Record of Oral Submissions made to TJRC 14th June 2011 NHIF Auditorium Nairobi, 26.
492 Col. (Rtd) Frank Kariuki Muhindi Verbatim Record of Oral Submissions made to TJRC 24th June 2011, NHIF Auditorium Nairobi, 5.
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Col (Rtd) Frank Kariuki Muhindi: Not at all.
Leader of Evidence: Okay. You have said that the army unit was attacked and you are
not clear whether it was by the Kenyan shifta or the Ethiopian militia?
Col (Rtd) Frank Kariuki Muhindi: That is correct.493

The Malka Mari dilemma
681. The nature of Malka Mari has presented the Commission with something of a
dilemma. If an operation is undated, undocumented, unacknowledged and—
above all—has resulted in an unknown number of dead, how can it still be
said to have generated a massacre? For answers, the Commission returned to
certain observations made in relation to Bulla Karatasi. Security operations
in North Eastern were predisposed to result in mass violence. Three elements
were identified as being responsible for this pre-disposition. The first was the
Internal Security Scheme which gave Provincial and District Security Committees
enormous latitude and powers of discretion to react to emergency situations.
The second was the incorporation of military officers into civilian operations.
The third element consisted of the collective punishments applied to entire
populations regardless of questions of individual guilt or innocence. A fourth
but entirely obvious element was that the challenging security environment in
Northern Kenya (instability in Ethiopia and Somalia, weapons proliferation and
so on) meant that operations were much more likely to be staged there than in
other parts of the country.
682. Consensus has it that the Malka Mari operation took place in 1981. The
Commission placed great significance in the timing. It is possible that Malka
Mari was staged only a matter of months after Bulla Karatasi. The implications
of this are that the administrative and operational infrastructure that may have
permitted mass killings to occur in Garissa was unchanged. It is highly unlikely
that the Internal Security Scheme would have undergone any modifications that
could have, for instance, curtailed the District and Provincial Security Committees’
ability to autonomously launch large-scale security operations. Committees in
1981 still held on to the power to respond to emergencies without referring
to any other arms of government and administration; the Commission saw no
evidence to suggest otherwise. Similarly, no adjustments had been made to
rule Army officers out of civilian operations. Above all, it would have taken more
than a few months to dislodge the generations-old attitudes that characterize all
Northerners as potential or actual supporters of shifta. That stereotyping of the
493 Col. (Rtd) Frank Kariuki Muhindi Verbatim Record of Oral Submissions made to TJRC 24th June 2011, NHIF Auditorium Nairobi, 6 7.
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Somali and other communities in Northern Kenya dates (at the very least) all the
way back to the war. One account of Malka Mari suggests that the 200 men set
upon were innocent herders who had no associations with bandits.494
683. That there existed in Mandera the conditions for a large and violent incident draws
most of its strength from the recollections and testimonies of witnesses who have
not wavered from their central claim that an operation and a massacre took place
in and around Malka Mari. The collective memories of these people could not be
dismissed simply because they lacked some of the details necessary to establish
the occurrence of the killings.

Further explorations
684. While the undocumented state of Malka Mari presents challenges, it also
presents a number of opportunities for further research. The main goal of
such research would most certainly be to locate more detailed and specific
information on events. Because of their age, Malka Mari witnesses, victims and
survivors need as a matter of urgency to be interviewed. Thirty years on, it
is unreasonable to expect that people with direct connections to the event
will be alive for very much longer. Surviving administrative and security
officers must also be included amongst those who require identification and
interviewing. An initial sweep through files and correspondences has indicated
that considerable chunks of vital documents have over the years been regularly
shredded or otherwise destroyed. However, all may not have been lost. It was
regular practice for District Security Committees in North Eastern to share
copies of their minutes and intelligence reports with other committees (within
the province) as well as with committees in neigbouring Coast and Eastern
Provinces; the rationale for this was that security issues sometimes crossed
administrative boundaries. It may thus be possible to locate Mandera-related
security material elsewhere.
685.

Witnesses and survivors have also spoken about mass graves that may contain the
bodies of Malka Mari victims. Imole, Nulis and Kirwaheri in Northern Mandera have
all been mentioned as places where bodies may be found. Once again, there is a
need for speed. The aging generation of witnesses who hold so many of Malka Mari’s
memories would also be helpful in locating such graves. Such informants might also
have further details on the specific circumstances surrounding the creation of the
graves. The burial sites might also allow for specialized forensic work.

494 S. Abdi Sheikh, Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla Massacre of 1984. Nairobi: Northern Publishing House, 2007, 26.
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A Massacre of Children: Turbi Massacre
Introduction
686. The Commission recognized that, over the years there have been various violent
conflicts among the pastoral communities in northern Kenya that have led to the
loss of hundreds of lives and gross violations of human rights. Marsabit, just like
many other parts of northern Kenya, has been affected by these conflicts. The
conflicts in Marsabit have pitted the Borana and Gabbra communities against each
other, culminating in the Turbi Massacre of July 2005 where 95 people were killed
and several others injured. Of these 95, approximately twenty were children killed
within the grounds of Turbi primary school. Several hours afterwards, a further nine
people were killed in revenge for the killings in Turbi. This killing of nine people is
what is referred to as the Bubisa Massacre.
687. This section of the Chapter examines the nature, causes and impact of both the
Turbi and Bubisa massacres with special emphasis on the experience of children.
It will also make recommendations with the aim of preventing any massacre
recurring between these pastoral communities of Marsabit district.

The context
688. Marsabit County is an arid and semi-arid region in the northern part of Kenya largely
inhabited by pastoral communities. It is one of several counties that have been
carved out of the old Eastern Province. Marsabit’s neighbours are Turkana, Wajir,
Moyale and Isiolo Counties. The administrative and commercial hub of the
county is Marsabit town.
689. Marsabit residents speak eloquently yet bitterly about their lives in this very remote
and difficult part of Kenya. A Borana elder, Mr. Abdikadir Kaaru Gullet, presented a
memorandum on behalf of his community to the commission and testified to life
of marginalisation characterized by gross violations of human rights. Like many
others in Northern Kenya, Mr. Gullet traces the region’s woes back to the colonial
period:
The colonial legislation eventually became the Kenyan law which is mentioned here. The
outlined Restricted Districts Ordinance of 1992 became Cap.103 of the Laws of Kenya.
This Act declared Northern Kenya a closed district. That is, movement in and out of the
district was prohibited and was only possible with a special permit. It is only in this part
of the country that one needs a visa to travel in and out as if we are in a separate country
rather than Kenya. This naturally shows the attitude of isolation and separation vis-a-vis
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with the rest of the Kenyans. The former Northern Frontier Districts were administered
under a regime of law that rendered them distinct from the rest of the Kenya colony.
That had the effect of encouraging separateness of identity and nurtured a Kenyan
outlook and attitude which turned out to be costly to Northern Kenya at the time of the
emergency.495

690. As will become clear, the story of the Turbi Massacre is one characterized by
patterns of conflict and competition between the county’s inhabitants. A number
of communities call Marsabit home: the Samburu, the Turkana, the Gabbra, the
Burji, the Borana and Rendille. It is also home to some Somali and Ameru traders
and migrants. The numerically dominant ethnic group in Marsabit are the Borana,
who make up 60 percent with the remaining 40 percent shared by Rendille,
Gabbra, Samburu, Turkana and Burji.496 The Samburu live in the South and have
been in conflict with the Turkana. The Gabbra and Borana share a language and
cultural identity. The Borana are found in both Kenya and Ethiopia. The Turkana are
affected by the conflict because some residents consider them to be immigrants
into the county and their presence is often unwanted.497
691.

The massacre itself occurred in Turbi Location of Marsabit County. Turbi is a small
town located some 130 kilometres North East of Marsabit Town, and lies directly
on the boundary between Marsabit and Moyale counties. This boundary has been
the source of much conflict, exacerbated by politicians from both North Horr and
Moyale. Like most settlements and urban centres in Northern Kenya, Turbi is rural
and isolated. The population is primarily nomadic, moving with their cattle in search
of pasture and water. There is very little infrastructure, and the only visible structures
are the manyattas. Undeniably, Turbi area is one of the least developed in Kenya.
The roads are all dirt which turn into mud whenever it rains and become almost
impassable. Turbi witnesses painted pictures of poverty and deprivation for the
Commission:
We do not have hospitals. When women are in labour they are taken to Sololo, most
of them die on the way. We do not have any development worth mentioning. The
Government is not making any effort to help us. Sometimes we take expired drugs
because we do not know how to read the prescription. We just put our hope and trust in
God because no human being can assist us.498

495 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Marsabit/04 May 2011/p.2
496 Report of the Intergrated Agriculture Development Consult (IADC) ‘Assessment and consolidation Report on: Existing Approaches
and Best Practices in Cross Border Peace Building and Conflict Mitigation and Strengthened CSOs Across the Ethio-Kenya
Border’, December 2009 p 15.
497 Report of the Intergrated Agriculture Development Consult (IADC) ‘Assessment and consolidation Report on: Existing Approaches
and Best Practices in Cross Border Peace Building and Conflict Mitigation and Strengthened CSOs Across the Ethio-Kenya
Border’, December 2009 p 9.
498 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Marsabit/5 May 2011/p. 2-7.
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692. Since there are limited banking and other financial services, most of the residents’
wealth is found in their camels, cattle and goats. Cattle raids are frequent in this
area leading to a vicious cycle of raids and counter-raids. The pastoralists are armed
with modern rifles which they are quick to use in order to protect their cattle and
themselves. There is limited water, placing strains on both the people and their
livestock. The people share rain water with their livestock and wild animals. The
general perception in the area is that the government has neglected them because
they are a minority:
We hear a lot about the Government, but we hear and see nothing concerning
development in our area ad education, we are so backwards. Since the animals were
taken away, we are so poor and have a lot of problems. Whenever they come and ask
us about our experience I feel a lot of pain inside me. I have only that and that is what I
can say.499

693. Ethnic, clan and community conflict are long-standing features of life in this
particular part of Northern Kenya. Marsabit’s many peoples are locked in
frequent and deadly conflict over pasture, territory, water and more recently
political and economic power. There are various cleavages but what powered
the dynamics of the Turbi massacre is the rivalry between the two main
groups: the Borana and the Gabbra.
694. As has been established in other sections of this Report, there is often a
retaliatory quality to conflict in many parts of the region. The first incident
in the long chain of incidents that eventually exploded in Turbi and Bubisa
was marked by the killing of a Gabbra man at Turbi by members of the Borana
community. In response, members of the Gabbra community stole 728 goats
from the Borana. A meeting was held in Turbi between Gabbra and Borana elders
on September 6, 2002 to resolve the conflict. The elders resolved that peace be
maintained. Two days later, on September 8, 2002, a follow up meeting took
place at Sololo, Moyale District. Administrators, members of peace committees,
and opinion leaders from both Moyale and Marsabit districts attended. The
peace committees were asked to recommend compensation based on the
Garissa declaration; as a result the Borana community was asked to pay 100
cattle in compensation for the one person killed, and the Gabbra community
was to give to the Borana three times the number of goats they had taken. Both
parties opposed the peace committees’ recommendation for compensation.
Other meetings were thus held on the 16th and 17th of September 2002 in Yabello,
Ethiopia. The two communities reinforced their commitment to peace and the
situation temporarily calmed down.
499 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Marsabit/04 May 2011/p 21
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695. On the 17th of October, 2002, another meeting was held at Funnanqumbi (near
Turbi) to seek solutions between the two communities. No agreement was
reached because neither of the communities was ready to pay compensation
as recommended by the Peace Committee. Thus, a resolution was passed
restricting the sharing of resources between the two communities. Borana living
in Funnanqumbi were denied access to Turbi town and Gabbras were deprived
access to Rawana and Waldaa water points, which are the nearest permanent water
sources controlled by the Boranas. Though calm continued after the passing of
these resolutions, tension returned in November 2002 and continued throughout
2003. A year later, on December 22, 2003, a congregation of 6 prominent Gabbra
leaders from Moyale undertook a peace campaign amongst the Gabbra in Turbi,
Bubisa and Marsabit for a week. Afterwards, these leaders held discussions with
their Marsabit counterparts and organized a joint Marsabit and Moyale meeting
on 12 February 2004 in Turbi. This meeting did not take place because the Turbi
people scuttled it claiming they had not been sufficiently informed, even though
the Moyale Boranas had turned up in big numbers. This meant that tension
remained throughout 2004 and early 2005. There was no sharing of resources or
exchange of animals throughout this period.
696.

In March 2005, the Gabbra and the Borana communities at Turbi and Rawana met
with little external facilitation, though no resolutions were achieved. Finally, on
May 23, 2005, the two communities at Rawana and Turbi reached an agreement.
The Gabbra people would return the 728 goats and the Borana would compensate
the Gabbra for the dead person according to Borana law. The Gabbras agreed and
handed over the goats on 30 May 2005.

697. However, the peace lasted for only two weeks. On 5 June 2005, three out of five
Ethiopian Boranas who were travelling amongst the Gabbras were killed near
the Ethiopia border. In a revenge attack Ethiopian Boranas invaded the Gabbras
villages along the Kenya-Ethiopia border and stole animals. The Borana leaders and
the government condemned the actions and quickly recovered the stolen animals.
In the meantime, Ethiopian Boranas made peace with the Kenyan Gabbras and
made a pact that the Gabbras would not attack the Kenyan Boranas in revenge.
Nonetheless three herds of Borana cattle were stolen from Marsabit and Hurri
hills. In addition, a Borana chief and his reservist were also shot dead. Hence, some
Boranas retaliated by burning Gabbra houses in Marsabit and killed a Gabbra. The
final trigger appears to be the killing of six Borana in their sleep around Forole,
near the Ethiopian border.

Turbi: 12 July 2005
698. Matters finally came to a head on the morning of 12 July 2005 started just like
any other day in Turbi. Mothers were preparing their children for school. Others
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were still sleeping, while teachers and standard eight pupils at Turbi primary
school were about to begin their morning studies. During this morning routine
the raiders, armed with sophisticated weapons and machetes, descended on the
small village of Turbi. The attackers left a trail of destruction at the trading
centre and the Turbi Primary school. They also burned to the ground most of
the dwelling places (manyattas) in the village.
699. Turbi Primary School was the picture of normality with students deeply
engrossed in their morning lessons. That was all to change very quickly.
The Headmaster, Mr. Guyo Isacko, told news reporters that he had arrived
at the school that morning when he heard shooting from the lower side of
the village. When he went outside to check what was happening he saw
armed raiders had surrounded the school. He quickly ran to warn the pupils
in the lower classes to run and hide. Unfortunately the bandits followed the
children. The Headmaster managed to hide himself in the bush as the raiders
pursued the children into the villages.500 The account of the schoolmaster
was later reaffirmed during the Commission’s hearings. Ms. Elizabeth Killi
Talaso, who witnessed the raid and killings, recounted how nine pupils were
shot and killed in cold blood as they huddled together on the dusty floor of
the houses in which they had sought refuge.501
700. The school had about 294 pupils before the attacks. The nursery section
had about 56. The school had 12 teachers in total. Of these Twenty two
pupils were killed, twenty injured and fifteen school camels for the feeding
programme and utensils were stolen. The raiders also stole relief food meant
for pupils. One teacher lost twenty three camels. The attacks were highly
organized.502 Some students recognized the attackers as parents of some
of their schoolmates and called them by name as they asked ‘why are you
killing us?’503
701. First, it is believed that the school was targeted because it was considered the
heart of the community and thus the best target to have the greatest impact
on the Gabbras. Second, it would appear that the attack on the School was
planned. The Commission gained access to certain reports which indicate
that three weeks before the attacks ten Borana children were removed and
500 Njeru M. (2005) ‘ Survivors tell of their battle with the raiders on how they cheated death’ Daily Nation, July 14, 2.
501 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p 8 and also TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/04 May 2011/p. 21 and also
TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/05 May 2011/p.2
502 Marsabit conflict Assessment Report, 21st-28th July 2005, This was a report from a mission undertaken under the auspices of
the National Steering Committee on Peace and Conflict Management (Office of the President) with the support of a consortium
of NGO’s. The mission was undertaken immediately after the Turbi massacre with the aim of carrying out an independent and
objective assessment of the conflict situation in Marsabit District, P.35.
503 Njeru M. (2005) ‘ Survivors tell of their battle with the raiders on how they cheated death’ Daily Nation, July 14, 2.
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transferred from the school.504 This suggests that their parents might have
known that an attack was imminent. Eighty pupils were orphaned as a result
of the massacre. Many of these “Turbi orphans,” as they are sometimes called,
have not been able to return to school. A witness told the Commission that;
‘The children who were left have no caretakers as their parents were killed’.505

The Manyattas
702. Various witnesses narrated to the Commission how armed raiders surrounded
the small clusters of huts known as manyattas in Turbi on the morning of 12
July 2005. Starting from 5.00 a.m. onwards, the manyattas were attacked and their
residents were shot or hacked to death by rifle and panga-wielding raiders. Women
and children were killed and livestock taken by the raiders. Chakullisa Kayua, a
woman who resides in Turbi and is a survivor of the massacre, testified before the
Commission:
We were still sleeping because it was 5.00 am but the kids were up. We heard gun shots
and then we tried to put our children under the beds, so that they could hide. I took the
kids under the bed. However, I feared that they might torch the house, I took the kids
outside later. We ran out and they tried to shoot us, but they were not successful. At 9.00
am we were able to come back.506

703. This account of Mama Chakullisa Kayua was similar to that of Ms. Abdullahi
Shongolo, who told the Commission that she first heard gun shots around 6.00
am, and they continued until 9.30 am Mama Elizabeth Killi Jirma Talaso recalled
how raiders who masqueraded as home guards woke her up at around 5.30 am
They asked her and her children to get out of the house if she wanted to be saved.
She however realized that they were masquerading and ran with her children into
hiding. Mama Elizabeth Killi Jirma Talaso in tears recounted how people were killed
as she watched from her hiding place in the bush near her manyatta. She told of
the story of how an elderly woman who was in her 90s and a much loved lady
by the people of Turbi was killed. She also witnessed the killing of children who
were still breast feeding. She sobbed as she recounted watching an infant who was
about six months old have his head smashed on a rock. In addition, she told the
commission about a woman who was killed while in labour despite the fact that
the midwife was attending to her:
504 Marsabit conflict Assessment Report, 21st-28th July 2005, This was a report from a mission undertaken under the auspices of
the National Steering Committee on Peace and Conflict Management (Office of the President) with the support of a consortium
of NGO’s. The mission was undertaken immediately after the Turbi massacre with the aim of carrying out an independent and
objective assessment of the conflict situation in Marsabit District, P.35.
505 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/Marsabit/04 May 2011/p.21
506 TJRC/Hansards/Public hearing/Marsabit/04 May 2011/p.20
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‘There was a woman who was in labour pains and had a midwife known as Kardhoroba
Sharavu. This woman was killed there and then in that condition. The mother of Sharavu
is called Gudid Jaro who was also there. Their children and husbands were with the
animals out there. They had run away. The animals were taken away and the people
who were injured and others who were unconscious were carried to the road. We told
the priest of Sololo that our people had been killed and asked him whether he could
take the injured to the hospital, but he refused and proceeded on with his journey. I sat
amidst the people injured and dead people and cried. I appealed to God to come to our
mercy, so that justice could be done’. 507

704. The death toll of the massacre would have been higher had it not been for
two administrations police officers and three home guards who put up a brave
fight with the raiders before running out of ammunition. Mr. Mamo Godana
Guyo described to the Commission how these two administration police
fiercely exchanged fire with the raiders.508 The Commission was unsuccessful
in its attempts to track these officers down in order to obtain their version of
the events and recognize their dedication to the community. It is quite clear
to the Commission that their efforts need to be given formal recognition and
commendation.
705. Mr. Mamo Godana Guyo narrated to the Commission how he saw his elderly
father being shot and killed. He also testified that his mother’s house was filled
with blood and was slippery such that he was unable to walk as four bodies of
his relatives lay on the floor. Among the bodies laying there was one of a young
girl called Elema who was a standard four pupil. Elema was not dead, nor was
she shot, though she had been cut. The witness together with his in-law rescued
Elema, his mother, and others who were still alive. Mr. Mamo Godana Guyo further
stated that the raiders took all their livestock near their homestead: cattle, goats,
donkeys, camels and even the dogs. Mr. Mamo Godana Guyo personally lost
thirty camels. He also testified that they counted seventy-two dead bodies lying
on the ground. The dead lay strewn all over the village. They were only buried on
the following day, 13 July 2005, in a mass grave, though some were buried in the
homestead of the deceased persons. This witness also stated that some bodies
have never been traced to date.509 More than 100 people were wounded in the
massacre but were not taken to the hospital because the raiders repeatedly
returned to the village, mounting six sporadic raids throughout the day.510
507
508
509
510

TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.7-12
TJRC/Hansards/In-Camera Hearing/Marsabit/06 May 2011/p.12
TJRC/Hansards/In –Camera Hearing/Marsabit/06 May 2011/p.12
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Revenge Massacre: Bubisa Massacre
706. On the afternoon of 12 July 2005 near a smaller trading centre called Bubisa, which
is about 80 kilometres from Turbi, four children and six adults were killed. They
were all Boranas and were from Sololo parish. They were members of a church
group, catechists who had travelled together with their wives. Among them there
was Andre Abduba Wako, who survived but whose wife and child were killed
during the massacre.
707. Mr. Andrew Abduba Wako testified before the Commission that the church
group was travelling from Sololo parish in Moyale District to attend a family life
leadership workshop organized by the Catholic Church in Marsabit town. They
were in Toyota Land cruiser belonging to Sololo Parish. The vehicle was driven by
an elderly Philippine priest, Father Adrin Joseph Janito. They had left Sololo around
7.30 am for Marsabit. On reaching Turbi trading centre they found a dead body
in the middle of the road. People standing alongside the road signalled to the
priest to proceed. The situation in Turbi was bad as there was so much tension and
everyone was armed. 511
708.

According to Mr. Andrew Abduba Wako, when the priest’s car reached Bubisa at round
12.00 p.m, which is some 40 kilometres North of Marsabit and 80 kilometres from
Turbi, they found the road blocked with stones. There was a huge crowd of people
who were armed with rungus, spears, sticks, pangas and guns who signalled for the
priest to stop and asked him if he had any information about the Turbi students who
were killed that morning. When the priest answered in the negative, they asked him
about the identity of the people whom he was carrying in his car and he told them
that they were Christians from his Sololo parish. They then said that, ‘what they have
done to our people at Turbi is what we are going to do to them now’.

709. At that point, the priest was forced out of the car and the car keys were confiscated.
The road was blocked with stones and a lorry had blocked the road from behind.
At that point, the priest was ordered to step aside and Mr. Wako and the other ten
people with whom he was travelling were forced out of the car, cruelly beaten
and killed as the priest watched in horror. Mama Fatuma Ali Jadesa, who lost
her daughter in the Bubisa massacre, also reaffirmed this account of events as
recounted by the Priest to her when he arrived in Sololo. Mama Fatuma told the
Commission that her daughter was travelling to Turbi that morning together with
the priest when a lorry blocked the priest’s car and her daughter together with the
other passengers were stoned to death.512
511 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/Moyale/02 May 2011/p.2
512 TJRC/Hansards/In-Camera Hearings/Marsabit/06 May 2011/p. 15 -19
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710. The attackers, however, thought that everyone was dead. Mr. Andrew Abduba
Wako was in fact not dead, although badly injured. He survived to tell the story of
the Bubisa massacre. Mr. Andrew Abduba Wako testified before the commission
how he narrowly escaped death:
They used stones to try and finish us. I was hit on the head. I sustained a big cut on the
eye. My arm was badly injured. Even my leg was broken. My waist was also badly
injured. I was not born disabled. My disability was a result of the injuries I
sustained during that incident. I became unconscious. We were collected from there
and taken to another place. So, I was unconscious. I did not know when I was removed
from there and who removed me. I even did not know the number of days I spent. I just
found myself, one early morning. I heard birds singing and realized that it was in the
morning. My body was covered with stones. When I looked around me, I found dead
bodies. I heard a young child crying, but I did not know who it was. At sunrise, I saw
Government officers. They started firing their guns. I thought that the enemies had
come back and tried to hide myself. The officers approached me. I lay still on the
ground. I could hear what they were saying but I could not stand up. I heard the name
“Balgaja” called out. I then heard people speaking Bantu language. I heard the name
“Balgaja” called out repeatedly. It was apparent that Balgaja was being interrogated. I
heard him being asked: “Where is your wife and which is your child?” When I heard
Balgaja respond, I raised my hand so that I could be seen. From there, I was taken to
Marsabit and then to Sololo Hospital’.513

711. The Commission was able to establish that after the killings the dead bodies were
put into the priest’s vehicle and driven away into a bush towards Marsabit where
they were dumped. Later on they returned the vehicle to the priest whom they
held captive all day and night. The attackers forced the priest to stay with the
attackers at Bubisa until the next morning when he was picked by his superior
Father Alex, who was the Vicar General, Marsabit Diocese, and sister Betta at
around 9.00 am.514
712. Witness accounts of the Bubisa massacre confirm that it was intended as a revenge
attack against the Boranas by members of the Gabbra community to avenge the
massacre at Turbi. Ms. Fatuma Ali Jaldesa shared this belief when she testified
before the Commission:
‘I do not know, but I think it was because the Gabbra people were attacked. I think they
were travelling their way and they wanted to revenge. That was why they stoned them
to death’.515
513 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Moyale/02 May 2011/p.3
514 These account has been abstracted from the formal statement made by Father Adrin Joseph Janito on 13 July 2005 at Marsabit
police station.
515 TJRC/Hansards/In-Camera Hearings/Marsabit/06 May 2011/p. 15 -19
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713. The opinion of Mama Fatuma was shared by another witness, Bishop Ambrose
Ravasi, who informed the Commission in his testimony that Father Adrin Joseph
Janito was spared because he did not belong to any of the warring communities.
Bishop Ravasi also testified that the priest had informed him that before they were
attacked and killed, the attackers had accused the church group of belonging to
a community that killed their relatives in Turbi. In addition, the priest informed
Bishop Ravasi that he had been warned against speaking of what he had witnessed
in Bubisa.516

The response
714. When news started filtering out on that fateful morning that hordes of people,
including school children, had been killed, the police displayed a casual attitude
that left the journalists who kept seeking updates about the casualties perplexed.517
Ordinarily police officers are expected to move with lightening speed in response
to cases of violence or insecurity. Yet this was not the response in Marsabit. Indeed
the Commission learnt that it took more than twelve hours for the report of the
Turbi massacre to reach Marsabit district headquarters. In fact the then OCPD of
Marsabit, Mr. Amos Cheboi, confirmed that there were communication challenges:
‘communication was very poor and, therefore, we could not communicate with
Marsabit or Isiolo.”518
715.

The Commission was also informed that officers in Marsabit had been overwhelmed
at the time because they lacked adequate resources. Mr. Cheboi disclosed that the
entire Marsabit region had only one police vehicle. He also testified that the OCS had
no vehicle and the officers were able to only cover two places: Forole and Aladi. The
OCPD also informed the Commission that Turbi location had no police station; it was
served by Forole Police Station, which is approximately 40 kilometres away. Turbi did
however have an administration police camp, though with only two policemen.519
It was difficult for the two police officers to respond when Turbi was attacked given
that they were grossly outnumbered. To adequately address the attack they would
have had to seek reinforcements from the Provincial headquarters or even from
Nairobi, neither of which were feasible at such short notice.

716. Residents in Turbi, together with their leaders, had warned the government that
tension between the warring communities were building up in the district from
January 2005, and that these tensions were due to the increase in sporadic killings
more than the retaliatory attacks. These sporadic conflicts should have been seen
516
517
518
519
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by the government as early warning signals , thus enabling it to put in place conflict
prevention measures and provide adequate security in the area. Mr. Amos Cheboi
informed the Commission that there had been tensions in Marsabit since 2004. He
also said that the police were informed that there would be attacks in Marsabit,
especially in Forole and Aldai. The police therefore fortified Dukanao, Aldai and
Forole, stationed one police vehicle in Dukano and Forole, and alerted the officers
in Turbi because they had no police station there.520
717. With hindsight it is difficult to understand why the police choose to provide
increased protection to Forole and Aldai but not to Turbi. This is even harder
to understand given that the government had received information of an
impending attack on Marsabit. The fact that the provincial administration and the
security intelligence apparatus were unable to detect that something was likely
to happen in Turbi even after receiving reports on possible attacks in Marsabit
is curious. The Commission was told that, way before the massacre, there were
rumours going round that there would be an attack, and the police were aware
of those rumours. Mr. Mamo Godana Guyo told the Commission:
‘The Committee on Security and Peace had a meeting and they talked about the rumours
that we would be attacked. They told us that they would take the information to the
police to be passed to the Government. We thought that the Government heard and that
it would help us, but nobody assisted us. The person who told us about the rumour was
from Marsabit. His name is Issako Orto. He told us that he wrote a letter to the security
offices but we do not know if it was true. We want you to follow up and find the truth’.

718. Thus the utter disregard of the concerns raised by community leaders and
residents of Marsabit to the state security apparatus was responsible for the failure
to prevent, or even to be prepared for, the massacre.
‘In July, the school and manyattas were invaded and my son who was in class eight was
killed. Many children and women were murdered. There was nowhere we could run to, so
we stayed in the same place. There were only two administration police men and Marsabit,
Sololo and Moyale were very far so the rescue team could not come immediately. The
raiders stayed in our village up to 2 pm and eighty people were killed The plane that
carried the soldiers came two days later and stayed in the hills and they saw the people
who had been killed and the animals that were being driven away. Nobody came to our
rescue. We asked ourselves why we were not rescued yet we were born in Kenya. Just
imagine 21 children were killed. These children were supposed to be the future leaders of
this country’. 521

719. Notwithstanding this general unpreparedness and lack of action on the part of the
government, the two administration policemen who camped in Turbi and the six
police reservists all put up a brave fight against the many raiders who invaded Turbi
520 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.37-54
521 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.2
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village on the morning of 12 July 2005. The two AP officers were only identified to
the Commission as Mr. Welda and Mr. Sololo. They fought with the raiders until
they ran out of ammunition and then took off for the bush to protect themselves.
Two of the six police reservists were killed and another one injured during the
fight, possibly because they were ill equipped.
720. While the Turbi massacre was happening, the OCPD together with the District
Security Committee were meeting in Isiolo, some 300 kilometres away, where
they were hosting the Commissioner of Police. Mr. Amos Cheboi admitted to the
Commission that the police took a long time to arrive in Turbi as they were far from
the scene of the massacre and there were few police officers in the region. Upon
receiving information about the massacre, Mr. Amos Cheboi instructed the OCS,
who was at Marsabit town, to organise himself to leave immediately for Turbi. The
OCS left for Turbi with some police officers. The OCPD also communicated with the
Provincial headquarters in Embu and he was instructed to depart for Turbi. They
were supposed to travel by air to Turbi, but according to Mr. Amos Cheboi it was
taking longer to arrange air transport, so they decided to travel by road and arrived
in Marsabit at around 2.00pm.
721. When the OCS arrived in Turbi he immediately pursued the attackers and caught
up with them at a place called “Benale”. They fought and the OCS managed to
recover some animals. They also received reinforcement from officers from Moyale.
The OCS and the officers from Moyale tracked the raiders up to the border with
Ethiopia. Some of the officers then returned to Turbi with the recovered animals.
The remaining officers pursued the attackers. Additional people joined the effort
in Turbi, including the Provincial Police Officer and Deputy Commissioner of Police.
Since it was now getting dark, they postponed the operation to the following
morning. The following morning, the OCPD accompanied by other officers went
to Moyale to inform their counterparts in Ethiopia about the raid and attack. The
Ethiopians promised them that they would search for the stolen animals. The
Ethiopian government ultimately recovered 30 camels, which were handed over
to the Kenyan police.522
722. On receiving news of the Turbi massacre, the Ministry of Internal Security dispatched
security forces to the area to track down the bandits and restore peace to the region.
Two thousand soldiers from the military, the general service unit, and regular
and administration police were flown to Marsabit and the neighbouring districts
to track down the heavily armed bandits. Military and police helicopters were
also deployed to enhance aerial surveillance and assist the ground forces.523The
522 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.37-54
523 Daily Nation, 14 July 2005, 2-4.
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then Member of Parliament for Mandera Central, Mr. Billow Kerrow, nevertheless
criticised government efforts:
The use of military jets, tanks and helicopters may be a show of strength by the
government, but it will not resolve the conflict. What we need is a different show of
strength by the government-one characterised by economic opportunities, better
rangelands management, development of infrastructure, recognition of the pastoralist
way of life and peace-building dialogue. 524

723. The residents of Turbi were also sceptical, emphasising that the security
personnel were unlikely to arrest the bandits since most of them were believed
to have crossed over into Ethiopia. The state security forces are usually outwitted
physically and psychologically in terms of target areas, escape routes, and livestock
recovery. Raiders usually plan their escape routes in advance, picking terrain that
will pose the greatest difficulties for police officers. This they do by ensuring that
any pursuit must be on foot and therefore slow. They also ensure the routes to use
are unfamiliar to the police officers. The raiders also always spilt themselves into
different groups forcing the officers to separate or go after one band of raiders.
In terms of livestock, the raiders also play with numbers. If for example, they took
2000 animals, they may decide to give back 200 back in batches of 50 animals to
the police in order to discourage any further hot pursuit. Again, when the police
officer find the 50 animals they are forced to secure them or assign an officer to
drive them back to the base. Thus when the number of such recoveries the officers
would have reduced and would consider any further chase unwise forcing them to
stop pursuit instead of risking death or injury.
724. While making a ministerial statement to parliament on the Turbi massacre, the
then Minister for Internal Security, the late Hon. John Michuki stated that by dusk
of 12 July 2005 the security forces had killed ten of the bandits and recovered 5,000
sheep, 60 heads of cattle, 4 donkeys and 10 camels.525

The church
725. On the afternoon of 12 July 2005, six catechists, two women and two children were
killed at Bubisa apparently in revenge for the Turbi massacre. The six catechists were
attached to the catholic church in Sololo Parish in Marsabit District. The catholic
church condemned their killings. Twenty-eight Catholic Bishops expressed shock
at the killings and described them as barbaric. The Commission was informed
that the Kenya Episcopal Conference had sent a statement a day after the Bubisa
massacre also condemning the killings. The Kenya Episcopal Conference also urged
the state to be more responsive to the needs of the residents of Marsabit and to
524 B Kerrow This massacre could have been averted, Daily Nation, 19 July 2005, 9.
525 Daily Nation, 14 July 2005, 5.
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provide adequate security in the region. The Bishops also urged residents of the
affected areas to avoid ethnic hatred and conflict and instead preach and practice
peace as a means of conflict resolution.526
726. Notwithstanding these reactions by the Catholic and other churches, many
residents of Turbi and victims of the massacre blamed the church for its neglect on
the day of the massacre. A very emotional witness, Ms. Elizabeth Killi Jirma Talaso,
testified before the Commission while sobbing that she had approached a catholic
priest who was driving through Turbi to Sololo and requested him to take her
injured and dying son to Sololo hospital. The priest refused. She blames the priest
for the loss of her son, who died in her hands:
‘I felt very bad. I cried and said what I could not have said to the Father. I told him the
accident which actually happened to me, and cursed him, I wished that what had
happened to me befall him too. In the tradition of Christianity, I should not have said
that, but it was out of the stress I was in at that time. I also prayed later after that so
that God forgave him and me too. I do not know whether that father is still alive. We
happened to be in the same parish, but he did not help’.527

727. Bishop Ambrose Ravasi testified before the Commission that the Catholic Church
had helped the residents of Turbi bury the bodies of the dead people in Sololo
and in Sueni according to the wishes of the family. The church had also paid the
medical bills of all those who were injured. The church, in collaboration with the
government, provided food to and constructed houses for the affected people.
Bishop Ambrose Ravasi pointed to the Gabbra Settlement program, which was
started and run by the church. In addition, the church had offered an apology to the
survivors and those who had suffered from both the Bubisa and Turbi massacres.
The Church also sponsored a school and built a church in Turbi since there is a large
group of Christians in Turbi. Bishop Ambrose Ravasi testified that the church did
not understand the causes of the massacre at Turbi and Bubisa. The Church is of
the view that the two massacres were not caused by any religious rivalry or conflict
in the area. The Commission heard no testimony, nor received any information,
that would challenge that conclusion. The Bishop testified:
Even today, we are asking ourselves and wondering what caused the incident and
why they killed so many people in Turbi. Then they killed the Catechist who happened
to be a Borana from Sololo who was passing through Turbi. He was from the Gabbra
community and he was headed to Bubisa where the Gabbra people settled. Why they
killed them is still not known up to today. That incident was regretted very much and we
insist that the truth of this matter be found.’528
526 Daily Nation, 16 July 2005, p.4.
527 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/Marsabit/05 May/2011/p.7-12
528 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.26
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728. The Bishop also shared his disappointment that nearly seven years since the
massacres there had not been any investigations into their cause. To this end, the
Bishop informed the Commission that the church has been working very hard to
restore peace in Marsabit. For instance, the Church has supported efforts to bring
rival communities together to create a common understanding of the massacres,
and thus opening the door for apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation. The
Bishop acknowledged that this was an uphill task which has not been successful
for most of the residents. It was Church’s view that a thorough investigation of
the massacres leading to holding those responsible accountable would assist the
community in coming to terms with the massacres. Subsequently, however, the
church focused more on bringing healing to the local communities.
‘I do not think we did any report to the police or the authorities, but we carried out
investigations. As a matter of fact, in the Diocese, we have our own department which
deals with such matters. We have the Justice and Peace Commission. They looked into
the matter carefully, but it was a very delicate and dangerous situation. Certainly, what
we did was to convince the people to accept what had happened and which could not
be changed. Then we organized several meetings of reconciliation. As a matter of fact,
we did it in collaboration with the Government’.529

729. Still, It was clear from the testimonies and other information provided to the
Commission that the residents of the region, especially the survivors, were very
bitter over the Church’s failure to report and investigate the massacres. Witnesses
from the area also blamed the Church for failing to aid the police in their efforts
to identify, arrest and prosecute the perpetrators of the massacres
730. The Catholic Church transferred Father Adrian Joseph Janito to the Philippines
before the conclusion of the investigations of the Bubisa massacre. The transfer of
Father Janito rendered any investigations of the Bubisa massacre fruitless, and thus
closed the door to any form of accountability for the perpetrators.
731. Bishop Ambrose Ravasi informed the Commission that the Catholic Church and
especially the diocese of Marsabit were saddened at the killing of the catechists
because so much had been invested in their training. The church had trained the
catechists for three years. Even up to the time of the writing of this report seven
years after the massacre, the Church has not replaced the catechists at Sololo
Parish. This is attributed to the hard work, time and resources involved in their
training, which makes it difficult to find volunteers to take on the position.

529 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.29
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The politics
732. With the coming into power in 2003 of President Kibaki’s Government of National
Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) Kenya undertook an important transition
toward establishing a truly democratic society committed to the protection
of fundamental human rights. There was hope that the repression that had so
characterised past regimes would become a thing of the past. However, in the case
of Northern Kenya things remained pretty much the way they have been since
independence.
733.

Marsabit, just like any other part of northern Kenya, remains a major challenge in
terms of security. Since the advent of the NARC government, violent conflicts in
Northern Kenya increased and took on new characteristics. As a result, the new
government has been accused of not doing enough to address the short and long
term causes of conflicts in Northern Kenya as well as lacking an effective response
mechanism to these conflicts when they occur. The events surrounding the Turbi
and Bubisa massacres can well illustrate the failure of the government to provide
security to its citizens.

734.

Residents of Turbi criticized the government for failing to prevent the massacres.
Ms. Shugli Korowa, a resident of Turbi and a victim of the massacre, testified that
the government did not protect them against external aggression by the OLF
attackers.530 The same sentiments were expressed bother witnesses who testified
before the Commission. For instance, one witness stated that the government failed
to protect its citizen and failed to act despite reports by Chiefs and local leaders on
the impending attack in 2005. This witness stated; ‘Way before the massacre there
had been rumours that there would be an attack. The police were aware of those
rumours but nothing was put in place to avert any attack on innocent women and
children’.531 The Commission met with victims and survivors who were very bitter
about the government failure to protect them against this brutal massacre even
though it had been warned of an imminent attack. Bitterly, and amongst sobs, a
witness told the Commission:
Had the government acted on the warnings we would have been spared. We were never
before exposed to any massacre. It was a sad day that we are still struggling to forget
but never goes away.532

735. Following the massacre, the state admitted that it was partly to blame for the
killings that rocked Turbi and Bubisa on 12 July 2005. The then Eastern Provincial
Commissioner Mr. John Nandasaba acknowledged that the government did not
530 TJRC/Hansards/Women’s Hearing/Marsabit/ p. 37.
531 TJRC/Hansards/In-Camera/Marsabit/06 May 2011/p.11
532 Testimony of Shuglis Alima Korowa
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respond as quickly as possible. He stated ‘the massacre would have been averted
had the government acted on the information it had received’.533 The state’s weak
response to the massacre and failure to protect the citizens was also pointed out
by one scholar who stated that:
The government, read police and military, can only respond after an attack, and quite
often, the raiders outwit them. More accurately, the security forces allow themselves to
be outwitted by the raiders. And once the heat dies off, leaders and government officials
will go back to their usual routine, until the next incident occurs. And that is where they
are failing us’534

736. The Commission learnt that, way before the massacre, a local Member of
Parliament had got wind of the imminent attack and called a press conference
on 22 June 2005 at which he had accused some Marsabit politicians of using OLF
to kill people and destroy private property. He therefore pleaded with the Local
Security Committee to send in the para-military General Service Unit to deal with
the OLF issue. Nonetheless the Provincial administration disregarded this plea.
The then Eastern Provincial Commissioner, Mr. John Nandasaba is on record for
acknowledging that, ‘It is true...that we were slow in responding to the request to
send in the general service unit personnel and it is very painful.’ 535 The Commission
noted that the Turbi massacre took place 20 days after the above-mentioned press
conference which was held on 22 June 2005.
737. The Commission also heard testimony on how the state had equally failed to
focus on addressing the deep rooted hatred that has given rise to massacres
in northern Kenya. The state has failed to adopt effective conflict prevention
and resolution mechanism. Instead, the state has narrowly focused on military
solutions to solve problems that require a more comprehensive approach. This
has led to disastrous consequences. The manner in which the state responded
to the Turbi massacre indicates a lack of capability to provide adequate security
to the residents of the region, also illustrates the lack of basic infrastructure
and personnel within the security forces in Marsabit. Ms. Abdullahi Shongolo,
a resident of Turbi and a victim of the attack, testified that at the time of the
attack there were only two Administration police officers in Turbi. She stated,
‘we felt that because our community is very small, then maybe that was why the
Government was not helping us. We are a minority group. Maybe that is why the
Government does not identify us as the real citizens of this country’.536Another
witness testified that at the time of the massacre many divisional administrative
533
534
535
536
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offices within Marsabit District did not even have vehicles. 537 Yet another witness
testified before the Commission:
I was born in Turbi. I live in Turbi, So, I am a Kenyan citizen. However, we do not believe
in the Government of Kenya because, at the time we were raided, there were only two
police officers in the whole location. These were Mr. Welda and Sololo. I may be illiterate,
but I know that the Government has power. I do not know why they did not help us. I
think they did not help us because our MP was in KANU and that is why we were not
assisted. I believe both the majority and the minority should be given equal rights. The
Gabbra people are few. We want our voice to be heard. The people who were murdered
were around 80-90 years. My dad was 85 years old when he died. My father always used
to lead us in the right path.538

738. As civilians were being attacked in Turbi on the morning of 12 July 2005, President
Kibaki was attending the opening of that year’s Nakuru Agricultural Show. He
condemned the attacks as barbaric and sent his condolences to the families of
those who lost their lives in the attacks: ‘ as citizens who seek peace we condemn
the attacks of innocent civilians’.539 The President also appealed for calm in Marsabit
as the government was tracking down the perpetrators. In addition he revealed
that a team had been deployed on the ground to assess the situation and to ensure
that injured Kenyans were provided adequate assistance.540
739. Though the state acknowledged that it was partly responsible for the attack
in Turbi, it defended itself against the allegation that the Turbi massacre was
as a result of its gross negligence of Marsabit district and the entire northern
region. The state instead shifted the blame on political ethnocentrism. Following
the massacre, the government said that it was aware of the hostility among
the communities, particularly among the politicians, and emphasised that the
conflicts were fuelled by political leaders in the area. However, the then Member
of Parliament for Saku constituency , Hon. Abdi Sasura, accused the internal
security minister of blaming the leaders unfairly. He said the minister had been
misled by his officers on the ground: ‘the government should stop passing the
buck if police have failed to do their work’. This sentiments were also expressed
by the then member of parliament for North Horr, the late Hon. Bonaya Godana:
they are simply giving excuses for the massacre. The government is aware of the activities
that have been taking place in the district and it knows who has been working with
foreign militias.541
537
538
539
540
541
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It was clear to the Commission that ethnic, political intolerance and hostilities among
political leaders from the region contributed to the massacre. However, the state still
bears some responsibility for the massacre because it failed to create and enhance
social cohesion and consensus among leaders and residents of the various ethnic
communities.

741.

The state’s immediate response to the need for ensuring security to the residents of
Marsabit was minimal. The state only provided, alongside civil society organisations
such as the Red Cross Society of Kenya, relief food to displaced persons. The state also
failed to set up an emergency fund to assist the bereaved, displaced and those whose
houses were burnt down by the attackers. The state was also blamed by another
witness for failing to help him and other victims provide a proper burial for those
killed.542 In fact it is the view of the residents of Marsabit that had the state responded
immediately and provided adequate security in the area, fewer people would have
died, especially in the revenge or retaliatory killings at Bubisa. Ms Abdullahi Shongolo
told the Commission that; ‘we did not get any help. We were given maize by the NGOs.
It is them who helped us. We did not get any help or support from the Government.
We were dying because of them’.543 The residents of Turbi expressed their bitterness
and pain about the government during the Commission’s hearings. This bitterness
continued because even after the massacre in 2005 the government continued to
ignore them. Mama Elizabeth Killi Jirma Talaso bitterly told the Commission:

Chapter FOUR

I asked him to look into our rights and look for ways and means of solving our problems.
Since the DC left, we have not seen any Government agency or personnel, or any help
from the Government. The next time we saw the Government was during the elections
because people came to us looking for votes. When they came asking for votes, they
were in aeroplanes, yet they were unable to recover our animals. They came and asked
us to give them our votes, but we told them when our animals were stolen and we were
killed, they never assisted; so, how could we possibly give them votes’.544

The search for justice
742. Since the Turbi and Bubisa massacres of July 2005, the victims, survivors and residents
of Marsabit, together with their leaders, have been seeking justice, which has
proven elusive over the years. The government has neither brought the culprits to
justice nor put in place mechanism to avoid the massacres from recurring.
743. The Turbi and Bubisa Massacres are some of the worst incidents of human rights
violations in modern Kenya. Although the government was not directly involved,
542 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/04 May 2011/p.20-22
543 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.3-6
544 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.9
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it has however been accused of complicity in the massacres by not providing
security to residents in the region. On its part, the government has blamed political
factors as the main cause of the massacre. The Commission was told that the state
began investigating the political dimensions of the conflict and, in the process
three Members of Parliament from Marsabit District were summoned by police to
record statements over the massacre. These members of parliament voluntarily
recorded statements but accused the state of political persecution and the police
of planning to use them as scapegoats over the killings.

The Bubisa Trial
744.

Mr. Patrick Mugo, the then Deputy CID officer, Eastern Province, was the investigating
officer of both the Turbi and Bubisa massacre. He testified before the Commission
that he launched investigations into the Turbi and Bubisa massacres immediately
upon arriving in the area. He recorded various statements from victims and survivors
of the massacre. He also carried out a full sweep of the area which led to the arrest
of many people, some of which were illegal immigrants who were then tried in the
Magistrates court at Marsabit. However, the Commission was not able to acquire any
court files or documents in relation to that trial. Mr. Mugo also told the Commission
that some other people were identified by the Turbi people as the perpetrators of
the massacres, and those individuals were taken to court after the completion of
the investigations. But this witness never provided the Commission with any names
of the accused person in relation to the Turbi massacre nor any proceedings of that
alleged trial. In fact he could not even recall the number of the case. In view of that,
the Commission finds it difficult to believe that there was any trial initiated at all over
the Turbi massacre.

745.

On the Bubisa massacre, Mr. Mugo informed the Commission that during the course
of his investigations he came across the vehicle that was driven by the priest and
that had carried the 10 people who were killed at Bubisa. According to Mr. Mugo, the
vehicle had so many stones inside, bloodstains and the windscreen was smashed.
As a detective, he therefore concluded that there was violence at the time of the
massacre.

746. After the conclusion of the investigations, a criminal trial was commenced. Mr Mugo
informed the Commission that this criminal trial was initiated against 3 people, the
Marsabit Criminal Case No.1753 of 2005, Mamo Wako and 3 Others, which started on
5th August, 2005. The first accused person, Mr. Mamo Wako, was the then chief of
Bubisa while Mr. Robert Guyo was the then Assistant Chief and Mr. Galgalo Barile
was the owner of the lorry that had blocked Father Adriano Janito’s vehicle. As
discussed above, the police were never able to interview the eye witness, Father
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Adriano Janito, because he was flown to Nairobi and thereafter repatriated to his
home country of the Philippines. Mr. Mugo also recalled that during the course
of his investigations he visited the congregation centre at Nairobi and recorded
a statement with the police and the provincial conveyor. Mr. Mugo had informed
the Provincial Conveyor that Father Adriano Janito’s testimony and presence was
very important for the investigation and any subsequent criminal trial. But he was
informed that the priest had left the country of his own free will.
747. The Commission heard that Mr. Mugo had contacted Interpol to help locate the
priest, but they were unable to do so. As of the time of the writing this report, Father
Adriano Joseph Janito had not been traced. Mr. Mugo also told the Commission
that upon the start of the criminal case he was transferred to Western province
and handed over the file to the officer who replaced him. He also recalled that
he was called to testify in the trial at one time in Marsabit Magistrate Court, but
the case never proceeded as the Magistrate was not sitting. He later informed the
Commission that he was told that the case had been withdrawn by the state under
section 87 (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 75 of the Laws of Kenya. 545
748. The case was withdrawn under section 87(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap
75 Laws of Kenya after Interpol informed the police and the investigator that it was
unable to trace the priest. The police and the investigators were of the opinion
that even though there was one eyewitness, Mr. Andrew Wako, who survived
the Bubisa massacre, his testimony would not have been adequate to warrant a
conviction since it could not be corroborated. They accordingly forwarded the file
to the Attorney General who advised the DCIO to withdraw the case under Section
87(a)546 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 75 of Laws of Kenya. While responding
to a question asked by the Commission Mr. Patrick Mugo clarified:
Leader of evidence: Thank you very much. The second clarification is that you
indicated that the case was withdrawn for one of the witness. You also indicated that
the sole survivor Andrea Wako also wrote a statement. From your position as a senior
officer, could this not stand as a direct eyewitness to hold the case?
Mr. Patrick Mugo: My Lords, Commissioners, according to me, that statement could
stand if you go by what is in Section 143 of the Evidence Act, where no particular
number of witness are supposed to prove any fact. But the rule of the court, the
previous ruling and the precedent - even the High Court may say it is unsafe to convict
on uncorroborated evidence. In my opinion, I think that was why the Provincial Criminal
Investigations Officer (PCIO), who took over from me, decided to seek the authority of
545 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.54-67
546 Section 87 of Criminal Procedure Code provides that; In a trial before a subordinate court a public prosecutor may, with the
consent of the court or on the instructions of the Attorney-General, at any time before judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the
prosecution of any person, and upon withdrawal –
(a) if it is made before the accused person is called upon to make his defence, he shall be discharged, but discharge of an accused
person shall not operate as a bar to subsequent proceedings against him on account of the same facts;
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the Attorney-General. Even if it was me, I could do the same because why should I take
a case which was not well corroborated?’547

749. Mr. Amos Cheboi confirmed the account of Mr. Patrick Mugo. He testified before
the Commission:
The two witnesses gave evidence in court, but the eye-witness, that is Father Aldrin,
after writing the statement, he went and we never knew where he was. When he was
writing his statement, he informed us he was going to Nairobi. We were in dire need of
him because he was the only witness who could give us information. In the court, we
could not proceed with the case without him. After some time, we sought advice from
the Attorney-General and he agreed that we could withdraw the case under Section
87(a) which can allow us also to re-arrest the suspects when Father Aldrin came. So, that
is how the case of Bubisa transpired’.548

750. It is therefore the Commission’s view that the Kenyan Government should have
requested the cooperation of the Philippines government in tracing Father
Adriano Joseph Janito. It appears that the case against the accused persons for
their alleged responsibility in the Bubisa massacre can still be re-opened. This is
because acquittal under section 87(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 75 Laws
of Kenya is not a bar to a subsequent trial.

The impact
751.

The Turbi and Bubisa Massacres have had very negative and severe impacts on
the communities living in Marsabit, especially the Gabbras and Boranas. It is worth
noting, however, that other than the two tragic massacres that befell Marsabit
in 2005 and which attracted great attention, killings continue at a smaller but
steady rate, and thus do not attract the same level of attention as the massacres.
The Commission’s independent research, witness testimonies, and memoranda
and statements submitted by residents, victims and survivors of the massacres,
revealed several consequences of the massacres in Marsabit. These include the loss
of human life, property and displacements of large segments of the communities.
The massacre also disrupted the socio-economic situation and increased hatred
between the two warring communities, thus leading to restriction of movement and
environmental degradation, especially around water points. According to residents
these restrictions and environmental degradation led to the loss of livestock, hence
deepening poverty. The Commission also established that the provision of food aid
among the displaced groups resulted in an unprecedented level of dependency
within the community.

547 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.60
548 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.40
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Loss of life
752. Life is sacred. Section 26(3) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides that every
person has the right to life. No innocent person shall be intentionally deprived of
their life except to the extent authorized by the Constitution or any other written
law. The right to life is one of the most basic human rights. The fundamental nature
of the right to life is also clear from the fact that it is non-derogable, meaning
that it may not be abrogated even in time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation.
753.

It is speculated estimated that when 800-1000 raiders surrounded the small village
of Turbi in Marsabit County, their aim target was to massacre the entire village. There
are contradictory reports on how many people actually died. An official government
assessment carried out by the Office of the President immediately after the massacre
concluded that 50 people were killed and 25 injured. Newspapers reported 89 people
killed and 46 injured, of which 10 of them were said to be close to death. The District
Medical Officer in Marsabit, Dr. Mukiri Mukuria, was reported to have received ten
adults and fourteen children as patients from Turbi.549 Mr. Mamo Godana, a survivor
of the massacre, testified that he had counted seventy two dead bodies on the
ground on that fateful morning of 12 July 2005.550 Mama Elizabeth Jirma Talaso told
the Commission that over eighty bodies were lying on the ground and close to 100
people were injured.551 It is therefore obvious to the Commission that the death toll in
Turbi was between fifty and 100 people, but it is difficult to give an accurate number
because some bodies were buried hurriedly in accordance with Islamic law.

754. Bubisa was different from Turbi. There is no uncertainty over the number of people
who died. All agreed that ten people were killed in Bubisa: 6 men, 2 children and
2 women.552 Mr. Andrew Abduba Wako survived with serious injuries: ‘they used
stones to try and finish us. I was hit on the head. I sustained a bit cut on the eye. My
arm was badly injured. Even my leg was broken. My waist was also badly injured.
I was not born disabled. My disability was a result of the injuries I sustained
during that incident’.
755. The Commission spoke with victims and survivors of the two massacres who
shared with the Commission fond memories of their dead relatives. Most of the
victims of the massacre were women, children and elderly men. Mr. Mamo Godana
Guyo, a resident of Turbi and who witnessed the massacre, testified:
549
550
551
552

‘Kenya’s killing fields’, Daily Nation, 14 July 2005, p. 1
TJRC/Hansards/In –Camera Hearings/Marsabit/06 May 2011/p.11
TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.7-12
TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May/2011/p.24-36
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TJRC staff visiting the mass graves at the site of the Turbi massacre in Wajir.

Then women and children ran away. There was a lot of fighting, but I had never seen men
killing women and children before. I can say they killed the kids but we knew that the next
generation, the commissioners of tomorrow, were them. For now I can say they are gone.553

756.

Mr. Mamo Godana Guyo lost his father and several relatives in the massacre. He told
the Commission that his father, a loving elderly man of 85 years old, was shot dead in
the presence of his son as he tried to run away into hiding. Mr Mamo had very fond
memories of his father. He told the Commission that the old man was their strength
and used to lead them in the right path, and he used to give them advice on all issues
of life. He affectionately referred to his father as a good father and a wise man.554

757. Elizabeth Killi Jirma Talaso, who lost her son during the massacre, recalled the
reaction of the then Provincial Commissioner (PC) who had visited Turbi after the
massacre. The PC told the residents that he had not seen such a massacre where
women and children killed. She testified about the PC’s visit:
even if there are problems in a whole society, they had not seen people who come and
kill children and women in labour pains; because children had been killed alongside
their mothers. They had not seen that kind of massacre, even though they had been
seeing wars; they were Kenyans born in Kenya but they had never seen that kind of a
massacre. I was the one who spoke to the PC and I told him since Independence, I had
lived in the country but I had not seen that kind of a problem before. I was born in Kenya
and I had not seen such kind of a problem?555

758. The Commission witnessed the sorrow and pain that the victims of the Turbi
massacre live in today because of the loss of their loved ones. During the
Commission’s public hearings, most witnesses relived the experience and could
553 TJRC/Hansards/In-Camera Hearings/Marsabit/06 May 2011/p. 12
554 TJRC/Hansards/In-Camera Hearings/Marsabit/06 May 2011/ p.10-12
555 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.9
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not help but break down during their testimony to the Commission. For instance
Commissioner Berhanu Dinka empathized with the pain and suffering of Mama
Fatuma Jaldesafor the tremendous loss in the death of her daughter and grandchild.
The Commissioner had to interrupt the session and console Mama Fatuma while
sending her for counselling by the Commission’s staff. Mamma Fatuma Jaldesa’s
daughter and her child had travelled together with Father Adrian Joseph Janito to
Marsabit when they were attacked and killed in Bubisa. Ms. Abdullahi Shongolo
sobbed while recalling the memory of her son who was a standard eight pupil at
Turbi Primary school. Her son boy was killed in the Turbi massacre at the primary
school. Ms. Abdullahi Shongolo told the Commission through tears:
My son was a very clever boy, Adano Tura, who used to help me all the time. On
weekends, he used to fetch water and firewood for me. He was 14 years old. He used to
help me in all the domestic chores and he used to do a lot of things for me.556

759.

Many children were orphaned. This has increased their susceptibility to poverty and
human rights abuses. Although the Commission received contradictory information
on the actual number of orphans in Turbi, it is estimated that there are around 80
children who were orphaned by the massacre in Turbi alone. Many of these children
have been traumatised and the government has neglected them and failed to
provide counselling. It is thus the civil society organizations at both grassroots and
national levels that have appealed to qualified counselling personnel countrywide
to volunteer their services to the affected children.557 The Commission was told by a
witness that, ‘we had a lot of problems supporting the poor people, and the orphans
we had. The children who were left behind had no caretakers as their parents were
killed’. 558

Socio-economic impact
760.

The impacts of the massacre in Marsabit on economic activities are many. They include
reduction of farming activities, concentration of livestock in small areas where there
is water and pasture, stock theft, looting and destruction of property, displacement
of people, and highway banditry. The massacres have resulted in widespread poverty
and have adversely affected human security. Hunger is often severe and can last for
many months, thus increasing dependency on relief food which they receive from
the state, civil society organizations, and other aid agencies.559

556 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearing/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p. 7
557 Mwangi (2006) ‘Kenya Conflicts in the Badlands’:The Turbi massacre in Marsabit District’, Review of African Political economy NO.
107:81-91, 83.
558 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/04 May 2011/p.20
559 Mwangi (2006) ‘Kenya Conflicts in the Badlands’:The Turbi massacre in Marsabit District’, Review of African Political economy NO.
107:81-91, 84.
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761. Many of the residents of Turbi have been left destitute since the livestock, which
are their only means of survival, were taken away during the massacre. The people
of Turbi, like other pastoralists, depend on livestock for sustenance and as their
primary source of income and wealth. Livestock allows them to acquire food and
to educate their children. In Turbi alone, almost 12, 000 animals were stolen out of
which fewer than 50% were recovered.560 In fact the then OCPD of Marsabit District,
Mr. Amos Cheboi, testified that they only recovered 25 camels out of the suspected
6,000 stolen. The high levels of poverty in Turbi are thus partly explained by the
massive livestock raids during the massacre. Mama Chakullisa Kayua, a victim of
the massacre, told the Commission; ‘Since the animals were taken away, we are so
poor and have a lot of problems. I have only that and that is what I can say’.561 Mama
Chakullisa’s opinion was verified by many other witnesses to the Commission who
identified the stock theft as the major cause of poverty in Marsabit and in particular
in Turbi.
762.

Apart from losing animals, Mr. Denge Recha, a then police constable attached at Kilifi
police station, also lost his job. Mr. Denge Recha had travelled to Turbi from Kilifi to
attend to his family upon receiving news that there was a massacre in Turbi. He lost
his livestock during the massacre. One day after the massacre he was informed by
a police reservist, a Mr Wario Raga, that there was a vehicle that was ferrying goats
which had been recovered by the police after the raid. He was informed by this
police reservist that his animals might be amongst those recovered. On receiving
this information Mr. Denge rushed to the police station where he discovered that
some of the goats bore his identification marks. As he was identifying his animals,
the OCPD for Marsabit, Mr. Amos Cheboi, approached him and he identified himself
as a police officer. A fight ensured between the OCPD and Mr Denge.

763.

The Commission was shown a video clip in which the OCPD slapped his junior
officer after Mr Denge accused his Senior of being bribed and of performing his
duties with bias. This was followed by a bitter exchange of words between the two
officers. Some officers intervened and Mr. Denge proceeded to the report office to
file an assault complaint against his senior. He was instead arrested and put in the
cell for a few hours under the instructions of Mr. Amos Cheboi until the Provincial
Investigating Officer, Mr. Patrick Mugo, intervened. Mr. Denge was freed after a
search was undertaken in his home to ensure that he did not have a fire arm as the

560 See Marsabit Conflict Assessment Report, 21st-28th July 2005, This was a report from a mission undertaken under the auspices
of the National Steering Committee on Peace and Conflict Management (Office of the President) with the support of a consortium
of NGO’s. The mission was undertaken immediately after the Turbi massacre with the aim of carrying out an independent and
objective assessment of the conflict situation in Marsabit District, p.12, also Mwangi O. (2006) ‘Kenya: Conflict in the ‘badlands’:
The Turbi Massacre in Marsabit District, Review of African Political Economy NO. 107: 81-91, 81, also Daily Nation, 19 July 2005:3.
561 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/04 May 2011/p.20
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OCPD had alleged. The OCPD went on to lodge a complaint against Mr. Denge with
the Commissioner of Police which resulted in the termination of the services of the
police officer, Mr. Denge. 562
764. The Commission is of the view that Mr. Denge Recha was not accorded fair
treatment by both the OCPD and the Commissioner of Police. He was not given
a fair hearing in accordance with the rules of justice. In fact, Mr. Amos Cheboi
was the complainant, prosecutor, and judge at the same time concerning the
misconduct alleged against Mr. Denge Recha. It is interesting to note that
according to the police standing regulations, Mr. Denge could only initiate a
complaint through the OCPD who assaulted him. The entire process was stacked
against Mr. Denge and did not accord the officer an appropriate channel to lodge
his complaint, thus violating the fundamental principles of fairness and the rules
of natural justice.
765. It appears that the Commissioner of Police acted hastily and failed to adhere
to the regulations in terminating Mr. Denge’s services. It is hard to understand
why the Commissioner of Police only issued a warning against Mr. Amos Cheboi,
whose actions are suspect, and at the same time terminated the services of Mr.
Denge who had been subjected to harassment and assault by the same Mr.
Cheboi. Mr. Denge was not even given an opportunity to appeal against the
decision of the Commissioner of Police. It is unfortunate that the complaint
which had been launched by Mr. Denge was never acted upon by any authority.
Mr. Denge told the Commission a fact that was not denied by Mr. Amos Cheboi:
So, after one and half months, I received a dismissal letter which stated that: “Your
service has been terminated because of disrespect to Mr. Amos Cheboi.” So, I wrote an
appeal and I was told that I should appeal through the office of Mr. Amos Cheboi who
was the person who insulted me. He is the person who recommended that I should be
sacked and locked me up without taking me to any court for trial. Up to now, as I am
speaking, I have never got any reply of my appeal. I was only told by other officers that
my appeal had been rejected, although I did not receive that communication. So, I felt
that I had been denied justice’.563

766. Mr Denge felt that he was mistreated and dismissed because he had implicated Mr.
Amos Cheboi in the conflicts in Marsabit. He presented to the Commission a letter
he had written to the Commissioner of Police about Mr. Amos Cheboi’s role in the
conflicts. The letter read in part;:
Sir, I being a resident of the district understand fully the likely root cause of the trouble
boiling in my own district. Indeed, the ammunitions used in attacking innocent villages
562 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/04 May 2011/p.41-47 and TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.4042 and also TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/05 May 2011/p.57-59
563 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/04 May 2011/p.44
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and resulting into havoc are being channelled and distributed into wrong hands illegally
by dishonest officers. I hereby kindly request the Police Commissioner to investigate on
the issue of supply of excess ammunition to Marsabit Police Division and eventually the
dangerous misuse by the area senior police officers; both the administration police and
Marsabit Police Division.564

767. Mr. Denge informed the Commission that no action was taken from the police
headquarters against Mr. Cheboi. The Commission gave Mr. Cheboi an opportunity
to respond to the allegations made against him. However, the Commission was
unable to establish whether or not any action was taken against Cheboi.

Fear
768.

The Commission learnt that one of the greatest impacts the massacre has had on the
people of Turbi is that they live in constant fear of additional attacks. They have lost
confidence in the government’s ability or willingness to prevent or assist in the event
of any attacks. The residents have also lost mutual trust amongst themselves as they
view each other with suspicion. Children have been traumatized and most of them
have not been able to go to school ever since the massacre. These children are in
dire need of counselling in order to be able to live their lives again normally. Mothers
have also been traumatized and most of them live in fear that they may lose their
remaining children in another attack. Mama Fatuma Ali Jaldesan testified before the
Commission that since the massacre she has had a problem with her heart, it beats
very fast and sometimes she is not herself because she thinks very much and she has
developed ulcers.

769. The Bishop of Marsabit Diocese, Ambrose Ravasi, also stated that people in Turbi
live in fear and are suspicious of each other.565 This was also confirmed by another
witness, who was testified in camera because he feared for his security. Another
witness told the Commission that because of the massacre and the sporadic
attacks against them investors have kept away from Marsabit because they fear
that they may be attacked at any time. Thus fear of future attacks has directly
effected economic development in the area.

Antecedents and factors leading to the Turbi Massacre
770. Marsabit County is populated by a diverse and dynamic group of people who
have managed their lives through difficult climatic conditions and a history
of conflicts. A recent study identified that violent conflicts in Marsabit have
been aggravated by loss of traditional authority, failure by the government
564 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/04 May 2011/p 45
565 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.30
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to understand traditional grazing boundaries, and the influx of automatic
weapons.566 In the course of public hearings and through the various statements
and memorandas, the Commission established that the Turbi massacre was
caused by boundaries demarcation (especially as it affects pasture and water
points for livestock); the competition over natural resources between the
Boranas and Gabbras; political factors, in particular misunderstanding between
political leaders of the Borana and Gabbra communities; and external forces
from neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia. The sections herein discuss
each of these causes.

Boundaries demarcation
771. One of the major causes of conflict in Marsabit, including the Turbi massacre, is
the demarcation of boundaries. The earlier district boundaries created by the
colonial government have been changed over the years without the involvement
of the local people. The concept of boundaries is alien to the people of Northern
Kenya in general; territorial boundaries can hinder the development of pastoralist
communities. In fact, many of the local languages do not have a word for boundary.
Many people have criticized the government for failing to understand the
traditional grazing practices of the pastoralists and creating boundaries
without considering the peculiar lives and circumstances of the pastoralists.567
772. During colonial times, the British carved up Northern Kenya into ethnic territories.
The main boundary was a north-south divide that separated the Somali from the
Oromo. This is the so-called ‘Somali-Galla’ line that was drawn east of Moyale and
west of Wajir and ended up near Garissa. Further divisions have occurred over
the years. These demarcations have further divided communities along ethnic
lines. The Borana for instance, were assigned the land triangulated southwards
of Isiolo. The Rendille block was right below that, and so on until the whole
of Northern Kenya was neatly fixed. These boundaries were strictly enforced.
Fines of up to ten percent per herd were imposed on people who crossed these
boundaries for grazing.568
773. At independence, Moyale was in Marsabit District but was later detached from
Marsabit and made a district on its own. This demarcation created polarities
between the Borana and Gabbra. Gabbra political leaders in North Horr insisted
566 Marsabit Conflict Assessment Report, 21st - 28th July 2005, This was a report from a mission undertaken under the auspices of
the National Steering Committee on Peace and Conflict Management (Office of the President) with the support of a consortium
of NGO’s. The mission was undertaken immediately after the Turbi massacre with the aim of carrying out an independent and
objective assessment of the conflict situation in Marsabit District, p.15.
567 NJeru M, ‘ Turbi raiders scaled down village attacks’, Daily Nation, 20 July 2005 p 11.
568 Gunther Schlee, Territorialising Ethnicity: The Political Ecology of Pastoralism in Northern Kenya. Max Planck Institute for Social
Anthropology Working Paper, 2009, p. 8.
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that Moyale ought to be in Marsabit while Borana leaders in Moyale claimed
it ought to be a district on its own. Further, both sets of politicians have used
disputes over the political administration of Forole and Turbi as a campaign
tool. For instance the politicians in North Horr insist that Turbi is in Marsabit
while their counterparts in Moyale claim it and allege that with the creation of
Moyale as a district, Forole and Turbi should have formed part of the district.
The Boranas in Moyale have alleged that powerful political leaders in Marsabit,
especially the late Hon. Bonaya Godana, influenced the decision to retain these
two towns in Marsabit District, and thus to be occupied by the Gabbras. It is
also alleged that the Boranas wanted these areas so that their community will
occupy the areas stretching from Ethiopia through Moyale and Marsabit up to
Isiolo. An independent report commissioned by the government concluded that
the attack on Turbi was intended to scare away the Gabbras so that the Boranas
could occupy the land.569
774. In addition, the Commission was informed by the Moyale/Sololo Borana
community that at independence the Borana community used to occupy Bunna
and Bute towns which were later curved out of Moyale and put into Wajir District
within the North Eastern Province. The Boranas expressed frustration with the
government for using tribal grazing boundaries to establish political boundaries.
The Borana view this as an injustice as they have been divided by the boundaries
along tribal and clan basis for political reasons. The Boranas stated to the
Commission this boundary demarcation ‘…was in favour of the then politically
favoured and connected influential individuals in the system’.570
775.

The issue of boundaries between Moyale and Marsabit, and between the Boranas
and Gabbras, have been the subject of frequent discussions between these two
communities. Nevertheless agreement has been difficult to reach. Boundaries are
thus a source of continuous conflict between them. For instance, a week before the
Turbi massacre, the Commission learnt that in a public baraza held by the Eastern
Provincial Security Committee chaired by the Provincial Commissioner (PC) at Sololo
on 16 June 2005, the issue of the boundary between Moyale and Marsabit was
mentioned. A civic leader, a Councillor from Moyale whose identity was not revealed
to the Commission, requested the provincial administration to clarify on which side
of the border Turbi was. This leader stated ‘we want you, bwana PC, to tell us whether
Turbi is in Moyale or in Marsabit’. 571

569 Marsabit Conflict Assessment Report, 21st-28th July 2005, This was a report from a mission undertaken under the auspices of
the National Steering Committee on Peace and Conflict Management (Office of the President) with the support of a consortium
of NGO’s. The mission was undertaken immediately after the Turbi massacre with the aim of carrying out an independent and
objective assessment of the conflict situation in Marsabit District, p.15.
570 See the memorandum submitted to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission by the Moyale/Sololo Districts Borana
Community ‘historical injustices experienced between 1963-2008 in Moyale/Sololo’ dated 29.04.2011 p 1.
571 Njeru M. (2005) ‘Turbi raiders scaled down village attacks’ Daily Nation, 20 July 11.
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776. The Commission therefore is of the view that the demarcation of parliamentary
constituencies as well as administrative boundaries is a source of tension between
these two communities. This tension erupts from time to time into violence. The
main issue causing the conflict in Marsabit is the demarcation of boundaries
that ignore the intricate relations of the Borana and Gabbra communities in this
area. These communities perceive malice and bad faith in the demarcation of
boundaries causing them to mistrust each other further, sometimes erupting
into violence in which innocent members of both communities are killed.

Politics
777. From the various witness statements and memoranda collected by the Commission,
it is clear that Marsabit County politics influences the latest conflicts between the
Gabbra and the Borana communities, and particularly the massacres at Turbi
and Bubisa. The competitive nature of politics has created the need to secure
predictable voting blocs. In the search for secure voting blocs, politicians have
succumbed to the destructive notion of equating ethnicity with political support.
Politicians have thus resisted efforts to relocate to their districts ethnic groups
who they perceive will not favour them in an election.572 Some in Marsabit indeed
believe that political incitement is the leading cause of conflicts in Marsabit and
that politicians have played a key role in disrupting peace and harmony by pitting
the Borana and Gabbra against each other.
778.

The government has recognised the role that political ethnocentrism played in the
massacres. Long before the massacres, the government held a series of meetings
with local leaders and their communities aimed at easing ethnic tensions in the
area. The then Assistant Minister for Internal Security, the late Hon. Mirugi Kariuki,
revealed that a series of meetings were held starting in January 2005 to defuse
tensions among the clans in the region. The government urged the participants to
stop engaging in violence and instead to assist the state in restoring order in the
region. Following the massacres, the government acknowledged that it was aware
of the hostility among the communities, particularly among the politicians, and
emphasised that the conflicts were fuelled by political leaders in the area. The late
Hon. Mirugi Kariuki noted, ‘ we had done our part to bring them together but it does
not appear to help’.

779. In a ministerial statement on the Turbi and Bubisa Massacres to Parliament, the
then Minister for Internal Security, the late John Michuki, pointed out that the
atrocious acts were a culmination of ethnic and political hostilities and tensions
that had been building up in the district in the previous months. He expressed
572 Baseline Study of the Conflict in 7 Districts of North Eastern and Eastern Provinces of Kenya. Northern Aid, Camel Bell Limited,
(2004) p. 14.
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concern that some leaders had been making irresponsible statements bordering
on incitement to violence. The irresponsible statements, he said, had served to
heighten tensions in Marsabit. As a result, the state appealed to the members
of Parliament and other political leaders to desist from making inflammatory,
reckless and divisive statements. The Minister further warned the politicians
that the government would take action against politicians found to have incited
violence even if they were Members of Parliament.573
780.

After the two massacres, members of Parliament for the region traded accusations
over the perennial violence between the Borana and Gabbra communities, claiming
that the killings were political. The Member of Parliament for the Gabbra, the late
Hon. Bonaya Godana, was accused by his counterparts for failing to condemn
previous attacks by his Gabbra people against the Boranas. Whilst responding to the
accusations, the late Hon. Godana blamed his fellow members of Parliament, claiming
that they were actively involved in the violent conflicts. He further said that it was
important for the politicians to be investigated in order for the truth to be established.
His sentiments were later echoed by the Parliamentary Committee on Security, which
also acknowledged the existence of hostile political differences among the area
members of parliament when it held meetings with the Marsabit District Security
Committees and the area members of parliament prior to the attack. 574

781. The Turbi and Bubisa massacres demonstrate clearly how politics has been
used to cause conflict in this area. Prior to the massacre, politicians incited
the people in public meetings. The Rendille and Borana communities allied
against the Gabbras and the two sides started stealing livestock from each
other, leading ultimately to the massacre a few weeks later. This was confirmed
to the Commission by top security officials. Former Deputy Provincial Criminal
Investigating Officer, Patrick Mugo and one time Marsabit Officer Commanding
Provincial Division Amos Cheboi told the Commission that local leaders were the
primary cause of the Turbi and Bubisa massacres. The two testified before the
Commission that different ethnic groups living in Marsabit County were hostile
to each other and politicians exploited this by inciting their respective clans.575

Resource use
782. The pastoralist communities traditionally managed and used communally
resources such as land, pasture, watering points and hunting grounds. The Boranas
and Gabbras are traditional allies who speak the same language and share the
same culture. The Gabbras are camel people while the Boranas raise cattle but
573 Daily Nation newspaper, 14 July 2005, p.5.
574 Mwangi O, ‘Kenya: Conflict in the ‘Badlands’: The Turbi Massacre in Marsabit District’ (2006) Review of African Political Economy,
No. 107:81-91, p. 87.
575 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/.p.37-54 and also TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/05 May 2011/p .54-73
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over the years have maintained a long-standing symbiotic relationship [with the
Gabbra?] that includes mutual assistance during times of environmental stress. For
example, during the long drought of 1999-2001, many Gabbra people migrated
across the border and the two communities lived peacefully on the Borana
plateau.576 However, over the years alternative resource management methods
have been introduced that conflict with these more traditional approaches. Such
practices includes the review of boundaries, establishment of settlement schemes,
and gazettement of forests and national parks which led to scarcity of pasture,
watering points, and hunting grounds, thus heightening the competition over
resources between the two communities.
783.

There has also been a struggle over access to resources that are diminishing at a
high rate because of climate change and the encroachment on pastoral lands by
agriculturalists. Local communities thus often find themselves on a collision course
as they negotiate for access to pasture and water. Increased population also puts
more pressure on the dwindling resources, thus heightening conflicts, especially
over water and pasture. Conflict increases during the dry spell when livestock tend
to concentrate in the diminishing areas with water and pasture.

784.

The question of boundaries is intricately intertwined with that of competition for
scarce resources, particularly pasture and water. For example, a Councillor, whose
name was not given to the Commission, claimed that his constituents developed
the water point at Turbi, the primary school and other social amenities. These social
amenities were later pushed out of his constituency by the previous Kenya African
National Union (KANU) government through the influence of a local politician from
a neighbouring community. The Councillor had stated; ‘We are still bitter for having
been thrown out of our area. It is common knowledge that it is us who developed
the area and drilled the water hole.’577

785.

Accordingly, the Boranas and Gabbras have been in conflict over access to the areas
around Turbi and Maikona because they have ideal livestock pasture and several
water holes. There has been a spate of resource based clashes in Marsabit since
2002. It was during this period that the District Commissioner (DC), Mr. Ali
Mbwarali held a public baraza in an effort to restore peace. The DC is on record
for having stated that: ‘Your cattle, camels and goats mingle and graze together
peacefully. Why can’t you people do the same?’578 After this public baraza the
conflict and violence decreased and did not resume until early 2004 and 2005.
These sentiments about ethnic conflicts and resources were also shared with the

576 Goldsmith P (2005) ‘ Kenya paying a high price for neglect’ Daily Nation, 15 July 19.
577 Mwangi O. (2006) ‘Kenya: Conflict in the ‘badlands’: The Turbi Massacre in Marsabit District, Review of African Political Economy
NO. 107: 81-91, 89.
578 Goldsmith p (2005) Daily Nation 15 July, 9.
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Commission during its public hearings by Elizabeth Killi Jirma Talaso, a resident of
Turbi and a victim of Turbi massacre, in her oral submission before the Commmission.
Mama Elizabeth Talaso said:
‘I can remember that the PC from Embu came with our MP, Dr. Bonaya Godana, and they
sought to know our problems and why this had actually happened. They asked that
question and we told them we did not know what caused the problem as these people
were neighbours, and we used water resources together. We had been grazing animals
together and their children and ours went to the same schools. We asked our PC to dig
into the root cause of this problem, look for the animals which had been taken away and
see how they could compensate us for the lost lives. The PC stood up and told us there
was a problem in every place but they would look into the root cause of the problem’.579

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
786. Kenya has, for several years, been exposed to external forces that have ignored
Kenyan sovereignty and have contributed to conflicts in Northern Kenya. One such
external force is the Oromo Liberation Force (OLF) of Ethiopia. The OLF started
in 1973 with the objective of achieving autonomy or secession from the rest of
Ethiopia. The OLF lays claim to about half the state of Ethiopia and parts of Kenya
as the traditional homeland of the Oromo.
787. Research shows that the OLF remains an important influence in the communal
conflicts in Northern Kenya. The Borana and Gabbra who inhabit part of Northern
Kenya share an identity with their Oromo relatives in Ethiopia, and members
of both communities have supported the OLF, though the Gabbra do so only
marginally, and even then quite reluctantly. The Kenyan Boranas have closer links
with the OLF and host them from time to time. In turn, the OLF has been used
by the Borana against the Gabbra. The OLF itself has denied any role in the Turbi
and Bubisa massacres. The OLF asserts that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) exacerbated the ethnic conflict between the Borana and
Gabbra communities of Oromo living on both sides of the Kenya-Ethiopia border
to discredit OLF. The OLF has stressed that it has neither strategic nor temporary
interest in provoking Kenyans and their government, nor any motive to commit
atrocities against relatives across the border even though some news media in
Kenya have, allegedly, reported that it massacred innocent Kenyans in Turbi.580
788. Nonetheless, witnesses testified before the Commission that the OLF had a
permanent base in the hills of Marsabit, and that they harass people at will and
extort resources from them by force. These infractions have been tolerated by the
population who otherwise feel impotent to do anything to stop it. The Commission
579 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.9
580 Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (2005), ‘ Liberating the Oromo People for Stability and Development in the Horn of Africa.’ Available at
http:/www.oromoliberationfront.org/liberating%20the%20oromo%20people-DDA.htm (accessed on 28 February 2012).
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is of the view that the OLF was a factor in the conflicts experienced in Marsabit, and
Moyale.
789.

The Turbi massacre illustrates the role of the OLF in the conflict between the
Borana and Gabbra. Various witness from Turbi testified before the Commission on
how the raiders from the neighbouring Moyale District, and also those suspected
to be members of the OLF who were dressed in uniforms, attacked them on the
morning of 12 July 2005. A survivor of the Turbi massacre told the Commission that
the attackers were members of the OLF and were all Boranas. Ms Elizabeth Talaso,
a resident of Turbi and survivor of the massacre, testified that the raiders were
speaking in Borana.581 This account was confirmed by another witness, Mama Hawa
Tura, a resident of Marsabit who lost her son during the massacre. Mama Hawa Tura
told the Commission that the raiders were from the Borana community and came
from the Ethiopian side. The account of these witnesses was also confirmed by the
then OCPD of Marsabit, Mr. Amos Cheboi who told the Commission that,
‘We were then informed that they would communicate to us. We believed that the
people who had attacked the people of Turbi had come from Ethiopia. However, we
came to learn later that the attack was mounted by the group known as “OLF”. That was
what we communicated to the Government of Ethiopia, which assisted us very much. I
remember that on that same day, they returned 30 camels immediately we left Moyale.’

790. The Commission also heard that a local Member of Parliament from Marsabit had
received information about an imminent attack on the Gabbras by the Boranas,
and had held a press conference on 22 June 2005 at which he had accused some
Marsabit politicians of using the OLF to kill people and destroy private property. He
therefore pleaded with the Local Security Committee to send in the para-military
General Service Unit to deal with the OLF issue. 582

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons
791. Marsabit County shares an expansive porous international border with Ethiopia.
The government of Kenya has been involved in three major interrelated armed
conflicts in the Horn of Africa: the between Kenya and Somalia; between Ethiopia
and Somalia; and the current civil war within Somalia. These armed conflicts
have had a great impact on northern Kenya, resulting in the free movement of
firearms and ammunition within the region and the conscription of young men to
fight against an adversary. The proliferation and easy availability of firearms and
ammunition in northern Kenya, including Marsabit, as a part of these wars is a
factor fuelling conflicts as well as cattle raids, murder and banditry.583
581 TJRC/Hansards/Public Hearings/Marsabit/05 May 2011/p.8 and also Njeru M. (2005) ‘Survivor tell their battle with the raiders and
how they cheated death’ Daily Nation 14 July.
582 Njeru M. (2005) ‘Survivor tell their battle with the raiders and how they cheated death’ Daily Nation 14 July and also TJRC/
Hansards/In-Camera Hearings/06 May 2011/p.11
583 Report of the Intergrated Agriculture Development Consult (IADC) ‘Assessment and consolidation Report on: Existing Approaches
and Best Practices in Cross Border Peace Building and Conflict Mitigation and Strengthened CSOs Across the Ethio-Kenya
Border’, December 2009 p 17.
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Conclusion
792. The Commission concluded from its investigations and research that the Turbi and
Bubisa massacres could have been minimized or even prevented if early actions
had been taken by relevant authorities. Although it is difficult to place entire blame
on any specific authority, institution or individual, it is clear that politicians and
politics played a major role in fuelling the animosity between the two communities
involved in the massacre. The nature of the Turbi massacre, in which more women
and children were killed, indicates that the killings were both ethnic-based and
political . The attackers came from specific ethnic groups which were identified by
witnesses as the Borana in the case of Turbi and the Gabbra in the case of Bubisa.
The attackers also included members of OLF who were working with the Boranas
in Kenya, and in particular at Marsabit, to exact revenge against the Gabbras of
Marsabit for aiding and abetting the Ethiopian government.
793.

However, it was clear to the Commission that the Turbi massacre was also a result
of the state’s failure to fulfil its basic functions and responsibilities in Marsabit. The
Commission established that the State did not provide meaningful security and
development in the region. While there were early warnings of looming violence in
Marsabit, the government machinery including the security forces failed to respond
in good time. In fact it was plain to the Commission that the security forces are thinly
spread and ill-equipped in Marsabit, and thus even if the advance warnings had been
heeded it is not clear how well they could have defended against the attacks. The
government must therefore take full responsibility for its failure to protect lives and
property in Turbi and Bubisa and for failing to create and enhance social cohesion
between the Boranas and Gabbras of Marsabit both before and after the tragedy.

Massacres in the North Rift
Background
794. Since time immemorial the Marakwet, Pokot and the Turkana have regarded each
other as sworn enemies. Various factors have contributed to the tension and
conflict between then which, factors have been said to include:
intensified cattle rustling, proliferation of illicit arms, inadequate policing and state security
arrangements, diminishing role of traditional governance systems, competition over
control and access to natural resources such as pasture and water, land issues, political
incitements, ethnocentrism, increasing levels of poverty and idleness amongst the youth.584
584 Ruto Pkalya, Mohamud Adan and Isabella Masinde, ‘Conflict in Northern Kenya: A focus on Internally Displaced Conflict Victims
in Northern Kenya’, Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) (2003) pg 10.
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It is worth noting that cattle rustling is the greatest cause of fatalities between these
communities. Historically, these communities raided one another but the raids were
controlled by the elders to ensure another’s communities stock was not depleted
and that such raids did not result in fatalities. During that time, raids were meant
to replenish a community’s stock especially after their herds had been wipes out
by a drought. There were very few casualties as the weapons used then were the
traditional ones (spears, knives and clubs) and that killing during raids was in itself a
taboo.

796.

Over the years, cattle rustling have been commercialized with raiders stealing
livestock with the intention of reselling them to the various slaughterhouses in
various parts of the country. The increase in population and the high demand of beef
has meant that raids have been frequent and larger sections of communities have
been targeted for raids to meet such demands. The porous borders have facilitated
trade in illegal arms which have been used in raid. The inability of the government
to provide security in the pastoralist areas have forced the communities to arm them
in a bid to protect their livestock; their only source of livelihood. Similarly, the raiders
have been able to acquire sophisticated weapons to facilitate the raids. The results
have been that raids and counter-attack by communities have become bloody and
has resulted in massacres as well as the loss and destruction of property.

Chapter FOUR

797. The response of the government in the form of disarmament and security operations
to weed out the criminal elements from these communities, had lead to more
deaths. The government has over the years been accused of the use of excessive
force which has also led to deaths. The Commission learnt that it is against such
backgrounds that the Murkutwa massacre in Elgeyo Marakwet County and Lotiriri
Massacre in Pokot County, as will be discussed, took place.

Murkutwa Massacre, Marakwet
It is a massacre; it is a national disaster. Where will my people go? What will
they eat? Their houses have been burned down. This rustling will not end until
an electric fence is built between the Pokot and the Marakwet.585

Background to the Murkutwa massacre
798.

The Murkutwa massacre took place on the morning of 12 March 2001 when heavily
armed Pokot raiders attacked the resident of Murkutwa location in Marakwet District.
According to the information received by the Commission, this was not the first time

585 John Marrimoi, former Marakwet East Member of Parliament.
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the Pokot raiders were attacking the Marakwet. Witnesses informed the Commission
that since 1992, there have been many incidences of cattle rustling. They listed about
5 of the many incidences of cattle rustling. According to the information, Pokot
raiders are said to have struck Liter and Tot areas on the dawn of 6 April 1992 and
killed three people before leaving with unknown number of livestock. The following
day, 7 April 1992, the same raiders are said to have raided from Tot to Chesongoch
killing 9 people and fleeing with unknown number of livestock. On 13 May 1997,
Pokot raiders attacked Murkutwa village killing 8 people who included teachers
and pupils. Like in the previous raids, they fled with unknown number of livestock.
The raiders again struck on 25 December 1997, at Chechan Primary school killing 2
people and stealing unknown number of livestock. According to other reports, over
40 people had been killed, over 10,000 families displaced and over 5000 livestock
stolen, between April and May 1997. 586 Further, 11 people who included women and
children attending a polio vaccinations exercises were killed by Pokot raiders on 24
October 1999.587 A witness informed the Commission that the raiders also attacked
children on their way to school. He narrated how, in 1999, his daughter was shot
dead while in school.
The attack took place in 1999 at the Toroko primary school. The children had come to
school and around 10 am, the Pokot raiders started shooting and chasing children out
of the school. My daughter ran to a nearby bush. She was seen by the perpetrators then
shot in the head by a bullet and an arrow on her arm.588

799. According to Mr. Felix, 1999 saw many attacks by the Pokot on the Marakwet. He
listed the attacks that took place in that year as follows:
In 1999, our neighbours; the Pokot, invaded us and took away 5,000 herd of cattle; 1,021
goats and injured three people. After three months, we were invaded again and they took
away 509 herds of cattle, 600 sheep and goats and two people were injured. The names of
those injured were Messrs Michael Ndoluna and Limangel. When they went to recover the
livestock, two people; Messrs Paul and Lechal, were killed. In October the same year, they
again took property of the Endo Location, injured two and three killed people.589

800.

586
587
588
589

412

According to the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), there were a series of
raids between the two communities that triggered the Massacre. First, on 9 February
2001, the Pokot raiders shot dead a Marakwet administration police officer, Mr.
Joseph Beliangut, at Kapkobil as he rode on his bicycle. It is said that this was meant
to intimidate and scare the Marakwet people into leaving the green pastureland
near the Kerio River for Pokot herdsmen to graze their animals. This triggered a cycle

Kenya Human Rights Commission, (1998) Killing the vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya, p.39.
TJRC/Memo/M0087/p. 2.
TJRC/Statement/05514.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Eldoret/3 October 2011/p. 41.
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of raids. On 10 February 2001, the Marakwet youth staged a revenge attack in which
they killed two children and injured several others in Cheptulei village of Chesogon
Division in West Pokot. The next day, the Pokot attacked the Marakwet area of Liter,
killed a nine year old boy, Sammy Kiplagat and took off with the 12 goats he was
herding. Few days later, on 12 February, the Pokot struck again and this time killed
two boys Kilimo Tomoluk (10 years) and Kipkemboi Limaruk (15 years) who were
on their way to school. A day later, on 13 February, the Pokot struck the Marakwet’s
Kaben village and killed two pupils.590
801. The series of these ethnic attacks turned bloody when the Marakwet staged a
revenge attack, on 14 February 2001, that left four Pokot and two Marakwet dead.
They also stole between 300-500 cattle during that attack. The Marakwet youth
are also said to have attacked a Pokot herdsman and injured him with poisoned
arrow as a way of deterring the other Pokot herdsmen from grazing ‘their’ animals
on the Marakwet territory along the Kerio Valley. Unlike the previous years where
Pokot elders would request the Marakwet for grazing land, the Pokot are said to
have forced their way into the Marakwet’s grazing land. Apparently, the Pokot
were grazing, on the Marakwet side, the cattle they had previously stolen from the
Marakwet, a fact that is said to have greatly angered the Marakwet youth. They also
accused the Pokot of spying on them as they grazed only for them to later raid their
animals.591
802. The Marakwet raid on the Pokot, on 14 February 2001, is said to have been the
trigger of the Murkutwa massacre. Following the attack, the Pokot are said to
have constantly demanded from the Marakwet, the return of the stolen cattle,
threatening that in the event that the cattle were not returned, the Pokot would
attack and kill Marakwet women and children. Unfortunately, the Marakwet did
not hid the demands and the Pokot made good their threats, hence the massacre.

Guns at dawn: 12 March 2001
803.

On March 12, 2001, a large contingent of Pokot raiders, estimated to be about 3000
people, armed with sophisticated weapons, invaded Marakwet villages (Kasang,
Kacherturgut, Kirawi, Katemuge, Kakisegei, Kwenoi, Kaptul and Kakimoi) in Murkutwa
Location. According to various witnesses, the raid was well planned as demonstrated
by the way the raiders carried out the attack. They were organized as follows:
i)

There were those who moved with arrows and sticks driving animals whenever
they were or saw. These were escorted by armed raiders with guns.

590 Raiding Democracy: The slaughter of the Marakwet in Kerio Valley, (2001) KENYA Human Rights Commission p.14.
591 Raiding Democracy: The slaughter of the Marakwet in Kerio Valley, (2001) KENYA Human Rights Commission p.15.
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ii)

There were those who burnt houses mainly and were armed with arrows,
pangas and match boxes for torching. These were also escorted by gun
shooting raiders.

iii)

The third group consisted of looters. This group never spared anything they
considered precious ranging from sufurias, utensils, clothing, radios, chairs,
stools and water gathering gallons and containers.

iv)

The fourth group consisted of those who were stationed at strategic positions.
All of them had powerful weapons and could see all the hideouts and identify
caves and bushes were people had escaped to hide. This group is responsible for
the death of young children, old men and women who were killed in caves and
bushes while hiding. This group also made sure that the raiders who had gone
raiding in various directions had returned. They remained in their places till all
groups had returned and made sure that those were driving animals had gone
for more than 2 kilometres from the scene of raids. They had whistles that they
used to call back or direct raids as they deemed necessary. It is like the group
was the commanding one. They made sure that every raider had gone before
disembarking from their positions and hence were the last to move or leave.592

804. The locals were woken up by sounds of gunshots and the light and smoke from
burning houses.593 Those who never heard the commotion and were still sleeping
were burnt in their houses.594 Witnesses shared with the Commission the confusion
that ensured and how many were killed as they tried to hide. A witness stated:
It was around 5.00 pm, my father was at his home. All over sudden he heard gunshots
and saw houses burning. Then he ran away. The Pokot raiders followed him to where he
hid himself in the cave and shot him five times in his stomach.595

805. Another witness shared that her husband ‘ was sleeping in his house when he
heard gun shots. He came out [of the house] and then he was shot in the chest and
died on the spot.’596
806. Some of the residents tried to ran away but in the confusion, some ended up
running in the direction of the raiders and therefore met their death.597 As indicated
above, the raiders were stationed at strategic places and were able to see the
villagers as they fled and as such there seemed to have been nowhere to hide as
many villagers were shot at as they fled or at their hiding places. Witness shared:
592
593
594
595
596
597
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TJRC/Memo/M0087; TJRC/Hansard/ Public Hearing/ Eldoret/ 5 October 2011/p.44.
TJRC/Hansard/ Public Hearing/ Eldoret/ 5 October 2011/p.44.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Eldoret/ 5 October 2011/p. 44; TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Eldoret/ 3 October 2011/p. 41;
TJRC/Statement/05530.
TJRC/Statement/05534.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Eldoret/ 5 October 2011/p. 44.
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It was around 11 am when gun shots were heard. Then the old man [the witness’s
father] was at his boma [home]. He took cover at a nearby bush. When the raiders were
running up and down looking for animals, they saw the old man and shot him in the
stomach and he died instantly....the raiders were shooting at whoever they saw and
took animals...598

807. Mr. John Kipkore, who testified at a public hearing, stated as follows:
Most of us were picked from the bush and brutally murdered. These included old men
and women of up to 85 years old and also children of even two months old. So, those
who did these acts were those warriors who had organized and positioned themselves
strategically. They were shooting almost everywhere to scare people.599

808. The attack took about seven hours. When the guns went silent, the villagers, who
had survived by sheer luck, left their hiding places and started counting their
losses. The witnesses informed the Commission that many houses had been razed
to the ground, unknown number of livestock. Corpses were strewn all over. Many
of the bodies were had bullet wounds,, others had deep cuts while others were
recovered in burnt houses burnt beyond recognition. The witnesses confirmed
having counted 43 bodies which included old men and women of up to 85 years
old and also children of even two months old.’600 The witnesses indicated that the
most disturbing scene was the discovery of the body of female primary school
teacher in a cave together with those of her 3 children. Their bodies, which were
riddled with bullets, were discovered nine days after in a cave where they had tried
to hide from the raiders.601 The discovery was made after the villagers noticed birds
circling the cave and going closer to the cave, they discovered a foul smell coming
from the cave. 602

Assistance and response to the massacre
809.

Witnesses informed the Commission that for the entire period of attack, the residents
of Murukutwa location did not get any assistance. They explained as follows:
The Anti-Stock Theft Unit camp at Chesongoch, within the location, was surrounded
by the raiders. So, they could not offer any assistance. They were locked in for about
seven hours. The raiders also made sure that all routes leading into and out of Murkutwa
Location to the neighbouring locations were guarded. So, we were not assisted.603

598
599
600
601
602
603

TJRC/Statement/05509.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Eldoret/ 5 October 2011/p. 44.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Eldoret/ 5 October 2011/p. 44.
TJRC/Exhibit/Eld/007.
TJRC/Memo/M0087/ p.3.
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810. The first people to arrive at the scenes of the massacre were the survivors of the
attack. Soon thereafter, villagers from the neighbouring villages started streaming
in. It is this latter group that assisted the survivors in retrieving bodies from the
bushes and caves, where victims had been killed as they tried to seek refuge. They
also assisted in taking the injured to the nearest hospitals.
811. The government’s actions before, during and after the massacre was heartbreaking.
Witnesses informed the Commission that prior to the massacre, they had informed
the security agents in the area of ongoing attacks by the Pokot as well as about the
threat of an impending major attack. Unfortunately, no action was taken. In fact,
3 days before the massacre, on 8 March 2011, the administration police officers
stationed in the area, were recalled back to the Kapsowar District Headquarters.
The government neither provided an explanation for the withdrawal of security in
the location nor replaced the recalled officers. It was also curious that the officers
were moved at a time when there was an impending attack. One would have
expected the government to beef up security in the areas after receiving such
information.
812. A report by the Kenya Human Right Commission on the Massacre also indicated
that the police had been informed about the impending attack on the Marakwet
by the Pokot but ignored the information.604 Further, days before the massacre,
the field monitors of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) in the
region are said to have written a letter to the Police Commissioner alerting him
that an attack was eminent because the Pokot leaders had been making inciting
remarks. That notwithstanding, the security forces had been alerted by the Chief
of Murkutwa Location chief about the planned raid and even confined barazas to
alert the villagers about the impending attacks.605
813. The government is also accused of having trivialised the killings arguing that they
were just the product of ethnic violence or tribal feud. Some of the state officers
denied that the Pokot were responsible for the massacre. A cabinet Minister,
Christopher Lomada is on record for implying that the real origin of the aggressors
ought to be established because the ‘Pokot had no quarrel with the Marakwet’.
Other state officers were quick to pass judgment on the Marakwet people for
what they called provoking the Pokot people by stealing and refusing to return
their animals. The government’s motive in denying these atrocities committed
against the Marakwet people have been heavily criticized. The critics viewed
604 Raiding Democracy: The slaughter of the Marakwet in Kerio Valley, (2001) Kenya Human Rights Commission p.18.
605 Raiding Democracy: The slaughter of the Marakwet in Kerio Valley, (2001) Kenya Human Rights Commission p.18.
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the government approach of denying the Murkutwa massacre as a strategy to
humiliate the rebel Marakwet community thus forcing it to rejoin Kenya African
National Union (KANU) party hence uniting with the Pokot community in the run
up to the 2002 elections. 606
814. In fact, some witnesses felt that the government had a hand in the attack. In a
memorandum submitted to the Commission, the witnesses stated as follows:
While searching for the bodies, the villagers and neighbours found empty cans of food
stuff, army biscuit boxes which the raiders were using. Boiled yellow maize parked in
small tins was also recovered. There were also spent bullet cartridges in the places were
the commanders were stationed and at the scenes of dead bodies. Some of the spent
bullet cartridges were labelled G.K.607

815. Even after the raiders left, the government did not send security officers to follow
the raiders. The former President Moi expressed the same sentiments one month
after this massacre. While addressing a public rally in the turbulent North Rift,
President Moi had acted shocked that the police officers and the entire provincial
administration were relaxed and careless in their work. The President had asked,
“how come, animals could be stolen…and taken all the way to East Baringo
without being noticed by Chiefs and their Assistants? Are the livestock airlifted?”608
816. Witnesses further stated that it was only after one week that government
officers arrived at the scene led by the then Minister for Internal Security,
Masden Madoka who is said to have brought some iron sheets and foodstuff. The
witnesses indicated that substantial assistance to the survivors came from nongovernmental organizations including the ‘National Council of the Churches of
Kenya, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Red Cross Kenya, World Vision
and many others.’609
817.

606
607
608
609

The Commission was told that the government presence was seen in the location
one week after the massacre. The Government sent some officers to the ground
including the then Minister for Internal Security, Marsden Madoka with condolences
to the victims. The Minister had disclosed that names of the bandits who had carried
out the, massacre had been handed over to the government and he had promised
to charge them in court of law for the crimes they committed. However, to the time
of writing this report, no raider had been arrested.

Raiding Democracy: The slaughter of the Marakwet in Kerio Valley, (2001) Kenya Human Rights Commission p.16.
TJRC/Memo/M0087.
Raiding Democracy: The slaughter of the Marakwet in Kerio Valley, (2001) Kenya Human Rights Commission p.18.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Eldoret /5 October 2011/p.44.
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Effect of the massacre
818.

Buildings in Murkutwa still have bullet holes, a constant reminder of the attack
that saw 44 people of all ages massacred, 4 people injured, 316 houses burnt,
many properties looted and destroyed, and over 5000 animals, the main source of
the residents’ livelihood, stolen.610 Witnesses shared with the Commission how, in
addition losing family members and many being injured in the process, the massacre
affected the community members who survived the attack, especially women and
children. They also stated the impact the massacre had on the economic activities in
the region.

819. With regard to how women were affected by the massacre, witnesses, through a
memorandum submitted to the Commission stated as follows:
Many were widowed; many were left to support their children alone; some remarried
and the children were left to support themselves. There was a break in child bearing;
women who remarried separated from their children; many were left homeless; many
were deprived off their livelihood; and some were traumatized.611

820. With regard to the effect the massacre had on the children, witnesses stated that
many of the children were orphaned while were injured during the attack. There
are also many cases of child labour as children seek to fend for themselves. Many
of the children dropped out of school with some of them entering into early
marriages as others resorted to prostitution.
821. Witnesses also informed the Commission that economic activities in the location
were affected. Many if the survivors are said to have fled to safer areas including
‘Kapsowar, Eldoret and ADC farms in Milimani’.612 As a result, businesses in
Murkutwa were left unattended or closed down altogether. Homes and farms were
left unattended while livestock, the main source of the community’s livelihood,
were left to wander on their own. Poverty levels increased as income decreased.613
Majority of the destroyed houses and businesses are yet to be rebuilt.614
822. Investigations into the massacre are yet to be carried and the perpetrators brought
to book. The Witnesses however stated that the construction of the Queen of Peace
Secondary School at Chesongoch by the Catholic Church serves as a memory of
those who perished during the massacre. The institution has also been used to
foster peace between the Pokot and Marakwet as students from both communities
are accommodated there.615
610
611
612
613
614
615
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List of people Killed during the Murkutwa massacre
A Men
NO

NAME

SEX

AGE

VILLAGE

1

Kibor Kimwole

M

70

Kakisegei

2

Kihara Itok

M

72

Kakisegei

3

Chebelieny Kimore

M

70

Kakisegei

4

Mzee Kipchebelei

M

80

Kakisegei

5

Kabarer Kiptunyony

M

65

Kakisegei

6

Chewerui Kibor

M

65

Kakisegei

7

Nyengwesi Kipcheres

M

70

Kakisegei

8

Mathew Kirop

M

40

Katemuge

9

Samuel Kimatiya

M

25

Katemuge

10

Vincent Rono Bowen

M

23

Katemuge

11

Kemero Lokorpang

M

85

Kirawi

12

Amri Chemur

M

80

Kirawi

13

Chabasa Rotich

M

73

Kacheturgut

14

Jackson Chepkilis

M

50

Kacheturgut

15

Arap Tuga

M

50

Kacheturgut

16

Morshombu Yano

M

70

Kasang

17

Kipkanadogo Lotuman

M

65

Katieny

SEX

AGE

VILLAGE

B. Women
NO

NAME

1

Kobilo Chelimo

F

83

Kakisegei

2

Kobilo Mutyo

F

65

Kakisegei

3

Ko Chepchumba Alumo

F

70

Kakisegei

4

Talaa Muget

F

65

Kakisegei

5

Tula Chelanga

F

72

Katemuge

6

Sally Bowen

F

18

Katemuge

7

Tula Cherop

F

65

Katemuge

8

Gladys Kipchemeri

F

30

Kirawi

9

Nelly Kisang

F

27

Kirawi

10

Hellen Lochaa

F

38

Kirawi

11

Talaa Chebow

F

68

Kirawi

12

Kokimuitai Chebesa

F

70

Kacheturgut

13

Monica Siran

F

20

Kasang

14

Elizabeth Suter

F

25

Kasang

15

Leah Marko

F

32

Kakimoi

16

Talaa Chelanga

F

72

Katemuge
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C. Children
NO

NAME

SEX

AGE

1

Kibet Chesum

M

10

VILLAGE
Katemuge

2

Elseba Bowen

F

16

Katemuge

3

Kipchumba Kipchemeri

M

6

Kirawi

4

Jemutai Kipchemeri

F

3

Kirawi

5

Kiprotich Kisang

M

3 months

Kirawi

6

Kimutai Kisang

M

3

Kirawi

7

Jepchumba Kibusa

F

7

Kirawi

8

Kipkosgei Karungu

M

13

Kacheturgut

9

Rutto Dominic

M

16

Kacheturgut

10

Kiplagat Komen

M

2

Kakimoi

11

Kimutai Marko

M

2

Kakimoi

12

Kiprotich Marko

M

3 months

Kakimoi

Lotirir Massacre
823.

The Pokot border the Turkana to the North, Karamojong and Sebei of Uganda to the
west and South West respectively, Trans-Nzoia district to the South, Marakwet to the
South-East and Baringo to the East. All those areas are home to pastoralists who, like
the Pokot, are known to engage in cattle raids. Accordingly, the Pokot have over the
time been both attackers as well as victims of cattle raids. Most of the time, such raids
have lead to massacre of individuals as the raiders make away with the livestock. In
other cases, it is the security officer that have been deployed to restore order after an
attack, who have ended up killing civilians.

824. According to a memorandum submitted to the Commission, Joseph Thompson,
a Scottish geologist and missionary, who is said to have been among the first
European to meet the Pokot (then known as the Suk), is quoted as having
described the Pokot, in his memoir, as ‘strongly boned, ugly fellows...very warlike
and generally a match for the Maasai.’616 According to a memorandum submitted
to the Commission by Pokot women, such description and stereotyping informed
how the colonial administration as well as the post independent government
viewed and has continued to relate with the Pokot.617 They also blamed such
stereotyping to the injustices that have been meted out to the community
including economic marginalisation, forceful acquisition of their land, insecurity
616 TJRC/Memo/M01206.
617 TJRC/Memo/M01161.
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as well as constant harassment by the government in terms of numerous security
operations that have seen the community members killed, injured and most of
the time impoverished.618
825. The Pokot elders, in their testimony before the Commission, lamented that the
government has failed in the provision of security to the Pokot exposing them to
attacks by neighbouring communities both from Kenya and from neighbouring
countries.619 This has over the year prompted them to arm themselves in a bid to
protect their persons and properties. The elders took time to explain the history of
insecurity in the area and how many guns have their way into the hand of civilians.
Insecurity in West Pokot District also finds roots in the area's history. Closely related
to the Karamojong in Uganda some Pokot people had not come within the effective
ambit of modern government control until as recently as 1970. Prior to that, part of
the present Pokot area was administered under the Upe County in Uganda. The whole
of what is now Kacheliba constituency fell under Ugandan administrative control from
1930. While under Ugandan jurisdiction, the Pokot were exposed to the instability
endemic in that country and they learned to survive in the most extreme conditions.
The Pokot acquisition of illegal arms reached its peak during the later days of Idi
Amin's regime and immediately after his ouster in 1979. The fall of Idi Amin led to
the Karamojong and Sebei of Uganda acquiring guns that were used to attack and
raid Pokot People. Originally, the Pokot did not have guns. Pokot by then were armed
with the traditional bows and arrows spears and shields. These traditional weapons
could not measure upto the sophisticated machinery that their neighbours owned.
The government failed to protect Pokot and their property against the heavily armed
Karamojong and Sebei (Pokot North). Pokot people realizing that their security was
threatened, they resorted to buying guns to protect themselves and their property.620

826. The Pokot elders stated that levels of insecurity in the region worsened and this
marked the beginning security operations as the government sought to disarm
the Pokot to restore law and order in the region. Accordingly, the first security
operation is said to have been carried out in 1976. A witness, aged 70 years, in
his statement, stated that the killing of a police officer who was following Pokot
raiders is what triggered the operation. He narrated as follows:
There had been an operation in December 1976 which had been prompted by the
death of chief inspector Mr. Ngisirei of special branch based at Kapenguria Police
Station. He was shot by the cattle rustlers around Nasokol Girls Secondary School
while he was driving, pursuing the rustlers who had stolen some cows from Makutano
township at night. The officer died while being airlifted to Nairobi for treatment.
Kishaunet, Kapkoris and Chemwochoi locations were then declared operation areas to
recover illegal guns. The Rift Valley Provincial Police Officer (PPO), Mr. James Mungai
mobilized security forces to track down the rustlers. The security forces rounded up
100 people around Kishiaunet and Nasokol indiscriminately; they were tortured, their
618 TJRC/Memo/M01208.
619 TJRC/Memo/M1208; TJRC/Memo/M01158.
620 TJRC/Memo/1201; TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapenguria/14 October 2011/19.
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houses torched down, money and household goods pillaged. Mr. Mungai oversaw the
process, during which security forces killed one old man. Known as Mzee Siwanyang
Loyolmoi.621

827. The witness further narrated how, during the 1976, security operations, the
villagers, including the professionals in the community were tortured. He narrated
his tribulation as follows:
While all this was happening I was in Kisumu attending KNUT Annual General Meeting.
I was then the branch chairman for West Pokot district. My family was harassed, my
wife with a six months old baby, my aged mother and two brothers were all rounded
up at home on 18th December 1976 and beaten up by the policemen, my house was
ransacked and valuables taken away by policemen including money which was in
the house and an expensive camera. They were taken to Nasokol and interrogated
the whole day, to disclose where the guns were kept. They were released late in the
evening... I was picked up by four policemen from home on 29th December 1976 at
9:30pm after coming back from Kisumu. The leader of the arresting team whom I knew
by the name Mr. Opindi who was either a corporal or sergeant from special branch
section, he informed me that I was under arrest but did not disclose the offence. I
was taken to Kapenguria Police Station on the same night where I met Mzee Simeon
Kitelapong from Keringet and Hon James P. Korellach MP for Pokot East (Present Sigor
Constituency). The three of us were driven to Kitale Police Station and remanded over
night.
On 30th December 1976 we were separated from the MP and taken to Moi's Bridge
before we were moved to Endebess Police Station on 1" January 1977 where the two
of us were locked up for two days. On 14 January 1977 the two of us were moved from
Endebes Police Station which was a very dirty Police Station, we were physically stepping
on human faeces whenever we were going to relieve ourselves while walking bare feet,
because our shoes had been removed and kept at the report office. We joined James
P. Korellach the (MP) at Kitale Police Station where after the usual interrogation about
the guns and physical beatings we were taken to Moi's Bridge Police Station where we
stayed for one day. On 4th January 1977 the three of us were brought back to Kitale
Police Station for further interrogation. On 5th January 1977 we were released from
Police Custody unconditionally, having been locked up in police cells for Seven (7) days
and subjected to a lot of suffering. It should be noted that Hon. James Powon Korellach
and Mzee Simeon Kitelapong are now both deceased.622

828.

Unfortunately, the government neither carried out corresponding security operations
on heavily armed neighbouring communities nor guaranteed the provision of security
to the Pokot. The result was that, the Pokot were left vulnerable to attacks and true to

621 TJRC/Memo/1201.
622 TJRC/Memo/M1201.
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it, between 1977 and 1978, the Sebei from Uganda are said to have raided Chepolow
and Kapulio Location in Pokot. The raiders ‘killed, maimed, destroyed property and
escaped with thousands of cows, donkeys, sheep and goats’ which the Pokot blame it
on the government.623
829. As expected, the Pokot in Kenya rearmed themselves at a time, April 1979, when
the Pokot from Uganda are said to have looted Moroto Barracks and were being
hosted by their brothers, the Pokot in Kenya. The Kenyan Government responded,
soon thereafter, by carrying out yet another security operation, referred to as,
the Chemulunjo operation of 1979, where security officers, drawn from the GSU,
were deployed in the Chepkopegh sub-location in Kipkomo Location, West Pokot
District. The security officers are said to have tortured the locals leading to the
death of the following 9 persons: ‘Rurume Kachepkes; John Yokonyang Kiwarlee;
Kadonyang; Yarakulow Pkowo; John Lonyangareng Ariangatom; Lomukel Kitido;
Kedireng Matayo; Francis Yoponyang and Mrs . Rurumee who raped by the officers
and later died.’ The security officers are said to have had ‘Mazol Location Chief Mr.
Lokorion...tortured, roped onto a GSU Land Rover, and dragged on the ground to
death.’ Further the security officers confiscated animals from the local, a case in
point the taking of 2500 livestock belonging to a Mr. Francis Yoponyang.624
830. The Pokot elders informed the Commission that soon thereafter, in 1980, the
Karamojong, realising that the Pokot had been disarmed, struck in what is known
as the ‘Tokodow raid’ in which the Karamojong ‘killed people, maimed many and
escaped with thousands of cows, donkeys, sheep and goats.’625 The raids by the
Karamojong and Sebei continued. According to witness testimonies, the Pokot
approached the government for assistance. The response by the government
and the subsequent turn of events worsened the insecurity situation in the area.
The Pokot people on the Kenya side of the border appealed to the government for
defence, and in 1980, the government responded by forming home guard units,
which were presented with a number of guns. This move was misinterpreted by
the Pokot, however, as the go-ahead for them to acquire more heavy weapons;
consequently, instead of the situation's being brought under control, it grew worse,
reaching alarming proportions under control, it grew worse, reaching alarming
proportions by 1983, when cattle-rustling in the area became widespread that it
spilled over into the neighbouring farming areas of Trans- Nzoia District and upper
parts of West Pokot.626
623
624
625
626

TJRC/Memo/1161.
TJRC/Memo/1206.
TJRC/Memo/1158.
‘The storm abates, and several find themselves in the cold’ Weekly Review, 22 July 1988, as attached to TJRC Memo/1210.
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Events that prompted the security operation
831. Witnesses confirmed that a previous raid in Uganda by the Pokot prompted both
Uganda and Kenyan Government to take measures to curb the insecurity along the
Kenya Uganda border. According to the information received by the Commission,
about 3000 Pokot raiders are said to have raided Kapchorwa, Bukwa in Sebei
District, Eastern Uganda between 30 December 1983 to 1 January 1984. The raiders
took away 2000 livestock, looted stores, shops, to avenge earlier raids by the Sebei
Warriors.627 The raid was reported to the Obote administration and a series of
meetings held to decide on the best way to deal with the Pokot. After a series of
meeting between both the president of Uganda and the Kenyan president, a joint
military operation to be carried out by the two governments was agreed upon. The
operation was to be overseen by the Kenyan government. 628
832. It is then that the government launched the greatest ever crackdown aimed at
disarming the Pokot and restoring law and order in the region. The crackdown was
dubbed ‘operation nyundo’. Helicopters were used for about six months locating
cattle rustlers, and stolen cattle, and searching for arms caches. It is from the sound
of the helicopters, lotiriri that the massacre that followed got its name. During this
massacre, many people are said to have been brutally killed and many injured by
the state security agents carrying out the operation.629

The massacre
833. Witnesses informed the Commission that over 50 security operations have been
carried out in the regions but none of those had devastating effect as the 1984
security operation that resulted in massacre of people. This operation was carried
out between 22 February and 22 May 1984 and coincided with the infamous
operation at Wagalla.
834. As is common with security operation in Kenya, the security agents that were
deployed in the area were accused of gross violations of human rights including
acts of torture, sexual violence and murders. According to the witnesses, the
government used heavy artillery and bombed the following areas in West Pokot
District: ‘Kadam Hill; Achalau Hill; Lorusuk Hill; Kasei Hill; Chepyomot (Cheloboi
area) / Tarakit Hill; Kases; Alale; Nauyapong; and Kishiaunet’630 the result was that
many were killed and others maimed. Those who were injured during this operation
627
628
629
630

424

TJRC/Memo/1206; TJRC/Statement/44322.
TJRC/Memo/1206.
TJRC/Memo/1206.
TJRC/Memo/1206.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

Include: ‘ Todosia Ng'olechom who became toothless after being tortured Keringet
centre by Kenya Army; Kidom who was hammered a 6" nail at Kolongolo centre
and died in hospital Kitale; and Kapelo Monges remained permanently lame after
he was beaten at Kolongolo Market.’631
835. Commission heard that the security agents were targeting even those going by
their daily chore. A witness shared how his brother was killed as he grazed his
goats. The victim was resting under a tree facing in the opposite direction from
where the officers stood. The officers are then said to have shot him at the back
killing him on the spot. They then packed the goats in lorries and drove them to
Kacheliba where they had set up a camp.632 They killed adults as well as children.633
836. Yet another witness informed the Commission how the security officers surrounded
their home and shot their father dead. This witness further confirmed that Chief
Lomil was thrown out of a helicopter that was already airborne. He confirmed
that many people were killed at the time and many sustained serious injuries. He
further confirmed that the Army men were shooting from helicopters and spraying
villagers with bullets.634
837. According to Rev. Simon Alew, the security agents subjected the local residents
to torture and other degrading treatment. In explaining this in his testimony
below, Rev Simon Alew indicated that the residents were subjected to ‘communal
punishment’.

Mzee Atoligole Losute became the first person to surrender his gun,
but when he tried to raise the certificate, the helicopter dropped
down and then he was told: Because you are a good person, we will
take you round to be an example to other people. So, when that
Mzee was flown off by the helicopter, his wives saw him go inside
the helicopter and after going round, he was seen hooked or tied
on his neck to the helicopter and then he was flown off and went
round the helicopter and after about 30 minutes, that old man
died. He was thrown away at the border of Kenya and Uganda.
631 TJRC/Memo/1208.
632 TJRC/Statement/44322. TJRC/Statement/443. ‘The Storm abates, and several find themselves in the cold’ Weekly Review, 22
July 1988, as quoted in TJRC/Memo/1210.
633 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapenguria/14 October 2011/p.13-14.
634 TJRC/Statement/34387; TJRC/Statement/41037.
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‘When he turned after surrendering, he was shot on the back and
he died instantly. It was a cold blood killing’
If I may go direct to the operation of 1982/1984; this was the major one where the Government
of Kenya led by former President Moi declared that the Pokot community should be disarmed. The
disarmament turned into kind of a communal punishment. I am calling it a communal punishment
because everybody, even if you were a peacemaker, a bishop or a professor; you were treated equally.
So, if it was beating, you were all beaten. There were some people who were beaten and tortured.
Over 25,000 herds of cattle were taken to Kacheliba Police Station. Over 10,000 cattle died in the
same police station and the remaining 15,000 were just transported to unknown places.
When the Government went round to collect firearms, they announced that: ‘If you surrender
your gun, you will be given a certificate of confirmation. People were informed that when the helicopter
comes, you should raise that certificate so that they will know that you are a peaceful person and
some people did the same. Mzee Atoligole Losute became the first person to surrender his gun, but
when he tried to raise the certificate, the helicopter dropped down and then he was told: Because
you are a good person, we will take you round to be an example to other people. So, when that Mzee
was flown off by the helicopter, his wives saw him go inside the helicopter and after going round,
he was seen hooked or tied on his neck to the helicopter and then he was flown off and went round
the helicopter and after about 30 minutes, that old man died. He was thrown away at the border
of Kenya and Uganda. Another person who was treated the same way was Mzee Achelo. When
he raised his certificate to show that he was a peaceful person, he was sprayed with bullets by the
helicopter and three others died at a place called Karamel in Nikunyau Division, which was a location
then.
There was an assistant chief called Michael Among’utobotela who talked to the people as he
was a mediator between the community and the Government. He tried to advise people to surrender
guns to him at night and then he would give them to the Army men because the community
feared being killed or being shot. So, the assistant chief, Mr. Among’utobotela, received the guns
and he surrendered them to the General Service Unit (GSU) and the Army. When he turned after
surrendering, he was shot on the back and he died instantly. It was a cold blood killing.
Mzee Chesirok Lotee was given an iron metal to chew it. He was threatened that he was going
to be sodomized. He was told to lie down on his back and was thoroughly beaten. Then the army
men took some sand and poured into his eyes. That old man is blind as we speak now. I do not know
whether he is around here. But, maybe, for confirmation, if you want to see him, you may get him
later.
I have some few pictures which show the victims of those who were affected by the said
operations. If I may raise this picture here, it shows a man whose leg was cut off. He was shot and
because there was no health facilities near; the only option was for the leg to be cut off.
There is another gentleman here who was suffering from epilepsy, but because of fear of the
helicopter, he decided to hide himself. He entered into somebody’s house and was caught by the
disease while there and he got burnt.
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838. The soldiers are also accused confiscating animals635 which they either short dead,
ate or sold. Major Joseph Nkaissery (the then MP for Kajiado Central and Assistant
Minister for Defence) is among the senior officers accused of selling thousands
of cattle and transporting them using Kenya Army lorries to Kitale, Eldoret,
Nakuru, and Nairobi.636 In some cases security agents starved animals , numbering
approximately,30,000 cattle, that had been confiscated as a way of compelling their
owners into surrendering guns. All these actions are said to have been overseen
by the area DC, a Mr. Langat. Mr. Langat is also said to have fired from their jobs 36
chief and assistant chiefs, who he accused of conspiring with the raiders and being
beneficiaries of the raids.637
839. Witnesses narrated their experiences during the 1984 operation. One such witness
was Mr. John William Lochakaii, who served as chief in Alale Location, recalled:
The 1984 operation was a very serious one. It was as if it was targeting me. They wanted to
kill me. Those who were in the opposition wanted us to be taken away and they wanted
us to die, so that they could take over. The ordinary people cried Our chiefs have gone.
They really cried. I was arrested in 1984. The operation started in Kacheliba in February
and proceeded to other areas. We thought it would be in Kacheliba alone, but it went on
until Alale. That is when they came to my place. I had four wives and I had built my houses,
so that they were in the same place. They were four houses and they were iron sheet
thatched houses. I had my cows, sheep and goats, which were being taken for grazing.
Some of the big bulls were taken to Uganda for grazing. At the time, I had gone for a visit.
They came to my place with a maroon vehicle and one which was for the police. They had
come from Nakuru. Its colour was grayish. This was the lorry which really hurt our place;
there were two lorries.
When they came to my home, they removed everything. The children were even sleeping
on the cemented floor. When I came back from my business, because I was selling gold
- I started the business of selling gold and sometimes selling cows in the 1980s – I was
warned not to use the normal route to my home. So, I decided to go through the bush.
When I reached home, I found that the people had left home and gone to the hills, while
the children had gone to the forest. They (the soldiers) really looked for me and they
really wanted to meet me. Why? Just because of those things.
Then I went to the forest. They sent people to come and look for me, but the hills and the
bush were so thick. So, we had to hide ourselves in the bushes and the hills. When they
army men came, they threw bombs at us; they searched for me in the bush and they
would bomb that bush. Up to now, those bombs are in the bush and we are waiting for
the Commission, so that those bombs can be taken from that place because they can
explode anytime and kill us. At that time, all my cows went. I lost all my 40 cows; I lost
all my sheep, around 160 of them; I lost all my goats. Those were around eighty and that
was not very important. I lost all my chicken.
635 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapenguria/14 October 2011/14.
636 TJRC/Memo/M01158.
637 TJRC/Memo/M01158.
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When my cows were taken away, and when I surrendered myself to the OCS, the OCS
gave me a letter and asked me to take that letter to that place. The DC had gone. The DC
made a call to the army “Just go and get hold of that man called John. He has come to
that place.” So, I went out to where the children were. The operation was coming to an
end and the people were being told to go back to their homes.

Impact of the Massacre
840. Like in the case of other massacres, the Lotirir massacre resulted in loss of life,
severe injuries, and destruction of property as well as displacement. Witnesses
confirmed that they were also affected financially with many being:
unable to send their children to school and most children dropped out of school
completely leading to,the current illiteracy rate of over 70% in the affected areas and
the General illiteracy rate of 60% in West Pokot County.638

841. Witnesses also informed the Commission that the massacre impacted negatively
on education in the affected areas. According to the witnesses, most schools were
closed as people fled to safer areas. Some of the schools closed included:
Kanyerus Primary school which was low cost boarding. Up to now not re-opened.
Schools now re-opened include Kopulio primary school, Nakuyen primary school,
Tiyinei primary school, Kosia primary school, Karon primary school, Karameri primary
school, Nauyapong primary school, Kasitot primary school, Kases primary school,
Kalapata primary school, Sasak primary school among others.639

Loteteleit Massacre (28 April 1988)
842.

Like their neighbours, the Pokot and Marakwet, the Turkana too have been victims
of cattle raids which have resulted in the massacre of their people. The Turkana have
been victims of attack by both local communities, mainly the Pokot, as well as raiders
from neighbouring countries namely, Uganda, Southern Sudan and Ethiopia.

843. During such attacks, many lives have been lost, many people severely injured and
unknown number of livestock stolen. As will be demonstrated below, assistance
from the government has not been forthcoming and sometimes it has been a case
of the government offering too little too late.
844. The Commission was informed that on 28 of April 1988, cattle raiders believed to
be the Toposa of Southern Sudan and the Nyangatom of Ethiopia ambushed the
638 TJRC/Memo/M0367.
639 TJRC/Memo/M0367.
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Turkana who had gone to water their animals at a watering point that was near a
kraal. The raiders are said to have sprayed with bullet the people watering their
animals at the watering point. The victims were not able to fight back since they
had been ambushed and they could not match the weapons that the raiders had.
The raider surrounded the watering point and any of the victims who tried to run
were shot dead. After killing all the people at the watering point and driving their
animals away, the raiders are then said to have proceeded to attack and raid the
nearby kraals. 640
845. The Commission heard that the attack lasted four days leaving about 290
people dead641 and very many injured. The Commission was not in a position to
independently confirm the number of people who died during the massacre. The
witnesses lamented that the government response was wanting. To begin with,
at the time of the attack, the GSU officers stationed nearby did not come to the
victim’s rescue. Further, the then Provincial Commissioner Yusuf Haji and the then
area Member of Parliament, Mr. Japheth Ekidor, only arrived at the scene four days
after the incident. The Provincial Commissioner is said to have been accompanied
by some police officer who followed the raiders and managed to recover some
animals, which were distributed amongst those who had lost their animals.
Unfortunately, the animals recovered were few to cover everyone. The Commission
learnt that among those who were killed included the entire family of Lowoyapua
including Lowoyapua himself (a renowned medicine man in the region) as well as
Eseken Natibakituk.

640 TJRC/Memo/M0367.
641 TJRC/Memo/M0367.
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Political Assassinations
Introduction
1.

Kenya has lost some of its best and brightest to political assassination. At the
Commission’s hearings in Kisumu, Phoebe Asiyo, one of the pioneer Kenyan female
Members of Parliament was asked about her lowest moment in her political career.
She responded:
I think the most difficult was when Tom Mboya was gunned down along Government
Road. That was the lowest in my life and, I guess, the life of many other people. That
was a man who gave all his life for this country. He was one man who championed the
sitting down in Lancaster House to discuss the Kenyan issue. He was one man who asked
the warring sections to stop war; he was the one who persuaded the British, I think,
amongst all other people, that sitting down on a round table was, perhaps, the best
option. But that day, they shot him dead. Up to today, nobody has told us why Mboya
was killed. That was the lowest in my life.1

2.

Similar sentiments were repeated again and again with respect to the many people
who have died under mysterious circumstances since Kenyan independence:
Pio Gama Pinto, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki (popularly known as J.M Kariuki), Robert
Ouko, Father Antony Kaiser, Bishop Alexander Muge, Crispin Odhiambo-Mbai,
and many others. A number of these deaths have been the subject of high profile
investigations; in some cases they have been subject to repeated investigations.
Yet despite all of the investigations in these and other similar cases, the uncertainty
concerning who was responsible for the killings and why specific individuals were
killed is often as unclear as it was on the day the body was found.

3.

Given the failures of past investigations, the Commission was fully aware that
solving any of the mysteries surrounding these deaths would be difficult and
challenging. Nevertheless, the Commission gathered information, undertook
research and investigations, and solicited testimony to understand the context
in which such killings took place; the circumstances and thus probable causes of
such killings; the impact of such killings, particularly on the family and friends
of the victim; and the failure of investigations to solve the mystery of why a
person was killed and who was responsible. The Commission has also identified

1
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those individuals it thinks warrant additional investigation with respect to these
assassinations.
4.

Politically motivated killings have occurred under all three post-independence
governments. During Kenyatta’s administration, Kenya witnessed the highest
numbers of political assassination. Although it cannot be statistically concluded
that more people died during his reign than that of his successors, very famous
and influential political figures died mysteriously during the period. As OnyangoOloka asserts:
The Kenyatta Regime is now largely recognized to have witnessed some of the worst forms
of political repression, although the Mzee was treated as a benevolent and benign ruler,
in the mould that fitted those leaders who came to power in the immediate aftermath of
independence. After combining the powers of the prime minister with those of Governor
General, Kenyatta became an Executive President and then embarked on neutralizing
parliament as an effective watchdog, whereby crude and inhuman means such as
assassinations were resorted to.2

5.

Political assassinations reduced during President Moi’s reign in power. President
Kibaki’s reign witnessed an even lesser number of political assassinations. But
extra-judicial killings increased gradually over time and appear to have reached a
peak during Kibaki’s era.

6.

The list of those targeted for political assassinations in Kenya is long, and contains
individuals from diverse political and ethnic background. While such stateperpetrated or condoned atrocities have been committed against citizens, there
has never been any form of official acknowledgement or even apology. Attempts
to uncover the truth of these killings have repeatedly failed. The Ouko assassination
is the most extreme in this regard, having been the subject of two commissions of
inquiry, an investigation by Scotland Yard, and two separate investigations by the
Kenyan police force. Moreover, there have been a number of arrests related to the
assassination and two criminal trials. These numerous investigations have mostly
increased confusion and uncertainty about what happened rather than providing
answers. While it is the most extreme example, the Ouko assassination is not alone
in being the subject of investigations that detracted from, rather than contributed
to, truth and understanding about what happened and who was responsible. As a
consequence, there is still the prevailing view among many Kenyans that the truth
has not been uncovered, or perhaps, more accurately, that while the truth of the
matter is known, there has been no acknowledgement of that truth either by those
involved or by the Government.

2

J.Onyango-Oloka, “Unleashing the Skeleton of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Kenya: From the Outside Looking” in A
Report of the Convening on Transitional Justice in Kenya, Revisiting Transitional Justice, a non Partisan and Non-Governmental
Engagement –December 7 2007, Serena Hotel Nairobi, Kituo cha Katiba and Ford Foundation.
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7.

This chapter focuses on assassinations in order to: understand the context,
circumstances and purposes of assassinations in Kenyan history; provide a
narrative history of some of the most famous assassinations and extra-judicial
killings including their historical context; and explore how to further justice in a
way that can contribute to truth and reconciliation.

Definition and Context
Definition
8.

Political assassinations are a special type of killing defined by both the nature of
the victim and the motive of the perpetrators. While legal authorities differ over
what constitutes a political assassination, we adopt here those elements that are
common to most definitions:
a) The killing
b) Of an individual with leadership or other symbolic importance
c) For the purpose of sending a strong political message

432

9.

Assassinations are intentional killings. Indiscriminate or accidental killings do
not qualify as an assassination as they do not involve the specific intent to kill an
individual. The target of the killing must be someone who has, or is perceived
to have, leadership qualities or other symbolic importance. This character of the
victim is tied to the motive, which is for a political purpose. The Commission
recognizes that many intentional killings can occur for a political purpose. In
fact many of the killings that were the subject of the Commission’s hearings and
investigations were politically motivated. Assassinations are different in that they
target a specific individual whose death, because of his or her status, will have a
significant political impact. Such individuals need not be politicians themselves,
although in many cases they are.

10.

Assassinations are different from extra-judicial killings (which is discussed in a
separate section of this Report) in two fundamental ways. First, extra-judicial
killings are illegal killings committed by State agents. On the contrary, a private
non-state actor can commit a killing that qualifies as an assassination. While a
private non-state actor can commit murder, he cannot commit an extra-judicial
killing unless he is acting on behalf of a State. Second, assassinations require a
political motive; an extra-judicial killing is any illegal killing committed by a State
regardless of motive.
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11.

There is some authority that assassinations are subject to harsher condemnation
than most other killings, thus underscoring the special seriousness of such killings.
The courts of the United Kingdom, for example, have upheld particularly harsh
sentences of those convicted of attempted assassinations because they were
attempted assassinations and not ordinary attempted killings.3

12.

Assassinations sometimes refer to inter-state killings – in other words, the killing
of the national of one state by the nationals of another state, or even by the
government of another state. This international aspect of assassinations is reflected
in a number of international treaties that expressly prohibit such inter-state killings.
The prohibition found in the Charter of the OAU contemplates such an inter-state
killing. The language of the AU Constitutive Act is broader and includes interstate and intra-state killings. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents
prohibits the killing of heads of state, foreign ministers, and representatives of
state or international organizations when the target of the assassination is abroad.
Thus the killing of such individuals within their own states does not trigger the
Convention.

13.

The focus of this Chapter is not on inter-state assassinations, but on intra-state
assassinations – in other words the assassination of Kenyans by other Kenyans,
and often with the direct or indirect involvement of Kenyan government officials.
While it interpreted its mandate to include those inter-state assassinations
condemned by international treaties, the Commission received no evidence
suggesting the involvement of non-Kenyan citizens in the assassinations
discussed in this Chapter.

Chapter FOUR

Context
14.

While political assassinations have occurred in all regions of the world, Africa is
the only region that includes an express prohibition against assassinations in an
international treaty. Article III (5) of the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity provides that:
The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II solemnly affirm and
declare their adherence to the following principles …unreserved condemnation, in
all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of
neighbouring States or any other States.4

3
4

Crown v. Gill (concerning conspirators in assassination plot against Rajiv Gandhi); Crown v. Al-Banna (attempted assassination of
Israeli ambassador by members of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement).
Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, entered into force Sept. 13, 1963.
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15.

The Charter of the Organization of African Unity was replaced in 2001 by the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, which also includes as one of the fundamental
principles of the African Union:
Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and
political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities.5

16.

This express reference to political assassinations may reflect the unusually high
frequency of such assassinations in Africa in the post-colonial period, and the toll
such killings have wrought in Africa. Assassinations have been employed in most
African countries since independence, marking, altering, or determining the course
of political events in modern Africa. Some of the most prominent assassinations in
Africa since the era of independence include:
a) Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in 1961;
b) Sylvanus Olympio, leader of Togo, in 1963;
c)

Hendrik Verwoed, the Prime Minister of South Africa, stabbed in Parliament
in 1966;

d) Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, who was Nigeria’s military head of state, and the
Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in 1966;
e) Ugandan Chief Justice Benedicto Kiwanuka in 1972;
f)

the Arch-Bishop of Uganda, Janani Luwum, in 1977;

g) Steve Biko, South Africa’s anti-apartheid crusader, killed in police custody in
1977;
h) Francois Tombalbaye, the President of Chad, in 1978;
i)

President Murtala Mohammed of Nigeria, in 1976;

j)

Liberian President William Tolbert Jr, during the 1980 military coup;

k) Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, shot during a military parade in 1981;
l)

Thomas Sankara, the Head of State of Burkina Faso, in 1987;

m) Rifaat al-Mahgoub, speaker of the Egyptian parliament, in 1990;
n) Samuel Doe, the President of Liberia, in 1990;
o) Chris Hani, the leader of the South African Communist Party, in 1993;
p) Rwandese President Juvenal Habyarimana, killed when his plane was shot
from the sky in 1994;
5
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q) Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, President of Niger, in 1999; and
r)

The Congolese President Laurent Kabila in 2001.

17.

Tragically, this list is a very small sample of the political assassinations that have
occurred in Africa since independence.

18.

Political assassinations can serve multiple purposes. First, they can eliminate
or weaken a political opposition that threatens the existing government or its
beneficiaries. Second, they can be used to terrorize a population and thus act as
deterrence to further political dissent and organization; it has been said that terror
and assassinations are the mainsprings of despotic government. Third, they can be
used to punish an individual who is perceived to have betrayed the establishment.

19.

It is often the case that a particular assassination was committed with more than
one of these purposes. That is certainly the case for many of the assassinations that
have occurred in Kenya. Many scholars have explored these and other purposes of
assassination, noting how the killing of political opponents has been deliberately
deployed by leaders to consolidate their regimes and intensify their power since
independence.6

20.

The mere threat of assassination has and continues to play a pivotal role in the
history of human politics, particularly in Africa. It has had a profound socioeconomic impact upon all nations. Today, political leaders all over the world are
routinely protected from motivated and opportunistic assassins. Nations adapt to
this threat by implementing defensive strategies, which require the expenditure of
time, effort, and resources.7

21.

In addition to the assassinations discussed below, there have been assassinations
of less well known individuals in Kenya. The Commission was informed, for
example, of the assassination of members of the Kikuyu elite in the late 1960s
who refused to participate in and support the then prevailing practice of oathing.
These individuals were killed because of their political stand against oathing, and
it is likely that those who killed them did so to send a strong political message to
others who might have otherwise considered opposing the practice of oathing.
There have also been assassinations of other well-known people, including Father

6

7

See for example works of Bienen, H. (1970). Tanzania: Party transformation and economic development (2nd ed.).Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press; Lemarchand, R. (1972). Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: Competing solidarities in
nation-building. American Political Science Review, 66(1), 68-90; Rothchild, D. (1997).Managing ethnic conflict in Africa: Pressures
and incentives for cooperation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution and van de Walle, N. (2006). Meet the new boss, same as the
old boss? The evolution of political clientelism in Africa. In H. Kitschelt & S. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients, and policies:Patterns
of democratic accountability and political competition (pp. 50-67). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ronald F. White, ‘3 General Theory of Assassination’ in Assassination Research Vol. 5 No. 1, 2007. p.3
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Kaiser in 2000. While Father Kaiser’s case is not dealt with here in any detail, the
Commission notes that like the others discussed, it is a killing that has gone
unsolved and thus may benefit from a more thorough, and objective, investigation
than has been conducted to date. The current Director of Public Prosecutions acted
as the attorney of one of the suspects in the case. Given this conflict of interest
we recommend that an independent prosecutor be established to determine the
truth of Father Kaiser’s killing and to determine whether enough evidence exists to
prosecute any responsible individual.
22.

In researching these and other assassinations, the Commission was struck by the
dearth of scholarly writing in Kenya on assassinations, either generally or with
respect to specific cases. The overwhelming majority of research on assassination
appears in the west, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom. The
Commission searched through the thesis and dissertation scholarly database in
Kenya and found hardly any that dealt with the topic of assassinations generally,
or with a specific assassination in Kenya. This is perhaps not surprising. African
academics who have attempted to immerse themselves into assassination
scholarship have often faced deportation, imprisonment or even death. Given the
numerous failed investigations into specific assassinations; given the common
practice of the government shutting down or failing to make public any findings
from such investigations; and given the mysterious death of some of those who
have either had or sought knowledge of such assassinations, it is not surprising that
most academics are reluctant to delve into the topic. The impunity with respect to
assassinations in the past itself ensures that no one will delve too deeply into the
topic for fear of becoming the next victim of an unsolved murder.

Pio Gama Pinto
23.

A little over a year since independence, on 25 February 1965, Kenya suffered its
first major political assassination. The Pinto assassination demonstrates all of the
complexities and tragedy of political assassinations in post-independence Kenya.
Its context included: a global cold war that was mirrored in domestic political
debates; a domestic struggle to consolidate power and narrow dissent; and a
resort to violence to address political differences.

Political context
24.
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The newly independent Kenyatta Administration had to grapple with myriad
challenges after independence in 1963. Besides fighting illiteracy, lack of education,
poverty and disease, the country was the target of ideological and strategic
interests of the capitalist West and communist East during the Cold War. Both
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parties to the Cold War thus nurtured and cultivated ideological and political allies
within Kenya. At the same time President Kenyatta’s government used many of the
laws and institutions of the colonial government to minimize and even suppress
dissent. Those in President’s Kenyatta’s inner circle who had ambitions to succeed
him utilized numerous mechanisms to neutralize political opponents. One of the
tools used in these early days, and ever since, was political assassination. The first
victim of political assassination to be weeded out through the barrel of a gun was
Pio Gama Pinto.
25.

Pinto was a nominated member of parliament in Kenya’s first government, and
was among the few Kenyan Asians to face detention in colonial Kenya. While
Kenyatta leaned towards the west and capitalism, his Vice President, Oginga
Odinga, was more sympathetic to the east and socialism. Goldsworthy describes
Pinto as ‘Odinga’s foremost tactical adviser and link-man with Eastern embassies”
that bankrolled his socialist ideas’. Indeed, it is reported that Pinto had organized a
meeting between Odinga and a Chinese delegation that discussed Kenya adopting
a more socialist path, entering into a defence pact with Kenya, and the possibility
of using Kenya as a conduit for Chinese arms to liberation movements in Africa.8

26.

It was later alleged by the press that The Lumumba Institute, which Pinto headed,
was teaching scientific socialism to party members (selected largely for their
receptivity to such ideas). President Kenyatta did not take kindly to such activities,
and in a series of speeches and statements attacked, among others, ‘alien’ ideologies
and activities of traitors of KANU. President Kenyatta asked Mboya to draft a policy
on African socialism to counter Odinga’s socialism. It was to be tabled in Parliament
in April 1975. When the Odinga group got wind of this move, they asked Pinto
to write a counter draft to be tabled on the same day as Mboya’s and mobilized
parliamentarians to vote against the government.9 Had this plan come to fruition,
it could have made Pinto the architect of the first parliamentary coup and thus the
man closest to organizing a real political revolution in Kenya.10

27.

It was during the heat of these early debates about the direction of Kenyan
economic and political policy that Pinto was assassinated. He was shot outside
his home in Westlands in front of his 18 month-old daughter, Tereshka. Kenyans
were shocked, and the possibility that this was a political assassination was
immediately raised. Vice President Joseph Murumbi sobbed openly. Information
Minister Achieng Oneko reacted to the news with: ‘No, no, no! Kenyatta must
explain! He must explain!’11 President Kenyatta, who retorted “Bwana Waziri do
you think it is Kenyatta who has killed Pinto?” lamented that the country had

8
9
10
11

Kamau Ngotho, Daily Nation, June 20, 2000, p.8.
Kamau Ngotho, Daily Nation, June 21, 2000, p. 8.
Kamau Ngotho, Daily Nation, June 21, 2000, P.9.
Kamau Ngotho, Daily Nation, June 18, 2000 p.4
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lost ‘one of the conscientious workers for freedom who suffered many years
in detention for his uncompromising stand in politics’. Kenyatta asserted that
his government ‘will exert every effort to hunt down and bring to justice the
perpetrators of this outrage’. Underscoring the widespread suspicion of a political
murder, Oneko termed it a ‘deliberate and cowardly move in what I believe to be
a planned assassination’. Joseph Murumbi resigned as Vice President to ‘protest
Pinto’s murder and subsequent intrigue in Kenyatta’s inner circle’.

Arrest and trial of alleged assassins
28.

Following the assassination of Pinto, the Kenya Police mounted a massive
manhunt for the three gunmen who it was alleged ambushed and murdered
Pinto. Two teenage suspects were arrested: Kisilu Mutua, who was 18 years old,
and Chege Thuo, who was then 19. During their arraignment before Supreme
Court Justice, Sir John Ainley, they pleaded ‘not guilty’ to the murder. Kisilu
admitted he was near the scene when the shooting took place, having been paid
to scare Pinto after his recent opposition activities in Parliament. He testified that
as he approached Pinto’s house, shots rang out and he saw Pinto collapse in his
car. He testified that he was unable to see who had fired the shots.

29.

During the preliminary hearing, it was found that none of the ten fingers and
palm prints found on Pinto’s Saab car belonged to the two teenagers who
were charged with what was being described as a ‘well planned and efficiently
executed’ killing.12 It was also revealed that thirteen hours before his murder,
Pinto had told his house servant, Waweru Ng’ang’a, that a man had been offered
money to kill him. A CID corporal told the court that the two had been sent to
frighten Pinto by Ochola Mak’Anyengo ‘because he had been interfering with
his union’.13 When the trial ended, the three assessors found Kisilu and Thuo ‘not
guilty’.14

30.

Although Chief Justice Ainley conceded that ‘the case wears an unfinished aspect
and that we may not have all who were involved in the crime before us’, and while
he was satisfied that Kisilu had not pulled the trigger, he nevertheless said that
the young man could not have gone to Pinto’s place without an idea of what was
to happen. He found him guilty and sentenced him to hang. This sentence was
later changed to a life sentence. Thuo was however freed on grounds of insufficient
evidence.

12 Daily Nation, April 10, 1965, p.4
13 Daily Nation, April 10, 1965, p.4.
14 Ibid
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Theories
31.

The trial and conviction of Kisilu did not put the matter of Pinto’s assassination to
rest. Over the years, a number of theories have been put forward to explain the
assassination. Some have suggested that Pinto was killed by members of President
Kenyatta's inner circle, while others speculated that Pinto was assassinated by neocolonialist forces because he was viewed as an avowed Communist with links to the
Mozambican liberation movement.15 A declassified cable from the US Department
of State captures the breadth of the conspiracy theories that were being circulated
in the period following Pinto’s assassination:
Other rumours centre around resentment against Pinto as an Asian and speculate that
he was killed because he was a major recipient of communist largesse who may have
been holding out on money received, or tried to blackmail a high official, or was killed
by the Chicoms [Chinese Communists] because he was moving closer to the Soviets or
by Kikuyu who feared he was a threat to Kikuyu dominance.16

32.

15
16
17
18
19

Thirty five years after the Pinto trial, an investigation by the Daily Nation concluded
that Kisilu, Thuo and a third man who disappeared, were peripheral players in
the murder. The Daily Nation asserted that Kisilu in fact did not kill Pinto, but
was instead set up by the Directorate of Security Intelligence.17 According to the
Daily Nation, the plan to assassinate Pinto began three years earlier. A memo
by the Kenya Intelligence Committee dated 13 December 1962 had labelled
Pinto as a “man to be watched very closely.” By 1965, Kenyatta felt threatened
by Pinto’s strong trade union base.18 Pinto’s positioning as a substantial threat to
the existing Government ultimately led to his elimination. The subsequent cover
up, according to the Daily Nation, included keeping Kisilu behind bars against
numerous recommendations by the Prisons Review Board for fear of the dossier
that he might spill on the Pinto murder.19 The Commission was unable to verify
or disprove the allegations made in the Daily Nation report. Indeed, although
the Commission heard testimony on the assassination of Pinto, it was unable to
discover any additional evidence that would shed light on any of the theories
concerning Pinto’s death. As noted elsewhere in this Report, the Commission
was not allowed access to many of the documents held by the Government that
would have assisted in investigations such as this, including the archives of the
National Security Intelligence Service.
"RIGHTS-KENYA: Tasting New Life after 36 Years in Jail. Inter Press Service News Agency. July 11, 2001
Daniel Branch ,Kenya Between Hope and Despair 1963-2011 (2011) 46
Kamau Ngotho, Daily Nation, June 18, 2000, p.4
David Goldsworthy, Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget, 1982.
Kamau Ngotho, Daily Nation, June 18, 2000, p.4.
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Aftermath
33.

Pinto was the first of what was to prove to be many Kenyan politicians assassinated
after independence. At the time of his assassination, Pinto was 38 years old. He was
survived by his wife, Emma and his three daughters Linda, Malusha and Tereshka,
the last of whom witnessed her father’s killing when she was only eighteen months
old. Two years after the assassination, Emma and her daughters moved to Canada.20

34.

While Pinto’s death continues to be shrouded in mystery, the Pinto Trust Fund
was established after his death to benefit Emma and the children. In September
1965 the International Organisation of Journalists invited Mrs. Emma Gama Pinto
to Santiago, Chile, to receive a posthumous trophy awarded to her husband for
his contribution to journalism that furthered the liberation of African countries
from foreign domination and exploitation.21 Many years later in 2008, the Postal
Corporation of Kenya released a series of four stamps titled Heroes of Kenya, one
of which featured Pinto. 22

Tom Mboya
Context
35.

During the first decade of independence, Kenya had a very distinctive single-party
dominant system. Unlike many of its sub-Saharan neighbours, the country had laws
permitting opposition political parties. Moreover, the dominant party, the Kenya
African National Unity Party (KANU) remained relatively weak. It had no internal
structures for resolving differences between members and forging a common party
platform and thus had little role in interest articulation and aggregation, which are
functions that parties in multiple-party and single-party systems often perform.
These responsibilities were carried out informally through the Harambee or pulling
together system. Additionally, KANU exercised little control over policy matters
within the party. Most initiatives originated from the Office of the President, and
then appeared on Parliament's schedule for discussion and implementation.

36.

KANU was a relatively weak organization, most of the power being increasingly
concentrated in the Office of the President. As earlier alluded to in the case of Pio
Gama Pinto, it was dangerous to challenge the status quo or to appear to have
ambitions for higher office. It was in that context that Thomas Joseph Mboya

20 Meusburger, Peter (2011). Knowledge and Space: Cultural Memories: the Geographical Point of View. Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 318.
21 Vaz, J. Clement (1997). Profiles of Eminent Goans, Past and Present. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. pp. 243.
22 "Pio Gama Pinto (1927–1965)". Safari Africa Radio.
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became the second prominent politician to be assassinated during the Kenyatta
administration, with repercussions that continue to be felt in Kenya today.
37.

Mboya’s rise was meteoric. Starting as a health inspector with the Nairobi City
Council, he joined the Local Government Workers Union as secretary general
and turned it into a formidable union. He then turned to the Kenya Federation of
Labour which he made into a quasi-political vehicle to fill the power vacuum left
after key leaders were arrested during the freedom struggle before independence.

38.

Mboya was a key intellectual during the formative years of the country. He played
a major role in drafting Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism, through which
Mboya believed he had finally arrived at a formula to solve the problems bestowed
on the country by the colonial government. It was while he was diligently working
to implement this policy that Mboya was shot dead.23

39.

Mboya started a trade union-cum-political career that many envied; he was a good
orator, skilled debater, efficient mobiliser, and extremely shrewd organizer who
progressively built himself into a position where he was indispensable.24 Without
his brilliance, it would have been difficult to push through the many government
bills enacted during those early years of independence. He was also KANU’s chief
campaigner in most matters, including general elections. He was a member of the
Presidential Commission on Trade Unions that led to the formation of the Central
Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) in 1965, and was also a member of the Philips
Commission that drafted the treaty on East Africa Cooperation two years later.
Before that, Mboya had made a name for himself organizing the famous student
‘airlifts’ to the United States, which resulted in about 1,000 Kenyans attaining
higher education in the United States between 1958 and 1961.

Political career
40.

Mboya posed a challenge to the existing government and its supporters at three
levels. Firstly, his following in the trade unions and his childhood on a sisal estate on
the borders of Machakos and Kiambu, which enabled him to converse colloquially in
Gikuyu and Kikamba as well as in Swahili and Dholuo languages, meant that he was
able to secure support from outside his own ethnically restricted sub-nationality.
More than perhaps any other politician, Mboya had a Kenya-wide following and
national appeal. Secondly, his international reputation and his close relationship with
the American labour organizations dating from the 1950s, and his network of former

23 Ochieng’, TheDaily Nation, 1969, July 7, p.8
24 Gathigira, Th eDaily Nation, July 7, 1969, p.9

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

441

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

‘airlift’ students who had benefited from his patronage, meant that it was harder
to isolate him as was done with Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia by allegations
of socialist tendencies. Moreover, as Minister of Economic Planning, Mboya had
been instrumental in the drafting of Kenya's official statement of commitment to
capitalism, misleadingly named "Sessional Paper on African Socialism". Thirdly, at the
national level, Mboya appeared to threaten the dominate position of the Kiambu
elite with his ability to appeal to Kenyan national solidarity.25
41.

Many scholars have analysed the political dynamics of the early Kenyan government.
It is in that political context that the reaction against Mboya, leading ultimately to
his death, must be understood.

42.

Goldsworthy posits two sub factions within KANU in order to understand the
political dynamics of the time; KANU A and KANU B. KANU A was the formidable
force or the ‘inner group’ but which was variously known as the ‘Kikuyu group,’ the
‘Gatundu group’, or otherwise the ‘court,’ and included Charles Njonjo and Mbiu
Koinange who were all close to the President, and with them, Vice President Daniel
Arap Moi as one of the few non-Kikuyu’s in this faction. KANU B included Tom
Mboya, and had support from Ministers of various ethnicities. In sum, Mboya had
the backing of the Luo, Kamba, coastals and legislators from the north east.

43.

Goldsworthy asserts that the Gatundu group’s jealousy and fear of Mboya emerged
at a private meeting of the full KANU parliamentary group in March 1968. This
was the first time that the issue of Mboya was unambiguously discussed in such
a large gathering and in the presence of Kenyatta himself. Subsequent leaked
accounts reveal that it was the attorney general, Njonjo, who led the attack. Njonjo
delivered an address full of aspersions against Mboya’s ambitions and his American
connections. Mboya argued back strongly.

44.

In 1967, the government had set up a committee with Kenyatta’s approval to
propose a succession formula to replace the existing one, under which if the
president died in office the assembly would elect a successor for the balance of
his term. This formula had ironically been drafted by Mboya and Njonjo in 1964.
According to Goldsworthy, the Gatundu group now feared that if Mboya were
given an opening under these arrangements, he could mesmerize parliament and
ensure his own election. In March, the government introduced a constitutional
amendment bill providing that if the president died, the vice president would
automatically succeed him for the rest of his term. Mboya’s position was saved,
however, by the genuine anger and resentment of almost the entire back bench of

25 Otiende 1969, P· 35; The Standard, October 14, 1969 and November 25, 1969; Goldsworthy 1982b, pp. 267-275. 284-285.
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MPs at this further erosion of parliamentary power. Confronted by flat refusal to
pass the bill, the government in April presented a revised version under which the
vice president would succeed the president for six months after which there would
be a national election.
45.

Jennifer Widner26 argues that the office of the President moved rapidly to amend the
constitution in ways that would insulate Kenyatta from factional feuding and limit
the chances that an official opposition party could secure a significant foothold in
Parliament. The sixth and tenth amendments to the constitution, passed in 1966
and 1968 respectively, changed the political map. The sixth amendment gave the
office of the President the power to detain individuals citizens without trial. The
tenth amendment eliminated President Kenyatta's dependence on a parliamentary
majority by replacing procedures for election of the president by Parliament with
procedures for direct, popular election.27

46.

Accompanying legislation terminated provincial councils, restricted independent
candidates (candidates without official party affiliations) from running in local or
national elections, made the legislature a unicameral assembly, and permitted
press censorship. These laws all worked together to insulate the presidency from
the battles within KANU and to hamper efforts to challenge the allocation of
resources favoured by the Kenyatta government.28

47.

Kenyatta himself appears to have condoned some of these tactics when he was
persuaded they were necessary to preserve his government. Yet neither during
this period nor later does it appear that Kenyatta offered blanket approval for such
actions, although his control over members of his coalition varied greatly and
prevents inference about his real views on the subject. In the early years, Kenyatta
appeared sensitive to the possibility that opposition to restriction of political space
would bring economic or social pressure to bear on his government.

48.

In 1966, Kenyatta suffered a stroke. Njonjo and Moi, without consulting the cabinet,
hurriedly put up a third version of the succession plan which retained the six
month interim presidency by the vice president but reduced his powers in certain
areas. Still concerned with combating Mboya as a possible successor, they added a
completely new clause raising the minimum age of presidential candidates from 35
to 40. At the time Mboya was only 39 years old. On this point they miscalculated, for
when Kenyatta recovered, according to Goldsworthy, he admonished both Njonjo

26 Widner, A. Jennifer, The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From "Harambee!" to "Nyayo!". Berkeley: University of California, 1992.
Online book found at http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft9h4nb6fv/ visited 12/2/13
27 Ibid
28 Mueller, "Government and Opposition in Kenya," p. 410
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and Moi and asked them to withdraw the bill. Nevertheless, Goldsworthy argues
that Njonjo, Koinange and Mungai were still determined to get Mboya out of the
way and they became increasingly desperate as Kenyatta’s health deteriorated.
49.

By this point most analysts agree that a clear rift had emerged between Mboya
and the Gatundu group, led by Njonjo. Recognizing this growing tension Mboya
decided to back off. In May 1965, a by-election was held in Gem constituency to
elect a successor to Argwings Kodhek who had been mysteriously killed in a road
accident. Mboya both as party Secretary-General and as the sole remaining Luo
minister at the highest level was naturally expected to spearhead the government
campaign on behalf of its Luo candidate. Mboya declined to get involved, and
it therefore fell upon Mungai to lead the KANU campaign. Mboya’s unspoken
message was, ‘let them see what they can do without me’.

50.

The KANU candidate was defeated. In the view of some analysts this incident was the
final straw for KANU A; the factor that hardened them against Mboya once and for all.
The political tensions and struggle thus intensified, culminating in the assassination
of Mboya in broad daylight in downtown Nairobi on the morning of 5 July 1969.

Arrest and trial of alleged assassin
51.

Nahashon Isaac Njenga Njoroge was arrested and convicted for Mboya’s
assassination. Njenga had trained in Bulgaria as a mechanic but could not find
work in Kenya. Frustrated, Njenga became a youth winger and hired security
guards for politicians in the city. Shortly before Mboya was shot, Njenga had been
arrested for carrying an illegal firearm. He was however released on the condition
that he acts as a police informer, providing information on politicians of interest to
the government. Njenga was sentenced to death on 11 September 1969 by Justice
Simpson.29 On 8 November 1969 Njenga was executed.

52.

Before he was hanged at Kamiti Maximum Prison, Njenga confessed to hangman
Kirugumi Wa Wanjiku that he had the ‘logistical support’ of three senior police
officers with whom he stalked Mboya on the morning of 5 July 1969 before he
shot him. When he was arrested the murder weapon was found in his house in
Ofafa Jericho, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Joginder Singh Sokhi, asked
Njenga; ‘Is this gun that killed Mboya?” Njenga retorted: “Why don’t you ask
the big man? We did what we were told’.30 Njenga’s reference to the ‘big man’ is
an oft-repeated refrain, convincing many Kenyans that the plan to assassinate

29 Kwendo Opanga, Daily Nation, July 17, 1990, p.5
30 Daily Nation, September 3, 1969, p.1).
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Mboya came from the highest levels of the government. Little was done at the
investigations stage or the trial stage to follow up on this reference to more
powerful accomplices, fuelling further speculation of government involvement
and cover up.

The Aftermath
53.

Mboya’s death was mourned across the country. In a poem, Macgoye asked
pertinent questions about the death of Tom Mboya which led to so much distress
in the land. She asks a question for freedom, for "the hunters go unchecked"
after they have taken away the freedom to live, think and act from a leader who
promised to be extremely helpful to the poor who needed him most and to the
nation.
Who calls him rich in worldly things?
We knew him rich in peasant tongue,
Thought in each language newly sprung
and courtesy, the grace of kings.31

54.

The effects of the murder of Tom Mboya have lasted until today. Specifically, it
divided the Luo and Kikuyu communities in ways that are still felt today. It resulted
in demonstrations against President Kenyatta at Mboya’s requiem service. After
the suspected assassin was identified as a Kikuyu, Colins Leys observed that ‘the
Kikuyu leadership responded by inaugurating a mass oathing programme among
the GEMA tribes’.32 The subsequent banning of KPU in October 1969 and the
detention of Oginga Odinga and other leaders without trial sent additional signals
to the Luo ethnic group, furthering the divide between the two communities.

55.

The animosity between the Luo and Kikuyu communities broke out into outright
violence during the visit of Kenyatta to dedicate the Russian Hospital in Kisumu.
During the visit, a large crowd of Luos reportedly menaced Kenyatta’s security. The
security guards fired back in what later came to be known as the ‘Kisumu massacre’.
The government accused KPU of being subversive, intentionally stirring up interethnic strife, and accepting foreign money to promote anti-national activities.
The proscription of KPU returned Kenya to a de facto single party state. Nyanza
Province, like many other parts of Kenya, was virtually written off from ‘national’
development plans.

31 Ibid
32 The initials GEMA means -Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association- an organisation created to advance the social and political needs
of peoples descended from the mythological figure Mumbi: the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru peoples. It was founded in 1971 by Njenga
Karume.
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Josiah Mwangi Kariuki
56.

Like Tom Mboya, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki (popularly known as J.M Kariuki) was another
‘rising star’ in Kenya politics.33 He consistently advocated that the government
guarantee a fairer distribution of the country's resources to all Kenyans. Like
Mboya, he was increasingly viewed as a popular alternative to President Kenyatta
and his inner circle, and like Mboya and Pinto, his rhetoric threatened to weaken
the economic and political benefits shared by the President’s inner circle and its
beneficiaries. In March 1975, J.M Kariuki was brutally murdered at Ngong forest in
Nairobi.

57.

According to David Throup, J.M Kariuki was a threat to President Kenyatta because
he was attempting to subvert Kikuyu sub-nationalism from within. Whereas Mboya
and Odinga as Luos had been compelled by their ethnicity to work from the
outside and secure support by their populist rhetoric or trade union past, Kariuki
was a former Mau Mau detainee and could challenge the authority of the Kiambu
elite by mobilizing a populist Kikuyu following of discontented former Mau Mau.
Throup argues that:
In a conflict within the Kikuyu community, Kariuki threatened to mobilize the rest against
Kiambu by emphasizing the unequal distribution of state resources, and to destroy the
stability of the regime from within Kenyatta's political bailiwick. Kenyatta, of course, had
attempted to ensure that Nyeri and Murang'a benefited from development and welfare
schemes as much as Kiambu, and that the Kamba, with their important position in the
senior officer corps and in the army's ranks, and the Embu and Meru also prospered.
Political power, however, and the distribution of economic rewards and development
measures was concentrated in the hands of loyal Kiambu Kikuyu. While Murang`a, Nyeri,
Embu, Meru, Machakos, and Kitui had only one cabinet minister each under Kenyatta,
Kiambu MPs occupied six key government ministries.34

58.

As President Kenyatta’s health continued to decline, J.M Kariuki was believed to
have his eyes on the presidency. His dashing style struck a powerful chord with
the masses, but also earned him bitter enemies in Kenyatta's State House.35 Not
only did he give generously to charity, but he was also known to have given
the princely sum of Ksh 80,000 to a public cause at a time when the President's
highest known donation was Ksh 3,000 to the Jomo Kenyatta College of
Agriculture at Juja.36 His speeches were increasingly populist. In 1973, on the
10th anniversary of Kenya's independence, President Kenyatta joyfully extolled

33 Charles N. Mwaura, “political succession and related conflicts in Kenya” A paper prepared for the USAID Conference on Conflict
Resolution in the Greater Horn of Africa held at Methodist Guest House, Nairobi, 27-28 March 1997.
34 David W. Throup, "The Construction and Destruction of the Kenyatta State," in The Political Economy of Kenya, ed. M. G. Schatzberg
(New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 37.
35 See The Daily Nation' of Thursday, 2nd March 2000, p 9-11
36 Ibid, p.10

446

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

the country's achievements while J.M Kariuki spoke elsewhere that Kenya had
become a country of 10 millionaires and ten million beggars.37 According to a
witness who spoke to the Commission:
On land distribution, J.M Kariuki owned land in Nyandarua and bought a farm in Gilgil
which he called Kanyamwe Farm. However, he decided to share out the Ol Kalou land
with the needy and he called upon other landowners to do likewise. This worked
seriously against him as the move was to be termed subversive and socialistic. He
organized his constituents and formed groups to raise money to buy land in Kamiti area
but they were blocked. He toured the country helping new groups to buy land and
settle themselves on such land, thus posing a challenge to the Government on matters
of settlement of the millions who were landless. J.M Kariuki came up with a statement
on how Kenya had become a country of ten millionaires and ten million beggars. This
was seen as causing “actual bodily harm to the body of politics in the country and the
time would be opportune he would be made to pay for it.38

59.

In 1974, Kariuki was banned from addressing gatherings in colleges and rallies in his
constituency. His pistol was confiscated. He thus resigned from office and became
a back bencher. The restriction went so far as to prevent a birthday celebration
– road blocks were sent up on all roads leading to his house, and guests both
domestic and foreign were forced to leave:
The parliamentary term 1969-1974 was the roughest time for J.M as he was making efforts
to put many wrongs right. He was deemed to be fighting the system and was accused
of plotting to overthrow Kenyatta. This raised the question of Kenyatta succession as
the president was now approaching towards the 90s in age. J.M Kariuki was banned
from addressing gatherings in colleges and in rallies in his constituency. J.M was still an
Assistant Minister but even then he was banned from addressing his constituents. In
1974 as the country was approaching a general election, the then District Commissioner,
Mr. Thuo had been given strict instructions to impose the ban. He went even further
and took away J.M’s pistol. Whichever route or road the administration knew he would
be passing, had a road block manned by the Kenya Police personnel. J.M found it very
odd for a Government Minister to be treated this way while still in office. He chose to
resign from that post of Assistant Minister and joined the backbenchers in Parliament.
He gave reasons for his prompt action as being pushed too far. However, he remained a
candidate for his seat and even without campaigning; he won the 1974 general election
with a landslide. It will be unfair to forget one very important event of the family that
was to celebrate James Kariuki’s birthday at his home in Kanyamwe Farm at Gilgil. The
orders to the police and DC to ban all JM’s gatherings were applied and the roadblocks
were on all ways which led to Kanyamwe Farm. All those who had managed to make
it to the farm were ordered to leave. Many foreign friends of J.M and the Press were
not spared. The press reported the happenings but no one owned up. Human rights,
freedom, justice and family privacy were all abused and to this day, no healing has ever
taken place. The family had to bear the trauma.39

37
38
39

Ibid
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Political Assassinations/5 March 2012/p. 9.
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Political Assassinations/5 March 2012/p. 10.
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60.

J.M Kariuki was informed of a plot against his life from colleagues in Parliament.
They asked him to seek audience with Kenyatta and give his side of the story
concerning his ‘people’s revolt against the government’. An organization called the
Maskini Liberation Movement was formed, and leaflets were distributed bearing
Kariuki’s name. A series of bombs rocked the city and police informers credited the
Maskini Liberation Movement as responsible.

61.

Kariuki became increasingly stressed by the state of affairs and was advised to take
a rest by his doctors. An Overseas Trade Corporation (OTC) bus he had booked
to the Coast exploded killing 27 and injuring 100. Kariuki escaped after a friend,
Isaac Macharia, dissuaded him from travelling at the last minute. Later, Gethi asked
Kariuki to explain his innocence regarding the city bombing to security chiefs ‘in
a friendly atmosphere’, on the promise that he (Gethi) would protect him.40 On
Sunday, March 2, Gethi went to Kariuki’s home. Gethi provided him with a pistol
as protection. Later, Gethi picked Kariuki from the Hilton Hotel where the two got
into Gethi’s car, leaving Karikuki’s Mercedes at the parking lot. It was 7.00 pm. That
was the last time J.M was seen alive.

62.

An investigation by the Daily Nation in 2000 claimed that the Special Branch
released a convicted bank robber, Peter Kinyanjui, alias Mark Twist, and bank
robber Pius Kibathi, to trail Kariuki.41 The Daily Nation alleged that Gethi took
Kariuki to the Special Branch headquarters at Kingsway House along Muindi
Mbingu Street where he met police reservist Patrick Shaw, National Youth Service
boss Waruhiu Itote, Criminal Investigations Department (CID) head Ignatius Nderi
and Kenyatta’s head of security, Arthur Wanyoike Thungu, who asked him about
some ‘missing foreign funds’ when Kariuki was Kenyatta’s private secretary and
later Assistant Minister for Agriculture. In the ensuing argument, Thungu punched
Kariuki on the mouth, knocking out three of his lower teeth. When Kariuki’s body
was later found, three lower teeth were missing, providing some corroboration
for this version of events. Provoked, Kariuki is said to have taken out the pistol he
had been given by Gethi, but before he could fire Gethi shot him on the right arm
‘to protect Thungu’.42 Three men brought in to testify about Kariuki’s involvement
in the city bombings were asked to handcuff him,43 and Kariuki was forced to
enter into the car of Ngong Ward Councillor John Mutung’u. Kariuki’s body was
later found, without fingers and eyes gorged out in the Ngong forest. Testimony
presented to the Commission in camera is consistent with some of the findings of
the Daily Nation investigation. In particular the Commission was told that a car
filled with GSU officers, including senior superintendent Kiarie, was found near

40
41
42
43
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the body of J.M. Those individuals were arrested, but were quickly released on
the orders of OCS Lee Kinyanjui.

State cover-up
63.

A number of incidents since the death of Kariuki point to a cover up with respect
to his murder. First, the then minister of state in the office of the president, Mbiyu
Koinange, declined an invitation by the Parliamentary Select Committee headed
by Elijah Mwangale which was investigating the disappearance and death of J.M
Kariuki. The minister neither attended the meeting nor sent any apologies for his
failure to respond to the committee’s written invitation. The then vice president
Daniel Moi and attorney general Charles Njonjo accepted the invitation to the select
committee. However, when the sub-committee visited the CID Headquarters, they
were not allowed to inspect both the investigation files on the murder of J.M and the
ones on the bomb explosions the day before the disappearance of J.M from Hilton
Hotel.

64.

Second, it is reported that after the Mwangale Select Committee started its work
on the investigation, there was a lack of cooperation from the Kenya Police Force
under its commissioner, Bernard Hinga. Mungai, who was the Senior Assistant
Commissioner of police in charge of Rift Valley Province, where the body of J.M
was found, and his junior officers were unwilling to disclose what they knew
without the permission of their immediate superiors.44 On the other hand, when
the District Commissioner of Nyandarua, Thuo, appeared before the committee to
be examined and give evidence, the report described his attitude as ‘negative and
hostile’ forcing the committee to conclude that he not only did not tell the truth as
he knew, but was also not a truthful witness.45

65.

Third, witnesses with information on the disappearance of J.M were harassed,
intimidated and tortured by members of the CID after being held in custody for
questioning.46 Witnesses called by the committee to testify on events at Hilton
Hotel on the evening of 2 March 1975, were found to have passed through the
hands of police and made prior statements, hence there was reason to believe
that they were frightened to change what they knew when they appeared before
the Committee. Police also refused to produce statements made by witnesses on
the disappearance and death of J.M. Additionally, and as claimed by the police,

44 Ibid. see section 1.4
45 Report of the Select Committee on the Disappearance and Murder of the Late Member for Nyandarua North, the Hon. J.M. Kariuki,
p. 1070
46 For instance, Mwithaga had claimed that Patrick Shaw, who had never had any formal training in the police work, was the chief
inspector at the Kenya police reserve, was recruited by colonial government and yet worked together with other police officers Clark
and Young were patrolling around Nairobi, harassing and beating up anybody who witnessed what happened at Hilton Hotel. For
instance, one newspaper vendor who witnessed what happened to J.M at Hilton was beaten by Mr. Shaw and driven away. This
could be a way of silencing the witnesses. See Report above.
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the committee was not able to interrogate a material witness, as he had left the
country and had not returned. It later turned out he was actually in Nairobi at the
time, a fact that was known to the police.
66.

Fourth, Inspector Henry Waga, who was the deputy to Inspector Kinyanjui, took
charge of the investigation. He proceeded to the crime scene and collected the
body without taking fingerprints or any photographs of the body in question.
The body was then taken to the City Mortuary, where it lay hidden from 3-12
March 1975 when the body was positively identified as belonging to J.M
Kariuki.47 Gunshot cartridges that killed Kariuki showed that they had been
fired by a gun belonging to a member of the presidential guard. Pius Kibathi, a
criminal and police informer, was implicated in placing Kariuki’s expensive watch
inside the toilet of Makongeni Police Station three weeks after he went missing.48
It later emerged that Kibathi was to be the scapegoat for the assassination as
part of being implicated as the police informer on the city bombings by Maskini
Liberation Movement.49

67.

Fifth, to support the argument of a conspiracy to kill and cover-up J.M Kariuki’s
assassination, a witness before the Commission stated when the wives of J.M
Kariuki and Members of Parliament went to view the body of J.M Kariuki at City
Mortuary not only were they denied entry into the mortuary but that the ‘mortuary
attendant’ at the time was a known Special Branch official:
When we reached the City Mortuary, we were not allowed to enter except the compound.
It was now obvious that the Government had started a kind of self defence mechanism
in fear of the truth that was now coming out. One senior superintendent of police in
charge of Nairobi CID and who was on leave found us there. He knew many of us and
he wanted to find out why we were all there. It appeared he was also in the dark over
this issue. We told him we knew J.M Kariuki’s body was in the mortuary and nobody
wanted to open the place for us to view that body, and there was one police officer
from Parliament who had been attached to the Special Branch and who was identified
by hon. Grace Onyango and asked why he had a label of a mortuary attendant on his
coat. The special Branch officer attached to Parliament was now an attendant. The senior
superintendent of police was known as Mr. Kibera. So, he asked this attendant to open
the place for us, so that MPs could view the body if it was true it was there. He said he
had instructions not to open for anybody.50

68.

This suggests that the police had something to hide, or were being instructed to
hide relevant evidence. Further, the Mwangale Committee was not allowed to
read the investigation files from the CID investigations, which is a pointer to the
fact that the CID may have had something to hide and was afraid the committee

47 Ibid, 4.7
48 Kamau Ngotho, in quoting Blundell, A love Affair with the Sun,1994, Daily Nation, February 11, 2002, p. 11
49 Michael Blundell, A Love Affair with the Sun, 1994
50 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Political Assassinations/5 March 2012/p. 13.
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would find out.51 Even more worrying was the fact that the public who were at the
public gallery in parliament were not allowed to follow parliament proceedings
by the speaker.
69.

Sixth, Silas Mburu Gichua, the then Nakuru Mayor, and other officials gave
conflicting information to the Select Committee. For example, Mburu claimed he
was not in Nairobi on the day J.M died, yet the committee had information to prove
that he was indeed in Nairobi on that day. Additionally, J.M’s watch was found at
Makongeni police line, and yet no police person gave any information on how it
had arrived there.52

70.

Seventh, the Select Committee was instructed by President Kenyatta to remove
the names of specific individuals from the report, as reported to the Commission
by a member of the select committee:
When we presented the report to the then President Kenyatta, as a matter of procedure
and courtesy, we were doing so, so that we do not table the report in Parliament before he
knew what the contents were. I remember he looked at us and he was fuming. But then
we were able to develop some elementary psychology and cooled him down because
I remember telling him: “Mzee, throughout the time we sat in this Committee, nobody
mentioned your name; nobody wrote to us with evidence containing your name and that
having been the case, surely, it would have been witch-hunting to introduce your name in
the report when you had not been mentioned. But all the others we have mentioned here,
Ministers and public officers, we have many documents which were sent to us by people
as proof of their evidence. Others came in person, recorded and stated what they knew
about them.” At that point, I remember Mzee looking at me and he felt convinced. So, at
least, we had time to discuss a few other things. It is at that point he asked Mr. Mwangale,
the Chairman: “Why do you have my Minister’s name here and my bodyguard? These are
in the Office of the President. It appears if it had not been for politeness, then you would
have put my name because leaving my name and putting these names here is the thing
I am questioning you.” Before Mwangale responded, Mzee cancelled those two names
himself with his own pen and he asked Mwangale to initial the concurrence.53

71.

This dramatic interference in the committee’s report was apparently minor
compared to what some had been warned about:
I remember that Mr. Shikuku had warned us before we went to State House because
he refused to join us to go there. Even Mr. Seroney did not join us. He had told us: “It is
better that you go a few of you because you may never return and if you do not return,
we will tackle this issue outside here before we are also picked up.54

51 Report of the Select Committee on the Disappearance and Murder of the Late Member for Nyandarua North, the Hon. J.M. Kariuki,
p. 949
52 Report of the Select Committee on the Disappearance and Murder of the Late Member for Nyandarua North, the Hon. J.M. Kariuki, p.
1140
53 TJRC/Thematic Hearing on Political Assassinations/5 March 2012/p. 17
54 TJRC/Thematic Hearing on Political Assassinations/5 March 2012/p. 17
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72.

At the same time the President apparently mobilized political support against the
committee and its report:
I remember the President staying in Mombasa … some Members of Parliament and other
dignitaries were being summoned to Mombasa to go and support the Government
against our committee. They would be given microphones on television to state how
they stood by Mzee Kenyatta in that scenario. This was meant to be fighting us.55

73.

The challenges the committee faced directly with the President translated into
Parliament when they tried to table their report, as described by a member of the
committee:
We were asked to stop and flash our fingers with the KANU salute. This was high politics.
I sensed, therefore, that the system was at war with itself as to how to conclude this
matter without it being affected adversely or otherwise. Having realized this, when we
went back to Parliament, I approached my chairman, Hon. Mwangale, and I told him let
us move quickly. Let us table this report now even if it is for five minutes. Mwangale
tried, but the Speaker Mati refused to accept the move. He said there is no hurry. We can
wait for another day or two. He did not realize that we were sitting on a very hot bath. I
told Mwangale if he was not able to table it, he allows me to do so as his vice-chairman.
When Fred Mati refused us to table it, we had no choice but to wait for the Deputy
Speaker, Mr. John Seroney. When the Speaker went for tea and Hon. Seroney took the
Chair, Mr. Seroney read all the papers which the Speaker had left behind, but there was
nothing about this move. So, when Mwangale tried again table the report, Mr. Seroney
allowed him to do so. He said since there were no instructions by the Speaker on this
matter, he decided to exercise his authority as the Deputy Speaker. The Deputy Speaker
put the question to decide whether Mr. Mwangale was in order to table the report and
the House allowed it to be tabled. Mr. Mwangale was now allowed to table the report.
He moved the Motion and I seconded it.56

74.

Yet this maneuver that resulted in the report being tabled had immediate political
consequences for those involved. Again, as testified before the Commission by a
member of the committee:
When we were voting for the adoption of this Report … a number of Ministers … stood
up and spoke in the House in support of the Motion. One such was Hon. John Keen. He
was an Assistant Minister for Public Works. He remarked and I quote: “Since the hyenas
of Ngong Forest did not eat the body of J.M. Kariuki, they should be honoured with EGH
State medals and what have you.” It is on the records of the House. That evening, he was
sacked as the Assistant Minister for Public Works. On the day of voting for the report,
Hon. Masinde Muliro who was a Cabinet Minister and Hon. Peter Kibisu, who was an
Assistant Minister, voted for the adoption of the report. In the evening or at round 6.00
p.m., they had lost their positions in the Government.57

55 TJRC/Thematic Hearing on Political Assassinations/5 March 2012/p. 21
56 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Political Assassinations/5 March 2012/p. 18
57 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Political Assassinations/5 March 2012/p. 19-20.
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All the above reasons, point not only to the involvement of the state or its agents in
the assassination of J.M Kariuki, but also its involvement in subsequent cover-ups.

The impact
76.

Kariuki’s murder and the subsequent cover-up by government officials proved to
be a greater threat to stability than was posed while he was alive.58 Kariuki’s murder
ignited the country. University of Nairobi students rioted leading to the closure of
the University.

77.

Macgoye narrates in Coming to Birth how the people never stopped to miss their
elected but killed leaders. They mourned and commemorated them. She writes
that:
J.M. Kariuki burst upon the scene as a martyr, and a paroxysm of grief ran through the
city. The skies were laden that April and it grew colder and colder.

78.

And pop music makers of the day, Kamaru and others, did not fear. They asked
President Kenyatta in songs in his mother tongue what happened to Kariuki. The
song went, ‘People of our mother since Kariuki has died ... and he has not stolen or
killed anybody. He has died for being good ... and you ask yourself what you will
die for ... a song I heard and which moves me still’. President Kenyatta banned the
song.

79.

A Tanzania band too commemorated J.M. Kariuki only for the song to be banned
by the Tanzanian President, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, upon the request of President
Kenyatta. The song goes:
Kifo cha J.M Kariuki
Sisi watu wakenya tuna uchungu mwingi sana
Eeh kariuki enda salama sisi tuliobaki tuko taabuni
Sisi sote twajuasio kawaida, nasio cha halali
Tunajua natunakungoja urudi59

80.

While there is no question that the death of J.M Kariuki had enormous political
implications, what is often lost in the case of such high profile assassinations are
the lingering effects of the death, and the narrative around the death, of a loved
and revered family member. The son of J.M., Antony Kariuki, testified before the
Commission:

58 Ingham, 1990:104.
59 Song by Patrick Palicidia, Western Jazz band , 1976
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We have lived in that dark place, unwittingly so. But there is a vast difference between
us and them, and it is that we are innocent and this situation was thrust upon us and
they are guilty and they are the ones who were entrusted in us. In talking about time,
in your investigations and compilations, I want you to remember and this is on recordJames’ Time Piece which was earlier mentioned and we engraved it with his name after
curiously looking for it and finding it at Makongeni Police Station.60

81.

He went further to say:“The brutal murder of the late J.M Kariuki denied us our
inherent right to family, parental care and happy childhood, optimum education,
health, welfare and reasonable standard of living, measurable or commensurate
with our father’s economic and financial ability”61.

82.

Antony’s sister, who has tirelessly pursued the story of her father’s assassination,
poignantly recounted to the Commission its impact on her life:
I was 11 years old. I was in a boarding school in Eldoret. We used to read newspapers
every weekend. That weekend, we had seen the article that J.M. is missing. So, I was a bit
concerned because I knew that it was not his habit to go anywhere without saying where
he had gone. I had also grown up knowing that there were people who did not like him.
So, when the news came that he died, that morning I was in the Convent School and the
headmistress called me and she said: “Remember, your father is missing. They have found
him but unfortunately he is dead”. There was no counselling and so each one of us was
forced to deal with our emotions and our feelings in our own separate ways. That is why
you heard my brother talking about depression and other social cycles that affected us.
I would like to confirm that I understood exactly what had happened to my father, even
though I was 11 years old […] My biggest fear was that my mother would be next.62

83.

It is not only the fact of his death that has continued to effect the family, but the
manner in which he was killed, and the stories that were propagated to explain,
and cover up, the true motives behind his assassination:
At the time of his death, the late Hon. J. M Kariuki was one of the wealthiest Kenyans,
brightest politician and administrator. He had many friends across the political divide
and among the wealthiest and the poorest. The family socialized with families of equal
financial status and those who did not have. Subsequent to the assassination of their
husband, the first thing that happened is that their friends in the higher echelons of
politics and finances started isolating them. They were no longer welcome to the families
of those who were wealthy for fear that they too would be victimized politically. So, the
first thing that happened to the family was isolation. It looked like the Government of the
day deliberately put fear in politicians and business people to keep away from the J.M
family with the exception of Mark Mwithaga and Waruru Kanja. Those are the only true
family friends who stood with the family through the difficult times.63

60
61
62
63
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Robert Ouko
Background
84.

President Daniel arap Moi’s administration had its fair share of political
assassinations. The country had become a de jure single party state in 1982 after
Parliament, under duress from the Executive arm of government, enacted a law
that made de jure what had been a de facto single-party state. Events in August
1982, when a coup was attempted by Kenya Air Force soldiers, were to change
the political course of the country. With the failure of the coup, President Moi
acted to ensure that there would not be another challenge to his government by
turning Kenya into a police state. The secret police became a formidable arm of
government; they became the ever present eyes and ears of the executive. The
security apparatus was systematically employed to eliminate ‘dissidents’ and any
politicians who were a threat, whether real or imagined, to the government

85.

One of the most gruesome events during this period was the assassination of
Robert Ouko, the first major political murder during the Moi administration. Ouko
was the MP for Kisumu Town and Minister for Foreign Affairs when he was reported
missing on 16 February 1990, three days after leaving his Koru home near Kisumu.
His body was found badly burnt, but the face was recognizable. His arms and legs
had been smashed. A bullet had passed through his skull. There were no signs
of struggle near Nyando River at the foot of Got Alila Hills where his body was
discovered by a 13 year old boy. When the grim news spread, people broke down,
sobbing. All public places closed shop in Kisumu.

86.

President Moi said that the partly burnt body was found ‘in circumstances that at
the moment, suggested foul play’. The Police Commissioner, Philip Mbithi, said it
was ‘a cruel, inhuman and most bloody murder’.

87.

What follows is the Commission’s best deduction of the events leading up to and
including the murder of Robert Ouko. We have devoted more attention to this
assassination than to the others for two reasons. First, the Ouko assassination
has been the subject of investigation by all three branches of government (the
executive, Parliament, and the Judiciary) as well as one of the world’s oldest and
most respected investigative bodies, and yet there is little clarity concerning who
was responsible for Ouko’s death or why he was killed. Second, the chairman of
the Commission is a witness to some of the events leading up to the assassination,
and has himself been the subject of some of the inquiries around Ouko’s death.
The controversies surrounding the chairman’s conflict of interest in this matter
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require us to be particularly thorough and forthright with respect to this particular
assassination.
88.

The version of events below is based upon an analysis of the numerous investigations
undertaken of the murder, including the investigation by Scotland Yard that was
performed at the request of President Moi, and documents and testimony received
by the Commission during the course of its work. In evaluating this information, the
Commission gave slightly more weight to investigations and testimony collected
contemporaneously with the murder than to those investigations and inquiries
conducted many years, sometimes decades, after the events described.

Ouko’s Death
89.

Ouko disappeared from his Koru farm in the early hours of 13 February 1990. A
witness who appeared before the Commission and who had knowledge about the
death of Ouko stated:
Actually, it is the DC’s vehicle in Nakuru which was brought so that he could recognize it
and board, but when he tried to get in he saw strange people. There was rumour going
round that a helicopter was involved. I tried to find out whether it was true but the two
inspectors, Wekesa and Kinyanjui told me that they could neither confirm nor deny. But,
definitely, he was taken from Kisumu to Nakuru.64

90.

That afternoon, a herdsboy saw smoke around the Got Alila Hill, approached
the area and discovered a human body on fire.65 He ran away to inform nearby
villagers. Although, for whatever reason, those villagers never reported the news
to police, this information is nevertheless critical in establishing that Ouko was
killed shortly after he disappeared. After the initiation of an extensive official
missing-persons search for Ouko, authorities eventually discovered Ouko’s body
just a few kilometres away from his home on 16 February 1990.

91.

Ouko had a broken right leg at the ankle, bruising on his body, a gunshot wound to
the head, and his torso had been badly burned. The burning had been contained so
that his face was still easily identifiable, and there were a handful of items from his
home to further ensure a positive identification. Additionally, the .38 revolver found
near his body was his personal state-issued weapon.

92.

One of the witnesses who appeared before the Commission stated ‘the site was
pathetic. Some fire was still burning at the site and there was nobody to identify the

64 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Nairobi/6 March 2012.
65 John Troon, “Disappearance and Death of Dr. Robert Ouko EGH, MP Report,” (28 August 1990), paragraph 38. (hereinafter
referred to as Troon Report)
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body. The body was very small and all the veins were not there. His teeth had been
removed. His tongue was not there and only some part of the skull was there”.66
93.

Dr. Jason Kaviti was the Kenyan state pathologist at that time. He performed a
cursory post-mortem at the scene and an actual autopsy in Nairobi. He initially
claimed Ouko’s broken leg was due to the heat of the fire, then later attributed it to
blunt force trauma.67 The actual cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head
which, according to Dr. Kaviti, was self-inflicted. Between the state of the crime
scene and Dr. Kaviti’s conclusions, the government quickly went forward with the
story that Ouko had committed suicide.

New Scotland Yard and the Troon Report
94.

The announcement of Ouko’s death was met with an intense public outcry.
Demonstrations and riots quickly followed based on the perception of a
government cover-up, particularly once the theory that Ouko had committed
suicide was propagated. The idea that Ouko somehow broke his own leg, shot
himself in the head, doused himself in petrol, and then lit himself on fire was too
far-fetched to be believable. Additionally, Ouko was an anti-corruption crusader
who was popular throughout the country and beyond. His death occurred on the
heels of the deaths of other popular Kenyan public figures including J.M Kariuki,
and Tom Mboya. The politically-motivated death of another popular politician
perceived to be fair and incorrupt only served to increase the public uproar. The
government’s response of arresting a handful of individuals for the crime of ‘rumour
mongering’ did not accomplish its intended goal of intimidation, but rather further
incensed the prevailing public mood.

95.

In order to placate the public, uphold the nation’s international image, demonstrate
transparency, and at least ostensibly to solve the crime, on 19 February 1990
President Moi requested that the New Scotland Yard commandeer the Ouko
investigation from the Kenyan Police and Special Branch. The idea was that in
the eyes of the public, a neutral third-party would carry out a fair and effective
investigation, and Moi promised to make their findings available to the public.

96.

On 21 February 1990, the team from New Scotland Yard arrived in Kenya. The
team was led by Detective Superintendent John Troon, and included Detective
Inspector Graham Dennis, and Detective Sergeant David Sanderson from the
Special Operation Branch of the International and Organized Crime Branch.68 They

66 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Kisumu/16 July 2011.
67 Troon Report, paragraph 48.
68 Jonah Anguka, Absolute Power: The Ouko Murder Mystery, Pen Press Limited (1998), page 70. (hereinafter referred to as Anguka)
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were accompanied by Dr. Ian West, a renowned forensic pathologist from the
Home Office. Dr. West performed an autopsy that clarified that Ouko’s death was
not a suicide but conclusively a murder, and the investigation commenced.
97.

While investigating the death of Dr. Ouko, New Scotland Yard’s Detective
Superintendent John Troon set out possible motives stemming from his
investigation of two key events: the revival of the Kisumu Molasses Plant Project
and the February 1990 Kenyan delegation to Washington, D.C.

Molasses project theory
98.

The history of the molasses plant dates back to the 1970s. The project was seen as
a turnkey agrochemical project undertaken between the Madhvani Group and the
Kenyan government.69 According to Troon, there was evidence contained in the
statement of John Reru that suggested that money being invested in the project
by the then Minister of Industry, Mr. Nonjonjo, was for an unknown reason being
either ‘diverted’ or overspent.70 Eventually, the money dried up and the project was
abandoned. Troon concluded that either corruption or mismanagement of funds
explained the project’s fate.71

99.

Troon further stated that in the same department at that time, and holding senior
positions, were Mr. Nicholas Biwott and Mr. Joab Omino.72 This is significant because
the revived project would later suffer from allegations of corruption involving these
same two men.

100. In 1987, Ouko, then Minister of Industry and Member of Parliament for Kisumu
Rural, became deeply involved in the revitalisation of the project. Troon believed
that Ouko’s motivation for undertaking such a project stemmed from his hope of
enhancing his political career and increasing jobs in the heavily unemployed area.73
It is noted that in late 1987 President Moi made a public declaration supporting
Ouko in his endeavour to revitalise the project.74
101. Ouko is said to have been actively involved in fighting corruption in the Kenyan
government, and Troon was under the impression that Ouko sought a qualified
European company ‘with no misuse, by corruption or otherwise, of the finances to
complete the project’.75 Ouko reached out to Mr. Airaghi and Mrs. Briner-Mattern,
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
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The Risk Advisory Group Limited, Executive Summary of the Report to the Parliamentary Select Committee Investigating the Death of
the Late Hon. Dr. Robert Ouko Submitted on Behalf of the Hon. Nicholas Biwott (November 2003), paragraph 2. (hereinafter referred
to as TRAG Executive Summary)
Troon Report, paragraph 145.
Id. at paragraph 146.
Id. at paragraph 145.
Id. at paragraph 147.
Id. at paragraph 148.
Id. at paragraph 149.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

company directors of BAK Group Switzerland. The company was responsible for
finding reputable European donor companies to undertake projects in East Africa.
102.

According to The Risk Advisory Group (TRAG), the company hired by Mr. Biwott to
investigate Troon’s allegations regarding Mr. Biwott’s involvement in the assassination,
BAK was not the reputable company it claimed to be. While Troon found the Directors
of BAK to be reputable and credible in his interviews with them, TRAG believed
them to be disreputable opportunists. According to TRAG’s report, Mr. Airaghi was a
convicted criminal and Mrs. Briner-Mattern was a temporary secretary. Reportedly,
Mr. Airaghi was convicted in 1987 in a criminal court in Milan, Italy, of attempted
extortion and sentenced to 2.5 years in prison and fined. Additionally, “neither had a
history in successful, legitimate, international finance [n]or agrochemical projects.”76
They reported that in November 1988, Otieno, who was the newly elected Minister
of Industry, had stated in Parliament that BAK was a firm of “doubtful integrity”.

103. Nevertheless, BAK introduced Ouko to two Italian companies who were interested
in undertaking the feasibility study for commencement of the project: Techint of
Milan and Italcement of Bergami. Meetings were held with Kenyan Government
officials including then Minister of Finance, Professor Saitoti, then Private Secretary
to the President, Mr. Kiptanui, then Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Mwangale, then
Permanent Secretary to the President’s office, Mr. Letting, then Chairman of KANU,
Mr. Aringo, Dr. Ouko, and Nicholas Biwott.77
104. Mrs. Briner-Mattern states that after the initial contact, she, her partner, the
delegates from Techint and Italcement, Dr. Ouko, Mr. Aringo, and Mr. Bore visited
the site of the plant at Kisumu. According to Mrs. Briner-Mattern, Dr. Ouko had
been authorized to sign the two offers presented by the Italian companies in order
to commence work on the project.78

Allegations
105. According to Troon, Mrs. Briner-Mattern alleged that Professor Saitoti and Mr.
Biwott were among those who were against the project being revitalised and the
project was then met with problems.79 She alleged that the opposition they faced
was due primarily to ‘commissions’ that had to be paid. She further alleged that
there was a meeting in which the Chairman of the Pan African Bank in Nairobi, Mr.
Aslam, informed them on behalf of Mr. Biwott and Professor Saitoti, that BAK and
the Italian companies would be expected to pay commissions to certain individuals
if they desired the project to move forward. During a meeting with the Director
76
77
78
79

TRAG Executive Summary, paragraph 2.
Troon Report, paragraph 156.
Id. at paragraph 157.
Id. at paragraph 158.
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of Techint, Mrs. Briner-Mattern stated that the terms of the commission were as
follows: if Techint was awarded the contract, the company had to pay commissions
on the total amount of the contracts. Mr. Biwott would receive 15%, Professor
Saitoti 10%, Mr. Mwangale 10%, Mr. Kiptanui 5-10%, and Mr. Aslam 5-10%.80
106. It is further alleged by Mr. Airaghi, co-director of BAK, that the initial approach for
commissions came from Mr. Surtan, a Kenyan official from the office of the Vice
President, who was also allegedly acting on behalf of Professor Saitoti and Mr.
Biwott. However, Mr. Surtan denied that this conversation ever took place.81
107. Both Mrs. Briner-Mattern and Mr. Airaghi stated that when they told Dr. Ouko of the
demanded kickbacks, Ouko became very concerned and frightened, and urged
them to be careful in their negotiations.82 However, Ouko’s reaction to this news
could have been due to multiple reasons. While Ouko could have been concerned
about the corruption and potential danger of the situation, it is also noted that
the 1988 elections were about to commence. Ouko was running for office and
in revitalising the Molasses Project he stood to gain an advantage against his
opponent. Therefore, Ouko had a personal stake in the continuation of the project
and the quick completion of the negotiation phase.
108. However, it should also be noted that after Ouko won the election, he maintained
a strong interest in the project. According to Mrs. Briner-Mattern, he even made an
official government visit to Italy to discuss government financing with the Italian
authorities.83
109. Due to Ouko’s continued interest in the project, Mrs. Briner-Mattern stated that
throughout 1989 and early 1990 she had been in contact with him by telephone
and correspondence in relation to the Molasses Project and her allegations of
corruption. She stated and showed evidence that she had written personally to
President Moi about these allegations and grievances, and while the letter reached
State House, there is no evidence that President Moi received it personally.84
110. One of her grievances dealt specifically with the expulsion of Mr. Airaghi from
Kenya. On 15 March 1989 Mr. Airaghi was arrested by immigration officers while
on business in Kenya, and expelled from the country for allegedly interfering with
government matters.85
80
81
82
83
84
85
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111. Troon stressed that the relationship between BAK and the Kenyan government was
one of dislike and mistrust. Mrs. Briner-Mattern was allegedly denied an audience
with President Moi in regards to her allegations. The relations between the two
entities left BAK with very little credibility in Kenya.86
112. Perhaps for these reasons, Mrs. Briner-Mattern continually reached out to Ouko
and in time arranged for him to allegedly prepare a report corroborating her
accusations for the President.87
113. Troon presented evidence that over the weekend before his murder, Ouko was
seen carrying briefcases that were allegedly full of documents to compile a report
laying out the allegations of corruption within the Kenyan government. Ouko
reportedly hoped to hand the report over to the President within the week.88
114. However, the British investigators did not find these papers that may have been
in Ouko’s possession right before his death. Troon unwaveringly believed that
some of these papers were removed on 16 February by police and/or Special
Branch officers when they searched Ouko’s Koru farm following his disappearance.
However, all of the officers interviewed denied seeing or taking any evidence of
the sort.89
115. Nevertheless, both Directors of BAK stated that at no time did they actually pay the
bribes. They further stated that “because of their refusal to cooperate in respect of
paying commissions, the Molasses contract did not materialise through them and
their recommended companies.”90
116. TRAG, on the other hand, found that the evidence presented by the Directors of
BAK was inconsistent and, in fact, the directors “were prepared to offer bribes or
facilitate the payment of bribes and that shortly before Hon. Dr. Ouko’s death[,]
Marianne Briner-Mattern threatened Dr. Ouko.”91 Additionally, the allegations of
corruption related to the Molasses Project were supposedly already known to
President Moi, and a copy of the report given to a third party. TRAG finds that “to
kill a man to get copies of documentation already with independent third parties
and to try to shut him up after he had purportedly already spoken to President Moi
makes no sense at all.”92
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at paragraph 154.
Id. at paragraph 169.
Id.
Id. at paragraph 171.
Id. at paragraph 176.
TRAG Executive Summary, paragraph 5.
Id. at paragraph 6.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

461

Volume IIA

Chapter FOUR

117. For these reasons, TRAG came to the conclusion that Troon’s findings were
unsupported by evidence, and that any connection between the timing of Ouko’s
death and the preparation of a report on the subject of government corruption is
erroneous.93
118. Although Troon set out these possible motives, it must be stressed that he lacked
direct evidence of Dr. Ouko’s killer’s identity. In the interest of justice he strongly
suggested that more work be undertaken in the investigation. Both TRAG and
Troon pointed out that Troon was met with difficulty and silence in his investigation,
and it is clear that witnesses were aware of more than they were willing to share,
whether due to active intimidation or for other personal reasons.94

Washington trip theory
119. From 29 January 1990 to 2 February 1990, a delegation of 84 Kenyans went on
an unofficial visit to Washington, D.C. to attend the National Prayer Breakfast with
President Bush and other world leaders. Since it was not considered an official
state visit, President Moi was unable to get a private audience with the President
of the United States of America. Ouko led a press conference and also met with
some human rights organizations and US representatives on Capitol Hill.
120. According to the Troon Report, Malacki Oddenyo, the Director of Administration
for Foreign Affairs, told Ouko’s brother Barrack Mbajah that Ouko had a private
meeting with President Bush during the Washington Trip, and that President Moi
was aware of this meeting.95 The meeting apparently caused a great rift between
Ouko and Biwott, with Biwott sarcastically referring to Ouko as ‘Mr. President’ and
the two having public arguments in the presence of other delegation members.
According to Mbajah, Ouko was suspended from official duty, banished to Koru,
had his passport confiscated, and was stripped of his official car and private
security.96 A witness who appeared before the Commission equally stated that:
So [Dr. Ouko] decided to prevail again to James Baker who was the Secretary of State
at that particular time. So, he had an audience with James Baker. It was reported in
the press and …. Bush finally accepted to meet President Moi. But I wish he did not
meet President Moi, because that is where [Dr. Ouko’s] life started to disintegrate. When
President Bush met President Moi, the situation was ugly. It was not good. President
Moi then took out his anger on Dr. Ouko, claiming that Dr. Ouko took him there to be
ridiculed. Then things started falling apart for [Dr. Ouko] at that particular time.97
93
94
95
96

Id.
See Troon Report, TRAG Executive Summary paragraph 2.
Troon Report, paragraphs 79-80.
The Risk Advisory Group Limited, Report to the Parliamentary Select Committee Investigating the Death of the Late Hon. Dr. Robert
Ouko Submitted on Behalf of the Hon. Nicholas Biwott (November 2003), page 117. (hereinafter referred to as TRAG Report)
97 Testimony of a Witness during TJRC In- Camera hearings in Kisumu on 16th July 2011.
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121. Furthermore, the Commission was informed that a note hastily written by Ouko on
the night he disappeared was given to Ouko’s maid to pass along to Ouko’s brother
Mbajah. This note supposedly had the names of those with whom Ouko was to
meet the night he disappeared, and included Hezekiah Oyugi, Nicholas Biwott,
Jonah Anguka, George Oraro, Paul Gondi, and James Onyango.98
122.

Oddenyo, however, denied discussing the Washington Trip with Mbajah, or making
any remarks regarding the status of the relationship between Ouko and Biwott.99
Troon noted that Oddenyo became very anxious when Troon raised the topic of the
Mbajah conversation, and therefore found reason to doubt Oddenyo’s credibility.100
In contrast, Troon found Mbajah very cooperative and believable, with the possible
exception of his statements regarding Dr. Ouko’s note, given that fellow witnesses
including Ouko’s wife Christabel Ouko and maid Selina Were Ndalo denied the note’s
existence.101

123. The Troon Report referred to another conversation that took place between Ouko’s
sister Dorothy Randiak and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Bethuel Kiplagat. Randiak said Kiplagat told her there was a serious disagreement
between Ouko and Biwott on the Washington Trip, that all was not well between
the two, and that Ouko had flown back separately from the rest of the Kenyan
delegation.102 Ambassador Kiplagat, on the other hand, denied that they discussed
the Washington Trip.103
124.

To support the above alleged statements a witness who appeared before the
Commission stated: “when [Dr. Ouko] went back to his hotel room, Biwott said
sarcastically: How are you, Mr. President? [Dr. Ouko told me that] they almost fought.
It was bad. Unfortunately for [Dr. Ouko] he was now alone. None of the 84 people in
the delegation were with him because most of them were with the President. Most
of them were Ministers and he was alone”.104 Randiak also mentioned that before his
death, Ouko appeared emotionally troubled after his return from the Washington
Trip. She was able to observe his behaviour through multiple visits and phone calls.

125. With the aid of The Risk Advisory Group, Ltd., Biwott disputes Troon’s Washington
Trip theory. TRAG first emphasized that Ouko was fighting with his brother at the
time of his death,105 and therefore this impacted Troon’s assessment of Mbajah’s
98
99
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reliability as well as the likelihood of Ouko’s note to Mbajah actually existing.
Moreover, in terms of Ouko’s general apprehension after his return to Kenya, TRAG
attributes this to his strained relations with his brothers as opposed to strained
relations with his colleagues.
126.

TRAG also provided statements from fellow delegation members that relations
between Ouko and Biwott were not strained. Ambassador Kiplagat insisted that the
delegation returned to Kenya as a cohesive unit, that they were together the entire
duration in DC and that he neither witnessed Ouko having a private meeting with
Bush nor exhibiting any tension with Biwott.106 Chief of Protocol Moses Njuguna
Mahugu raised the point that Ouko and Biwott shared a car the entire duration of the
trip without incident.107 Kenya’s Ambassador to the US and delegation host Denis
Afande also confirmed that there was no tension between Ouko and Biwott.108

127. In terms of Ouko’s supposed banishment, they pointed to the fact that Ouko
continued to act in his official capacity after his return to Kenya, attending meetings
with President Moi and various ambassadors, and holding press conferences.109
Additionally, he had command over his official driver and bodyguards, and
maintained contact with his personal secretary. Lastly, after Ouko’s death, his wife
Christabel Ouko was discovered to be in possession of his passport, thus directly
contradicting the theory that it had been confiscated.110
128. One of the most important points that the TRAG report refuted is the alleged
private meeting with President Bush, as Bush’s personal diary had no such record
of a private meeting with Dr. Ouko.111
129. Troon conceded in his report that the Washington Trip theory contained very
tenuous facts, and that he essentially relied on witnesses describing the change
in Ouko’s demeanour that they observed before his disappearance, and their
conversations with Ouko’s colleagues after his death.112 The hearsay issue is a
major impediment to the Ouko investigation; without the opportunity to observe
individual credibility firsthand, it is difficult to favour one story over another. TRAG’s
arguments are to be approached cautiously, as they were working for Biwott who
is one of the prime suspects in the events leading up to Ouko’s killing. TRAG clearly
had greater resources at their disposal than Troon, including the ability to obtain
106
107
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witness statements from government figures that had previously rebuffed Troon,
and the ability to access a wide range of documents, both at a domestic and
international level. The fact that a private company could obtain more information
and documents than officials tasked with investigating the matter raises its own
set of questions concerning official government cooperation with the multiple
investigations undertaken.
130.

It is difficult to assess the credibility of the Washington Trip theory. Most of the
individuals on the trip either say that nothing eventful happened, or that they did not
see anything significant, or that they cannot remember. Even Ambassador Kiplagat,
who was reportedly close to the Minister, says that he saw nothing untoward, though
many of those who have investigated the situation felt that Ambassador Kiplagat
was withholding information about the trip. The Commission was unable to receive
any additional clarity from Ambassador Kiplagat on these issues.

131.

In addition, the Washington Trip theory revolves around a private meeting with
President Bush and Ouko that never actually occurred. It highlights the observation
that Ouko was in emotional turmoil before his death based on an argument with
Biwott, although others either attribute this emotional turmoil to ongoing family
drama, namely fighting with his brothers, or disavow that Ouko was suffering
any type of emotional distress at all. That this theory is rooted in Ouko’s internal
emotional state is especially problematic, since Ouko is the only person able to
adequately describe that state, and he is deceased. Nevertheless, there still may have
been significant tension between Ouko and Mr. Biwott. Ouko was greatly troubled
by American perspectives on Kenya concerning corruption and human rights issues,
which he was confronted with during the Washington Trip. In response, it is possible
that he could have prepared an anti-corruption report, similar to the one he was
purportedly developing under the Molasses Project theory.

132. Moreover, jealousy is the exact emotion that seems to have caused the supposed
Ouko-Biwott conflict, with the latter being jealous of the attention the former
received. Jealousy is an emotion that can be contained, but it may also come out
viciously and unexpectedly. It is very possible that Biwott was jealous of Ouko’s
status as a Kenyan favourite within international circles, a status that was enjoyed
long before the Washington Trip, and he may have been particularly jealous
of Ouko’s successful performance at the press conference and President Moi’s
subsequent accolades. Ouko and Biwott may not have been publicly quarrelling on
the Washington Trip, but it is entirely plausible that Biwott and others harboured a
jealousy towards Ouko in terms of his political standing, and it is very possible that
this jealousy, combined with other factors, led to Ouko’s murder.
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Judicial Commission of Inquiry (Gicheru Commission)
133. A Judicial Commission of Inquiry was established in October 1990 to investigate
the murder of Ouko. It was suddenly disbanded in November 1991. The Judicial
Commission purported to re-examine the Ouko investigation entirely, but
essentially it just focused on the Troon Report. However, the Troon Report was
intended to be instructive rather than definitive; while Troon focused on Hezekiah
Oyugi, Job Omino, and Nicholas Biwott as his top suspects, he repeatedly stressed
the need for further investigations. Troon’s report was rushed to completion from
the then Kenyan Commissioner of Police Philip Kilonzo, and admittedly based
on incomplete investigations.113 It was never made public as President Moi had
promised. Neither was the report of the Gicheru Commission ever made public.
134. Stories differ on the reasons behind the dissolution of the Judicial Commission
of Inquiry. Some parties blame Troon’s sudden return to the UK for the sudden
conclusion (presumably his reaction to being poisoned and receiving numerous
subsequent death threats),114 while others steadfastly believe that the Commission
was honing in on the true perpetrators and Moi ended the exercise because it was
getting uncomfortably close to uncovering the truth.
135. Immediately after the dissolution of the Commission, the investigation was once
again entrusted to Kenyan law enforcement. Shortly thereafter, a handful of
government officials were arrested, including Nicholas Biwott, Hezekiah Oyugi,
Julius Kobia, George Oraro, and Jonah Anguka, among others.115 Save for Anguka,
these individuals were subsequently let go after two weeks for lack of evidence,
and efforts to resurrect some form of investigative commission were blocked for
many years. As for Anguka, he was acquitted of Ouko’s murder in 1992, and fled to
the US out of fear for his safety. He was subjected to two criminal trials as the judge
in his first trial unexpectedly died before a verdict could be reached.

Parliamentary Select Committee (Sunguh Committee)
136. President Mwai Kibaki re-opened the Ouko investigation in 2003, with the hope of
releasing a public report with findings. Much like its predecessors, however, the
Sunguh Committee encountered some serious obstacles. By this time, according
to the head of the Committee, over 100 witnesses had either died or disappeared,
making investigation almost impossible. There was dissension within the ranks of
the Committee as well, with a number of members resigning over what they saw
113 Anguka, page 76.
114 The Telegraph, “Kenyan Agent ‘Tried to Kill British Detective’,” 24 February 2005.
115 Id. at page 150.
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as an unfair process. Similarly to the Gicheru Commission before it, the Sunguh
Committee also chose to rely heavily on the Troon Report, and Biwott again found
himself to be a main target.
137. In the interim time period between the two investigations, Biwott had been busy
attempting to clear his name. He attempted to get the New Scotland Yard to issue
him an apology; he initiated a number of defamation suits; and he specifically hired
The Risk Advisory Group Ltd. (TRAG), a UK firm that specializes in international
corporate investigations and business intelligence consultancy,116 to discredit
Troon’s main theories and clear Biwott’s name. TRAG spent a number of years on
this project, and Biwott invested a great deal of money into the compilation of the
TRAG Report. TRAG was able to access hundreds of pages of documents related to
the Molasses Project and the Washington Trip, and compiled them in three bound
volumes. This formal report is a stark contrast to the Troon Report. Troon was
virtually unable to access any of these same documents, stemming from problems
related to resource disparity and lack of government cooperation.
138. Despite all the efforts poured into the TRAG Report, the Sunguh Committee
disbanded in 2005 before it could come to any clear conclusion concerning who
was responsible for the murder and whether Biwott was involved or not. The
Committee could not come to a consensus on issuing a final report, and their
findings were never made public.

The Witness Problem
139. One of the major impediments to any successful investigation was what author
Jonah Anguka refers to as “convenient deaths,” where key witnesses and other
individuals related to the Ouko case either disappeared or died, usually under
sudden and mysterious circumstances. Included below is a list of actors in the
Ouko case whose deaths have impeded further investigation.117
140. Mohamed Aslam, then chairman of the Pan-African Bank, died on 18 November
1991 from a sudden-onset illness, right around the time he was due to testify
before the Gicheru Commission regarding the Molasses Project, and specifically
about the allegation that he had demanded a commission or bribe for his
support of the Project. The herdsboy who discovered Ouko’s body, Paul Shikuku,
disappeared and presumably died before he could serve as a key witness before
the Gicheru Commission. Oidho Ogalo, one of the Koru farmhands and one of
116 TRAG Report, page 2.
117 Anguka, pages 219-229.
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the few individuals who was present the night of Dr. Ouko’s disappearance, died
an unexplained death around the same time as the proceedings of the Gicheru
Commission. James Eric Onyango, a relative of Dr. Ouko’s who spoke with him via
telephone on the night of the latter’s disappearance, also died very suddenly and
unexpectedly. Similarly, Otieno Gor, who visited with Dr. Ouko on the night of his
appearance, died mysteriously as well.
141. Martin Ochanda, a friend of Dr. Ouko’s who worked in the Special Branch, died in
December 1991, after having been reassigned from Kisumu to Nairobi, presumably
to keep him out of the Ouko investigation. Then Superintendent of Police Joseph
Mbogo was closely involved with the Gicheru Commission, and died in 1993.
Joseph Otieno Yogo, Dr. Ouko’s personal driver and bodyguard, died in 1992 from a
short illness, having served as a key witness for the Gicheru Commission. Dr. Ouko’s
own mother, Susan Aloo Seda, died mysteriously while the Ouko investigation was
at its peak.
142.

After the Gicheru Commission was dissolved, Anguka’s bodyguard Pius Omollo
Ngwaye was taken into custody, suffered extreme physical abuse, and died shortly
after his release. Then Senior Assistant Commander of Police Nehemiah Shikuku
Obati, who had spearheaded the arrest and interrogation of prime suspects Biwott
and Oyugi, and was demoted to a junior position following his bold actions, died in
August 1992 of alleged liver failure, although the circumstances strongly suggest he
was poisoned. Masinde Muliro, then vice chairman of the Forum for the Restoration
of Democracy, died around that same time. Muliro had shared a flight to London
with Biwott, and the former had met with former Special Branch Inspector George
Wajackoyah, who was very vocal in his theories of government involvement in Ouko’s
murder. Upon his return to Kenya, Muliro suddenly collapsed at the airport and died
unexpectedly.

143. Hezekiah Oyugi, then head of Internal Security and one of the main suspects in
Ouko’s murder, had just agreed to testify before the Gicheru Commission before
it suddenly disbanded. Oyugi was arrested with a handful of other individuals,
including Biwott, held for two weeks, and released for lack of evidence. Shortly
thereafter, Moi fired Oyugi in October 1991. Less than one year later, in August 1992,
Oyugi died from a very rare brain ailment that could have been induced. (There
was a rumour circulating regarding a tape recording of Oyugi on his deathbed,
in which he implicated certain individuals in the Ouko murder, but the details of
the recording are unknown along with its whereabouts, and the recording’s very
existence is tenuous at best.) Despite over three decades of service to his country,
the Kenyan government ignored Oyugi’s death, rather than reward his service
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with a traditional state funeral. This ill-treatment may have been due to Oyugi’s
willingness to cooperate with the Gicheru Commission and thus being seen as a
traitor to a government he was supposed to protect. Alternatively, the government
of Kenya may have seen Oyugi’s death as an opportunity to place responsibility for
Dr. Ouko’s death on one of the main public suspects, and thus put a stop to public
scrutiny of the case once and for all.
144. Justice Fidahussein Esmailji Abdullah, the judge at Jonah Anguka’s trial, died
suddenly in November 1993. He had been involved in a widely publicized trial
in 1991 in which he was highly critical of the Kenyan police. His death arrived on
the heels of a speech that was highly critical of the Kenyan political system and
the corruption therein. Jonah Anguka was the only individual actually tried for Dr.
Ouko’s murder, and the timing of Abdullah’s death came just before a verdict was to
be delivered. This resulted in a mistrial. The retrial resulted in an acquittal. Anguka
had been detained for just over two years. Upon his acquittal he immediately fled
to the US.
145.

Philip Kilonzo, the Commissioner of Police at the time of Ouko’s death, died in July
1997 after having his beer poisoned at a bar in Matuu, Yatta. This was an especially
blatant poisoning because there were so many witnesses present, although the
perpetrators are still unknown. Dr. Jason Kaviti, the pathologist for the government
of Kenya, appeared before the Sunguh Committee in 2005 and renounced the
Ouko suicide theory as completely manufactured. He suffered a stroke in 2006, and
died from health complications in October 2011. Lastly, Selina Were Ndalo, Ouko’s
maid and a key witness over the years, died in January 2012 after suffering from an
unidentified illness supposedly related to a snakebite from the previous year. After
initial cooperation with Troon and other authorities, Ndalo was subject to such levels
of intimidation and threats to her life that she essentially spent the rest of her years
in hiding.118

146. The difficulty in uncovering the identity of those responsible for Ouko’s murder
has been largely due to the lack of witness cooperation in investigative efforts.
We do not include this section to definitively state that all these witnesses have
been murdered, although the frequency and circumstances behind these deaths
is certainly suspicious and worth looking into. Rather, what is equally important is
the intimidation effect that these deaths have had on other witnesses, along with
the general public, in creating a general atmosphere of fear and mistrust within the
investigative process.
118 The Nation, “Selina Were’s Death is Yet More Music to the Ears of Ouko Killers,” 8 January 2012.
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Way forward
147. Since Ouko was murdered in 1990, the Kenyan people have continuously called for
his killers to be brought to justice. Various attempts have been undertaken over the
years, and all have subsequently failed. Likewise, based on the limited information
available before this Commission, we are unable to shed any additional light on
the identity of Ouko’s killers.
148. It must be pointed out that the “justice” referred to in the Commission’s title applies
to both victims and perpetrators. The late Ouko and his friends and family may
not obtain the justice they deserve. Nevertheless, it would be antithetical to the
Commission’s mandate to implicate an individual in this investigation where the
evidence is lacking. Still, it is fair to ask why the evidence is lacking, and there are
numerous reasons to explain why.
149. This investigation currently poses problems because it is a cold case; nearly 25
years have passed since Ouko’s murder occurred. But even when the case was
fresh, different forms of active obfuscation prevented a successful investigation.
150.

The previous section provided just a handful of individuals involved in the Ouko case
that disappeared or died under mysterious circumstances. Even those in positions
of power were threatened with death, much like one Commissioner involved in the
Judicial Commission of Inquiry, and Troon himself appears to have suffered at least
one assassination attempt. Oyugi’s death, in particular, seems to emphasize that
no individual was out of reach for those trying to cover up the identity of Ouko’s
murderers. Likewise, his posthumous treatment suggests the government was
willing to allow him to serve as a scapegoat for Ouko’s death, as he was in no position
to defend himself from accusations implicating him in Ouko’s murder.

151. Efforts to determine the cause of death of all those who have died have been
obstructed by individuals like Dr. Kaviti, who labelled Ouko’s death a suicide and
had since admitted to manufacturing similarly false reports.119 It would appear that
the same corruption that Ouko decried in his lifetime has stubbornly maintained
its hold throughout Kenyan society.
152. The Kenyan Police and Special Branch officers involved in the Ouko case were for
the most part ineffective in their duties and in many ways foiled any attempts at
investigation. Therefore, it can be said that at the very least the Kenyan police
served in some sort of collaborative function with Ouko’s killers, and they were
119 The Standard, “The Man who Claimed Ouko Committed Suicide,” 24 October 2011.
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almost certainly involved in the ensuing cover-up. The New Scotland Yard mandate
gave Troon and his fellow officers operational command over all investigations,
with the authority to access any document and interview any witness they deemed
necessary.120 However, rather than cooperate with New Scotland Yard, Kenyan law
enforcement flouted their authority.
153. The Ouko crime scene was not properly preserved for the arrival of New Scotland
Yard and precious evidence was lost or destroyed, particularly tire tracks that
might have provided further clues to the identity of the mysterious white car
originally spotted by Ndalo. Additionally, as previously established, Ouko’s home
had been extensively searched, and Troon was never able to access the files and
documents that had been confiscated from the Ouko home. It was also clear that
Ouko’s phone was being monitored prior to his death, most likely by the Special
Branch, but whatever numbers were dialed in that time period were expunged
from Ouko’s phone records.121 Information-sharing among police agencies was
virtually nonexistent, despite the important fact that Ouko’s bedroom phone was
discovered off the hook after his disappearance, highly suggestive of the fact that
the last person he talked to was either one of his killers or at least one of his captors.
154. It also appears as though the police prevented a good deal of potentially
useful information from reaching the New Scotland Yard team. Part of this was
accomplished by conducting parallel investigations contrary to the mandate,
and not sharing information. Also, officers would take statements from witnesses
multiple times. This tactic could have served a number of purposes, including
exhausting witnesses and tricking them into contradicting themselves, and thus
negatively impacting their credibility. In addition, police could have been trying to
coax a particular story out of people, and shaping the witness’s narrative to square
with their own interests. Lastly, they could have been intimidating witnesses, and
thus ensuring they would not want to cooperate with other investigators out of
fear for their physical safety.
155. This atmosphere of intimidation was widespread, and could even be felt in relation
to the actions of the public inquiries into Ouko’s murder. All members of the
Gicheru Commission were kept under police surveillance, presumably for their
own safety, although this had the dual purpose of instilling fear in them. This may
be the reason why the Troon Report was so heavily relied upon. Since Troon had
already made some preliminary accusations, his investigation essentially became
the foundation upon which others were built. Troon had gone to the lengths of
120 Troon Report, Mandate.
121 Anguka, pages 90-91.
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implicating certain people in his report, and his actions could not be undone by
Kenyan officials, but those same officials were not obligated to delve any deeper
than Troon’s initial conclusions. Taking action based on the advice contained within
the Troon Report was safe because those actions could be attributed back to Troon,
whereas taking the investigations further in an independent investigation might
put those inquisitive parties in grave danger, as they would be acting on their own
accord, and most likely against the interests of the state. Likely due to the above
reasons, high-ranking government officials who were most likely to know the
circumstances of Ouko’s death refused to talk to Troon.
156. As far as the public inquiries were concerned, they did not add much to public
knowledge of the circumstances around Ouko’s death, and in many cases further
confused the matter. They were highly politicized, very costly and time-consuming,
and were not allowed to fulfill their dual promise of truth and accountability.
During the time lapse between the Gicheru Commission and the Sunguh
Committee, many parties suggested creating a new public body of inquiry, but
these suggestions were never widely supported. Neither the Sunguh Committee
nor the Gicheru Commission resulted in a report that was made available to the
public, though information from both inquiries has been linked to the press from
time to time. Thus the promise of a vigorous, objective, and transparent inquiry
resulting in truth and accountability was never kept.
157. Much as Dr. Ouko had strived for during his lifetime, a spotlight needs to be shone
on the pervasive problem of corruption within Kenyan society in general, and
politics in particular. The intimidation effect applies to all levels of society, and
Troon remarked that the majority of Ouko’s political colleagues were uncooperative
and virtually none came forward and offered themselves for an interview, despite
Troon’s need to speak to members of the delegation that attended the Washington
Trip.122 In this environment, it seems almost certain that Ouko’s murder was
committed for political advantage.
158. The Commission has described the various evidentiary deficiencies in the Ouko
murder investigations, and for those reasons we are unable to conclusively
determine the guilty parties. Based on extensive research, we are, however, able
to identify persons of interest, similar to what Troon did in his much earlier report.
159.

Nicholas Biwott has been a primary target of the Ouko murder investigation for over
two decades now. According to Biwott, Troon had a personal grudge against him.
According to Troon, Biwott’s name was frequently mentioned by key witnesses as

122 Troon Report, paragraph 229.
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someone who had recently been at odds with Ouko, thus making him a logical prime
suspect in the case. These two versions of the Ouko story are inherently at odds with
one another. However, in all of Biwott’s attempts to clear his good name (including
hiring numerous lawyers and prestigious British consulting firms), it does not appear
that Biwott has presented us with a convincing narrative to describe Ouko’s fate. His
energies have been entirely invested in discrediting Troon’s theories, yet it does not
appear that he has provided a strong alibi for himself. Additionally, all the energy that
has gone into the personal dispute between Troon and Biwott has greatly diverted
attention from the true focus of the investigation: the murder of Ouko. Many of
Biwott’s actions appear to have impeded a serious investigation into Ouko’s death,
and so for the various reasons listed above, we would recommend that Biwott be
further questioned regarding his possible role in events.
160.

In addition to Biwott, former President Daniel arap Moi is a person of interest, and
should be specifically questioned regarding the Molasses Project, as well as his
inexplicable willingness to adopt and propagate the Ouko suicide theory. While
there is no credible evidence that the Commission has seen that Moi was directly
involved in Ouko’s murder, he must take partial if not full responsibility for the
failure of all of the inquiries conducted during his Presidency.

161.

In addition, Dr. Ouko’s colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be
further questioned due to the likelihood of their knowledge of important events
leading up to Ouko’s death. Ambassador Kiplagat in particular should be further
questioned, given his role in the Washington Trip theory as well as his more recent
involvement with the Sunguh Committee and the allegation that he provided
them with misinformation.123

162.

Additionally, efforts should be undertaken to acquire additional statements from
BAK Group members, particularly in regards to TRAG’s theory that Briner-Mattern
was threatening Ouko with extortion just before his death. Lastly, additional motives
need to be pursued outside the limitations of the two theories outlined in the Troon
Report. A starting point can be looking at other suspicious circumstances that
occurred around the time of Dr. Ouko’s death, but were not adequately pursued: a
warning that went out urging the Kenyan delegation not to attend the Washington
Trip; a car accident that occurred just a few days before Ouko’s disappearance, that
could have been an initial attempt on his life; a strange woman placing calls to Ouko’s
wife and girlfriend and threatening their lives; looking into whether Ouko may have
been poisoned, as he claimed to not feel well following the Washington Trip and
left a speaking engagement early for health reasons; a renewed investigation into

123 The Nation, “Moment of Reckoning for Big Shots over Ouko Murder,” 11 December 2010.
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the missing documents in Ouko’s possession just before his death, particularly his
diary; and a land deal that Ouko was then involved in, to name just a few. There are a
multitude of details surrounding Dr. Ouko’s death and all of these avenues should be
thoroughly considered by a new investigation.
163.

For the sake of national unity and settling a decades-old mystery that has hung
over the country people like a dark cloud, the Commission encourages individuals
to participate in good faith with a renewed investigation before the passage of
time prevents an elucidation of the full truth and efforts to hold the perpetrators
duly accountable.

Crispin Odhiambo Mbai
164.

Crispin Odhiambo Mbai’s assassination underscores the reality that political
assassination continues to be viewed as a legitimate tool of resolving political
differences. The death of Mbai was unexpected, coming at a time of great optimism
for Kenya: the coming to power of the Kibaki Government which was accompanied
by reformist optimism. The political space during Kibaki’s rule profoundly expanded
the latitude of participatory democracy. There was a more vigilant, powerful and free
civil society. Kenyans were more aware of their rights and there existed a healthy
environment for political ambitions to thrive without antagonizing the powers that
be. No assassination of a major politician took place during the Kibaki regime, at
least not one where there was evidence of involvement of the security forces. Yet
Crispin Odhiambo Mbai was gunned down. He was the Chairman of the Devolution
Committee of the National Constitutional Conference at the time of his death.

165. The killers of Dr. Mbai, went into his house and shot him dead. A witness who
appeared before the Commission stated:
In the content of the story, the suspects detailed how they had been contracted by
somebody and hired to go and do a job. They met in Kawangware on the first day. On
the second day they were recruited to go and do that job. They narrate how they met in
Kawangware and how they went on the next day, and how they gathered themselves
and eventually travelled in a matatu and went all the way to Dr. Mbai’s house. They got
out and found him in the sitting room. He was sitting alone in his living room and when
he saw them coming, he greeted them and said, “Can I help you?” One of them said that
they had been sent and then he pulled out a gun. Dr. Mbai then jumped up to try to fight
them off and threw a stool at them. A scuffle ensued and the three of them managed to
shoot him and then they left. The same matatu they had used had now dropped people
and come back; it did not have people and it was waiting there. So, they got in and
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drove off. So, the police followed up this trail of events and arrested them. My belief is
that those suspects actually killed Dr. Mbai. I have no doubt in that. [The suspects told]
me that they killed another guy but they did not know who this guy was. They were just
told to go and that there was a job. So, I was very curious ... They told me they were on
a killing mission. Since that was a confession they made to me in the environment of
criminals, they also knew I was there as a thug or something and they were just chatting.
So, I believe they were the guys who did it but now why and how no prosecution has
ever been undertaken, I have really not understood.124

166. Former Prime Minister Raila Odinga described the death as an ‘assassination’.
Shocked Constitutional Review Chairman Yash Pal Ghai said it was suspected that
Mbai was executed by hired killers. “The Committee had made great progress.
There have been claims of threats, bribery and attempts to scuttle the review, it is
possible that there were some who were not happy with its work and wanted to
slow it down,” he added. Government Chief Whip Norman Nyagah was implicated,
but denied the allegations from colleague Peter Owidi. A witness who appeared
before the Commission during the hearings stated:
We went to Kawangware towards Satellite where they said that they met with Mr. Norman
Nyagah. We came to Adams Arcade stage where they said they waited. They said that they
were three of them but one of them was still at large. I still remember one name because
it has been long, that is, Gabbow. He went to Tanzania and we had not apprehended him.
At Adams Arcade, those people showed us where they sat and the watchman, who was
the first suspect, showed us where they sat. He directed us to the house of the late. On
reaching the house of the late, that is the time, I knew that those were the real killers of
the late Crispin Odhiambo Mbai. They showed us how they operated from the house. On
reaching the house of the late on 26th, I was so much puzzled when they told us how they
acted when they entered the house of the late that afternoon. We told them: “Please, just
do what you did.” They demonstrated exactly what they did. That day, I concluded in my
heart and said that those were the real persons who killed the late.125

167. Moses Gitogo Mbuthi, Collins Ketore Kilel, alias Supa and Ramadhan Karume were
charged with the murder. Raphael Kapatasi alias Martin Chakava alias Gabo was
also implicated while on the run. The motives for the murder never came to light.
However by way of testimony that was adduced during the Commissions hearings,
a witness stated:
The first suspect said that he was taken to Ngong Hills Hotel and met certain people
whom he would not name. He told us that he will never say who they were. He only
mentioned the former Member of Parliament, Honourable Nyaga. That is why I said
earlier that we went to Parliament because we wanted to know exactly where those
124 TJRC/Hansard/In-camera Hearing/Nairobi/6 March 2012/p.42.
125 TJRC/Hansard/In-camera Hearing/Nairobi/6 mar 2012/p.18.
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people met. He told us that after meeting at Ngong Hills Hotel, they went to the office
of Norman Nyagah in Parliament. The suspect called Collins Ketore was the one who
used to work as the watchman at the compound of the late Crispin Odhiambo Mbai. So,
he had access to all places. The suspect also said that he was actually taken to Norman’s
office by Honourable Joseph Nyagah, the Minister for Co-operative Development and
Marketing. He was the one who introduced him to Mr. Norman Nyagah.126

168. Although Norman was implicated in the murder, efforts to get him by the Police
to shed light on the matter were thwarted as stated by a witness who appeared
before the Commission and said:
There was one day, I do not remember the exact date but I think it was on September,
2003, we went to Parliament Police Station to request for the office of the former
Member of Parliament for Kamukunji, Mr. Norman Nyagah. By then he was the Chief
Whip. They did not allow us. They totally refused and we had to write in the Occurrence
Book at Parliament Police Station.127

Conclusion
169.

Political assassinations have occurred under each of the three successive governments
since independence. The motives associated with these assassinations have varied,
from getting rid of political competition, weeding out ambitious politicians, and
removing perceived “dissidents” of the government or those who posed as “threats”
to power. Evidence of state involvement and subsequent cover-ups is evident in
the majority of political murders. Propaganda and commissions of inquiry are often
used as smokescreens to get to “the bottom of the matter,” and often have the effect
of masking the motives and faces behind the assassinations. Prominent figures
in government are said to be implicated. Key witnesses into the assassinations
disappear or die mysteriously. No real perpetrators have ever been prosecuted, much
less effectively investigated.

126 TJRC/Hansard/In-camera Hearing/Nairobi/6 mar 2012/p.19.
127 TJRC/Hansard/In-camera Hearing/Nairobi/6 mar 2012/p.18.
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Extra-Judicial Killings and
enforced Disappearances
Introduction
1.

This chapter deals with extra-judicial killings (EJKs) and enforced disappearances
(EDs), two violations which are expressly enumerated in the TJR Act as gross
violations of human rights. The Commission received information indicating that
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances have been used as a repressive
tactic against political dissidents and government critics both during the colonial
era and in post-independent Kenya.

2.

This Chapter is a synthesis of secondary data and primary data that were available
to the Commission. Primary data was drawn from various sources, including:
individual statements submitted by victims in the prescribed form; testimonies
made during public and in camera hearings (individual and thematic); interviews
with key actors and experts; and memoranda submitted by individuals and groups.
We also examined relevant secondary sources including academic writings and
reports by governmental and non-governmental actors/agencies.

Methodology and limitations
3.

A quantitative assessment of primary data (statements and memos submitted
to the Commission) captures insightful trends as far as extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances are concerned. However, a much deeper exposure of the
circumstances, antecedents, context, perspectives of the victims and adversely
mentioned persons is required in order to establish an accurate, complete and
historical record as is mandated by the TJRC Act. In this regard, the analysis in this
chapter will consider specially selected cases of EJKs and EDs and the in-depth
interviews that were conducted by the Commission’s Officials.

4.

There are, however, certain challenges as far as documenting extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances are concerned. One such challenge is the
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unavailability of accurate records at police stations indicating the number of people
reported to have been killed by state agents. This particular challenge has not only
been experienced by the Commission but also by other human rights bodies that
have made attempts to document EJK and EDs.1 Further, in most instances EJK and
EDs occur in clandestine circumstances, and efforts are often made to conceal their
occurrence. Witnesses who are ready to come forward and testify on the subject
are also difficult to find owing to fear of retaliation from the perpetrators.
5.

The Commission is also aware that the analysis presented here is based upon
a limited set of data. While we draw upon some secondary sources, our primary
information comes from the Commission’s statement taking process, public hearings,
investigations, and other direct solicitations of information. The data was not based
on a scientific sample. Rather it is limited to information provided to the Commission
by individuals who agreed to engage with the Commission. This chapter therefore
captures the reality of extra judicial killings and enforced disappearances as
recollected by a cross section of Kenyans. It provides a picture of the reality of these
violations, but we do not claim that it captures a complete picture.

Definitions
Extra-Judicial Killings
6.

The term ‘extra-judicial killings’ is not expressly defined in an international treaty
or in Kenyan law. Both international and domestic law protect the right to life,
though this right is subject to certain limitations. The International Bill of Human
Rights that consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (and its Optional
Protocol) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) are all clear on the sanctity of life. Domestically, the right to life was
protected under section 15 of the Independence Constitution, and under section
26 of the 2010 Constitution.

7.

Murder is criminalized under the Kenyan Penal Code (section 203), and the Kenyan
Criminal Procedure Code provides for special investigation by a Magistrate with
regard to cases of murder (Section 387(1)). The crime of murder, however, does
not fully capture the crime of extra-judicial killing. As a crime committed by the
state, extra judicial killing is particularly insidious. The state is obligated to protect
individuals within its jurisdiction from unlawful killings, yet extra-judicial killings

1
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are committed by the state itself, the entity that is tasked with preventing such
crimes. Thus the common crime of murder does not adequately capture the full
extent of the crime of extra-judicial killing.
8.

At the international level, resolutions and other instruments of a non-binding
nature address extra-judicial killings, specifically several United Nations General
Assembly resolutions,2 and a set of international standards on extra-judicial
killings developed by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).3 The ECOSOC
international standards were later adopted by the General Assembly4. Because
of the seriousness with which extra-judicial killings are considered by the
international community, special rapporteurs have been appointed by both the
UN system (Human Rights Council) and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. Their function is to inquire into and address this issue together
with states. In 2008, for instance, The UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial,
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions undertook an official fact-finding mission to
Kenya.

9.

Drawing upon these varied legal texts the Commission defines extra-judicial killing
as a killing ‘outside the boundaries of the law’, that is, killing that is not judicially
sanctioned or which is committed without the minimally required due process. An
extra-judicial killing has three elements:
a

killing which is illegal under law and in most cases qualifies under domestic
laws as murder;

b. committed by government agents or with support or complicity by the
government when committed by private citizens or groups; and
10.

2

3
4
5

The following killings would therefore not qualify as an extra judicial killing: a
killing resulting from a legitimate and proportional use of force in self defence by
a private citizen or by law enforcement officials as prescribed by law;5a killing of
a legitimate target in the context of armed conflict as provided by the laws and
customs governing armed conflict (international humanitarian law).
Res 35/172 of 15 December 1980 which was the first time the issue of Extra-judicial Killings was addressed in a specific resolution;
Res 36/22 of 9 November 1981 invited members states of the UN to give their views and observations with regard to Extra-Judicial
Killings; Res. resolutions 37/182 of 17 December 1982, 38/96 of 16 December 1983, 39/110 of 14 December 1984 and 40/143 of
13 December 1985 in which the GA strengthened its position against Extra-Judicial Killings; Res 41/44 of 4 December 1998 which
condemned the various Extra-Judicial Killings that continued to take place around the world.
See Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal Arbitrary and Summary Executions. ECOSOC Res.
1989/65 of 24 May 1989
Res 44/162 of 15 December 198
See Generally the UN code of conduct for Law enforcement officials; See also the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials in a Report to the General Assembly, A/61/311. Which permits the taking of life in exceptional
circumstances (where a life is threatened by the target of the state’s law enforcement measures)
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Enforced Disappearances
11.

The definition of enforced disappearances in the TJRC Act is similar to the definition
found in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. There are however
some significant differences between the two definitions which we highlight here.
The TJR Act defines enforced disappearances as:
the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
any other form of deprivation of liberty committed by agents of the State or persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.

12.

The Rome Statute defines enforced disappearances as follows:
the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

480

13.

There are some significant differences between the definition provided to the
Commission and that found in the Rome Statute. Those differences provide insight
into the special nature of the mandate provided to this Commission.

14.

First, the Rome Statute speaks of both the State and political organisations as entities
capable of committing an enforced disappearance. The TJRC definition pointedly
does not include political organisations. Thus although under international law one
non-state actor could be found to have committed enforced disappearances, the
drafters of the TJR Act clearly wanted to limit our inquiry with respect to enforced
disappearances to those involving the State.

15.

Second, the Rome Statute speaks of a deprivation of “freedom” while the TJR Act
speaks of a deprivation of “liberty.” We do not think that this difference is significant.

16.

Third, the Rome Statute speaks of the refusal “to give information on the fate or
whereabouts” of a disappeared person, while the TJR Act speaks of “concealment
of the fate or whereabouts” of a disappeared person. We think that concealment
requires a greater showing of State intent to hide the whereabouts of an individual
than the refusal to give information.

17.

Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the Rome Statue specifically includes an
intent requirement, which is noticeably absent from the TJR Act. In other words under
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the Rome Statute one must show the specific intent to remove a disappeared person
“from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.” The TJR Act does not
include such a specific intent requirement, though as we note above we think the
requirement to show that the State “concealed” rather than merely refused to give
information may require some showing of intent – in this case the intent to conceal,
rather than the intent to remove an individual from the protection of the law.
18.

The term ‘enforced disappearance’ was coined to describe the practice of dictatorial
military regimes in Latin America of ‘disappearing’ individuals by abducting, secretly
imprisoning, and usually then killing their opponents and critics in the 1960s-80s.
Because individuals were “disappeared” as opposed to being publicly picked up by
the state, the state could, and did, deny knowledge of the individual’s whereabouts.

19.

Numerous instruments and declarations were adopted to address the crime of
disappearances: the 1992 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance;6 the 1994 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons;7 the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (ratified by Kenya on 6 Feb 2007);8 and most recently the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which punishes disappearances
as a crime against humanity9.

20.

Drawing upon these international documents, and the definition provided for in
the TJR Act, the Commission adopts a definition of enforced disappearance with
the following elements:
a

deprivation of liberty, including through arrest, detention or abduction;

b. the involvement of the state, whether directly or indirectly through
acquiescence; and
c.

21.

6
7
8
9

there is refusal of the state to investigate meaningfully the disappearance,
or the state conceals the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person.

Enforced disappearance and extra-judicial killings often operate together. An
enforced disappearance often, although not always, results in the death of the
individual disappeared. In such cases the death is often a killing that qualifies as an
extra-judicial killing. Extra-judicial killings can be committed outside of the public
eye, and the body of the victim concealed or destroyed. In such cases, without
clear evidence of the actual killing, the individual is said to have been disappeared.
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18,
1992)
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons art. 3, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1429.
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. A/RES/61/177, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/RES/2006/1 (Dec. 20, 2006)
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
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22.

The United Nations Manual on The Effective Prevention and Investigation of ExtraLegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions10 recognizes that political assassinations;
deaths resulting from torture, ill treatment, detention and enforced disappearances;
excessive use of force; and executions without due process all fall under the
definition of extra-judicial killings. The Commission recognizes that extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances are two distinct legal categories, but also
recognizes the close relationship between the two crimes.

23.

Because of the close relationship between extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, the Commission discusses them together in this chapter. We
discuss the incidents, context and circumstances of both crimes together in order
to demonstrate the relationship between the two crimes, the relationships among
those responsible for both crimes, , and the similar contexts and events that lead
to the commission of each crime.

24.

We do not directly address massacres, assassinations, and detentions here, though
all three include incidents of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
We devote separate chapters to each of these phenomena because of the frequency
of the occurrence of each, the importance the public places on the history of each,
and the unique circumstances that surround each in Kenyan history.

25.

For the sake of clarity and certainty, the Commission uses the terms extra-judicial
killings and arbitrary executions/killings interchangeably. The Commission also uses
the terms ‘enforced disappearances’, ‘forced disappearance’ and ‘disappearances’
interchangeably.

Context
26.

The historical, social, political and legal context outlined in Chapter 1 provides
the background in which extra-judicial killings and disappearances, among other
gross human rights violations, have occurred in Kenya since 1963. For purposes of
the subjects and case studies dealt with in this chapter, the following specific and
broad contexts are worth noting. It is also important to note with caution that the
specific instances of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances have their
own separate contexts which have are discussed in the respective sections of this
chapter.

10 U.N. Doc. E/St/Csdha/.12 (1991).
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Historical context
27.

Incidents of extra-judicial killings by state agents go back to colonial period. The
practice continued into the post-colonial period. Research and investigations
conducted by the Commission show that there is a common trend and pattern of
state-sanctioned extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.

28.

The struggle for economic liberalization and democratic space during each
of the succeeding regimes has led to a rise in social tensions which in turn
created conditions fostering extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
According to the Commission’s data, the years 1982-5 saw the highest number of
reported extra-judicial killings besides those during the 2007-2008 post-election
violence. A careful reading of the submitted information indicates that 1982 was
the year when many people were killed following the unsuccessful coup attempt
that year.

29.

The commission of extra-judicial killings in Kenya has also been noticed in
the pursuit by state agents of alleged criminal organizations which directly or
indirectly posed a threat to the stability of the state. The Commission notes that
killings of the suspects in these cases as opposed to arresting them appears to
have been used as a timely and cost efficient method of addressing perceived
security threats. Two clear examples of this are the recent pursuit of the Mungiki
and the colonial era conflict against the Mau mau. Economic inequality, among
other real and perceived grievances, led to the emergence of both the Mau
mau and Mungiki (the latter drew some its inspiration from the former) of these
groups. While there is no question, given recent scholarship, that the reaction
by the colonial state to the Mau mau was particularly brutal, we notice here, as
in other areas of our mandate, that the post-independence state adopted many
of the techniques and operating procedures of the colonial state; in the case of
Mungiki a quick resort to the use of lethal force rather than a more traditional law
enforcement approach.

30.

The use of excessive force against citizens has been a common theme running
through Kenya’s history. In March 1924 for instance, Harry Thuku led a group of
protesters who were members of his East African Association, in order to protest the
reduction of African wages by a third. More than 25 demonstrating Africans were
shot dead by the police outside the Norfolk Hotel, and Thuku was deported to the
island of Kismayu. More contemporary examples include the Kisumu massacre of
1969, the shootings of Saba Saba riots in 1991, the killing of demonstrators during
Tom Mboya’s requiem mass and many others.
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Legal context
31.

The legal system has been used and/or ‘misused’ to legitimize extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances. Successive governments have either enacted laws
that enabled these violations or created systems which ensured that otherwise
protective laws were either not followed or were conveniently ignored. Contextual
analysis also indicates that the judicial system has at times been used to ensure
that the legal system acquiesced in the commission of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances.

32.

The threat of employing oppressive laws and using the legal system to facilitate
the commission of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances runs from
pre-independence to date. The colonial state enacted laws that legalized brutality,
extra-judicial killings and detentions as well as those that ensured suppression of
social, economic and political competition between the British and the Kenyans11.
As far as extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances are concerned, certain
laws allowed the use of brutal force and even the employment of state-sanctioned
hanging (albeit at the expense of ignoring judicial guarantees). The fact that
the death penalty and other laws continue to form part of the laws of Kenya has
contributed to a culture that diminishes the sanctity of life, and thus contributes to
an atmosphere that tolerates, and even encourages, the liberal use of force and, in
extreme cases, extra-judicial killings.

33.

The current legal system is not sufficient to prevent extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances. Firstly, there are no specific laws that define the two
violations precisely so that their perpetrators can be prosecuted. Secondly, the
inadequacy of Kenya’s present laws act as enablers for extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The use of force by state security agents in Kenya is
regulated by the Constitution, Penal Code, Police Act and the Force Standing
Orders12. The Criminal Procedure Code13 defines the parameters within which force
can be reasonably exercised. What qualifies as legally permissible “reasonable
force” is dependent on the amount and kind of resistance of a person towards
the police during apprehension and the circumstances in which the offence
was committed. The Police Act envisages these circumstances to include acts

11

Such laws include those relating to land dispossession of Africans, the Master and Servants Ordinance and the Employment of
Natives Ordinance of 1910, the Resident Native (Squatters) Ordinance, and the Resident Ordinance Imposing criminal sanctions
for breach of contract by Africans among others.
12 Constitution of Kenya, Article 26 (1), Article 28, Article 29; Penal Code Section 18; Police Act, Section 28; Police Force Standing
Orders, Appendix 51A
13 Section 21 (2) which states that if a person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, the police
officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest. (3) Nothing in this section shall justify the use of greater
force than was reasonable in the particular circumstances in which it was employed or was necessary for the apprehension of the
offender.
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incidental to: 1) preventing escape of a person in lawful custody, 2) preventing
rescue of a person in lawful custody, 3) preventing lawful arrest of a person
having committed a criminal offence and 4) self- defense. There is however
inconsistency and a degree of ambiguity in these laws as well as their continued
abuse which could lead, and has led to, the killing of unarmed suspects who
did not pose any threat to the public14. In addition, we have received testimony
concerning unofficial shoot- to- kill policies adopted by some of the security
forces to disperse and contain violent groups. Such policies if adopted obviously
undercut the effectiveness of any attempt to regulate the use of force by law
enforcement agencies.
34.

With regard to the permissiveness of the laws, the Penal Code, Section 82, authorizes
police officers to do all things necessary for dispersing people in a riotous assembly.
The ambiguity of the term ‘riotous assembly’ has given the police leeway to use
unnecessary, excessive, and even deadly force against civilians. The commission in
this regard observes that the use of deadly force by the police caused the highest
number of reported deaths in 2007/2008 in comparison to the rest of the mandate
years of the Commission. Another example is when the police and the GSU took
the matter personally after their colleague was shot in Mathare slums and killed
over 30 people in less than six hours. The justification of invoking the powers of
GSU was that there was a riotous assembly.

35.

With respect to enforced disappearances the legal framework is also inadequate.
The Penal Code neither defines arbitrary deprivation of freedom, nor provides for
a definition of enforced disappearance or missing person. The crime of enforced
disappearance is however mentioned in the International Crimes Act and in the
TJR Act as a constituent of crimes against humanity. The closest crimes the Penal
Code covers are kidnapping and abduction.15 Kidnapping and abduction however
do not apply to state action. The Penal Code also includes wrongful confinement,
which is a misdemeanor and carries a sentence of not more than a year in jail or
a minimal fine of no more than Ksh. 14,000.00. Wrongful confinement is also not
defined, so it is not clear if enforced disappearance would qualify.

36.

Pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Act the police are responsible for conducting
investigations into cases of persons who are missing and believed to be dead,
wherever the death occurs including in police custody. While this general
obligation on the part of the police is appropriate for cases of missing persons that
do not involve the government, in those cases of enforced disappearances (which

14 Africa Watch Report, Kenya: Taking Liberties ‘The shoot-to-kill Policy” 323
15 Sections 254, 255, 256 of the Penal Code
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by definition do involve the government) imposing the obligation to investigate
on the police is more problematic.

Political context
37.

The political aspects of EJK and EDs in Kenya are evident from the pattern of the
commission of the violations to the frequent denials and cover-ups that impede
investigation and prosecution. The pursuit of justice for the victims of EJK and EDs
is in almost all occasions blocked by powerful individuals who benefit from either
the commission of the violation or in the non-pursuit of justice for those who are
victimized.

38.

The political context of EJKs and EDs is also evident given that they often occur
during elections years, such as 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. The occurrences of
killings and disappearances during these periods are addressed elsewhere in this
report.

39.

It has also been observed that there have been extra-judicial killings and
disappearances which seem to have been used to further specific political ends,
at times in combination with other abuses such as torture and illegal detentions.

40.

Political factors continue to be detected in some killings today in Kenya. For
example, on 12 March 2001 the Pokot raided the Marakwet in the context of
a dispute over grazing land, resulting in what has been called the Murkutwa
massacre. Although socio-economic differences between the two communities
may have contributed to the conflict, the Commission heard from witnesses that
there were also political factors that played a part in this massacre where over
51 people were killed16. In 2001, the Marakwet were the first group of Kalenjin to
be in the opposition against KANU. Witnesses testified before the Commission
alleging that the Pokot had been reinforced in order to attack effectively the
Marakwet and to suppress them. This allegation is accepted by much of the local
community because the Pokots used sophisticated weaponry (guns) that it is
assumed could only have come from the government. One witness testified
before the Commission that spent cartridges found after the Pokot attack bore
the marks of ‘GK’. The Commission was unable to verify the veracity of this
testimony.

16 TJRC/MEMO/0087
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Episodes of Extra-Judicial killings and Enforced
Disappearances
41.

A number of witnesses testified before the Commission about killings and
disappearances they say were committed by state-authorities. The Commission has
chosen a few of the killings and disappearances mentioned in these testimonies.
The case studies have been chosen because they are prominent events that warrant
investigation and discussion, or because they demonstrate a pattern of violations,
or because they highlight the contextual and systemic factors that encourage such
violations. Using these criteria we discuss in the rest of this chapter the following:
EJK and EDs of members of anti-colonial movements; EJK and EDs during riots and
riotous assemblies; EJK and EDs of anti-corruption advocates and whistle-blowers;
EJK and EDs during security operations (North Eastern, North Rift Region, Mount
Elgon and the Police Operation against the Mungiki); and EJK and EDs during the
electoral periods of 1992, 1997 and 2007/8.

Colonial Period
42.

To understand better the occurrence of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances in post-independence Kenya, it is useful to briefly consider the
history of these violations during the pre-independence period. The circumstances
under which these two violations were committed by the colonial government,
and the manner in which they were perpetrated, resonate with practices in the
post independence era.

43.

Extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances during the colonial period
were used by the colonial government in reaction to the anti-colonial rebellion.

44.

Recent historical studies document how the colonial government responded to
the anti-colonial struggle during the 1950s through detentions in deadly labour
camps, mass killings, executions following sham court trials, excessive use of force,
and subsequent cover-ups. The executions by the state at this time are described
in various research records such as in Charles Hornsby17 as follows:
‘A thousand were judicially hanged and many more were killed by troops in the forests…
There were Extra-Judicial Executions by police and Home Guard units… The beating
and torture of Kikuyu suspects was commonplace, and the Security forces murdered
hundreds.’

17 Charles Hornsby ‘Kenya’ p.47
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45.

The effect of these violations continue to be felt today, over half a century later.
The families of some of those executed by the colonial government approached
the Commission to request a formal recognition and acknowledgement of what
they had suffered.18

46.

The codification of the laws that categorize and establish rules of engagement as
far as wars of colonial domination are concerned (Additional Protocol II of 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949) were not yet in force and were not recognized
by the anti-colonial governments of the time including the British Government.
Nevertheless basic human rights standards, which at the time were properly
recognized by the British Government through their support of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and their extensive participation in the post
WW II Nuremberg trials, were conveniently ignored.

47.

To better understand the dynamics of extra-judicial killings in Kenya’s recent history
the Commission looks at the killings and disappearances that took place during
the colonial period for insights into the the trends, patterns and entrenchment
of extra-judicial killings in Kenya. The tactics used by the British security officers
of the time also shed light on the culture and practices inherited by the newly
independent Kenya.

48.

The British Government declared a state of emergency on the night of 20th October
1952, which led to the passage of additional laws and regulations to combat and
suppress the anti colonial movement. Included in these laws were wide powers of
detention.

49..

The Emergency powers also curtailed the rights provide for in the judicial system.
Magistrates were given the powers of Supreme Court judges to try offences such
as oath administration, murder and assault. Emergency Assize Courts and the
elimination of preliminary hearings before cases were committed to the Supreme
Court were also introduced.19 These changes had the effect of limiting the due
process rights of individuals brought before the judicial system in the name of
fighting the anti colonial struggle. In fact trials were streamlined and often resulted
in the execution of anti-colonial dissidents. 20

50.

Executions became more common, and thus indirectly encouraged EJKs during
this time. The death penalty was expanded to apply to sabotage, illegal carrying
or obtaining a firearm or other weaponry, certain oaths administration, and the
aiding or supplying insurgent groups. Following such expansion, the colonial

18 See statements of Kimathi’s widow; see the memo from Meru of General Baimungi
19 Antony Clayton, ‘The Killing Fields of Kenya’ p 14
20 Antony Clayton, ‘The Killing Fields of Kenya’ p 14
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government moved towards the entrenchment of the death penalty. Little regard
was thus given to the rights of suspects in capital cases. Mr. Blundell, the leader
of the settler community, expressed what was perhaps a common opinion during
this period by the settlers::
‘He (Blundell) thinks in the present circumstances it would be better to hang an innocent
African occasionally than to tolerate protracted legal proceedings,’

51.

Emergency Assize Courts were approved in Kenya in July 12 1953 notwithstanding
the concern expressed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill that the creation of
such courts would lead to summary executions in Kenya.21 At the same time
committal proceedings were removed which denied the accused the opportunity
to know the nature of the evidence brought against him in court.22 In many cases
convictions were based on confessional statements that were obtained from
suspects who had been tortured.23

52.

The hanging of 71 individuals in response to the the Lari massacre is an example of
the insidious impact of all of the aforementioned reforms. The Lari massacre involved
the killing of a number of Kenyans who had been cooperating with the colonial
powers by members of the Mau mau. A number of Mau mau suspects were arrested,
and pressure mounted on the legal department to speed up the convictions and
executions.24 Some at the time even suggested that the suspects should face martial
law, which would allow mass executions through firing squad. The hangings started
on 15th October 1954 and went on unabated for some time. At the end of this
period a total of about 71 people were hanged for the massacre at Lari. Many more
hangings were carried out after this for Mau mau related offences. Over 1,092 people
were executed under this legal regime during the colonial period.

53.

This legal regime applied up until the last executions of those involved in the anticolonial movement, including the famous Mau mau leader Field Marshall Dedan
Kimathi. Dedan Kimathi was convicted of violating African Arms Ordinance under
which “Africans” were not allowed to carry arms without a special permit. As a result of
that conviction Field Marshall Kimathi was executed by hanging on 18 February 1957.

54.

The extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances that occurred in colonial
Kenya were committed in the context of anti-colonialism. There was an inevitable
concentration of killings and disappearances where there were threats of anticolonial rebellion.

21
22
23
24

See Anderson fn 86 and confirm, p 154
David Anderson, ‘Histories of the Hanged’ 155
David Anderson, ‘Histories of the Hanged’p 158
David Anderson, ‘Histories of the Hanged’ p 174
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55.

Killings in most cases therefore took the form of shootings during instances of
demonstrations and riots, massacres, random shootings and deaths that resulted
from the labour camps and screening centres.

56.

Extra-judicial killings sometimes happened under direct orders, and sometimes
were on the initiative of an individual, but later commended by the government.
An example of the latter occurred at what was then known as the Ruthangathi
home guard post, where a home guard by the name of Wamai executed two people
suspecting them to be members of Mau mau. This action was congratulated by the
British officers as a job well done25. This pattern of events is similar to testimony we
received in which the Kenyan police kill in suspicious circumstances members of a
criminal organization such as the Mungiki, after which instead of the Police officer
being punished, he is rewarded with promotions26.

57.

Another case of wanton killing during the pre-independence period is suffused
with racism. A colonial police officer killed a black Kenyan just because he was
irritated by what he referred to as his grin!. The same officer, in a bid to get
information of the whereabouts of other Mau mau fighters pulled a shot at two
other Kenyans at a police station.27

58.

Mass killings of Africans by the British were also a regular occurrence. On one
occasion, the colonial authorities executed 11 political detainees at Hola Camp as
described in the chapter on Massacres.

59.

As far as enforced disappearances through illegal detentions, the Colonial
government did not disclose to the families of the captured or detained the
whereabouts of their loved ones28. Those who survived these years claim that
their loved ones who disappeared during the emergency period have never been
found. This includes the many that were buried in unmarked graves.

60.

In order to suppress the Mau mau uprising, the Colonial Government engaged in
various operations of abducting young men from their homes and taking them
to detention camps. Between the years of 1953 and 1960, the British Government
maintained over 14 detention Camps in which detainees were kept in deplorable
conditions.29 It is alleged in other records that the colonial government maintained
over 50 detention and labour camps and that in total between 150,000 and 320,000

25
26
27
28
29
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David Anderson, ‘Histories of the Hanged’ p 297-8
Kenya National Commission for Human Rights, KNCHR, ‘Cry of Blood’
David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, p 300
See section on illegal detentions for an elaborate discussion of the kind of detentions that took place during this period.
See section on illegal detentions for an elaborate discussion of the kind of detentions that took place during this period.
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Africans were detained in these camps.30At these centers, the people were tortured
and in many occasions killed.
61.

Some historians suggest that the entire operation against the ‘Mau mau’ led to
the deaths of at least 14,000 Africans, 29 Asians and 95 Europeans.31 A further
curious figure indicates that out of a classification of 5 ethnic grouping in Kenya
(the people of Nyanza, Kikuyu(Embu and Meru), Kamba, other Kenyans and nonKenyans), the Kikuyu constituted 46% in 1953 and later on only 28% by 1959.
Comparative estimated statistics indicate that, assuming the percentages were
constant, at least one million Kikuyus went missing between 1953 and 1959.

62.

The operation and pursuit of the Mau mau in whatever form it took, was expressed
in the figure of one Ian Henderson. Ian Henderson was a Scottish-born police
officer whose name is largely popular for his alleged role in quashing the Mau
mau movement in Kenya as well as the capture of Dedan Kimathi. During the
colonial time, and specifically the period of the war against the Mau mau, he was
tasked with leading the team that eventually macerated the Mau mau uprising.
This team was State-sanctioned (Colonial State) and included the The King’s
African Rifles, the Kenya Police, the Tribal Police and the Tribal Police Reserve.32
Ian Henderson is acclaimed to have suppressed the Mau mau uprising which he
boldly referred to as a ‘terrorist’ group. In his account of the suppression which
he published in a book called ‘Man Hunt in Kenya’33, he gives a description of the
Mau mau freedom fighters which account is racist at its best.

63.

His mode of operation in dealing with this movement is indicative of a broader
contextual picture of the entrenchment of state-sanctioned illegal killings of legitimate
fighters for democratic causes in the name of suppressing criminal activities. The
attitude and operation mounted by him is also expressive of the general attitude
that the Colonialists had against the Kenyan people. The recognition of his work
in Kenya, particularly in Kenya by the Government and the Queen in 1952 and the
subsequent years commenced the entrenchment of extra-judicial killing and enforced
disappearances as a mode of state repression. His leadership and confirmation as an
exemplary police officer, through the awards he received34, spelt doom to the kind of
state security operation that Kenya would later inherit from the British.

30
31
32
33
34

David Anderson, ‘Histories of the Hanged’ p 5; Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: British Gulag in Kenya 91-232
Charles Hornsby, Kenya, p 47
Ian Henderson, Manhunt in Kenya, p 235
Ian Henderson, Manhunt in Kenya.
Henderson was honoured by Queen Elizabeth II with the CBE 1986, George Medal 1954 (and Bar 1955), Queen Elizabeth
Coronation Medal 1953, Mentioned in Despatches 1955 and Kenya Police Medal for Distinguished Services 1952. He was
honoured by Government of Bahrain with Order of Bahrain 1st Class and Bahrain Meritorious Service Medal 1st Class.
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64.

The killings that were conducted by Ian Henderson and the Colonial government
were as immense as they were numerous. Despite the actual killings of Kenyans in
high numbers of about 300-400 per month35, there was the despicable targeting
of young children and even labeling them terrorists. At the end of the operation,
between1952-1960, there were about 15,000 lives that were lost36. This figure is
disputed and estimated to be much higher. Some reports state that the estimated
number of Kenyans killed by the British Army during the emergency period is about
10,000 with 1,086 executed after mock trials.37 The Kenya Human Rights Commission
(KHRC) estimates that 90,000 people were executed, tortured or injred during
the crackdown against the Mau mau while over 160,000 others were detained in
appalling conditions.

65.

The style of suppression used by Ian Henderson and the colonial government was
not consistent with human rights standards even as they existed at that time. Further,
based on the Commission’s research, the depictions of Ian Henderson as a hero
as depicted at the time or even today, are clearly misplaced. The historical record
suggests that Henderson committed or aided in the commission of extra-judicial
killings of Kenyan freedom fighters, as well as contributed to the construction of a
system for repressing democratic opposition through illegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

66.

Recent reports indicate that Henderson continues to enjoy a lavish life in Berlin and
has bought a holiday home at Mukima Ridge, which is about 10km from Nanyuki
town.38

President Kenyatta’s Era (1963-1978)
67.

Upon Kenya’s achievement of independence, there was anticipation that the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances committed by the colonial government
would be no more. Unfortunately, this turned out not to be the case. The use of many
of the suppressive tactics employed by the British through killings and enforced
disappearances continued through successive independence governments.

68.

It is important to assess the violations within the political context of the time.
When Kenya gained independence on 12 December 1963 and Jomo Kenyatta
received from the Colonial Secretary the Articles of Independence,39 Kenyans

35
36
37
38
39
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Ian Henderson, Manhunt in Kenya, p 8
Antony Clayton, ‘The Killing fields of Kenya, 1952-1960: British Operations against the Mau mau'
Antony Clayton, ‘The Killing fields of Kenya, 1952-1960: British Operations against the Mau mau', p.53
Muchiri Gitonga, ‘The New happy valley: Why the British are flocking back to Laikipia’ Sunday Nation, April 8, 2012
Hornsby, Kenya p 19
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hoped they would be free from economic exploitation, brutal laws and illegal land
acquisition. Hidden from them at the time were the complex negotiations leading
to independence, and the necessary compromises the late President Kenyatta had
to make with the British to ensure a transfer of power. These compromises included
a continued dependence on the coloial government machinery, especially that of
security. They also included commitments with respect to security of tenure of
ownership of land by the settler population, and a more gradual implementation
of land reform and redistribution than most average Kenyans expected. The
high expectations accompanying independence, including that independence
would effect a complete break from the past, with the reality of the compromises
required to achieve independence which were not made public, quickly led to
disillusionment by many Kenyans.
69.

Despite independence, British officers continued to command the army up to
196640, and the navy and air force up to 1972.41 Officials associated with colonial
oppression, including EJKs, such as Richard Caitling, stayed in Kenya in their official
capacities until 1965. The Tribal Police structure also remained but under the new
institution of the Administration Police. Independence thus did not dramatically
change the face of the state security machinery, and the use of such machinery as
a tool for social control aimed at quashing opposition against the state continued.

70.

Most of these vestiges of the colonial government were inscribed in negotiated
pacts with the colonial government. For instance, the Defense Agreement of 3 June
1964 stated that the British Troops in Kenya would withdraw by 12 December 1964.
Prior to this, the British government would commit funding and would train Kenyan
Army and so on. On the other side of the bargain, the Kenya Army would continue to
be led by a British Officer. The Kenyan government would also allow British soldiers
to train on Kenyan soil twice a year, and enjoy over-flight facilities among other
benefits. In turn, Britain would provide assistance to the Kenyan government to
deal with internal disturbances if need be, and train its solders in counter-subversive
techniques.

71.

In addition to the continuation of colonial structures and policies, the other
major factor the contributed to the continuation of extra-judicial killings was the
development of hyper-competitive politics in Kenya. This phenomenon of hypercompetitive politics was not peculiar to Kenya alone, but developed in most newly
independent states. For instance in East Africa alone, four countries experienced
army mutinies shortly after independence.42 In Kenya several hundred soldiers

40 Charles Hornsby, Kenya p 199
41 Charles Hornsby, Kenya p 199
42 Charles Hornsby, Kenya p 97
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of the 11th Battallion of the Kenya Rifles went on strike at Lanet near Nakuru
shortly after independence on 24 January 196443. The strike was fuelled in
part by disappointment in the lack of progress towards fulfilling the high postindependence expectations. In this case the army expected to no longer be under
British command, which turned out not to be the case.44
72.

Kenyatta, having realized that he would not be able to meet the needs and
expectations of all Kenyans, engaged in measures that would ensure political
survival and self sustenance of his government. This lead to a strengthening of
the role of the security agencies similar to the role they played during the colonial
period, and particularly aimed at controlling, and suppressing dissent and organized
political opposition. In brief, in the words of Charles Hornsby, ‘the Independent
State soon echoed its colonial parents repressive attitudes to dissent’.45

73.

During the Kenyatta administration, there were cases, reported and unreported,
of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. The killings that took place
during this period took the form of either political assassinations, mass killings or
deaths resulting from excessive use of force by the police and security agents.

74.

With regard to political assassinations, Kenyatta was president during the deaths
of Field Marshall Baimungi (1964), Pio Gama Pinto (1965), Kungu Karumba (who
disappeared since June 14 1974), Tom Mboya (July 5 1975), Ronald Ngala (12
December 1972), J.M Kariuki (March 2 1975) and Argwings Kodhek (1969).46 These
cases are covered in some detail elsewhere in this Report. The investigations into
these deaths were quite cursory. The lack of serious investigation into these killings
created the public perception that the truth about these killings has yet to be
established.

75.

As far as deaths resulting from excessive use of force by the police and state
security operatives are concerned, Kenyatta on two occasions authorized and/or
acquiesced to the unnecessary use of force. One of these occasions was during
the requiem mass of Tom Mboya during which members of his Presidential escort
opened fire against the gathering crowd which led to the killing of two people and
injuring several others. We were unable to uncover any investigations, much less
prosecutions, of the individuals involved in those killings.

76.

Much later President Kenyatta went to open the Russia (now Kisumu) Hospital
which had been built using donor money secured by the leader of the former

43
44
45
46
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radical wing of KANU, Oginga Odinga. In the course of that occasion there was
an unexpected outbreak of chaos. It is said that the police literally shot their way
through to the waiting motorcade. The official number of dead people was said to
be about 11. This figure was highly contested as a cover-up and not consistent with
the memories of witnesses whom the TJRC interviewed.47 The details surrounding
the incident of the Kisumu shootings are covered in the chapter on Massacres.

President Moi’s Era
77.

The scourge of extra-judicial killings had not been vanquished even at the time that
the second president of Kenya, former President Daniel Arap Moi, took the oath of
office. President Moi further entrenched the autocratic style of government of his
predecessor, and extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances continued
to occur. During President Moi’s government, extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances took the forms of political assassinations, the killing and detention
of pro-democracy reformists, and deaths as a result of torture of democracy and
human rights activists.

78.

In the buildup to the coup attempt of 1982, there was an almost complete closing
of democratic space and accusations of dictatorships against the government
increased. This led to a failed attempt on 1st August 1982. The coup attempt and its
repression left many people dead. Many people were accused of having participated
in the coup and were later charged and convicted for treason, after which they were
sentenced to death. Extra-judicial killings during this time also took place in the form
of the shooting and killing of political dissidents as well as deaths during detention.

79.

Immediately after the coup attempt the air force officers were called back to their
stations. Some were killed because they were perceived to be disloyal, and others
were sent to prison where they were assaulted and tortured. The official death toll
was 159 but there were speculations that the number was higher than that. Some
sources put the death toll between 600 and 1 800.48

80.

Soldiers who were on leave were also recalled and implicated in the coup. Innocent
soldiers were killed and those detained tortured and many lost their job because
Kenya air force was disbanded. Those who were considered key leaders of the coup
were taken through torturous process before facing a court martial where more
than 10 people were said to have been sentenced to death and later hanged.49

47 See more on this on the Chapter on Massacres, specifically under the section on Kisumu Massacre of 1969
48 Norman Miller, Kenya: The quest for prosperity (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984) as quoted by Africa Watch; Kenya
taking liberties (1991) 11.
49 See Chapter on State Suppression: Torture and Illegal Detention
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Killings during the 1991 Saba Saba riots
81.

The continuation of the clamor for democracy in Kenya led to yet another incidence
that resulted in deaths and disappearances of its participants. In particular, the
1991 Saba saba riots were as a result of a long overdue struggle for multi-party
democracy. Politicians such as Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia organized a prodemocracy rally on July 7, 1990 – this day is nicknamed Saba Saba (Kiswahili for
seven – seven, indicative of the seventh day of the seventh month) - but on July
5, the two were separately arrested by special branch officers and detained. The
detention of Matiba and Rubia did not deter people from gathering at Kamukunji
grounds50 to continue with the struggle. According to an Africa Watch report of
July 1991, people turned up in the thousands on that Saturday July 7, 1990, calling
for the release of Matiba and Rubia, they waved branches, flushed the two finger
symbol of multiparty politics and shouted their political demands.

82.

The demonstrations were initially peaceful and appeared to be nonviolent. The
problem began when security agents arrived with a great show of force, including
members of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the General Service Unit
(GSU), the regular police, and the Administration Police (AP), all accompanied with
paramilitary trucks and helicopters. GSU officers were alleged to have charged
into the crowd firing tear gas canisters and beating people with batons. In an
attempt to escape and run for cover people were reported to have hurled stones at
the police51. The entire scene quickly degenerated into chaos and running battles.
The excessive use of force by the police was reported widely in both Kenyan and
international media where police were seen to be chanting Uua! Uua!52 Similar
chants were repeated during the July 7, 2004 saba saba demonstrations.53

83.

President Daniel Arap Moi was in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia attending a meeting of
Organization of Africa Unity by the time the fracas started and he immediately
returned to the country. Upon return president Moi is alleged to have instructed the
security forces to use “all necessary force” to restore order54. After this instruction
was apparently given the security forces opened fire on the crowd. Many people
were killed and bodies were left lying in the streets55.

50 Kamukunji is an open ground east of Nairobi, it was meant to be the venue for the public rally but turned the epicenter of violence
and running battles between the police and pro-democracy activists.
51 Africa Watch Kenya taking liberties (1991) 61.
52 Kiswahili for “kill”
53 ‘Live Bullets Used to Quell Saba Saba Day Riots’ The standard, July 8, 2004. available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200407080044.
html (accessed on March 1, 2012)
54 Africa Watch Kenya taking liberties (1991) 64
55 ‘Riots spread across Kenya’ The Guardian July 10, 1990. The article mentioned bodies left lying on the streets for long hours in
Nairobi and more than twelve hours in Kiambu.
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An eyewitness reported;
‘The police were terrible. Maybe ten would suddenly manage to corner a group of young
boys, shooting at them as they ran, and then they would beat them to the ground and
continue beating them until they were useless. They had covered trucks where they
threw in the injured and dead. I saw a group of GSU corner some young boys […] one
fell on the ground because he was shot in his leg. I remember him because four to five
[officers] piled on him, beating him with their sticks and guns while the others chased
the rest of them. I remember them dragging him to the truck and I could see his white
t-shirt was red. Those boys got beaten so badly then picked up and thrown in the back
of the police truck. Then the police beat them [the boys] worse in the back of the truck.
I think some of the injured must have died from the beating.56’

85.

The media reported that 1056 were charged with “riot-related” offences related
to the incident, the majority of whom were not allowed recourse to legal
representation and even appeared in court with visible injuries.57

86.

The aftermath of the Saba Saba riots and killings took a familiar pattern, with the
official description of the event differing in some cases dramatically from those
of eyewitnesses. On July 10, the then Permanent Secretary in Charge of Internal
Security, Hezekiah Oyugi, reported that 20 people had died despite evidence and
reports from other sources showing much larger figures. The government created
a Commission of inquiry which also concluded that 20 people were killed and 60
injured 58. In contrast the newspaper reports put the death toll well over 100.59

87.

Many people who were injured did not go to hospital for fear of getting arrested
by police and charged or locked in police cells. Due to this many seriously injured
persons are believed to have died in the villages and are unaccounted for to date.
The security personnel are said to have followed people to hospitals where they
had gone to seek treatment. The security personnel then arrested many of them,
while others were handcuffed to hospital beds. In the light of this, some of those
left the hospital before they received treatment for fear of being arrested or further
assaulted. This worsened their health conditions and some later died without
having received adequate medical care.60

88.

The bodies of dead and badly injured people were collected by the police and
dumped in hospitals. Africa Watch recounts how a patient who had gone to seek
treatment after being shot had to help to sort out the live injured people from

56
57
58
59

Africa Watch Kenya taking liberties (1991) 62-63
Daily Nation July 11, 1990 as cited by Africa Watch Kenya taking liberties (1991) 61 65.
See Kiliku Report p 14
CN Mwaura (1997) ‘political succession and related conflicts in Kenya’ available at http://payson.tulane.edu/conflict/Cs%20St/
MWAURFIN2.html (accessed on March 1, 2012)
60 TJRC/Stat/06610sb.
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twenty eight bodies of dead persons in Nyeri district hospital61. This information
was also reported by various NGOs and the local media, the Daily Nation at the
time reporting “the dead and the injured were all lying together on the floor of
the casualty.” The Commission received first hand testimony information that the
police neglected injured people and in some cases allowed them to suffer and
bleed profusely.62
89.

The security operations related to Saba Saba spread to other towns outside Nairobi
like Kiambu, Limuru, Muranga, Nyeri and Naivasha in central province, Nakuru and
Eldoret in Rift Valley province, Kisumu in Nyanza and Mombasa in Coast province.
Many of these areas reported increased incidents of rape, assault and killings.

90.

In Nakuru the police are said to have opened fire and killed many people during
the demonstrations and related riots. It was also reported that security officers
were seen in the evening removing dead bodies from fully covered trucks. More
dead people were also discovered at the hospital wards. Similar incidents of
killings by security personnel were reported in other parts of the country like
Kisumu, Muranga, Nyeri, Eldoret, Naivasha, Kikuyu and Limuru. Exact numbers of
the people killed by the police during this period could not be established since
there was a nationwide information blackout and anybody including journalists
who attempted to cover any story were harassed and materials confiscated.

Killings of Anti-corruption Advocates and Human Rights Whistleblowers
91.

As noted previously, government response to many incidents of killings and other
gross violations of human rights have been at best one of neglect, with little or no
effective investigation, and at worse active cover-up. Often the efforts to suppress
the truth resulted in additional serious violations. Some who came forward
with evidence concerning extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances
were subjected to death threats and in some cases were killed or disappeared.
For instance, as discussed in the chapter on political assassinations, witnesses to
Dr. Robert Ouko’s death, have died or disappeared in suspicious circumstances,
leading many to conclude that their deaths are part of a conspiracy to protect
those involved in Dr. Ouko’s assassination.

92.

A number of individuals have died under mysterious circumstances after publicly
accusing the police or other members of the security forces with extra judicial
killings. For example Mr. Paul Oulu and Oscar King’ara of the Oscar Foundation
were shot shortly after releasing an explosive report on extra-judicial killings by

61 Africa Watch Kenya taking liberties (1991) 71
62 TJRC/Stat/06631.
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the police as part of the anti-Mungiki crackdown. Despite the fact that they were
killed publicly in broad daylight, no one has been accused or arrested in connection
with their killing. The killings of these two human rights advocates took place two
weeks after they met with the Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Killings and
enforced disappearances.
93.

The Commission also notes the brutal murder of one Bernard Kiriinya shortly after
he publicly accused the police of extra-judicial killings as part of the anti-Mungiki
crackdown. Mr. Kiriinya, who was a driver with the police, have given information
of how members of the kwe kwe squad went around the country rounding up
people who were believed to be members of the outlawed sect and killing them
brutally. Some of the information he exposed was included in the KNCHR report on
extra-judicial killings, ‘Cry of Blood’.

94.

With regard to anti-corruption advocates, the Commission notes the murder of
a journalist who had written about corruption and other wrong doing by the
police in Nyanza province. It is reported that the officer assigned to investigate
the murder faced intimidation and death threats from fellow police officers and
government officials63. The Commission also notes the death threats of people
who exposed the biggest corruption scandals in Kenya’s history including the
Goldernberg scandal (the late David Munyakei) and the Anglo-Leasing Scandal
(John Githongo).

95.

The Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances
reported that human rights defenders in Mt. Elgon were directly warned by
government officials not to disclose any information about extra-judicial killings64.

96.

The impression created by these and other similar incidents is that rather than
investigating and bringing to justice those involved in these murders (whether
state agents or private citizens), the government often attacks the credibility and
legitimacy of those making the allegations.

97.

There is no doubt in the Commission’s eyes that the victimization of witnesses
to human rights violations and anti-corruption advocates were in the above and
many other cases the master-mind of the Kenya government and its agents and
for which the government should take responsibility of apology, restitution and
reparations for those who were victims and their surviving family members.

63 Human Rights Watch: World Report (2010) 130
64 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, Mission to Kenya A/HRC/11/2/
Add.6 (26 May 2009) 62
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Killings during Security Operations
98.

Extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances have also been committed in
connection with state security operations. There have been many unfortunate
events where security operations have resulted in more insecurity and deaths.
In a number of cases where security operations are aimed at those who are the
cause of the insecurity, the security forces employ excessive force which results
in the deaths and disappearances of many innocent people. As corroborated by
statements and testimony given to the Commission and various reports from
others,65 security operations in Kenya have indeed resulted in the deaths of the
very same people who the operations were meant to protect, and have often
resulted in increasing the insecurity of those communities.

99.

There are observable similarities and patterns in the manner of conducting security
operations by state security agencies in almost all instances of state-sponsored
security operations. It is often the young, unemployed and in many cases poor and
uneducated that are targeted.66

100. The following is a description of some security operations that have taken place
in Kenya and for which there are various allegations of EJK and EDs. For ease of
reading and proper thematic arrangement, the historical analysis of these sections
is discussed in separate chapters as will be referred. The following brief sections
therefore merely describe the actual instances of killings and disappearances. The
security operations discussed here include those in the North Eastern and upper
Eastern regions;, those in the North Rift region; the Okoa Maisha operation in the
Mount Elgon region;, and those against the Mungiki.
101. There are two historical causes of insecurity in Northern Kenya: the desire of the
many of the inhabitants of the north to secede and join Somalia at the time of
Kenyan independence; and the policies of the colonial government concerning
development and security in the region. The politics of secession in turn affected
the growing competitive politics of post-independence Kenya. The undeveloped
economy and the difficult terrain of the region meant that the limited resources
were often the subject of inter-ethnic conflicts.
102. The desire to secede combined with the political and military support by Somalia
to that end and the determination by the newly independent government of
Kenya to prevent such secession, were at the root of the Shifta War of 1964-1967.
65 See Philip Alston, Report on Extra-Judicial killings and enforced disappearances p 24
66 See TJRC/Hansard/Maina Njenga; See TJRC/Hansard/Ngunjiri, ED, Change Executive Trust; HRW, ‘All the men have gone’.
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The subsequent operations undertaken by Kenya to oppose secession occasioned,
at times, indiscriminate and excessive use of force by security forces that led to
heavy loss of lives and destruction of property, often of innocent civilians in the
region. A separate chapter of this Report deals with massacres committed during
security operations.

Security Operation and the SLDF in Mount Elgon Region
103. Various organizations have conducted in-depth research and held multiple
discussion forums on issues affecting the people of Mt. Elgon. These organizations
have established that Mt. Elgon residents were severely victimized by both the
SDLF and the Kenyan military and security forces. This section only highlights
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances that took place there.
104. Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur for extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, estimates over 700 killings and 200 disappearances occurred
in Mt. Elgon between the years 2006 and 2008.67 According to IMLU, MSF, HRW,
WKHRW, over 200 people are said to have disappeared in the hands of security
forces in Mt. Elgon. Some of those disappeared are said to have been dumped in
Mt. Elgon National park. A local daily went into details of how bodies were dumped
by state security agencies in Mt. Elgon area here68.
105. Western Kenya Human Rights Watch documented 615 people killed by the SLDF
up to February 2008, 118 abducted and 33 maimed by the same group.69 The UN
Human Rights Council reported that the number of persons killed or disappeared
by the security forces were estimated at over 200.70 The Kenya Red Cross Society
put another number of 69 to have died due to health complications, 154 owing to
bullet wounds & machete cuts.71 The Human Rights Watch estimated the number
to be about 700 people dead. Whereas the Human Rights Watch pinned a total of
270 deaths and 199 disappearances at the hands of Kenyan authorities.72
106. The Commission through the information obtained from the submitted
statements, memoranda and the hearings, approximated 750 deaths and over
300 disappearances.
67
68
69
70
71
72

Philip Alston Report on Extra Judicial Killings and Enforced Disapperances.
See some of the testimonies given to the Working group on enforced or involuntary disappearances.
Human Rights Watch (2008), All the Men Have Gone: War Crimes in Kenya’s Mount Elgon Conflict pg.22
See Philip Alston, Report on Extra-Judicial killings and enforced disappearances p. 27
Kenya Red Cross Society, Mount Elgon Clashes Status Report, 4th April, 2007
Human Rights Petitions, Allison Tung ‘Investigate Kenyan Mass Graves & Atrocities available at http://forcechange.com/8204/
investigate-kenyan-mass-graves-atrocities/ accessed 16 April 2012
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107. The conflict in Mt. Elgon has its origins in the Government’s attempts, starting in the
1960s, to relocate the landless in three phases of what is referred to as the Chepyuk
Settlement Scheme. The conflict in the area commenced owing to disagreements
among different clans arising from phase III of the Settlement Scheme. These
disagreements led to creation of the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), a militia
group that was formed to fight against what was perceived as unfair and unjust
land allocation through the Settlement Scheme. The SLDF fought mainly against
the Ndorobo Sub-Clan whom they considered as the enemy in the issue of land
allocation.
108. The SLDF, in pursuing their goals for land allocation, increased their control in
villages, instilled fear and abused all those who failed to follow their orders. The
Police and other security agents launched security operations in order to combat
the brutality of the SLDF. The security operations themselves also resulted in
many deaths and disappearances. The people of Mt. Elgon find themselves caught
between the SLDF, who terrorize the population, and security agents who are
welcomed by many of the residents who desire protection against the SLDF, but
who often themselves commit their own violations.
109. The government launched Operation ‘Tafuta Amani’ on 10 March 2008 to address
the insecurity created by the SLDF. The operation consisted of the military, the
Kenyan Police, the GSU, the AP and the Anti-Stock Theft police.
110. The state security agents’ primary strategy for flushing out SLDF members involved
arresting all teenage and adult males and screening them in the established military
camp at Kapkota (Cheptais Division). The arrested males were to be ‘screened’ but
evidence presented to the Commission indicates that some of the arrested males
were beaten to death, others executed, while still others disappeared.
111. It is reported that in total 3,839 people were screened, and eventually 1,078 were
taken to court.73 The operation however was criticized by many of the residents for
its pattern of abuses, including extra-judicial killings and disappearances.
112. The ICRC stated that they perceived this to have risen above the level of an internal
skirmish and tension and the involvement of the army signalled that there was
a perception of an armed conflict. The government however stressed that the
involvement of the army did not mean that this was a armed conflict between
Kenyan forces on the one hand and the SLDF on the other, but that the military
only came to assist in terms of logistics and also to cordon off the area where the
73 See Philip Alston, Report on Extra-Judicial killings and enforced disappearances p 20
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police were operating in order to make their work easier. It was stated that the
entire operation was carried out under the direction of the Western Province PPO.
However, it was variously mentioned that this was not entirely true as the army was
operating in the upper forested areas with minimal intervention by the Police.
113.

The Commission notes, albeit inconclusively, that there are certain qualifications
of an armed conflict that were not met by the operation which may have the
consequential effect of disqualifying the operation as armed conflict, making the
government responsible directly to those who were victimized as well as implicating
criminal prosecution for those who engaged in criminal acts during the operations as
per the Kenyan Penal Code. In the instance that this matter is adjudicated as properly
constituting an armed conflict, as analyzed by ICRC, those found responsible should
be subjected to International Criminal proceedings for war crimes.

Killings and Enforced Disappearances by the SLDF
114. The Commission received information on the SLDF from its own research, hearings
and investigations. In addition to the direct or indirect role played by the members
of this group, it was possible for the Commission to assess the mode of operation,
targeting and pattern of victimization for the members of this group.
115.

The epicenter of the SLDF violence was Kopsiro Division where Chepyuk Phase Three
is located.74 SLDF fighters raced through Kopsiro targeting people believed to have
illegally and unfairly benefitted from the allocation of Chepyuk land. The other focus
of SLDF violence was Cheptais Division which was home to significant populations
of Bukusus, Tesos and others who were seen by the SLDF as outsiders who thus had
no claim to Mount Elgon land. Cheptais was the focus of a crude ethnic cleansing
between 2006 and 2008 when non-Sabaots were either killed or evicted from
their farms. As recently as July 2011 the Commission heard testimony in Cheptais
confirming the extent and intensity of anti-Bukusu violence in that division.75 In
addition, TJRC witnesses credit the intensity of the violence in Kapkota division to
the fact that that division is home to several top SLDF commanders who used the
militia’s brutal methods to sort out long- running neighborhood feuds and disputes.

116. It is indisputable that the SLDF carried out atrocities against the people of Mt. Elgon.
The boys that belonged to SLDF were trained deep in the forest in the use of guns,
machetes and other weapons.76 They would raid in groups of 12- 20 dressed in
jungle uniforms and with a military-style chain of command. One Samuel Ketoung
74 For an administrative map of Mount Elgon District, see http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments
)/01363D252B669433C125750400481067/$file/Militianisation+of+resource+conflict-Th+case+of+Mt.+Elgon+region.pdf
75 Report of TJRC field visit to Cheptais, 7th July 2011.
76 www.eaststandard.org 30th April 2007
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narrated how his three relatives were killed and after the attack the commander
could be heard on the phone saying that they had accomplished their mission as
all houses had been ransacked and walls spread with bullets.77
117. One of the survivors recounted his ordeal to the MSF team as follows:
I was living up in the mountain and needed to get food for my children. I had gone
down to Teldet with four people where we get vegetables. We were attacked by four
young men on our way. They were wearing military boots but had civilian clothes. They
beat us with pangas and told us to lie down. They asked where we came from and for
our ID cards. We told them we were from Masob and they said [you are the ones we are
looking for]. They continued beating us with the pangas. One man died and I was left
unconscious. One of the men said, [tell them that the janjaweed are still alive78.

118. Eliud Kaee testified before the Commission that the SLDF youths, recruited
from amongst the people who were locked out of the ballot settlement system,
ambushed their area Assistant Chief in October, 2006 and shot him dead. This was
one of several killings attributed to the SLDF during this period. 79
119. Another woman testified before the Commission that on the 6th of August
2007, men she identified as ‘janjaweed’ burst into her home in Chewamoi and
immediately killed her husband. This incident resembles that reported by IMLU80 of
a woman who fled her home in Chepkururu after the slaughtering of her husband
who’d gone to herd their cattle at around 5 p.m.

Killings and Enforced Disappearances by State Security Agencies
120.

The bodies of those killed were delivered by the military and/or police officers to
Bungoma District mortuary. As reported by Human Rights Watch, the bodies revealed
shocking signs of torture, which included gun shots, bruising, swollen faces, rope
burns around wrists as well as broken wrists.81 Relatives who wanted to take their
bodies for burial were forced to sign affidavits that they did not intend to lodge any
claims against the security forces for the death of their family members.

121. Other gruesome instances of murder and torture were reported to Human Rights
Watch, such as one instance where it is alleged that,
77 Release Political Prisoners Trust (2008) Exertions of protecting rights to life and security in Kenya. Pg.19
78 Medicins Sans Frontieres; Mount Elgon: Does Anybody Care? MSF Takes Stock after one year in the heart of the Crisis in Mount
Elgon pg. 11
79 TJRC/WEST/MT.ELGON/05/Public/p.2
80 IMLU, Double Tragedy: Report on Medico- Legal Documentation on Torture and Related Violations in Mount Elgon “Operation
Okoa Maisha”pg.8
81 Visiting Justice Officer, Bungoma High Court, “Research Report on Bungoma prison as per 21st May 2008”, Filed with HRW
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The soldiers were holding (the victims’) legs apart and smashing their private parts with
a club. Some were falling unconscious, some died. I saw two corpses.”82

122. The Daily Nation (March 28, 2008) quoted an insider from the military who described
how dead bodies were dumped into forest reserves of Mt. Elgon National Park.
A resident during the security operation in Kaptaboi village reported to Human
Rights Watch that he saw military helicopters dropping off dead bodies on the day
of April 2, 2008 at their residence.83
123. The Commission was told during the public hearings that state security officers
frequently arrested local men at dawn from their homes to interrogate them as
to the whereabouts of the SDLF. Those arrested in such way were usually beaten,
detained and tortured, and in the process many died. The security officers were
alleged to have operated on the inhumane policy “if one man dies, just drag him
off to one side and carry on.”84 Arbitrary arrests led to Bungoma Prison holding
a staggering 1,380 prisoners as opposed to the set standard of 400. A report
by Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU) asserted that 100% of the detained
residents were severely tortured resulting many deaths.85 This was corroborated
by the testimony before the Commission of Mzee Jocktan Wepukhulu Mayu who
told of the death of Titus Wakori Wagwavuvi after being tortured using live electric
wire in prison.86
124. The Commission interviewed a 23-year old woman who was a refugee in
Kiryandogo, Uganda. She was a victim of the Mt. Elgon Clashes of 1992. Having
lost her parents at 14 when they were shot and killed by the Sabaot, she was left
to take care of herself and her 7 year old sister. She was married at 17 and her
husband too was killed during the SLDF operations in Mt. Elgon when she was 9
months pregnant. She fled to Uganda and settled in Kiryandogo camp.87
125. Despite the numerous efforts to access justice by reporting such grave incidences
to the police, no successful investigation has been carried out to date. The
unidentified bodies discovered (and perhaps buried) in Bungoma, Kakamega and
Webuye would require exhumations far beyond the administrative boundaries of
Mount Elgon District. Even so, there are particular hotspots and concentrations of
SLDF and military activities in the area that need further investigation.
82 ‘Rights group accuses Kenya army militia of abuses’ available at http://afp.google.com/article/
ALeqM5ivb3h1Szp80JNhqJXwi8EaBO1D5A
83 See http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ivb3h1Szp80JNhqJXwi8EaBO1D5A
84 Human Rights Watch Report 2008, p 31.
85 IMLU Preliminary Report (2010), p.12
86 TJRC/WEST/MT.ELGON/05/Public/p.23 testimony by Mzee Jocktan Wepukhulu Mayu
87 TJRC Investigators Commission interview with NAS 76
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126. The Commission was told by witnesses that during the 1992 clashes the GSU and
the AP trained the Sabaot Youth for the purpose of eliminating political opposition
groups. The Commission was also told of how the Sabaot were given modern
weapons to kill and throw ‘outsiders’ out of their farms.
127. The Kenyan civilian and military officials with authority for the security forces
Operating in Mt. Elgon at that time include; Minister of Internal Security, who
is in overall charge of the police, Commissioner of Police at that time and the
Administration Police Commandant, the people in charge of the Army including
the Minister of Defense, Chief of General Staff, and the Kenya Army Commander.
The two men officially in charge of the operation on the ground were the Western
Provincial Commissioner, and the commander of the army in Mt. Elgon88 as well
as the full list of Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) officers deployed to Mt Elgon area
between 2006 and 2008 November, and the list of all APs working in the area of Mt.
Elgon during the period in question.
128. The Commission also heard of instances where key politicians were also involved
directly in supporting the violence by SLDF. A witness told the Commission as
follows:
During every election and campaign period the politicians from Mt. Elgon will call
us(Kikuyus) viroboto(flees) or madoadoa(spots) and incite people against us. All the
members of parliament starting from SOD 44 , YIN 12 and KAPF 13 were inciting people
against us forcing us to be squatters. Our women were raped, property destroyed,
people killed and others were maimed. I cannot remember the exact date and month
but within 2007 a lorry transporting weapons and food sent by NID 13, LIL 33 and ICH
79 to the Sabaot Land Defense Force was captured by the police in Chesikaki and we
witnessed the content but when the lorry was taken to Kakamega police station is the
last time we heard about it.

Operations by and against Mungiki
129. Like the SLDF, Mungiki arose out of a desire to address historical injustices. While
the government reaction to the SLDF was primarily through a joint force of police
and the military, the primary government reaction to the Mungiki was through the
use of the civilian police services. The conflict between the Mungiki and the police
led to hundreds of deaths of suspected members of this group. In this section we
will discuss some of the controversies that have surrounded the operation and the
nature of the Mungiki , expose the limitations of the police response, and describe
the pattern of human rights violations in the general context of law enforcement.
88 TJRC/WEST/MT.ELGON/05/Public/p.36
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130. There are many other criminal organisations besides the Mungiki that existed at
the time of completing this report. Many witnesses testified before the Commission
about such militia groups. They include: Kalenjin Warriors, SLDF, Taliban,
Chinkororo, Baghdad Boyz, Kamjesh/Jeshi la Mzee, Al Shabaab, Amachuma, Angola
Msumbiji,, Banyamulenge, Charo Shuru, Coast Housing Land Network, Congo by
Force, Dallas Muslim Youth, Forty Brothers, Forty-two Brothers, Jeshi la Embakasi,
Jeshi la King’ole, Japo Group, Kamkunji Youth Group, Kaya Bombo Youthz, Kosovo
Boys, Kuzacha, Makande Army, Mombasa Republican Council, Sakina Youth, Siafu,
and Sungu sungu.
131. While the Commission cannot, under the definitions provided to us under our
Act, speak of extra-judicial killings or enforced disappearances committed by the
Mungiki or other non-state actors, we note that the Mungiki and other similar
groups did commit summary executions (sometimes through the use mock trials)
and did disappear individuals. The victims of such atrocities were both the police
themselves as well as innocent civilians.
132. As far as the government response to Mungiki is concerned, evidence submitted to
the Commission suggests a pattern which involved systematic killings as opposed
to arrest and arraignment to court to answer to criminal charges. Witnesses
testified to the Commission that killings by the police were sometimes done in such
a way that they appeared to be committed by the Mungiki themselves rather than
the police. This perception has invariably led to some killings being incorrectly
attributed to the police, and some probably incorrectly attributed to the Mungiki.

Social, Historical and Political Context of the Creation of the Mungiki
133. The term Mungiki refers to a Kikuyu word Muingi, which means masses or people89.
Its exact date of creation is unclear, but various commentators suggest 1987 as the
date of its creation.90 While the movement has cultural, historical, religious and
political aspects, some classify the Mungiki as primarily a religious movement.91 In
his public testimony before the Commission, the former leader of the group, Mr.
Maina Njenga, stated that the name Mungiki was not created by the group itself,
but by politicians and eventually the public.92
89 Grace Nyatuga Wamue, ‘Revisiting our Indegenous Shrines through Mungiki,’ African Affairs 100 (2001), 453-467 at 454
90 Oloo Adams, Marginalisation and the rise of militia groups in Kenya: the Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence Force in Militias,
Rebels and Islamist Militants, Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, eds Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe, 147-183,
150; Grace Nyatuga Wamue, ‘Revisiting our Indegenous Shrines through Mungiki,’ African Affairs 100 (2001), 453-467; Peter
Mwangi Kagwanja, ‘Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca” the Mungiki ethnic Violence and the Politics of Moi succession in
Kenya, 1987-2002, African Affairs 102 (2003), 25-49
91 Grace Nyatuga Wamue, ‘Revisiting our Indegenous Shrines through Mungiki,’ African Affairs 100 (2001), 453-467
92 RTJRC 12.03., NHIF Building Nairobi, Maina Njenga Testimony, p.3
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134. From a historical perspective, the Mungiki are seen as the inheritors and modern
representatives of the hopes and aspirations of the Mau mau or the Kenya Land
and Freedom Army whose goal was to resettle landless Kikuyus and reposess land
that was illegally acquired by the British in the pre-independence era93. The early
founders of the movement claim to have consulted with the surviving members
of the Mau mau movement for inspiration and wisdom on the construct, style and
operation of the movement.94
135. The Commission interviewed a woman in Kiambu West who claimed to have
been a Mungiki member. She confirmed that Mungiki members felt dispossessed
and their membership in the group was motivated by their desire to advance
themselves as a people. She also dismissed the assumption that only Kikuyus
made up the membership.
136. The group in its early years engaged in certain commendable activities in its earlier
days that confirm its purpose and origin as a movement in search for economic
freedom and liberalization. This commenced with a campaign against drunkenness,
rent hikes, drug use, prostitution, HIV/AIDS, street children rehabilitation, garbage
collection, security and so on.95 In some areas, it was reported that they were even
concerned with poverty alleviation projects96. It is stated that by 2005, they had
about 600 businesses.
137. Efforts to organize on the basis of land dispossession started much earlier than
the Mungiki. In 1975 a group of citizens visited state-house and presented their
grievances to the President. They stated that the white man had left, but they
still felt that they had not achieved economic freedom. Through a letter to the
President in 197597, they stated that the government they wanted could not be
achieved unless it was inclusive of all of Kenya’s 47 tribes. The letter also called for
the recognition of all Kenyan Freedom Fighters.
138. Culturally, the Mungiki are said to be a return to African values as a source of social
cohesion and to fight against the yoke of ‘mental slavery’ and western domination.
Some of the cultural practices that the group is said to engage in therefore include
female circumcision, oath administration and snuff taking.
93 Jean Christophe Servant, Kenya’s Righteous youth Militia, ‘ Landless in the Rift Valley, ‘ Le Monde Diplomatique, January 2005.
94 P K Kagwanja, Politics of marionettes:extra-legal violence and the 1997 elections in Kenya in M R Rutten, AM Mazrui, and FG
Grignon(eds), Out for the Count:The 1997 General Elections and prospects for democracy in Kenya, Kampala:Fountain Publishers,
2001; D.Anderson, Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya, African Affairs, 101, (2002); M Ruteere, Dilemmas
of crime, human rights and the politics of Mungiki violence in Kenya, Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Institute, 2008
95 Kagwanja ‘facing mount Kenya’ (2003), p.37; Servant Christophe, ‘Kenya’s Righteous Youth Militia’ (2005).
96 Mutuma Ruteere, ‘Dilemmas of Crime, Human Rights and the Politics of Mungiki Violence in Kenya, KHRI, 2008 15
97 Letter from the dissatisfied Kenyans to the Late President Kenyatta Ref 5311.1x20/8/75
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139. It is important to note that whatever the antecedent origins of the group, many
people joined out of a desire for economic liberation and self empowerment.
The group expanded during periods of heightened injustice and insecurity. For
instance, one of the main periods of expansion in Mungiki membership came
during and after the post-1992 election violence where the displaced saw the
need to protect themselves as a community. There is also indication that many
who joined the movement were the victims of displacements from the clashes
in Molo, Elburgon, Rongai, Narok, Laikipia and Njoro. Other movements that
emerged during the colonial period at this time and whose purpose was hinged
on economic liberalization include the Mumbo Cult of 1913, The Dini ya Msambwa
of 1947, and the Karinga Movement of 1920s/30s.98
140. It was primarily the struggling class of Kenyans (the jobless and the economically
and politically desperate) that joined the Mungiki in large numbers . Unconfirmed
estimates of the group’s membership range between 1.5 million to 7 million99. In
1999, Rift Valley Provincial coordinator Mr. Ndura Waruinge stated the membership
of Mungiki at 3.5 million. He also stated, contrary to the common perception that
membership is drawn only form the Kikuyu community, that members of many
other communities and ethnicities had joined the movement.100 In testimony
before the Commission, Mr. Maina Njenga stated that the movement today has
a staggering membership base of about 10 million youth.101 Others place the
membership at between 1.5 to 2 Million, including 400,000 women members.102

Political Context
141. Certain aspects point to the Mungiki as a political movement. The Mungiki’s force
in politics is influenced by the power of numbers. Owing to its large membership,
the Mungiki began to be viewed by some political leaders as a useful political tool.
This view is supported by various academic writers and by information obtained in
the course of the Commission’s work.103
142. Some of the first marked engagements of the Mungiki in politics include the
mobilization of its people following the violence committed against members of
its community, the Kikuyu, following the 1992, 1997 and 2002 electoral violence
98 Margaret Gathoni Gecaga, ‘Religious Movements and Democratization in Kenya: Between the Sacred and the Profane,’ in Godwin
R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasong’o.
99 Mutuma Ruteere, ‘Dilemmas of Crime, Human Rights and the Politics of Mungiki Violence in Kenya’, KHRI, 2008 16
100 Daily Nation, April 13 1999
101 See TJRC/Hansard/Testimony of Maina Njenga
102 P. Kagwanja, Warlord Democracy: the proliferation of militia and pre-election violence in Kenya, 1999-2002, Kenya Human Rights
Commission, Unpublished as at 2003..?, D Anderson, Vigilantes, Violence and the politics of public order in Kenya.
103 Oloo Adams, 148 of the ISS publication
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in Kenya104. Mr. Ngunjiri, the Executive Director of Change Associate Trust, whose
organization has engaged in extensive research on criminal organised groups, and
who testified during the Commission’s thematic hearings on ethnicity, observed
that groupings like Mungiki become politically convenient for politicians who
use them to get votes.105 Politicians may make alliances to secure the votes of
such an organization’s membership, and also to create youth wing movements
which in extreme cases can be used to form militias to scare and intimidate
voters. Mr. Ngunjiri gave as a historical example the KANU youth wingers.106
143.

Politicians themselves, especially from Central province, embraced the opportunity
of engaging with the Mungiki. For instance, KANU politicians attended rallies and
meetings of the Mungiki107, allegedly funded the Mungiki in their activities108 and
even engaged with them for the purposes of developing political strategies.109 More
direct political engagement came to light when, in 2003, David Manyara, the Nakuru
Town MP, was charged with sponsoring the activities of the Mungiki after it had been
banned in 2002. In June 2007, a member of Parliament claimed that the Mungiki had
oathed 10 MPs from Central Province.110 The secrecy with which support appeared to
be given by members of Parliament led the Hon Saitoti to state in a press conference
that those politicians who are allegedly involved in Mungiki activities must be named
and shamed. Thereafter, according to NTV reporting, the Police stated that they had
the files which indicated the involvement of certain key politicians.

144. Upon its banning in 2002, the Mungiki evolved into a youth-oriented political
organisation, the National Youth Alliance, which was deregistered at the beginning
of 2007. Undeterred, its leaders were said to later form a party and name it the
Progress Party Alliance111

Killings and Disappearances by the Mungiki
145. As noted above, the terms extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances do
not apply to the actions of non-state actors. It is clear, however, that non-state
actors can engage in killings, and can also engage in disappearances. [Some
non-state actors are large enough, and sophisticated enough, to share attributes
104
105
106
107
108

Mutuma Ruteere, ‘Dilemmas of Crime, Human Rights and the Politics of Mungiki Violence in Kenya’, KHRI, 2008, 10
TJRC/Hansard/Ngunjiri Presentation p.38
TJRC/Hansard/Ngunjiri Presentation
Daily Nation, 2 June 2007
Oloo Adams, Marginalisation and the rise of militia groups in Kenya: the Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence Force in Militias,
Rebels and Islamist Militants, Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, eds Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe, 147-183,
p 161
109 Daily Nation, 10 November2005
110 ‘How Mungiki Forced Oath on 10 Mps, Daily Nation, June 9, 2007.
111 S Kilonzo, Terror, Religion or socialism? The faces of Mungiki sect in the Kenya public space, CODESRIA conference held in
Yaounde, Cameroon, 7-11 December 2008
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of the state. For example, some non-state actors are highly organized, with
hierarchies and sub-organizations based upon functional activities – such as
providing security, enforcement, dispute resolution, etc. Mungiki evolved into
an organisation with some of these attributes, including a quasi-judicial dispute
resolution or punishment process.
146. The development of the Mungiki from a social justice organization to something
more like a criminal organization started as early as 1992 when the group shifted
from primarily a religious group to a group with a stated objective of defending
a particular ethnicity, the Kikuyu. Tribal defence group, allegedly supporting the
cause of the Kikuyu people and in response to the ‘Kikuyu Land Defence Team’.
What started as criminal activity of individual members developed, over time, to
something more organized. As described by Davide Anderson, ‘The Mungiki should
be seen as a movement that has metamorphosed from its cultural-spiritual roots
to a criminal vigilante and a tool for the politics of ethnic exclusion. (Anderson,
Vigilantes, 2002, 534).’ As early as 1999 the Mungiki were said to have attacked
members of the First Born Holy Spirit worshippers in Kahawa West who were singing
circumcision songs.112 There were also allegations of members of the Mungiki were
involved in raping a woman and later forcibly circumcising her.113 When questioned
about these criminal activities the former leader Mr. Maina Njenga testified before
the Commission that those who engaged in criminal activities did so at their own
peril and that the movement was not driven by criminal ideologies.114
147. The group is reported to have expanded its activities to include atrocities such
as amputations, beheading and dismembering their victims in order to cause
terror and fear among those who did not support or who betrayed their cause.
For instance, 10 people were executed in Othaya, which is the president’s
constituency, following the announcement by President Kibaki of a crack down
on the Mungiki.115
148. During the 2007/2008 electoral violence it was reported that the group members
were responsible for causing the deaths of ODM members in the PNU strongholds
in Kenya. This was in fact a finding of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post
Election Violence. Currently the Prosecutor of the ICC has indicted Deputy Prime
Minister Uhuru Kenyatta on the allegation that he conspired with the Mungiki to
engage in such violence.
112
113
114
115

Daily Nation, August 9, 1999
Daily Nation, July 19th 1998
TJRC/Hansard/Maina Njenga
P Mathagani, Kibaki pledges tough action to rein in Mungiki, East African standard, 5 December, 2008
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149. One classic example of some of the movement’s activities took place in Mathare
where the Mungiki are said to have formed a base of operation in not only this
area but also many other slum areas of Nairobi. In the name of enforcing law
and order, the group is said to have beheaded four people as a warning to the
residents not to commit crime. The following months, Mathare was a haven of
peace and security and the crime quietened down. The Mungiki also connected
the long awaited electricity for the residents by stealing it from KPLC and getting
payments from the locals. Over time, the activities of the Mungiki in the area,
however, metamorphosed to criminal extortion where they would force people
to make payments to them for security. Those who fail to cooperate are said to be
disappeared or to be subject to assault, including amputations.116
150. The criminal activities of members of the Mungiki and the counter-attacks by
community vigilante groups and the police have led to many deaths. Mr. Njenga
testified before the Commission that the Mungiki has lost over 10,000 youth since
its inception.117 The Commission was unable to confirm this estimate.
151. Earlier on, there were retaliatory attacks from the Mungiki for instance when they
formed the ‘Bagation’ squad which stands for ‘no bargain over death’, on 8 March
2004. Such grouping was not strange or new to the operational activities of the
Mungiki as they were earlier on alleged to form military training bases in Nakuru,
Nyandarua, and Limuru forests.118 This later was transformed to the Mungiki
Defence Council.119
152. Witnesses testified before the Commission about the infamous Mathira massacre,
in which a group of about 29 people were hacked to death on 21st April 2009 in
Gathaithi, chehe sub-location, Iri-ini Location of Mathira Division, Nyeri District.
The Commission was presented with copies of the death certificates of the victims
of this massacre. The Commission’s research indicates that the massacre may have
been committed by a group of vigilantes who were protesting against the killings
perpetrated by the Mungiki.
153. The Commission however notes that in a bid to restore order, the government
through the police has an obligation to ensure the continuity of law and order
through conducting investigations and judicial proceedings and making findings
in the legally recognized criminal prosecution process as opposed to directly
targeting suspects and killing them.
116
117
118
119
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154. One of the instances of alleged killings by the Mungiki was on March 4, 2003 when
23 people were killed in Kariobangi slum area. The people targeted were the nonkikuyu dwellers mainly being of the Luo ethnic group. The Political elements of the
2002 elections surrounding these killings are imperative in understanding what
could have happened. Owing to the expanding membership of the Mungiki at this
time, certain politicians saw the benefit of becoming allied to the Mungiki. This was
the first time that the opposition teamed up to run up against KANU. In this way,
KANU attempted to ally itself to the group. The leaders of Mungiki on 3rd March
2003, the day before the killings declared that they would back KANU’s Uhuru
Kenyatta who denounced the movement the following day. The two Mungiki
leaders who tried to run for elections under a KANU ticket were barred.
155. There was another instance where suspected Mungiki members killed two chiefs
in Central Province. This and several beheadings, allegedly by the Mungiki took
place around the time in May June 2007 when the members of the sect threatened
to hike protection fees to public transport owners and users. It is however alleged
that the beheadings were suspiciously not conducted by the Mungiki alone, but
there were other allegations that they were also done by the police.120
156. The Mungiki went beyond simple killings and executed people in styles to suggest
much more than just death, but the desire to spread terror. Investigative reports
indicate killing in fashions of dismemberment, skinning and burning. These
occurrences take place mainly in slum areas. The Commission observes that owing
to sometimes the manner in which the group spread terror, it was somewhat
difficult to establish an exact count of how many people may have disappeared or
died under the hand of the Mungiki.
157. The Commission also acknowledges that there are allegations that some killings
attributed to the Mungiki were conducted by the police, allegedly in order to
spread negative propaganda against the sect.121 Given the lack of evidence, lack
of prosecutions, and fear of witnesses to speak against either the Mungiki or the
police, it is often difficult to determine who in fact was responsible for a specific
beheading or other killing.

Mungiki and the 2007 Post-Election Violence
158. The Mungiki have been accused by, among others, the Waki Commission and
the ICC, of committing criminal acts during the 2007 post-election violence. The
Commission heard of many unfortunate incidents where the group is said to have
attacked entire neighbourhoods in the name and motive of either supporting a
120 Mutuma Ruteere, ‘Dilemmas of Crime, Human Rights and the Politics of Mungiki Violence in Kenya, KHRI, 2008 20
121 See interview by Ross Kemp of the top Mungiki Leaders.
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political party or cause during the 2007 post-election violence. The Commission
also heard from witnesses who gave details that the Mungiki were indeed used by
the politicians to advance their political goals.
159. In particular, the commission heard in the towns of Nakuru and Naivasha where
the Mungiki were said to be allied to PNU and engaged in many killings and attacks
against ODM supporters.122 In the PNU strongholds such as Naivasha and Nakuru,
a number of witnesses testified to the Commission of their victimization owing to
the fact that they were campaigning or acting as agents to ODM candidates. Two
witnesses who testified before the Commission lost their entire families; in one
case the families disappeared, and in the other they were burnt to death.
160. One witness testified to the Commission that certain politicians would provide
direct support to the Mungiki by paying them approximately Ksh 7,000 every
evening for the work done. There were allegations from witnesses that the build up
to the electoral violence and the direct threats from the Mungiki were foreseen and
reported to the police in Naivasha and Nakuru, but according to these witnesses
the police took no action to either protect them or to punish the perpetrators.
The Waki Commission corroborates these findings where the National Security and
Intelligence Committee are alleged to have received information on the evolving
situation of insecurity but took no action.
161. The Commission also heard of many incidents especially in Nakuru and Naivasha
towns where the Mungiki descended upon innocent civilians and killed them
using machetes.123

Killings by the Police in response to the Mungiki
162. One of the earliest instances of state response against the Mungiki include the
time when former President Moi issued orders for the arrest of people who were
responsible for illegal oath taking in 1992. Further actions against them include
in 1994 when the Police arrested about 63 people in Laikipia.124 Eventually the
government banned the organisation in 2002.
163. In order to respond effectively to the Mungiki, the police established a specialized
force of about 14 officers known as ‘Ondoa Kwe Kwe’, which was later locally
referred to as ‘Kwe Kwe squad’. The exact timing of the establishment of this squad
122 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/Testimonies.The witnesses concluded that the attackers were supporters of PNU as they
heard some of them speaking Kikuyu; and they concluded that those attacked were attacked as members of ODM as the victims
primarily spoke Luo.
123 TJRC/Statement/12122
124 Oloo Adams, Marginalisation and the rise of militia groups in Kenya: the Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence Force in Militias,
Rebels and Islamist Militants, Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa, eds Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe, 147-183, 163
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coincided with the time within which over 500 people died in the hands of the
police according to the report by the KNCHR.
164. Alluding to the fact and likelihood that the people who were shot and dumped at
city mortuary are Mungiki, KNCHR investigated the circumstances surrounding the
deaths of 454 people that were left at the city mortuary between June-October of
2007. Almost all of these individuals were young Kikuyu male adults. The cause of
death according to the pathologist was gun-shot wounds at close range. For those
instances where the families have come to claim those bodies, they are said to
hail from Kiambu, Murang’a, Nyeri and Nairobi slums such as Mathare, Korogocho,
Huruma, Dandora and Kariobangi. Another indication that shows the purposeful
execution besides the fact that the gunshots were fired at close range, is that most
of these gun-shots were aimed from a close range.
165.

For instance, in Kayole which is viewed as a Mungiki stronghold, the police would
indiscriminately order people into their houses and move from door to door and
ordering any young men outside. In a certain operation, the police went there and
many people were ordered into their houses. Many of these people would be taken by
the police hurdled into vehicles and taken into the stations. In many cases, they were
beaten even after expressing consent to accompany the police and there are reports
that a number of them never came back. An incident is noted by the Commission
where a journalist, Ross Kemp was not only declined by the police an interview
but was also told to ‘go home’. During this operation, the police were reinforced by
the GSU. The Commission noted certain illegalities where the GSU raided homes of
people who were not necessarily rioting but were merely in their homes.

166.

In the course of our public hearings the Commission heard testimony from a Mr.
Ngunjiri that the police often arrested people based on stereotypes rather than hard
evidence contrary to the rules of natural justice. Mr. Ngunjiri spoke of numerous
instances in which young unemployed Kikuyus would be arrested as Mungiki
suspects, and the burden would then shift to the suspect to prove that he did not
belong to the movement. This method of shifting the burden to the suspect to prove
his innocence was similar to that adopted by the colonial government with respect to
the Mau Mau, and more recently with respect to arrests of individuals from the Sabaot
community who were automatically suspected of being members of the SLDF.125

167. The Commission further observes that the killings were planned, organised and
systematic. They in many cases were orchestrated from the high command of the
police structure. This particular finding is corroborated by the finding in the Philip
Alston Report on Extra-Judicial Killings.
125 TJRC/Hansard/Ngunjiri Presentation p.40
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168. The case of the execution of an alleged notorious criminal by the name of Matheri
is indicative of the Police’s reluctance to follow the prescribed mode of pursuing
criminals under the law. The testimony of the slain Bernard Kiriinya indicates how
on 20th February 2007, Matheri came out from his house with his hands up having
surrendered, and being laid in front of his house to be later sprayed with bullets.
Thereafter, it was testified that the police stage managed the area so as to make it
look like there was an exchange of fire between him and the police.
169. He again describes the executions that took place after the alleged attack by
Mungiki on the late John Michuki’s house. Upon instructions that the police must
be seen to be doing something, the team of which the witness was a part, went to
Dandora, arrested 4 suspects, transported them to Kangema and shot them there.
In the course of that, they also shot one of their colleagues to silence him, as they
perceived that he may disclose the execution he had witnessed.
170. The testimony also talks about the murder of the spiritual leader of the group Mr.
Kimani Ruo who was arrested almost the same day after being cleared by the court
on joint charges with Maina Njenga, who was at the time serving his sentence in
Naivasha Maximum Prison. The testimony of the late Bernard Kiriinya indicates that
the orders came from the highest office of the police force down to the officers
who eventually committed the execution. Prior to his execution, he and others
were taken to Ngong forest, where they interrogated using force, and forced to
confess their involvement with Mungiki as well as name their other members in
Dandora. They were later killed and their bodies dumped.
171. In the course of this, it is important to note some of the brutal tactics that the police
used to extract information, threaten or terrorize their suspects were as brutal
as the ones perpetrated by the Mungiki in the slum areas. In certain incidences,
the Commission has heard of cases where the officers conducting the execution
gouged out the eyes of the suspects, and beat them to pulp with clubs.
172. The testimony of Bernard Kiriinya discusses up to 24 series of executions in 2007
where suspects, some seemingly innocent people, were executed in cold blood
by the Police. The Commission observes, which observation is corroborated by
various reports, that the orders to kill were coming from the highest office of the
police force then. Mr. Kiriinya also testified that the police not only killed but also
engaged in robbery, sexual abuse and vandalism. The main victims who were
murdered include the Mungiki spiritual leader Mr. Kimani Ruo, alleged notorious
criminal Matheri and Maina Njenga’s wife Nyakio. A short period after testifying
to KNCHR, Mr. Bernard Kiriinya was also brutally murdered. It is the Commission’s
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recommendations that the conduct of the involved officers be investigated fully.
It is observable that the police were experts in stage-managing the scenes after a
shoot-out. For instance the testimony of Benard Kiriinya shows that once Matheri
and his colleague had been killed, the police engaged in a series of shootings to
make it sound like there was an exchange of fire. After the shooting, there was a
public notice on the Police website indicating that the criminals that were shot at
Athi River residence were indeed Matheri and his accomplices. To a large extent
the testimony of the late Kiriinya is corroborated by the said disclosure of the
police.

Current State of the Mungiki
173. Mr. Ngunjiri, the Executive Director of Change Associate Trust, testified before
the Commission concerning the conditions that contribute to the creation of
organisations like the Mungiki. He noted that as each generation continues to
struggle for economic sustenance in the face of high unemployment, there will
continue to be people who can be recruited into organizations like Mungiki.126
174. Although the Mungiki are a banned organization, and despite the history of
brutal police response to the Mungiki, the Commission heard testimony from
government officials that as of February 2011 the movement is still alive and wellorganised. Through an interview, one of the respondents to the Commission, the
DC of Kiambu District, told the Commission that the Mungiki is still alive as at 9th
February 2011.
175. The group having been banned in the year 2002, exists in various forms, and is still
energized despite the fact that there are indications that following the crackdown
of its highest members it may have disintegrated. According to a source, the
Commission learnt that many members of the Militia attempted to exist secretly
within a group called ‘Forest Guard’ who are led by a retired Kenyan General, and
former Commandant of the National Defense College. There were also unconfirmed
allegations that a Kenya Army Commander had been requested to release G3 rifles
among other equipment to the ‘Forest Guard’ group. The movement is also alleged
to be receiving constant supply of funds from wealthy and connected Kikuyu
politicians.
176. During his testimony to the commission he said ‘you cannot kill a generation’ to
mean that the movement may cease to exist but the passion and the cause for
economic empowerment by the youth will not cease to exist.
126 TJRC/Hansard/Ngunjiri Presentation
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177. In one of the interviews, a woman follower of Mungiki was interviewed and asked
what she thinks would happen if Maina Njenga was killed. In response she said:
This Kenya would be bloodshed, we’ll revenge the whole world. Mombasa, Eldoret,
Lamu, everywhere. We’ll burn the houses to hell and I will be in front.

Killings during Electoral Periods
178.

Since the start of multiparty democracy in 1992, Kenya’s elections have coincided
with violence which has led to deaths, destruction of property and the entrenchment
of violence as a tool towards achieving political power. The government through its
state security agencies has sometimes contributed to such violence by using extreme
force itself in the name of suppressing electoral violence; at times incumbents have
used the state machinery to commit violence to further their re election or the
election of their political allies. The violence related to the December 2007 elections
brought this phenomenon to the attention of the rest of the world, but the use of
violence as part of elections dates back at least to 1992.

179. This section will focus on the killings and disappearances perpetrated by state
security forces and in particular, the police, during the key electoral periods of 1992,
1997, 2002 and 2007. It must be noted, however, that the violence surrounding
elections in Kenya have their roots in a mixture of other long-standing issues which
include economic inequalities, corruption, lack of rule of law and most of all the
problems relating to land and land administration.

1992 General Elections
180. The outbreak of violence in 1992 included the direct involvement and engagement
of the state security machinery and administration which heightened the violence
as it was aimed principally at advancing the interests of a particular candidate.
This section will specifically focus on the instances of extra-judicial killings and
disappearances relating to this particular election.
181. The Akiwumi Commission concluded that the violence was motivated by highranking government ministers and party leaders who supported Majimboism.
Majimboism is a form of decentralized federal government which was developed
by supporters of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) prior to and just after
Kenya attaining its independence..127
127 Joshia O. Osamba, ‘Violence and the Dynamics of Transition: State, Ethnicity and Governance in Kenya’ Africa Development, Vol.
XXVI, No.1 &2 (2009) 41.
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182, In order to understand what happened, the political context of this violence should
be highlighted. The 1992 elections were the first multi-party elections to be held
following the repeal of section 2A of the independence constitution.
183. At this time the Moi government had been in power reigned for 14 years. During
that period President Moi had entrenched his rule and placed members of his
larger community, the Kalenjin, in the most important government positions,
including the state security machinery.. With the advent of multi-party politics, a
direct threat posed by the opposition to the status quo.
184. The violence and the deaths that occurred at this time were primarily caused by
the tension between the “reformers” and “anti-reformers,” the fear of the KANU
government and its beneficiaries being ousted from power, and the debates on
Majimboism and strong national centralized power.
185. A witness testified before the Commission that during the introduction of
multiparty democracy there arose a bitter rivalry between the political parties
FORD and KANU. This political hostility took on an ethnic dimension, creating
hostility between members of the Kalenjin and Luo communities. This ethnic
hostility manifested itself in Sondu with the creation of Kalenjin and Luo zones,
which in turn led to the famous Sondu Massacre.128
186. Perceptions of the relationship between political power and employment also
contributed to the election related violence. The civil service in the Rift Valley
included very few people of Kikuyu origin, leading to the perception that they
were denied such jobs because of their ethnicity. A witness testified before the
Commission that he saw the need to vote differently at this time owing to the
fact that they were never given options for employment or recruitment into
government jobs.129
It was into this context that resulted in so many deaths, and the deployment of state
security agents which often led to further violations and deaths. A witness testified
before the Kiliku Commission that during the clashes in Nandi he saw two army
helicopters and the “Kalenjin warriors” accompanied by the police who chased away
members of the Kikuyu community to pave the way for the burning of their houses.130

187.

In addition to ethnic cleansing directed against members of the Kikuyu community
in the Rift Valley, ethnic cleansing was also directed against members of the Kalenjin
community in the Rift Valley. The Commission received information that certain

128 Commission Investigators interview with NGW, 59 year Old at Kericho.
129 TJRC Investigators Interview with KIWI 45
130 Kiliku Report pg. 15
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members of the Kikuyu community committed violent acts against members of
the Kalenjin, Luo and Luhyia communities. This violence was encouraged by some
politicians, including a local public official and Member of Parliament HON34 who
was allegedly buying weaponry and funding the Kikuyu youth for the purpose of
evicting members of the Kalenjin and Luo communities.131
188.

There were also instances of retaliatory attacks such as when ethnic Clashes between
the Maasai, Kalenjin and Kikuyu which was caused due to political incitement whereby
evictions where being conducted against non kalenjin and Maasai communities so
that they don’t vote, many people were also evicted from Likia where a Maasai was
killed with his son. This caused their tribesmen in Melelo to also start killing others
as revenge.

189.

Witnesses testified before the Commission that certain politicians incited this ethnic
violence and the resulting deaths. Mary Nungari Ng’ang’a of Mlima Panya village
of Maai Mahiu testified that the clashes in her area could be traced to a particular
politician. She testified that one EYE34 kept saying at Barazas that all foreigners – by
which was understood all individuals not of the Maasai community – will have to
leave Maasai land and return to their ancestral homes. We have never returned to see
what our tormentors did with our land since they even killed some of us.”

190.

The Kiliku report in particular refers to two meetings in Kapsabet and Kapkatet in
1991 which led to the polarisation of the majimbo and anti-majimbo camps. As
reported by the Kiliku Commission, at the meeting in Kapsabet the participants were
instructed to take action against all multi-party agents and to kick pro-multiparty
reformers such as Paul Muite out of the Rift Valley. It was also at this meeting that
the founder of FORD, Mr. Masinde Muliro, was ordered out of Trans-Nzoia. A proposal
was made to ban LSK because of its support of multi-party democracy. There were
also audacious statements from people like BIM88 who told his people to go into
bars and crush those who are anti-government. LOK19 ordered his supporters to arm
themselves and go and crush FORD members.132

191.

The Commission notes the analysis in the Kiliku report but finds opportunity
to stress that the same cycle of politicians inciting unsuspecting Kenyans into
violence, especially during electoral periods, continues to repeat itself and is what
consequently led to the deaths of over 1,300 people in 2007/2008 elections. For this
reason, the Commission notes the need to prosecute those who are alleged to have
directly incited people as is documented by the Kiliku report in all the instances that
they were never prosecuted.

131 TJRC investigators interview with JIK 16
132 Kiliku Report, p.17.
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192.

The violence related to the 1992 elections left a trail of destruction, suffering and loss
of life. During this period, it was severally reported that the violence was sponsored
by the government.133 The Commission observes further finding of the Kiliku
Commission in which people were directly threatened that if they left KANU there
would be ‘fire’. The intention of the security forces in Nandi was also indicated where
a group of GSU officials killed a number of Kalenjin youths probably in retaliation
who had come to quell the clashes134.

193.

The government did very little to contain the situation. Nothing was done, for example,
to stop remarks made by ministers, civic leaders and provincial administrators that
incited members of the public to engage in violence. For Instance, LYK 09 is said to
have ‘threatened to lynch and forcibly expel Luo people from Bomet and Kericho
Districts if they supported FORD Kenya.’135 The late TOD11 in his speech delivered
at the Makutano Stadium in Kapenguria on 28 November 1993, ordered Kikuyus
to leave West Pokot District in 48 hours and warned that the Kalenjin and Pokot
community would take the law into their own hands if they did not comply with his
order.136

194.

After the violence the government attempted to minimize the gravity of what
had happened. Initially, the government denied that politically-motivated ethnic
violence was even taking place, and instead described what was occurring as a
normal conflict between communities. When the government finally acknowledged
the abnormal amount of violence it reported far fewer deaths than that reported
by the media and civil society organisations. Richard Carver, in his “Kenya Since the
Elections” (1994) stated ‘The official death toll of 365 is lower than all other estimates.
Inter Press Service reports opposition estimates of 800 dead (14 May 1993), while
another recent press estimate is 1,000 (The Guardian, 28 April 1993). Africa Watch
puts the number of dead at 1,500, extrapolating from the 750 estimate made by
the Kiliku parliamentary select committee (November 1993). The government even
attempted to block discussions of the violence in parliament until parliamentarians
protested.

Chapter FOUR

133 Joshia O. Osamba, ‘Violence and the Dynamics of Transition: State, Ethnicity and Governance in Kenya’ Africa Development, Vol.
XXVI, No.1 &2 (2009) 38
134 Pg 16, Kiliku
135 Human Rights Watch/Africa, ‘Kenya: Multipartism Betrayed in Kenya: Continuing Rural Violence and Restrictions on Freedom
of Speech and Assembly’ Human Rights Watch, Vol. 6 No.5 (July 1994) pg 10 available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/KENYA947.PDF (accessed on 10 March 2012) quoting ‘Wamalwa Wants Kones Arrested’ Daily Nation 6 April 1996.
136 Human Rights Watch/Africa, ‘Kenya: Multipartism Betrayed in Kenya: Continuing Rural Violence and Restrictions on Freedom
of Speech and Assembly’ Human Rights Watch, Vol. 6 No.5 (July 1994) pg 10 & 11 available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/KENYA947.PDF (accessed on 10 Marc 2011) quoting ‘Remaining Kikuyus Told to Move Out by Lotodo’ Daily Nation
29 November 1993 & ‘Tension Rise in West Pokot’ Daily Nation 30 November 1993. See also Korwa G. Adar & Isaac M Munyae,
‘Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi, 1978-2001’ African Studies Quarterly 5(1) available at http://web.africa.ufl.
edu/asq/v5/v5i1a1.htm (accessed on 10 March 2012).
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195. Government resources and those of contesting politicians were used in support of
the violence. Vehicles belonging to members of parliament were seen transporting
the anarchist warriors to trouble ridden areas who would in turn attack and kill
members of the community who were labelled as “outsiders”137.Military helicopters
were also observed assist the warriors to penetrate inaccessible areas, and it was
alleged that the fighting would intensify just after the helicopters visited an
area. In one instance, it is reported that an Administrative Police officer attached
to the D.O.’s office gave his gun to a Mr. Richard Rono who used it to kill one Mr.
Kinyanjui.138
196. A Major General summarized the violence of 1992 to the Commission as follows:
Personally, I summarize the 1992 clashes as a politically motivated violence. The multiparty politics, especially from KANU were so uncomfortable with a multi party system.
There was a political strategy of destabilisation just before the election so that voting
patterns change. It created an environment for violence.139

197. The Commission received testimony of how members of the Kalenjin community
were incited by prominent members of their community to kill members of the
Kikuyu community. On his way to Tambach, ICH 78, a Kalenjin who had allegedly
rigged elections, told the people of Tambach that they had voted for a corpse. He
also mocked the Kikuyu community members by telling them ‘na nyinyi wengine
mko hapa, mwende muulize ma Babu zenu walitoka wapi’ (and you, should go and
ask your grandparents where you came from). This statement insinuated that the
Kikuyu people did not belong in the Rift Valley. In further mockery, partiality to the
ethnic tensions told the displaced kikuyu’s at Burnt Forest that they were displaying
their furniture so that other people could see how expensive they are.140
198. The Commission heard testimony from individuals who asserted direct
government support for the ethnic violence. In December 199 residents of
Chebilat feared further attacks from youth from the Kalenjin community (who
had already been stealing their cattle) and reported such fears to the area chief.
The area chief responded by noting that the attacks by the young Kalenjins was
a government project. This government support empowered these youth and
allowed them to act with impunity. 81 year old ZIW 23 told the Commission of
how an assistant Chief known to them came and told her that no one would be
offered security by any Policeman so they should leave Rift Valley Province and
go to Murang’a.141
137
138
139
140
141
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199. The young Kalenjin warriors would attack any individual who indicated he would
vote for the political opposition or anyone perceived to be anti-Kalenjin not just
within Rift Valley but also along the border of Nyanza, and thus affecting many
members of the Luo community.142
200. A witness told the Commission investigators of instances where the Kalenjin youth
would be called into secret meetings where they would be paid depending on
how many houses they had burnt. It was alleged that the leaders also provided
them with bows and arrows to execute the tasks of removing what they considered
foreigners from among their midst. The Commission notes that there are as many
as 3,000 families of the 1992 clashes who were displaced and have never received
any compensation from the government.
201. Much of the violence in the Rift Valley in 1992 was committed by young members
of the Kalenjin community who were used and directed by members of the
government, including local officials.
202.

A 59-year old woman and mother of 6 related to the Commission the harrowing
experience of being attacked by a group of young people from the Kalenjin
community:
They also shot my sister in law who was eight months pregnant with an arrow. The arrow
went through her chest killing her and the foetus instantly.

203. Another witness testified:
I remember that in April 1992 a group of boys stormed into our compound. We had
rumours of possible attack by the Kalenjin but didn’t know that our immediate neighbours
would turn against us. The boys who stormed into our compound were Kalenjin. I tried to
escape towards the river, but they caught up with me. They had dogs. Two of the boys
killed my friend in my presence. They cut his head with a knife. [sic]. … They beat me with
clubs and gouged my eyes out with a knife. They left me for dead. …A week later I found
myself at Eldoret Hospital. I have suffered greatly since the blindness. I virtually depend on
my family for everything. The government has not done much about the violence, since
they would deploy the GSU and since the majority of these officers were from the Kalenjin
Community, they did not do much [sic]143

204. The involvement of politicians was further noted during the 1992 clashes as well.
The Commission heard that during December 1992, one KAPF 13 is said to have
had a meeting with some members of his Ndorobos community in Kaptama. These
youth later came to the lady’s house singing KAPF 13’s name, raped the lady in
front of her husband and engaged in acts of torture against him.
142 TJRC Investigators interview with a 64 year old lady in Sondu, MOM 16 who told the Commission of how the Kalenjin warriors
chopped off her husband’s right leg and went away with it.; Also TJRC investigator’s interview with AIZ 19 in Kisumu
143 TJRC interview with a 42 year old male in Lugari, NAPS 18
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205. Witnesses testified before the Commission of disappearances during the 1992
elections. WON 89 is said to have gone missing during the 1992 electoral violence.
The Commission spoke to his surviving wife and heard how her husband was
involved in local politics, which is why she thinks he was targeted. She told the
Commission that the last time she saw her husband was on the 6th of April 1992.
206. The Commission spoke to a 72 year old man (PAO 1) who narrated how in 1991 two
contestants for parliamentary elections said they would help the Kalenjin people
to weed out the impurities from among them, referring to the Kikuyu. Another
witness recounted to the Commission how a sitting Member of Parliament advised
Kikuyus who were in Maasailand to “lay low like envelopes’.144
207. The Kiliku Report listed a number of incidents where state officials were alleged
to be involved in killings. One witness before the Kiliku Commission in Koru
testified how he watched a cripple being hacked to death by an assistant chief
of Belgut Division in Kericho District. Another witness testified that members of
the General Service Unit (GSU) killed three cattle rustlers at the Nyamira/Narok
border during patrol145. This testimony was corroborated by Rev. John Koskei,
who testified before the Commission that he witnessed shock trigger- happy
police men shooting to death seven people within Londiani-Sorget area in
Kericho146. In addition they injured more than ten including a five year old child
lying on her mother’s back.
208. In September, 1993, the Government declared the Burnt Forest region a security
operation zone. A vicious attack was instituted the following year which left 18
people dead and many displaced. Worse still, security forces, Maasai morans and
game rangers attacked Kikuyu settlers in Enoosupukia killing at least 30 people.
When their member of parliament was confronted he said that he had no regrets
about the events because the Maasai were fighting for their rights and further
claimed that the Kikuyu were suppressing them by occupying their land.147
209. The raiders were well organized and coordinated. They attacked non- Kalenjins
and non- Maasais under cover of darkness. Homes were looted and set on fire, and
their occupants were sometimes killed with traditional weapons. The attacks left
the victims economically crippled and psychologically traumatized. There was a
general lack of concern by the government and the police for their security and
144 TJRC interview with HUM 12
145 Republic of Kenya ‘Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and other parts of
Kenya’ (1992) 71
146 TJRC/RV/KERI/09/Public/p.19
147 Daily Nation October 20 1993 as cited in ‘Out For The Count: The 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya 78
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welfare.148 One of the victims testified to the Commission that the police, the GSU
and the administration police trained the youth to eliminate the opposition ethnic
group.149 He further testified that government was aware of the atrocities given
that it had issued modern weapons to the perpetrators ensuring they were well
armed. Most people were killed and others kicked out of their farms as government
security forces refused to intervene. When they reported the incidences to the
police, their cries were arrested by the notion that “that was a Gor Mahia and
Abaluhya match.”150
210. The government did not fulfil its obligation to pursue justice for the victims of this
violence. Perpetrators who were arrested were released without any charges and
without any valid explanation. The number of those arrested differed with those in
custody with the knowledge of the government but it did nothing in intervention.
The Council of Churches in Kenya issued a press statement asserting,
It is of great shame and utter disregard for the rule of law and respect of the basic rights
of the people, for a government to institute the use of force negatively in the clashes. We
hereby call upon the Attorney General to set- up a special committee of inquiry into the
death of innocent citizens including children who are claimed to have died in the hands
of the police while on ‘cross fire.151

211. Most incidents took place in Rift Valley in 1992. The Commission was however
told of the Mitheru massacre where there was extreme opposition to antiKanuism. The Commission heard from a witness RUJ 56 who stated that on the
night of 11th October 1992 in Mitheru village police officers in a government
land rover armed with guns came to the village at about 7.00pm and went on
a mission to eliminate those who had declared opposition for their opposition
parties. He told the Commission that 5 people were killed that evening. He stated
that those who were responsible include REY 12, RAG 05, FRI 44, PRO 03, CIC 98,
all government officials.

General Elections
212. This was the second time Kenyans were to participate in a multi-party election.
Like the first time, this election was also marred by violence exacerbated by ethnic
tensions that were exploited by politicians. Election-related violence occurred in
various parts of the country.
148
149
150
151

Akiwumi report paras 90- 91
TJRC/WEST/MT.ELGON/05/Public/p.37
Meaning Bukhusus had no say in a foreign land (Sabaot land) if they wanted to be heard they ought to have gone to their own land
NCCK Report ‘the Cursed Arrow: Organized Violence against Democracy in Kenya” 18
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213. President Moi of KANU was declared the winner of the election. Mwai Kibaki, who
opposed the re-election of Moi, , lodged a petition to the High Court challenging
the election results on the grounds that there had been irregularities in the
electoral process. This petition did not go through
214. Extra-judicial killings took place prior to, during and after the elections. Four
months before the election there were reports of ethnic fighting in the Mombasa
region. The violence took place primarily in the Likoni-Kwale area, a KANUdominated zone. This violence left several people dead. The violence pitted ethnic
communities against each other.
215. Testimonies before the Commission, corroborated by research from numerous
NGOs, research institutions and other bodies, establish that most of the 1997 election
violence was politically-motivated, with members of different ethnic communities
fighting against each other despite the fact that they had lived together peacefully
for many decades. Many of the resulting deaths were committed by local militia
acting either in retaliation or defense on the one hand, and the police and other
arms of the government who acted in defense of the militias but also fuelled the
violence for their own political ends.
216.

Witnesses testified before the Commission about the politically-motivated Kaya
Bombo clashes in Mombasa in 1997. They testified that the clashes were instigated
by the government for the purpose of chasing those who were perceived to be from
other parts of Kenya and who were assumed to be supporters of the opposition. Many
young and jobless youths resisted being chased away. They broke into the Likoni
Police Station and stole arms and ammunition. The police and other government
security forces came down hard on Likoni area. Witnesses testified to the security
forces beating people brutally, torturing them and even killing them.152

217. Prior to the outbreak of the Kaya Bombo clashes, tensions already existed among
some of the residents. The youth from the Digo Community perceived members
of the Luo community as unjustly benefiting from the resources of the local
community. Groups identifying themselves as ‘Vijana wa Kaya bombo’ started to
distribute leaflets demanding all people not originally from the coast to vacate the
Coast Province. The leaflets included a deadline by which all non-coastal people
were to leave. With the passage of that deadline the clashes started. Witnesses
stated to the Commission that the police and government administration knew of
the impending clashes but took no action.153
152 See TJRC investigators interview with SHA03
153 TJRC Investigators interview with KID33
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218. One witness stated to the Commission that the government security forces were
divided in the area. He overheard an exchange between a Kenya Navy Officer
and a police officer of Kikuyu origin on or about 13 August 1997. The Navy officer
stated to the police officer that the “foreigners” in the Coast must leave. On hearing
this exchange the witness took his family to the Catholic Church in Likoni where
they stayed for almost one year. He testified to the Commission that at this time,
many people were killed among other violations.154
219.

Witnesses reported to the Commission that after the Kaya Bombo clashes many of
those arrested for supporting or participating in the clashes were severely tortured
and in some cases killed. Witness SHA03 told the Commission that he was arrested
because he was suspected of being one of the individuals who broke into the Likoni
police station and stole arms and ammunition. He reported that after being arrested
he was tortured severely at Diani police station where the DCIO wanted him to be
‘finished off’ (meaning killed) but survived only to go through additional gruesome
torture.

220.

The Commission heard from a 54 year old woman who described the death of her
husband and her husband’s friend at the hands of the police. She stated to the
Commission that her husband was in a make-shift kiosk when the police started
shooting. Her husband’s friend was shot first and then her own husband was shot
and later died at the hospital.155

221. The Commission also heard from a 54 year old man testified about the killing of
his son during these clashes. He described direct involvement of soldiers who at
one point went into his hotel and killed two people. The following day his son was
arrested on the spot and beaten up and in the end died as a result of his injuries.156
222.

A 50 year old man, SHA03, told the Commission that he suffered at the hands of the
police and other security officers. He claimed that he suffered because he opposed
the idea of politicians chasing away the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhyia and Nandi from outside
Rift Valley.

223.

Information presented to the Commission suggests that the state security forces’
reaction to the demonstrations caused 60 or more civilian deaths. The deaths were
occasioned either under the hand of the local militia (Kaya Bombo in Likoni area or
the Kabuithu in Embu, among others), as well as the state security agents. Witnesses
testified that the local militia were in most instances incited or enabled by politicians

154 TJRC Investigators interview with LIT 34
155 See TJRC investigators interview with TIN 56
156 See TJRC investigators interview with HOM19
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or the government itself. The Commission interviewed many people whose relatives
or friends had died in the hands of uniformed police officers and other government
officials.157
224. The Commission also received evidence with regard to enforced disappearances
of some of the people who had been arrested following the Kaya Bombo clashes.
The Commission spoke to one SIM76 who was arrested by the police in 1997 to be
questioned at the Likoni Police Station and has never been seen again. His arrest
followed the raid of the police station. On arrival, he found people being whipped
and detained, most of whom had done nothing.158
225.

The involvement of the government and especially the anti-opposition forces was
specifically evident from the testimonies to the Commission. The key politicians in
coast province at the time found ample opportunity to campaign on the platform
of diminishing resources when told people in a number of rallies to ‘protect their
land’ with the subsequent effect of the local Coast people seeking to chase other
communities.159

226.

The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) in a report on the clashes highlighted
the government’s indifference and lack of political will to respond to brutality of
the situation despite having adequate resources to do so.160 The Deputy District
Commissioner of Nakuru, for instance, is reported to have described the clashes as a
mere ‘disagreement’ between communities, refusing acknowledge the existence of
violence warranting intervention.161

227. The violence and killing of 1997 was also felt in other places in the country, with
specificity of areas where there was opposition. During the electoral campaigns,
President Moi addressed a crowd in Embu town. The youth of the town and the
then area MP, Njeru Kathangu, led several youths in protest to the visit. . In response
three lorries of GSU officers armed with batons arrived, a large show of force given
the nature and size of the protests. The GSU officers went beyond dispersing
the local crowds on the streets and went into people’s houses attacking them
indiscriminately. Many of the indiscriminate attacks and beatings, and subsequent
arrests led to deaths and disappearances.

157 TJRC Investigators interview with SAN07 who testified with regard to the death of his father who was killed by uniformed Police
Officers.
158 TJRC Investigators interview with SIM76
159 TJRC Investigators interview with DAC77
160 KHRC Quarterly Repression Report, July-Sept. 1997
161 XIX Article 19, ‘Kenya: Post Election Political Violence’ (December 1998) 7 available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/
kenya-post-election-political-violence.pdf accessed on 9 March 2012
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228. The Commission heard from a 69 year old woman from Embu who testified that
her then 27-year old son was one of the people beaten by the GSU. He had been
at home milking cows when he was assaulted by the police for no reason, and later
taken to the police station. She stated that she went to the Police station but the
police denied her entry and she was later told he had died.162
229. The escalation of violence was also felt in areas like Meru which was worsened
by the formation of local militia. Witnesses told the Commission about a militia
group called Kabuithu which engaged in a number of violations including killings.
A witness alleged that the attacks were organized by local politicians who wanted
to evict certain people from the area.163
230. The Commission heard of the circumstances surrounding the death of Jane Njeri
Muchungu who was shot dead by a Nakuru police officer after violence erupted
during the counting of votes in the 1997 elections164. Jane was in her business
premises when she was killed. A witness stated that incidents of violence by the
police against unarmed civilians, specifically women, during the elections that year
was quite alarming. An inquest was conducted into the killing of Ms. Muchungu
and a pathologist report concluded that she died as a result of injuries from bullet
wounds in the head that caused brain shattering. Due to the lack of cooperation
by the police in surrendering their guns, the magistrate overseeing the inquest
was unable to identify the policeman responsible. This killing was reported four
years later by the media in 2001.165
231. Ethnic tensions and violence increased exponentially as impunity prevailed. Local
leaders mobilized supporters to carry out acts of targeted violence against their
opponents during the election period. The Commission received information
concerning the brutal murder of Francis Ndidi Njuguna who was hacked to death
by the local chief with the aid of a local Kalenjin resident. The victim’s son recounted
to the Commission how he tried to protest but was ordered to leave. When he
would not leave he was cut on the face but luckily survived the ordeal. He testified
how he saw the perpetrators were seen drinking his father’s blood shortly before
leaving with his head.166
232. A quasi-military organisation of youth, well trained to kill, generated most of
the attacks during this period. The “enemies”, in turn, with the guidance of their
political leaders, demonstrated their expertise of skilfully wiping the attackers out
162
163
164
165
166

TJRC Investigators interview with LEN 03
TJRC Investigators interview with TIB01
TJRC/Stat/03804
The Daily Nation (13 April 2001) ‘Families demand relief over killings’
TJRC/Stat/31608
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by the use of proliferated firearms167. One raider asserted to Human Rights Watch
how politicians supplied them with guns before the Likoni attack168 and even sent
vehicles to transport them to the operation fields where they maimed, killed and
chased away those they perceived as foreign.169
233. Members of Parliament and senior KANU leaders were reported to have been
involved in financing and organising the violence. In December 1997, a Mombasa
member of parliament claimed during an interview with the Kenya Human
Rights Commission that two senior politicians from Rift Valley and Coast were
responsible for planning and funding the clashes in collaboration with State House
operatives.170 It was later reported by Human Rights Watch that a politician would
occasionally pay the raiders a visit in their camps and provide them with food and
money as reward for “a job well done.”171
234. As explained by one of the witnesses to the Commission:
In 1997, the then President Moi, incited the Digo against other tribes in the Coast to send
back home the non-coastal tribes to their original homes. This was an attempt to alienate
non-KANU faithful so that the then ruling party garners majority of the votes in the area.

235. There were allegations that some of the people responsible for killings committed
in order to force the “non-Coast people” back to the main land were foreign
militias from outside Kenya who had been hired by politicians. Witnesses told the
Commission that Kaya Bombo was carried out by foreign militias. A witness told
the Commission in Shika Adabu area of Likoni district the following as far as the
1997 violence is concerned:
that during the 1997 Kaya Bombo Clashes the attackers were foreigners. She narrates
how hooded men in red garments burnt their house at night on claims that they were
non-coastal.

236. Like the 1992 ethnic violence, no efforts were made by government security
forces to stop the raiders before and even after the raids were launched despite
numerous advance warnings. Amnesty International noted that the police only
167 Human Rights Watch ‘Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya’ 4
168 Human Rights Watch interview with a raider (22 April 1999) he reported that they were introduced to a Somali by a politician who
supplied guns to them KHRC ‘Kayas of Deprivation’ 24
169 Human Rights Watch ‘Playing with Fire: weapons proliferation, political violence and human rights in Kenya’ 50 ‘A politician sent a
lorry at night to transport the group leaders together with some raiders to the outskirts of Likoni in preparation for the attack’
170 The People Daily 18 August (2000) 2 as cited in Oyugi O Walter ‘Politicised Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon’
(2000) 12
171 Human Rights Watch ‘Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya’ 56 – a raider who
guarded the camps during the interviews stated that Suleiman Shakombo, Likoni MP, visited the camp twice and each time he’d
leave the commanders would announce that they had received money for food

530

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

showed up long after the destruction and deaths had occurred. 172 Further still,
the police expressed a lot of reluctance to get involved; they did not demonstrate
the same zeal they had shown while suppressing opposition supporters and
dispersing people attending meetings organized by the opposition.173 One witness
told Human Rights Watch how the inaction by the police made it possible for the
raiders to conduct their attacks without fear of resistance. He stated:
We had to keep our activities secret. Messages were sent to senior police but they took
no action. No one came and disturbed us at all.174

There were even incidents where more than thirty armed security men came
across the raiders and instead of pursuing them they literally fled to avoid armed
confrontation.175
237.

The police handled the situation so casually as to raise widespread suspicions of
government complicity in the attacks. Those with vital information regarding the
attacks were not given an opportunity to record statements. One such person later
revealed that the trainings of the raiders by politicians took place on his own farm but
his statement was nowhere in sight to corroborate the allegation176 It was reported
that the police threatened individuals who wanted to report cases that incriminated
the government. A victim of the 1997 political violence in Likoni recounted her
ordeal to the Commission of how she and her family members were burnt, some of
them to death, when her house was torched by the raiders. Based on the malicious
threats by the police, she decided not to report the incident to the authorities.

238. In December 1998, a police ambush against the raiders took the form of mainly
targeting the Digo community youths. Patterns of excessive use of force and
brutality by the police were documented by Human Rights Watch. Some were
reported shouting, “Let’s kill them they killed our askaris”. Those interviewed
explained how they were severely beaten, tortured and in the process some died.
One vividly accounted the ordeal,
A colleague was cut with a panga on his head by a police officer while in prison. He did
not receive any medical attention. The deep cut was infected by insects got worse every
other day and eventually he died.177
172 The Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner visited Laikipia a week after the violence had begun. See Amnesty International, ‘Kenya:
Political Violence Spirals’ (1998) 10 available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR32/019/1998/en/67dd2c7e-daa511dd-80bc-797022e51902/afr320191998en.pdf accessed on 9 March 2012
173 Amnesty International, ‘Kenya: Political Violence Spirals’ (1998) 1 available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
AFR32/019/1998/en/67dd2c7e-daa5-11dd-80bc-797022e51902/afr320191998en.pdf accessed on 9 March 2012
174 Human Rights Watch ‘Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya’ 41
175 Human Rights Watch ‘Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya’ 42
176 Oyugi O Walter ‘Politicised Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon’ (2000) 12
177 Human Rights Watch ‘Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya’ 45
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239.

Criminal justice institutions provided little if any remedy to the victims of these
attacks. Shoddy investigations were carried out rendering it difficult to link evidence
to the alleged criminals. The low quality of the evidence often prolonged the trials.
Most of the accused were acquitted due to lack of evidence while those in remand
prison awaiting decisions often died in the process178. The Akiwumi Commission
uncovered key evidence in the course of its hearings which would have been material
to these trials. It was stated before the Akiwumi Commission that documentary
evidence containing raiders’ records were presented to top officials in the Criminal
Investigations Department which documents were never produced as evidence in
court.179

240. The Akiwumi Commission concluded that a lot could have been done to minimize
the atrocities committed in 1997. The Commission stated that
The government ought to take responsibility to promptly, thoroughly and impartially
investigate ethnic violence and bring those responsible to justice.

241.

The information provided to the Commission makes clear that it was not members
of just one ethnic group who perpetrated the 1997 election-related violence. In
addition to members of the Kalenjin community using violence in support of
political candidates, members of the Kikuyu community worked with sympathetic
government officials to use violence to address injustices related to land. The
Commission heard testimony of how at Bararget settlement scheme several Kalenjin
families were evicted from the area because they were Kalenjin in order to create
room for Kikuyu settlers in the Molo region. This group of Kalenjin families later
moved to Lare. The houses for these families were destroyed by government agents
in order to ensure that only members of the Kikuyu community lived in the area. The
families complained to the then DC Nathan Mwangi, but nothing was done. On 25th
and 27th January 1998, more than 5000 families were evicted from Lare settlement
scheme by the Kikuyu community after the general election of 1997.

242.

The Commission heard of the direct involvement of administrative officers and
the police in Coast Province fronting the ideas of the politicians in 1997 during the
Kaya Bombo Clashes.180 A witness told the Commission how he was victimized for
opposing the plan by some politicians and elders of the Coast Province to chase
away people who were not originally from the Coast Province. The witness testified
about a meeting that was held at Ibiza club Grounds in Ukunda by politicians from
Kwale and administrative officers of Coast province to discuss how to remove/chase
away people from up-country. It is important to note that at this time, there were

178 The investigating officer who had began to uncover important evidence was transferred and replaced by a junior personnel who
was new to the investigations See Human Rights Watch ‘Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human
Rights in Kenya’ 59-60
179 Akiwumi Commission Official Transcript (October 6 1998) 44-53
180 TJRC investigators interview with Rashid Bogodzo Sengeza
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direct efforts by the Moi government to chase away people who were his opponents
from the Coast in order to ensure that he attains a win in the 1997 elections. The
devastating effects of the Kaya Bombo clashes can be indicated by the story of a
mother who lost 9 children. In her statement to the Commission she stated:
A mother of 9 who lost some of her children in the Kaya Bombo ethnic clashes revealed
that the state did not open an inquest even after the burial permit indicated that
deceased died as a result of excessive bleeding due to gunshot wound. No one has ever
been arrested. She demands an official apology and reparation.

General Elections
243.

The 2007 post-election violence witnessed the largest number of deaths of any election
period. At the time of compiling this report, official government estimates place the
number of dead at about 1,300. The background, situation and consequences of this
violence were documented most ably by the Waki commission report.

244. The violence was similar to election related violence which has happened during
the 1992 and 1997 general elections.181 The violence had underlying political and
ethnically-insular motivations, and was conspicuous for its relative intensity as it
was widespread, protracted and preceded a general election.182
245.

The TJRC, however, received overwhelming information, on various themes that are
included in appropriate sections of this report. This section discusses the information
we received on specific incidents of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.

246. It has been well-established that the Government received intelligence reports
from various security organs, including the National Security Intelligent Service,
warning of tensions and possible violence before the elections, but did not act
upon these warnings. The Kriegler, Waki and KNCHR reports are unanimous on the
fact that the security forces expedited their duties with utter unprofessionalism
during the post-election violence. The reports report how the security forces
were biased in that they only protected individuals from their ethnic groups or
otherwise failed to protect individuals at all from the ensuing violence.
247.

A devastating incident was reported to the Commission by one Bernard Ndege,
a victim of the post election violence, during the Commission’s public hearings in
Kisumu.183 Mr. Ndege lost 11 members of his family and eight friends in the presence
of the police and with no assistance from them. His family members were burnt
to ashes by Mungiki youths just because they were ‘Luos’ and supported the local

181 CIPEV Report, p. 38 paragraph 3.
182 CIPEV Report, p.1, paragraph 1.
183 TJRC/NYZ/KSM/07/Public/p.7
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ODM candidate. Prior to the attack, Mr. Ndege, among others, had reported to the
police that they feared such an attack. Rather than providing him and his family with
protection, the police sent him and others back to their homes where they were later
attacked. In the case of Mr. Ndege all of the 19 people who were hiding in his house
were killed.
248. The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) (commonly referred
to as the ‘Waki Commission’) detailed the circumstances and causes of 1,113
killings which occurred during that period which included; the growing power
and personalization of power around the Presidency; historical marginalisation
and perceived inequities concerning the allocation of land and other national
resources; increasing poverty and unemployment; unaddressed grievances and
previous acts of political violence that erupted around general elections in the
1990s.184
249. The Waki Commission further identified major limitations with the way state
security agents responded to the violence. Their quasi- judicial role in the electoral
violence had its roots in discriminatory policies followed during recruitment.
250. The 2007 post-election violence was also characterized by the use of excessive
force and extra-judicial killings by the police. In late December during the vote
counting process and even after the results were announced, police in many towns
were confronted by demonstrations that rapidly turned into riots. In response to
these demonstrations and riots the police used live ammunition leading, in many
instances, to deaths.185 Many witnesses provided information to the Commission
concerning killings attributed to the police during that period. Rev. John Koskei
testified before the Commission and named five people who were shot by state
security agents in his presence186. The Waki Commission listed 962 victims of
shootings by the police, 405 of whom were fatal. The Waki Commission report
concluded that gunfire was the single most frequent cause of death during the
post-election violence, and assumed that all such deaths were caused by the
police:
The Commission received no evidence to suggest that where gunshots were recorded
as the cause of death or injury, it was from a source other than the police.187
184 CIPEV Report cap 2
185 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March
(2008) 26
186 TJRC/RV/KERI/09/Public/p.20 “The late Samwel Kirui killed by a police officer at Tegnon Area; the late Paul K. Rotich killed by
police officers in his home area at Tegnon; the late Patrick K. Mutai killed by the OCS, Londiani Police Station by the name Richard
Kimutu, outside his house; the late Wilson Koskei, nicknamed Nyarundu, killed by Army officers in his residence at Letsotet Farm;
the late Mobei arap Chepkwony killed by police officers at Kwitu Farm, Sorget area.”
187 CIPEV Report 347
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According to a report by Human Rights Watch, police shot unarmed protesters and
bystanders, including women and children, without any initial attempt to use nonlethal force.188 The Waki Commission found that the police indiscriminately used live
ammunition and that over half of the gunshot victims had wounds from the back.
They found no legal or operational basis for justifying the shooting of citizens from
behind as such citizens could not have posed an imminent threat to life at the time
of the shooting which would have justified firing at them in self-defense.189

252. Nyanza Province recorded the largest amount of police brutality. The Waki Report
provided that a total of 111 people died in Nyanza during the post-election
violence period. Out of this number, 89 people died of gunshot wounds. Hon.
Shakeel Shabir, Member of Parliament for Kisumu, testified that when the election
results were announced 87 people were shot “dead like dogs” and that one actually
died in his own hands. He went on to list the names of the victims and asserted that
the shoot-to-kill orders emanated from Commissioner of Police and not the PPO
as some claimed190. In addition, out of the 214 people admitted to hospitals in the
province, 48 were treated for gunshot wounds.191
253. Witnesses testified to the Commission that the police shot at people randomly on
the streets of Ronda during that election period. Carey Ochieng Odunga, while
in the comfort of his friend’s home, heard a commotion outside the house. On
stepping outside to investigate he was shot dead on the spot by an Administrative
Police Officer .192 Out of the 98 people who lost their lives in Western Province more
than three quarters died of gunshot wounds. Similarly in Rift Valley province, 170
people out of the 779 who died were killed by gunfire. In Coast province, 5 people
were shot and killed, 4 of whom were shot in the back while running away from the
police.193 In Nairobi, it was reported that 61 out of 342 people who were admitted
to hospital were treated for gunshot wounds, 23 of whom died.194
254.

In conclusion, the Waki Commission found that the police response to demonstrations
and protests was inconsistent with its obligations under the Constitution and the
mandate of the Police Service to protect the public. Rather, the police response
resulted in the unnecessary killing of scores of people.195

188 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” 20 1 (A) March (2008)
24-25
189 CIPEV Report 389
190 TJRC/NYNZ/KSM/07/Public/p.39
191 CIPEV Report 389
192 TJRC/Stat/03934
193 CIPEV Report 394
194 CIPEV Report 395
195 CIPEV Report 419 ‘the police have a responsibility to save lives and maintain law and order.’
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255. The then PPO in Nyanza, DIS07, is said to have ordered the excessive use of force
by giving “shoot-to-kill” orders and sanctioning the use of live bullets against
demonstrating Kisumu youth.196 Further, she is reported to have said with respect
to the demonstrators, “They don’t know another language except the gun” 197 thus
defending her order to use live ammunition.
256. In another report, the former US Ambassador Michael Ranneberger states that
police sources claimed that the Nyanza PPO, Ms. Kaindi issued stunning directives
to her station commanders to the effect that during any future political protests in
the region, deadly force is immediately authorized.198 An exclusive interview she
gave to The Associated Press also quoted her as saying: “It was an extreme situation
and there was no other way to control them.”199 I gave the order to open fire myself
when I heard that my officers were being overwhelmed. If we had not killed them,
things would have got very bad.”
257. DIS07, the Nyanza PPO, told the Waki Commission200 that she had received
intelligence reports that Luo youths had threatened Kikuyus who would not
support the ODM candidates. This was in contrast to what the Kisumu OCPD,
Simon Kiragu, said to the Waki commission that he did not notice any tension
and for that reason did not make any preparations in anticipation of violence.201
258.

The Nyanza Provincial Commissioner stated to the Waki Commission that the
Provincial Administration had put in place mechanisms to ensure that peace was
maintained throughout the period. The Waki commission also reported that when
the Provincial Security and intelligence Committee received intelligence from the
NSIS on 28th December 2007 predicting that there could be high levels of tension
regardless of how the results turned out. It was reported that the NSIS forwarded this
information to the relevant authorities for action.202 Being the PPO it is most definitely
assumed that was a relevant authority who would receive such intelligence.

259. What was said by her in as much as what specific steps were taken upon receiving
the intelligence reports in order to take security measures against the violence. At
the same time, it is important to recognize that indeed some actions were taken
such as deployment of security agents in various places. As far as this is concerned,
196 Kenya National Human Commission on Human Rights, “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya’s Post2007 Election Violence” pg.186
197 See Jon Swain, Sunday Times, January 13, 2008,
198 The Star, 14th/7/11
199 Kaindi said on the Dec. 29 clash in Kisumu. (Michelle Faul, Associated Press).
200 Waki Report pg 105
201 Waki report pg 175
202 Waki Report pg 176

536

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

it will be useful to understanding the lacunae in this deployment and why the
security measures were not successful.
260. Despite the many deaths, displacements and missing persons occasioned during
operations by the police during the 2007 post-election violence, nobody raised a
finger to conduct serious investigations or condemn the brutality. One victim at
Kibera who was shot but not killed sued the government. The High Court found
the government liable stating,
The shooting was unprovoked, reckless and an act of impunity on the part of the police
officers.203

Similar judgments have been made in that regard but no reparations awarded to
date.
261. During the height of the post-election violence the media captured video of a
police officer kicking the lifeless bodies of two youths who had been shot dead
in Naivasha. The police constable responsible was charged with murder but later
released for lack of evidence.204
262. There were, however, a few instances during the violence during which the
police used dialogue and other peaceful means to address the tense situation.
For example an Administration Police officer in Nairobi successfully negotiated
with demonstrators not to cause violence. Further, police stations, AP posts and
chiefs’ camps were one of the first ports of call for persons fleeing the violence. The
Kenyan army also participated in ferrying IDPs from trouble spots to safer parts
of the country.205 There are also several police officers who lost their lives while
carrying out their duties.
263. The responsibility of politicians for the deaths and disappearances during the postelection violence must not be ignored. The most serious actions by politicians with
grave consequences on life and property are the acts of incitement, funding and in
some cases direct engagement in violence.
264. The political context of the 2007/2008 elections violence dates back from
the 2005 referendum for a new constitution where the country was divided
between those who opposed the constitution (the “orange” camp) and those
203 Human Rights Watch ‘Turning Pebbles: Evading Accountability for Post- Election Violence in Kenya’ (2011) 68
204 Oywa J ‘Fury as evidence of police killings left out by judges’ The Standard (April 6 2011) available at www.standardmedia.co.ke/
headlines.php?id=2000032711 (accessed on 21 March 2012)
205 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights ‘On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya’s Post-2007
Election Violence’ August (2008) 12
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who supported the constitution (the “banana” camp). Attributing ethnic groups
and geographical areas to the banana and orange camps joined ethnicity (and
assumptions concerning the relationship between ethnicity and geography) as
inflammatory factors leading up to the 2007 elections. Rift Valley, for example,
was said to have been predominantly against the Constitution, and thus “orange,”
except for the Kikuyus who were said to be “banana.” Thus political hostility
around the constitutional referendum (orange versus banana) took on an ethnic
dimension when it was assumed that certain ethnicities (in this case Kikuyus)
supported the Constitution while others (in this case Kalenjins) were assumed to
oppose it. A witness interviewed by the Commission stated that rivalry surfaced
among members of the Kisii, Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo communities when these
non-Kalenjin communities were told to go back to banana zones.206 This same
witness continued:
In 2005 during the referendum campaign the rivalry surfaced again between Kisii,
Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo. During one of the meetings at the Sondu Market Orange
leaders informed those who were supporting Bananas that they should go back to the
‘banana zone’[…]They referred to non Kalenjin as ‘madoadoa’. These utterances incited
the public in attendance. This kind of incitement continued right up to the elections in
2007.207

265. Many politicians sought votes by campaigning to evict the non-Kalenjin groups
from the Rift Valley. Unfortunately it is inflammatory rhetoric such as this that
attracts some voters. Mr. Keffa Magenyi of the Internally Displaced Persons
network commented on this phenomenon to the Commission: “The voters will
mostly vote for the one who has the harshest speech on land. They will never
vote for a candidate promoting dialogue.”208 In this regard, the Commission
notes that this inflammatory campaign rhetoric directly decreased the security
and safety of individuals who were not Kalenjin but living in the Rift Valley. The
Commission’s research, corroborated by witness testimony,209 indicates that there
was a pattern of eviction of non-Kalenjins from parts of the Rift Valley during
election periods.
266. The involvement of politicians in the 2007 post-election violence is indisputable.
Various witnesses who were interviewed by the Commission testified to occasions
where they personally witnessed incitement by politicians which led to killings
among other violations.
206
207
208
209
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267. A witness testified that NID 13, LIL 33, and SIK 09 incited a crowd at a meeting
at Cheptiret Secondary School before the election by stating that the members
of the Kikuyu Community should be expelled from the region. They went on to
claim that there was need to remove the ‘madoadoa’ from Rift valley because
they were the cause of the economic injustices since all the money was being
taken to Central Province.
268. Such statements were not without consequence. Those who engaged directly
in some of the killing were heard to use some of the same language as these
politicians. For instance, a witness testified before Commission:
On August 2007 some armed hooded men covered with black clothes came to our
house and demanded money. Before we could do anything they asked us why we
should associate and do business with a Kikuyu. They killed my business partner Michael
Ngugi in front of my door and forced themselves inside.

269. Media houses also contributed to the violence, including through the broadcast
of messages that incited their listeners. Individuals spoke to the Commission
about how the media needed to be more responsible in the messages they
conveyed. A witness told the Commission the following in this regard:
The media played a role in sowing disunity among Kenyans. There is need to ensure
that broadcasters are professionals capable of sieving information from their callers.

270. The same witnesses also indicated to the Commission the consequence of
irresponsible politics and disrespect for democracy where he noted that the
tensions in Eldoret were rising as there was more than a clear indication on the
possibility of vote rigging. He told the Commission:
During the call-ins (in Kass FM), some callers alleged that they had information of
planned rigging e.g. some claimed that ballot paper and boxes had been stashed at
Hon. Barngetuny’s home in favour of PNU.

271. Another witness corroborated this in a formal statement by saying:
A few days to the election KASS FM announced that there would be rigging and in some
of their open forums they encouraged people to use the radio to incite people who gave
their views.

272. Testimonies to the Commission indicate a pattern of violence that is consistent
with the claim that violence in the Rift Valley was to a large extent incited by
politicians.
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273. A witness recounted to the Commission that he attended a meeting during the 2007
campaign where former Member of Parliament NUR 16 engaged in inflammatory
rhetoric in the Nandi language.210
274. The use of inflammatory and derogatory language by politicians running for
office, some of whom were elected, was recounted by a number of witnesses to
the Commission. Some of those mentioned as having engaged in such activity
are TIF 34 and HOR 55.211 Witnesses stated that these politicians constantly used
derogatory language such as ‘kwekwe’ to refer to non-Kalenjins residing in the
Rift Valley. TIF 34 stated at a meeting that if he is favoured presidential candidate
could be elected into parliament, then the people would be able to remove
weeds. One of the witnesses to the Commission indicated that the meetings
were conducted at TIF 34’s house in preparation for mass evictions of the nonKalenjin from Kericho.
275. The incitement messages were sometimes embellished with references to
historical myths. A witness told the Commission of an instance when TIF 34
gave a message to him with information about the Koitalel arap Samoei and the
prophesy concerning how, after a hundred years, all the non-Kalenjins would
be evicted from the Rift Valley. In expressing urgency the material indicated
that if they failed to do so in 2007, they would not be able to do it ever again.
He stated that SAN 04 was the appointed leader who had taken leadership from
Koitalel.212
276. The Commission also received overwhelming information regarding direct
and targeted shooting by the police during the 2007 post-election violence.
One witness, an 85 year old male in Kakamega gave an account of how his two
nephews were shot by the Police en route from the market.213 The Commission also
heard the story of a 52 year old male who testified about his brother being shot at
point blank range, and that the alleged perpetrator is still a serving officer within
Western Province.214 The random shooting by the police is also illustrated by a
witness who testified how her 12-year old boy was shot and killed by the police
during the post-election violence of 2008.215

210
211
212
213
214
215

540

TJRC investigators meeting with NERI 12
TJRC Investigators Interview with Witness TAU 01
TJRC Iinvestigators Interview with Witness TAU 01
See TJRC Investigators interview with TAF 01
See TJRC Investigators interview with SUE19
See TJRC Investigators interview with HIL90

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FOUR

State Responses
State Inaction
277. The state has engaged in efforts to conceal extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances. These efforts include deliberate failures to investigate, sham
investigations, and frustrating genuine investigations.
278.

The Commission came across many cases of extra-judicial killings and disappearances
where the government completely ignored and did not undertake any effort to
investigate them.

279.

A good example of state inaction are the numerous cases of killings and disappearances
in the Mt. Elgon region. The Mt. Elgon DSIC reported to the UN Special Rapporteur
that he constantly sent monthly minutes to the Provincial Security Committee216.
In some of these minutes, requests were made for reinforcements to counter the
threat presented by the SLDF. The government took substantive steps in response
to such requests only in 2008 stating that it did not want to intervene prior to or
during the elections. There were other indications that the state was aware of these
violations through the Parliamentary Committees on Administration and National
Security, and Defense and Foreign Relations. A number of victims’ families told
Human Rights Watch and the Commission that they would file complaints to local
authorities and the police, about family members being abducted or disappeared
but their complaints were never acted upon.217

280. The Commission also heard testimony from victims of the 2007/2008 post-election
violence who had reported killings and disappearances to the police. These
reports were either met with inaction or in some cases were addressed in a manner
suggesting acquiescence or indifference to the attacks.
281. In addition, the TJRC corroborates the findings of the Waki Commission as far as
general inaction is concerned. For instance it was reported that the NSAC had
intelligence related to the possibility of violence ahead of 2007 General Elections
but it was not ascertained what use was made of this intelligence material
that was received by the CSC. It was also not established whether the NSAC
disseminated this material to the provincial and district committees for action. As
far as this information is concerned, the Waki Commission was able to establish
that facsimiles were forwarded to the Police Commissioner’s office ahead of
216 Philip Alston ‘Report on Extra-Judicial killings and enforced disappearances’ p.19
217 Human Rights Watch (2011) “Holding your heart”: Waiting for justice in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon Region. p.49
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the 2007 Post Election violence.218 The Commission was also informed that
many Provincial Administration officers had not received any special guidelines
and directions drawn up by the NSIS.219 Generally the Waki Commission noted
that there was an indication of a top down breakdown of information as far as
delivery of intelligence reports is concerned. This could have been natural as a
result of genuine overwhelming turn out of political events, or it could have been
strategic.
282. The Waki Commission noted that of all SSAs the NSIS was best prepared in handling
the 2007/2008 PEV. The Commission noted that they were well prepared in
gathering intelligence and prepared reports highlighting the issues and provided
them to senior government officials as well as the Police, Military Prisons and other
agencies.220 Note that these reports were very extensive and as periodical as they
were fortnightly. Some reports are said to have been shared with the Chairman of
the ECK and also presented to NSAC. When all this was said and done, there was
however direct inaction on those who ought to have acted early enough to avoid
the chaos that eventually occurred.

International Obligations
283. Kenya is a signatory to the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance which entered into force on 23rd December
2010. As a signatory, Kenya is obligated not to act in a way contrary to the object
and purpose of the Convention. It is noted that the government does not make
regular reports to the United Nations Working Group on Enforced Disappearances
(UNWGEID).
284. Article 4 of the Convention states that all acts of enforced disappearances shall
be offences under criminal law punishable by appropriate penalties which shall
take into account their extreme seriousness. So far there is no criminalising act
of government against enforced disappearances. Municipal law through the Bill
of Rights guarantees the right to freedom of person, including the right not to be
deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause, detained without trial except
during a state of emergency.221
285. A case in point in which those who were victimized are still staring at the loud
absence of inaction and none-acknowledgement by the government is the bomb
218
219
220
221
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attack that took place on 7th March 1989 in Lokichogio and which left 5 dead and
7 injured, a record of lost property and destroyed social amenities.222
286. The death of Father Jude Kimeli Kibor illustrates how government response to
a killing can suggest government indifference or even complicity in the death.
Father Jude Kibor’s body was found on 11th May 2006. His body, clothes and car
were all discovered in different places.223 A short while after his body was found,
the flying squad, and not the usual police, appeared at the place where his body
was discovered, cordoned the area and took the body to the police station. To date
there has been no inquest that has been disclosed to his family members, and no
conclusive investigations have been conducted to discover his killers.

Cover-ups
287. The system of state operated cover-ups for human rights violations has existed
in Kenya since pre-colonial times. The British Colonial government was careful
to ensure that there would be no recognition of those who were executed under
their hand and meticulously engineered a system of creating cover-ups for those
who had been estranged from their families or extra-judicially killed in the anticolonial war. Attempts to launch investigations were met with opposition from the
highest levels of the colonial government who thought that such investigations
and possible prosecutions would embarrass the colonial government.224 A similar
attitude seems to be pervasive among members of today’s security forces.
Caroline Elkins in her well documented book ‘The British Gulag’ states that prior
to independence there were ‘bonfires’ whose aim and purpose was to ensure that
all records of those who were detained in the labour camps and those who were
executed were burnt.225
288. Many more cases of extra-judicial killings took place during the colonial era and
it is difficult to give an approximation of exactly how many people died in these
circumstances. These killings were carefully documented but were also deliberately
destroyed on the eve of independence as a cover-up of the British injustices
against Kenyans.226 Despite the many cases of unprofessional, undisciplined and
reckless police officers, it is important to note that there were few descent police
officers who made attempts to ensure prosecution against the others who were
responsible for the extra-judicial killings and other atrocities.
222 TJRC/Memo/1074
223 TJRC/Memo/111
224 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, p. 300
225 Caroline Elkins, British Gulag
226 Caroline Elkins, The British Gulag
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289.

The Colonial government engaged in official denial of the numbers and the conditions
under which detainees were kept. By the time of operation anvil227 (described under
the section of illegal detentions), which saw the detention of over 30,000 Kenyans228,
the British parliament through the Colonial Secretaries wrongfully stated that there
only were about 1,781 Kikuyus who were detained.229 When put to task to make a
statement with regard to the actual situation on detentions and the conditions, the
Colonial Secretary was evasive and did not respond.230

290. The cover-ups were also systemized as far as executions were concerned to ensure
that there would be no form of commemoration of those who died, and so that
their graves would not become places of pilgrimage and memorialisation. In
1953, Winston Churchill is said to have instructed the then Secretary of Colonies,
Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, to avoid executing many people at once so as to minimize
public reaction.231
291.

State-sponsored cover-ups is certainly well documented by a number of
organizations. Extra-judicial killings by the police in the operation against the
Mungiki are also indicative of the use state sponsored cover-ups. One week prior
to the release of the Philip Alston report on extra-judicial killings, President Kibaki
established the Ransley Task force on Police Reform. A short while later, he released
the commissioner of Police from his duties replacing him with Mathew Iteere and
making the then Police Commissioner Hussein Ali the Post-Master General.

292. In another incident, the Commission observed after the killing of Oscar Foundation
officials, Oscar Kingara and Paul Oulu, in cold blood allegedly by the police, the
government spokesman Mr. Alfred Mutua came out and stated that the foundation
was a Mungiki organisation.
293.

The Government has consistently denied any involvement by the police or other
security forces in extra judicial or other illegal killings. Statements made by
successive Ministers responsible for Provincial Administration and Internal Security
in parliament have overtime shown a pattern of adamant denial of police committing
extra-judicial killings. In addition, responding to the report released by the UN
Special Rapporteur in 2009, the Kenya Police Spokesman Dr. Alfred Mutua criticized
the report as petty and baseless while maintaining that the police force has always
observed law in its discharge of duties to the public.232 It is of course true that most

227 This was one of the major crack-downs on Mau Mau fighters that led them to be detained in the camps that had been set up by the
British.
228 Operation Anvil in which almost 100,000 Kenyans, in May 1954, were detained in deplorable conditions without trial.
229 See British Parliamentary Hansard, HC Deb 07 April 1954 Vol 526 cc 357-8
230 See British parliamentary hansard, HC Deb 07 April 1954 Vol 526 cc 357-8
231 Martin Gilbert, Never Despair: Winston Churchill 1945-1965 (London, 1998)
232 Response by Government Spokesman Dr. Alfred Mutua “government rejects findings of un special rapporteur” February 25, 2009.
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police officers perform their duties in good faith and consistent with existing laws
and procedures. Unfortunately the absolute denials of any wrong doing in the face
of overwhelming evidence of some wrong doing does a disservice to those police
officers who are not involved in such killings and other related activities.
294. The Commission observes that in many instances the Commission has failed to
prosecute anyone following cases of extra-judicial killings and disappearances
where either the government and the security machinery acted directly or
acquiesced to the violations. An example of such response is with regard to the
March 12th 2001 Murkutwa massacre where it was reported that following a
dispute between the Pokot and Marakwet communities, armed men from Pokot
descended on the Marakwet and left over 51 people dead and over 250 others
displaced.233 As up to 2011, it was noted that to date no one had been prosecuted
for the attacks.234
295. Another example of what appears to be a government cover-up, or at least
unwillingness to investigate, concerns the death of Robert Alusiola Mumasi on
7th October 2002. The killing occurred during what has been called the Kakamega
riots235 of 7th October 2002. The riot took place during a visit by President Moi
and candidate Uhuru Kenyatta in Lurambi at Bukhulungu. Responding to the
riot, the OCPD gave shoot to kill orders. The killing of the late Alusiola occurred
far away from the epicentre of the riots suggesting that his death had nothing to
do with the riot.
296. The government pathologist YOP 04 stated that the cause of death for Alusiola
was deep cuts to the chest, while the shooting was not only witnessed but also
confirmed by a number of others including a second post-mortem report.236
297.

Another common mechanism used by the government that diminishes the ability
to investigate, and thus fosters impunity, is the common practice of frequently
transferring officers. Often these transfers occur after an event that warrants
investigation. The case of Alusiola was no exception in this regard. As the family
members continued to push for an investigation, the government transferred up
to 6 officers who had knowledge of the circumstances around Alusiola’s death. This
same technique was used following the 2007/2008 post-election violence, again
making it extremely difficult to investigate and thus hold to account those involved
in violations during that period.

233 TJRC/MEMO/0087
234 Standard, May 1, 2011, pg 32
235 The Standard 8.10.02; Daily Nation 8.10.02; Standard 9.10.02; Daily Nation 9.10.02; Daily Nation 10.10.02; Daily Nation 8.10.02;
Daily Nation 19.10.02; Saturday Nation 26.10.02; Standard 6.10.02
236 TJRC/Memo/1039 at p. 28
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Responsibility of Main Actors
Government and State Agents
298. Government agencies may be involved directly or indirectly in the commission
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. The involvement is direct
when officials of the agencies themselves perform the killing. The involvement
is indirect when they provide support to other individuals or organizations who
engage in such activities, including not investigating and bringing to justice
those responsible for such killings or disappearances.

The Kenya Intelligence Service
299. The Kenya intelligence service plays a key role in the state security machinery.
It has historically been accused of involvement in gross human rights violations
including extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. This department
of Kenya’s security machinery has existed under different names and structures
throughout Kenya’s history.
300. The first structure under which the Kenya intelligence existed was the Special
Branch. A secret intelligence unit was created by the colonial government during
the Mau Mau uprising. In 1952 this unit was made public and given the name
Special Branch. It operated under the authority of the Commissioner of Police.
When the country gained independence in 1963 the Special Branch was carved
out of the police service and made independent. Its roles and functions were
defined in a presidential charter of 1969 which formalized its operations.
301. In 1986 the Special Branch transformed into the Directorate of Security Intelligence
(DSI) pursuant to a Presidential charter. The DSI retained the structures and
organisation of the Special Branch.
302. The DSI was then transformed into the National Security Intelligence Service
(NSIS) in 1998, through the National Security Intelligence Service Act. The
objective of NSIS was to protect the national security interest and safeguarding all
the Kenyan citizens by identifying and reporting on all state security threats. The
Director General of NSIS is a principal advisor to the President and Government
of Kenya. This position was held by Brig. (Rtd) Wilson A.C Boinett from January
19, 1999 to January 19, 2004, and then by the current Director General, Maj. Gen.
Micheal Gichangi.
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303. Historically the state intelligence services have been feared by the vast majority
of Kenyans. The Special Branch under the colonial period engaged in brutal
repression of the Mau mau and those perceived to be supporters or sympathizers.
The Special Branch after independence engaged in similar activity, including the
operation of the detention and torture facilities at Nyayo House.
304. The Commission also received information with regard to the politicisation of
state security agencies such as NSIS. For instance, in the period preceding the
2007/2008 post-election violence, information reached NSIS of planned violent
or fears of violent activities (see Waki report), but there were certain indications
that the head of NSIS, who hails from the Kikuyu Community, (a PNU sympathetic
group) was more interested in receiving information relating to the opposition
ODM than he was interested in matters of national security.

The Police
305. Under the constitution, the Kenya Police is in charge of enforcement of law and
order in Kenya. Prior to the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, the Police
Commissioner oversaw the police services and was appointed by the President.
306. Section 14 (1) of the Police Act according to Kenya Police provides responsibilities
of the Kenya Police to include: Maintenance of law and order; Preservation of
peace; Detection and prevention of crime; Offenders apprehension; Protection of
property and life; Enforcement of all regulations and laws.237 Furthermore, Kenya
Police duties are also provided under section 15 of the Police Act to include:
Obedience of lawful orders from superiors; Obedience of warrants and orders
issued to them; Collect and communicate intelligence affecting law and order;
Take all necessary steps to prevent commission of offences and public nuisance;
Detect offenders and bring them to justice.
307. The Commission has gathered vast information and evidence from testimonies of
the witnesses who appeared before the Commission that indicated that members
of the police force in Kenya have committed extra-judicial killing and facilitated
enforced disappearances. These testimonies were backed by credible research and
investigations conducted by the Commission and corroborated by reports from
various organizations.

237 Kenya Police. (2011). “Police Reforms”, <http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/police%20reforms.asp>
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308. In 1996, it was recorded that there were over 130 people killed by the police,
while in 1997 there were about 159 people killed by the police.238 In a Statement
to the Commission by the head of the Western Kenya-Human Rights Watch and
Human Rights Joint Statement, April 2, 2008 it was reported that there was
involvement of the police in torture and enforced disappearances in Mt. Elgon.
309. For instance the Commission established that there was police excess in Mt.
Elgon where many people were executed in the purported operation/attempt to
end conflict in the region. These findings were corroborated by the report of the
U.N Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Prof.
Philip Alston239 and other NGO reports as discussed in the sections above.
310. In addition, immense powers given to arrest the police on grounds of mere
suspicion240 has not only led to their abusing of powers but also directly engaging
in criminal activities such as extortion cartels against which they are supposed to
protect the citizens against.
311. Media reports have also exposed incidences of severe torture that led to deaths
by the police. For instance the bodies of Peter Wachira 37, a driver and his
conductor Peter Mwangi were found in a city mortuary after being captured on
camera being handcuffed by police. Post mortem reports revealed that the two
had injuries on various parts of their bodies and the conclusion was that manual
strangulation was the cause of their deaths. The mortuary attendants reported
that the bodies were taken there by a police officer who said the two were found
dead along Ngong road.241
312. Police have been mentioned as direct and key perpetrators of the extra-judicial
killings during the course of the security operation against the Mungiki. Various
reports indicate that the police were directly given orders to kill suspects who were
associated with the illegal movement.
313.

The Commission also heard from witnesses of how the Police specifically acquiesced
to the killings that were being carried out during these elections. The particular
case of burning close to 30 people at Kiambaa church is one of these instances. The
painful experiences narrated to the Commission during its hearings which are highly

238 Kenya Human Rights Commission, ‘Mission to Repress: Torture, Illegal Detentions and Extra-Judicial Killings by the Kenyan
Police’p.2
239 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, Mission to Kenya, Report to the
Human Rights Council, Eleventh Session, Agenda Item 3, A/HRC/11/2/Add.6, 26 May 2009.
240 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. (2008). “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right Account of Kenya’s Post
Election Violence, <http://www.knchr.org/dmdocuments/KNCHR%20doc.pdf>.
241 The Daily Nation, July 7, 2008
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corroborative of many other 2007 post-election initiatives are indicative of this242.
The Commission observed the specific ignorance of the Administration Police whose
station was a mere 1 km away from where the church for the Kenya Assemblies of
God stood.
314. The Commission notes that the Police force is required to obey and execute
promptly lawful orders and warrants from superiors within the force. Usually the
Commissioner of Police gives orders to his juniors who shall perform as per his
instructions. The PPO relays the same orders to his or her junior officers and they
are executed.
315. In one occasion the US Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. Michael Rannenberger is said
to have raised concern with then Commissioner of Police stating that there were
officers under him who had authorized the application of deadly force against
political protesters. He noted that such use of force was most obviously against
the established rules of engagement in quelling protests.
316. The Police has also been accused of employing excessive use of force in
conducting its operations. One of the witnesses whom the Commission called
to testify at its hearings was Ms Grace Kaindi (Former Provincial Police Officer
for Nyanza Province. She was called as one whose position, person and role as
a state security agent has been adversely mentioned in the course of the work
of the Commission’s research, investigations, statement taking and hearings as
far as the 2007/2008 post election violence is concerned. She became a relevant
witness in the hearings related to the 2007/2008 post-election violence due to
her direct and indirect knowledge of the involvement of the state agents, in a
province where a high number of casualties and deaths were caused by direct
use of force by the police against civilians.
317. Miss Kaindi who was appointed directly by the Police Commissioner then, Maj.
Gen. Hussein Ali, had been a career Police woman almost all her career life.243 As far
as her appointment is concerned, it was important for the Commission to consider
and even question the merit of her appointment and whether such appointment
compromised her impartiality as a responsible officer in her line of duty. Her role in
the 2007 PEV is considered in light of the violations committed directly or indirectly
by the police in Nyanza Province.
242 See for instance TJRC/Memo/Eastern/Meru/Women Public Hearing; TJRC/Memo/Rift Valley/Eldoret/M0017
243 Her Personal Identification Police Number 211379.
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318. The role of security agencies in Nyanza region was classified, which classification
the Commission agrees with, by the KNCHR in terms of inaction and excesses.244
In other words, there are steps that the security agents failed to take which led to
more chaos, injuries and even death. On the part of excessive use of force, there
were allegations of directed and specifically targeted attacks against the civilians
by the Police.

The Administration Police
319. Witnesses testified before the Commission about members of the Administration
Police directly shooting at people with the intent to kill them.245 Examples
presented to the Commission include those where suspects were said to have
raised their arms in surrender only to be shot and killed by the Administrative
Police.246
320. The Commission also heard of an instance where the AP did approach the
burning Kiambaa Church, asked one of the people present where the attackers
had gone and headed towards the opposite direction.247 The Police and Military
did much more to indicate complacence to the brutal killings that were going in
other places such as Naivasha as well. The Commission heard the heart-rending
testimony of Benard Ndege,248 who lost 11 members of his immediate family and
who corroborated this complacence by the Police by stating that the people
of Naivasha who were facing various threats had reported in several instances
that they were under threat. The Commission notes that there were no specific
measures taken by the Government through the Police to offer some kind of
protection to those people who felt threatened. This finding is fortified by the
instances where the police specifically directed the people to go back to their
homes following the days of the killings just to have the attackers descend on
the people following the disputed elections.249

The Kenya Military
321. The military has been accused of involvement in extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The Daily Nation (March 28, 2008) quotes someone from
inside the military who describes how the military dumped dead bodies into the
244
245
246
247
248
249
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Kenya National Commission of Human Rights, On the Brink of Precipice, p 103
TJRC/Memo/0314; TJRC/Memo/MO461 indicating the shooting of about 5 people during 2007 PEV in Tegunot area
TJRC/Memo/M0444
TJRC/Memo/Rift Valley/Eldoret/M0017
TJRC/NY/KISUMU/Testimony of Benard Ndege
Cite Ndege; See if Jared Otieno odhiambo corroborates further
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forest reserves of Mt. Elgon National Park.250 A resident of Kaptaboi village who was
interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that he or she saw military helicopters
dropping bodies on April 2, 2008 which was during a period of military operations
in that area.
322. As is seen in many sections of this report, such as the state security operations,
the military has been a critical actor in extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances.

250 Daily Nation, (March 28, 2008).
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Annex:
List of Massacre Victims
STATEMENT NAMES
ID
40670
GAIYE JIMDE ABDI

552

GENDER

CONTEXT

PROVINCE

DISTRICT

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40670

GADANE JIMALE ABDI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40670

KURROW ABDIYOW

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41057

DOF HUSSEIN ISMAIL

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41057

SUGOW HASSAN ISMAIL

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41057

GURDALA BISHAR HUSSEIN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41057

GEDI BISHAR HUSSEIN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41057

HABUR BISAHR HUSSEIN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41057

NASHTUA GULEYO OMAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41057

HABIBA GULEYO OMAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41057

HASSAN ISSACK

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41057

MUHAMED KULAY MOHAMUD

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41077

NUNO HASSAN ABDULLAHI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

41151

HALIMA ALI GEDI

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

41151

HALIMA ISSACK ABDI

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

41151

ADEY NUR ISSACK

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

41151

SAFIA NUR ISSACK

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

41151

AHMED NUR ISSACK

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

41151

MOHAMED NUR ISSACK

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

41151

DERA OLOW ADAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

41435

DIYARA SULEIMAN ALI

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

42532

ABDI OSMAN OMAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

42532

MOHAMED NOOR ABDULLAH

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

42533

YUNIS DAWID SHURIA

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

WAJIR

42534

HALIMA ABDULLAH HAJI

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

42538

IBRAHIM OMAR SHEIKH OSMAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

47201

SUBDOW MOHAMED ALI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40670

OSMAN ABDIYOW

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40671

ZENAB ABDULLAHI

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40671

BARWAKA ABDULLAHI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40671

HARETH ABDULLAHI

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40603

OMAR MUMIN ISMAIL

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East

40603

SALAT MUMIN ISMAIL

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East
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STATEMENT NAMES
ID
40695
BARNEY AHMED HABAT

GENDER

Chapter FOUR

CONTEXT

PROVINCE

DISTRICT

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East

40877

OSMAN GABOW DIIS

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40878

YUSUF MOHAMED GULIYE

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40705

ABDI GAIYE OSMAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40710

ABDIRAHMAN ABEY

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

40710

ALI MOHAMED

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

40710

OMAR YUSSUF

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

40710

KULMIYE IBRAHIM MUMIN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

40710

AHMED RASHID ABEY

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

40710

OMAR KHEYLEY ADAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

40710

MARYAN ABEY

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

40710

ISNONO MOHAMED ABEY

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

40710

AHMED RASHID ABEY

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir North

40738

ABDULLAHI MOHAMED ADAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East

40738

ALI MOHAMED ADAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East

40854

SUBAN MUMIN HUSSEIN

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40854

SUBAN YUSSUF

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40854

SHAWKARA ABDI

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40854

NURIA ABDI

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40854

FATUMA ABDI

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40867

HUSSEIN ABDI GARAD

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40867

MUSE ISAAK YAKUB

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40867

IBRAHIM YUSUF ALI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40868

HALIMA ISSAK MOHAMED

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40868

HINDIA DAHIR MOHAMED

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40868

SURAY BISHAR

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40868

USUBA OMAR ELUII

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40868

HISH MOHD OMAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40868

ADAN MOHD OMAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40868

ABDULLAHI MOHD OMAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40871

HUSSEIN SUMBUL ABIKAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East

40871

MOHAMED SUMBUL ABIKAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East

40871

MUHUMED SUMBUL ABIKAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East

40871

ALI SUMBUL ABIKAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East

40872

SUMBUL ABIKAR ISMAIL

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir East

40879

ALI ABDI SHILAW

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40879

HAWA HUSSEIN OMAR

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40897

FARAH IBRAHIM ADAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir
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STATEMENT NAMES
ID
40908
HARETHA DAVID ABSIYE

554

GENDER

CONTEXT

PROVINCE

DISTRICT

Not given Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40908

SHALLA MOHAMED NUR

Not given Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40908

OSMAN MOHAMED NUR

Not given Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40910

ALI HASSAN ELMI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40910

HUSSEIN ALI ELMI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

47267

ABDILLE SAMAN ELMI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

47267

ADAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

47267

ISSACK

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

47286

IBRAHIM ABDI OMAR

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

47291

BASH MOHAMED OSMAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

47291

MOHAMED OSMAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

16635

AHAD MOHAMED ADAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40874

ALI AHMED YAKUB

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

40874

ADAN MUKYAR ABDI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

11984

MOHAMED BULL HASSAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

33670

ABDULLAHI MUHUMED ABDI

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

33670

DUALLE ABDULAHI MUHUMED

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

33670

HALIMA ABDULAHI MUHUMED

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

7924

SHUKAI ISSACK MOHAMED

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

7927

NOT GIVEN

F

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

7927

MUKTAR ABDI SAMAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

North Eastern

Wajir

7929

HUSSSEIN ALI HASSAN

M

Bagalla massacre 1998

NG

NG

39849

MWAURA GIKONYO

M

Bulla Kartasi Massacre

Central

Kipipiri

31554

GABAI YEROW SAHEL

M

Garissa Gubay Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

41289

MARIAN ABDIKARIM

F

Garissa Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Garissa

41289

MOHAMUD DUALE

M

Garissa Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Garissa

41483

HUSSEIN

M

Garissa Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Garissa

41483

ADAN SHIDE

M

Garissa Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Garissa

18634

SHAHIA KEDIE ABDILE

M

Garissa Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Garissa

18631

ISNINO ABDI HASSAN

M

Garissa Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Garissa

41510

OSMAN SALAT

M

Garissa Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Garissa

39541

ANSHUR

M

Garissa Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Garissa

81335

MOHAMUD DABOW ABDI

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

MOHAMED MOHAMUD GOLLOW

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

ABASS AHMED JIMALE

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

ABASS ABEY JIMALE

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

DAHIR JIMAALE GUDOW

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

AHMED JIMALE GUDOW

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera
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M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

HASSAN AHMED JIMALE

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

ABDULLAHI AHMED JIMALE

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

IBRAHIM AHMED JIMALE

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

RAHOY AHMED JIMALE

F

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

DAKON AHHMED JIMALE

F

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

GABEY MOHAMUD GEDE

F

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

FATUMA JIMALE GUDOW

F

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

FATUMA ABDULLAHI AHMED

F

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

MAALIM MUHUMAD MOHAMED

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

ADAN HUSSEIN

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

ANMINA DAKAW ABDILLE

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

81336

MALELA MOHAMED ELINI

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera

61600

MOHAMMED ABDIRAHAMAN GEDI

M

Garse & Bur joon Massacre North Eastern

Mandera West

19722

HASSAN HUSSEIN YALEHOW

M

Isiolo Massacre 1997/98

North Eastern

Wajir South

19717

GAALOW ABDILLE

M

Isiolo Massacre 1997/98

North Eastern

Wajir East

19717

SHIMAY IBRAHIM

M

Isiolo Massacre 1997/98

North Eastern

Wajir East

40942

GENYE GABOW ABDULLAHI

F

Isiolo Massacre 1997/98

North Eastern

Wajir

81208

LUCAS PKECH

M

Kollowa Massacre

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

44322

M

Lotiriri Massacre 1984

Rift Valley

North Pokot

34384

EWORILE LOKWAREBON JOEL
LOMWAI
JOHN LOMILI

M

Lotiriri Massacre 1984

Rift Valley

North Pokot

34386

LONYANGALE SAUCHOR

M

Lotiriri Massacre 1984

Rift Valley

North Pokot

81208

KIDOM

M

Lotiriri Massacre 1984

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

61588

MAALIM ADAN MOHAMUD

M

North Eastern

Lagdera

42257

HASSAN GOLICHA

M

Malka Mari /Garsey
Massacre 1980
Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

42257

MOHAMED HASSAN

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

42257

IBREN HASSAN

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

42257

ENOW HASSAN

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

42260

IBREN ALI

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

42260

MIDINA HASSAN

F

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

42260

EDIN HASSAN

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

42260

YAREY HASSAN

F

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

42288

ABDI ALIOW OSMAN

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera East

42288

ISSACK OSMAN

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera East

42288

ISSACK MOHD ALI

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera East

42290

ROBLE EDIN ROBOW

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

42290

EDIN ROBLE

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera
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M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

80460

MOHAMED ABDI GARORE

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

YUSSUF ABDI GARORE

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

MOHAMED ALI GARORE

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

HALIMA MUHUMUD GARORE

F

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

KANYARO HUSSEIN ABDI

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

HASSAN NOOR ABDI

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

ADAN NOOR ABDI

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

SAHARA ADOW ABDI

F

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

HALIMA YUSUF ABDI

F

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

ABDULLAHI GARORE MUHUMUD

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

KAHIYA ABDULLAHI MUHUMUD

M

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

HABIBA ABDI GARORE

F

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

80460

RUKIA ABDI MOHAMED

F

Malka Mari Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

81336

HASSAN ABDILLE GULIYE

M

Malka mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81336

ABDI BARROW HASSAN

M

Malka mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81336

IBRAHIM BARROW HASSAN

M

Malka mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81336

FATUMA ABDI GULIYE

F

Malka mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81336

OMAR ABDILLE GULIYE

M

Malka mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81336

AMINA MOHAMU AMIN

F

Malka mari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

8896

DAHIR MAALIM IBRAHIM

Not given Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera West

8896

ABDISHKUR MAALIM IBRAHIM

Not given Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera West

8896

ISMMAIL MAALIM IBRAHIM

Not given Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera West

8896

KHEVOY L MAALIM IBRAHIM

Not given Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera West

8896

HAWA MAALIM IBRAHIM

Not given Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera West

8903

IBRAHIM SHEIKH MOHAMMED

Not given Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

8903

QUREY SHEIKH MOHAMED

Not given Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

8903

ABDI SHEIKH MOHAMMED

Not given Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

Not given Malkamari Massacre

8903

BURDE SHEIKH MOHAMED

North Eastern

Mandera

10054

MOHAMED DUGOW

M

Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

10054

OSMAN DUGOW

M

Malkamari Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

5705

JOSEPH KIPTONY KOIMA

Rift Valley

Kuresoi

2576

MOHAMED NGULA

M

Sakuye Massacre

Eastern

Moyale

2576

FATUMA NGULA

F

Sakuye Massacre

Eastern

Moyale

2576

HADIJA NGULA

F

Sakuye Massacre

Eastern

Moyale

47310

JIMALE IMAN FARAH

M

Shifta War 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

47332

YUSSUF ISSACK HAILOW

M

Shifta War 1964-67

North Eastern

Wajir

47817

ALI MOLU ABDI

M

Shifta War 1964-67

Eastern

Garbatula

Not given Naishi Massacre
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M

Shifta War 1964-67

North Eastern

Mandera West

61584

IBREN HASSAN ALI BORA

M

Shifta War 1964-67

North Eastern

Mandera West

61584

MAALIM ABDULLAHI SHEIKH ALION

M

Shifta War 1964-67

North Eastern

Mandera West

19734

YUSSUF ALAGOW ABDI

M

Shifta War 1964-67

North Eastern

Wajir

43011

ADAN ABDI ADAN

M

Shifta war 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

43011

MOHAMED ABOH ADEN

M

Shifta war 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

43011

MOHAMED ADEN NUR

M

Shifta war 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

3157

MALICHA JARSO

M

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3166

HUKA TESO HUKULE

F

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit

3171

HUKHA SABDUYO HOKILE

F

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit

3184

WATO GORJE

M

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3190

BARAKO GIRO DOTI

M

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3185

MIDINA DUB TUME

F

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit

3188

YATTANE GUYO KATELO TUME

F

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3137

ISENE DUBA BURI

Not given Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3138

QATU ROBA SHARAMA

F

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3139

BOYA MACHALA

M

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3141

BATI DUBA BURI

F

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3167

HUKHA ISAKO HOKILE

M

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3186

DIDPO DUB TUME

F

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

18448

ABDULLAHI INFALLO GUYO

M

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

3168

HUKHA TUNE HOKILE

M

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

18442

KOMBA GUFU ISAKO

M

Turbi Massacre 2005

Eastern

Marsabit North

41052

MUHAMED OMAR IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47204

NOOR OMAR ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47279

ALI ADAN ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42506

YUSSUF DIIS

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39418

ABDULLAHI BILLOW UNSHUR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir North

39420

ALI HUSSEIN BARDAD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40553

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40554

MUHUMED MOHAMED
YUSSUF(DEAD)
HAILOW SUGOW ISSACK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40572

HILOLE UNSHUR NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40573

IBRAHIM ALI GAAL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40579

SANGAWA

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40579

NOUR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40593

MOHAMUD HASSAN KALMOY

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40599

MUHUMED JELOKI EROWE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40608

BASHIR BIRIK DUGOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40612

BISHAR GUHAD ALASON

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40617

IBRAHIM GEDI ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40618

MOHAMED DAGANE ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40619

558

GENDER

ALASON GEDI ABDULLAHI

40620

RASHID AHMED ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40634

ABDULLAHI MUHUMED ALASOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40638

YUSSUF IBRAHIM ARALE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40640

UNE OSMAN MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40652

OMAR ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40653

OSMAN QEYLEY

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40657

MOHAMED AMIN IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40666

ISNMAIL ABDULLAH MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40666

YAROW MOHAMMED ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40677

KURAVE HUSSEIN OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40678

KASIM GEDI OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40681

ABDULLAHI OSMAN AMIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40685

ABDILLE ABDI SAMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40686

BALAT JELLE SHILLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40688

ADOW YUSSUF BARROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40690

BARYARE AHMED MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40693

SAMON HILOLE MADEY

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40700

ADEN ALI IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40711

MOHAMED GORANE NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir North

40712

ALI ADEN SAAD(DEAD)

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40728

HUSSEIN ABDI MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40729

NUR MUHUMED HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40731

MOHAMUD AHMED SALAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40734

ABDI HAJI ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40741

IBRAHIM HASSAN KANYERE(DEAD)

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40742

ABDULLAHI ABDI HANSHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40744

NOT GIVEN

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40750

ALI ABIKAR NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40752

OMAR DUALE OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40761

ADOW BARGAB MATAU

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40786

HAJJI MUHAMMED ISSACK BARROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40852

SHIMOY ABDI MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40853

HASSAN NOOR KALMOY

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40853

ADAN HUSSEIN MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40853

UGAS DUBAW MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40855

ABDILLE ABASS GEDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40856

HALIMA HUSSEIN MOHAMED

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40856

NOT GIVEN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40857

ABDIKADIR MOHAMUD MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40858

ABDI RAHOY ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40858

MOHAMED NOOR ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40858

MOHAMUD OMAR ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40858

HUSSEIN ABDI ADEN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40858

AHMED HASSAN FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40859

ABDULLAHI ALI HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40859

ADAW KEYNAW ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40859

ABDI HASSAN MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40859

ELMI ALI HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40860

GABANA MOHAMUD DUGOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40860

AHMED MOHAMUD DUGOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40860

HASSAN MOHAMED DUGAW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40861

HUSSEIN ALI SHAIR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40861

MOHAMED HUSSEIN ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40861

FARAH HUSSEIN ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40861

NOOR HUSSEIN ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40862

KULEY BULLE AHMED

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40866

OMAR NOOR MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40875

BARAK ABDINOOR ISAAK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40894

NOOR ABDIRAHMAN ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40894

MALELE MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40894

WEHENYE MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40895

OSMAN ABDI HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40898

ABDI OSMAN ABDILLA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40900

ABDILLE MALELE ELMI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40905

MOHAMED SHEIKH MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40906

ISSACK MOHAMED JILAOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40906

NOT GIVEN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40909

MUHUMED SALAT ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40909

ALI SALAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40913

ABDULLAHI OLOW ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40915

OMAR MUHAMED ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40917

IBRAHIM AHMED GOSAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir North

40917

MALELA AHMED GOSAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir North

40917

ABDI AHMED GOSAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir North

40921

NOOR ABEY KALMOY

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40922

ABDULLAHI ABDI GUHAD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40928

ADAN NOOR SABDOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40929

BARRE HASSAN ABI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40931

KEYNAN IBRAHIM ELMI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40932

BILOW SABDOW NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40938

ADOW MAALIM ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40945

ABDILLE ABDI OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40950

KAHIYE ABDILLE ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41080

NADHIFA GUNE

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41080

HABIBA MOHAMED

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41083

ADEN BULLE OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41095

KHAMIS ADHAN MUMIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

Coast

Tana River

41095

BAGAY KHALINLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

Coast

Tana River

41096

ADOW ABDI ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41112

OMAR MAHAMED ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41114

ABDILLE ABDI SAMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41132

MUMIN OMAR SALAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41132

HABIBA ABDILLE

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41137

SULEIMAN ELMI ROBLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41152

DAKANE ABDILLE ABIKAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

41152

OLOW DAKANE ABIKAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

41152

SADIK ABDI HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

41153

EDOW IBRAHIM MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41153

GAIYA EDOW IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41171

MUMIN SALAT NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41174

AHMED HARED ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir North

41183

ADOW FARAH HARON

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41191

SHURIE BUUL GULET

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

41191

GUROW GULET

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41191

BILAR GUROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41193

HUSSEIN HASSAN IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41271

BILLOW SAMDOW NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41271

ADAN SABDOW NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41442

ALI ABDILLE ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41446

SALAT MOHAMED ISAAK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41446

YUSUF ALI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41446

ADAW ALI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42145

GUATU JALSO

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

Eastern

Isiolo

42508

NUR BILLOW GUMOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42524

ABDI ISSAK UBAHLA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42525

ISMAIL MUHAMED MAHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

42525

ADAN ISMAIL MAHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

42539

HASSAN BULLE ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43004

SALAT ALI OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43005

MUKTAR AHMED ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43005

DIIS AHMED ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43007

OSMAN SHEIKH MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

43009

ABDI ALI ISSACK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

43010

BIRIK MAO MAALIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera
Central
Wajir East

43011

MAOW ABDI ADEN NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43011

ZAINAB ABDI ADAN NUR

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43015

MOHAMED ALI BULE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43016

GULIYA YUSSUF YAHYA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

43019

NUNOW MUHUMED GAANEY

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43022

ALAS ISSACK ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

43024

MOHAMED ABDI SAMATAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

43027

DIYAD BIRIK FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43028

HASSAN HANAN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43030

MOHAMED HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43032

DIRIYE HAMUD OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

43032

KOROW OMAR YUSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

43043

HUSSEIN MADEY BULLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43050

OSMAN ABDI HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43104

ABEYOMAR ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43104

NUNOW JIRE SETHOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43108

YUSUF HUSSEIN MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43111

YUSSUF DUGON IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

Eastern

Isiolo

43115

OMAR SALAT OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

Eastern

Isiolo

43121

HUSSEIN MUHUMED ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43122

MUKTAR GULIYA ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43122

SALAT SHURIA KANYARE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43125

HASSAN ABDI ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43126

MOHAMED ADAN OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43132

MUHUMED ALI ABIBAKAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43133

YUNIS MOHAMUD HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43134

MAOW GEDI ALASOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

43135

HABIBA JIMAALE ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43140

MUHAMMED OMAR ISACK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

43140

MOHAMED ADAN FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

43143

SARAT MOHAMMED ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

43150

GAIYA ITHOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

43150

ITHOW IBRAHIM MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

45901

EBLA KAHIA

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

45901

OSMAN DAKAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

45901

ABDI DAKAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

47209

BILLOW ABDI ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47209

HABIBA MOHAMED HASSAN

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47211

SALAT HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47211

MUKHTAR MOHAMED HASAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47215

SARURA OMAR SALAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47221

HASSAN ALI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47222

YUSSUF IBRAHIM YAKUB (DEAD)

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47226

SHAABAN KOROW ADAWA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47226

AHMED KOROW ADAWO

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47227

MUMIN ABDILLE SAMATAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47229

BASH GEDI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47229

ADOW GEDI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47231

KALMONY HABASHOW AHAD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47248

SHABAR KHOROW ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47253

AHMED YAKUB

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47253

SALAT AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47253

ABDI AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47254

IBRAHIM MUHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47254

HASSAN MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47254

MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47255

ALI ADAN YUSSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47256

ABDI ALI ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47256

MOHAMED ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47256

ISSACK ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47263

ADAN SALAF BUCUL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47280

ADOW ABDI SAMAW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47285

ABDIRAHMAN ALI NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47293

GELE ELMI ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47310

HUSSEIN HASSAN ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47315

MOHAMED HASSAN MUSE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47326

MOHAMED OSMAN MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47328

MUKTAR YUSSUF HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

47332

HAJI GARAD JILAOW IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47343

MOHAMED BARROW YUSSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir South

47350

MOHAMED ABDULLAHI FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

7907

DUGOW HASSAN MAHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

7917

SUBANE ISSACK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

7917

OSMAN ISSACK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

7918

SHARIFA ABDULLAHI UUSHIR

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

7920

SANEY ISSACK FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

7928

BUNEY MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

7928

MAHDI BARRE ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

7934

SHEIKH BILAL ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

7940

ABDISALAN SHEIKH ABSHIOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

9585

OSMAN ABDI ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11950

AHMED SHEIKH MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11955

IBRAHIM ISSACK MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11961

AHMED NOOR MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11975

ADAN JILLAOW DAGANE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11975

ISMAIL BORAI KUROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11976

MOHAMED ABDULLAHI SHEIKH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11980

ABDI MUSA SAMATAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11986

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11993

ABDIWAHAID HASSAN ADAN
DIISOW
AHMED SALAT ADOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11994

HUSSEIN MOHAMED ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

11995

OSMAN SHEIKH ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13401

BASHENE GAAL MUHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13428

HUSSEIN MAALIM ABDI AMIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13434

AHMED ISMAIL HAILOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13435

ALI ABDI HAILOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13436

ABDI GEDI MUHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13437

KASSIM AHMED ISMAIL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13442

NURIA ABDI IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14501

OSMAN MUHUMED MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14502

SALAAT IBRAHIM MURSAL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14503

AHMED SULEIMAN YAQUB

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14504

ABDULLAHI MOHAMUD HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14506

BISHAR ALI OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14507

MAOW ISSACK MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14508

KAMIS ADAN MUMIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

14510

ABDILLE YUSSUF ALASOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir North

14513

ABDULLAHI ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir South

14515

JELE YUSSUF ALASOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

14518

ABEY ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14518

MUHUMED JELLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14518

SALAT ADEN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14519

MAOW ALASON

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14539

AHMED MOHAMED SHURIYE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

15901

MAALIM BARE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

15901

SAMOW MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

15924

ABDI MOHAMMED YUSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

15936

SALAT YAKUB ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

16607

MOHAMED ISSACK BARAKA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18005

KAHA MOHAMUD OLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18009

DAUD YUSUF ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18013

MOHAMED MUHUMED NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18014

AHMED GORO ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18014

HUSSEIN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18015

HABIBA IBRAHIM SALAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18038

ABDULLAHI OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18046

ELISTS YUSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18049

ABDI HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18050

ABDI RAHMAN ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Garissa

18603

MUHAMED JELLOW EROLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Garissa

19706

DAUD ABDI ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19710

MOKTAR KUSON HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19710

KULOW KUSON HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19713

JELLE HASAN ELMI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19725

SIRAT MOLID ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19725

SALAT SHURIE QANYARE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19727

JELLE UGAS ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir South

19729

MOHAMAD HILLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19729

DAHABA HILLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19729

NIMO HILLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19729

MUHAMED HILLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

20035

ADEY SALAT MUSA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26505

YUNIS MOHAMED HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26512

BARE ABDI ISSACK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26516

MOHAMED ABEY ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26521

AHMED MUHUMED FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26527

HALIMA ABDI HASSAN

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26532

MURSAL ABDI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26533

IBRAHIM MOHAMUD JIRE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26536

MOHAMED MUHUMED DAUDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26542

GARORE MOHAMED ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26544

IBRAHIM HASSAN OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26546

OSMAN MUHUMED HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26548

GABANE DAHIR AHMED ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26550

MOHAMED SHEIKH GABOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26553

HUSSEIN AHMED ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26565

KASAI ADAN GUTHON

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26585

DIRIYE FARAH NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26589

ABDI ADAN AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26589

ADOW ADAN AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26597

DIAD BIRIK FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26802

AHMED MOHAMUD ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26815

DAUD MUHUMED YUSSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26816

ISMAIL ALI ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26828

BISHOR ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26830

IBRAHIM MOHAMUD ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

26845

MUHAMMUD BARROW FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26850

MOHAMED KEINAN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26850

KEINAN ABDI HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26850

ADAN ABDILLE BARE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26861

NOOR ABDILLE GULLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26861

GOSAR YARROW GULLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26868

ABEY SHEIKH NORR DALIR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26869

BILLOW SABDOW NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27206

MOHAMED ISSACK FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27212

ADOW DAHIR AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27218

ABDI SHEIKH ALI OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27222

ABDULLAHI ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27230

ADAN IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27235

MOHAMED MUHUMED ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27236

ABDI ABDILLE MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27246

ABDI IBRAHIM ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27246

MAOW IBRAHIM ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27252

JIMALE AHMED MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27257

FATUMA NOOR MOHAMMED

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27257

ALI BIRIK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27257

MOHAMMED BIRIK MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27257

GABANA BIRIK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27257

HILLOWLE BIRIK MOHAMMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27258

YUSSUF DIIS IBRAHIM.

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27262

YUSSUF BILLOW ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27264

AHMED HASSAN HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27264

HASSAN HUSSEIN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27265

BISHAR ABDULLAHI ORAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27269

MOHAMED ABDIRAHMAN IROBE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27270

ABDI JILLAO

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27278

MOHAMED DAWED HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27279

BARYERE HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27282

ABDILLE BORAI ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27284

ADOW ADAN AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27285

ABDIKADIR OLOW IDHOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27285

NUR ABDIKADIR OLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27288

ADAN GELEY MOLAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

STATEMENT NAMES
ID
27295
MOHAMED JELLOW IROBE

GENDER

Chapter FOUR

CONTEXT

PROVINCE

DISTRICT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27297

ISSACK QALAAW ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27300

ABDILLE DUKOW TAKOY

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27300

OSMAN DUKOW TAKOY

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27558

OLOW GURHAN SOLOMON

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27822

ABDI ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

27831

ADAN KEYNAN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

33672

MOHAMED ADAN MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

33683

GEDI DAKAT ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

33686

BARE ABDI ISSACK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

33688

ADEY ABDI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

33688

KOROW ABDI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

33689

IBRAHIM MOHAMED KANYARE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35351

ALI SAMAN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35354

HUSSEIN ABDILLE AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35357

HUSSEIN DAVD MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35357

ABDI HUSSEIN DAUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35357

MUHUMED HUSSEIN DAUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35362

YUSSUF NOOR ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35362

KAHIYA NOOR ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35362

HASSAN NOOR ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35364

MUHUMED ADAN FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35366

OLOW MAHAMED SHEIKH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35368

MAHAMUD MOHAMED IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35373

JIMALE DAGANE ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35375

FATUMA SHEIKH SALAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35375

MUKTAR KUSOW HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35375

HUSSEIN SHEIKH YUSSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35376

ABDULLAHI OSMAN HUNTUR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35386

ABDI ALI DAHIYE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35389

MOHAMED OLOW ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35389

MOHAMED OLOW ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37326

RUKIA MUHUMED HASSAYE

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37326

ISMAIL ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37326

YAROY ABDULLAHI MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37326

ABDIKADIR WHAH ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37326

MUHUMED ABDULLAHI MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37326

ADAN MUHUMED HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37326

KATHUMA ADAN

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37326

FATUMA RUKIA ADAN

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37338

HABIBA HASSAN LOHOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37338

ABDI HASSAN LOHOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37339

DAUD JELLOW AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37340

ABDIA MOHAMED IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37340

ABDI MOHAMED IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39002

ABDIRASHID OSMAN OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39007

OSMAN MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39007

MUMIN OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39008

BAREY OMAR

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39008

UGAS DAHIR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39008

ABDI DAHIR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39008

HASSAN DAHIR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39008

JAMAL DAHIR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39008

TIMARE DAHIR

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39009

ABDULLAHI ADAN SAMATAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39013

GABANE ABDULLAHI YARROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

39014

ADAN JEHOW OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39015

MOHAMED OMAR ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Garissa

39026

ABDI SHEKH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39026

ABDULLAHI ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39029

DAIS ABDI MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

39031

SHEIKH MUSE KASSIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39040

HARETHA ABDI HASSAN

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39053

IBRAHIM OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39061

AHMED ABDI ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39068

OLOW DAKANE ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39068

BASHOW DAKANE ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39074

ADAN BULLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39075

NOOR IBRAHIM FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

39075

SULEIMAN OSMAN IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

39098

ABDI ABDULLAHI IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39098

AJABA MOHAMED GEDI

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39099

ABDULRAHMAN ABDI ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39353

BARYARE HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

39364

MOHAMUD HASSAN HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39401

AHMED ISMAIL ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39416

ABDILLE OMAR ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

39417

MUKTAR ALI TIMAGED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

39418

ABDULLAHI BILLOW UNSHUR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir North

26836

BUUL MUHUMED ISMAIL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26836

ADON BULLE MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

36656

FATUMA GULLED ELMI

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

40560

ISSACK AHMED MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40574

NOT GIVEN (A BABY)

Not given Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40574

HALIMA MAALIM AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40594

AHMED MUHUMED NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40596

AHMED ELIMI ABDILL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40601

OMAR ABDI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40613

ALI ABDI YUSSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40673

DAHABA HUSSEIN OMAR

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40673

AMINA AHMED ADEN

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40702

MOHAMUD BARROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40713

ABDI IBRAHIM AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40727

FARAH ABDI MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40727

ABDIA GEDI ABDILLE

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40727

HALIMA BULLA

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40727

AMINA BIRIQ MOHAMUD

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40727

MOHAMUD ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40727

HALIMA ALI

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40735

HUSSEIN ABDULLAIH AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

40744

ADAWA HUSSEIN MUHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40814

SUGOW HUSSEIN ABOH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40829

OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40851

DAHABA ABDI SALAY

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40893

ELMI MOHAMED OLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40904

DAKAT AHMED ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41059

AHAD IMAN HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41059

JELLE IMAN HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41061

IJAB ILYAS SULEIMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41069

IBRAHIM MOHAMUD JIRRE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41069

MUHUMED MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41085

FARAH ADEN HABAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41092

MUKTAR QANYANE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41097

BISHAR OSMAN HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41144

BILAL ABDI ABIKAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41170

YUNIS ALI ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41175

ABDISALAN YAKUB ISAAK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41178

AHMED ADEN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41178

HARETH ADEN HANSHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41178

ABDULLAHI ABDI HANSHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41179

ABEY ALI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41186

ALI AHMED HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41189

OSMAN SALLAT BULLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41193

SHARMARKE ADOW MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41194

SALAT ADEN ISSE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41269

HARET ADEN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41434

ABDILLE FARAH ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41439

ABDI MAHAMED GARED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41439

MUKTAR BARON

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41439

BISHAR DURON

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41439

SALAT JELLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41439

OMAR MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41443

MOHAMED KANYARE NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41449

MAALIM ABDI MUHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42514

ISAAK AHMED ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

42518

ABDI MOHAMED GURE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42520

OMAR MAHAMUD AMIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42520

GAIYE MAHAMUD AMIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42527

ABDI ABDIKARIW SHANU

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

42527

DIRIYE ABDI SHANU

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

42555

BIRIK SALAH HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42563

AHMED ABDI NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43008

FARHIYA OMAR ALI

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43034

ABDI MAALIM MUHUMED MALELE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43103

ABDULLA HASSAN MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43114

HASSAN ABDILLE ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43114

AHMED ADOW DAKANE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43128

ABDI OMAR YALAHOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

Eastern

Marsabit

43128

NUROW ABDI DORE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

Eastern

Marsabit
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

Eastern

Marsabit

47156

HUSSEIN AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Garissa

47203

BAROW NOOR ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47203

NOOR ABDILLE ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47206

DUNE ADAN ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47219

ADAN DAKAY NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47246

ABDI FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47246

BILLOW ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47252

YUSUF MUKHTAR BARROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47257

MOHAMED IBRAHIM HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47257

OMAR YUSSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47295

HUSSEIN HASSAN ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47304

SANEY SHEIKH ABSHIROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47306

NOOR UNSHUR BARROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47320

OMAR ADAN HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47322

DAHIRE ABDULLAHI ABDIRAHMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47327

MOHAMED BARROW FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47327

MUDE IBRAHIM ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47334

AHMED ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47342

RASHID HASSAN DAKANE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

7919

SULEIMAN AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

7919

OMAR SALA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

7919

MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

8791

AHMED ISSACK DAKAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

8806

MUHUMED ALI HUSSEIN(DEAD)

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

8827

MOHAMED ABDILLE HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

8832

BASHOW HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

8837

ABDIA ABIKER

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

8837

IBRAHIM ABIKER

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

9034

OMAR ATHAN ALISO

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

9034

ALI ATHAN ALISO

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

9034

FATUMA ADAN FARAH

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

9082

SHEIKH MUSA ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

11954

ADAN MUHUMED OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11962

HUSSEIN MUHUMED JELLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11965

BARE ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11967

ABDI AHMED ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

11967

AHMED SHEIKH ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11973

IBRAHIM JELOW DAGANE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11985

MOHAMED MUHAMED KASAI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11990

NOOR ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

11991

BASHIR HUSSEIN ABIKAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

11998

MUHUMED ISSAK HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13407

SALAH OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13407

HUSSEIN MOHAMED GULLED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13410

ABDI YUSSUF WEDOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13415

AHMED BIRIK HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13415

IBRAHIM KHARIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13419

HILOW AMIN MOHAMUD

Not given Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13419

BIRIK AMIN MOHAMUD

Not given Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13419

GARTON AMIN MOHAMUD

Not given Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13420

MUMIN SALAT MAHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13420

ABDI MOHAMED AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13421

OMAR ALI SALAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13422

ABDI MOHUMED DAUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13430

MOHAMED ABDILLAHI ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13432

YAKUB SHIRE ISMAIL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

13441

BILLOW GUHAD UNSHUR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14542

MOHAMUD MUHUMED BALA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14548

IBRAHIM NUR MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

14904

ABDULLAHI KEYNAW ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

15905

MOHAMED OMAR HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

15913

AHMED HASSAN ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

15931

JILLE HUSSEIN OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

15935

AHMED BILLOW MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

16602

GALA ISACK SHEDO

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

16605

ABDI HASSAN GUMOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

16633

ISMAIL HUSSEIN AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18012

ABDI ABDULLAHI KULOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18039

KHALIF MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18044

ATHAN DAGANE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18044

ATHAN OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18048

SUGAL A. UNSHUR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18760

GEDI AKSON

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18760

BISHAR KEYNAN DAGAHOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19707

KANYARE MOHAMED MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

20032

BASHIR MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

20033

KHEIRA MOHAMUD OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

20037

MARKABA ISSACK ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

20042

ABDI JILLOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

20046

ADAN AHMED(DEAD)

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26106

HAREDHA ABDI DADAI

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26108

OSMAN MAALIM NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera East

26132

ADOW HARUN IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26561

YUSSUF OLOW HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26571

ABDIRAHMAN ABDILLE IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

Central

NG

26575

MOHAMED ISMAIL YUSSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26578

ADAN ALI HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26584

MOHAMUD OSMAN AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26587

MUDE IBRAHIM ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26588

MUHUMED BAROW FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26591

ISMAIL HUSSEIN AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26593

ALI MOHAMUD HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26801

IBRAHIM HASSAN MUMIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

26804

BILLOW ISSACK OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

26804

ISSACK OSMAN DAKANE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

26805

ADAN MUSA HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26805

KATHIC BABUL HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26805

HUSSEIN KATHIC BABOI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26806

FARAH ABDULLAHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26806

ADAW KEYNAN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26807

OMAR MUMIN ISMAIL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26817

OSMAN ARALE FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26818

SANEY HANUD HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26822

ABDI MOHAMED HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26822

ABDULLAHI HUSSEIN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26825

MOHAMED NUR BUUL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26827

KASIM ABDIDLER SULEMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26827

HUSSEIN ABDILLE AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26827

IBRAHIM ABDILLAHI ELMI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26827

ABDI NUR GURE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26832

JEHOW ISSACK OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26835

ADHABA BORAI IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26837

SALAT ABDI ISMAIL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26838

MUHUNED ABDI MUHUMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26841

NOOR MOHAMUD OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26841

ABDULLAHI HUSSEIN ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26841

SHEIKH MOHAMUD ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26844

HUSSEIN ALI NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26866

ABDIZALIMAN ALI DAHUR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26880

KASSIM ABIKAR SULEIMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27204

MUHUMED HASSAN LOHOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27211

BISHAR KEYNAN DAGAHOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27223

ABDULLAHI SHEIKH ABDI SHEIKH ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27226

AHMED ABDULLAHI HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27227

AHMED MOHAMED OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27245

MUHUMED ISSACK ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27254

ABDI AHMED JIRE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27259

ABDI ALI IMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27277

ADOW ABDI ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27296

FARHIYA S OMAR MUSA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27296

MOHAMED SAMATAR OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27820

ABDI HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

27820

NOOR IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

27820

BIRIK HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

27824

ABDULLAHI ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27829

OSMAN NOOR ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

28452

MARYIAN ALI ADAN

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

28453

FATUMA NOOR

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

35379

AHMED YUSSUF NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera
Central
Mandera
Central
Wajir

35381

ALASON HUSSEIN ABDILLA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Garissa

35384

MOHAMED ABDI ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35394

KASSIM OSMAN ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

35398

OMAR ABDI HERSI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

37327

HUSSEIN ABDILLE ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39012

MUKHTAR MOHAMED ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39017

ABDIRASHID ALASOW MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39021

OMAR SALAT BULLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

STATEMENT NAMES
ID
39045
ABDI ALI YUSSUF

GENDER

Chapter FOUR

CONTEXT

PROVINCE

DISTRICT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39047

FARAH OMAR ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

39047

ALI ABDILLE GURE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

39066

NOOR ABDILLE GULLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39066

MOHAMED BUKE HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39091

ALI GUHAD ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

39091

OMAR YUSSUF NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

39091

GEDI OSMAN YUSSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

39360

MUHAMUD HASAN ADEN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39374

BILLOW ALI HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39378

ADAN MUSA ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39414

NUROW JIMALE GEDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40578

IBRAHIM ELMI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

40645

HAREDA ABDI GEDI

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41200

KASSIM MUHUMED HIRSI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

WAJIR

43046

MOHAMED JIMAALE SALAT

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

43046

BIRIK IBRAHIM ELMI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47345

BISHAN DUROW ELMI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

8776

ADAN SHEIKH IBRAHIM

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

8839

MOHAMMED YAKUB

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

8993

MOHAMED ABIKAR ISMAIL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

13418

IBRAHIM DUBOW IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18016

ISMAIL KAILEY NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18018

NOOR ANTAR YUSSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18019

ABDI MUHUMED ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir East

18023

ABDI MOHAMED ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18032

BILLOW IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18759

BISHAR KEYNAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19349

ABDI BULLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

19731

NONOW JERRE SETHN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19731

HEBIBA ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19731

MOHAMED KINAN BAREL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19731

HASSAN ABDULLAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19731

MOHAMED ABEYORMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

19731

HAHMA KEINAN BURE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

20040

AMBIA HARSHI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

20043

SAINAB SALAT ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

20045

DIYAD JIMALE ADAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26135

AHAT MUHAMUD OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26572

BULLE IBRAHIM ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26572

OMAN IBRAHIM DORE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26592

ZEINAB ADAN SHEIKH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26592

ALI SHUKA IBRAHIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

26599

SHIEKH ABDILLE KHALID NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26599

MAALIM SULEIMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26826

OSMAN AHMED BABUL

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26843

DIBANE BORAI QUROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26843

KAHIYE GURE ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26843

ISSACK GURE ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26843

GEDI SUGOW ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26846

HALIMA SHEIKH HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

26846

ABDI MUHUMED HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

27225

SUGON ADAN FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

33210

MUDIER MUMIS

Not given Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

35383

JIMALE HIREY ALASOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39022

ADAN MUHAMED ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39028

ISSACK OSMAN KOSAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39028

IBRAHIM AHMED KOSAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39028

MALELE AHMED KOSAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39028

ABEY AHMED KOSAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39034

ABDI HASSAN NOOR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39035

ABDI SHEIKH ALI OMAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39035

ABDULLAHI ABDI SHEIKH ALI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

39388

KASAY ADEN MOHAMUD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

36652

HASSAN MOHAMMED ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

36652

MAALIM IBRAHIM BARROW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

36652

ABDI BARROW HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

36652

HASSAN ABDILLE GULLED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

36652

JELLE ABDI JIBRED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

40722

JIMALE EUNICE ALI

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40722

ALASA MUDOW ABDOW

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40722

KASSIM ADEN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40722

MOHAMUD ABDI ADEN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

40722

ABDULLAHI ADEN MOLID

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41066

FATUMA AHMED QANYARE

F

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41066

ABDILLE AHMED QANYANE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41138

GURE OSMAN MOHAMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42513

BALE BULE HIDIQ

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

NG

NG

43148

MOHAMED HUSSEIN ISSACK

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

43148

SALAT HUSSEIN DEER

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

43148

MOHAMED HUSSEIN BARDAD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

47213

IBRAHIM MOHOMED HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

8814

GUREH BAROW MAALIM

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

16615

GAIYA IBRAHIM ABDILLE

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

18026

AHMED HUSSEIN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

20030

DEKA DIRIYE HASSAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

20047

BISHAR DUROW ELMI(DEAD)

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

39011

MALELE AHMED GOSAR

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41108

MUKTAR BAROW YUSUF

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

20001

RAMADAN ADOW HARON

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

20049

HASSAN MUHAMMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Mandera

40551

MAHAMUD HUSSEIN BARDAD

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

42511

GABANE DAHIR AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

41145

ABDILE OMAR ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47265

MAALIM ABDULLA

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47265

SHEIKH AHMED

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47276

BISHAR DURAW ELMI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47282

ABDIKHER ISSACK FARAH

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47294

FARAH HUSSEIN ABDI

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

47300

KORANE HUSSEIN OSMAN

M

Wagalla Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

81338

LENGOTOOLAI

M

Wamba Massacre 1964

Rift Valley

Samburu

81639

AMODOI LENAKAE

M

Wamba Massacre 1964

Rift Valley

Samburu

81639

NAMAN LENGIRO

M

Wamba Massacre 1964

Rift Valley

Samburu

81639

LETIYION LOLKINYATI

M

Wamba Massacre 1964

Rift Valley

Samburu

81639

REPALLE LEPARTIRE

M

Wamba Massacre 1964

Rift Valley

Samburu

81639

MALGIS LEKITASCHARAN

M

Wamba Massacre 1964

Rift Valley

Samburu

81639

LENAITORONO

M

Wamba Massacre 1964

Rift Valley

Samburu
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81048

HUSSEI ABDI SHEIKH KULOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN HUSSEIN IBRAHIM

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OSMAN KUSA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

EYMOY ABDIMOR

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SHEIKH OSMAN KANYARE

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI ALI YARROW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

DILSON KUSA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED ABDI MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLS ABDIRAH SHEIKH

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI SHURIA MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED HASSAN ADAN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLAHI SALAT

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIKADIR HUSSEIN GODANA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIKADIR OMAR MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HUSSEIN MOHAMED ISSA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN M NOOR

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OSMAN ELMI ABDI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN MOHAMED KERROW

81048

SAMON KUSA

81048

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

OMAR KUSA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABIRAHMAN ABDI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUNOW MOHAMED SADIA

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN OSMAN GOLICHO

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN M HUSSEIN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

NOOR M MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN ABDI BULLE

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

AHMED ABDI MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI YUSUF MOHA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OSMAN HASSAN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YUSUF MOHAMED OSMAN

81048

DIIS ADAN GODAN

81048

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

ALI GEDOW ALI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

KEIRO ADANA GODANA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED OSMAN GULICHA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUDOY HABOLE

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM MUDAY

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OROW OMAR MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir
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81048

IBRAHIM MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM ABDI GULICHA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDAH AND HOKO

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABURAH ADAN HASSAN

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YAROW MAALIM ABIRRAHM

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN ABDOW SALA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED HASSAN BOCHALE

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLA MUSA AHAMD

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADBOW SALA OMAR

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDILLA HASSAN ABDI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IKOW WAKE OMAR

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

AIBRAHIM ALI IBRAHIM

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI MUSA AHMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN HUSSEIN ABIKAR

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MAALIM MOHAMED GUMA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MAALIM BULLE ABIBAKAR

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIRAHIM HASSAN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI SALAN HASSAN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN OMAR MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIKADIR ABDI MAMA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED SANEY ABDI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED ABDI SALAN HASS

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OSMAN SAHED MAMUD

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI MAALIM MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MAALIM ALI GOLICHO

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MAALIM GOLICHO

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

M HASSAN MAHAT

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SAANEY MAAMIN SAMALE

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED YAROW ADAN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN GABOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI MIRAN ADOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

BILLOW HAJJI MAOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HUSSEIN ABDILLE

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

KHALIF MADEY

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

JANAN ABDIRAHMAN MAOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUHUMED SHEKOW ADOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir
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M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

Not given

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

KUHAD SHEKOW

81048

KULE YUSUF

81048

OSMAN IBRAHIM GOLICHA

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HALIMA HUSSEIN MOHAMED

F

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

30241

Margaret Owindo Khakubi

F

Other Massacre

Western

Samia

35410

OSMAN GUYO

M

Other Massacre

Eastern

Moyale

40873

MOHAMED YUSSUF ALI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

40873

FARHIA MOHAMED YUSSUF

F

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

43069

NOT GIVEN

Not given

Other Massacre

Eastern

Isiolo

43069

NOT GIVEN

F

Other Massacre

Eastern

Isiolo

43069

KABALE BONAYA

F

Other Massacre

Eastern

Isiolo

81208

MADYARO IBRAHIM SAMOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

ABDULLAHI MAALIM ISSACK

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

SHEIKH ADEN EDU

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

ISSACK MAALIM

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

AHMED ADEN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

ISMAIL ISSACK

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

EYMOL HASSAN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

MAD NURROW ADEN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

ABDULLAHI IBRAHIM SAMOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

HASSAN IBRAHIM SAMOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

IBRAHIM ALI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

MAALIM ADEN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

NURROW ALIO

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

GOLO HASSAN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

ADEN TACHE

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

ADOIN MAALIM

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

HASSAN MAALIM

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

EDEN IBRAHIM

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

HASSAN ALIO

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

ADOW IBRAHIM

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

MOHAMED ALIO

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

HASSAN EDEN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

IBRAHIM SHEIKH

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

MAALIM ADOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

IBREM EDEN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera
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81335

ISSACK ALI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

ALI MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

HILLOW MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

81335

ISMAIL ALI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

18609

OMAR DIBII

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

18633

GALASSI ANSHUR AHMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Garissa

19733

GAALOW OSMAN HILLOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

19733

HABIBA HILLOW

F

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

19733

KAITUNA HILLOW

F

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

19733

RAKAY HILLOW

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

19733

ADAWA SHIMOY

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

41072

MOHAMED MOHAMED HUSSEIN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

41072

HABIBA MOHAMED HASSAN

F

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

41072

ABDI MOHAMUD MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

8923

ABDI FARAH ROBIE

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

26508

KULAY AHMED ADAN

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

33221

HABIBA AHMED ADAN

F

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera

40749

ADAN FATUMA OLOW

F

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

40749

SUADIA ABDI AHAMED

F

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

40749

HABON NURRA ISAAK

F

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

41150

MOHAMUD SABDOW BUUL

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

19703

HABIBA OMAR SALAT

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

19703

ROBLEY OMAR SALAT

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Wajir

8852

EDILE DAUD ALI

M

Other Massacre

North Eastern

Mandera
West

81048

ABDULLAHI YUSUF MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre
10/9/2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM SALA OMAR

M

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADOW IBRAHIM GIRO

M

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI HASSAN ABDULLA

M

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

BISHAR AHMED IBRAHIM

Not given

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

AHMED IBRAHIM OSMAN

M

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED OSMAN WEKE

M

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN OSMAN WEKE

M

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIRAHMAN AHMED WEKE

M

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDILADIF HACHURA ABDI

M

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI HOKO ABDI

M

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir
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Not given

Other Massacre 1963

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IKOW HACHIRA ABDI

81048

HADIJA IBRAHIM YAROW

F

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM OSMAN

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM HUSIN ABI

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

KOFI OMAR

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MAALIM SAMBURU MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED ABDI ISMANI

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

NOOR ALIYOW KHASIM

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SHABOW ALIYOW KHASIM

Not given

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN YUSUF OSMAN

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED ISMAILM ABDULLA

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN SALAT FARAH

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI MOHAMEDNOOR SALATA

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN ABDIRAHMAN SALAT

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

AHMED ABDINOOR SHEIKH

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASNA ABDINOOR SHEIKH

Not given

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIRAHIM IBRAHIM HARAQE

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDINOOR ADAN HINI

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADANOW HASSAN AHMED

Not given

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED MOHAMUD ALI

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN AMIN GABOW

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

KURFA KANO MAHAD

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ISSACK ADAN ALI

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OSMAN MOHAMED OMAR

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIKADIR ABDI MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ZAINAB ABDI MOHAMED

F

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLAHI HASSAN OMAR

81048

NUNOW HAMO GOLICHA

81048

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

Not given

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

AHMED OSMAN ALI

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM CHICHANA ABDI

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED MOHAMUD ALI

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HUSSEIN MIYOW MOHAMUD

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN MIYOW MOHAMUD

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SAADIA MIYOW MOHAMUD

Not given

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM GARAR ABIKAR

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUKTAR GARAR ABIKAR

Not given

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

GARAR ABIKAR HASSAN

Not given

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir
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81048

ALI YANOW ABIKAR

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIRAHIM NURROW ABIKAR

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HAMARA MAALIM ABDIRAHMAN

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YUSUF HASSAN ABDI

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HUSSEIN HUSSEIN ABIBAKAR

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDISALAH HASSAN HUSSEIN

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUSLIMA ABDI HASSAN

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

RUKIA HASSAN HASSAN

F

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

AFYER MOHAMED OMAR

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

KAISUMA GOMA ABDI

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUMINA MOHAMAED OMAR

F

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HABIBA MOHAMED OMAR

F

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ZEYNAB KUSANI MAMA

F

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MALEY KOTO ABDI

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YUSSUF HASSA OMAR

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MAALIM MOHAMED GOMA

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

BALACHO WAKO

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SAIDO BALACHO WAKO

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED ABDULLA BONAYA

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HANAN ABDULLA BONAYA

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

BURROW AHMED

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI HAMATE ABDI

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YARROW MUSA

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI WAHID AMIN

Not given

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED GUYO ABAKIGO

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HUSSEIN ALI MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SEINABU GUYA

F

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

AMINA HASSAN ALI

F

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN HUSSEIN ALI

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMUD ARABEY

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLAHI MOHAMED OSMAN

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABIBAKAR ABDI ALI

M

Other Massacre 1968

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUKTAR SHEIKH AHMED

Not given

Other Massacre 1969

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OMAR ADAN MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 1969

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIKADIR ALI HASSAN

M

Other Massacre 1969

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OMAR MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 1970

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HALIMA OMAR MOHAMED

F

Other Massacre 1970

North Eastern

Wajir
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81048

YARROW OMAR MOHAMED

Not given

Other Massacre 1970

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

DIKA HUSSEIN TULICHA

Not given

Other Massacre 1979

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN MOHAMUD MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLAHI MOHAMED IBRAHIM

M

Other Massacre 1980

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

JEHOW ISACK OMAR

Not given

Other Massacre 1981

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIAZIZ MOHAMED ARUBY

M

Other Massacre 1982

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HAWA HASSAN AMIN

F

Other Massacre 1982

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED MOHAMUD SAMANEY

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HUSSEIN MOHAMED MAANEY

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YUSUF AHMED SHEIKH

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABSHIR ABDULLAHI IBRAHIM

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLAHI SALA OMAR

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

FATUMA HASSAN

F

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI HABOLE

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SAACHIA MOHAMED GULICHA

Not given

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI MOHAMED GULICHA

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

BISHAR MUDOG

Not given

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

KURFU SORA TESO

Not given

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED GUYO ADIMOR

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLA SALA

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ZAINAB ABDULLA HUSSEIN

F

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLAHI OMAR HASSAN

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI YUSSUF OSMAN

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

AHMED MOHAMUD ARUBY

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABEY ABDI AHMED

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SANEY AHMED MAHADI

Not given

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIKADIR HUSSEINMAHAD

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED OSMAN AHMED

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN MOHAMED OSMAN

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABEY MOHAMED OSMAN

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULKADIR HUSSEIN MAHAD

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIKHER GARAR HUSSEIN

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMUD HUSSEIN MAHAD

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HUSSEIN BURA GARAORE

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM MOHAMED ALI

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ZEINAB CHICHAWA ABDI

F

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

NUGLOY HINI MOHAMED

Not given

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULKADIR ALI IBRAHIM

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir
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81048

ALI AHMED HASSAN

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED OSMAN AHMED

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI BARE IBRAHIM AHMED

M

Other Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED ALI GULICHA

M

Other Massacre 1984

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI YARROW ABIKAR

M

Other Massacre 1992

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HABIBA ABIBAKAR ISMAN

F

Other Massacre 1993

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUMINA OSMAN

F

Other Massacre 1993

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OSMAN GARAR ABIBAKAR

M

Other Massacre 1993

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIKHUR ALI HINI

M

Other Massacre 1995

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HALIMA MAALIM ISAACK

F

Other Massacre 1996

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM ABDOW MAMA

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

KEROW ADAN GULICHA

Not given

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED ABDIRAHMAN

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLA ABDI

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI IBRAHIM MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

NURIA IBRAHIM

F

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED ABDI

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HAFI ABIBAKAR MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM GET

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HUSSEIN OSMAN

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM ABDIRAHMAN

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED HASSAN MAHAT

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HUSSEIN ABDI ROBA

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUKTAR KHALIF MOHAMUD

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OSMAN HASSAN HARAKE

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MAALIM AHMED IBRAHIM MAHAD

Not given

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YARROW IBRAHIM MAHAD

Not given

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HASSAN IBRAHIM ALI

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI IBRAHIM HINI

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

FATUMA IBRAHIM ALI

F

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

NURROW ABDULAHI ALI

Not given

Other Massacre 2001

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

HABIBA ADAN MOHAMED

F

Other Massacre 2003

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDISALAN NUROW BUCHO

M

Other Massacre 2004

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED ABDULLA MUSSA

M

Other Massacre 2004

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ZIAD MOHAMED HASSAN

Not given

Other Massacre 2004

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABIKAR ABDI MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 2004

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

AHMED DAHIR ABDIRAHMAN

M

Other Massacre 2005

North Eastern

Wajir
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81048

MOHAMEDNOOR HUSSEIN OSMAN ALI

M

Other Massacre
24/03/2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI OSMAN SALAT

M

Other Massacre
5/9/1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

BARE OSMAN MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre
5/9/1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI SHIER KULOW

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

RUQIYA BULLE MOHAMED

F

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

DADEY BULLE MOHAMED

Not given

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI ABDI BULLE

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YUSUF BULLE MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

DAHABA HUSSEIN

Not given

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI ALLI BULLE

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OSMAN HASSAN ELMI

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YUSUF ABDULLAHI IBRAHIM

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABUBAKAR ABDULLAHI ABDIRAHMAN

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ISMAIL ABDULLAHI ABDIRAHMAN

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM MOHAMED SADIQ

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLA MOHAMED SADIQ

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI IBRAHIM DINKA

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDINOOR ALI GABOW

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ISMAIL ABDULLA SHEIKH
ABDIRAHAMAN

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABIKAR ABDULLA SHEIKH
ABDIRAHAMAN

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MARYUN ABDULLA SHEIKH
ABDIRAHAMAN

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SHEIKH ALI SHEIKH AHMED

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMUD OMAREY MOHAMED

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ROBLEY IBRAHIM MOHAMED

Not given

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN MUDO

M

Other Massacre 1966

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN ELMI

M

Other Massacre 1967

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN MUSA

M

Other Massacre 1968

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIRIZAR OSMAN GULISHO

81048

HASNA MOHAMED ALI

81048

M

Other Massacre 1968

North Eastern

Wajir

Not given

Other Massacre 1978

North Eastern

Wajir

MOHAMED ADAN H

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ALI ADAN HASSAN

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLA OMAR SALAT

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir
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Not given

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MOHAMED MOHAMED ADAN

81048

MAALIM BILLOW IBRAHIM

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIRAHMAN ABDI

M

Other Massacre 1987

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

DAHABA AMIN ABDI

M

Other Massacre 1993

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ADAN MOHAMED ABDIRAHMAN

Not given

Other Massacre 1993

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

YUSUF ABDIRAHMAN

M

Other Massacre 1995

North Eastern

Wajir

35407

MOHAMED NUR FARAHIM SORA

81048

DAYIB MOHAMED MOHAMED

81048

M

Other Massacre 1998

Eastern

Moyale

Not given

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

ADAN MOHAMED ADAN

M

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OMAR YUSUF ALI

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SALAT OMAR ALI

M

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

DAHIR SALAT OMAR

Not given

Other Massacre 1964

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

UGAS KUSE

Not given

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

FARAH SALAT OMAR

M

Other Massacre 1965

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDI ABDULLA HASSAN

M

Other Massacre1968

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

OMAR ABDI ABDULLA

M

Other Massacre 1968

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

IBRAHIM BULLE

M

Other Massacre 1977

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

MUSA ABDI ALI

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

SALAT YARROW ABDI

Not given

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLAHI YAROW ABDI

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDULLAHI ADANI KANYORE

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

ABDIRAHMAN ALI

M

Other Massacre 1983

North Eastern

Wajir

81048

WAYSAME AHMED SHEIKH

Not given

Other Massacre 2000

North Eastern

Wajir

81639

NOT GIVEN

M

Other
Coast
Massacre,Other,LAND
DISPUTE

Magarini

81208

LUYALOKANIKI

M

Other Massacres
13TH JUNE 2006

Rift Valley

Trans
Nzoia

81208

MRS PETER LUWASIKOW

F

Other Massacres23RD Rift Valley
Dec 1998

Trans
Nzoia
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CHAPTER

FIVE

Unlawful Detention, Torture and
ill-Treatment
I want to thank all Kenyans who have been part of the struggle to make
this day possible. We can now discuss this openly including politicians and
activists who were detained and tortured for a free Kenya. At that time, it was
not possible to even seek legal redress let alone talk publicly about it.1
Honourable Mohamed Ibrahim Elmi, TJRC Public Hearing, Nairobi, 18 May 2011

What a waste of time the Moi KANU regime went through, plucking university
students from their classrooms and homes and dumping them in filthy dungeons.
It did not stop anything. Did it? We are still here. Are we not? We survived. Did
we not? Yes, we are survivors and not victims. We are victorious overcomers
and not carcasses of state oppression. They tried to bury us alive but we
defiantly emerged from the graves called maximum security penitentiaries. We
are still here standing up and fighting for peace, justice and democracy. You can
lock people up but no oppressor has yet found a way of imprisoning patriotic,
democratic and revolutionary ideas.2

1
2

TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nairobi/18 May 2011/p. 10.
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 Feb 2012/p. 47.
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Introduction
1.

In many ways, and despite the many challenges that it continues to face, Kenya is
a country whose democratic and political space is relatively wide and dynamic. At
least from 2003, the state has more often than not respected citizens’ freedom of
expression, assembly and the right to association. However, it was not always this
way. The freedom that Kenyans enjoy today is an outcome of many years of activism
and struggle against dictatorship and state repression or violence. It is a freedom
that came at a high price for many men and women who dared criticize or oppose
Jomo Kenyatta’s and Daniel Arap Moi’s political administrations. Many of them were
detained without trial, tortured, and subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.
Their families were equally subjected to untold sorrows by state operatives. Others
succumbed to torture or were killed after undergoing torture.

2.

This Chapter looks at the nature, extent and impact of unlawful detention, torture
and ill-treatment perpetrated in Kenya during the Commission’s mandate period.
During this period, torture was commonplace and used, for the larger part, to crush
opposition and any dissenting voices. During the Commission’s mandate period,
widespread and systematic use of torture occurred in the following contexts:
during the Shifta War; in the aftermath of the 1982 attempted coup; between
1982 and 1991 purposely to quell dissenting political voices and as part of the
crackdown on Mwakenya; between 1993 to 1997 as part of the crackdown on the
February Eighteenth Revolutionary Army (FERA); in 1997 following a raid on a
police station in Likoni; and most recently in 2008 during Operation Okoa Maisha, a
security operation to flush out members of the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF)
in the Mount Elgon region.

Definitions and Legal Framework
Torture
3.

3
4

590

The Commission was mandated by the TJR Act to investigate acts of torture and
severe ill-treatment as part of its broader mandate to investigate gross violations
of human rights.3 The Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),4 which was ratified by Kenya on 21
February 1997, defines torture as:
Section 2 of the TJR Act 2008 includes torture under its definition of crimes against humanity.
The Treaty was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10
December 1984. It entered into force on 26 June 1987.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FIVE

Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.5

4.

Although, the definition in CAT limits the perpetration of torture to state actors,
recent developments in international law recognizes that torture may be committed
by non-state actors. For this reason, the Commission extended its research and
investigations to cover torture by non-state actors such as the SLDF. Moreover,
although CAT distinguishes between torture, on the one hand, and inhuman and
degrading treatment, on the other, both in terms of how they are defined and state
obligations entailed therein, the Commission did not draw this distinction in its
work because it was not a court of law.

5.

During the Commission’s mandate period, despite the fact that section 74(1) of
the Independence Constitution protected individuals from torture, the state did
little to legislate against or punish torture. In the 2010 Constitution, sections 28
and 29 provide constitutional protection from torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment.

Unlawful Detention
6.

Unlawful detention is one of the gross violations of human rights that the
Commission was mandated to investigate.6 According to Section 2 of the TJR Act,
gross human rights violations include imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law.

7.

The Commission adopted the definition proposed by the UN Working Group on
unlawful detention, which broadly considers unlawful the following forms of
deprivation of liberty:
a) When it is clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the
deprivation of liberty;
b) When the deprivation of liberty results from the exercise of the rights or
freedoms guaranteed by articles 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 10 and 21 of the Universal

5
6

CAT, article 1
Section 6(a) of the TJR Act relates to functions of the Commission.
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Declaration of Human Rights and, insofar as State parties are concerned, by
Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26 and 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights;
c)

8.

For the purposes of this Chapter, detention extends to deprivation of liberty in
the following circumstances: either before or during trial but excludes after a
conviction; preventive detention (detention without trial); and detention in the
form of house arrest and ‘rehabilitation’ through labour when accompanied by
serious restrictions on liberty of movement.

9.

Prolonged detention occurs during pre-trial detention when a suspect arrested on
the suspicion of having committed a crime is not brought before the court within
the prescribed period of time provided by the law.

10.

Legal provisions regulating detention have evolved over time in Kenya. During the
colonial period, there were three detention laws, namely:






7
8
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When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms
relating to the right to a fair trial, spelled out in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and in the relevant international instruments accepted by
the States concerned, is of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty
an arbitrary character.7

The Deportation (Immigration British Subjects) Ordinance 1949. Under this
legislation early Mau Mau suspects were detained as well as leaders of the Bataka
Party of Uganda and Uganda African Farmers Association, both organisations
having been banned by Gazette Notice No. 678 of 1949. Members of other
proscribed groups were also detained under this Ordinance, for example the
Somali Youth League (banned through Gazette Notice No. 516 of 1948) and the
Kipsigis Central Association (banned through Gazette Notice No. 52 of 1948);
The Detained and Restricted Persons (Special Provisions) Ordinance 1960 No
3 of 1960 provided for detention of those considered a threat to British rule
in Kenya. This legislation permitted the detainee to appeal to the Detainee
Appeals Tribunal;
The Preservation of Public Security Ordinance 1960 empowered the governor
allow detention without trial in the preservation of public security. The postindependence Preservation of Public Security Act 1966 was a replica of this
Ordinance.8

Fact Sheet No. 26, the UN working Group on Arbitrary Detention www2.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs26.htm
(accessed 13 February 2012)
The Price of Political Freedom: The story of political resistance in Kenya, W Kihoro, 2005

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

11.

Kenya has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) that
expressly prohibit unlawful detention. Article 9 of the ICCPR states that “no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention; no one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure
as are established by law.” Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights provides that ‘no one may be arbitrarily detained.’

12.

Under the Independence Constitution the right to personal liberty was a
constitutionally protected right that was subject to lawful limitations. Section 72
of the Constitution read together with Section 36 of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Kenya Cap 75 prescribed lawful detention and protection of the
rights of the detainee. A detained person must have been informed of the
reason for his detention and brought before court within 24 hours of his
arrest or released on bail if he was suspected of having committed a noncapital offence. Section 72(3) provided that an individual suspected of having
committed a capital offence (punishable by death) be brought before court
within 14 days of his arrest. Upon failure to do so, the burden of proof lied
with the person alleging this provision had been complied with. Section 72(6)
of the Constitution provided that a person who was unlawfully detained by
another person shall be entitled to compensation from the latter.

13.

Section 29 of the Criminal Procedure Code gave police wide discretionary
powers to arrest individuals (without a warrant) if they suspected a crime
had occurred or was imminent. The Criminal Procedure Code lays down the
provisions on pre-trial detention. Section 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code
provides that upon taking into custody such an individual arrested without a
warrant, if it does not appear practicable to bring the person before a court
and he has not committed a serious offence (murder, treason, rape, robbery
with violence or attempted robbery with violence), the person must be
released upon executing a bond for a reasonable amount. This provision is
read together with Section 123 which allows for the person to be released on
payment of bail or execution of a bond without sureties.

14.

The Criminal Procedure Code also lays down provisions for pre-trial detention
when an individual is arrested with a warrant. Section 108 provides that the court
issuing a warrant of arrest for offences other than murder, treason or rape may
direct that the suspect executes a bond with sufficient sureties for his attendance
before the court.
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15.

Article 83 of the Constitution, however, permitted the derogation from
fundamental rights and freedoms in situations when Kenya was at ‘war’.
Section 85 of the Constitution also provided that the “President may bring
into operation by order published in the Kenya Gazette, Part III of the
Preservation of Public Security Act’’.

16.

The Preservation of Public Security Act (PPSA) No. 18 of 1966 gave the President
the authority to give orders for detention of persons without trial. Although
this measure was applicable in emergency situations, the law was applied
indiscriminately even when the country was at peace. The PPSA also gave the
Minister of Home Affairs powers to detain a person without trial if he was satisfied
that the person was a threat to public order and security.

Methodology
17.

The Commission received 4345 statement and memoranda on torture and 1144 on
unlawful detention. The Commission conducted thematic hearings on Torture and
on Prisons and Detention Centres during which it heard witnesses from the Ministry
of Public Works, the Prisons Service as well as relevant civil society organizations
whose areas of expertise include promoting the rights of torture victims and of
prisoners. The Commission also relied on secondary sources of information available
at its disposal, including academic writings and reports by non-governmental
organizations.

18.

The following graphs shows the number of cases of torture and unlawful detention
reported to the Commission over time:

Cases of Torture
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Cases of Unlawful Detention

19.

The patterns of torture cases follow major events in the history of Kenya. There
are peaks during the Shifta War, immediately after the 1982 attempted coup,
then around the events leading to the return to multi-party democracy in
1991-1993, and finally around the presidential elections of 1997 and 2007.

20.

The occurrence of unlawful detention was not uniform over the mandate period
of the Commission. The graph above illustrates that there were several peaks
in the number of violations related to unlawful detention. The Commission
also received a high number of violations related to unlawful detention that
occurred during the colonial period between 1952 and 1960, during the state
of emergency.

21.

Episodes of unlawful detention also occurred predominantly during and
immediately following the attempted coup of August 1982 as well as during the
popular demands for multi-party democracy in the early 1990s. Other incidences
of unlawful detentions occurred during the presidential elections in 1992, 1997
and 2007. Noteworthy is the fact that the Commission also received reports of
cases of unlawful detention beyond its mandate period (after February 2008).

22.

The two graphs taken together show that peaks in torture cases were not always
linked to peeks in unlawful detention cases. This is consistent with testimonies
received by the Commission that indicate many torture cases taking place
outside of detention centres or during or immediately following arrest by police.
These testimonies will be presented in later parts of this chapter.
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Patterns by region
23.

The graphs below shows the distribution of cases of torture and unlawful
detention reported to the Commission by region:
Torture Cases by Region

Unlawful Detention Cases by Region
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24.

Torture an unlawful detention occurred throughout Kenya in a pattern that was
a reflection of the forces that were shaping events at the time. The Commission
received statements from Western Province, where suspected members of
clandestine movements such as February Eighteenth Resistance Army (FERA).
Nyanza had the highest number of victims who reported to the Commission as
victims of detention during the attempted coup in 1982.

25.

In Rift Valley, the data revealed that most detentions occurred in the
aftermath of presidential elections. Eastern province revealed a pattern in
which most of the unlawful detention and torture cases took place as a result
of the government’s crackdown against the Shifta. Administratively, Isiolo
and Marsabit are districts that fall under Eastern province where the Shifta
were also present in North Eastern Province. The highest number of cases of
torture reported to the Commission took place in North Eastern and Western
provinces.

Chapter FIVE

The victims
26.

The Commission identified 12,756 victims of torture, of which 19% were women, and
6095 victims of unlawful detention, of which 10% were women. The low percentage
of women might be explained by the fact that men were predominantly involved in
political activities and were therefore most likely to be targeted for state violence.

Those who openly criticized state conduct were detained without trial or jailed on
trumped up politically motivated charges.

The Perpetrators
27.

The majority of the victims of unlawful detention, torture and ill-treatment
who appeared before the Commission identified the police and the military
as the main perpetrators. Within the police force, torture was perpetrated
largely by officers attached to the Special Branch which was in 1986 replaced
by the Directorate of Security Intelligence. The DSI was disbanded in 1998 and
its tasks were eventually passed on to what is now known as the National Security
Intelligence Service (NSIS).

28.

The Commission established that in Nairobi, a special task force was established
for the sole purpose of interrogating and torturing individuals who were
suspected to be a threat to national security or were suspected members of
Mwakenya and other such underground movements. A witness who worked
with the police in the Provincial headquarters in Nyayo House in January 1986
told the Commission:

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

597

Volume IIA

Chapter FIVE

When I was posted to Nairobi, after a few weeks I was told, “You are one of the officers
who are going to do a special task which has arisen, but you will be briefed.” I was
told to report to Mr. [James] Opiyo. We were quite a number of officers who had
been drawn from various places. It was a special kind of operation. We were told that
there was a movement which had been engaging in subversive activities. “We have
arrested some people and we want to embark on investigation of this movement and
see to what extent it has operated and know the people who are involved and their
aims and objectives.” Having been in the service, we understood what was meant by
subversion.9

29.

Among the members of this task force were: James Opiyo, Peter Munyiri, Elias Mjomba,
James Majani, James Kilonzo, Serbi, Ben Machiri, Martin Muthee, Francis Mwabembe,
Ndirangu and Paul Liminaji. The task force operated under the leadership of James
Opiyo. There were other junior officers who guarded the cells at the basement of
Nyayo House, including Peter Kimanthi, Rukwaro, and Martin Ochanda.

30.

Although members of the judiciary and the Office of the Attorney General did not
play a role in the torture of individuals, they were accomplices to these violations
insofar as they conducted trials that lacked any guarantees of fair trial, including
conducting such trials in the night. In many cases, they turned a blind eye to
the fact that the accused persons had been evidently tortured. Although many
victims who recorded statements and testified before the Commission indicated
that they had stood trial late in the evenings and often into the nights, Benard
Chunga who admitted to have prosecuted a good number of the Mwakenya
and FERA cases, insisted that: ‘to my recollection and I say this with absolute
honesty I do not recall any occasion when any of these cases – Mwakenya or
FERA – were dealt with beyond 5.00 p.m.’ All he could admit is that perhaps there
were isolated cases which took place in the night. However, like most AMPs who
appeared before the Commission, he emphasised that it was not easy to clearly
remember events that had happened close to 20 years before. He alluded to the
fact that his memory would have been refreshed if he had the court records.

31.

Despite the clear lack of independence of the judiciary during his tenure, a fact
entrenched by the removal of security of tenure of judicial officers in 1988, President
Moi insisted to the Commission that the judiciary was independent during his time
in his office:
I do not agree with the assertion that the justice system was interfered with during
my term of office. I can only explain this through the system of hiring judges and the
appointment of the Chief Justice, which was done as provided by the law.10

9 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Nairobi/29 February 2012/p. 4.
10 Former President Moi, My views to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 21 May 2012
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Detention and Torture during the Colonial Era
32.

While the colonial era is outside the strict temporal mandate of the Commission, an
account of violations that occurred during the immediate that period is necessary
because most colonial practices and law, including those relating to detention and
torture, were maintained by the independent state.

33.

As narrated in the chapters on Historical Context and the History of Security
Agencies, the colonial state employed violence to stamp its authority in Kenya.
Uprisings against the colonial administration were quelled with disproportionate
force. Detention and torture during the colonial period reached a peak during the
emergency years, 1952 to 1955. The declaration of a state of emergency in 1952
was followed by detention and torture of all Africans who were suspected to be
or associated with Mau Mau. Thousands of Africans were detained during two
particular operations: Operation John Scott and Operation Anvil.

34.

Screening camps were established in various parts of the country, especially in
Central and Rift Valley Provinces, and at which individuals were interrogated
to establish whether or not they were members of the Mau Mau. During these
interrogations, torture was the norm and its absence the exception.

35.

The horrific descriptions of the methods of torture used during the emergency
period have been described in detail by Caroline Elkins’ book ‘Britain’s Gulag: The
Brutal End of Empire in Kenya’. In many cases, torture took a predominantly sexual
nature. In general, British soldiers, policemen and Home Guards were responsible
for inexplicable acts of sexual violence:
When the Mau Mau war was going on, women were violated a lot by the colonial
soldiers. Women were beaten and raped. Batons were inserted into their private parts.
Do you hear that? I do not know if you have heard of that? Have you heard of such things
– that our women were beaten up and raped by the colonial soldiers, and that batons
were inserted into their private parts? Do you know where our private parts are? You can
imagine a bottle being pushed in and then you are left there or beaten.11

36.

A common practice during interrogation was to squeeze men’s testicles with pliers.
In his book ‘Mau Mau Detainee’, James Mwangi Kariuki (J.M Kariuki) wrote that he
had witnessed with his own eyes a man who had been castrated:
I have seen with my own eyes that Kongo Chuma whom I first met in Nakuru before he
was detained and who is now living at Kianga in Embu district, has been castrated. He
had not been like this when he was in Nakuru but when we met in the detention camp

11

TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Nairobi/21 February 2012/p. 11.
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at Athi River he told me it has been done to him by the screeners at Kwa Nyangwethu.
He also told me that bottles of soda water were opened and pushed into the uterus of
some women to make them confess. Kongo said these things were done by the Africans
but the European officers knew what was going on.12

37.

Those who were found to owe allegiance to Mau Mau in any way were transported
to detention camps where they were not only tortured but subjected to inhuman
and degrading conditions. Not even women were spared. At Kamiti Women’s
Detention Camp, for instance, those detained include pregnant.13 It was common
for suspected members of Mau Mau to be moved from one detention camp to
another. J.M Kariuki, for instance, was detained in 14 camps around the country.
Mutua Kirimi who presented a statement to the Commission was detained in
three camps:
I was taken to the screening camp. I stayed there for a month then I was taken to
Lang’ata where I stayed for a week. Finally, I was taken to Manyani detention campCompound number 8 where I was detained for a month before I was released.14

38.

Jonathan Njoka Muruanguiko was detained in four detention camps. He recounted
his ordeal in a statement submitted to the Commission:
I was arrested and detained for one month in Majimbo, two years in Mageta Island, three
months in Manyani Camp and six months in Kathigiriri (Mwea) Camp. I was alleged to be
a Mau Mau fighter. I was tortured highly, especially my genital organs that left me sterile
as well as the beating that left me deaf15.

39.

Another victim, Nguru Mbora, suffered permanent injuries after he was brutally
beaten by a warden in a detention camp:
I was arrested by policemen from Runyenjes police station. During my detention, I
suffered a dislocated leg joint after I was hit with the butt of a gun by prison warders. I
have a problem walking. I am highly dependent on people, not to mention my disability
(blindness).16

40.

12
13
14
15
16
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Sometimes the brutal beating of prisoners at these detention camps resulted
in death. As described in detail in the Massacres Chapter, on 3 March 1959, 11
detainees were clubbed to death by guards at the Hola Detention Camp while the
surviving prisoners sustained serious permanent injuries.
JM Mwangi Mau Mau Detainee (2009) 30.
W Kihoro The Price of Freedom: The story of political resistance in Kenya (2005) 82.
TJRC/Statement/38763
TJRC/Statement/29361
TJRC/Statement/43381
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Operation Anvil
Excerpt from Tom Mboya Freedom and after (1963) 37-39
‘Operation Anvil, ‘the biggest sweep of the whole Emergency, began in the middle of a
Saturday morning – April 24th, 1954 – when Africans had already started work in the offices,
shops and factories of Nairobi. The streets were suddenly full of lorry-loads of soldiers with
machine-guns. Cordons were thrown around the whole area. Leaving several colleagues in
my office, I went down into the street. Within a few seconds I was challenged by soldiers
pointing a gun at me. I raised my hands above my head as ordered and walked up to him. He
gave me a shove with the butt of his gun and ordered me to walk on. I was taken to a street
island where other Africans were already sitting, and ordered to squat down. I noticed that
some of the people in the group were marked with paint all over their faces. Later I learnt
these people were either hesitant when called upon to stop, or were found in what the soldiers regarded as suspicious circumstances.
For hours we waited until we were ordered into a lorry and driven to a reception camp
which was surrounded by barbed wire. Here we again squatted for hours. Then we were lined
up and European police officers asked each one of us his tribe and separated us accordingly.
Those of us who were non-Kikuyu were led out of the camp by a European officer, who told us
we were free to go home but warned us not to come back into the cordoned area. No questions were asked, no names given. Such were the methods used ‘Operation Anvil’, in which
35,000 men and women were detained.
[...]
There were many other incidents, many other times when we were whisked off from our
offices and sent to screening camps. We were asked whether we knew Mau Mau agents or
where oathing was taking place. For many of our members who were Kikuyu, Embu or Meru,
the arrest meant a one-way ticket to the detention camp. For the rest of us, we were only
saved because we did not belong to the Kikuyu tribe. But many times our houses were raided
during the night and turned upside down in a police search. When Nairobi was portioned off
into tribal areas, I was very surprised that I was put into the Kikuyu area - Bahati – instead of
being left to live in the Luo area of Kaloleni. I suppose this was because some people in the
administration thought I was a bad influence since I had been outspoken on some of the
Emergency problems.
But outspokenness had its effect. W e made a strong statement against the screening
methods. Hooded men ( or were they women?) were bought into a camp and merely pointed
at a person without confronting him with any evidence or witnesses, and on those grounds
alone the person pointed at was sent off to a detention camp. There was no knowing who
was under the hood – an African or a European.
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Hola Detention Camp

	
  

Detention and Torture during President Kenyatta’s Era
41.

The practice of torture and unlawful detention did not end with the hoisting of the
independence flag. Repression of dissent in a variety of ways continued under the
leadership of President Jomo Kenyatta. The bureaucratic centralization of power
under colonial rule, weak party structures and lack of respect for the Constitution
were all inherited by the Kenyatta regime. The government retained the colonial
legal framework, which allowed it to control political activity in the country
through legislation such as the Public Order Act and the Chief’s Act.

42.

Although the KANU manifesto described preventive detention as inhumane and
pledged to abolish the ‘undemocratic and unjust practices’, emergency laws were
reinstated by the passing in June 1966 of the Preservation of Public Security Act
(PPSA) which allowed for preventive detention to persist. The PPSA was applied as
a weapon to preserve the interests of the ruling party, which were camouflaged as
interests of the State.17 The PPSA enabled the state to detain individuals without
trial, allowed control of free movement, authorized the imposition of curfews, and
press censorship.

17 Kenya Taking Liberties: An Africa Watch Report (1991)
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43.

Unlawful detention and torture during President Kenyatta’s presidency was
rampant during two particular contexts: in the context of the Shifta War and as
part of the state’s repression of dissenting political voices. Violations committed
during the Shifta War include unlawful detention and torture have been covered
in a separate chapter of this Report.

44.

Following the enactment of PPSA, the detention of individuals who dared criticize or
oppose Jomo Kenyatta’s administration became rampant and commonplace. Political
activists were kept under constant surveillance by the police. In August 1966, 18 KPU
supporters were arrested and detained. In many cases, individuals associated with
political activists were harassed and even tortured for no other reason than the fact
they were thought to owe allegiance to such political activists. For instance, upon
Jaramogi Odinga’s resignation as Vice President in 1966, one of his bodyguards, he
was forced to resign as a police officer at the tender age of 26 years and ordered to
stay out of Nairobi for a period of five years. His career having been brutally cut short,
he fell into destitution. He told the Commission his sad story in Kitui:

Chapter FIVE

I was working in the Police Department. I managed to be an escort of Jaramogi Oginga
Odinga. I stayed with him for that time he was working in Government. They came to differ
with another fellow elder who was the President of this country, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta.
When they differed, it was said that I was to go to the Police Commissioner who was called
Bernard Hinga. I received the report from the officer in charge at Muthaiga Police Station
that year. After the elders differed, I went back to Merek Police Station. When I went to
see the Commissioner of Police he told me that I should explain to him the movement of
the old man we were working with. The old man loved me because I was really obedient.
I told the Commissioner that, personally, I was not taken there by the Government to do
investigations about a person, but I went there to protect the life of the person. I continued
telling him that if he would ask me how he was injured, I could have an answer. I could
not just give information about somebody. I am a Christian and speak the truth. He gave
me 48 hours to go back with a full report about Mzee Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. When I
went back he asked me, “Do you have the complete report?” I replied that I did not have
any report to give him and that was all. He told me I should go and write a resignation
letter and if I could not do that I would be dismissed without any document even to show
I was in the police. I did not have any choice, I wrote the resignation letter so that if I was
dismissed, I could get employment even as a watchman. Once dismissed from the job,
I thought it better for me to go back home. I was ordered to stay for five years without
going back to Nairobi Town. For sure, I stayed, persevered and my people suffered.18

45.

Another victim of such harassment was a police officer attached to the Special
Branch and was at one time charged with the responsibility of guarding the house
of Oginga Odinga when he was under house arrest. He told the Commission the
following story:

18 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Kitui/1 December 2011/p. 21-22.
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People who were critical of the arrest and detention of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and
talked about it in public were similarly arrested which I thought was not justified. I
remember that there was a DO1, Jembe Mwakalu. He heard that Jaramogi wanted a
public administration officer to go to his house so that he could tell him his tribulations.
The DC declined to visit the home, but Jembe Mwakalu opted to go there to listen to the
old man’s problems. Immediately he came back, Mwakalu was arrested by junior police
officers who had been instructed to wait for him. He was placed in the police cells. The
police station was next to the District Headquarters where he worked as DO1, currently,
Deputy District Commissioner. He was kept in the police cells for over a week. He was
not allowed to take a shower or change his clothing. At one time when I and other
officers were taking his statement, the DO actually smelled. He was taken to Nairobi
and later I learnt that he was detained. He later fled the country when he was released.

46.

He continued:
Personally, I got into trouble with the Special Branch while I was guarding Jaromogi
Oginga Odinga when one morning he decided to leave. He had been given limited
permission to be going to town for about an hour and then he would be driven back
to the house. On that day, he decided to move out and he was driven to his Bondo
home in Siaya. When I reported that Jaramogi had disappeared, I was told to produce
him within an hour or I would be placed in the cell in his place. So, I took my crew
and followed him while making inquiries on the way until we traced him at his Bondo
house. The following morning he told me that he had accomplished what he wanted
and he wanted to go back to Kisumu. He was to be driven in his Mercedes Benz by his
driver, Daniel Obuon. I allowed him to do so. However, instead of driving to Kisumu, he
was driven very fast in his vehicle. I was then using a Bluebird Station Wagon and so I
could not match their speed. So, Oginga and his team disappeared only to resurface in
Kampala the following day. This brought a lot of distrust on my side. My seniors felt that
I had known about the disappearance of Oginga from Kisumu and Siaya. This instilled
a lot of fear in me because I had known while working in the department that there
existed a special department that was dealing with Government critiques and it was
possible then to be placed in detention at any time. So, I was in fear. None of my seniors
believed any story I told them about Jaramogi. I told them that the loophole he used
to escape was not my making because it was the headquarters that had allowed him
limited freedom of moving to town. That made them spare me although inwardly I
knew that they continued to follow me. Later in 1983 I was transferred from Kisumu
to Bungoma, my home district. In Bungoma, the District Security Intelligence Officer
(DSIO) was an inspector. I was also an inspector, but when I arrived I was told that I
would be posted to Sirisia as a field intelligence officer which position was being filled
by subordinate officers, that is, constables, corporals, sergeants and senior sergeants,
but not inspectors. I agreed to move on where I worked for four months and then I
transferred to the headquarters in June, 1983.19

19 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Bungoma/10 July 2011/p. 25.
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47.

In October 1969, KPU was banned after the opening of Nyanza Provincial Hospital
by President Jomo Kenyatta turned violent, culminating in what is popularly
referred to as the Kisumu massacre. In the same year, KPU officials were detained
without trial, including Oginga Odinga, Ochieng Oneko, Bildad Kaggia and
Wesonga Siyjeyo. Daniel arap Moi, who was at the time the Vice President, justified
these detentions without trial stating that ‘any government worth its salt must put
the preservation of public security above the convenience of a handful of persons
who are doing their utmost to undermine it’.20

48.

Although men were the predominant victims of detention and torture during
President Kenyatta’s era a few women were also victims of the repressive regime,
including Caroline Okello-Odongo, Jaramogi’s personal secretary, and Chelagat
Mutai, a Member of Parliament. Detention and torture continued throughout
President Kenyatta’s time in office and by 1978 there were at least 26 political
prisoners in jail.

Chapter FIVE

Detention and Torture during President Moi’s Era
49.

Moi’s accession to the presidency was followed by crucial moments of political
strategising and positioning. His immediate approach towards politics and the
country’s leadership soon after the transition has been generally perceived as open
and optimistic. The outlook of optimism was partly illustrated by the release by
of 26 political detainees held under Kenyatta for varying periods on the fifteenth
anniversary of the country’s independence (Jamhuri Day, 1978). 21

50.

This gesture certainly signified to many the dawning of a new era in Kenyan political
life, the ushering of a chapter of tolerance and reconciliation. On the contrary
and quite in a subtle manner, around the same time the provisions authorizing
detention without trial in the Public Security Act were renewed. New regulations
were laid before Parliament on 3 November 1978.

51.

Following the attempt to topple his government by force in 1982, President Moi
established an autocratic patronage system that systematically undermined the
rule of law and respect for human rights. What emerged through this period was

20 G K Adar and M Munyae, ‘Human rights abuses in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi 1978-2002’, Africa Studies Quarterly (2001)
21 Political prisoners who were released were: Ngugi wa Thiong’o, George Anyona, Mitchell Muhoro Muthoga, Joseph Martin Shikuku,
Apollo Washington Juma, Jean Marie Seroney, Charles Gikonyo Rukungu, Ruel Thairu Muthiga, Charles Mwangi Mahinda, Peter
Gicheru Njau, Adam Mathenge, Michael Koigi Wa Wamwere, Moffat Muthee Munyara, Mwanzia Lawrence Boniface, Lawrence
Were, Wesonga Sijeyo, Dagane Golal Mohammed alia Haji Dagane Galal, Haji Mahat Kuno Roble, Ibrahim Ali Omar, Duale Roble
Hussein, Ali Dabat Fidhow, Mohamed Dahir Digale, Mohamed Nurie Hanshi, Ahamed Shurie Abdi alias Ahmed Shurie Stamboul,
Mohamed Abdille Hadow and Sugow Ahmed Adam.
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an authoritarian system where the President directly became involved in almost
everything in the country, particularly issues concerning the rights of individual Kenyan
citizens to speak their minds, assemble without hindrance, and write and publish
without undue restrictions. A wide range of individuals were targeted for detention
and torture, including politicians, university lecturers, and students. Lecturers in
particular would be detained and tortured for allegedly teaching subversive literature
aimed at creating disorder in the country. 22 Eventually the University Staff Union was
banned for what the government referred to as ‘over-indulgence in politics’.23 Many
lecturers were also forced into exile for fear of their lives.

Detention and torture in the aftermath of the 1982 attempted coup
52.

On 1 August 1982, several members of Kenya Air Force (KAF) officers staged
a coup against the government. They took over of Embakasi, Eastleigh and
Nanyuki airbases, and seized Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, the post office
and Voice of Kenya Broadcasting House. However, the coup was quickly crushed
by loyal forces that recaptured the Voice of Kenya Broadcasting station.

53.

The operation mounted by the loyal forces to regain control of the captured points
in Nairobi resulted in heavy casualties. Unofficial estimates of casualties range
from 600 to 1,800.24 Other sources state that about 2,000 KAF personnel and
at least 1,000 civilians were detained.25 In order to find out those who had
planned, staged and supported the coup, KAF officers were arrested, detained
and tortured. Many university students, lecturers and civilians who were
suspected to have been participants in the coup, in one way or the other, were
similarly detained and tortured.

54.

Many of the KAF members who testified before the Commission said they were
arrested within their army base while others were arrested on arrival at their
bases after the attempted coup. They were transported to various police stations,
army headquarters, KAF Nanyuki, Kamiti maximum prison, Kodiaga main prison,
King’ong’o prison and Naivasha maximum security prison. According to some of the
witnesses, the Air Force officers were arrested by soldiers from the Kenyan army. A
witness who testified before the Commission estimated that three quarters of the
1,500 who were sacked neither knew about or played any part in the attempted
coup.26

22 B A Ogot, Editor “Politics of Populism” in Decolonisation and Independence in Kenya, 1940-93(1995) 199
23 Adar, K, G, “Human Rights and Academic Freedom in Kenya’s Public Universities: The Case of The Universities Academic Staff
Union” Human Rights Quarterly (1999) 187
24 Kenya a History Since Independence, C Hornsby (2012) 377
25 J Achira, Mwakenya: Real or Phantom? A journalist’s Harrowing Experience in the Moi Regime, pg xxiii
26 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nairobi/21 March 2012/p. 13
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At Nanyuki Airbase, Air Force officers were arrested, beaten and made to move
on their knees for almost 800 meters. They were later made to sleep inside a
go-down near the supply section within the barracks. They were not given food
until the fourth day. Army soldiers started interrogations on the sixth day. On
the tenth day, they were taken to Kamiti maximum security prison led by their
commander Major General Kariuki. Humiliation continued when all were told to
remove their clothes and remain naked. They were later given their clothes and
the following day on 11th August 1982, they were then transferred to Naivasha
maximum security prison. The officers again were denied food until 20th of
August. Interrogations began again on the 21st. One witness recalls the painful
experience thus:
By this time we could hear people crying and screaming with pain. On the 3rd October,
1982 I was called for interrogation by three people in plain clothes and they asked me
questions about the coup […] I was told that there was someone who said that I had
information about the coup and am refusing to tell them the truth. This is the time I was
taken to Naivasha Nyayo House Block F. Here there were rooms filled with water halfway
and I was thrown there for four days. This was my bed, toilet and even water to drink
and food.27

56.

Another witness told the Commission the following story:
When I went for interrogation, I was told to explain to them what I knew about the
revolution and I said that I knew nothing. When I said that, I was told to take the bowl
to the fish. I did not understand what the fish meant. But the fish meant a cell that was
inside, was painted black and was blocked. Inside, there was no light and there was
water that used to go up to one’s legs. I was stripped naked and told to go there. I was
forced to enter there. I thought this would take a day and it was very dark. For those
who have gone to Naivasha Prison, this is a building inside a building. Therefore, you
cannot see outside. I stayed there and very early in the morning, prison officers would
come with very cold water. I would be given that cold water and told to bath. I stayed
there for seven days without eating and I was naked. At first, I could stand but later, I
became very weak until I slept on the water. I had to persevere and after seven days, I
was told to say the truth. I was told that if I did not say the truth, this time round, they
would not take me to the water but finish me. I was forced to explain the truth. I told
them how I was arrested and after that, someone was recording a statement. I was
told to sign and I was not taken back to the water. I was taken to a different cell and
given porridge.28

57.

Evidence that crude methods of interrogation were used has also been corroborated
by other witnesses according to memoranda submitted by the Victims of Coup

27 TJRC/Statement/13030
28 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Wundanyi/25 January 2012/p. 4
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Attempt (VOCA) and the Nyanza VOCA welfare association. The former Air Force
officers narrate the inhuman and degrading methods that were used to obtain
confessions. These confessions extracted through torture would later be used in
court martial against the officers.29
58.

Interrogation continued in Naivasha prison as Air Force officers awaited to be
transported to Nairobi for court martial. On 21st October, the officers were taken
to Kamiti maximum security prison where they waited to be charged with mutiny.
One witness who presented a memorandum to the Commission described the 22nd
August 1982 as a ‘day of darkness’, when he was sentenced to six years in detention.
They were taken to industrial area prison where he describes the condition as
“people lived like animals in a den full of lice everywhere.”30

59.

On 26th October, many Air Force officers were transferred to Shimo la Tewa prison in
Mombasa. From 1st August when they were arrested until 6th June 1983, they were
not allowed to communicate with their families. One witness recounts how none
of his family members and friends knew where he was. Later on, many officers
had their sentences reduced by years without any explanation. Other soldiers were
held for months without criminal charges being preferred against them and later
discharged without being given a reason. Some witnesses who testified before the
Commission said they were used as prosecution witnesses and issued with new
service numbers only to be dismissed after the trials were completed.31

Testimony of a member of Kenya Air Force who was arrested, detained
and tortured in the aftermath of the 1982 attempted coup
After a while, the army people came in. When they came in, they stripped us naked and
beat us up. We stayed there up to 1.00 a.m. when lorries were brought and we were taken to
Kamiti Prison. At Kamiti, we slept hungry while naked on the floor. The cell was a big room. We
were about 500 people who had been squeezed in that room. We stayed there for two days
without eating anything and we were naked. After three days, we were brought some clothes,
trousers but no shirts. We were also brought some food like porridge. After taking the porridge, we were told that there would be screening. After sometime, they started calling us. They
would call us and you would go and meet a committee which was carrying out screening. They
would ask if you had taken a gun and if you said yes, you would be given a red piece of paper
and taken to a different cell. After that you would be taken to Naivasha Prison.
29 Memoranda submitted by Nyanza VOCA Welfare Association on July 2011 in Kisumu p. 6
30 TJRC/Statement/13030
31 TJRC/Statement/36403
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At Naivasha Prison, you would be put in a small cell measuring six feet by four feet. We
would sleep there about 12 people and we would be given a small bowl that we would use
for our calls. Sometimes we would tell the prison warders that the bowl was full and we
wanted to get out but they would refuse. The cell was built in a way that it was very cold. We
really suffered there for about two weeks when they started interrogating us. When I went for
interrogation, I was told to explain to them what I knew about the revolution and I said that
I knew nothing. When I said that, I was told to take the bowl to the fish. I did not understand
what the fish meant. But the fish meant a cell that was inside, was painted black and was
blocked. Inside, there was no light and there was water that used to go up to one’s legs. I was
stripped naked and told to go there. I was forced to enter there. I thought this would take a
day and it was very dark. For those who have gone to Naivasha Prison, this is a building inside
a building. Therefore, you cannot see outside.
I stayed there and very early in the morning, prison officers would come with very cold
water. I would be given that cold water and told to bath. I stayed there for seven days without
eating and I was naked. At first, I could stand but later, I became very weak until I slept on
the water. I had to persevere and after seven days, I was told to say the truth. I was told that
if I did not say the truth, this time round, they would not take me to the water but finish me.
I was forced to explain the truth. I told them how I was arrested and after that, someone was
recording a statement. I was told to sign and I was not taken back to the water. I was taken
to a different cell and given porridge. I took porridge for two days and I started taking food.
After one week, I was taken to Kamiti Prison. I stayed there for one day and the following day,
I was taken to Lang’ata Barracks where there was a court marshal.
At the court marshal, we were called in a group of 12 policemen and we were told that
we were supposed to go and we should go and look for someone to defend us. We were told
to explain what kind of a defending officer we wanted and it had to be an officer who was
at the rank of a captain and above. We proposed our CEO who was Colonel Kamunye. They
said that they did not want one from the Air Force and that I should take one from the army
or the navy. I said that I wanted Major Masila and at that time, he was the CEO at the Training
Camp at Lanet and I knew him very well. Surprisingly, I did not even see Major Masila. I was
brought another captain and I was told that that would be our defending officer. The captain
called us and told us that it was a court marshal and not like a normal court. He told us that
the statement we had recorded and signed is what would be brought to the court. I was told
that the statement would be brought and when I was asked a question, I was only supposed
to say yes. If I refused, I then would be taken back to Naivasha and hanged. Therefore, I had
to let him speak on our behalf. We took an oath and the case began. We were taken there and
told that we were found in Nairobi armed with a gun with an aim of threatening civilians and
bringing about chaos. We said “yes” and after that, I was sentenced to nine years in jail. I was
taken to Industrial Area Remand Prison on 19th October, 1982 where I slept for two days and
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the place was very dirty with many jiggers. After two days, I was put into a vehicle and taken
to Shimo La Tewa Prison.
I started my life in prison and we had to appeal. We were told that there was no appeal
and in 1984 we were told that the Commanding Officer at the Shimo La Tewa Prison had
allowed us to appeal. We were given papers and filed our appeals. In 1995, we went to the
Mombasa High Court for the appeal and Justice Bhandari was the one who was listening to
the appeals. The appeals were rejected and we were told to continue with our jail terms and
that we did not have enough grounds to file appeals. I continued with my jail term until I
finished it in 1998. I only stayed there for six years.
There were many problems in prison. Those who know what used to happen during that
era, they know that the prison was bad. We used to be beaten a lot by the prison warders. We
used to be known as Air Force policemen and the prison warders used to hate us very much.
You would be beaten very badly when you were found with a small mistake. There was a time
when cholera broke out and people died. We stayed for two weeks without treatment and
doctors came from Nairobi to treat us when we refused to eat. Life at Shimo La Tewa Prison
was very difficult. I remember the commanding officer who came from Naivasha. We stayed
there for two years and during his era, we really suffered. At that time, you would be beaten
and not allowed to speak to prison warders while standing. One had to kneel. While speaking
to them, they would beat you at the joints of your knees. But I thank God that He helped us. I
completed my jail term and was released. After being released, I was given Ksh 44 for all the
six years.

The trials
60.

Those who were thought to have participated in the coup were transferred to
Lang’ata Army barracks where they tried for mutiny. Evidence received by the
Commission show that the trials were marred with violations of fair trial guarantees.
One witness told the Commission that he was not given a chance to choose a
lawyer of his own choice from within the military rank.
We were told to explain what kind of a defending officer we wanted and it had to be
an officer who was at the rank of a captain and above. We proposed our CEO who
was Colonel Kamunye. They said that they did not want one from the Air Force and
that I should take one from the army or the navy. I said that I wanted Major Masila
and at that time, he was the CEO at the Training Camp at Lanet and I knew him very
well. Surprisingly, I did not even see Major Masila. I was brought another captain and
I was told that would be our defending officer. The captain called us and told us that
it was a court marshal and not like a normal court. He told us that the statement we
had recorded and signed is what would be brought to the court. I was told that the
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statement would be brought and when I was asked a question, I was only supposed to
say yes. If I refused, I then would be taken back to Naivasha and hanged.32

61.

According to another witness:
My defending officer told me that when I get before the judge, I should not try to answer
anything and that he was the one who was going to help me to be set free. When I asked
him why I should just agree, he told me that I should listen to him and that he was the
one who was going to help me to be set free. I appeared before Judge Bosire and I was
sentenced to 16 years jail. My defending officer was not able to defend me in any way
and I was so shocked but I just agreed with what the judge said.33
The Commission also heard that the possibility exists that the conviction and
punishment of the mutiny suspects was predetermined even before they reached the
court martial.

We were not even given time to be represented. In Kamiti, I was informed by my
colleagues that there was a magazine which said that I had already been sentenced
to nine years imprisonment. To my surprise, when I went to the court martial, I was
given nine years imprisonment.34

62.

Despite the many testimonies that the Commission received indicating that
the trial of mutiny suspects was not fair, Justice Samuel Bosire, who served as a
Judge Advocate in the court martial during that period, said that due process was
followed in the trials in which he participated.35

Impact
63.

Many witnesses of the 1982 attempted coup who spoke to the Commission
narrated how they have been affected individually, and as families and
communities, as a result of the crackdown. Many were dismissed from the
Air Force. Their careers were prematurely terminated without any terminal
benefits. They suffer from social stigma for they are branded rebels or
fugitives.
We also want to rewrite history books such that we – all airmen – are not implicated in
this heinous crime. It has greatly stigmatized our children. In turn our children doubt us
and may never believe we were not part of this horrible scheme.36

64.

On social stigma, another witness narrated his struggle to be accepted back to
the community:

32 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Wundanyi/25 January 2012/p.5.
33 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Wundanyi/25 January 2012/p. 12.
34 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/18 July 2011/p. 3.
35 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nairobi/8 April 2013.
36 TJRC/Memo/1068.
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I was 22 years then and I had a love for my country. I had said that i was going to
serve in the Armed Forces. That was my career and belief. I wanted to serve in the
Air Force. That was ruptured […] Now we are approaching death. I am 49 years [old].
Many have died […] Had we been in the service, this would be our retiring age and
expecting our benefits. We are however still suffering. What we are worried about is
that this suffering will be extended to our children. We and our wives have suffered,
but our children will still suffer. Already, there is segregation in our community
with regards bursary, relief food and other opportunities […] poverty is imposed
on us and we fear our children will also inherit that poverty. If I cannot pay for my
children’s school fees are they not to inherit poverty?

65.

As a result, they have found it extremely difficult to get employment
opportunities. The levels of despondency among these former servicemen
are very high. One witness described his situation to the Commission thus:
After prison, it took me ten years to get a job. I am still solving a lot of problems because
life is difficult. The salary that I get now is not enough. I am a diploma teacher but I wish I
was in the army. Probably were it not for the revolution, I would be very far. I had an aim
of going back to school and serve my country. I was very faithful to the Government.37

66.

Another witness described his situation as follows:
The coup affected me. When I was released from prison, I realized that my wife had gone
and my kid who was two years old when I was arrested had died. My property was taken
away. I did not get anything. During the investigations, I was beaten. I have a scar on my
forehead. The coup affected my entire life because since then, my life has never been the
same again. If you went to my home you would be astonished. I live in a single room. My
first wife is married to another man. We separated and I married another woman with
whom I have six children. I only have three acres of land. Most of the times, my kids are sent
away from school because I cannot afford their school fees. In my certificate of service, the
comments therein have made me not able to get a job. I have been without a job for 31
years now. I have tried to look for employment, but in vain. The employers say that they
cannot employ somebody whose services are not required. Those are the words in my
certificate of service. I have a copy of it with me. So, employers look at me as a bad person.
I have been elected by my village to come over and represent them as the Kenya Police
Reservist. When I went to the OCS he told the chief, “You have even brought this one?” The
chief wondered why the OCS was making those remarks. The OCS said that if he gave me
a gun, he would be fired. He said that I was part of the 1982 group of rebels. There was
a time the Tana teachers wanted a watchman. I wrote an application letter and took it to
them. They saw my certificate of service which has the words “services not required”. They
told me that they could not employ me. So, I can only do farming and small construction
work. This issue of the 1982 coup has affected me mentally also.38

37
38
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Many witnesses spoke of suffering from depression caused by loss of
income, stigma and social rejection due to the perception of being traitors
and rebels.39 Loss of income also led to many families of detainees living
in poverty until the present day.40 One witness told the Commission:
Due to absurd dismissal we have always been in hard times financially. Educating
our children and getting food and shelter for our family has been adversely affected
and currently we are living under inhuman conditions. This has affected the health
and education of our children.41

68.

Apart from the psychological consequences, witnesses also described in large
numbers the long term physical consequences of the torture suffered. Some
are still disabled and suffer from partial paralysis,42 eye and ear malfunctions,43
permanent limb and back pains,44 epilepsy45, high blood pressure,46 and other
health problems. The story of Lawrence Njoga is particularly sad. He joined the
army when he was, in his words, ‘an agile, strong man’ but in the aftermath of

the coup, he was arrested, detained in several prison facilities in the country
and then eventually sentenced to serve a prison term. He started going blind
in prison but prison authorities failed to ensure that he gets proper and early
medical attention. When he came out of prison he could not afford the cost of
eye treatment and he eventually went completely blind. Here is his story:47
I started experiencing eye problems when I was in prison. I tried to reach the doctor but
it was very difficult […] My eye problem did not stop but it was difficult to access the
doctor. The clinical officers who came to see us, they only gave us panadol. It reached
a time that I could not even eat. So I was given time to be taken to the dispensary
where I was admitted and all the eyes were closed with a bandage. I stayed in the
dispensary for about four days. When the bandage was removed, I could not see. The
clinical officer wrote for me a letter so that I could be taken to Coast General Hospital
to go and see a consultant. I was given treatment and admitted at the Coast General
Hospital. I was operated on my left eye but it did not succeed very well. The doctor
recommended that I be transferred to Kenyatta National Hospital. I was then brought
back to Shimo La Tewa where all the plans were being done so that I could be taken
to KNH. While I was in Shimo La Tewa, a report came that I was going to be released.
The Review had quashed my sentence. That was around 1987. I was released around
39 TJRC/Statement/13668; TJRC/Statement/13671; TJRC/Statement/18102; TJRC/Statement/05631; TJRC/Statement/32969;
TJRC/Statement/35611; TJRC/Memorandum/M0971
40 TJRC/Statement/17404; TJRC/Statement/08458
41 Memorandum to the TJRC on January, 29 2011 at Kericho submitted by Hezekiah K. Langat on the Attempted Coup of August, 1st
1982
42 TJRC/Statement/06825; TJRC/Statement/24232
43 TJRC/Statement/13677; TJRC/Statement/16212; TJRC/Statement/32974; TJRC/Statement/23264; TJRC/Statement/24589; TJRC/
Statement/25258; TJRC/Statement/13003
44 TJRC/Statement/35638; TJRC/Statement/35614; TJRC/Statement/05607; TJRC/Statement/32969; TJRC/Statement/23613; TJRC/
Statement/35636; TJRC/Memorandum/M1792
45 TJRC/Statement/34401
46 TJRC/Statement/35634; TJRC/Statement/06479
47 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/18 July 2011/p. 3-4.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

613

Volume IIA

Chapter FIVE

17th July, 1987. I was released and given a warrant to Nairobi. I could not trace my
path properly. I asked good Samaritans to guide me. I went up to the Railway Station
where I boarded a train to Nairobi. When I reached Nairobi, I asked good Samaritans to
help me get to Kenyatta National Hospital. When I reached Kenyatta National Hospital,
I met a consultant, Prof. Ochieng’ Adala. Just because I was nostalgic, I really wanted
to see my people at home. I asked for permission and he understood my situation and
gave me time to go home.

69.

He continued:
I went home and met all my parents and brothers, and I was so happy. I stayed with
them for about a month and then I went back to Kenyatta National Hospital. I met Prof.
Adala again and I was admitted. On that very, very week, my left eye was operated.
The operation was successful. After about a month, again, the right eye was operated.
I stayed in hospital for one month and then, I was discharged. Prof. Adala gave me a
prescription to go and see the optician around Wilson Airport; that is, the Wheels
Opticians. He gave me a lens which I used for sometime. That was positive 11. I think it
was the last lens, the most powerful one. I used that lens and when it reached around
2005, the eyes started to diminish. I was unable to see the doctor regularly because of
lack of finances. I went to Thogoto Hospital and the doctors there told me that my eyes
were now beyond repair. I could not believe myself because I did not know how to help
myself. I was now married with two wives and six children. I was declared blind and
could do nothing. I was guided by the cousins whom we were with and I sought Prof.
Adala again. By that time, he had left the Government and was having his clinic at, I have
forgotten the name. When I reached that place, I got Prof. Adala. Just because he was
my friend and my doctor, he told me, Bwana Andrew, you have delayed so much. There
is no way I can help you. The only thing that you can do, I will write for you a letter to go
for rehabilitation. He asked me the nearest place where I could go. He preferred Sikri,
where I went. When I went to Sikri, they accepted me. I learnt to read braille and write,
mobility, typing and the artisan skills of weaving. I cannot still help myself because all
the things I learnt in Sikri; the writing materials are very expensive. They cost about Kshs
90, 000. The loom (weaving) machine is also very expensive. Up to now, I am at home. I
am just being helped by my old dad who sacrificed and educated me. He spent a lot of
his time and wealth on me. Instead of assisting him, he is still helping me. By bad luck, I
lost my mom in 1991.
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Torture, unlawful detention of a mutiny suspect: Omar Boru Qutara
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Marsabit/4 May 2011

It was on Sunday 1st August, at about 2.30am when I was woken up by a siren which
indicated that there was an issue, and all the soldiers were required to report to the Operation Room, where details and orders are given. It was total confusion and frightening being
woken up in the middle of the night. So, I rushed to the Operation Room, where I was ordered
to stop and raise up my hands and Appointment Card.
Unfortunately, I had not even carried the Appointment Card. This earned me the first
punishment of being kicked, slapped and sent back to go and get it. I went back to my room
and collected my Appointment Card. When I came back, I was allowed to join the others,
who were already kneeling down. The number was so big that you could not know who was
who, since it was in the middle of the night and the lights were off. We were told to stay there
until morning, which we did.
In the morning, some groups were told to report to their respective places of work. Everybody did that. However, when some of us reported on duty, we found nobody at the place
where we used to work. In the Kenya Air Force, I was working in the unit called “Air Defence
Control Unit (ADCU)”, that is giving police services. I had to hang on there until 10.00 a.m. As
a human being, I had to look for something like tea to take. I went back to my mess, where
we used to have breakfast. We were given breakfast. Some of us went back to the same place,
because we had nowhere to go and there was total confusion.
At lunch time when we came back for lunch, there was no lunch. There were army personnel all over and they were asking us, “Where are you going?” We replied, “we are going for
lunch”. Then they asked us, “Which lunch?” We replied, “It is lunch time, is it not?” Somebody
told me that I was under arrest. So, when I asked why I should be arrested; I was in the camp
and I had nothing. Then orders were given, “Deal with him accordingly. This one seems not to
have woken up; wake him up”. They kicked and slapped me, and then we were taken to the
football pitch. At 3.00 p.m. It was raining. We were told to remove all our clothes, and were
loaded onto trucks and taken to 1KA – another Army Camp. When we arrived at the camp, we
were lined up. We were entering the gate one by one and receiving a reward of kicks, blows.
Women and children were laughing at us. The children were saying, “Look at the way this
one looks. Look at his buttocks”. When children and women laugh at you--- I came across an
old corporal, who happened to speak Borana Language. I told him, “Mzee Isaakh, are we not
Muslims? Why are you treating us like this?” He told me that Islam was in the mosque; it was
not in that place. He said, “Take these people and deal with them accordingly”.
We were divided into different groups. We slept in an open field and it rained the whole
night until morning. In the morning, we were ferried back to the Kenya Air Camp. were ferried
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back to the Kenya Air Force camp. We were taken to the runway, where aeroplanes land. We
were told to lie on our backs, and then somebody came, stepped on our chests and asked,
“Did you want to overthrow the Government?” I asked him, “Which Government? Why should
you do this to me?” They then said, “This is your prayer time; tell your parents that, if you
have any way of telling them; say your last prayer, and forget the world. There is no Kenya
Air Force any more; even a dead body is more important than you”. We stayed there up to
lunch time and we were given back some clothes to put on. We were then taken to Nanyuki
Prison. There it was like hell. I have never seen hell but I saw hell on earth. We were beaten
with chains, various sticks and iron rods of all sizes. From there, we were taken to King’ong’o
Prison in Nyeri. We stayed in Nyeri for 17 days, and then we were taken back to Nanyuki. We
were being interrogated by army officers, and some officers in civilian clothes. I did not know
them and cannot tell their names.
I was put in a group called misprison group. I raised my hands and said, “Can I ask a question?” Then one of the senior officers from the Engineering Battalion called Lt Col. Njoroge
said that—He said: “You are not a living person who can ask a question. You are a dead person. You do not deserve to ask a question. Follow what we tell you if you want to breathe the
air of this world or else we shall terminate your life now”. He was pulling the trigger at that
time. He told me to open my mouth and he put it in. I was around 22 years and I cried. He then
asked me: “Are you crying milk or honey?” He ordered: “Put him out!”
I was blindfolded and bundled into a Land Rover because that was the common vehicle
for the Army and the Air Force. I was taken to the Air Force Base in Eastleigh and later taken to
Kamiti Prison where I was kept for two days. I was then ferried to a destination where I later
learnt was Naivasha Maximum Prison. I think Naivasha Maximum Prison is a place no human
being should be taken. It is not worth any man to live there. I do not know whether it has improved or not. When we first landed there, we were shaved. We were given the whiteKungur;
a short and shirt. The place is very cold. On the first day, I was put in an empty cell with no
blanket. I complained not knowing that the worst was to come. The following day, I was taken
into a dark room with no blanket or toilet facility. We were told to stay there naked. Imagine
that, Commissioners.
We stayed there for 11 days while being fed with half a cup of porridge called mururu
for the whole day. After the 11 days, I was taken for interrogation. I was taken into a stinking
toilet and given the porridge to take. I am an inquisitive guy so I asked the prison warder why
they should give me food in a toilet. He told me he had, in fact, felt mercy on me because I
was a young man. Can somebody who feels mercy for you give you food in a stinking toilet?
However, that was very little. When I was called for interrogation, I was stripped naked while
being whipped with a telephone cord. I was told to speak out even with the nozzle of a gun
in my nose. How do you speak out what you do not know? A man with a big beard told them
to take me to the lodge to rest. He said: “Take him to the lodge and let him rest. He seems to
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be very worried and tired.” I was taken back to the same cell I was before. That was the lodge.
We were again brought out after 10 days. At that time, you are emaciated and you do
not have the strength to speak. When you say that you are sick, nobody listens to you. They
would ask: “Have you rested enough now?” When you do not respond you are adjudged rude
and taught a lesson. You are taken to a special room where there is a person to make sure
that you speak by whipping you. I do not know how they were doing it, but if those wires
come into contact with your body, you faint. I went through that ordeal for 70 days. On the
seventh day, I had no option but to surrender to the will of those guys the way they wanted.
They prepared a statement and I was told to sign. “What have I written to sign?” I asked them.
They said: “No, you will be trained on how to sign. There is no problem.” The condition was
hostile. When I asked them to give me the document to read and then see its contents, they
told me that I did not have eyes and that there are special eyes for me to read. They asked me,
again, whether I would sign the document or not. I said I will not sign it. I found myself on the
ground. I did not know there was somebody behind me. I was only seeing the interrogators
in front of me. I was kicked and dragged on the ground. I had no option, but to tell them that
I was ready to sign the document the following day just to save my neck.
From the beatings, I developed a problem on my left hand. It is painful. I signed the
document to save myself from being taken to the gas chamber – it is a sort of a gas chamber.
I do not know if those people are really human beings. They are people with no mercy or
reasoning power. They could not listen to you. I signed and then I was taken to Kamiti where
I stayed for two days. I was then taken to Lang’ata. We were told that we were being taken for
medical check-up. I found a local guy with whom I wanted to speak our vernacular language.
He declined. I wanted him to assist me because I was feeling very bad. I told them that my
hands were painful and my ribs were not okay as a result of the beatings. They said that they
were just supposed to give us a tablet of Panadol and then we proceed to the next stage. I
had no option. The people I had been with had already left. Somebody told me not to waste
time. He told me there was no mercy within that compound.
I proceeded and met a group of Army officers who claimed that they had been sent by
the higher authority to come and represent us in the process. I asked them how they were
going to do that. They said that such a question could only be asked outside the camp. They
said that no questions are asked inside there and issues there are conducted the way a drill
parade is done. When a commander gives orders to march, you are expected to do so. They
told me that I was to sign some forms and we were to be in groups of tens. They had blocked
the top part of the form, but I managed to see what was written in. It said: “The Court Martial
Trial Form”. I signed it. We were in a group of ten and we marched into a room. Names were
called out and we responded. I remember very well. There were senior officers seated in front.
There was somebody in a judge’s gown. On the left, there were army officers and on the right
some men and women in civilian clothes. When our names were called out, somebody stood

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

617

Volume IIA

Chapter FIVE

up and said that we are the guys from Nanyuki Base. We were the first in that room. There
were several rooms where people were being tried. Our names were called out and then we
were sentenced to six years imprisonment. One of our colleagues raised his hand but he was
told speaking was not allowed there.
I was taken to Nairobi Remand Prison and then Kodiaga Prison in Kisumu. I served three
years there. One day, they told me that I had been released. I said: “My sentence was six
years and not three years.” They said that I should not worry because the Government had
pardoned me, but there were conditions. I was told to be reporting to my local chief and I
should not attend any public rallies or any meetings. I was to report to the chief whenever I
went somewhere. I was told to keep peace for the rest of my life. That is the brief story of the
situation.
Allow me to speak about what that has done to my life. I was 22 years then and I had a
love for my country. I had said that I was going to serve in the Armed Forces. That was my
career and belief. I wanted to serve in the Air Force. That was ruptured. Secondly, I thought
that after prison and all that suffering, if I went home, I would be a very free person and
live peacefully. However, until today and even I think in the future, I still fear. I am suffering.
They call me rebel, fugitive, msaliti in my community. I applied for the post of assistant chief,
but I could not get. The same happened when I applied to be a Forest Guard. I applied for a
teacher’s training course, but I could not get. I tried several employment opportunities, but
I did not get any. Even in the village, I had no peace because villagers were saying that I am
the fugitive who has been disturbing Moi and he is now disturbing us here. Up to now, when
there is Government relief, my family receives half the portion.
After prison, I married and then got nine children. One of my daughters is in college. The
ratio I am given is for five persons and yet we are 11. I am still marginalized. My children are
chased away from school on the grounds that “Baba yao ni msaliti”. My child had to leave the
first school and go to the second one because I had gone there to argue her case. She now
attends a day school. We have already been branded traitors. There is no place that we feel
comfortable expect our own room. The only people who have been close to us are our relatives – my father, mother, aunts and sisters. Nobody else comes to us, save for my Imam who
normally comes to console me. After being released, I could not even access the courts. The
applications were allowed in the High Court after 15 years. It is now 29 years and our cases
have never been finalized.
Hon. Commissioners, during all these years there was no justice. Now we are approaching death. I am now 49 years. Many have died. Some of us God has helped us because we
succumbed to our faith. We prayed to God. Humanity has discarded us. We pray to our God
and that is why we are surviving. Had we been in the service, this would be our retiring age
and expecting our benefits. We are, however, still suffering. What we are worried about is
that this suffering will be extended to our children. We and our wives have suffered, but our
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children will still suffer. Already, there is segregation in the community with regard bursary,
relief food and other opportunities.
My dear Commissioners, we have been law abiding citizens. Since we left prison, there
is no time we have been charged with any offence. The oath of allegiance that we took when
were recruited is still with us. That is why we have decided to abide by the law. Poverty is
imposed on us and we fear our children will also inherit that poverty. If I cannot pay for my
children’s school fees are they not to inherit poverty? My child cannot go to university because it requires resources which I do not have.
I pray this Commission to look into the following: I demand for reinstatement and payment of all my pending dues. A reasonable retirement package should be included. I need to
be cleared of names such as rebel, fugitive, or msaliti. A special economic programme in form
of an affirmative action should be put in place so that our economic status is uplifted. That
way, our children will get education. They have not committed any offence and they have a
right to education. This Commission should consider the welfare of our children. All kind of
discrimination against us and our families should be stopped. I served in the Armed Forces. I
have a certificate of discharge from the same. I have a copy of the memorandum. We filed a
case in the High Court, that is, Case No.548 of 1995 which has not been decided. I am seeking
justice for the ill-treatment. This is for us and our families. The injustice has extended to our
families. I think I explained that.
We are seeking justice for the suspended sentences; loss of employment; and compensation for the damages. I had no opportunity to be counseled. So, I want to be counseled. I
also want to be taken for a special medical examination. My left hand still has a problem especially when it is cold as a result of the beatings I got. I need to be examined and my health
status known. Also, this Commission should make a recommendation and declare that we are
still in employment. We are also seeking all payments that have accrued since August, 1982,
including penalties, interest, general and special damages as the Commission may deem fit.

Detention and torture of Mwakenya suspects
70.

The 1980s were characterized by the emergence of several underground political
movements in Kenya. The emergence of these movements was prompted by the
proscription of political parties by an amendment to the Constitution in June
1982 that made Kenya a de jure one party state. After the August 1982 attempted
coup, it became even more dangerous to publicly express dissenting views about
the country’s political issues, nor was it safe to advocate for the opening up of the
political space or respect for human rights. This forced activists for democracy
and human rights to resort to the formation of underground political movements.
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Of these, it is Muungano wa Wazalendo was Kukomboa Kenya (Mwakenya) that
had an enduring impact. Mwakenya was an offshoot of an earlier underground
movement: December Twelfth Movement (DTM).48 According to a witness who

testified before Commission on the evolution of the organization, one of the
main objectives of the movement was to ‘educate the Kenyan people about

what was happening in the country and what they could do to make this
country a nation that respects human rights and that allows freedom of
its own people’.49 As such, one of the activities of the movement was the
publication of magazines:
The newspapers, airwaves; the radios and television were not free; they were all
controlled very tightly by the regime of that time, the KANU regime. So, we went
out to create publications that were to speak freely about what was going on in the
country and one of these publications was Mpatanishi, which was for our own internal
education; educating the cadres of the struggle. Then there was another one for mass
consumption which was called Pambana. Pambana was something that we were
writing and distributing all over the country so that people could know the truth that
was happening. The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) was the only broadcasting
station of that time, so, we tried to create a free press. But it was an underground press.50

71.

State crackdown on Mwakenya began in March 1986 when three men (Peter
Young Kihara, Kamonye Manje and Maina Kiongo) were arrested in Nairobi and
charged with being members of an illegal organization; Mwakenya.51 What
followed after this event were arrests, detention and torture of hundreds of
people who were suspected to be members of Mwakenya. Among those who
were arrested, detained and tortured included doctors, politicians, lecturers,
students, journalists, businessmen, teachers, and writers. Even civil servants
were not spared:
In the 1980s, the Government was like a monster which did not know even the public
servants. We had several public servants such as Onyango Sie, who was working with the
Department of Public Trustee in Nyeri; Wainaina Chege, who was working in the Judiciary
at the High Court, Nairobi; Nelson Akaukwa Muyela, who was working with the Kenya
Railways; Oduor Ongwen, who was teaching at Kericho Girls High School; Richard Odenda
Lumumba, who was also a teacher at Kericho Girls High School; James Mwangi Kahiri, who
was a teacher at Muguga High School, and Florence Murage, who was an Administrative
Assistant at the University of Nairobi. This is only a short list of public servants who were
political prisoners.52

48
49
50
51
52
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The National Victims and Survivors Network estimate that nearly 300 people
were arrested in connection with Mwakenya activities and that thirty of them
died during incarceration or immediately after they were released.53

The arrests
73.

Many Mwakenya suspects were arrested in their homes, mostly in the night and
in the presence of family members. Police officers, mainly attached to the Special
Branch, would ‘invade’ homes of suspected Mwakenya members, and without a
warrant, search every part of the home for materials associated with Mwakenya.
It was common for newspapers headlines to read that a particular individual
had been ‘picked’ from his house by Special Branch officials for interrogation on
issues relating to Mwakenya. After the arrests, the whereabouts of such suspects
remained unknown to their families, sometimes for weeks or months on end.
It was commonplace for suspects to be moved, in a short span of time, from
one police station to another. Records at police stations were poorly kept or not
at all. This effectively made it difficult to trace and find out the whereabouts of
suspects. Joan Kabaselleh narrated to the Commission how her husband was
arrested, both in her presence and that of her children. Her house was turned
upside down in the search for what the Special Branch officials considered
seditious materials:
Then some of them moved to the bedroom, some went to the kitchen and some
remained in the sitting room. So, from the bedroom, they started searching the rooms.
They searched all the things that they could find in the bedroom. They turned the
mattresses upside down. I remember our young boy who was three years old; they
turned the mattress when he was asleep and he could not even hear. They folded the
mattress when he was inside and he did not hear. He did not even know what happened.
So, the other children were bullying him in the morning telling him in Kiswahili: “Our
father was taken away and you were just sleeping and you did not hear. After three
hours’ search, they left. They carried the documents, my husband’s passport and some
newspaper cuttings which my husband used to have. My husband used to have so many
newspaper cuttings. They carried all these documents with the54

74.

After the husband was taken away, she did not know of his whereabouts until much
later when a friend called to inform her that the husband had been sentenced to
three years imprisonment:
The next day very early in the morning, I started contacting some of his friends and
some of our close relatives telling them that he was taken and we did not know his
whereabouts. We stayed for about two weeks and we did not know anything concerning
him […] We kept on looking for him having sleepless nights and I believe there was a
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friend who was close to the people who arrested him. He would always come and tell
us not to talk to the media people because that would worsen the situation. We did not
know that, that was another way of avoiding publicity. People would tell us that he had
been seen at Naivasha Maximum Prison. Others told us that he had been seen being
taken to Ngong Hills. So, all through this was a time of pain. It would have been better
if he was in a police cell. We would have gone to see him and known his whereabouts.
On 29th October, 1986, a relative called us around 8.00 p.m. that he was saying that he
had been seen at the High Court and that he had been imprisoned for three years. The
next day, which was 30th October, we went very early in the morning with my sister and
my sister in-law who had visited us. The newspapers on that day carried this message
as the headline. It was in all the newspapers. It was painful seeing those newspapers in
the streets.55

75.

Similarly, Dr. Odhiambo Olel was arrested at his home, detained in at police cells
around Kisumu and when the police officers could not find any evidence linking
him to Mwakenya he was released:
In May 1983, these bad visitors came to my house at midnight and a without warrant
of arrest. They searched my house thinking that I was one of those publishing
Mpatanishi and Mapambano magazines. I was arrested and taken in for interrogation.
I spent a whole night being interrogated. They suspected me of being one of those
people who published clandestinely those pamphlets to destabilize the legally
elected Government of Mtufuku Rais Moi. I was transferred from Kisumu police cells
to Majengo police cells where again I spent three days and apparently finding that
the police had no substantive reason to charge me before a legal court of law, I was
released and I continued with my work.56

76.

But his woes were not over yet. A few years later, on 20 March 1987, police officers
arrested him at his office, searched through and when they could not find documents
relating to Mwakenya, they drove with him to his house where they continued the
search. The search was conducted in the presence of his ailing mother and of the
wife and children, leaving them traumatized by the incident:
Again, on 20th March, 1987, police officers from Nairobi came for me at around 11.30
am in my office. They did not have a warrant of arrest, but they searched my office. The
town hall or Kisumu Municipality headquarters was surrounded by many plain clothes
policemen. I knew some of them because I had worked there for long. Police officers
from Nairobi identified themselves and asked me to accompany them to my house
because they could not get anything from my office to implicate me with publication
of those magazines. They told me I was under arrest. They searched thoroughly my
house. Unfortunately, at that time my mother was sick. She was staying with us. So,
you could imagine how pathetic the situation was. My mother, wife and children
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were affected by this search. After a thorough search, they did not find anything to
show that I had anything to do with those publications. Later on, they asked me to
accompany them to an unknown destination. So, I bade farewell to my wife. I told
her not to worry very much because God was with me. I told her not to fear because I
would overcome all these challenges.57

77.

It was common for teachers to be arrested at school in the presence of their pupils
or students. Rashid Salim had such an experience:
As I was going on with my job, on 30th of September, at 2.05 pm, I was picked from
school by security officers from the Special Branch in Taveta Station. They told me
that they had issues they wanted to discuss with me but the discussion would be at
the police station. They took me there but before we got there, we passed through
my home and a search was conducted. They searched my home and found that I had
some scripts that I had written as a Kiswahili teacher concerning leadership and it was
a story. They required letters concerning one of my relatives whose name was Komeja
Mswiya but they did not get any such letters. So, they took my scripts and they also
took me directly to the Taveta Police Station. They questioned me a little and I spent
the night there. In the morning of 31st, I was taken to Voi Police Station. I was put in
remand and I continued to be questioned.58

78.

Most university students and lectures were arrested at the university premises.
Wafula Buke, for instance, was ‘picked’ from his room, just nine days after he had
been elected one of the student leaders at the University of Nairobi:
We had been student leaders for only nine days because in October the police
came for me. I was in my room and they escorted me out. They were all armed and
pointed pistols at my head. We were taken to Central Police Station where I found my
colleagues. At that time we were a bit naïve and we did not know how the state works.
I remember asking a lawyer friend what the state would do to us. My first lawyer even
told me that he thinks we will just be beaten and set free. So, as we were beaten I had
hopes of being released. I found that all my colleagues, the student leaders had all
been arrested. They were about seven. I was taken to Kasarani Police Station and in the
morning a police inspector came there and gave me about four hard slaps mentioning
something like seditious publication. I thought that maybe he was preparing me for
the case. The following day I was put in a Land Rover and brought here. At that time, I
did not know it was Nyayo House.59

79.
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Other victims of detention and torture were lured into a trap that led to their arrests.
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Nakuru. He was suspected to be sympathetic to the cause of Mwakenya members
who were serving jail terms at the Nakuru prison. Here is his story of how he was
arrested:
So, on that day of 22nd I reported at work in the morning and left at around 9.00
am back to my quarters. Later on the officer in charge sent somebody that I should
report to his office immediately in civilian. When I got the information in my house,
I changed into civilian and came back to the officer in charge. When I reported to
him, in his office he was having two visitors whom he introduced to me as officers
from the Nakuru Central Police Station and they had come to help me to trace the
case of the prisoner. He was sending me out with them for that work. We left the
officer’s office, came out of the prison gate, got a white car which was parked outside
with a driver. We went straight to that car and in that car I took the back seat with
the two officers putting me in the middle. The vehicle drove from the prison up to
somewhere in Nakuru town at a building which I knew was hosting a supermarket
called Ibrahims Karimbuks. On the first floor was an office of the special branch. We
went there straight and I was placed in one of their rooms which only had a bench. I
stayed there up to around 2.00 p.m. and then I was brought to a certain officer who
was very harsh and on his table was a pistol. He called me by name and told me to
name all my friends in Nakuru and the names of my relatives in Nakuru. I started
with the names of my relatives in Nakuru because I had some there. He dismissed
me and told me to give him the names of my friends. I gave him some and he asked
me about Koigi Wamwere’s family and if I have met them at Nakuru Library. I told him
we had not met. Then he told me where I am. The other officers then took me away
from him. We stayed there up to late in the evening. I was taken back to my house in
the company of three vehicles. By then I was married with two children. My first born
was around one year old. When we reached the house, my wife was instructed to stay
away from the house. They then started searching the house. They turned everything
upside down. They got some books because I used to go to Nakuru Library to borrow
some books. All my photographs, all personal effects were taken. They then told
my wife to stay there; they will come and know her position. At night after around
three hours, I was driven back to that office but I was transferred to Nakuru Railways
Police Station cells. Here I stayed for seven days. Later I was transferred to Nairobi
at Muthangari Police Station. Later on I was transferred to Nyayo House on a night I
cannot remember. In Nyayo House I stayed for 19 days.60

80.

60
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George Kwanya Odidi was arrested while he was addressing a women’s group
in Kisumu. The policemen who arrested Odidi informed him that the Provincial
Commissioner had summoned him for an urgent meeting. This was never to be.
He ended up in a police cell where he was detained for five days:
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while addressing the Kisumu Women Group which wanted some extension of water
to various points, policemen came. I pleaded with them to allow me to finish the
meeting with the ladies but they refused. They told me that the PC had a meeting and
there is some information that they wanted me to provide. They said that the PC had
halted the meeting because of me. I gave up and entered their Land Rover. We drove
and passed the PC’s office. As we passed the PC’s office, I started asking them: “You
said that the PC wanted me. Why are you passing?” By that time, they had changed
their attitude. They were hostile and ordered me to keep quiet. They drove the vehicle
to the Nyareri Police cells. I was locked there and I stayed there for about five days.61

81.

Another victim of detention and torture, Abuya Abuya, was a Member of Parliament
at the time of his arrest. He narrated to the Commission how he was cheated into
been arrested.
Come 1987 during my second term, three young men came to Parliament on a
Thursday afternoon when I was getting into the Chamber ready for the afternoon.
As I walked into the Chamber, they stopped me and saluted me and said Honorable,
we have a message for you and the message was if I could remember a Mr. James
Opiyo an old friend of mine. That he wanted to talk to me. I had forgotten about this
James Opiyo but happened to have been one class ahead of me in Kisii High School.
So they explained where he was and that he has an office in Nyayo House. I asked him
what he does and they told me that he works with the Provincial Administration and
that he was waiting for me. I said that I could not go because I had business in the
Chamber and then they asked me when I could go. I said maybe on Saturday when
I am travelling to my constituency. They said I was welcome and that they would be
waiting for me just outside Nyayo House. On Saturday morning at 10 O’clock, I drove
here with my cousin who was also my driver. They saluted me outside here in the
entrance and we parked the car. They said that my driver would be waiting for me and
that my friend James Opiyo is waiting for me upstairs. We went to the 25th floor using
a lift then I sat on a bench in the corridors and they told me that my friend was going
to be there within five minutes and they disappeared. I waited and then James Opiyo
came and with all the good greetings, he said that we had not met for a long time and
he congratulated me for becoming a Member of Parliament. He led me into a room
and said that his officers will have an interview with me. He did not even tell me what
kind of job he was doing. He told me that the officers will take a statement from me
then I could proceed. He disappeared and then a group of about eight people and
a lady came into the room and they all sat on the table and then put a chair in the
middle.62

82.
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Almost without exception, those who narrated their stories to the Commission
said that upon been arrested they would blindfolded and forced to lie prostrate
inside a police vehicle or car, often a Land Rover. The vehicle would then move
round and round the town at which they had been arrested. This would create the
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At night, I was blindfolded, taken to places I do not
know, beaten thoroughly and returned to the cell. They
wanted to know how I was related to Koigi, Njehu
Gatabaki and Gitobu Imanyara.

impression in the minds of the suspects that they had travelled a long distance out
of the town. Abuya Abuya recalls his experience:
After all that harassment of about an hour and a half, they put me back into the lift
and to a white Land Rover and drove me round several times obviously blind folded.
At about five, I ended up at Kileleshwa police station. I was there until about eight and
then I was brought here in one of these cells, I think cell no. 3.63

83.

Other victims, like Dr. Odhiambo Olel and George Odidi, were actually transported
a distance of about , from Kisumu to Nairobi, while blindfolded and lying face
down in a police Land Rover:
Since I had worked in Kisumu for a long time, I knew I was being driven around Kisumu
streets. We stopped at the Central Police Station. I was still in the same position. From
there, they collected Mr. George Odidi Kwanya. As he was thrown into Land Rover
he was blindfolded. I did not immediately realize that he was George Odidi Kwanya
because both us were blindfolded. He was asking them in Kiswahili Language where
he could step because I was already lying on the floor. I only knew him when he was
asking them those questions. He was forced into the Land Rover and told to lie next
to me. He was also blindfolded. We were strictly warned not to talk to each other.
So, we had our long journey. Again, knowing the Nairobi- Kisumu Road very well, we
knew when we reached Nyamasaria, Ahero and Awasi. We knew even when they were
fuelling the vehicle at Kericho. After that stopover, the journey resumed in earnest.
We went through Nakuru, Gilgil and Sigona. We entered Nairobi City through the Aga
Khan Hospital area. So, I could not exactly know where we were coming from. My
mind was a bit distorted. From there, I did not know where we were being taken. They
stopped the vehicle and we were told to come out. My hands were held. I came out still
blindfolded. I was then pushed into a dimly lit cell and I was told to feel at home and
make myself comfortable. How could I have felt at home in such an environment?64
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64

626

TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012/p. 45.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/15 July 2011/p. 45.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

Chapter FIVE

Detained, Tortured and imprisoned for possessing and reading The
Financial Review
TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Nyeri/7 Nov 2011

After my primary school, I attended Karima High School. From there, I joined the National
Youth Service. After that, I was sent to several places for nation building. From there, I was sent
to Mombasa Vocational Training where I did Grade Tests. I was then sent on-the-job training at
TANATHI project. From there I was taken to Tana Basin Project on job training. After that, due to
financial constraints, we were sent home. In the year 1989, I was given a letter by G.W. Griffins
to report to the NYS head office not later than 29th November of that year. When I went there, I
was employed as a motor vehicle electrician, Grade II. I continued with my work.
In 1990, I was given my annual leave and I had planned to proceed home. But before I
embarked on my leave, I was informed that I had to wait for clearance first, so I had to wait
for two days. I had rented a house at Ngara. In the morning after taking my breakfast, I went
outside and bought a newspaper which I read. When I was tired of reading the newspaper, I
pulled out a magazine, Financial Review, and began to read. Just as I was reading it, two people
came, knocked on my door and I opened. When they came in they asked me: “Where is your
neighbour?” I told them I did not know because he normally would come at 9.00 p.m. They then
asked me what work I did. I told them I worked with Nyayo Bus Services. I pulled out my ID and
the job card which I gave them. One of them apologised to me but the other one said: “He is
reading a seditious document.” So they were very bitter and began to search my house. They
saw another Financial Review magazine and that is when I realised they were police officers
because they were using the word “afande”.
One of them said, “this is the suspect; handcuff him”, and I was handcuffed and taken to
Kamukunji Police Station. I was not booked in the Occurrence Book (OB) while at that police station. I was told that the case belonged to the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and the
following day at 3.00 a.m., I was taken away by three cops who were armed, saying that I was intending to overthrow the Government. I was not sure what was going on. I was taken to the CID
Headquarters and Central Police Station. I was taken to the station and nothing was booked. At
night, I was blindfolded, taken to places I do not know, beaten thoroughly and returned to the
cell. They wanted to know how I was related to Koigi, Njehu Gatabaki and Gitobu Imanyara. I
told them I do not know those guys. I am employed by the Government and I cannot overthrow
the Government that is providing for me; the Government that enables me to feed my family.
High Court, Court No.5, where I met George Omondi Tunya and a prosecutor by the name
Peter Mwangi. When I was asked whether I owned the books, I said that I had the magazines.
However, I said that because I feared to return to the police. There and then, the judge jailed
me for being in possession of prohibited magazines. I requested the judge to allow me to be
given medical attention because I was hardly able to walk and I had a broken tooth. I was taken
to Kamiti where I was in more trouble because there was little food. I was locked in solitary
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confinement and the only thing that was available was a small Bible. There were no beddings
in that room. The clothes for the inmates were scarce; there were lice and as a result, I had troubled nights. I stayed there in solitary confinement and after a while, I was called and I thought
I would be released. I was asked what I had trained in life, and I said that I was a trained motor
vehicle electrician. That is the day I was given uniforms. I was led into a lorry and transferred to
Athi River GK Prison where I was taken to a workshop to maintain vehicles and teach the others
Motor Vehicle Electricians’ course. I stayed there until my sentence was over.
When I was leaving prison, my father came to court and waited at the gate. I told him I was
not dead but alive. My father told me that we should go to our rural home but I told him that
I wanted to go and see my house. I met my landlord, who had closed the house and rented it
to another person. He had locked my belongings in a store. The landlord requested for Kshs
3, 000 for the rent but I told him that I did not have the money and I told him where I was. He
told me that if I did not have the money, he would not release my belongings. I thought that
I should return to the office and tell them how the situation was and see whether they would
have mercy on me. When I arrived at the gate, I found two new officers who called the security
officer in charge who went to the office to inquire about what he should do. He was informed
that I should not be around that place because I am a criminal and the media personnel had
written about me in the newspapers that I am a bad character. When I argued, he told the two
security officers to escort me all the way to Ruaraka and ensure that I was left near that vicinity.
So, I decided the best thing to do was to go home.
When I arrived home, I found that my wife and child were gone. I was very weak and my
mother told me that I should go and see a doctor because I looked ill. I went to Nyeri General
Hospital and the doctor told me that I had chronic TB. He recommended that I be injected six
times and I was admitted. After being admitted for two months, I was discharged and put under medication for a whole year. After every two weeks, I would go for medicine. I feared coming back to Nairobi. I asked myself what I had done to deserve all this because the Government
had employed me and I had not written the magazine, but I was jailed. My life got destroyed
because the people who are my age-mates are very far in life compared to me; because the income that I get is too little. I do not have my own land but my father has given me a small piece
of land. I feel that the Government really oppressed me.

Detention, interrogation and torture
84.

628

Torture and inhuman treatment of Mwakenya suspects took place most commonly
in the period between arrest and official acknowledgement of detention or trial.
Apart from police stations, torture was also carried out in at least two other
buildings in Nairobi City: Nyati House and Nyayo House. It is at Nyayo House that
many victims who spoke to the Commission said that they experienced the worst
forms of torture. At the basement of Nyayo House were 12 tiny identical cubicles
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Commissioners with Nyayo House torture victims outside Nyayo House

which were painted red and black,65 with no light in them. Here, survivors of torture
say, as is described in detail below, they would be stripped during interrogation,
pain would be inflicted on their private parts, they would be kept in freezing
drenched cells for days, and suffer blasts of hot gritty air66 which clogged their
noses and throats or made them blind67.
85.

Interrogation would take place at the top most floors of Nyayo House, that is, at
the 24th and 25th floor of the building.68 A witness claimed that at Nyati House there
were cells ‘full of ants, in fact, as big as a match box’ and a cell ‘full of snakes’.69
But a witness who admitted before the Commission to having been part of the
team that was charged with interrogating ad torturing Mwakenya suspects refuted
these claims:
With due respect, whoever says that there is a cell in Nyati House or an interrogation
centre, is lying. We have heard so many people talking about having snakes down
there. There were claims that there were also red ants where people were tortured
at the basement of that building. Even if you leave this place today and go to
that house, which is a Government building, you will find that it is a car park.
There was no interrogation centre and nobody could be taken to Nyati House for
interrogation. That was the headquarters of the intelligence department. The task
force was at Nyayo House and that is where the work was going on. It was not in
Nyati House and it has never happened the whole time I was in the service.70

65
66
67
68
69
70

TJRC/Statement/35602; TJRC/Memorandum/M1792
TJRC/Statement/01810; TJRC/Statement/02850
TJRC/Statement/35610; TJRC/Memorandum/M1796; TJRC/Statement/13303; TJRC/Statement/45127
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing/Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012/p. 3
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012/p. 51.
TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/29 February 2012/p. 27.
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86.

Because of the secretive nature of interrogations and torture even within the police
force, it is possible that this particular witness never came to know of torture cells at
Nyati House.

87.

Various forms of torture were used, mostly in an effort to make Mwakenya suspects
confess that they were indeed Mwakenya members and also to reveal the names
of other members. The torturers could not stop until a suspect surrendered to their
demands. During interrogation, suspects would be unaddressed and severely
beaten with broken pieces of furniture, wooden canes and whips. Dr. Odhiambo
Olel was beaten, in his words, ‘like a snake’:
They commanded me to do it very quickly. There is nothing I could do. I removed my
clothes and was told to do 14 press-ups which were not possible. I tried to do about three
or four but I fell down. They then started beating me with pieces of a broken coffee table.
They kicked me and told me that I had to talk. They told me to tell them about my activities;
mine and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and “some of your Mwakenya colleagues that you
know we have jailed.” I did not have a ready answer because I did not. They continued to
beat me until I fell down. I was weeping and crying but they had no mercy whatsoever.
They beat me like a snake. It was just like someone who wanted to kill an animal. After
that, they blindfolded me. I did not have all my clothes on. I only had my underwear. I was
taken downstairs using the same lift. When we went back, I was pushed to the cell.71

88.

Wafula Buke was equally severely beaten:
After about 12 days at Nyayo House, I was taken to Kilimani Police Station and asked
to plead guilty after we had gone through the writing of statements. I told him that I
had done nothing. The things they are saying I have done I said them because of the
beatings. They claimed that I was a Libyan spy and I had been sponsored by the Libyan
Embassy. They guided me through so I just said yes. When you say no they will beat you
until you say yes to survive. Towards the end when I refused, I was brought back. When
we reached the cells and the lift went up an officer I later met in another interrogation
years later called Leonard Wachira asked me what happened. I said that nothing had
happened. He told me that the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) was very unhappy. Of
course my sweat again rolled knowing that I was going to be beaten again. While there
they said they just wanted to beat me up. So, they beat me up from 8.00 am onwards.
I cried until there were no more tears. By Monday, anywhere was better than Nyayo
House. They told us that they control the courts and every time they give a statement to
the magistrate, they write at the back your sentence. So, they told me that I will not be
jailed for many years. One even said that I will be jailed for only two years.72

89.

71
72
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Sometimes victims would be threatened that would be electrocuted. Such was the
experience of George Odidi:
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/15 July 2011/p. 46.
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 30.
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A switchboard of buttons used for effecting various modes of torture at Nyayo House torture chambers

At that juncture, they told me to lie on my belly. I was naked. They started walking on me
and some two ladies tried to electrocute me. One lady would come from one side with
live wire and would hit me with it. I would make noise and they would carry me above
the ground and drop me.73

90.

Another victim, underwent the following experience in addition to been physically
assaulted:
They tied me and they told me that I was going to diarrhoea on that day. I told them it
was okay and if it was a matter of dying, I would die. I was very angry and I thought of
anything to hit them with. They came in and tied this hand to a metal; one would stand
on my fingers on this side and the other would do the same on the other side. They
stood on my fingers and hit me.74

91.

73
74

The suspects would also be kept in waterlogged cells. This effectively denied
them sleep which in itself was a form of torture. Dr. Odhiambo Olel remembers
that at Nyayo House after he had been severely beaten in the interrogation
room, he was returned to his basement cell only to find it filled with water. He
spent the night in the waterlogged cell. Another victim of torture, narrated a
similar experience:
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/15 July 2011/p. 50.
TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 23.
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In my final week of being there, I was taken to a section with something like a swimming
pool. I was left there for three days in that pool of water. There was no food and no one was
communicating with me. The pool had very cold water and you had to go in and stand.
When I stood in the pool, the level of water reached my neck such that I could not sit. The
only thing you were able to do was just to lean on the wall because sometimes you could
not stand from weakness. You would lean on the wall and find that you were in water and
you could not sit. God helped me. After three days, they came to take me from there. I was
in a bad state. They took me directly to the interrogation room. I was like a fish which had
been taken out of the fridge. I was in a very bad state. I was not able to talk.75

92.

Another victim, George Odidi was also kept in one of the waterlogged cells at
Nyayo House for three days in a row:
They sprinkled us with very cold water for long periods and left us submerged in one
foot deep water pool. The water never seeped out since they had fitted rubbers on
the doors. The cells were thus water tight. I was there in water for three days without
food or any one speaking to me. On the fourth day I was removed from the cell and
blindfolded and with lean clothing taken to the 26th floor for torture and questioning.
They had a panel of about four women and ten men all plain clothes police officers.
They all had rubber whips and pistols on their tables and begun questions. I was
questioned about Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Mwakenya, and my association with Raila
Odinga, my association with Osumba Langi who lived in London and who I never
knew. I had no idea about the accusations and informed them as such.

93.

In addition to torture, George Odidi was subjected to other forms of horrid and
unspeakable experiences. He was forced to load a dead body, first into a police car,

and later into cold storage in a mortuary:
one night, at 1.00 am, they removed me from my cell and took me to an adjacent cell.
They drove a Land Rover near the cell. They told me to go into the cell. On entering, I
found a dead body. I was told to load the dead body into the Land Rover. I was stuck
with the dead body in the Land Rover. I was blindfolded again and put in the Land Rover
and it was driven. After 50 minutes, I realized that we were in a mortuary. I was told to
do the job again which I did. Getting a space for the body was difficult. They kept on
opening the drawers until we found a drawer with only two corpses. I was told to put
the body there and I did that. I was blindfolded again and taken to Nyayo. The next day,
I realized that my moving this body had a purpose. When they took me for an interview
on the 26th floor, they asked me to decide whether I wanted to die there or if I wanted
to go further. I told them that the decision to die at that time or later--- I told them that,
that would depend on the decision they made. I told them if I were them, I would take
one leg, feed it onto the machines and clear me so that I no longer become a problem to
them. One of them asked me: “Have you seen a dead body here?” I consented and said
that I had seen a dead body yesterday. They asked me whether I wanted to die like that
man and I told them that I had no option. The decision for me to die or not was theirs.76
75 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Wundanyi/25 January 2011/p. 21. See also TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/
Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 22.
76 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/15 July 2011/p. 50.
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After this traumatic experience, Odidi was taken to Karura Forest where he was
undressed and lowered into a pit full of ants:
I realized that I was in the bush. They told me to go down using the staircase. I rolled down
and I landed on a hole. After that, they removed the ladder. There were ants in the hole. I
was naked and the ants ate me everywhere. I tried to cover my eyes, but I could not. That
lasted for about 30 minutes. Then they brought the ladder back. I was struggling with the
ants trying to remove them from my body and to protect my eyes, but my body was full
of blood. Blood was oozing from all over. The ants had cut me all over. Then they removed
me and blindfolded me again, gave me my trouser and the shirt.77

96.

Torture of Mwakenya suspects sometimes took the form of sexual violence or
threat of it. A witness told the Commission that he ‘they tied my private parts using
some rubber’ and that ‘they started burning my private parts using a small stick’.
Another witness explained how he was threatened of castration:
Have you ever had your genitals tied and forced to make you diarrhoea?” I told him that
has never happened to me and he told me, “You are a very young person. Do you have
any children?” I told him no, I was still a young boy. So, he told me: “If you have never had
any children, then there is no hope of you ever having any children”.78

96.

Suspects were also subjected to psychological torture. For instance, they would be
informed or made to believe that a close relative had been killed.79

Prison conditions
97.

Many Mwakenya suspects were released after days of torture and detention in
a police cell. However, charges were preferred against a good number of them,
and in the majority of cases, they were found guilty for being members of an
illegal organization and sentenced to serve prison terms. They were jailed in
different prisons around the country. In many cases, they were isolated from other
prisoners.80 Generally, prison conditions were deplorable and the prisoners were
subjected to inhuman and degradable experiences. Dr. Odhiambo Olel described
the situation in prison as follows:
Life in Block E was very horrible. The lights are on throughout the day. We were like birds
in a cage. We were not allowed at all to come out of the cells. We would only come out to
go and empty the small buckets that we were using. Each one was given one. There was
horrible food in Kamiti and if you love your dog, you cannot give it to the dog. The beans
we ate had weevils and the porridge was very bad. More often than not, we had diarrhoea
and other bad illnesses. The bins we had been given to relieve ourselves were most of the
time full. However, we could only be allowed to go and get them poured into the toilets.81

77
78
79
80
81

TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/15 July 2011/p. 50.
TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/7 March 2012/p. 26.
TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/7 March 2011/p. 22.
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012/p. 15.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/15 July 2011/p. 47.
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98.

As a result of the torture they had suffered, coupled with poor hygiene and
hazardous conditions in prison, many Mwakenya suspects became sick. Many of
them contracted Tuberculosis, asthma, and chest related complications. Others
developed eye problems:
However, one thing I realized was that when he came from jail, his sight was not normal;
he had chest problems and was diagnosed with diabetes. So, he was in and out of the
hospital. Before his arrest, my husband had no sickness.82

99.

In the majority of cases, Mwakenya suspects were specifically denied medical care:
The other important thing that I can say about prison is treatment. It is a bad thing to be
sick while in prison. We lost many people because of that. I know fellows who had quarrels
with the administration and Dr. Owino could tell them that they have been disturbing
them and they can take themselves to Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH). The fellow, his
name is Macharia, stayed for five days and died. The doctor was only willing to treat “good”
persons. Prison was tough. There were no books and we tried to go on hunger strikes to
get books. I remember staying without food. I was with Waweru Kariuki for about six days
before they could allow us to get books from outside.83

100. In some cases, prisoners died because they had been denied medication. The
Commission heard that Titus Adungosi died after prison authorities refused to
take him to hospital even when it was clear that he was critically ill (See below).
Kangethe Mungai told the following story of his nephew ‘s death in prison:
What was terrible for the family is that my nephew, Mungai wa Ruiru, the son of my halfbrother who was working with Kenya Railways was arrested and jailed for seven years at
Kamiti Maximum Prison. He was jailed in 1986, just around the same time with us. While
he was at Shimo la Tewa, he contracted Tuberculosis and he was transferred to Kamiti
Maximum Prison. He continued ailing there without medical attention. So, his younger
brother, Muiruri wa Ruiru who is with us here, for fear of being associated with people
who were agitating against the Government, never went to see him in prison. His father
who is my brother but has since died was the Assistant Chief of our area. He disowned
his son to save his job. So, Mungai got ill and so thin and never got attention until after
two years. He died in Kamiti Maximum Prison. The family would go to the prison and he
would be brought to them by two prisoners carrying him. Around 1988, they went to
prison to see him and he was not brought. When they asked where he was, they were told
that the prisoners who carry him were not around. They were told to come the following
day of which they did, but they were told he had been taken to hospital. They kept going
there for two weeks not knowing that he had died. They finally disclosed that he had died
and gave them a number. The family went to Kilimani Police Station and then to the City
Mortuary. There they found him; a small heap of bones. So, a funeral was done and the
Special Branch officers were all over the place.84
82 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 15.
83 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 31.

84 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/28 February 2012/p. 8.
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Death in prison: The story of Titus Adungosi as narrated by Wafula Buke
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 31-32

I had talked about health issues
and I wanted to give another example
of Titus Adungosi, perhaps Kenya’s
Steve Biko. I never met Adungosi myself but towards his end, he came to
Kamiti Prison. When he arrived, he
was taken to the sick bay. Those are
local dispensaries. We learnt from a
trustee that Adungosi had been transferred to Kamiti and he was very sick.
That trustee was called Ndung’u. He
told me that every time he swallows
milk, he vomits. He was not taken to
hospital the first day, second day, the
third day and the fourth day when we
bumped into Ndung’u he told us that
Adungosi had died when he arrived at
KNH.

Titus Adungosi’s mother holding onto her late son’s sweater

After our hunger strike for changes in our lives … the administration became uncomfortable with us and transferred us to Naivasha. While in Naivasha, I started investigating how Adungosi died. I learnt from a fellow prisoner
in punishment block where political prisoners were kept and also from the warders, one of
them a Nubian and another one called Corporal Masinde from Kimilili Constituency, who told
me that Adungosi got sick but could not get medication. His colleagues asked him to organize
and bring in money through some illegal means. Adungosi was a very religious man. In fact, he
used to argue with professors like Maina wa Kinyati, and could say “Jesus or Marx”. He said that
he had been jailed for fighting corruption and malpractices and that if the only way he could
get medication is by smuggling in money, then his days were numbered.
So, he got sick and continued deteriorating. He decided to try the only weapon that
prison authorities listen to and that is hunger strike. He had stomach ulcers and yet he had
to go on a hunger strike. He was on hunger strike I hear for about seven days, and then they
decided to take him to Naivasha District Hospital. He did not stay there for long. The fellow in
charge, I was told, was a Luhya with a Luo name. He claimed that security could not be guaranteed. So, he was brought back to prison and forced again to go on a hunger strike so that
he can secure a transfer to Kenyatta National Hospital for treatment. That is how we ended
having him in Kamiti and that is how he died. I owe it to Adungosi to say that story.
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‘When somebody is imprisoned, their families is imprisoned together
with them’: The story of David Onyango Oloo
TJRC/Hansard/ Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/ 28 Feb 2012/pp 48-49

Having said that, I want to say just briefly what the prison did to me. As you have heard from
Mama Karimi, when somebody is imprisoned, their families are imprisoned together with them.
I will tell you two things which happened to two members of my family. I am the first born in a
family of eight, although now many have passed on. One of those was who have passed on is my
younger brother, Joseph Ochieng Oloo. He was four years younger than I. When I went to prison,
he kept reading my books from the university and became very political. Unfortunately, he also
suffered a mental breakdown. Between 1982 and 1987, everyday on the newspapers there was
something about Mwakenya or a Kenyan being jailed because of subversion. So, my brother, because of my experience, went crazy. He used to go to police stations and report that he knew the
dissidents who were trying to overthrow the Government. Now, the Kenyan system does not
know how to deal with mental health issues. They used to arrest my brother, beat him up and lock
him up. He actually went to the Industrial Area remand home where he was beaten up by fellow
prisoners. Later on, he was killed by the police, but I do not want to go into that.
My father, ironically, was a senior prisons officer and so, I grew up in the prison. So, I have
seen prison from both sides. I grew up as an officer’s son in 1960s in many prisons around this
country. When I was arrested, my father spent a lot of time trying to get me released. In 1984,
there was a rumour that the Government was going to release all university students. This time,
we were given a specific date, that is, Jamhuri Day on 12th December, 1984. So, one of his in-laws
who was a Member of Parliament and an Assistant Minister, came and told him: “Good news!
Your son and his fellow students are being released on 12th December.” So, he was ready waiting for me. You know, within the elite, Moi had fallen out with Charles Njonjo and was labeled a
traitor. So, instead of releasing the university students on 12th December, Moi announced that
he had forgiven Charles Njonjo. My father was so mad that he got a stroke. On 18th November,
1996, he got a second stroke and that is what killed him.
My younger sister was right behind me and had qualified for university, but family members went to my father and told him: “Just marry her off because if she goes to university--“Everybody knows that those days I used to be called David. I have just started using the
name again, because there is another Onyango Oloo who has the exact opposite views like me
but also he is a commentator and writes. Everybody confuses him for me. So, I have reluctantly
reclaimed my Jewish name David for the time being for purposes of identity. They told my sister
not go to university. A lot of things went down.
When I came out of prison, I later went to exile in Toronto and Montreal in Canada. I used
to forget turning lights off until I realized that in prison, the lights are never turned off. I noticed
that even if I go to bed at 3.00 a.m. in the morning, at 5.00 a.m., I am up. Even if I go to a restaurant, I am always facing the entrance. These are little things which you do not notice. When
I went to prison, I did not have asthma but now I do. I have carried prisoners in hands; people
who have died because of medical neglect and all those kinds of things.
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101. In many cases, torture and detention extended to relatives of suspected members
of Mwakenya. According to Kangethe Mungai ‘These people [the relatives of
Mwakenya suspects] were the ones who were tortured more than anybody else
because they did not know anything while the police thought that they were
hiding information’. Kangethe Muigai recollected how his mother was brutally
beaten by Special Branch officials:
Honourable Commissioners, as this was happening, there was a repression that was taking
place and it was completely unknown to us; the harassment of our families back home. I
was made to understand later when we came out of prison that my home in Kabete - this
was narrated to me by my mother - her home was converted to something worse than a
grave. Nobody would ever dare enter that home. This was because the police were looking
for my three other brothers; luckily one of the brothers got a scholarship and went to
another country. But the other two were around either in Kenya or Tanzania. The police
wanted to arrest them and in the process they were harassing our parents and relatives.
My mother narrated to me how the police came to her and told her to produce her sons.
They did not mention Kang’ethe, but they said: “Tuko na Kang’ethe.” They wanted the other
two. They started beating her up. She told me that before, she had never been slapped
by a strong able bodied man with full force. I asked her how many slaps she suffered,
she told me that she could not remember, but they were from six upwards. So they beat
her in front of her daughter. There was one of our sisters who was left at home and they
were beating our mother while she was watching. Finally when she could not produce her
sons, she was arrested and taken to Muthaiga Police Station and locked there. Honourable
Commissioners, being beaten and taken to a cell was the worst form of torture for a lady
of 77 years.85

102. Kangethe Mungai also narrated to the Commission the story of his nephew who
was equally detained and tortured.
I had one cousin who was called Waruhiu Muhia who was arrested on suspicion that he
knew where one of my brothers who were in exile was. Mr. Cheha Mungai, my younger
brother is now dead. He was suspected of communicating with me. So, the police
brought him here and they thought he knew about the whereabouts of my brothers.
I was arrested and imprisoned but my brothers went to exile because of that, so the
police were looking for them. This man was arrested from where he was working at
the Kenya Breweries Limited and brought here. Having written his account, the police
started--- Now he is dead, but fortunately for us he wrote about his account. The first
thing they did was to undress him completely. He was undressed to his birth suit in front
of nine men here in this building, at the uppermost floor. They undressed him and made
him start going round on his finger on the ground as they beat him everywhere. They
were telling him to tell them that he was a member of an organization and to tell them
where all the others were. They beat him up until he fell unconscious, but he told them
he knew nothing about all this. They did not succeed to get information from him. They
took him downstairs to the cells still undressed. That is what he tell told us. I interviewed
him and I have no doubt that this is what happened to him. After that they pushed
85 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012/p. 8.
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him into a cell and brought a horse pipe. He was still naked and they sprayed water on
him. Then they left him there without food. He was not communicating with anyone;
he stayed without water and without going to the toilet for four days. They could come
and ask him whether he was ready to tell them what was happening, but he kept telling
them that he had no information at all. So, it continued like that until finally after 17
days, they were unable to get anything out of him. So, they removed him from the cell
with his skin bleeding off his feet and being quite ill. They took him to a place in town
and told him to go home. His wife was waiting for him at home but he did not find the
child they were expecting because the wife had miscarried because of shock. This man
continued ailing and died a year ago. This man was compensated by the court to a tune
of Kshs 1.5 million late last year. But he died before he could get his compensation. It is
still within the Government system.86

103. Wafula Buke also told the Commission how his association with Mwakenya affected
his brothers, uncles and the family at large:
One of things that I find problematic is that the broader family paid a very high price. In
fact, my uncle who was a teacher was arrested on FERA charges and stayed in for four
months, because he was my friend. He lost his head and we buried him not so long ago.
Of course, my brothers were all put in and got many problems. But the major thing that
hit us, as a family, is that because we were a bit of a dissident family, the fellows in KANU
schemed and used their connections and secured the title deed of our family ancestral
land, where we had lived from 1940s.87

104. Similarly, Veronica Wambui Nduthu was tortured and detained together with the
husband primarily because their son, who was later killed most probably by state
agents, was suspected to be a member of Mwakenya:
The police were consistently at our home at night or even at around 2.00 am They
would even come and check under the bed and keep asking where he was. We were
harassed and even our neighbours did not want us because they had been told that
we were bad people. We were left as loners and we continued staying like that […]
They arrested us and took us to Kericho with my husband. We spent the night in the
cells and in the morning they took my husband to court. At that time the former
President Moi had a meeting in Nakuru. We were released and transported back home.
We thought they were taking us to President Moi and started wondering if they were
going to kill us. By then my children were left crying. In Nakuru, we were detained
again at the Central Police Station where we spent the night. In the morning they
called us and started interrogating us with a lot of harassment, torture and beating.
They kept asking us:”Why did you give birth to this son? What kind of a son is this?”
We told them it was okay because it is God who blessed us with the son. They locked
us in for about two weeks. They went for his brothers and his friend. There was a lot
86 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/28 February 2012/p. 6.
87 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 40.
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of torture and they were not feeding us. They kept telling us that we were going to
produce our son.88

105. Another disturbing story was narrated by Wilson Awuor Ang’onga whose wife
was pregnant at the time when he was detained and tortured. One evening they
abducted Ang’onga’s wife and took her to a freshly covered grave where they
showed her the clothes of the husband, in effect making her believe he was dead.
This traumatic experience would contributed to the miscarriage that she later
suffered and the strained relationship she had with the husband when he was
released from detention:
What was very unfortunate was that during the time I was in jail my wife was at home.
She was pregnant. Special Branch officers in Kisumu used to come for her during the
night drive her to unknown destination and later bring her back to the house and tell
her not to inform my parents. That happened for about five times. On the fifth day,
she was taken to some places in Western Kenya, where man-made graves were. One of
them had my clothes, which I had when I was jailed. One of the officers asked where
her husband was, if she knew those clothes. When I went back home, I found that
some rituals had already been performed because she had reported that I was dead.
The family did not know that I was released. It was a problem. When I went home, I
decided to stay in my mother’s house for two days. I did not go to my house. My mum
was very welcoming but my wife was very negative. To her, it was like she was seeing
a ghost. So, my mother talked to me at length and explained all that had happened.
She told me that she would take me to some herbalist for cleansing before I rejoin the
family. I accepted because I was not a difficult person. We went to a certain herbalist,
who gave us some medicine for use in my house. I did that under the instructions of
my mother.89

106. The wife passed away not long after Ang’onga was released from prison:
Due to the long time of isolation, I was a very quiet man with my wife. This disturbed
my wife and later on she miscarried. I told her to accept the situation and we buried
the baby. So, my wife developed a sickness. As I had left the prison alone, I never
wanted to discuss things about prisons. People feared me in the community. Most of
the time, I was just in our home. My wife used to cry from time to time because she
realised that life was going to be very difficult since I did not have any employment.
I kept reassuring her that life would be normal but it did not work. On 15th February,
1996 my wife passed on.90

88 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012/p. 33. See also TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/7 March
2012/p. 24.
89 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/22-23.
90 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 23.
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Harassment of family members: ‘He said that he was seeing, in
the act of washing the books, his freedom’
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012/p. 16-17

There is an interesting case of the late Muigai, my nephew. They knew that he had books
and they wanted them. So, they came home and demanded to know where the books were.
Muiruri, the younger brother of Muigai who is sitting there, because of the fear had taken the
books and buried them in the farm. So, somehow, the mother discovered the books while
working on the farm. Knowing how dangerous it was when one was caught with the books,
she dug them out and threw them into the pit latrine. So, the Special Branch or the secret police came and demanded to have them. They would come in a threatening manner because
they came after arresting Muiruri and taking him to Parklands Police Station for three days
demanding the books. Muiruri did not know where they were because he knew there was a
hole where he had buried them. Because the mother felt that his son would be jailed like the
other one, she told them she is the one who knew where those books were. So, they asked
her where the books were and she said that she had thrown them into the pit latrine a month
ago. So, the police took torches and went to the pit latrine. They said, no, you are lying to us
because all we are seeing here are newspapers.
Madam Chair, the rural people cannot afford tissue paper and so they use newspapers
most of the time especially those days. The police did not believe that and so they said that
they would leave. They told her that if she did not take the books to them, her son would
also go to prison. So, they went with him and took him back to the cells in Parklands Police
Station. So, they were afraid that this son would be jailed just like the other son. They had to
demolish the pit latrine and use hooks and other things to look for the books in the pit latrine
that had been under constant use for a whole month. So, you can imagine how the books
were buried deep. They got the books but luckily, they were tied together in a net like the one
used for tying onions. So, the hooks succeeded in getting the books out. But the big job was
that when Muiruri was released to get the books he succeeded in cleaning them and he said
that he was happy to clean them. He said that he was seeing, in the act of washing the books,
his freedom. So, he washed the books very carefully and joyfully because he knew once they
got the books, he may not be tortured or taken to prison. So, he finally put them in a plastic
paper bag and left. There were no mobile phones. So, he went to the place they had agreed
to meet with the Special Branch opposite the Central Police Station. So, he went there and
after struggling to locate them, he had to use other police officers to report that he had arrived and had the books. So, finally, they came and he told them that he had the books. They
told him to open and he told them that if he opened, they would vomit. They then told him
to put them at the back of the vehicle. So, they carried them in that state.
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The torture squad
107. The Commission established that a special team based at Nyayo House was
established within the police force for purposes of interrogating and torturing
suspects of Mwakenya and members of other unregistered organisations or
those who were suspected to be engaging in subversive activities. A police
officer who was stationed at the Nairobi Provincial Headquarters at Nyayo House
in the 1980s told the Commission that he was a member of a Task Force that was
specifically established to interrogate suspected members of Mwakenya:
When I was posted to Nairobi, after a few weeks I was told, “You are one of the officers
who are going to do a special task which has arisen, but you will be briefed.” I was
told to report to Mr. [James] Opiyo. We were quite a number of officers who had
been drawn from various places. It was a special kind of operation. We were told that
there was a movement which had been engaging in subversive activities. “We have
arrested some people and we want to embark on investigation of this movement and
see to what extent it has operated and know the people who are involved and their
aims and objectives.” Having been in the service, we understood what was meant by
subversion.91

108. He disclosed the names of some of the members of the Task Force: Mr. James
Opiyo, Peter Munyiri, Elias Mjomba, James Majani, James Kilonzo, Serbi, Ben
Machiri, Martin Muthee, Francis Mwabembe, Ndirangu and Paul Liminaji.92
According to this witness, James Opiyo was the leader of the Task Force or at
least he reported to him. The witness also indicated that the officers in the Task
Force were of different ranks and carried out varying roles:
Those were senior people. I was just an Acting Superintendent. There was another
gentleman called Peter Mureithi. My senior most were Mr. Opiyo, Mr. Mjomba, Mr. Majani
and Mr. Munyiri. They were Senior Superintendent of Police. The rest were my equals and
others were junior. We had junior officers who were guards to the cells. There were officers
who were actually given those duties to carry [to guard the Nyayo House basement].
There was Nzomo, Peter Kimanthi, Rukwaro, Martin Ochanda – he was a Sergeant. Those
are the names I can remember.

109. Mwakenya suspects who were detained and tortured at Nyayo House also
mentioned some of these names as the people in whose hands they suffered
torture. James Opiyo and Elias Mjomba were particularly mentioned by many
victims of torture. According to a victim:

91 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/29 February 2012/p. 4.
92 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/airobi29 February 2012/p. 4.
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I can remember Mjomba, a light skinned guy who later became the Head of Operations at
the National Security Intelligence Service and I very well remember James Opiyo. Those
are the two people that I can remember. Opiyo is the one who was pointing at broken
legs of chairs and he would tell me if I do not cooperate, that is what they would use
to break my other leg. I remember that kind of threat. The person who was taking my
statement was called Mjomba. I do not remember his other name but he is the one who
was personally taking my statement.93

110. Another victim recalled that he was tortured under the watch of James Opiyo:
I was taken to a dark room and I did not know what time it was; it was very dark
there. I stayed there. They then called me and got me out and they blindfolded me. I
sensed that I was being taken into a lift. When we got up there, there was a huge table
and some six old people were sitting there. Each one of them asked me questions
like where I was born, how many members were in my family and my general life
questions. I heard them saying: “Mr. Opiyo, I think we have finished.” He was standing
there and he was just walking around, but he never asked any questions. He was a tall
dark man.94

111. Apart from police officers attached to the Special Branch, the Commission also
received evidence that members of the Provincial Administration (especially
Provincial and District Commissioners) were involved directly or indirectly in the
crackdown against Mwakenya. At Nyayo House, the Task Force responsible for
interrogating and torturing Mwakenya suspects was under the supervision of
the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner.95 Task Force responsible for interrogations
and torture was In Kisumu, former Member of Parliament, Phoebe Asiyo
narrated to the Commission how one night she was picked from her home by
policemen who took her to the office of the Nyanza Provincial Commissioner for
interrogation:
One day at 3.00 am in the morning in my house, the police came to my home. I was the
member of parliament for Karachuonyo. They told me to get out. They were brought
to Kisumu. I was in my pajamas and house coat. They said: “Come to the sitting room,
we want to talk.” They chose a day when my husband was not home. I was taken to
the PC’s office. The PC was drunk even at that time of the night. He could hardly raise
his head but when he did he asked me: “Are you the woman who wants to get rid of
the government of Kenya?” I did not respond because I was not a Mwakenya. I did
not know about the activities of Mwakenya and God knows this is the truth. I had a
very hard time. I could not come out of the PC’s office because I was naked; I did not
93 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/28 February 2012/p. 17.
94 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 21-22.
95 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/29 February 2012/p. 8.
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have clothes. There were no mobile phones those days. I did not have my car and my
driver was not there. So I was forced to walk on my slippers to Jubilee Market. The
humiliation and indignation was too much. I know that whatever these people who
have died went through must have been terrible. I was only there for one night and
it was bad. I was so dehumanised and did not even want to look up to my people as
their member of parliament.96

112. In most cases, in order to induce the suspects to make a confession, the torturers
would invoke the name of high ranking government officials including the
President. For instance, a victim remembers that he was informed that President
Moi did know that he was been detained at Nyayo House:
They told me that I should be aware that every prominent person had been at that place
where I was being interrogated. They told me that the seat I was seated on, Raila and
Matiba, had sat on it and they answered questions. They said: So, do not try to joke; you
are a small person. I answered and said that the truth that is in my heart is what I would
tell them and that I could not add anything because lies would not help me. They also
told me that I should be aware that President Moi was aware where I was and that they
could not do anything without his knowledge. I told them I was happy and that if that
was what would take my life away, then it was okay because the President knew that I
was there. I told them that if my life would be taken away for speaking the truth, then
that would have helped me.97

113. A witness who was engaged in the torture of Mwakenya suspects confirmed that
although they never did receive direct communication from the political class
(e.g. the President) they always knew that they were acting under some form
of instruction from high ranking government officials and that these officials
knew about the crackdown on Mwakenya members. In his words, ‘Although it
was not communicated to me, by the nature of the duties we were doing and the
demand, it was clear that there was pressure from somewhere. It was a political
decision’.98

96 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/14 July 2011/p. 27-28.
97 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Wundanyi/25 January 2012/p. 21.
98 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/29 February 2012/p. 23.
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A police interrogator confirms use of torture at Nyayo House
TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing on Torture/29 February 2012

Leader of evidence: A number informed us that they were kept in the cells, including
in cells which were waterlogged and they would be subjected to busts of dust on them, hot
and cold air and that by the time they would come up, some of them have said they would
have some physical injuries and they would not have had any food or water. Mr. Wachira,
can you confirm that some of the people that appeared before the panel were worse for
wear?
Witness: To be frank, there were some who had been put under those conditions and
hon …
Leader of evidence: Now, a number of individuals, in fact a large number have told us
that they would appear without clothes before the interrogation panel. They were nude. Was
that so?
Witness: To be frank, they would be forced to be nude. Psychologically you make them
to break down and you got the information that you wanted.…
Leader of witness : What some of the people have told us as part of the psychological
torment is that they would be exposed to spending time there with no food at the basement. When they would come up for interrogation, they would watch the panel eat but
not be offered anything. Were you on a panel that did this to the person that they were
interrogating?
Witness: I remember on many occasions when I was interrogating people, we had food
together with my interogees but denying people food, I think there were occasions when
they would be denied food. That is true and of course that was also another way to make
somebody break down
Leader of witness: Thank you … We really do appreciate your forthrightness. A number
of witnesses have also said that apart from the psychological torture, they were exposed to
physical beatings in order to extract information from them. Were you on a panel that probably assaulted people?
Witness: To be frank, that one was there and I even personally beat some of my friends
who are here. You use a whip and you get the information. It was there and I cannot hide it.
Leader of witness: … of the people that you interrogated, do you remember--- Some of
them have told us that they would make a number of visits to the 26th floor. So, you would
come and if you were found not to be revealing information, you would go back to the basement and then come back on a later date. Was that so?
Witness: That was there because we expected that when you came, maybe you had
recollected things and maybe elaborated on what you had said earlier; of course the team
expected that you would make progress in that particular report. Of course even that one
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would help the interrogators to know or determine whether you were really involved in this
thing, because there were some people who were mentioned by other people but they were
not involved and they were to be released.
Leader of witness: Thank you very much ... Some of the people say that in fact when
they went back to the basement, they were exposed to harsh treatment and the purpose was
to intimidate them, so that when they came back upstairs they would be willing to talk. So,
my question is: Were you on a panel that when sending back someone to the basement, you
would tell them words to the effect that: “we are taking you back there and when you come
back you better be ready to talk”?
Witness: There were quite a number of such occasions. They would be admonished with
words like: ‘When you come, come equipped with the information that we have been asking
you to give us.” This was a procedure.

Nyayo House Torture Chambers
114. As mentioned above, Nyayo House was one of the main sites where torture of
Mwakenya suspects took place. It served as the Headquarters of the Provincial
Administration for Nairobi and also housed the Immigration Department, among
other government offices. Ironically, this building is named after Moi’s philosophy
of peace, love and unity. In a disgraceful contrast, its walls and floors witnessed
the humiliation and torture of many victims confined in waterlogged cells.
115.

In an interview in 2003, Mr. AA Ngotho, the former chief government architect during
the construction of Nyayo House, told the Daily Nation that Nyayo House was set up
to house Special Branch offices.99 Mr. Ngotho revealed that during the construction,
his department was directed to deal with two senior officers from the Special Branch
and a Mr. Parkins who was also directly involved in the construction.100

116. The Commission believes that the Special Branch team of technicians involved
in the electrical fittings and the fixing of the telephone systems also installed a
control room complete with switches and vents to pump cold, hot or dusty air
into the cells and in addition to control cell temperature and light intensity.
117. The Commission’s research and investigations point to a strong likelihood that
the torture cells at the basement of Nyayo House were specifically constructed
for the purpose of detaining and torturing suspects. The Commission invited the
Ministry of Public Works to a hearing to clarify some of the allegations that have
99 Sunday Nation, Nairobi May 6, 2012 p.26
100 Sunday Nation, Nairobi May 6, 2012 p.26
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Some of the twelve cubicles at Nyayo House basement that were used as cells

been made regarding the construction of the torture cells. Two senior officers
appeared before the Commission to represent the Ministry of Public Works.
118. One fundamental question the Commission sought to clarify is the actual
architectural work that went into establishing the heavily fortified dark cells that
appear to suggest that they were specifically designed to become a place for
torture. Some of the distinctive features that compounds this theory include the
20 feet electronically controlled steel gate, doors made of steel five millimeters
thick, rubber seals to prevent leakage of water in the cells, the walls and roof of
the strong rooms was a double wall 6 inch thick each and sound proof materials
between them, possibly made to prevent the inmates from communicating
among themselves. The Commission therefore sought to hear from the officers
what the 12 cubicles at the basement were intended or used for. According to
one of them:
These strong rooms were supposed to house sensitive documents or documents to
be secured for any of the Ministries. My colleague explained that we had Immigration
Department which has passports. There is also the Transport Department which is with
KRA today. They produce logbooks and driving licenses which needed to be secured. It
is important that as the documents are taken to the strong rooms there should be some
documentation as to what is being taken there. That is what that office was supposed
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to have been for. Any facility with people using it, professionally, we should provide for
toilets and water. We note that we have parking in the basement. We would have had to
provide facilities for the drivers who would keep the vehicles down there.101

119. The officers indicated that they were not able to locate the initial file with the brief
and so claimed it is impossible to know whether the initial design included strong
rooms or if the strong rooms were part of later modifications. They produced the
drawings during the Commission’s hearings but were not able to ascertain whether
these were the initial drawings.
120. The Ministry of Public Works failed to provide the Commission with accurate and
complete information that would adequately help in answering the queries about
any changes in the original plans of the building and the subsequent conversion
of the cubicle cells into torture chambers. The Commission was disappointed
that the Ministry of Public Works did not provide conclusive answers to questions
on the construction chronology of Nyayo House.102
121. After the Commission’s hearings, the Ministry of Public Works wrote to the
Commission confirming that their officers visited the basement of Nyayo House
and established that the construction of the strong rooms was done as per the
design, based on briefs provided by the client, the Office of the President. They
also confirmed the existence of 12 strong rooms, an office and a washroom, all
as designed and as per drawings submitted. In its letter to the Commission the
Ministry of Public Works admitted:
It would therefore appear that the use of the facility as initially envisioned may have
been changed after completion of the work. It was however noted that there was an
attempt to demolish some walls, whereby the outer wall to the washroom had been
pulled down. The washroom is however not in use at the moment […]103

The Trials
122. The majority of Mwakenya suspects who stood trial informed the Commission
that the trials were devoid of fair trial guarantees. Firstly, after suffering horrid
acts of torture the majority of Mwakenya suspects simply pleaded guilty to avoid
been tortured further. For instance, although he had never been a Mwakenya
member, Wilson Awuor pleaded guilty to a charge of being a member of an illegal
organisation:
101 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing/Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012
102 Letter from Ministry of Public Works Ref: MOPW/A/200/01/59 8 May, 2012
103 Letter from Ministry of Public Works Ref: MOPW/A/200/01/59 8 May, 2012
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I was taken to court at around 6.00 p.m. where a charge sheet was read – that I was a
member of an unlawful society, which was Mwakenya. Due to fear for my life at Nyayo
House, because the experience there was very bad, I just admitted the offence and I was
sentenced to four-and-half years imprisonment. Later, I was taken to Kamiti Maximum
Security Prison. After two days, I was transferred to Kamiti Medium Security Prison,
where I was taken to the Segregation Block. In the Segregation Block, I and other political
prisoners who were there were not allowed to communicate. We were in isolation. That
was the life there.104

123. Secondly, since prior to their arraignment in court Mwakenya suspects had been
held incommunicado, they never had a chance to contact a lawyer, and at the
court, a lawyer was never availed to them. According to a witness:
There was nothing like being told to get a lawyer and our relatives were not informed.
They would do that to make sure that nothing would stop them from taking you to
prison and that you would definitely be imprisoned.105

124. Indeed, at the point of arrests, suspects and their families would be advised that
it was no use to contact a lawyer. Joan Kabaselleh remembers that when the
husband arrested her husband she was categorically told that ‘This is beyond
an advocate’.106 Thirdly, the trials were held late in the evening, sometimes way
beyond working hours.

Impact
125. The acts of torture that Mwakenya suspects suffered in the hands of state security
agents have had a lasting impact in their lives. Joan Kabaselleh told the Commission
that when his husband was released from prison he was not only a sickly man,
suffering from diabetes, eye problems and chest complications, but he also carried
a heavy emotional burden of anger. He was a bitter man:
He was bitter. I could encourage him but he was telling me: “No, the torture that I got
from Nyayo House, somebody using all parts of a chair to beat you until they are all in
pieces”. He could tell us that he would remain in water the whole day without food.
When he remembered those things, he was very bitter. He said it was better if he was
imprisoned but not the torture chamber. It was very painful. That is where his knee was
hit and the pain remained until he died. The chest pain also remained until he died. In
my life I always avoided the Nyayo Torture Chamber. Even when I was told people were
coming to visit this place, I could not come. It was only last week that I came to see the
place. Surely it was a beastly act. I just questioned myself whether this was being done
during colonial rule or after?107
104
105
106
107
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126. The majority of torture survivors have remained unemployed, decades later. Those
who were university students at the time of their detention and torture had their
education and careers abruptly and indefinitely cut short. Their families were
thrown into economic hardship for in most cases the suspects were the main family
breadwinners. Hannah Wangari Gathoga, the daughter of Peter Young Kihara,
who as indicated earlier, was among the very first people to be associated with
Mwakenya, narrated the economic impact of her father’s arrest and detention:
He was arrested as we witnessed in 1986. That is what I will talk about most. He was
arrested with the Mwakenya group. The policemen bothered us a lot because we were
put aside, all our property was destroyed or torn, for example, mattresses, blankets and
everything. Everything was placed on the ground and we were living in a mud house.
There were certain documents that they were looking for […] Because of what we
went through, we did not go to school because of the problems we had. Our mother
is unemployed and we are nine children in the family. So, we were not able to get
educated […]The other thing is that, it hurts a lot because I sat for my examinations in
1985 with my elder brother and I was not able to join a good school because they came
for my father on 23rd January. So, when we were looking for a school, my mother started
catering for my father instead because he was taken away on 23rd January and we saw
him again on 2nd April. So, instead of looking for a school for me and my brother, my
mother had to first take care of my father.108

127. Another witness spoke for and on behalf of many survivors of torture when he told
the Commission that:
Now if I go back to my own family as I have told you, people lost jobs. I think this is
something that cuts across families of these people who were brought here. People lost
their jobs. I was a civil servant working as an Agricultural Officer in Western Province.
My cousin Gitau Davy was working in the City Council of Nairobi and he was one of
the union leaders. He was a shop steward. My nephew Mungai was also working in the
Railways and so on. When we came out of prison, nobody could employ us. We were sort
of outcasts. Of course, the Government could not take you back. We were already marked
men and women. So, these people lost their livelihoods. Even my mother could not go
on with the work on the shamba because of the harassment that was going on and the
support that her children were giving. Almost all the families that were being arrested
suffered in more than one way and economic loss was almost uniform. Everywhere you
tried to invest, you found economic loss. This economic loss, hon. Commissioners, is an
important matter to address.109

128. The incarceration of Mwakenya suspects also led to family break-ups. For many of
them, it has been difficult to establish new families.
108 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 41.
109 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012/p. 12.
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This is something I like forgetting and it is probably why I did not remember to tell you.
Of course the hardest part was my family. I was very young and my wife was very young.
We had just got our first child and my first born was two months old. So, that was my
hardest part. As it has happened with most of my colleagues, my family broke down
because when I came out--- She was a young girl and I had stayed with her very briefly.
When I came out, we each had changed in different directions and something did not
work out. So, we had to separate. I first tried and even got two more children with her.
So, I have three children with the same lady but we had changed very much that we
tried to salvage the relationship for ten years. After those ten years, we could not do it
anymore. I have two boys after prison and I love them very much even if I separated with
their mother because I associate them with freedom. It was very difficult for me to start
another relationship. This has happened to very many people. I have talked to my own
colleagues. I have one of my colleagues who had to get married later to a person more
than 20 years younger than him. It was difficult because this was a dot-com and he was
becoming an old man and the language to use becomes difficult. It is difficult but we are
coping. Many families were affected like that.110

My message to Kenya is take care of widows
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/7 March 2012/p. 17.

What I can recommend from the meetings that have been held with the survivors’ widows; if there could be free medical services for the families and survivors. Many of them are
hurting and they have no means of getting proper treatment. If that can be given it could
help some of them who are still surviving to better their health.
Again, compensation should be done without going to court. In one of the meetings
I was told of somebody who was awarded Kshs 1.3 million but the lawyer wanted him to
add Kshs 200, 000. In other words, the person went without anything. Try to imagine such
a thing happening to a widow who is already in pain. That is like digging a grave for that
widow. I recommend that this thing should be done without going to court.
I also recommend a counseling centre for the survivors because of what they went
through because some are still hurting. I am saying this because of my spiritual background.
When I was with them I realized that many of them are still hurting and they need assistance.
I recommend special attention for the widows of the departed. Some of them were left
with children who were going to school. Some of them have various issues which they have
to address[…]
Again, concerning the widows, through the pain I first experienced when my husband
was jailed and after the death of my husband, I had a burden of a widow. I have been meeting
widows, encouraging them and many are getting healed. That is spiritual healing.
110 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Torture/Nairobi/28 February 2012/p. 19.
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Some of the widows are left when still young. So, how are they going to help themselves? I recommend that not only the widows of Nyayo Torture Chambers but also the
widows in Kenya should have their cases looked into. Like now, we have widows in the IDP
camps who did not become widows by choice but they are there. The test that they were
given during that time, you normally see it on TV; these are the tests they still have. With
my knowledge of weather, the long rains are just about to set in. Just try to imagine the
condition of these widows.
As I conclude, allow me relay a message to Kenyans from the word of God, from the
book of Exodus. I will read from my Bible if you allow me; Exodus 22:22 reads:“You shall not afflict any widow or fatherless child; if you afflict them in any way and they
cry at all to me, I will surely hear their cry and my wrath will become hot and I will kill you with
the sword, your wives shall be widows and your children shall be fatherless”.
That is the word of God. The Governments may come and go but the word of God is forever settled in heaven. So my message to Kenya is take care of widows. We are approaching
the elections again and it is my humble prayer that they take care that this land may not have
more widows. May the Lord, bless you.

Detention and torture of FERA suspects
129. The Commission received 16 statements from witnesses who were subjected
to torture as suspected members of the February Eighteenth Revolutionary
Army (FERA). The crackdown on FERA occurred between 1993 and 1997 within
Bungoma and Mount Elgon Districts. Suspected members of these groups
experienced torture and gross violations of human rights. Indeed, widespread
arrests, imprisonment and torture of residents of Bungoma were reported. FERA
suspects were held, often incommunicado, in police stations around Kimilili and
Webuye and beyond including Kakamega Prison and Kodiago Maximum Prison.
Some of them would then be transported all the way to Nairobi where they were
detained at Nyayo House.111
130. Witnesses who were arrested during the FERA crackdown narrated how they were
tortured, particularly by infliction of pain on their private parts. One witness told
the Commission:
While naked, I was made to put my legs apart and they tied my private parts. They tied
my testicles, I am not ashamed to say this because it happened and they started pulling.
They said they would bring an end to my life if I was not going to say anything. As they
kept pulling, I cried out and the more I cried, the more they pulled. Later, they released
111 See TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapsokwony/24 May 2011/p. 19-22.
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a bit and they asked me if I was ready to talk. They asked me what I knew about FERA
and when I said that I did not know anything about FERA, they said I was joking with
them. It reached a point when they said I was not talking. On the last day, I was beaten
unconscious and that is when I was served with papers and a pen and told to go and
write all my political role and involvement in FERA or Mwakenya.112

131. A female FERA suspect was sexually violated by police officers in a police cell:
They came into my home with seven vehicles and took me to Bungoma cells where I was
raped and they put a bottle in my vagina.113

132. In most cases, FERA detainees were asked to undress and remain nude during
interrogations. They were subjected to strenuous exercises like remaining in a
squatting position until instructed otherwise. Detainees who fell to the ground
during interrogations would be severely beaten by interrogators. Denial of food
was common, forcing victims to survive on water alone. Psychological torture
was also common as interrogators would leave the lights on in the cells so that
detainees were not able to tell day from night. All these were meant to break
the victims and make them to confess their involvement or knowledge of FERA.
Often, those detained would be persuaded to sign confessions admitting their
membership in FERA. They would then be removed from the cells after some days
in the same manner that they were brought in – blindfolded.
133.

Many of the FERA suspects who were detained and tortured bear permanent injuries.
Others succumbed to the injuries they suffered. Jackton Wepukhulu was arrested
and tortured together with two other people. He told the Commission about the fate
of the other two:
It is only one who is still alive. The other man died because he was tortured using live
electric wire. When we came out of prison, he lived for a very short time and succumbed
to death because of the injuries he sustained when he was being tortured. He was Titus
Wakori Wagwavuvi. Mr. Wycliff Wahonya is still alive, but he has some memory lapses.
In fact, he behaves like a mad man. As I speak now, I think he is in Uganda. He is not
comfortable living here with us. If need be, his relatives could come and testify before
this honourable Commission.114

112 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapsokwony/ 24 May 2011/ p. 6.
113 TJRC/Statement/36561
114 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapsokwony/24 May 2011/p. 23.
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Detention and torture of a FERA suspect: The story of George Walikhu
Marakalu
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapsokwony/24 May 2011/p. 3-9.

I was arrested on 12th January 1995; I was arrested in a very funny manner. It was very early
in the morning, before 8.00 a.m., when two police officers in plainclothes, who were attached
to Lwakhakha Police Post, came to my place of residence. They demanded to know who I was.
I gave them all my particulars. Then they told me to follow them since the boss of the police
station wanted to talk to me. I almost forgot to give you the names of the police officers. One
was Otieno but I did not know the name of the other, except that I talked to one of the special
branch officers called Peter Komora, who also demanded to know a few things about me and
my background. I talked to them and then they put me into the cells. I remember before I
walked out of the house I told my wife that since she knew me as a political activist, she should
not handle the issue lightly but instead she should track me to the police post. That was exactly
what she did. I spent there a day and my wife brought meals. Later on, I was transferred from
the police post to the divisional headquarters in Cheptais. When I reached there, there were
other people who had been arrested alongside me. They happened to be David Waliaula and
Lawrence Bwonya. I did not know exactly why I had been arrested and by the time we were being moved, it was not just a mere movement. We were put in a vehicle under very tight security
by the General Service Unit (GSU), regular police and Administration Police.
So, back in Cheptais, the District Officer (DO) talked to me. He wanted to know about me
and I told him everything. Now, he even asked me when I had left Uganda for Kenya. He made
some teasing statements. He asked me how Museveni was. I told him that I did not know him,
as I was just a refugee, and I had managed to come back to Kenya which was my home country.
During my stay there, one of the special branch officers came and took me to a separate room
where he interrogated me. He asked me a lot of questions. I am sorry I will not divulge all the
questions because of time, but they were all related to political issues.
They wanted to know why I decided to join the opposition politics. I talked at length about
it and I was sent back to the cell and I stayed there for a day or two before I was transferred to
Cheskaki Police Station. The cells were full in Cheskaki Police Station and there were so many
young men who had been arrested.
By that time, I was about 28 years because I was born in 1968. The place was very congested
and filthy and we stayed there for about two days and we were wondering why we had been
arrested. But all the same, we decided to wait until we get to know the accusations. After a day
or two there, the same policemen moved us again. I presume that we were more than 50 people
and we were put into two separate Land Rovers and moved to various police stations. I think
one of the Land Rovers drove to Kimilili and the other one went to Webuye. I was in the one that
drove to Webuye. From that time, we lost touch with our family members. I remember I was in
Webuye for more than one week and at one stage, we asked the OCS why we were not produced
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before the law court so that we could respond to any charges preferred against us. The OCS
responded by saying that he had only kept us in custody but he was not responsible for us and
that somebody else was responsible for us but he did not mention who that person was.
One night or three days later, at about midnight, several men in plain clothes came and
demanded that we come out of the cell. Before we reached the reception, our names were read
out. The experience I went through was very bitter. I was made to remove my shirt and the belt
was used to handcuff me from behind. The shirt was used to blindfold me before I was moved
to the waiting vehicle that was outside. I presumed that it was a lorry. I was not taken there in
a dignified manner; I was just bundled into the lorry like luggage. Inside the lorry, I instantly
realized that people were sobbing and sighing inside there and I knew that things were not
well. Before long, all of us had been bundled into the lorry and the journey began. The lorry
was being driven at a very high speed, even over bumps. We were shoved up and down and it
was very painful. Remember I told you that I had been handcuffed from behind so I sustained
some internal injuries in my spine and the neck. We arrived at dawn, the birds were singing and
that is how I got to know that it was dawn because I had been blindfolded. After we alighted
from the lorry, we were made to move slowly. Instructions were whispered to us; “step down,
move, take your legs up”, and I eventually found myself in a cell that was not big. It measured
about 7 feet by 5 feet.
As I was pushed into the cell, whoever was responsible for me removed the shirt that was
used to blindfold me as he left and instantly locked the door. So, I could not even have time to
look back to know who he or she was. After a few minutes, the same door was opened though
I could not see who was opening it. All I saw was that somebody was pushing a plate of uji into
the cell and when I looked at the uji and given that I was feeling hungry, I started bargaining
whether to take it or not. I did not know whether the uji was going to be safe for my life but all
the same I said that, come what may, I am as good as dead and I decided to take it. When I took
the uji, I left the plate there and before long, the same person came and removed the plate. I
had not told you what was in that particular room. What I found in that room was a pail of water
with a lid and on top of the pail was a cup. In the room was also one blanket, I did not know
what all those things were meant for but later on I realized that they were going to serve me.
When I wanted to go for a long call, I asked for permission to be taken to the toilet and I was
shown a bowl and that became my toilet from that day onwards up to the time I left that cell. I
used to defecate there and they would come and remove the bowl. My meals used to be served
in the same manner. When it came to lunch or supper, the plate used to be pushed inside and removed after I had finished. Lunch used to be ugali and some greens and supper used to be ugali
and some beans. On the second day, I was supposed to take a bath and I realized that we were
being handled by the warders because the men were dressed in prison uniform. I was blindfolded and moved out of the cell. The blindfold was removed immediately I reached the bathroom
and that was when I took my first bath. In the same manner, I was blindfolded and taken back to
the room. I realized that so many doors were being opened and closed and I must have sensed
that so many other suspects were with me in the same unit and yet, we could not meet or know
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who was where. About the third or fourth day, I was produced before the panel of those people
whom I presumed must have been special branch and intelligence men, for interrogation.
On the first day I met them they had sat round a table and remember that I was blindfolded
and made to pass through various gates, about 100 meters or so from the cell. I would only calculate that through the steps I was making, otherwise I would not see where I was being taken.
When I met the panel, they welcomed me after a long journey and demanded that I introduce
myself and give my historical background, which I did. After that, they said that they were going
to talk to me more and they wanted me to explain more about other issues. One of the funny
questions they raised was if I knew exactly why I was there. I answered no. This was funny because I was expecting them to tell me so instead of them expecting me to tell them. They said
that we would talk more and I was taken back to the cell. The next day I was taken back and that
is when I faced a lot of questions. I had to repeat all about myself in the same manner as the previous manner and they asked me to talk about myself and the political issues. They also wanted
to know whether I had at one time or the other joined any clandestine organization that was
out to undermine or oust the Government of the day. I said that I did not know anything of the
kind and that annoyed them. They said that people always said the truth there. I said that I had
said what I knew and I had nothing else to add. They decided to warn me and told me that they
had given me time to think and the next time I went there, I should tell them all I knew about
the things they had asked me.
On the third day of meeting them, I was produced before them and they were more serious than ever before. Previously, when I appeared before them, I used to be given a stool to
sit on. When I entered the room, they said that I was going to tell them all that they wanted
to know and all about what I had done. I told them that I was ready to say. They asked me if I
knew anything called FERA and whether at any time I had been a member of FERA or participated in its activities. I denied and that provoked them to anger and they told me that they
now meant business. They told me to undress and I did it and I remained nude. They then
said that they wanted me to do some simple exercises for them. I was told to go to the hall
and then they asked me to create an imaginary chair so that I could sit on it. That meant that
I had to squat with my hands akimbo and I was ordered to remain in that position until they
told me what to do next. Before long, as you would expect, I got tired and I fell on the ground.
They told me that I was joking because I was a trained man. I was told to redo it and when I
tried, I fell again and they started beating me. I do not know where they began to beat me
but all I saw was that they had wooden bars and they beat me on the hands, legs and soles.
When I cried they told me bado mambo, we still have a lot with you. I was told to climb over
the door and hang on to it. I had to use my arms to hang on to the cross bar of the door. That
meant that my legs were suspended and then they told me to cycle. I did it until I could not
do it anymore. As I was doing it, they were hitting at the soles and the legs and I was crying
but they would not sympathize.
The whole thing went on day after day and I remember that before they wound up, I was
told to bend on the floor and put one finger in one small hole that they had made and rotate

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

655

Volume IIA

Chapter FIVE

around it and that is exactly what I did and then I found myself on the floor. They came to
me with sticks and hit and kicked me and then they asked me if I was ready to talk and I said
I will talk. They asked me what I knew about those things and I told them that I did not anything. They asked me if I knew people like Buke and I said that I knew him. They then asked if
I had any kind of relationship with him, and I said no. I only knew him because he came from
the same region with me. They asked me if I knew people like Wang’amati and I said that I
knew him. They asked how I knew him and I told them that he was a politician whom I had
interacted with at one time or the other. They asked me whether I knew anybody called John
Otongo and I told them that I had never heard of him and they said that I was a pretender.
Later on, I was made to hang on the bars of the door and I was told to bark like a dog and to
ape a monkey and I had to follow the instructions. They then told me that I was ready to tell
them more stories. You can realize the kind of suffering I was made to go through. It went on
day after day but they did not get what they had expected of me. When it reached that level,
on one occasion after beating me and taking me through the same cycle, they decided to
use another technique.
While naked, I was made to put my legs apart and they tied my private parts. They tied
the testicles, I am not ashamed to say this because it happened and they started pulling.
They said they would bring an end to my life if I was not going to say anything. As they kept
pulling, I cried out and the more I cried, the more they pulled. Later, they released a bit and
they asked me if I was ready to talk. They asked me what I knew about FERA and I said that I
did not know anything and they said that I was joking with them. In the process, it reached
a point when they said that I was not talking. On the last day, I was beaten unconscious and
that is when I was served with papers and a pen and told to go and write all my political role
and involvement with FERA or Mwakenya. I was taken back to the cell and this time round,
my meals were suspended. They did not come for me until five days had elapsed. All I was
surviving on was just mere water. The lights were kept on day and night and I did not even
know where I was. I could not tell day or night and my body was swollen all over. It reached a
point where I could not lie on any side so I had to lie on my back. I stayed in that position and
yet I had to strain to write. At one time during that particular process of torture, I had been
forewarned by one of the warders to confess because if I was not going to, then anything
could have followed. I wrote that I was a FERA member and I wrote so many things, some of
which I cannot even remember. On the fifth day when they came for me--- I remember that
one of those people would peep though the key hole. When I was produced after about five
days of being in isolation, they asked me whether I had written anything sensible and I said I
had. I gave it to them and they read.
By then I used to smoke and I was given a cigarette to smoke. I was also given a cup of tea
and I remember that when I took the first gulp, it went painfully down the throat. It is as if it was
cracking my gullet but I took it slowly until I finished it. When I was taken back to the cell, this
time round I was not beaten and all I was told was that I had done well to comply. I was given
further instructions that they were preparing to release me but before they could do that, I had
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to abide by certain conditions. One was to accept each and everything and confess to being a
FERA member and I said it was fine. I think that is the time they relaxed and I was not beaten
anymore. When I went back to the cell, ugali was brought and I sensed that I was in danger. My
digestive system had practically collapsed and that is when I knew that eating anything solid
was going to endanger my life. I took a bit of it, soaked it in soup and bit a little bit and left the
rest. Barely 15 minutes later, I heard footsteps of somebody running towards my cell and when
he entered the cell, he was in a panic. He removed the ugali very fast and enquired if I had taken
enough water and I told him that I had been taking water all the time for my survival. After
about ten or so minutes, he brought a whole plate of uji and he instructed me to take it slowly.
That marked my lunch and supper because when supper was served, I could not even eat.
I want to come to what happened shortly before I was moved from the torture and what
happened after the torture chamber. After about three or four days, they came for me and
I think it was towards dawn. I was removed from the cell in the same manner having been
blindfolded and given all my clothes. I was put in a vehicle and I could sense that there were
other people in the vehicle because you could feel them breathing but you could not see
who was there. Before we got out, our fingerprints were taken. We were driven out of the torture chambers and we drove for many hours until we reached a place called Lessons and that
is when my blindfolds were removed. I do not remember anything else. We were driven further and sometime in the afternoon, we landed at Kakamega Police Provincial Headquarters.
We stayed there for a day and on the second day I was made to appear before the PCIO who
sought to know more about me and the reasons why I had been arrested. I had to explain to
him and he took a statement as pertains that.
I thought that we were going to be released to go home from there because when the
blindfolds were removed, I realized that I was in the company of four other people. These
people were Justus Waelo, Sammy Mafura, Patrick Baraza and Moses Mandu and I was the
fifth person. We did not know what was going to follow next only to realize later that we were
going to answer to some charges. Sometime on a late afternoon, the charges were prepared
and we realized we were going to be taken to court. When we were taken to court, it was a
few minutes past five and the courts were empty. There was no audience there but I remember I saw camera men, possibly Press men.
We appeared before a magistrate called Wilbroda Juma and she read the charges against
us. I was put on murder of 11 counts and as you know that by law, when murder cases are
preferred against you, you do not plead. That meant that we were to appear before the law
courts every fortnight for mention. In between our period of stay in the prison, we used to
appear before the court after every 14 days. Sometime later, the magistrate was changed and
we were made to appear before another Senior Principal Magistrate called Ms. Gladys Ndeda.
Wilbroda was a Senior Resident Magistrate. I met other suspects who had been associated
with FERA in Kakamega Prison where we stayed for a number of days. That was in March. At
one time during our custody, we were moved to Kodiaga Maximum Prison but we would
come and appear in Kakamega Court.
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Things went on like that until it reached a point where we seized the courage to ask the
court to commit us. We wanted to know why we were not committed and the case had run to
several months. We wanted the prosecution to come up with a committal. The prosecutor kept
telling the magistrate that the committal bundles were not ready and we were arguing that
this was going to amount to an injustice because justice delayed is justice denied. At one time
during those sessions, we were represented by lawyers and one of them was the late George
Kapten who kept challenging the court to produce the committal bundles but they were never
produced. I still remember various things that happened at that particular time which I would
want to mention and one of them is that even after having appeared before the court, the
police had to seize the opportunity to conduct a parade in the prison. On that parade, I appeared with my two co-accused fellows who were Moses Mandu and Patrick Baraza because
we were in the same charge sheet. When the parade was mounted, we asked the policemen to
create a space for our lawyer to be present so that justice would be done but the police did not
listen and they said that they were going to be fair so we complied. We did not have any one of
us identified in the parade. As we kept on demanding for the committal bundles which were
never there, I remember that my people had started visiting me and other suspects in prison
and they were wondering what way they would have to use to ensure that justice was done.
At one stage, they ended up in the hands of a State Counsel and I was made to understand
that the State Counsel asked for a bribe so as to secure our release. I was made to believe that
25,000 shillings was released to the State Counsel so as to buy my freedom. Barely three weeks
after he had received the money, we were made to appear before the Magistrate Ms. Gladys
Ndeda and we were released under Section 87B. My brother and the relatives of the other coaccused people had also come. I may not be so accurate with the section because I am not a
lawyer but all I remember was that section meant that investigations were pending and that
they could be collected and be produced and charged with the same offence any time. From
there, we were not entirely free people.
I went back home and joined my people and I remember that my wife was still there. I had
left her when she was pregnant and we had stayed for a number of years without a child and
something coincidentally happened. When she gave birth to my first born, I was in prison and
I was informed about it. She underwent a caesarean operation. When I went home, there were
so many people who came to say pole but later on I realized that there was something behind it.
People were not only coming to say pole, but they were also curious because they believed the
child was not mine. She was only two weeks pregnant when I was arrested so their curiosity was
satisfied when they saw that I resembled the baby girl. I was still staying in Lukhakha. I stayed
there for quite some time but I was still under surveillance. The Government was not satisfied
that I was a good citizen. My physical health was very poor and my special regards go to Independent Medical Legal Unit (IMLU) because when I got in touch with them, there were various
friends who really helped me among them Ms. Ling Kituyi who facilitated my treatment. We
also had other sympathizers from Amnesty International and also a British lady who helped us
financially and my life was partially restored.
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Detention and torture of Kaya Bombo suspects
134. On the night of 13 August 1997, Digo youths attacked a police station and
the ferry police post as their initial targets.115 The raiders stole guns and
ammunitions from the police station in what appeared to be a calculated act to
obtain arms that would be used to terrorise and drive away ‘up-country’ people
so that they do not vote for the opposition parties in the 1997 parliamentary
and presidential elections.116 After the raid on the police station, the police
mounted a massive a operation that targeted residents of coastal villages and
towns. This response led to an indiscriminate crackdown on the Digo population
which resulted in the torture of innocent people who had not been involved in
the raids. The patterns of violations and excessive use of force by the security
forces, involving combined units of General Service Unit (GSU), police and other
security personnel, resulted in indiscriminate arrests, detention, and torture of
hundreds of Digo men.117
135. Rashid Bogodzo was a victim of torture during this operation. He narrated his
experience to the Commission during its hearing in Kwale:
At Matuga, they ordered me to stand against the wall and they used chains and pipes
to beat me as one counted. Anytime I fell, they started counting afresh and they did
that until I messed up on myself. I had not even drunk water since the previous day
so I was not able to do anything and they would badly beat me whenever I lay down.
I was taken to the PPO’s centre where I found Masumbuko, the late Maitha, Chisondo
and Mr. Banda. I asked the late Maitha what was going on and he told me that I should
admit even if I did not know anything so that I could be released […] when you were
picked, you would go to the PPO’s office where you would be stripped naked and your
feet would be tightly bound. They would then take your testicles and tie with a wire
and it was very bad. You would then be made to say how many people you had killed
and how many guns you took. We were there for 37 days. 118

136. All Hajj Omar Masumbuko was equally subjected to gruesome acts of torture. His
story is captured in detail in the box below. It is a reflection of the experiences
of many Digo men who were detained and tortured during the Kaya Bombo
clashes.

115
116
117
118

Playing with fire: Weapons proliferation, political violence, and Human Rights in Kenya, 2002 p 35
Akiwumi Report p 21
TJRC/Statement/33003; TJRC/Statement/33042; TJRC/Statement/37035
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/23 January 2012/p. 5.
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The detention and torture of Al Hajj Omar Masumbuko
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/23 January 2012/pp 27-37

Al Hajj Omar Masumbuko: I am a victim of the Kaya Bombo clashes. I was arrested on 23rd
in 1997, two months after coming back from my pilgrimage by about 10 police officers who
had AK 47 guns and pistols. I was taken to the CID headquarters in Mombasa, where I met the
PCIO, who was Mr. Namai. I also met the PPO, Mr. Francis Gichuhi and the head of the special
unit which had been brought to Mombasa in order to tackle the Kaya Bombo issues, Mr. Nyaseda. There were also other officers whom I was not able to recognize. I was asked where I had
been the previous two days. I told them that I had gone to pick my children who had closed
school in Kirinyaga, Kerugoya. They asked me to prove that I had been to Kerugoya. I gave them
the address of the director of the school. I also had a receipt of the place where I had lodged. I
was asked if I knew anything about the happenings in Kaya Bombo. Mr. Olando, who was the
DC at that time, was a friend of mine. I was among the opinion leaders in this area and had been
asked to go to Likoni to say what had happened. I went there together with the DC, Mr. Olando,
PPO, PCIO and Commissioner of Police and saw what was happening. They asked me if I had
heard anything about Kaya Bombo for the previous six months. I told them that I had not heard
anything or hint, since I had gone for pilgrimage in the month of April. When I came back from
the pilgrimage, I did not hear anything about Kaya Bombo. They did not ask me anything. I was
handcuffed and taken to Bamburi Police Station. When I reached there, the police officers who
took me there asked the report office if they had cuffs for my legs and they said that they did
not have them. I was put in a cell which was overcrowded until morning.
In the morning, the Criminal Investigation Officers came and got me out of the cell. I
had spent the night in handcuffs. They put me in a vehicle and took me back the CID Headquarters. When I got there, I met the PCIO and PPO again, and other officers. They asked me
if I knew anything with regard to 20 guns and 500 bullets. I responded that I knew nothing.
The PCIO instructed someone known as Inspector Hassan and Inspector Kazar--- Mr. Nyaseda
called three other officers who were told to take me. I was taken to an ancient house near the
sea, which I believe is a godown. I would like the Commission to go and view the place, which
is dangerous. I had my legs chained and they started torturing me. They took a car battery
and connected some wires…[…]
They tied some wires on the battery and my feet and started shocking me with the
current from the battery while, at the same time, assaulting me. I did not say anything
because I knew nothing. They drew a pistol and shot at the wall. One of them removed a
sword and cut me on the face. I have a scar on my face. The scars from the electric currents
are also still there. My private parts were tied with a wire and pulled. They kept hitting the
wire. I was beaten up until I lost consciousness. When I came to, I had been taken back to
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Bamburi. The following morning, they took me again. When I got there, they told me: “We
do not want to torture you. Have you remembered? We just want you to tell us the truth.” I
told them: “To be honest, I am a pilgrim and have taken religion seriously. There is nothing
that I know.” I was taken down there by another group of soldiers ordered by Nyaseda and
Mr. Namai, who was a Senior Assistant Commissioner. When I got there, I found hon. Maitha
who also had his legs tied.[…]
I found Mr. Maitha who had been hung upside down. He was being assaulted and blood
was oozing from his nose. There was one person who had been beaten and I later discovered
that he was dead. He had a lot of wounds. He was a Digo youth.
They started hitting me again, but there was nothing I could say because I knew nothing. I told them that if they could check my documents, they showed that I had just returned
from Hajj.
Detention in a condemned section
We were taken to Shimo La Tewa where the warders were told to take us to the condemned section, which is in Block B. That was an area for people who had already received
capital sentences and were waiting to be hanged. It was on the right hand side. We slept
there and the following day, at about 3.00p.m. we were blindfolded and taken outside.
It was like a prison inside another prison
We could hear people’s voices. It was like a prison inside another prison. There was water
and about five other doors inside. On the wall, I could see names of very prominent people
including Shikuku, Matiba, and Raila […]
They told me that the people are fighting in Likoni and it was said that I used to be in
Iddi Amin’s Army and that I was a colonel. So, I asked them that at that age, with my years
and my education, did I do that work when I was still in my mother’s stomach because I
think that to be a soldier one should be over 18 years old and one of them said that it was
true. So, one of them wanted to hit me but the senior prison warder said that it was not
possible because I was now under the prison warders and they would not like policemen
to torture me before them. Kadzo said that it was possible because I was still under police
custody. He said that they brought me for keeping. So, they pulled us outside.
‘They told me that if the Buffalo and Lion rise, I will be their food’
When they were coming in, they had noticed that there was a lion and a buffalo waiting
for the KWS personnel. So, they tied me onto a tree five meters away from the wounded lion
and buffalo. I was tied there for hours and they told me that if the buffalo and lion will rise, I
will be their food. I did not really care much because I was tired of life and I was actually wishing that those animals would get up and “finish” me. After some time, they came and untied
me and took me back.
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Detention and Torture during President Kibaki’s Era
137. During President Kibaki’s time in office, rampant and widespread use of torture
occurred in the context of Mt. Elgon conflict. State security agents who were
deployed in the region to quash the Sabaot Land Defence Force descended on the
local population with excessive force that involved the torture of innocent citizens
in order to make them identify SLDF members amongst them. There was torture
during arrest and separation of men and boys from women in villages and towns.
There was torture during transportation to the bases set by the military in places
like Kapkota, Saandet and Kaptama. Finally, once in the bases, those arrested were
subjected to various forms of torture.
138.

Incidents of torture by state security agents in Mount Elgon have been widely
reported both by governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations.
Reports, documenting torture and other violations in Mt. Elgon include the following:













Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Mountain of terror: A report
on the investigations of torture by the military at Mt. Elgon (2008);
IMLU Double tragedy: Report on medico-legal documentation of torture and
related violations in Mt. Elgon Operation Okoa Maisha (2008);
Human Rights Watch All the men have gone: War crimes in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon
conflict (2008);
Report of the Joint Visit to Mount Elgon Region by the Committees on
Defence and Foreign Relations and Administration, National Security and
Local Authorities (2008);
Medecins Sans Frontieres Mount Elgon: Does anybody care (2008)
UN Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, Mission to Kenya, A/HRC/11/2/
Add. 6, May 26, 2009; and
Human Rights Watch Hold your heart: Waiting for justice in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon
region (2011);

139. Statements received from and the hearing held in Mt. Elgon region by the
Commission confirmed most of the findings of the above reports: the joint operation
referred to Operation Okoa Maisha resulted in the systematic and widespread
torture of individuals. According to a man who witnessed the atrocities:
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Although the SLDF was deadly, the Government used excessive force. Up to this time,
as I am talking, we talk as we shed tears of sorrow. We do not have youths in this land.
Women and wives are desperate. We have no men. The Army castrated the youths. The
future generation is not there. They used excess force. That is our cry. Although the Army
assisted us greatly, they did more harm than good. Anyway, we still pray that they do
not use that again. Let them use amicable ways so that they are safe. The Army used
bombs, Kifarus and every means they would have used against another country. It was
unfortunate. Mt. Elgon was trembling; the bombs were shaking the land. It was sad. It
extended to even areas that were not involved. Many people were arrested and they
were tortured by the Army. I saw it. Although I was not arrested, I saw the nasty things
that happened. Mt. Elgon was not safe. Even at this time, we are still trembling. We are
still worried. If you talk of the Army, I think you have to tremble.119

140. A woman narrated to the Commission how her husband was arrested by police
and military officers, tortured, and then forcefully disappeared.120

119 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapsokwony/25 May 2011/p. 12.
120 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kapsokwony/24 May 2011/p. 36-38.
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Annex:
List of Victims of Detention, Torture and ill-Treatment
STATEMENT
ID

664

NAMES

GENDER

PROVINCE

DISTRICT

CONTEXT OF
VIOLATION

6659

Kuria Mbogo

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

6665

Kigathi Nganga

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

6665

Njihia Muchai

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

6665

Njoroge Kibaka Kiruri

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

6665

Reuben Kibiru Njoroge

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

6666

Githiri Kariuki

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

6675

Gatoho Muthama

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

6675

Kibaki Gathanwa

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

6675

Njau Gachingu

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

10045

Erastus Kamuri M Mwereria

M

Eastern

Igembe North

Mau Mau

10045

Kuno M Munorue

M

Eastern

Igembe North

Mau Mau

14681

Chokwe Mwega

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Jane Wanga

F

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

John Mbiyu Koinange

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Laban H Wanga

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Margaret O Wanga

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Pio Gama Pinto

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Ramogi Ochieng Onoko

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Susan Nabwire Wanga

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Tab Omia Wanga

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Wanga Mahanga Oniang

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Waruru Kanja

M

Western

Bunyala

Mau Mau

14681

Wilgarda Odinda Wanga

M

Western

Bunyala

29113

Moki Kivisu

M

Eastern

29360

Fasilia Njoki

F

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

29360

Genalo Joyce Munyiva

F

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

29360

Sarah Igoki

F

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

29360

Silvano Mwaniki

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

29361

Aliet Kathuni

F

NG

NG

Mau Mau

29361

Elizabeth Thaara

F

NG

NG

Mau Mau

29361

Jonathan Njoka Muruanguiko

M

NG

NG

Mau Mau

29706

Kithinji Mirenge

M

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29706

Mitonga

M

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29706

Mmwauirua Mamburugua

M

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29706

Muchinga

M

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29706

Wanja

F

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29708

Mananua Margaret Muchuga

F

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29726

Koome Kanooro

M

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

Mau Mau
Mau Mau
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29726

Rimburia

29727

GIthinji

M

Eastern

Meru South

Mau mau

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29727

Kanooro

NG

29727

Mukangu Rimbeuria

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

Eastern

Meru South

29740

Kamunyi Riungu

Mau Mau

M

Eastern

Meru Central

Mau Mau

29740
29741

Mboroki Mbogori

M

Eastern

Mitunga Mtwamchira

M

Eastern

Meru Central

Mau Mau

29758

Araja Fm Chabari

M

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29758

Karomo Nteere

M

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29758

Mukiri Justus

M

Eastern

Meru South

Mau Mau

29804

Anastasia Mothea

F

Eastern

Tigania West

Mau Mau

29804

Doris Mwenda

M

Eastern

Tigania West

Mau Mau

29804

Harriet Ntonyi

F

Eastern

Tigania West

Mau Mau

29804

Ken Muita

M

Eastern

Tigania West

Mau Mau

29804

Mangeta Mikiba

M

Eastern

Tigania West

Mau Mau

29804

Mchebere

M

Eastern

Tigania West

Mau Mau

29804

Mutuma Patrick

M

Eastern

Tigania West

Mau Mau

29804

Wiliam Kailikia Mikiba

M

Eastern

Tigania West

Mau Mau

29807

Maria Nyegera Gichunge

F

Eastern

Igembe North

Mau Mau

29809

David Kubai Mithiria

M

Eastern

Tigania East

Mau Mau

29810

John Muuri Kunyara

M

Eastern

Tigania East

Mau Mau

29817

Benard Nkuri Mitumbiri

M

Eastern

Tigania West

Mau Mau

30127

Mikawatha Thirari

M

Eastern

Igembe North

Mau Mau

30127

Solomon Mitirikin

M

Eastern

Igembe North

Mau Mau

34563

Kariuki Thagichu

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

34575

Kamau Muturi

M

Central

Kiambu

Mau Mau

35947

Gathambo Githinji

M

Central

Nyeri

Mau Mau

35947

Kamori Kahohia

M

Central

Nyeri

Mau Mau

35947

Mithiga Kariuki

M

Central

Nyeri

Mau Mau

35947

Muthoni Kabuthu

F

Central

Nyeri

Mau Mau

35947

Nancy Nyaguthii Mburu

F

Central

Nyeri

Mau Mau

35947

Nduta Muchangi

F

Central

Nyeri

Mau Mau

35947

Ngina Kenyatta

F

Central

Nyeri

Mau Mau

35947

Ngonyo Muriuki

M

Central

Nyeri

Mau Mau

35947

Wanjiku Kabusi

F

Central

Nyeri

Mau Mau

41428

Jonathan Kathuku Wainaina

M

Eastern

Mbeere South

Mau Mau

41428

Kanegene Murua Migui

M

Eastern

Mbeere South

Mau Mau

41428

Mbogo Wa Njogu

M

Eastern

Mbeere South

Mau Mau

41428

Namu Muruajenga

M

Eastern

Mbeere South

Mau Mau

41428

Ndereva Njiru

M

Eastern

Mbeere South

Mau Mau

41428

Samuel Mbulaka Mulatari

M

Eastern

Mbeere South

Mau Mau

43381

Bilia Kaura

F

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43381

Kivunjio Nguu

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43381

Nguu Mbora Kavii

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau
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43384

Ieri Galemi

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43384

Njagi Mnjaria

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43384

Njiru Nduma

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43384

Njue Karuana Rombia

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43391

Douglas Njoka Kariko

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43391

Mugo Karuirua Rwamba

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43391

Ndwiga Gatema Nderi

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43391

Ngoroi Kanyakiri

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

43391

Njoka Mmbura

M

Eastern

Embu East

43394

Igandu Margaret

F

Eastern

Mau Mau

43394

Ndwiga Joseph

M

Eastern

Mau Mau

43394

Njamburi Lydia Gicuku

F

Eastern

43507

David Kitundu Kamu

M

Eastern

Makueni

Mau Mau

43507

Kimeu Kaviti

M

Eastern

Makueni

Mau Mau

43507

Ndutu Kulungu

M

Eastern

Makueni

Mau Mau

43508

Kasyoka Muli

F

Eastern

Makueni

Mau Mau

43508

Muli Kivindyo

M

Eastern

Makueni

Mau Mau

43508

Mwau Mbiio

M

Eastern

Makueni

43658

Mueni Joseph Mutunga

M

Eastern

43658

Ndewa Ngugi

M

Eastern

43658

Kaswii Kathiuni

NG

Eastern

Kitui

Mau Mau

43658

Kitheka Mwandai

NG

Eastern

Kitui

Mau Mau

43658

Kithingwa Kasingwa

NG

Eastern

Kitui

Mau Mau

43658

Mwangi Ndewa

M

Eastern

Kitui

Mau Mau

43658

William Chaka

M

Eastern

Kitui

Mau Mau

43686

Mwanzia Benjamin Kimuli

M

Eastern

Kitui

Mau Mau

44121

Nathan Namu Muratho

M

Eastern

Embu East

Mau Mau

47558

Cecilia John Wambui

F

Central

Muranga

47568

Ngugi Peter

M

Central

Mau Mau

47568

Chorogu Wambui Elizabeth

F

Central

Mau Mau

47568

Gatarua Njoroge David

M

Central

Mau Mau

47568

Kairu Peter Waithaka

M

Central

Mau Mau

47568

Kamau Kibe

M

Central

Mau Mau

47568

Ndungu Njeri

F

Central

Mau Mau

47568

Waikumbi Josephine Nyagiko

F

Central

Mau Mau

47568

Wambaka Ndungu

M

Central

Mau Mau

47578

Mbugua Peter Njogu

M

Central

Mau Mau

47578

Muriu Kagome

M

Central

Mau Mau

47578

Joyce Wambui Irungu

F

Central

Mau Mau

M

Central

Mau Mau

47580

666

NAMES

Kinuthia Peter Thuku

Mau Mau

Mau Mau

Mau Mau
Mau Mau
Mau Mau

Mau Mau

49566

Gichira Gatenyeka Gatemyeka

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49569

Lucy Kabare

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49569

Monicah Waruguru

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49569

Muthoni Mbagi

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau
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49569

Mwangi Muthigani

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49569

Regina Wambura Muthigani

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49595

Esther Nyawira

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49595

Mary Wanjiru

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49595

Naomi Wambui

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49595

Njanja Njambuya

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49595

Peter Wachira

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49596

Gacau Muthigani

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49596

Gladys Wanjiru Muthigani

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49596

Harry Wamwea

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49596

Joseph Wanjohi

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49596

Joseph Wanjohi Muthigani

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49596

Mwai Muthigani

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49598

Baar

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49598

Museke Hassan Rajabu

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49598

Mwanasha Wanja

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49797

Samson Ndambo Mbulo

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49797

Tumbo Kiai

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49797

Warui Wa Kithuci

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49798

Cyrus Mitirie James Munyi

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49798

General China

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49798

Ngura Ndibaru

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

49798

Waruru Kanja

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mau Mau

81080

Amos Maina

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Ben Gachahi Karanja

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

David Kairu Muiruri

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

David Wachira

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Francis Githuo Wa Karanja

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Gachanja Kangiri

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

James Ndiritu Kihenja

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Josephine Njeri Mukuna

F

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Kamanga Wa Mukonyoro

F

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Kanyi Wa Gachuhi

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Kikuyus

NG

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Ngethe Wa Murimi

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Ngure Kaboka Kungu

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Tabitha Nyambura

F

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

Wangai Wa Kibibia

F

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

81080

William Ndiritu

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

Mau Mau

2503

Abdi Adan Issack

M

North
Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

3598

Abdi Hassan Mohamed

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

3598

Abdullah Mohamed

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

3598

Aliow Mohamed

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War
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3598

Chaluga Mohamed

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

3598

Habiba Mohamed

F

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

3598

Mahad Mohamed

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

3598

Mamud Mohamed

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

3598

Qalo Mohamed (Mother)

F

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

3598

Tunit Mohamed

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

8800

Abdikadir Abdille

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

8800

Maalim Gedi Mohamud

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

8800

Mohamed Muhumad

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

8920

Abdia Faah Mursal

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

8920

Farah Mursal Aden

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

8920

Gafow Farah Mursal

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

8920

Mohamud Farah Mursal

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

8920

Oley Mursal Aden

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9793

Adan Mohamud Noor

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9793

Hassan Diis Mumin

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9793

Omar Hassan Noor

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9793

Sheikh Ahmed Sheikh Barrow

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9800

Daud Maalim Hajir

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9800

Ibrahim Noor Adan

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9804

Abdikadir Bulle Ali

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9804

Abdirahman Bulle Ali

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9804

Adan Ali Mohamed

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9804

Ali Issack Hassan

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9804

Mohamud Ibrahim Yabinow

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9848

Adan Mohamed Hassan

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

9848

Fatuma Korion Muhumed

F

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

10093

Diba Abalar

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

10093

Diba Dadacha

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War
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10093

Hussein Halkano Jillo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

10093

Nyencho Dadacha

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

10093

Roba Dadacha

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

19575

Galgalo Dima Abduba

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

19575

Jillo Boru Guyo

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

19575

Madera Katkato

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

19575

Selle Waqo

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

26605

Abdi Ali Mohamood

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

26605

Asli Haji Ahmed

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

26605

Sheikh Omar

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

26605

Yaya Abdi

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

28473

Farnan Shaban Elmi

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

28473

Ibrahim Hassan

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

28473

Matani

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

28485

Abdikadir Bulle Ali

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

31662

Adan Gufu Sora

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

31662

Buke Gufu

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

31662

Huka Gufu

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

31666

Ali Hapi

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

31666

Daral Mohamed Jerahim

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

31666

Issack Kiti

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

31666

Sharamo Ali

F

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

31666

Tulicha

M

Eastern

Moyale

Shifta War

34773

Jibo Bala Guracha

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34774

Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34775

Aya Shanu Kala

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34776

Adan Abdi

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34776

Hadija Abdi Ali

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34776

Halaki Abdi

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34776

Hassan Abdi

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34778

Boru Abaufi

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34778

Habiba Boru

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34778

Wario Boru Abaufi

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34791

Ali Shunayo

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34791

Amina Ngimbe Bicha

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34791

Bicha Tune

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34791

Shaba Shunayo

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34791

Zeinab Abdinur

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34796

Bakanis Molu(Dead)

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34796

Guracha Molu(Dead)

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34796

Molu Qampare

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34796

Salesa Molu

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War
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34796

Salesa Molu Guyo

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34799

Dida Matta

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34799

Gababa Hapicha Godana

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

34799

Galgallo Matta

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36476

Balafu Roka

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36476

Elema Roba

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36476

Hache Roba Roka

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36476

Roba Roka(Dead)

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36479

Gobo Guyo Bisiqo

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36479

Sarkama Guyo Bisiqo

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36480

Bashir Mohamed Kulicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36480

Mohamed Kulicha(Dead)

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36486

Abukar Boru Dida

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36486

Boru Dida Jillo

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36486

Golicha Boru Dida

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36487

Ali Qalla

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36487

Dera Galgallo Dokicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36487

Elema

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36487

Galgallo Hamana

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36487

Halkano Hamana

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36487

Wajer Boru Boko

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36487

Wario Bambana

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36488

Amina Sharama(Dead)

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36488

Hassan Sharama(Dead)

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36488

Jibrril Sharama Kota

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36490

Guyo Halake Shabana

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36490

Huga Shabana

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36490

Soukolo Shabana

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36496

Gollo Duba Hapi Odda

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

36496

Shaka Deba Duba

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

40181

Abdi Hassan

M

North
Eastern

Lagdera

Shifta War

40181

Ali Yabow

M

North
Eastern

Lagdera

Shifta War

40181

Foley Digale

M

North
Eastern

Lagdera

Shifta War

40181

Mohamud Yarrow

M

North
Eastern

Lagdera

Shifta War

40181

Muhamud Mohamed Dahir

M

North
Eastern

Lagdera

Shifta War

40232

Haretha Hakar Omar

F

North
Eastern

Lagdera

Shifta War

42021

Bootu Wario

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42021

Ginjo Boru

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42021

Gunjo Halake

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War
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42021

Hassan Guyo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42021

Ilmaan Halake Kore

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42021

Wako Nyaate Dugo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42063

Bidu Hallo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42063

Guyo Jattani

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42063

Guyo Wadha

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42063

Halkan Jattani

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42063

Matoye Boru

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42063

Mohamed Guyo Jattani

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

42275

Adan Kaya Hassan

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

42275

Kusow Noordhiis

M

North
Eastern

Mandera

Shifta War

47695

Abdi Shekh Hussein

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47695

Farah Mohamed

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47695

Mohamed Ali Sherua

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47695

Mohamed Mohamud Jabane

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47695

Mohamed Wathadyare

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47695

Mohamud Haji Hersi

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47825

Abdikadir Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Abdirahman Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Abikar Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Adan Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Asina Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Fatuma Golicha

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Golicha Galma

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Gubal Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Hawo Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Kadubo Dima

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Kulula Diba

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Mimina Oriti Mohamed

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Mohamed Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Rukia Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Wako Boru

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47825

Yussuf Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47829

Abdi Bonaya

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47829

Ali Ibrahim

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47829

Golicha Galma

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47829

Kulula Diba

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47829

Mohamed Sora Nakata

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47829

Nakata Shanu

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47829

Safo Galma Golicha

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47829

Saku Golicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47841

Abagolo Kampicha Orma

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War
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47841

Abdiaziz Hassan

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47841

Abdikadir Sama

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47841

Guyo Guda

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47841

Habiba Wako Huka

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47841

Hassan Halake

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

47937

Ali Galgalo

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47937

Butha Luma

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47937

Golo Luma

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47937

Guyo Duba Santo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47937

Huka Abagalse

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47937

Huka Barichi

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47937

Jilma Duba Babo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47937

Jirmor Umuro

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

47937

Sugu Gera

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48059

Abadaro Jane Kilono

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48110

Ismail Abdulkadir(Dead)

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48110

Jaafar Tupi

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48110

Maalim Mohamed Shuriye

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48110

Mohamed Abdulkadir

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48110

Mohamed Guyo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Abdi Guyo Babo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Adawo Galgalo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Bochol Abdi

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Boru Jirma

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Guyo Babo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Guyo Rufo

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Isaako Guyo Babo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Kamotho Galgalo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Kampure Abdi Abdi Babo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Kuno Roba

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Mohammed Galgalo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48113

Sharu Abdi

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48118

Amina Fugicha

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Boru Dabaso Kontoma

NG

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Fugicha Jillo

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Guyo Sora

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Hawo Fugicha

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Hersi Fugicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Hussein Fugicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Mariam Fugicha

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Mohamed Fugicha

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Mohamed Galgalo Hali

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Sama Shune

F

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War

48118

Sheik Abdikadir Guyo Tuye

M

Eastern

Garbatula

Shifta War
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48129

Abba Galla Billa

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48129

Billa Halake

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48129

Fatuma Kadubo

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48129

Haji Kadubo Billa

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48129

Jirma Umuro

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48129

Kalubo Billa

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48129

Tullun Godana

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48135

Abdi Dika

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48135

Ali Golo

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48135

Daki Golo

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48135

Diba Abdi Molu

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48135

Golo Saili

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48135

Halima Abdi

F

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

48135

Nura Dima

M

Eastern

Isiolo

Shifta War

5601

Geofrey Ngojine

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5601

Lesoipa

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5601

Michael Murji

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5601

Nicholas Litau Lasambu

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5601

Robin Lemorgosipil

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5602

Michael Murji Mathenge

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5607

Lobuk Pius Letaro

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5681

Jason Hearing

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5681

Job Lekalau

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5681

Leriyai

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

5681

William Leaduma Seketian

M

Rift Valley

Samburu Central

1982 Coup Attempt

6479

Abwere

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

6479

Edward D. Macharia Mukora

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

6479

Eunice Wacuka Thiru

F

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

6479

Joel Nganga Wairire

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

6479

Joseph Michael Thiru Mbacio

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

6479

Kamunya

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

6479

Peter Kibisu

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

6479

Stanley Ngangagathirwa

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

6862

Daniel Mutai

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

6862

Moses Chesire

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

6862

Moses Kurgat

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

6862

Simon Talam

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

6865

Moses Chesire

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

6865

Mutai Daniel

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

6865

Ombok

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

6865

Simeon Kiptoo Talan

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

6866

Daniel Kiprotich Sitienei

M

Rift Valley

Nandi North

1982 Coup Attempt

6866

Philip Kutoi

Rift Valley

Nandi North

1982 Coup Attempt

6866

Simon Talam

Rift Valley

Nandi North

1982 Coup Attempt

M
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6868

Birgen

M

Rift Valley

Keiyo

1982 Coup Attempt

6868

Joseph Rono

M

Rift Valley

Keiyo

1982 Coup Attempt

6868

Kimonyi

M

Rift Valley

Keiyo

1982 Coup Attempt

6868

Moses Chesire Koiser

M

Rift Valley

Keiyo

1982 Coup Attempt

6869

John Barabara Arap Kirwa

M

Rift Valley

Uasin Gishu

1982 Coup Attempt

6869

Moses Chesire

M

Rift Valley

Uasin Gishu

1982 Coup Attempt

6869

Nicolas Kiptoo

M

Rift Valley

Uasin Gishu

1982 Coup Attempt

10073

Gregory Godana Adele

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

11111

Salimin Bambaulo Mopleeh Boy

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

11127

Dennis Ngala Mtimba

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

11136

B Kithaka

M

Coast

Kinango

1982 Coup Attempt

11136

John Nyaga Kaibiru

M

Coast

Kinango

1982 Coup Attempt

11136

Karawi

M

Coast

Kinango

1982 Coup Attempt

11136

Mumo

M

Coast

Kinango

1982 Coup Attempt

11138

Jonathan Philip Malombe

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

11139

Jonathan Vangu Ndarane

M

Coast

Kaloleni

1982 Coup Attempt

11143

Mwaniki

Juma

Ali

M

11144

Msangi

Boniface

Eremani

M

11145

Joseph Mshamba Euggne

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

12773

Joseph Muturi Mwangi

M

Rift Valley

Kuresoi

1982 Coup Attempt

12899

Dismas Ogot Simanyure

M

Coast

Changamwe

1982 Coup Attempt

12899

Kalonzi

M

Coast

Changamwe

1982 Coup Attempt

13001

Samuel Ndungu Gatua

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

13002

David Mwangi Kibugi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13003

Gasper Ochieng Amolo

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13005

Benson Rawati Musanga

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13006

Victor Wamugunda Laban

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

13007

Joseph Murimi

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

13008

David Kanagi Thaugate

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13008

Jeremy Michael Gatugura

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13008

Joseph Mwagi Mbugwa

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13008

Kamau Ndegwa

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13008

Peter Ngari Kagume

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13008

Stephen Njuguna Ruiru

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13009

David Kagagi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13009

Jeremy Gatuguta

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13009

Joseph Gaichuru Chee

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13009

Joseph Gaichuru Chege

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13009

Joseph Mwangi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13009

Kamuau

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13009

Peter N Wambaga

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13009

Peter Ngari Kagume

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13009

R.Karangi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13010

Chege

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt
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13010

D.K Thangate

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13010

K.Gatuguta

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13010

K.Ndegwa

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13010

M. Mbugua

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13010

P.N Wambulwa

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13010

Peter Ngari Kagume

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13010

R.K Kirimi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13011

Davdi Kanagi Thangate

M

Central

Lari

1982 Coup Attempt

13011

Jeremy Michael Gathguta

M

Central

Lari

1982 Coup Attempt

13011

Joseph Gaichuru Chege

M

Central

Lari

1982 Coup Attempt

13011

Joseph Mwangi Mbugua

M

Central

Lari

1982 Coup Attempt

13011

Kamau Ndegwa

M

Central

Lari

1982 Coup Attempt

13011

Nahashon Wambulwa

M

Central

Lari

1982 Coup Attempt

13011

Pn Kagume

M

Central

Lari

1982 Coup Attempt

13011

Rueben Karangi Kirimi

M

Central

Lari

1982 Coup Attempt

13012

Michael Kinyanjui John

M

Central

Lari

1982 Coup Attempt

13013

Eustus Nyagah Kathuri

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

13014

Charles Kiprono Kwambai

M

Rift Valley

Keiyo

1982 Coup Attempt

13015

John Chege Gichia

M

Rift Valley

Kajiado North

1982 Coup Attempt

13016

Thomas Njoroge Mburu

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

13017

Alphonce Kipkemoi

M

Rift Valley

Marakwet East

1982 Coup Attempt

13018

Birkan Salat Jibril

M

Eastern

Isiolo

1982 Coup Attempt

13019

Hache Hassan Godana

M

Eastern

Isiolo

1982 Coup Attempt

13021

Peter Nashon Wambulwa

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13022

Omar Boru Kutara

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

13023

Julius Sidande Seda

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13024

Mohamed Adan Ali

M

Eastern

Isiolo

1982 Coup Attempt

13025

Lawrence Anyona Bonga

M

Nairobi

Langata

1982 Coup Attempt

13026

Ismail Aden

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

13028

Ochari Benard Orina

M

Nyanza

Nyamira

1982 Coup Attempt

13029

Kadir Simba Marko

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13030

Moses Njiriri Mburu

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

13031

Mocheche Nelson Onduso

M

Nyanza

Nyamira

1982 Coup Attempt

13031

Nyachienga Samuel Nyanga

M

Nyanza

Nyamira

1982 Coup Attempt

13033

Onduso Nelson Ochomba

M

Nyanza

Nyamira

1982 Coup Attempt

13034

Jillo Tadicha Jarso

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13035

Moses Ogalo Ogoma

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

13036

Waswa Thomas Osore

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

13037

Maina John Thairu

M

Central

Muranga

1982 Coup Attempt

13038

Murigi Patrick Ndoria

M

Central

Nyeri

1982 Coup Attempt

13040

Njiru Anderson Ndwiga

M

Eastern

Runyenjes

1982 Coup Attempt

13678

John Kamosin Tukoita

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

13679

Alfred Odhiambo Oyoda

M

Western

Busia

1982 Coup Attempt

13680

Evans Mbanilwa Osodo

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt
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13680

James Namasaka

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

13680

Joseph Cheloti

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

13680

Nicholas Waizuma

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

13698

Francis Kamari

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

1982 Coup Attempt

13698

Linus Yego

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

1982 Coup Attempt

13698

Peter Kamari

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

1982 Coup Attempt

13698

Shem Psenjen Kipsisier

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

1982 Coup Attempt

13998

John Ouma Okoyo

M

Nyanza

Migori

1982 Coup Attempt

14037

Ali Ngare

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

14037

Hamisi Banda

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

14037

Juma Boma

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

14037

Mohamed Mwamaneno

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

14037

Newland Ngome Akilimali

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

14038

John Yalekai

M

Coast

Kilifi

1982 Coup Attempt

14038

Khamis Komakoma

M

Coast

Kilifi

1982 Coup Attempt

14038

Unda Kombe

M

Coast

Kilifi

1982 Coup Attempt

14038

Winston Siryah Pekesheh

M

Coast

Kilifi

1982 Coup Attempt

14041

Mwamaneno Mohammed

M

Coast

Kwale

1982 Coup Attempt

14042

Silvanos Iden Gunyi Baraza

M

Coast

Kisauni

1982 Coup Attempt

14044

Armogast Aurelius Maganga

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

14044

Mambea

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

14044

Mwakisachi

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

14045

Hamisi Abdalla Bandia

M

Coast

Kwale

1982 Coup Attempt

14126

Shadrack Kitsao Karisa

M

Coast

Magarini

1982 Coup Attempt

14127

Stephen Charo Koi

M

Coast

Mombasa

1982 Coup Attempt

14128

John Muliwa Daudi

M

Coast

Taita

1982 Coup Attempt

14129

Sanga Samuel Elijah

M

Coast

Kilifi

1982 Coup Attempt

14132

Esau Kiora Mjomba

M

Coast

Taita-Taveta

1982 Coup Attempt

14368

Adhu Awiti

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo South

1982 Coup Attempt

14368

Benjamin Onduto

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo South

1982 Coup Attempt

14368

Charles Mcomer

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo South

1982 Coup Attempt

14368

Kabasa Rege

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo South

1982 Coup Attempt

14368

Maranje Odhiambo

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo South

1982 Coup Attempt

14457

Andrew Shikuku Waliaula

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

14457

Burnabas Rono

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

14457

Daniel Rungut

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

14457

Later

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

14457

Paul Choge

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

14457

Peter Njogu Karega

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

14457

Robert Wanjala

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

14457

Stephen Wanjala

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

14457

Stephen Wanjala Kandawala

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

14471

Stephen Kirahi Ngugi

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

1982 Coup Attempt

16209

Captain Mutoro

M

Western

Kimilili Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt
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16209

Humphury Maina Wachiye

M

Western

Kimilili Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

16209

Pius Wekesa

M

Western

Kimilili Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

16209

Samson Wafula Wanyonyi

M

Western

Kimilili Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

16219

Namasaka Namachi Julius

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

16222

Gabriel Sisule Simiyu

Western

Kimilili Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

16708

Ronoh Evans Kipkorir

M

Rift Valley

Kipkelion

1982 Coup Attempt

16709

David Chepkwony Kibore

M

Rift Valley

Kipkelion

1982 Coup Attempt

16710

John Langat

M

Rift Valley

Kipkelion

1982 Coup Attempt

16710

Kugo Samuel Sigilai

M

Rift Valley

Kipkelion

1982 Coup Attempt

16849

James Kanigu Charo

M

Coast

Changamwe

1982 Coup Attempt

17185

Seda Davis Obiri

Western

Mt. Elgon

1982 Coup Attempt

17193

Espilas Elphas Victors

Western

Emuhaya

1982 Coup Attempt

17198

Kweya Saul George

Western

Mumias

1982 Coup Attempt

17404

George Kaphar Ouya

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

17516

Gladys Kemuma Nyangau

F

Nyanza

Nyamira

1982 Coup Attempt

18102

Mayodi Micah Manyonyi

M

Western

Vihiga

1982 Coup Attempt

18655

Biv David Kipsang

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

18938

Magoma Porteous Makori

M

Nyanza

Masaba South

1982 Coup Attempt

18938

Mado Gilbert Magoma

M

Nyanza

Masaba South

1982 Coup Attempt

19416

Kangaa Sua

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19416

Kathendu

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19416

Wilfred Katuta Kasina

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

David Mwendwa Maluki

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Ida

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Irungu

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Kitungi

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Koskei

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Lisi

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Makau

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Mutua

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Ngeno

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Shiundu

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Wamwea

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19417

Wanjala

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19418

Anyulo

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19418

Julius Mulli Mbuku

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19418

Kariuki

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19418

Kasina Katuta

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19418

Muliu Kali

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19418

Mwanzi

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19418

Nzau Nzioka Kilai

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19418

Venza Kitungi

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

19422

Joseph Lisis Mbulula

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19422

Mbaunzi

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

M
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19422

Michael Ngeno

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19422

Musyoka Ndungu

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19422

Sammy Kimele

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19422

Sammy Munywaki

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19456

Joseph Kathendu Mwandikwa

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19456

Mbaunzi Ndambu

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19456

Mbithi Muli

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19456

Mubui Ndeme

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19456

Musyoka Ndungu

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19456

Mutui Ngiu

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19456

Thomas Mutisya

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

19475

Justina Syombua Matiti

F

Eastern

Kyuso

1982 Coup Attempt

19475

Mulwa Musyimi

M

Eastern

Kyuso

1982 Coup Attempt

19475

Rowland Matiti

M

Eastern

Kyuso

1982 Coup Attempt

19769

Daniel Rogut

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia East

1982 Coup Attempt

19769

Job Kipkemboi Talam

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia East

1982 Coup Attempt

19769

Julius Talam

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia East

1982 Coup Attempt

19769

Simon Kimtai

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia East

1982 Coup Attempt

20442

George Ngugi

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

20442

Joram Gathu

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

20442

Leonard Repho Ngure

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

20442

Titus Mathenge

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

20446

Francis Njihia Mberere

M

Central

Kiambu West

1982 Coup Attempt

20446

George Ngugi

M

Central

Kiambu West

1982 Coup Attempt

20446

Joram Gathu

M

Central

Kiambu West

1982 Coup Attempt

20447

David Kiarii Kamau

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

20447

George Ngugi Gitau

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

20447

Joram Gathu Buro

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

20447

Leonard Repho Ngure

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

20588

Ogina Nyangute

M

Nyanza

Bondo

1982 Coup Attempt

20588

Omolo Alexander Odundo

M

Nyanza

Bondo

1982 Coup Attempt

20588

Omondi Ogute

M

Nyanza

Bondo

1982 Coup Attempt

20588

Otieno Onyimbo

M

Nyanza

Bondo

1982 Coup Attempt

20588

Richard Obuon

M

Nyanza

Bondo

1982 Coup Attempt

20619

Charlse Odawa Mirasi

M

Nyanza

Rarienda

1982 Coup Attempt

20651

Dedan Maede Oleket

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

Annanias Etyang

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

Dedan Maede Olekete

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

Evans Ebu

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

Herbertr Omusugu

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

Jeremiah Odoh

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

Jonathan Ikwara Ekirapa

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

Patrick Etyang

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

Peter Imoh

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt
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20652

Peter Odero

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

Simon Majebei

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20652

William Osigwari

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20704

Pascal Olaimo Barasa

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

20728

Herbert Hudson Omusugu
Olekete

M

Western

Teso North

1982 Coup Attempt

21554

Jackson Ulwenya Anduvate

M

Western

Vihiga

1982 Coup Attempt

21570

Agrrey Staus Nduswe

M

Western

Emuhaya

1982 Coup Attempt

21591

Jairus Chanzu Kivuli

M

Western

Sabatia

1982 Coup Attempt

21592

Henry Angalika

M

Western

Sabatia

1982 Coup Attempt

21600

Gaulkey George Kweya

M

Western

Emuhaya

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wanjala Erastus Griffin

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Baraza Chesoni Patrick

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Fredrick Nyongessa

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Ghelot Joseph

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Jum Ba Ogilla Bauchamp

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Kiratu Stephen Ngugi

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Kiseka Wafula Peter

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Makhoa Moses

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Makona Melitus Nyongesa

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Malaka Loboni

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Malaka Loponi

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Mbugua Oliver Ngugi

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Musundi Nathan

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Mwema Edward

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Namasaka Ochwang James

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Ngugi Stanley

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Okiru Barasa

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Rugut David Kiptum

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Sisula Gabriel Simiyu

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wabomba Ndumba

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wabomba Nyongesa Wafula

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wachiye Humprey Maina

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wafula Gilbert

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wakuma Simiyu

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Walunchwati Wanyonyi Robinson

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wanjala David Wekesa

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wanyonyi Wafula Samson

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wanyonyi Wakubiri John

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22038

Wephukulu Dick

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

22433

Henry Nyongesa

M

Western

Bungoma South

1982 Coup Attempt

22434

Simiyu Maurice Waunya

M

Western

Bungoma South

1982 Coup Attempt

22435

Maxwell Namachanja Kimwanga

M

Western

Bumula

1982 Coup Attempt

22971

Captain Gedion Mutoro

M

Western

Bungoma Central

1982 Coup Attempt
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22971

David Wanjala Wekesa

M

Western

Bungoma Central

1982 Coup Attempt

22971

Meltus Makona

M

Western

Bungoma Central

1982 Coup Attempt

23117

Gideon Mutoro Musikuya

M

Western

Bungoma West

1982 Coup Attempt

23602

Morris Omollo Omuga

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23603

Elly Auma Auma

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23604

Robert Edwins Auma

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23607

Silvanus Oyange Odede

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23608

Nicodemus Oyoo Odhiambo

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23608

Okimi Olela

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23608

Richard Opiyo Ogolla

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23608

Samson Okuro Ogweno

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23611

Samson Ongicha Banya

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23612

Charles Okinyi Olela

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23613

Richard Opiyo Ogolla

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23614

Charles Abich Owiti

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23618

Samson Ogweno Aruji (Deceased)

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

23639

Jane Awuor Oluoch

F

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

23640

Samuel Ondiegi Ochieng

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

23642

Samwel Zachary Okoyo

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

23657

Segero Samuel Mulavu

M

Western

Kakamega East
(Shinyalu)

1982 Coup Attempt

23658

Malimu Protus Ungayi

M

Western

Kakamega East
(Shinyalu)

1982 Coup Attempt

23659

Patrick Makamu Kingi

M

Western

Kakamega East
(Shinyalu)

1982 Coup Attempt

23669

Protus Mukanzi Machina

M

Western

Bungoma Central

1982 Coup Attempt

23670

Alphonse Likembe Amwayi

M

Western

Kakamega East
(Shinyalu)

1982 Coup Attempt

23670

Wichenje Angela Wilumila

F

Western

Kakamega East
(Shinyalu)

1982 Coup Attempt

23672

Muleyi Aggrey Khasiya

M

Western

Kakamega South
(Ikolomani)

1982 Coup Attempt

23749

Alfred Owara

M

Western

Samia

1982 Coup Attempt

23749

Daniel Sibale

M

Western

Samia

1982 Coup Attempt

23749

Linus Khaseke

M

Western

Samia

1982 Coup Attempt

23749

Ojanji Ogongola Sibiya

M

Western

Samia

1982 Coup Attempt

23931

Dinda Charles Owino

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

24058

Omolo William Oruko

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

24058

Samuel Okumu Okway

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

24232

Late Richard Guyo Obuon

M

Nyanza

Kuria West

1982 Coup Attempt

24232

Mangera John Magaiwa

M

Nyanza

Kuria West

1982 Coup Attempt

24232

Patrick

M

Nyanza

Kuria West

1982 Coup Attempt

24232

Peter Masamaki Boke

M

Nyanza

Kuria West

1982 Coup Attempt

24232

Samwel Okumu Okwanyi

M

Nyanza

Kuria West

1982 Coup Attempt

24491

Adhu Awiti

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt
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24491

Benjamin Ondhuru

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

24491

Charles Marie Omar

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

24491

Kabasi Wilis Helekia

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

24491

Odhiambo

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

24787

Paul Auma Abuto Oselu

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

24926

Cpi Boaz Owaze

M

Nyanza

Kuria East

1982 Coup Attempt

24926

James Makuri

M

Nyanza

Kuria East

1982 Coup Attempt

24926

John Chacha Nkororo

M

Nyanza

Kuria East

1982 Coup Attempt

24926

Josephat Kibet

M

Nyanza

Kuria East

1982 Coup Attempt

24926

Lt. Colduu

M

Nyanza

Kuria East

1982 Coup Attempt

24926

Peter Mongou Moss

M

Nyanza

Kuria East

1982 Coup Attempt

25114

Cornels Akelo Onyango

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

25114

Ian Lewis Akelo

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

25114

Linet Atieno Okeyo

F

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

25114

Michael Onyango Cornels

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

25251

Muga Kolale

M

Nyanza

Rarienda

1982 Coup Attempt

25251

Oginga Ogego

M

Nyanza

Rarienda

1982 Coup Attempt

25251

Olweny Gedion Opiyo

M

Nyanza

Rarienda

1982 Coup Attempt

25251

Onyango

M

Nyanza

Rarienda

1982 Coup Attempt

25251

Onyango Jarteng

M

Nyanza

Rarienda

1982 Coup Attempt

25253

Adungosi

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

25253

Odhiambo Nyabogi

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

25253

Ombewa Rutha

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

25253

Richard Obwon Guya

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

25254

Apollo Amieno

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25254

Jackson Manyonyi

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25254

John Macharia

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25254

Jonathan Ekirapa

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25254

Livingstone Mudenbe

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25254

Nyonamu Patrick Achieng

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25254

Samuel Kamande

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25254

Samuel Okumu

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25255

Charles Oliech

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

25255

Omondi Saul

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

25255

Opiyo Gor

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

25255

Samuel Okumu

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

25255

Silas Agao

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

25255

Washington Ontimbo

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

25255

Willis Randiea Okach

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

1982 Coup Attempt

25258

Cpl.Ole Sapalang

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25258

Cpl.Oodhiambo Oleko

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25258

Onyango Paul Ojuka

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25258

Ssgt.Maingi

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25258

Woi.Joshwa Were

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt
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25259

Douglas Okalo

F

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

25259

Juma Henry Rambim

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

25259

Omolo Akelo

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

25259

Paul Geno

F

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

25259

Vitalis Anyenya

F

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Cleophas Okwako

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

David Nyangau

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Joseph Promen Kitarenga

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Osaka Sweta

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Peter Mose Miyienda

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Samson Ogweno Aruji

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Willis Okach Randiga

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Okoth Samuel

M

Nyanza

25260

Otok Charles Oliech

M

Nyanza

25260

Abdikadir Mohamed

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Absalom Wambua Kisandi

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Adan Ali Mohamed

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Alexander George Ligami

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Alexender Odundo Omolo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Anthony Miruka Agutu

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Apollo Ogolla Olloo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Ayub Odhiambo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Benjamin Kimunye Mwannza

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Charles Oliech

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Charles Owino Pinda

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Charles Wandera

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

David Njoroge Mwangi

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Davis Obiri Seda

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Denish Gumbe Osire

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Dick Wepukhulu

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Elphas Okoth Odondi

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Emanuel Masha Dongo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Gachanja Muthuri Ndira

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

George Awour Agola

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Gregory Godana Adel

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Hendry Kipruto Kenduiwo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Humprhey Kaburu Ndubi

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Jacob Digo Otieno

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

James Berege Changwony

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Jjoseph Kariuki Kega

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Joel Aduma Otiende

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

John Kurema Wangombe

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

John Bustats Kariuki Wamai

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

John Elavoka Ishilingi

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

1982 Coup Attempt
1982 Coup Attempt
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25260

John Otieno Onyimbo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

John Otieno Opam

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Joramson Micheni

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Joseph Agenga Onuonga

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Joseph Kimuyu Mutisya

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Joseph Waithara Mbugua

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Josphat Annguza Azangu

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Maina Kinyatti

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Michael K Ngeno

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Mirasi Odawa

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Mohamed Mwaura

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Nicholus Njeru

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Ochuka

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Odemisa

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Ogizi

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Oriwa

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Oteyo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Paul Onyango Ojuka

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Peter Kipkurui Tangut

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Peter Njoroge Mwangi

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Peter Wairagu Kairu

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Peter Waithaka Kiko

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Preston Kariuki Taiti

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Silvanus Anthony Oghina

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Simon Mbuto

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25260

Waithaka Joseph Njuguna

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25261

Dalington Otiato

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25261

Oremoh Arthanas Kangienga

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25262

John Kawa

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

1982 Coup Attempt

25262

Ochola Barrack Osendo

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

1982 Coup Attempt

25262

Saul Omondi

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

1982 Coup Attempt

25263

Nyaundi Valentine Abok

M

Nyanza

25263

Kalamu William Wachuenje

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25275

James Sandys Ajigo

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25278

Bonyo Waguda Wilson

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25279

Joshua Omondi Ogwang

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25279

Joshua Ouko

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25279

Otieno Moses Okongo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25279

Vincent Ouko Shem

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25280

Bonyo Waguda

M

Nyanza

25280

Hinda

M

Nyanza

25280

Ouno Evans Obudo

M

Nyanza

25280

Wanyonyi

M

Nyanza

1982 Coup Attempt

1982 Coup Attempt
Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt
1982 Coup Attempt

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt
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25287

Harris Okongo Arara

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25287

John Otieno Onyimbo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25287

Odhiambo Andrew Lawrence

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25287

Onyango Odeny

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25287

Patrick Lumumba Owade

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25287

Samuel Kibor

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25290

Charles Otieno

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25290

Gwada Sudhe

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25290

Ouma Gilbert Okina

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25290

Ouma Oselu

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25290

Stephen Oriang

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25291

Okumu Okwany

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25291

Onuonga Joseph Agenga

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25291

Spte.Ombewa Rutha

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25291

Ssgt.Charles Oliech

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25291

Ssgt.Samwel Dayo

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25292

Kwede

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25293

Benjamin Ogada Okeyo

M

Nyanza

Kisumu West

1982 Coup Attempt

25300

Benson Gathie Otieno

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25300

Evans Ouma

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25300

George Madara

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25300

Joshua Omoro Opiyo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25300

Mose Otieno Okongo

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25300

Patrick Lumumba Owade

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25300

Richard Obuon

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25300

Samuel Okumu Okuany

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25300

Tom Njura

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

25420

Akuloba Barasa Mohammed

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

25420

John Stwakha

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

25420

Justus Aswani

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

25477

George Owuor

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

25477

Okumu

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

25477

Okwany

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

25477

Washington Sienya Okwiri

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

25493

Jacques Hannington Muga

M

Nyanza

Kisumu East

1982 Coup Attempt

27652

Benson Ruoro

M

Central

Mathira

1982 Coup Attempt

27652

Irene Wanjiku Miano

F

Central

Mathira

1982 Coup Attempt

27652

James Munene

M

Central

Mathira

1982 Coup Attempt

27652

Joseph Miano Kabui

M

Central

Mathira

1982 Coup Attempt

27652

Margaret Wanjiru

F

Central

Mathira

1982 Coup Attempt

27652

Mercy Gathigia

F

Central

Mathira

1982 Coup Attempt

27654

Ishmael Nduki Wagiti

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27703

Eustus Maina Mukara

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27703

Josphat Mosogo

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt
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27703

Stephen Karangau Wanjau

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27703

Wanjohi Kairo

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27705

James Gitari Mutonga

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27705

Kangangi Michael

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27705

Murage

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27705

William Njuguna

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27709

James Gitari

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27709

Joram Njue Kirigia

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27709

Wainaina

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27711

Murage

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27711

Ngare

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27718

Murage

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27718

Nduki Ishmael

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27718

Wambua

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27718

William Njuguna Mulango

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27738

Kirugi Paul Kabui

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27738

Mwanje

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

27890

Otieno Stanley

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

27890

Paul Ombewa

M

Nyanza

Nyakack

1982 Coup Attempt

29778

Murunga Festus Kimathi

M

Eastern

Meru Central

1982 Coup Attempt

30032

Casncio Karugu Kagoromo

M

Eastern

Tharaka North

1982 Coup Attempt

30042

Karugu Kagoromo

M

Central

DK

1982 Coup Attempt

30042

Mathew Nthiga Nyagah

M

Central

DK

1982 Coup Attempt

30042

Muthengi Gituranthi

M

Central

DK

1982 Coup Attempt

30042

Peter Nguki

M

Central

DK

1982 Coup Attempt

31134

Irungu Josephat Nathan

M

Central

Thika East

1982 Coup Attempt

31158

Calvin Okeyo Ogutu

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31159

James Ndandera Nyariogi

M

Central

Ruiru

1982 Coup Attempt

31160

Gisore Michael Momanyi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31161

Titus Njiru Michael Macharia

M

Central

Ruiru

1982 Coup Attempt

31162

Joseph Michael Kinyanjui
Mwangi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31163

Samwel Obuche Ogawo

M

Nairobi

Kasarani

1982 Coup Attempt

31164

Watson Micheni M`Nkuene

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31165

Charles B. Kamandeh Karanja

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31166

Masai Michael Wambua

M

Nairobi

Kamukunji

1982 Coup Attempt

31167

Zebbabel Mutua Muthoka

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31168

Muigai Njoroge

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

31169

Sisto Owuor Haira

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

31170

Ndira Gachanja Muturi

M

Central

Muranga South

1982 Coup Attempt

31171

Francis Murigi Robert

M

Central

Muranga South

1982 Coup Attempt

31172

Mui George Jonathan

M

Eastern

Machakos

1982 Coup Attempt

31173

Martin Odhiambo Onginjo

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

31174

Joseph Mathu Ilovoo

M

Eastern

Mwingi Central

1982 Coup Attempt
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31175

Asumo Francis Lusaka

M

Western

Vihiga

1982 Coup Attempt

31176

Mathews Kaburia Miano

M

Central

Nyeri

1982 Coup Attempt

31177

Wanjala Charles Ogema

M

Western

Busia

1982 Coup Attempt

31178

Fredrick Wachira Allan

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31179

Joseph Nganga Mburu

M

Central

Ruiru

1982 Coup Attempt

31180

Andew Otiso Onyambu

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31181

Joseph Douglas Nganga Kaburi

M

Central

Gatanga

1982 Coup Attempt

31182

Michael John Kiarie

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

31183

Robert Kahiga Ndewa

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31184

Marani Amos Kunikwa

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31185

Otieno Stanley Orana

M

Nyanza

Nyakach

1982 Coup Attempt

31186

Sammy Kamau Warukenya

M

Central

Gatundu

1982 Coup Attempt

31188

Peter Matuu Ndwiko

M

Eastern

Mukaa

1982 Coup Attempt

31189

Luvai Hudson Msumba

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

31190

Apollo Ochieng Ameino

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31191

Salavius Nkonge

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31192

Anthony Nzioki Wambua

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31193

Danson Githae Mburu

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

31195

Karani Fredrick Kauma Nyagah

M

Eastern

Embu

1982 Coup Attempt

31196

Paul Kirungo Njihia

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

31197

Joseph Jacob Lio

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

31198

Mutui Robert Ndeme

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

31199

Edward Paul Ngahu Gikungu

M

Central

Muranga South

1982 Coup Attempt

31200

Lucas Mumbo Odhiambo

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32432

Samuel Kariuki Gichaga

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

32433

Livistone Kivisi Mudembe

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32436

James Wachira Gachoya

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

32437

Samuel Kariuki Gichaga

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

32438

Christopher Njoroge Muthike

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32439

Mohamed Abdikadir

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32440

Bernard Mukasa Ingosi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32441

Aggrey Muganzi Mudi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32442

Wamwene Dick Wephukhulu

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

32443

Justus Musymi Fundi

M

Eastern

Mwala

1982 Coup Attempt

32444

Adam Isiliu Mutinda

M

Coast

Kilindini

1982 Coup Attempt

32446

Josphat Kirugi Mwangi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32446

William Mwangi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32447

Njau Alex Benson Kumaka

M

Central

Muranga

1982 Coup Attempt

32448

David Musyoka Kamu

M

Eastern

Athi River

1982 Coup Attempt

32449

Jack Hamilton Mbai

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32951

Charles Mbusya Mutunga

M

Eastern

Yatta

1982 Coup Attempt

32956

Douglas Maina Mwangi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32957

Simeon Rlls Masese Angima

M

Nyanza

Kanyenya

1982 Coup Attempt

32958

John Savai

M

Rift Valley

Nandi South

1982 Coup Attempt
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32959

Titus Musyoka Daniel Kakuthu

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

32960

Sir Dickson O. Otiu

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

32961

Ismail Ibrahim Adan

M

Eastern

Isiolo

1982 Coup Attempt

32962

George Muriithi Mwaura

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

32965

Jenaries Salim Khiboi Wataro

M

Cebtral

Muranga

1982 Coup Attempt

32967

Yusuf Jirmo Wario

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

32968

Muiruri Patrick Wamwea

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

32969

Henry Kipruto Kendwywa

M

Rift Valley

Njoro

1982 Coup Attempt

32972

Kamau Samuel Maina

M

Central

Muranga

1982 Coup Attempt

32973

John Galgalo Elema

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

32974

Benjamin Omurunga Makunda

M

Western

Butere

1982 Coup Attempt

32977

Ndirangu Grace Gathiigia

F

Central

Nyeri

1982 Coup Attempt

32978

Peter Mwangi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32979

Francis Gichura Ndiba

M

Central

Mathira West

1982 Coup Attempt

32980

Lawrence Ngure Njoroge

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32981

Joel Aduma Otiende

M

Nairobi

Makadara

1982 Coup Attempt

32983

Adan Ali

M

Eastern

Isiolo

1982 Coup Attempt

32983

Hassan Godana

M

Eastern

Isiolo

1982 Coup Attempt

32983

Ibrahim Halake Kalicha

M

Eastern

Isiolo

1982 Coup Attempt

32983

Kamande

M

Eastern

Isiolo

1982 Coup Attempt

32984

Antony Mbiu Kariuki Kariuki

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32984

Jacinta Njeri Gachinga

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32984

Mary Wambui Karuku

F

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32984

Mary Wanjiku Gichura

F

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32984

Rachael Gakemia Muya

F

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32985

Fredrick Gathachi Maiyuria

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32986

George Githucha Waithaka

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32987

James Kimani Wambugi

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

32988

Orwa William Ojode

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32990

Jane Wangari Chege

F

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

32990

Samuel Chege Gitau

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

32991

Richard Muhindi Juma

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

32992

Henry Kipruto Chebiego

M

Rift Valley

Keiyo

1982 Coup Attempt

32993

John Otina Mbeche

M

Nyanza

Homa Bay

1982 Coup Attempt

34402

Ngio Titus

M

Eastern

34402

Kasina Katuto

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

34402

Wambua

M

Eastern

Kitui

1982 Coup Attempt

34461

Adan Chukulisa

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

34461

Lio Gache

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

34461

Omar Qutara

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

34461

Stephen Galgalo Elema

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

34461

Yusuf Jirimo

M

Eastern

Marsabit

1982 Coup Attempt

35520

Benjamin Soi

M

Rift Valley

Bureti

1982 Coup Attempt

35520

Joshua Rono

M

Rift Valley

Bureti

1982 Coup Attempt

1982 Coup Attempt
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35520

Michael Kimutai Turgut

M

Rift Valley

Bureti

1982 Coup Attempt

35520

Shame Kirui

M

Rift Valley

Bureti

1982 Coup Attempt

35524

Kipkurui Rotich Joseph

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

35524

Kipngeno Korir

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

35524

Paul Kipkoech Cheruiyot

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

35559

Eustace Maina Mukara

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

35559

Josphat Mbogo

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

35559

Paul Kirubi

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

35559

Stephen Karangao

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

35559

Wanjohi Kairu

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

35601

Simon Njiru Njauke

M

Coast

Lamu

1982 Coup Attempt

35602

Mwendwa Peter Ngumbau

M

Eastern

Machakos

1982 Coup Attempt

35603

Nicholas Mutuku Kiilu

M

Eastern

Mbooni East

1982 Coup Attempt

35605

Moses Lawrence Makokha

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia East

1982 Coup Attempt

35608

Joseph Patroba Malenya

M

Western

Bungoma East

1982 Coup Attempt

35609

Wanjosie Fred Waqnjala

Western

Bungoma South

1982 Coup Attempt

35610

Alphonse Nzangi Mutuluki

M

Eastern

Mbooni East

1982 Coup Attempt

35611

Fredrick Wanyonyi Nalianya

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia East

1982 Coup Attempt

35612

John Onyimbo Otieno

M

Nyanza

Bondo

1982 Coup Attempt

35614

Wepukhulu Dick Womwene

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

35615

Mary Wambui Kariuki

F

Rift Valley

Baringo

1982 Coup Attempt

35616

Francis Mbaunzi Ndambu

M

Eastern

Kitui West

1982 Coup Attempt

35617

John Sidwaka Wakukhas

M

Western

Mumias

1982 Coup Attempt

35619

V A Omondi

M

Eastern

Kitui West

1982 Coup Attempt

35619

Kyellenge Shadrack Mutisya

M

Eastern

Kitui West

1982 Coup Attempt

35619

Phillip Musyoka

M

Eastern

Kitui West

1982 Coup Attempt

35620

Vincernt Andrew Omondi

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

35621

Benson Thaiya

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

35622

Simuli Susan Agnetta

F

Western

Emuhaya

1982 Coup Attempt

35623

Oliver Mbugua Ngugi

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

35623

Susan Wambui Kamau

F

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

35627

Nganga Haginson Mwadime

M

Coast

Taita Taveta

1982 Coup Attempt

35629

Peter Gitahi Ndiritu

M

Central

Nyandarua

1982 Coup Attempt

35631

Aswani Justus Anjichi

M

Western

Emuhaya

1982 Coup Attempt

35632

Asila Darlington Otioato

M

Western

Emuhaya

1982 Coup Attempt

35633

James Kingoo Mukuthi

M

Eastern

Kathiani

1982 Coup Attempt

35634

Francis Muema Muindi

M

Eastern

Makueni

1982 Coup Attempt

35635

George Orina Ondieki

M

Nyanza

Nyamira

1982 Coup Attempt

35636

Philip Musyoki Kituku

M

Eastern

Makueni

1982 Coup Attempt

35637

Joel Aduma Otiende

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

1982 Coup Attempt

35638

Museti Enos Lukalia

M

Western

Kakamega South
(Ikolomani)

1982 Coup Attempt

35639

Amina Muchele Asman

F

Western

Mumias

1982 Coup Attempt

35639

Hashim Asman Khayundi

M

Western

Mumias

1982 Coup Attempt
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35639

Idris Khayundi Asman

M

Western

Mumias

1982 Coup Attempt

35639

Ruth Khaliche Asman

F

Western

Mumias

1982 Coup Attempt

35639

Sophia Makokha Khayumbi

F

Western

Mumias

1982 Coup Attempt

35640

Benson Sokio Lekalan

M

Rift Valley

Samburu

1982 Coup Attempt

35645

Stephen Maloba

M

Rift Valley

Nandi

1982 Coup Attempt

35647

Benson Wambua Musau

F

Eastern

Masinga

1982 Coup Attempt

35647

Catherine Mutio Wambua

F

Eastern

Masinga

1982 Coup Attempt

35647

Faith Syevvo Wambua

F

Eastern

Masinga

1982 Coup Attempt

35647

Kioko Wambua

F

Eastern

Masinga

1982 Coup Attempt

35647

Mutuku Wambua

F

Eastern

Masinga

1982 Coup Attempt

35647

Paulinah Kimwele Munee

F

Eastern

Masinga

1982 Coup Attempt

35647

Shadrack Musyoka Wambua

M

Eastern

Masinga

1982 Coup Attempt

35647

Tirus Kimwele Wambua

M

Eastern

Masinga

1982 Coup Attempt

35650

Wanjohi Charles Kairu

M

Central

Nyeri

1982 Coup Attempt

36382

Musyimi Samuel Munywoki

M

Eastern

Kitui West

1982 Coup Attempt

36401

Peter Tonny Wambua

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

36402

Simon Wambu Nzioki

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

36403

Rogers Kingo Richa

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

36404

James Mbiti Wambua

M

Eastern

Matungulu

1982 Coup Attempt

36405

Maingi

M

Eastern

Kagundo

1982 Coup Attempt

36406

William Ngebere Nguku

M

Eastern

Imenti North

1982 Coup Attempt

36407

George S . Mwangi Gatana

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

36407

Samwel Chege Gitau

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

36408

Stephene Odle Oriang

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

36409

David Kisilu Mutua

M

Eastern

Yatta

1982 Coup Attempt

37951

Thomas Dada Angango

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

41208

David Njuguna Mutonya

M

Central

Thika West

1982 Coup Attempt

44205

Opondo Ogenya Kakendo

M

Nairobi

Embakasi

1982 Coup Attempt

44210

Oloo David Onyango

M

Nairobi

Embakasi

1982 Coup Attempt

44493

Peter Wairagu Kairu

M

Rift Valley

Nakuru

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

Brenda Ashikhongo

F

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

James Akunda

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

Josephine Asingwa

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

Kowade Lumumba

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

Marcellus Nagachi Mangongo

F

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

Otino Mbeche

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

Samwel Okumu

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

Staus Induswe

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

Thomas W. Osore

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44628

William Ogam

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

44840

Gilbert Mana Githae

M

Rift Valley

Kajiado North

1982 Coup Attempt

44840

Kariuki

M

Rift Valley

Kajiado North

1982 Coup Attempt

44840

Major Ndungu

M

Rift Valley

Kajiado North

1982 Coup Attempt

44843

Alfred Muchiri Ndungu

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt
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44843

Amos Mokora

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

44843

James Wanyoike

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

44843

Sammy Kaharua Ngombo

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

45280

Daniel Mutai

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45280

John Cheruiyot

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45280

Joseph Kutto

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45280

Moses Kotut

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45280

Samson Kipkenei Kebeney

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45282

Noah Kibet Sigilai

M

Rift Valley

Uasin Gishu

1982 Coup Attempt

45282

Sammy Bor

M

Rift Valley

Uasin Gishu

1982 Coup Attempt

45282

Sammy Kimtai

M

Rift Valley

Uasin Gishu

1982 Coup Attempt

45283

John Cheruiyot Sumei

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45283

John Kirwa Bergen

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45283

Mathew Cheruiyot Rutto

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45284

Joseph Chemunai Chesire

M

Rift Valley

Baringo

1982 Coup Attempt

45284

Kiptanui Barkeles Chemobo

M

Rift Valley

Baringo

1982 Coup Attempt

45284

Solomon Kiproto Manyaku

M

Rift Valley

Baringo

1982 Coup Attempt

45285

John Cheruiyot

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45285

Moses Kotut

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45285

Peter Kipkosgei Sang

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45286

Agnes Somoei

F

Rift Valley

Eldoret East

1982 Coup Attempt

45286

Birgen John

M

Rift Valley

Eldoret East

1982 Coup Attempt

45286

Nicholas Kiptoo Mwei

M

Rift Valley

Eldoret East

1982 Coup Attempt

45290

Kiprotich Chepsiror Nelson

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45290

Kiptoo Mwei

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45290

Lwango

M

Rift Valley

Nandi Central

1982 Coup Attempt

45320

John Cheruiyot

M

Rift Valley

Keiyo

1982 Coup Attempt

45320

Justus Lucas Kurgat

M

Rift Valley

Keiyo

1982 Coup Attempt

45320

Moses Kutot

M

Rift Valley

Keiyo

1982 Coup Attempt

45989

Jediel Muriungi

M

Nairobi

Kasarani

1982 Coup Attempt

45989

Morris M. Muthamia Mwariama

M

Nairobi

Kasarani

1982 Coup Attempt

45989

Shadrack Muriuki

M

Nairobi

Kasarani

1982 Coup Attempt

46967

Francis Ongele Opalla

M

Nairobi

Westlands

1982 Coup Attempt

47644

Japhet Gatuguti Mwongera

M

Eastern

Tharaka-Nithi

1982 Coup Attempt

47644

Kimathi John

M

Eastern

Tharaka-Nithi

1982 Coup Attempt

47644

Wilston Michemi

M

Eastern

Tharaka-Nithi

1982 Coup Attempt

49158

Esther Nyaguthii

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

49158

James Maina

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

49158

Japhet Mbogo Estone

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

49158

Johnson Muriithi

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

Alfred Odhiambo

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

Alfred Wafula

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

David Wekesa Wanjala

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

Erustus G Wanjala

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt
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80435

Job Kipruto Arap Kemboi

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

John Kamosin

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

Joseph Malaka Loponi

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

Nathan Musundi

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

Patrick B Chesoni

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

Sarah(Shem Psenjen)

F

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80435

Stephen Joseph Kiratu Ngugi

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Allan Barasa Olaimo

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

David Wekesa

F

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Emmanuel Pikiach Tuwot

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Fredrick W Nalyanya

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Gideon Mutoro Musukuya

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Hellen Namasake

F

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Joan Akoroot Olaimo

F

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Job Kipruto Arap Kemboi

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Joseph Chelot

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Maxwel Kivinya

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Partrick P Chesoni

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Pascal Olaimo Barasa

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Priscah Nekesa Olaimo

F

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

80990

Wanda Wafula Masai

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

C. Langat Samuel

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

David Kipsang

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

Isaiah Koros

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

Joseph Chepkowny

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

Joseph Kipkurui Rotich Yopsoy

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

Kilel Samwel

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

Matthew Korir Kipngeno

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

Paul Kipkoech Cheruiyot

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

Samwel Kugo

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81068

Simeon Kimutai

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt

81624

Mwao Ongaro Asuoya

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

81743

Francis Muema Muindi

M

Eastern

Makueni

1982 Coup Attempt

81744

John Masinde Wasike

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81752

Joseph P Malenya

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

81753

George Ngugi Gitau Rugethe

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81756

Rogers Kimoso Richa

M

Coast

Taita

1982 Coup Attempt

81761

Lameck Otieno

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

1982 Coup Attempt

81761

Shekuna Abass

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

1982 Coup Attempt

81765

David Oliech Onyangio

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81766

Amos Kunikina Marani

M

Rift Valley

Laikipia

1982 Coup Attempt

81767

Raphael Victor Otieno

M

Nyanza

Nyando

1982 Coup Attempt

81771

Paul Ombewa Ruth

M

Nairobi

Starehe

1982 Coup Attempt

81772

Simeon Kimutai Maiywa

M

Rift Valley

Kericho

1982 Coup Attempt
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81776

Patrick Gwon Ombuna

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81777

James Mulima Olieba

M

Nairobi

DK

1982 Coup Attempt

81783

Samuel Obuche Ogawo

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81784

Robert Ouma Ogana

M

Western

Bungoma

1982 Coup Attempt

81786

Benjamin Okeyo Ogada

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81790

Simon Wambua Nzioki

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81791

James Ndarera Nyariogi

M

Nyanza

Kisii Central

1982 Coup Attempt

81793

Benjamin Njue

M

Eastern

Embu

1982 Coup Attempt

81795

Washington Onyimbo Moila

M

Nyanza

Bondo

1982 Coup Attempt

81796

Titus Kisamu Mulu

M

Eastern

Machakos

1982 Coup Attempt

81797

Peter Mose Ondieki Miyienda

M

Nyanza

Kisii Central

1982 Coup Attempt

81798

Anderson Ndwiga Njiru

M

Nairobi

Starehe

1982 Coup Attempt

81799

Samuel Kinyanjui Nduati

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81800

Raymond M Mwangi

M

Central

Nyeri

1982 Coup Attempt

81802

Duncan Mugoh Mbaka

M

Eastern

Mbeere

1982 Coup Attempt

81803

Lawrence Ngure Njoroge

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81804

Simon Njiru

M

Nairobi

Starehe

1982 Coup Attempt

81805

Stephen Kanuthu Ngatia

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81806

Leonard Repho Ngure

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81807

John Macharia Mwaura

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81808

David Mwangi Mwihia

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81809

Peter Mwangi

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81810

Patrick Murigu Ndoria

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81811

James Mwanzia Munguti

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81812

Adam Isiliu Mutinda

M

Nairobi

DK

1982 Coup Attempt

81814

Andrew Kungu Mwai

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81816

Lucas O. Mumbu

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81817

Zerubbabel Mutua Muthoka

M

Nairobi

Embakasi

1982 Coup Attempt

81818

Kivisi Mudembe

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81819

Peter Mobegi Moseti

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81820

Robert Chelugo Miningwo

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81821

Gideon Karanja Mathu

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81822

Peter Nzioki Mulwa

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81823

Salavius Njoroge Muchiri

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81824

Japhet Mbogo Estone

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

81825

John Cheruiyot Kipkoria

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81827

Peter Wairagu Kairu

M

Rift Valley

Nakuru

1982 Coup Attempt

81828

John Kibet Bowen

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81829

Mwao Ongaro Asuoya

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

81831

Martin Bruno Inda

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

1982 Coup Attempt

81832

Sisto Owuor Haira

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81833

John Kiprono Bii

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81834

Evans Njenga Kamunyu

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81835

Jackson Manyonyi Kedemi

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt
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81836

David Mwangi Kibugi

M

Central

Kirinyaga Central

1982 Coup Attempt

81837

Henry Indiazi Luhongo

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

81838

Shem Onzere Lovon

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

81839

Paul Chacha Kisero

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81840

Paul Kabui Kirugi

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81843

John Elavoka Ishilingi

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

81847

Michael Momanyi Gisore

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81848

Samuel K Gichaga

M

Central

Gatundu

1982 Coup Attempt

81850

Wilfred Waitiki Gakure

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

81851

Francis Gakongo Ntwiki

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81852

Joseph Mwaniki Gakunju

M

Eastern

Embu East

1982 Coup Attempt

81853

Eunice Murugi Gaichuru

F

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81853

John Chege Gaichuru

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81853

Joseph Gaichuru Chege

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81853

Lucy Wangui Gaichuru

F

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81853

Lydiah Waithira Gaichuru

F

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81853

Pauline Nyambura Gaichuru

F

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81853

Stephen Kimani Gaichuru

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81853

Teresia Wairimu Gaichuru

F

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81853

Vincent Wanyoike Gaichuru

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81854

Simon Kiprop Boor

M

Rift Valley

Uasin Gishu

1982 Coup Attempt

81855

Joram Gatho Boro

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

81856

Josephat Anguza Azangu

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

81857

Joseph Aziaya Amudabi

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

81858

Apollo Ochieng Amieno

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

1982 Coup Attempt

81859

Benjiamn Mumo Makau

M

Eastern

Machakos

1982 Coup Attempt

81860

Wilson Arap Towett

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

81861

John Maruge Mbogo

M

Central

Kirinyaga

1982 Coup Attempt

81864

Ishmael Ibrahim

M

Rift Valley

Laikipia

1982 Coup Attempt

81864

Joseph Kariuki Kega

M

Rift Valley

Laikipia

1982 Coup Attempt

81869

Elijah Anyanga

M

Nairobi

Kasarani

1982 Coup Attempt

81870

Henry Angalika

M

Nyanza

Borabu

1982 Coup Attempt

81871

Evans Miheso Alusiola

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

85000

Robert Kahiga Ndegwa

M

Central

Kiambu

1982 Coup Attempt

85001

Stanley Otieno Orano

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

85005

Martin Odhiambo Onginjo

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

85006

Winston Michemi Burini

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

85009

Gabriel Sisule Simiyu

M

NG

NG

1982 Coup Attempt

85010

Aggrey Mudi Muganzi

M

Western

Kakamega

1982 Coup Attempt

85013

Vincent Andrew Omondi Owuor

M

Nyanza

Siaya

1982 Coup Attempt

85015

Alfred Odhiambo Oyoda

M

Western

Busia

1982 Coup Attempt

85016

Dickson Wepukhulu Wamwene

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

1982 Coup Attempt

85044

Sergent Stephen Wanjau

M

Central

Nyeri

1982 Coup Attempt
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1663

Joseph Kamau Kinyanjui

M

Rift Valley

Nakuru

Mwakenya

1810

Benson Karanja Thiiru

M

Rift Valley

Nakuru

Mwakenya

12015

Amos Kibe Muigua

M

Central

Gatanga

Mwakenya

12015

Mukaru

M

Central

Gatanga

Mwakenya

12015

Mukaru Nganga

M

Central

Gatanga

Mwakenya

13303

Joshua Njoroge

M

Central

Kiambu

Mwakenya

13303

Kagethe Mungai

M

Central

Kiambu

Mwakenya

13303

Munyui Kahuha

M

Central

Kiambu

Mwakenya

13303

Njoroge Waguthi

M

Central

Kiambu

Mwakenya

13303

Peter Young Kihara

M

Central

Kiambu

Mwakenya

13303

Wameru Kariuki

M

Central

Kiambu

Mwakenya

14376

Ayub Kiqui

M

Rift Valley

West Pokot

Mwakenya

14376

Michael Lobuin Nenee

M

Rift Valley

West Pokot

Mwakenya

14376

Moroto Stephen Krop

M

Rift Valley

West Pokot

Mwakenya

14376

Salim Ndamwe

M

Rift Valley

West Pokot

Mwakenya

14376

Samuel Toyoko

M

Rift Valley

West Pokot

Mwakenya

18998

Joseph Njuguna Mutahi

M

Central

Nyeri

Mwakenya

18998

Wahome Mutai

M

Central

Nyeri

Mwakenya

20620

George Kwanyah Odidi

M

Nyanza

Kanyenya

Mwakenya

20620

Odhiambo

M

Nyanza

Kanyenya

Mwakenya

22388

Pitalis Owinyo Justus Agutu Chal
Kende

M

Nyanza

Bondo

Mwakenya

22439

Cornelius Mulumia Onyango

M

Western

Samia

Mwakenya

23623

George Wange

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

Mwakenya

23625

Peter Porna Odera

M

Nyanza

Rachuonyo North

Mwakenya

24682

Simon Omollo Ayombe

M

Nyanza

Nyando

Mwakenya

25403

Mbewa Ndede

M

Nyanza

Bondo

Mwakenya

25403

Odungu Randa

M

Nyanza

Bondo

Mwakenya

25403

Wachira Waihire

M

Nyanza

Bondo

Mwakenya

25403

Adhu Awiti

M

Nyanza

Bondo

Mwakenya

25403

Daniel Ojijo Odera

M

Nyanza

Bondo

Mwakenya

25403

Odhiambo Olel

M

Nyanza

Bondo

Mwakenya

27135

Njuguna Mutahi

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

27135

Odhiambo Okite

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

27135

Omolo Kodumo

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

27135

Patrick Munene Kamau

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

27135

Wacira Waheire

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

27135

Wahome Mutahi

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

27135

Wanyiri Kihoro

M

Central

Kirinyaga

27859

Stanley Kariuki Waweru

M

27859

Unknown Clan Members

DK

Central

Muranga East

Mwakenya

27859

Unknown Victim’s Family
Members

DK

Central

Muranga East

Mwakenya

27859

Victim’s Elder Brother

M

Central

Muranga East

Mwakenya

Mwakenya
Mwakenya
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31056

Salim Rashidi Lungala

M

Coast

Taveta

31056

Keziah Atieno Olondo

F

Coast

Taveta

Mwakenya

31056

Abdallah Kimwaga Jumanne

M

Coast

Taveta

Mwakenya

31056

Michael Omolo

M

Coast

Taveta

Mwakenya

38045

Paul Amina

M

Nairobi

Westlands

Mwakenya

38046

Nelson Muyela Akhahuwa

M

Western

Emuhaya

Mwakenya

44202

James Odindo Opiata

M

Nyanza

Bondo

Mwakenya

44203

Oyangi Mbaja

M

Western

Vihiga

Mwakenya

44216

Awino Loise

F

Mwakenya

44216

Awuor Phylis

F

Mwakenya

44216

Awuor Wilson

45155

George John Njenga Wainaina

M

Central

Nyandarua

Mwakenya

45178

Kuria Charles Wamwere

M

Rift Valley

Nakuru North

Mwakenya

45192

Church Members

DK

Rift Valley

Nakuru

Mwakenya

45192

Family

DK

Rift Valley

Nakuru

Mwakenya

45192

Michael Mahugu Danson

M

Rift Valley

Nakuru

Mwakenya

45194

Elijohn Gitau Ndabi

M

Central

Kiambu

Mwakenya

45194

Lenard Waruiru

M

Central

Kiambu

Mwakenya

45195

Maina Simon Grigacha

M

Central

Mathira East

Mwakenya

45198

Joseph Kamonye Manje

M

Central

Thika East

Mwakenya

45198

Kiongo Geoffrey Maina

M

Central

Thika East

Mwakenya

45198

Peter Young Gathoga Kihara

M

Central

Thika East

Mwakenya

45199

Peter Njuguna Nding’O

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

47552

Kihara Joshua

M

Mwakenya

47552

Njoroge Philip Gitau

M

Mwakenya

81011

Badul Dahya

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

Mwakenya

81011

David Ochieng Koyoo

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

Mwakenya

81011

Francis Ooko Oyoo

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

Mwakenya

81011

Fredrick Otieno Ouma

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

Mwakenya

81011

Grace Onyango

F

Nyanza

Kisumu

Mwakenya

81011

Magdalene Aboge

F

Nyanza

Kisumu

Mwakenya

81011

Magdalene Ojwang

F

Nyanza

Kisumu

Mwakenya

81011

Odungi Randa

M

Nyanza

Kisumu

Mwakenya

81077

Jonh Kibiro Munyui

M

Central

Kiambu

Mwakenya

1804

Kuria Wamwere

M

Rift Valley

Nakuru

Mwakenya

20402

Achieng Oneko

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya

20402

John David Kali

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya

20402

Joseph Mwanzia

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya

20402

Kamonye Manje

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya

20402

Kiongo Maina

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya

20402

Koigi

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya

20402

Okuto Mbara

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya

20402

Peter Gathoga Kihara

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya

20402

Sylvanus Oduor

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya
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20402

Waweru Kariuki

M

NG

NG

Mwakenya

21043

Eliseus Ikalok Ekesa Owaga

M

Western

Teso North

Mwakenya

22558

Alex Okoth Ondewe

M

Central

Mukurweini

Mwakenya

22558

Andrew Mwathi Ndirangu

M

Central

Mukurweini

Mwakenya

22558

Joseph Gichuki Karanja

M

Central

Mukurweini

Mwakenya

22558

Margaret Wangui

F

Central

Mukurweini

Mwakenya

22558

Naphtali Karanja Wandui

M

Central

Mukurweini

Mwakenya

22558

Njuguna Mutahi

M

Central

Mukurweini

Mwakenya

22558

Rhumba Kinuthia

M

Central

Mukurweini

Mwakenya

44485

Antony Waweru

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

44485

Gitari Cyrus Muraguri

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

44485

Jane Wamaitha

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

44485

Martin Murioki

M

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

44485

Mary Muthoni

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

44485

Moses Wanjohi

F

Central

Kirinyaga

Mwakenya

45191

Gathuku Fredrick Murage

M

Central

Mathira West

Mwakenya

81733

Apollo Washington Juma

M

Nyanza

Bondo

Mwakenya

8003

George Walukhu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8003

Justus Wayelo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8003

Mafura

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8003

Moses Mandu Mafumbuka

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8003

Moses Mirumi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8003

Patrick Barasa

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8003

Samuel Ngeti

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8008

Beles Wanyonyi

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8008

Grace Sakwa

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8008

Mandu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8008

Miruni

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8008

Sophia Matumbai Nafula

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8008

Wayelo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

FERA

8010

Ali Walukano Tyaba

M

NG

NG

FERA

8010

Alias Abas

M

NG

NG

FERA

8010

Charles Wanyonyi

M

NG

NG

FERA

8010

Fred Wanda

M

NG

NG

FERA

8010

James Sigala

M

NG

NG

FERA

8010

Mohamed Olema

M

NG

NG

FERA

8010

Muhindi Hassan

M

NG

NG

FERA

8010

Wilson Mabonga

M

NG

NG

FERA

8010

Wilson Wangwe

M

NG

NG

FERA

20704

Pascal Olaimo Barasa

M

Western

Teso North

FERA

34597

Andrew P. Wasike Munyole

M

Western

Bungoma

FERA

34597

Fiona

F

Western

Bungoma

FERA

34597

Ken Wanyama

M

Western

Bungoma

FERA

34597

Moses Khaemba Wasike

M

Western

Bungoma

FERA
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34597

Robrt Wafula Buke

M

Western

Bungoma

FERA

46504

Moses Khaemba

M

NG

NG

FERA

46504

Moses Khaemba

M

NG

NG

FERA

46522

Andrew Munyole

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

FERA

46522

Moses Wasike Khaemba

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

FERA

46522

Wafula Buke

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

FERA

46522

Wanyama John Kennedy

M

Nairobi

Nairobi

FERA

30888

Hassan Hussein Mbiega

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

30888

Mohammed Ramadhan

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

30900

Govi Mohammed Ramadhani

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

30900

Hassan Hussein Mbiega

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37031

Al Amin

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37031

Ali Saidi Chizondo

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37031

Hamisi Ali Banda

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37031

Khalif Khalifa

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37034

Ali Hamisi Njama

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37034

Amu Salim

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37034

Omari Saidi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37035

Hamisi Mwatawanya

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37035

Hamisi Saidi Chizara

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37035

Omari Saidi Chizara

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37035

Saidi Omari Mwakuaza

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37040

Ali Hamisi Njama

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37040

Amu Salim

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37040

Mwinyihajji Ali Mwawandeka

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37040

Saidi Salimu

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37044

Abdalla Hamisi Nundu

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37044

Ali Hamisi Njama

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37044

Hamisi Ali Kodi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37044

Saidi Salimu Nundu

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37045

Abdalla Saidi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37045

Haimisi Ali

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37045

Said Omari

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37045

Saidi Mohamed

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37045

Saidi Mohamed Kodi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37060

Ali Ramadhani Majani

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37060

Khalifani Mwanyiro

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37060

Majani Ali Saidi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37060

Ramadhan Ali Majani

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37073

Abdalla Nundu

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37073

Ali Hamisi Mwatawanya

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37073

Amu Salim

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37073

Mata Danitu

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo
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37074

Amu Mwakuaza

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37074

Mohamed Saidi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37074

Rameu Matano Hassan

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37074

Saidi Girigi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37075

Amu Salim

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37075

Mateno Rambu

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37075

Mohammed Kodi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37075

Nundu Abdalla Hamisi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37077

Ali Majani

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37077

Hussein Mwamanuko

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37077

Majani Ali Saidi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37077

Mwinyikai Choka

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37077

Ramadhan Ali Majani

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37078

Amu Salim

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37078

Hamisi Hamadi Mwatsingwa

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37078

Mohamed Kodi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37079

Ali Kassimu Mwamagoda

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37079

Hamisi Ali Tapha

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37079

Hassan Athumani Ramtu

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37079

Mohamed Saidi Kodi

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37151

Asha Muhammed

F

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37151

Mwagayo Bahatisha Hassani

F

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

37151

Mwanajuma Mwatari

M

Coast

Msabweni

Kaya Bombo

51472

Ali Abdalla Mwakisha

M

Coast

Kilindini

Kaya Bombo

51472

Ali Said Digore

M

Coast

Kilindini

Kaya Bombo

51472

Athman Mwalimu Mwakashi

M

Coast

Kilindini

Kaya Bombo

51472

Bakari Ali Sef

M

Coast

Kilindini

Kaya Bombo

81741

Rashid Bogodzo Sengeza

M

NG

NG

Kaya Bombo

81741

Vincent Andrew Omondi Owour

M

NG

NG

Kaya Bombo

43175

Etyyang

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

43175

Isaac Kimitios

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

43175

John

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

43175

Kamitios Ndiwa Joseph

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

43175

Kimitios Joab Sali

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

43175

Mashebi

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Bonface Nyarangi Bosire

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Cloephas Nyongesa Odunga

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Francis Wanyama Tinga

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Fransis Wamalwa Namusole

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Isaac Okwach

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Jeaming Simiyu Mtende

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Joseph Lutatala

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Joseph Misiko

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Kawa Chestiti

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIA

STATEMENT
ID

NAMES

GENDER

PROVINCE

DISTRICT

CONTEXT OF
VIOLATION

Chapter FIVE

29

Pius Nyongesa

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

Wanyonyi Marauni

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

29

William Wafula

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27306

Everlyn Chepkwemoi Kimungui

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27306

Hellen Chepkwemoi

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27306

Jane Wahikini

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27306

Mercy Nekesa

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27306

Mourine Wanjala

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27306

Robert Wambwa K.

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27306

Samuel Wanjala

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27308

Frida Nanyama

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27308

Henry Wanyonyi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27308

Nambunya

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27308

Teresa

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27308

Violet Naliaka

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

Babu Evans

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

Brows Nelima

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

John Mutio

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

John Wesonga

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

Kimungui

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

Luka

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

Margret Mutua

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

Nulu Mbuti

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

Philis Nambuya

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

Simon Wanyama

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27326

Wesonga

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27907

Janepher Nelima

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27907

Javan Masika

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27907

Maboni

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27907

Mary Bukusu

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28011

Daniel Maraka Masbo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28023

Isabella Kimunguinangilia

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28023

Mercy Nekesa

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28023

Mourine Nanjala

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28035

Francis Wanjala

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28035

Laban Nalianya

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28035

Mary Mutonyi

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28035

Musa Wanjala

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28035

Musundi Simiyu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28035

Phanuel Biketi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

28042

Agnes Cheben Wakora

F

Western

Bungoma

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60870

Chepkombe

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60870

Chesiar

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60870

Jacob Patrick Komon

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict
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60870

Marakaru Wilson

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60870

Muya

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60870

Rapson

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60870

Sakaria

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60882

Emmanuel Joginder Kinei

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60962

Titus Wabuke Kimengon

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60972

Wycliffe Wakhonya Mayu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60982

Kennedy Ndiema Kimtai

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60987

David Kiso

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60987

Isaiah Kiborit

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60987

Namunyu Moses Mokoit

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60987

Wycliffe Nakamet

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61276

Bonfes Chepot Juma

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61276

Samwel Kwemboi Cheptot

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61416

Eglane Namwenya

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61416

Jane Khalai Mukwana

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61416

Kenedy Juma

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61416

Sharon Nafula

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61417

Patrick Kipteyo Sewui

M

Western

Matungu

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61519

George Walukhu Marakalu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61542

Thomas Chepkurui

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61604

Susana Nekoye Wanjala

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61658

Andrew Cherok

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61658

Jackson Komon

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61658

James Wasama

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61658

Patrick Kiboi Kiterie

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61658

Sospeter Cherop

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61658

Stephen Chesori

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61658

Stephen Wasama

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61658

Symoh Miti

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61658

Titus Kimia

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61668

Moses Kiboi Simotwo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61668

Mzee Masongoch

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61668

Rington Simotwo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61668

Sammy Kwemoi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61673

Titus Kimtai Naibei

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

127

Alex Chebrot

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

127

Edith Chebet

F

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

127

Failin Kimonge

F

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

127

Francis Chemwor Psomuken

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

127

Hellen Cherotich Masai

F

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

127

Rael Chepkoech Kiberas

F

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia

Mt. Elgon Conflict

1522

Geofdfrey Chepkweko Naibei

M

Rift Valley

Kwanza

Mt. Elgon Conflict
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8328

Annah Simatwa Chachu

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8328

Clement Falantino

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8328

Festo Sikikoi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8328

Ishapai

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8328

Maluansi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8328

Masaranja

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8328

Maurice Murunga

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8328

Musa Benson

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8594

Faith Chepkwemoi

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8594

Julius Onyango

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8594

Kennedy Maluche Kirui

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8594

Lydiah Chepkosikei Kirui

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8594

Preto

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

8594

Valon Kiptoo Catherine

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

10456

Benard Naibei

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

10467

Reuben Kimai Bellet

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

11653

Alex Jacob Renda

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

16049

Ezekiel Onyait Jakait

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia East

Mt. Elgon Conflict

16049

Jefta Jakait

M

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia East

Mt. Elgon Conflict

16049

Loise Amase

F

Rift Valley

Trans Nzoia East

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

David Kuruma Kibiri

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

David Wanjala

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Dickson Wangatia

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Diphas Wabuyekha

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Jackson Namaswa

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Jacob Mwanikha

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Johnstone Wakubale

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Joram Wanyela

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Peter Muelesia

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Peter Wakhonya

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Trhomas Wangatia

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Wanjala Toile

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

17675

Watibin Matumbai

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Anne Nangekhe

F

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Coleta Wafula

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Edward Wafula

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Emily Wafula

F

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Ephraim Wafula

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Habert Wafula

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Joyce Wafula Nasielo

F

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Marti Komonwa

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Miriam Wafula

F

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Prisca Mukandah

F

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict
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19042

Robert Buke

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Tom Wafula

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Washington Wafula

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

19042

Wilson Lusweti

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

20253

Catherine Chebet

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

20253

Florence Sirai

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

20253

Gilbert Kiboi Kizebe

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

20253

Isaac Cheshari

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Abel Situma

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Alfred Nabifo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Francis Majimbo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

George Nabifo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Isaac Bwoya

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Juma Mafabi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Justus Wamalwa

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Lawrence Wekesa Bwoya

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Mrefu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Ngali Abraham

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Patrick Musungu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Samson Wekesa

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21153

Vincent Watenga

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Fred Kipkethny

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Isaac Cheskaki

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

John Kiboi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Morris Ndiwa Namnane

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Morris Sambuti

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Moses Alhamisi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Nato

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Pius Kaptunwo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Richard Chebus

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Timona Simon

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Timonah Kapchenga

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21197

Wanjusi Werisi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21986

Christine Nanjala

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21986

Florence Nangila

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21986

Fred Katila

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21986

Juliana Nekesa

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21986

Linet Nanjala

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21986

Peter Namasake Mukhwana

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21986

Sindani Wanyonyi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

21986

Zebadayo Nambafu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27307

Agness Nafula

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27307

James Wanjala

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27307

Janepher Nasimiyu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict
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27307

Janet Nasimiyu

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27307

Patrick Wekesa

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27307

Scovia Naliaka

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27307

Wyclife Wanjala

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27350

Evelyn Chepkwemoi

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27350

George Walukhu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27350

Jonathan B

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27350

Mourine Nanjala

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27350

Richard Kimungui Wakhale

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27350

Richard Wasilwa

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27350

Samuel Chepkwemoi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27350

Tiger Job W

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60020

Festo Kisiero

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60020

Thomas Chepkurui

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60140

Joseph Namasake

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60140

Mourice Wanjala Walubengo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60144

Edward Boiyo Mbuya

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60144

Simotwo Chemiken

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60249

Robinson Ndiema Kipsisei

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60352

Janepher Mulemia Jamin

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60714

Geoffrey Kaptumwo Jacob(Dead)

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60714

Lilly Chemtai Soet

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60750

Alex Mustuni

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60827

Andrew Masai Nakaisa Wanjala

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60827

Richard Kauka Masai

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60827

Rogers Kauka

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60833

David Kwema

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60833

Nancy Chematu

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60843

Gedeon Komes

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60843

Phillisy Chesakit

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60891

Bramwel Cherret Kapchanga

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60963

Gideon Maasai

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60963

James Kironget Nabruk

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60964

Charles Kibet Ndiwa

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60964

Martin Opachu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60977

Chesebe Alfred Shikuku

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61035

Stephen Ben Chongeywo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61039

Victor Kirui Ndiwa

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61040

Fridah Chepkorio

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61040

Jacob Juma Kironget

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61040

Nancy Chepkwemoi

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61042

Alois Chepkurui Tumbu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61042

Moses Chepkurui

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict
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M

Western

Kakamega South
(Ikolomani)

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61049

Elisha Shigogodi Aluhayo

61140

Fridah Chepkorio

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61140

Jacob Juma Kironget

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61140

Nancy Chepkwemoi

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61431

Elamu Wanyama Kibingei

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61431

Isaac Wafula Kibingei

M

Western

Bungoma West

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61519

George Walukhu Marakalu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61647

Leonard Kwemoi Chemengeny

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61648

Titus Cheprai Mongoi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61650

Mokos Ndiema Juma

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61654

Kennedy Kiso Katembu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61660

Chepkoy Stephen Kibet

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61677

Silas Kisa Kimtai

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61987

Chemuno

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61987

Chesubor

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61987

Csarah Chemtai

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61987

Gladys Ndiwa

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61987

Philis Kiptarus Tawarar

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61987

Samson Bera

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

61987

Zakayo Ndara

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Catherine Naswa

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Christine Osuka

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Gladys Temko

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Hazina R Musa

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Jane Tamko Taranes

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Mwanaisha Chemasut

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Panninah C Ndiwe

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Petruta Chemasut

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Rose Naibei

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81432

Salima Abdallah

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81437

Shem Cherowo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

81437

Stephen Wamalwa Siyoi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60321

William Marangachi Ngeywo

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60891

Bramwel Cherret Kapchanga

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

60954

Eliud Rasto Chenge

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

Mt. Elgon Conflict

27350

Evelyn Chepkwemoi

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation

27350

George Walukhu

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation

27350

Jonathan B

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation

27350

Mourine Nanjala

F

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation

27350

Richard Kimungui Wakhale

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation

27350

Richard Wasilwa

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation

27350

Samuel Chepkwemoi

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation

27350

Tiger Job W

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation
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60870

Jacob Patrick Komon

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation

60870

Marakaru Wilson

M

Western

Mt. Elgon

2008 Police operation
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SIX

Sexual Violence
Introduction
1.

Sexual violence is a crime that intimately impacts the victim both physically and
psychologically. It uses the victim's own sexual anatomy to dominate, suppress
and control. Sexual violence has increasingly become an issue of distinct scrutiny
under local and international justice and accountability mechanisms for atrocities
committed particularly during periods of conflict.

2.

In many cases, women and girls are the main victims of sexual violence, although
men and boys are increasingly subjected to sexual violence too. Sexual violence
occurs throughout the world, although in most countries (Kenya included) it is
only in recent years that attention is being given to sexual violence as a serious
human rights violation that affects millions of women and men, resulting in both
short and long-term consequences for the victims.

3.

Kenya has experienced various forms of violent conflicts. These include the struggle
for independence, cattle rustling, conflict over resources, ethnic and politicallyinstigated violence, and conflict arising from militia activities. In all these violent
conflicts, cases of sexual violence have been a common feature. These Chapter
documents systematic incidences of sexual violence committed during the
Commission’s mandate period.
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Definition
4.

For a long time, women and girls were believed to be the main, if not the only,
victims of sexual violence. Early human rights instruments were accordingly
drafted in the assumption that women and girls were the only potential victims of
such crimes. Such definitions omitted males (men and boys) as victims, and did not
envisage situations in which women or men perpetrated sexual violence against
men. Over time, there has been acknowledgement that men and boys are victims
of sexual violence and as such, the definitions have evolved to include them and
consequently, extended protection to them as victims. Still, sexual violence against
male victims is even more under-reported and under-investigated compared to
sexual violence against women.

5.

Various international human rights instruments define sexual violence to include
rape, sodomy, indecent assault on the sexual and reproductive organs of any
person, sexual slavery, forced marriage and sexual torture among others. Power,
coercion, threat of force, aggression and domination have been recognised as
being components of these violations. Sexual violence against women constitutes
discrimination against women, as stipulated under the UN Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),1 to
which Kenya is a state party. The Convention provides a universal definition of
discrimination against women. The Beijing Platform for Action2 expanded on this
definition, specifying that discrimination against women includes violations of
rights of women in situations of armed conflict, including systematic rape, sexual
slavery, forced pregnancy, forced sterilisation and forced abortion amongst others.

6.

Sexual violence may constitute torture under circumstances in which it is used to
obtain information, to punish, intimidate or coerce and for any other reason by
a state official based on discrimination of any kind. The UN Convention against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),
to which Kenya is also a state party, defines torture as an act in which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflected on a person and
the pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or incidental
to, lawful sanctions.3

1
2
3
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UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Article 1. Under General
Recommendation No. 12 of the CEDAW Committee, State Parties must report on legislation in force to protect women from
violence occurring in the family, at work or in any other aspect of social life. This includes sexual violence.
Beijing Platform for Action. Section D. Violence Against Women. 113 -115.
UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 1. General Assembly
Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984.
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7.

Thus, sexual violence would constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, where all the elements under the CAT are met. Sexual
violence is sometimes accompanied by mutilation of sexual and reproductive
organs of the victims.

8.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute) includes
mutilation as a war crime4 and describes it as ‘permanent disfigurement or
permanently disabling or removing an organ or appendage under circumstances
that are not medically justified’. Sexual violence, particularly in the context of
armed conflict or civil strife has been recognised as a tool of war and a crime for
which there should be accountability at the highest level. The Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia was the first to recognise rape as a crime against humanity. The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Special Court for Sierra Leone also
included sexual violence as punishable acts of crimes against humanity.

9.

Rape and other forms of sexual violence can also be an act of genocide. State
parties to the Rome Statute drew from jurisprudence established by the ad hoc
tribunals for Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone and enshrined gender-based
violence as a crime against humanity within the Rome Statute. It defines crimes
against humanity to include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilisation and “any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity.”5

10.

Although Kenya has ratified international and regional instruments such as CEDAW
and the African Women’s Protocol, a law to comprehensively address sexual violence
was only enacted in 2006: the Sexual Offences Act (SOA).6 Previously, offences
relating to sexual violence were dealt with under the Penal Code. As demonstrated
below, other domestic legislation provided for the definition and punishment of
sexual violence. It is worth noting that the SOA marked a major departure from
previous legislation that only recognised rape as a violation against women and girls,
and also failed to define rape exhaustively.7 The SOA sought to comprehensively
address all unlawful acts of a sexual nature. In reflection of international standards
on offences of a sexual nature, the SOA introduced new categories of sexual offences
in Kenya’s criminal justice system including sexual assault with an object8, rape by

4
5
6
7

8
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Rome Statute. Art 8(2)(c)(i).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 7 and 8, 2001.
Sexual Offences Act (SOA), Act No. 3 of 2006.
Penal Code, Section 139 defined rape thus: ‘Any person who has unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or a girl, without her
consent, or with her consent if the consent is obtained by intimidation of any kind, or by fear of bodily harm, or by means of false
representations as to nature of the act, or, in the case of a married woman, by impersonating her husband, is guilty of the felony
termed rape.’
SOA, Section 5.
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more than one person (gang rape),9 deliberate infection with HIV/AIDS,10 trafficking
for sexual exploitation,11 and child pornography.12 It also expanded and expounded
the definitions of existing sexual offences. For instance, the SOA defines rape to
include penetration of ‘genital organs’13 of women or men.
11.

The Children Act14 also refers to sexual violence and stipulates that ‘a child shall
be protected from sexual exploitation and use in prostitution, inducement or
coercion to engage in sexual activity, and exposure to obscene materials’.15 The
Counter Trafficking in Persons Act16 was also recently enacted and comprehensively
addressed trafficking on a broader range of offences, including sexual exploitation
and it references the SOA for definition of sexual exploitation. The Persons with
Disabilities Act17 recognised the special vulnerabilities of girls and women
and stipulated that special measures must be put in place to ensure their ‘full
development and advancement’.18

12.

As indicated elsewhere in this Report, the mandate of the Commission was
generally provided for under sections 5 and 6 of the TJR Act. With regards to
sexual violence, sections 5(c) and section 6(h) of the TJR Act were instructive.
Section 5(c) mandated the Commission to investigate gross human rights
violations which it stipulated included ‘rape and any other form of sexual violence’.
Section 6(h) required the Commission to ‘provide redress in respect of crimes of
a sexual nature against female victims’. The Commission was also required to pay
particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence.19 The Act also listed
‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilisation or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’ as
amounting to crimes against humanity when they are committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.20

13.

For purposes of its work, the Commission adopted the following definition of sexual
violence (borrowed from the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
Protocol on the Prevention and of Sexual Violence against Women and Children):

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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SOA, Sec 10.
SOA, Sec 27.
SOA, Sec 13.
SOA, Sec 16.
SOA, Sec 2 ‘genital organs’ includes the whole or part of male or female genital organs and include the anus.
Act No.8 of 2001.
Sexual Offences Act, S. 8 (15).
Act No. 8 of 2006.
Act No.14 of 2003.
Persons with Disabilities Act, Sec 6(2)(b)
TJR Act, Sec 27.
TJR Act, Section 2(g)
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any act which violates the sexual autonomy and bodily integrity of a person, including,
but not limited to:

a) Rape;
b) Sexual assault;
c)

Grievous bodily harm;

d) Assault or mutilation of female reproductive organs;
e) Sexual slavery;
f)

Enforced prostitution;

g) Forced pregnancy;
h) Enforced sterilization;
i)

Harmful practices, inclusive of all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices
which negatively affect the fundamental rights of women and children,
such as their right to life, health, dignity, education and physical integrity,
as defined in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa;

j)

Sexual exploitation or the coercion of women and children to perform
domestic chores or to provide sexual comfort;

k) Trafficking in, and smuggling of, women and children for sexual slavery or
exploitation;
l)

Enslavement by the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership over women and includes the exercise of such power in
the course of trafficking in women and children;

m) Forced abortions or forced pregnancies of women and girl children arising
from the unlawful confinement of a woman or girl child forcibly made
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the composition of the identity any
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law, and
as a syndrome of physical, social, and psychological humiliation, pain and
suffering and subjugation of women and girls;
n) Infection of women and children with sexually transmitted diseases,
including HIV/AIDS; and
o) Any other act or form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
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Methodology
14.

The Commission received hundreds of statements from women, men and children
outlining serious sexual violations perpetrated by individuals and groups of people
including ordinary citizens and state officials. A total of 1,10421 statements from
adults were received in regard to sexual violations. Of these, 103 were from men.
The statements and memoranda presented in regard to sexual violence represent a
victim count of 2 646 women and 346 men. Additionally, testimonies were heard from
women and men in the public hearings, in-camera hearings and women’s hearings.

15.

All the victims who recorded statements, regardless of their sex, identified their
perpetrators as being men. The victims ranged from elderly women and men to young
children. In many instances, sexual violence was in the context of other violations
such as extra-judicial killing, serious injury, torture and forced displacement amongst
others. Recognising that sexual offences are ordinarily complex to investigate,
the Commission adopted specific measures to ensure that sexual offences were
effectively and sensitively investigated. Firstly, investigators who had previous
experience in investigating sexual offences and who had undergone training on
the same, including on the Sexual Offences Act were recruited. Secondly, a set of
guidelines outlining the approach to be taken in investigating sexual violence was
prepared. The overall goal of the guidelines was to ensure that survivors of sexual
violence were treated with dignity. The guidelines required investigators to, among
other things:











ensure that victims and witnesses of sexual violence were treated with the
utmost sensitivity and respect;
observe cultural sensitivity;
ensure that victims/survivors of sexual violence were interviewed by an
investigator of the same sex;
minimise the number of interviews with victims/survivors to avoid further
traumatising them;
observe a victim’s demeanour or emotional responses during interview and
be keen to recognise if and when to discontinue the interview;
be aware that because of the nature of the violation, victims/survivors may
withhold information for a number of reasons, including because of fear,
shame or embarrassment;

21 These exclude statements on sexual violence received from children. Statements from children are discussed in the Children’s
Chapter.
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be aware that there is likely to be little or no primary or corroborating evidence
at all;



avoid using technical jargon; and



exercise patience when interviewing victims/survivors.

16.

In acknowledgement of the stigma, shame and embarrassment associated with
sexual violence, the victims of sexual violence were offered the option of testifying
either in camera or in public. The idea was to provide victims of sexual violence with
not only a platform to be heard, but also a conducive environment in which they
could share their experiences freely. The Commission also engaged the services of
counsellors to offer psycho-social support before, during and after the hearings to
enable the victims not only to narrate their experiences but also to cope with what
they had experienced.

17.

The Commission held public hearings in which 778 witnesses (213 women and
656 men) gave testimonies in regard to the violations. Of the total 778 cases that
were heard, 26 were in regard to sexual violence, with 21 from women and five from
men. One hundred cases were heard in camera, 19 of which were in regard to sexual
violence. Two of the sexual violence cases heard in camera were from men while the
rest were from women. Separate public hearings were also organised exclusively for
women. Over 1 200 women participated in the women-only hearings.

18.

The types of sexual violations reported to the Commission included mass rapes
(rape of many women in a community at the same time); gang rape (rape of women
by more than two men at the same time); sodomy; mutilation of male and female
genitals; castration; forced circumcision of both men and women; sexual torture;
and penetration of women’s sexual organs by harmful objects.

Reporting of Cases on Sexual Violations
19.

The Commission came face to face with the reality of the extent to which cases
of sexual violations have continued to be unreported. It is very likely that the
number of statements on sexual violence received, as indicated above, may be
but a minute fraction of the actual number that occurred. Many accounts of rape
and other sexual violence marked the first time that the victims were narrating
their experiences. While a number of women chose to give their testimonies in
camera, many more women chose to talk freely in the women’s public hearings. A
few spoke openly at the public hearings. Men on the other hand chose to speak
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in camera only. While some men actually testified about their ordeal with sodomy,
many more women spoke about the sexual violence that their sons or husbands
went through, reinforcing the existing view that sexually violated men find it
extremely stigmatising to report and talk about the violations.22
20.

The Commission learnt that some women, at the height of conflict in which they
suffered sexual violence, preferred to deal with issues they considered critical; such
as fleeing, seeking shelter and caring for injured family members. Accordingly, such
victims had neither sought medical attention nor received psycho-social support
even from family members. In some cases, women had borne the pain and scars
of sexual violence as well as shame and the silence, for three or even four decades.
This was particularly the case in regard to victims of sexual violence during the Mau
Mau period and the Shifta War. It was observed that, in a number of instances at the
women’s hearings, women began by speaking about other violations and it was only
after they saw other women share similar experiences or after being probed by the
Commissioners that they opened up about their own experience of sexual violence.

21.

For instance, a witness testified of violations such as forced displacement
before stating in passing and in closing that she had been raped over 20 years
earlier.23 The interaction with victims and witnesses of sexual violence as well as
organisations working with such victims provided the Commission with a clear
picture of the contributing factors to the limited reporting of cases relating to
sexual violence. Some of the factors identified included stigma and shame, fear of
reporting sometimes due to threats, lack of clear reporting lines and harassment
of victims by the authorities they were to report the violations to. Maendeleo ya
Wanawake identified the inability of victims to identify their perpetrators as having
discouraged victims, especially women, from reporting, stating:
We know that there are many women who were raped, but they were raped by people
with no faces. They cannot connect the rapists to their names and their faces. Maybe
they [rapists] covered their faces. [It] is a dilemma when you are raped by a gang of
four or ten men and you cannot even identify one. We [also] know that there are some
communities which will not come out even if they are raped because it is taboo and
they will not get married and people will try to stigmatise the same women and it is
very difficult.24

22.
22
23
24
25
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Many victims suffered trauma, impeding their ability to talk about their experience.
There were cases of women who never spoke for days after being violated.25 While
TJRC/Hansard/ In-Camera Hearing/Kiryandongo/ 1November 2011/p.11.
TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Nakuru/Women/24 September 2011/p. 15
Hansard Reports/Thematic Hearings/Women/Nairobi/8 February 2012/p.4
TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Kisumu/16 July 2011/p. 5.
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counselling enabled some victims to speak about the harrowing experiences they
had undergone, for others no amount of counselling would help. A Kenyan refugee
testified that he neither reported that he was sodomised nor sought treatment
because he was ashamed to do so, remarking:
Yes, I would wish to, but I am also scared because it is something that happened secretly.
For such a thing, men are embarrassed to reveal it in public.26

23.

Many victims of sexual violence indicated that they did not report the sexual
violations for fear that they would be shunned by their family members as well
as by society. They said their communities’ treatment of victims of sexual violence
discouraged them from reporting. Indeed, this was the case for most Samburu and
Maasai women who had been sexually violated by British soldiers, as discussed
below.

24.

Most of the victims, if not all, testified that they only informed female members
of their families who cautioned them against telling their fathers and spouses.
The victims said in the event their spouses or fathers knew of the violations,
they would be chased away. Accordingly, victims hid the fact that they had been
violated and did not seek medical help for fear that the same information would
be leaked to their spouses and that their marriages would be affected, as one
witness stated:
You hide so that your husband does not know that you have been raped. You just
persevere with serious pain because if the husband knows, he will leave you. Many
people have been abandoned and suffer with the children. Since you do not want to
be abandoned by your husband because of rape, you just keep quiet and persevere.27

25.

Even in cases where the spouses did not abandon the victims upon learning
that they had been sexually violated, the relationships were not the same again.
They changed for the worse. Witnesses said spouses of rape victims who learned
about the rape either remarried or resorted to mistreating and verbally abusing
the victims and in other cases just acted generally cold. Responding to questions
during the hearings as to whether she had received any form of support from her
husband following the violation one witness replied:
No, I did not get any support from him because since that day, there is no happiness or
harmony in the house. He has changed even when we sleep. He is just like an enemy in
the house. There is no love as we were living in the previous years.28

26 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Men/Kiryandongo/2 November 2011/ p. 6; TJRC/Statement/00578.
27 TJRC/Hansard/Women Hearing/Kuria/ 26 July 2011/p. 24; See also TJRC/ Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Rumuruti/15 November
2011/p. 12.
28 TJRC/Hansard/Women Hearing/Kisumu/ 16 July 2011/p.18.
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26.

The Commission heard of cases where victims and sometimes their families were
threatened with harm should they ever report to any individual or authorities
about the violations. While some victims ignored the threats and proceeded to
make reports, in cases where the perpetrators were state security agencies (SSAs)
or members of militia groups, the victims took the threat seriously and expressed
real fear for their lives.29 A Kenyan refugee in Kiryandogo, Uganda said:
In 1997, there was trouble but they did not burn the houses. So we just slept outside but
went back to the house later. When we slept outside, they [members of the SLDF] would
come and rape us at night but we did not know where to go and report them. In 2005,
a lot of trouble erupted. At that time, the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) had been
formed. We knew them but we could not go to the police. When they saw you with a
policeman, you would be hanged. We knew who were doing those things, but we were
afraid of going to the police lest you are seen.30

27.

It is such threats and fear of reprisal that prevented victims of sexual violence
committed by members of the Ndeteleka gang during forced evictions, discussed
later in this chapter, from reporting, as one victim revealed:
I never reported anywhere because I was threatened that if I make any mistake of
reporting, they would kill me and my family.”31

28.

For some of the victims, there existed cultural barriers that hindered them from
reporting about their violations. In some communities, it was taboo to discuss sexual
matters, leave alone sexual violations. Even when there was an opportunity to speak
on violations, such women opted to use alternative expression to explain the attack,.
On victims of sexual violence from the Kuria community,32 a witness told of the
experience of a girl known to her, demonstrating how such a taboo (also common
among the Teso) has prevented sexually violated women from seeking medical
treatment:
During the post-election violence, I can remember there was a girl who was terribly raped
in Naivasha but because there was a lot of movement, she could not get treatment. So, she
travelled all the way. She was brought to Busia by a lorry and then when she was taken
home, because it is a taboo to talk about rape, she kept quiet. She had been raped and even
a bottle was inserted in her private parts. So, she was just rotting in the house. In Teso when
a child is raped, the issue is not supposed to be talked of, otherwise who will marry her?33

29.

29
30
31
32
33
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This position was shared by victims of sexual violence perpetrated by British
soldiers. They indicated that the cultural prohibition on the discussion of issues
relating to sex or sexuality prevented many of the victims from reporting. Victims
TJRC/Statement/39443.
TJRC/Hansard/In Camera Hearing/ Women/ Kiryandongo-Uganda/2 November 2011/p. 2.
TJRC/Statement/43309/p.15.
TJRC/Memo/1496/p.5.
TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Busia/4 July 2011/p.5, 6.
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of sexual violence indicated that during conflict, there were no clear reporting
lines and many said they did not know who to report to about being violated:
Most of us do not have that kind of assistance because many are raped in the forests.
Others just keep silent because many of us do not know where to go; very few have that
information.34

30.

The history of harassment of victims of sexual violence at various police stations
also discouraged women from reporting and talking of sexual violence due to lack
of faith in the system, as described in another witness’ testimony:35
There is a lack of a structured system to take care of victims at the grassroots level.
Generally rape victims are afraid of reporting to the police because sometimes insensitive
police officers ridicule victims. They tell the victim: “You should have enjoyed it. Why
have you come to report to us?” These are stories you hear often when a report takes
place. I strongly believe that many rape cases go unreported because victims are highly
stigmatised and cannot dare reveal the circumstances for fear of repercussions. You will
appreciate that poverty is one of the major issues for these marginalised groups. Others
are fear of repercussions and insecurity, custom and culture, where family matters are
supposed to be kept secret, yet somebody continues to suffer. There is also ignorance
in our population; they do not know where to go and report when something happens
and the suffering cycle continues.

31.

Gender Violence Recovery Centre, GVRC said women were turned away from police
stations and could not record their violations:
during the post-election violence, there were people who went to report and were told
that a statement cannot be recorded. They had evidence at that time and it was never
collected. Will those people ever get justice?36

32.

Another victim was frustrated as she tried to report the violence and access medical
treatment:
[I got] no treatment because when I reported the case at Ikombe dispensary, they refused
to treat me and advised me to go and get the P3 or a note from the police. The police [at
Kwa Vonza police post] also refused and advised me to go back and get killed.37

33.

34
35
36
37

Reporting became even more difficult, especially in cases where state security
agents’ that the victims would have ordinarily been expected to report to, were
the perpetrators. Security officers at police stations intimidated victims, and
blamed them for the violation and often covered up the violations to protect
their colleagues. This was among the reasons why victims of sexual violations,
even during the struggle for independence, remained silent, with many citing
TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Rumuruti/15 November 2011/p.13.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Makindu/24 November 2011/p. 11.
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearings/Women/ 8 February 2012/ 28.
TJRC/ Statement/43350/p. 20.
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the difficulties of accusing government officials in the same government.38 One
witness indicated, while describing the fate of victims of sexual violence during the
operation in the North Eastern region, that corruption and bribery also contributed
to frustrate victims efforts to report and also ensured that the reported cases were
never investigated:
Even today, there are hundreds of small girls who go to school and who were raped
and become pregnant. The men who raped them are wealthy and if you report them
to the police, they bribe the police. There are girls who were raped by their teachers.
These men said that it was the women who gave their private parts or vaginas to the
men. They further said that they raped the women due to their willingness to be raped.
So, the police never listened to our case. I was successful to work for the human rights
body. I even still work for them. If raped girls come to me, I assist them. I ask them to
come forward. One day, I got the man who raped one woman. He told me that it was the
girl who let him do it to her. The girl was sent away because the man bribed the police
and that was the end of the case. That is the end of the story. Nobody gives you justice.
Nobody takes the rapist to court. So, he just bribes the police. Even chiefs take bribes.
The chief does not listen to us. The police will not take the rapist to the police station.
They just take the bribe and go away.39

34.

Others factors said to have contributed to the non-reporting of sexual violence
cases included ‘lack of appropriate documentation, illiteracy and lack any safe
keeping of documents’.40

Sexual Violence during Peacetime
35.

The prevalence and incidences of sexual violence in times of peace are crucial in
understanding the foundations of these violations and their use in times of conflict.
In 2003, for the first time, the government through the Kenya Demographic and
Health Survey (KDHS) began collecting data on gender-based violence.41 Although
the research was restricted to violence experienced in the household,42 it also
covered marital rape and other acts of sexual violence. According to the survey,
Marital rape appears to be common, with 15 per cent of married women and separated
or divorced women reporting having experienced forced sexual intercourse; 12 per cent
report this experience in the 12 months preceding the survey.43

38
39
40
41

TJRC/Memo/43291/p.
TJRC/Hansard/In Camera Hearing/Women/Wajir/21 April 2011/p.8.
TJRC/Memo/1496/p.4.
Kenya Bureau of Statistics. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS), Chapter 15, 2003. http://www.measuredhs.com/
pubs/pdf/FR151/FR151.pdf (last accessed 18 June, 2012).
42 Kenya Bureau of Statistics. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS), Chapter 15, page 259, 2003. http://www.
measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR151/FR151.pdf (last accessed 18 June, 2012).
43 Kenya Bureau of Statistics. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS), Chapter 15, page 264, 2003. http://www.
measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR151/FR151.pdf (last accessed 18 June, 2012).
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36.

According to the KDHS 2008-9, 12 per cent of women noted that their first sexual
encounter was against their will.44 Further, one in every five women (21 per cent)
experienced sexual violence and 37 per cent of women who have experienced
sexual violence reported intimate partners (current or past husbands or
boyfriends) as the perpetrator.45 A witness testified that she was seduced by a
man known to her. When she refused to marry him, he waylaid her and raped
her.46

37.

Statistics from GVRC over a three-year period indicate that 2,329 female sexual
violence victims were treated at the facility, compared to only 102 male victims
over the same period.47

38.

In 2005 alone, the Coalition of Violence against Women (COVAW) received over
750 cases.48 The year 2003 registered about 300 more cases than 2002, while by
mid-2004, reported cases of rape were almost as much as for the entire 2000. While
the increase in documented cases could be attributed to increased awareness and
hence greater reporting, the increase in the number of incidents nonetheless calls
for greater measures to ensure prevention, protection and ultimately, justice for
victims.

39.

It is not only the prevalence of sexual violence that is most troubling. Of great
concern too, is the age of the victims.49 In confounding traditional norms where the
young and the old in society are valued and nurtured, perpetrators targeted these
very groups of vulnerable people, including persons with disability. According to
GVRC, since their establishment in 2001, they are seeing trends where the victims
are younger and younger. They informed the Commission that:

Chapter SIX

The age of survivors is getting younger. So, we are asking ourselves what is happening
to our society because we have seen infants as young as a one-month-old baby being
sexually assaulted. Just three weeks ago we discharged a two-and-a-half year old girl
sexually defiled by her blood father. This child had to undergo theatre procedures just
to repair her.50

40.

A witness shared with the Commission how her casual labour/gardener, on two
occasions (2003 and in 2009), sodomised her mentally ill son.

44 Kenya Bureau of Statistics. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS), Chapter 15, page 274, 2008. http://www.
measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR151/FR151.pdf (last accessed 18 June, 2012)
45 TJRC/Statement/37945.
46 TJRC/Statement/00578.
47 As above.
48 Bi-Annual Human Rights Report, Vol. 7, No 3 – 4. July – December 2005. Kenya Human Rights Commission. P 10.
49 TJRC/Statement/07238.
50 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearings/Women/ 08 February 2012 /p. 25.
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Age Distribution of Female Victims of Sexual Violence

41.

According to the GVRC, there are increasing victims of sexual violence who are
children. Whereas between 2001 and 2005, the centre received a total of 1,019 cases
involving children, in 2010-2011, it recorded 1,437 cases.51 The violence is directed
at both boys and girls. However, girls comprise the majority of victims, as evidenced
by cases documented between October and December 2011, where out of a total of
324 incidents that involved children, 279 were violations against girls.

42.

According Linda Wanyama, learning institutions are not safe either. She testified how
schoolgirls, including college students, have been subjected to sexual harassment at
the institutions of learning. She stated as follows:
So, I want to start with sexual harassment. In secondary schools, this has come out more
clearly, especially on the female teachers on teaching practice. We sympathize with the
girls who come to our schools because you can see men sitting together trying to choose
them, as if they are goods in the markets. They do ‘booking’, saying: “This one is mine
and this one is mine.” These children are assaulted, not just by teachers, but even by the
university lecturers who supervise them. When he comes to see a student in class, he will
tell her: “Let us meet at Westgate so that we talk about the report that I will write.” Because
the girl is desperate and because her parents have paid school fees and she wants to finish
her studies and graduate, she has no option but to follow the male lecturer to the hotel.
We see this every day and we sympathize with them. Kenya is spoilt. 52

51 See generally TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing/Women/08 February 2012/p. 25-30.
52 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Bungoma/9 July 2011/p. 9; See also TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/ Busia/ 4 July 2011/p.1112.
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Sexual Violence during Conflicts
43.

Studies have shown that cases of sexual violence escalate in the contexts of
conflict, a factor attributed to a breakdown of the social order - perpetrators taking
advantage of the disorder to commit sexual violence with impunity - and the use
of sexual violence as an instrument of terror. Indeed, sexual violence has been used
to precipitate the expulsion of some communities from parts of the country.

44.

As indicated elsewhere in this Report, Kenya has experienced various forms of
conflicts, which most of the time have evolved into violent episodes. These include
the struggle for independence, cattle rustling, conflict over resources, ethnic and
politically-instigated violence, and conflict arising from militia activities. In all
these episodes, cases of sexual violence have been a common feature, with women
bearing the brunt of the violence.

45.

Witness accounts revealed that victims of sexual violence were ‘collateral damage’
because no matter which ethnic community the women came from, they
indiscriminately suffered sexual violence. Accordingly, no matter the ideologies
behind conflict, women still fall victim, whether they support those facilitating or
those repulsing a conflict.

46.

The Commission heard that when violence erupts, people living with disability
face additional danger and exposure to sexual violence, because they are not able
to quickly escape the danger. This delay may be due to poor sight, limited ability
to move, inability to access information warning about impending danger, mental
incapacity and other related challenges. Persons with disability are therefore
doubly vulnerable to sexual violence in situations of conflict.

Sexual violence during the colonial period
47.

Sexual violence is said to have been one of the methods employed by the colonial
government to not only discipline and humiliate the dissidents, but to also instil
fear in would-be dissidents. As the colonizers clamped down on the Mau Mau
movement, thousands of men and women were arrested and sent to detention
camps. At one time, the detention camps held more than 70,000 detainees53.
The Commission heard of both men and women being tortured, with men being
castrated and women raped to confess of their alleged membership to Mau Mau. In
probably the first recorded use of sexual violence in Kenya as a tool of suppression
and repression, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki in his autobiography wrote that:

53 Anderson D Histories of the hanged (2005) 313.
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There are evidences of castration of those suspected of being Mau Mau by screeners at
Kwanyangwethu; while these things were done by Africans. The white men knew and
approved of what was going on.54

48.

Nduku Mutua, one of five litigants who have sued the British government over
torture, sexual violations, detention without trial and other abuses committed
during the colonial period, recalls:
After 50 years it is time for justice. I was castrated and tortured by British prison guards. I
was robbed of my dignity and of a family and those scars have never healed. This wrong
must be recognised, I and many others deserve an apology and justice at long last.55

49.

Another example that typifies the suffering and torture of women during the awful
screening exercise is summed up in an account given by Elkins of a young woman
who at the time of Mau Mau was taken for screening in a hut on the estate of her
employer, not long after the start of the Emergency. During the interrogations, she
was asked about the number of oaths she had taken and the whereabouts of her
husband. Although she had just given birth and there was evidence of a baby, this
did not stop the interrogators from whipping her while naked. But even grosser are
the details she narrated on the general sexual torture meted out on women:
[…] apart from the beatings, women used to have banana leaves and flowers inserted
into their vaginas and rectums, as well as have their breasts squeezed with a pair of
pliers; after which, a woman would say everything because of the pain…..after such
things were done to me, I told them everything. I survived after the torture, but still have
a lot of pain in my body even today from it.56

50.

Women and girls who often acted as couriers of food and other provisions to the
Mau Mau found themselves victims of sexual violence for their support to the Mau
Mau. At the women’s hearings in Embu, one witness told of how she was raped as
a girl, by the colonialists:
When I was a young girl of 15 years, I was one of those who used to take food to the Mau
Mau fighters. We would find people waiting for us. They would subject us to shameful
activities. They used us as their women.... While leaving the forest, they would grab us
and remove our clothes and then rape us... Some of us never managed to get children.
We are in a lot of pain.57		

51.

Sexual violence was perpetrated by African officers working for the colonial
administration but with explicit or implicit approval from the white colonialists.

54 J.M Kariuki Mau Mau Detainee (2009) 34.
55 Kenya Human Rights Commission ‘Surviving after torture: a case digest on the struggle for justice by torture survivors in Kenya
(2009) 17.
56 C Elkins, Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (2005), 68.
57 TJRC/Hansard/ Women’s Hearing/Embu /22 November 2011/p.9.
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RWN, a witness from Runyenjes stated that she was beaten and raped in Gichera, for
purportedly being a supporter of the Mau Mau. She said she was raped by policemen
from Kathanjuri camp who “were in the company of their seniors (white men) who
issued the orders for us to be beaten and the women raped.”58 Twenty-one victims of
sexual violence during the Mau Mau era also submitted a memorandum identifying
the perpetrators of rape as ‘both white and African police who were then referred to
as ‘KEYA’ (local pronounciation for Kenya African Rifles – KAR).”59

Sexual violence during cattle raids
52.

Northern Kenya has over the years witnessed insecurity attributed to the region’s
proximity to warring countries and porous borders that have facilitated trade in
small arms and light weapons, the commercialization of cattle rustling, and the
inadequacies in the government’s provision of security and policing.60 These
breaches have motivated the local residents to arm themselves in an effort to
secure themselves and their livestock. Consequently bloody conflict over resources,
border conflicts and cattle rustling have left a trail of destruction in their wake.
Widely reported consequences of insecurity in the region, with deaths, serious
injuries and property destroyed, have been accompanied by another unspoken
consequence - sexual violence - which has affected almost all households in the
region.

53.

The Commission heard of cases where men would be physically assaulted and
their women sexually violated before the bandits made away with livestock. A
witness stated how he was attacked by Shiftas (bandits) who robbed him of his
day’s earnings from his shop, assaulted him and abducted his wife. He testified that
the bandits raped his wife for over an hour before they released her.61 Men were
not spared. A witness reported how raiders stripped him naked and proceeded to
sodomise him in front of his wife and children. Though he sought treatment, he
later succumbed to the injuries.62 Ms Adukan Raphaela, while testifying about the
suffering that members of her community (the Rendile), have endured narrated:
They [raiders] have been attacking us and mutilating people. We have evidence of boys
whose private parts were mutilated, and many women who are widowed by the same
people. So, we are suffering in the hands of the Turkana. The Gabbra too attacked a
village and killed almost 60 people in the recent past. 63

58
59
60
61
62
63

TJRC/Statement/ 43395.
TJRC/Memo/M0118/p 3.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Rumuruti/15 November 2011/p.17.
TJRC/Statement/30177.
TJRC/Statement/30186.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Rumuruti/15 November 2011/p.4.
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Sexual violence during security operations
54.

The government has over the years responded to the insecurity in various parts
of the country, especially the Northern Kenya region, by deploying state security
agents (SSAs) to either stop the violence between communities, restore law and
order in the affected area or disarm heavily-armed communities, under what has
come to be known as ‘security operations’. One would have expected that the
arrival of SSAs in a given area would be viewed, by the local residents, as a relief.
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. SSAs, usually consisting of a contingent
of officers drawn from the General Service Unit (GSU), the Anti-Stock Theft Unit
(ASTU), the military, the Administration Police (AP) as well as the regular Kenya
Police, have been accused of even more brutality and violation of human rights,
including sexual violence.

55.

Witnesses accused SSAs of harassing the locals in the name of obtaining intelligence
on previous attacks and disarming communities. They accused the SSAs of targeting
communities perceived to be hostile and administering collective punishment,
especially through confiscation of livestock - their only source of livelihood - as a
means of pushing the residents into surrendering guns that the military officers
believed they held.64 Witnesses confirmed that the SSAs committed sexual violence
on both men and women in the areas that they were deployed during those security
operations. One narrated how the military officers carrying out a security operation
in the area brutally raped his wife and took off with his 60 cattle:65
In October 1979, during the disarmament exercise, the GSU came to my home and
met me in my house. One of them told me to give out guns; I told him I didn’t have.
Immediately I was kicked and the others stepped on my chest and they started beating
me randomly until I vomited blood and finally, I was castrated.66

56.

64
65
66
67
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A witness from Samburu East testified how, following the kidnapping of two boys
from her Samburu community by raiders from another community, Samburu men
set out to rescue the boy. Two police officers are said to have been killed around
the same time under unknown circumstances. Immediately, SSAs were deployed in
the area and they landed using helicopters. When the Samburu men approached
the security officers, thinking that they were bringing back the kidnapped children,
they were shot dead. The SSAs then embarked on a community punishment of the
residents during which they confiscated over 6 000 head of cattle, injured many
people, raped hundreds of women and castrated boys.67
TJRC/Statement/04856.
TJRC/Statement/04360.
TJRC/Statement/00413/p.8; TJRC/Statement/05774.
TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Rumuruti/15 November 2011/p.7.
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A witness from Turkana testified how, in 1968, police officers drawn from the GSU
and deployed in the area following a cattle raid by bandits, raped and sodomised
his daughter, infecting her with a sexually transmitted disease that rendered her
infertile.68

Sexual violence during the Shifta War
58.

From Garissa, through Wajir and to Moyale, there was a common narrative involving
sexual violence by the SSAs deployed to the areas to suppress Shifta activities in
the region. Women and men were sexually tortured to humiliate, intimidate and
coerce them and to extract information from them. Many people died following
the brutal attacks, while others lived with permanent scars that are a constant
reminder of the violations they experienced.

59.

From witness testimonies, there seemed to be consistency in the patterns of
execution of rapes in the context of the ‘Shifta War’. Men were forcibly removed
from their homes, and some were killed in the process. Many times, the men
were taken to a central location for interrogation. When all men were gone, the
women were left vulnerable. At that point, the soldiers and policemen would go
back and begin raping the women and girls. After the rapes, the women would
be forced to walk to join their men for interrogation. A witness described it thus:
We were in our houses. They came at around 6.00am. They took out all the men; they
beat up all the men. They took me and a neighbour and raped us. Some animals were
killed and others were taken away. My husband was killed in the process…while one
was holding my hand, another held my legs, and they broke my knee. After the first
one raped me, the other one who was holding my hands raped me too. They raped my
neighbour’s daughter also.69

60.

A similar testimony was given by a witness from Wajir:
So, early in the morning at about 6.00am every man was taken away. We kept seeing
men being taken away from all over the place from 6.00am to 6.00pm. Others were
picked from one place. The men sustained injuries and some were bleeding and you
could see blood flowing out of the trucks. All these men were taken to an open field.
They kept coming to collect men between Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday. …
On Wednesday, the bodies were collected. On the same day, Wednesday, the soldiers
came back. Thousands of girls were asked: “Do you want your men back?” They said:
“Yes.” Every little girl or woman was taken away. They told us to follow them so that
they could show us where our men were. So, when we went with them to Makaror,
the soldiers turned on us when we reached the place called Makaror they said: “Today,
there are no men for you. We are your men.” No woman was spared. They did not care

68 TJRC/Statement/00662/p.7-8.
69 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Women/Isiolo/ 10 May 2011/p. 12-13.
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whether some were pregnant. They did not care when some women told them they
were about to give birth. They did not care that some women were old. Every soldier
came. They were so many soldiers. They were uncountable. There were no prostitutes
those days, so these men were sexually starved. By then, I was nine months pregnant.
They raped me again and again until my unborn child came out. Twenty women who
were raped died. I saw them die with my own eyes. Some women resisted them. They
struggled with them and because of that struggle, they were beaten to death. During
the night, the place became a camp for only women to be raped. The dead bodies
were taken away. We do not know where they took them.70… The soldiers did not care
about our private parts. They never used to get access before. So, one would step on
your stomach and the other one would rape you. One would hold your shoulders and
the other one would rape you. When they would leave, another four would come. That
is how they did it. They were raping us mercilessly without consideration. Any woman
who struggled died. I do not think they are living. All of them died. If they did not die
the same day, they died the following day. I do not think any of them are living. Maybe,
a few are living now but they are in very desperate situations.71

61.

According to Hamud Sheikh Mohamed, in Garissa, on 25 July 1967, over 25
women were raped and admitted at the district hospital. He told the Commission:
Many ladies, young and old were raped and beaten seriously. They [women] have
suffered more than any other person and the ladies continued being raped with no
water and food. Those ladies who were raped were admitted to Garissa District Hospital
where the Garissa Medical Training Institute is located currently. Over 25 ladies were
admitted to the hospital...some of them were my real sisters.72

62.

As a strategy to ‘contain’ the enemy, the government developed measures to
restrict access to food, water and shelter. The communities were rounded up
into temporary camps and anybody operating outside the camp was labelled a
rebel and hence, the enemy. Nonetheless life inside the camp was not necessarily
safer. Raping of women was commonplace and sometimes, it was in the full
view of their husbands and other relatives. At other times, the women would be
dragged outside the perimeter fences, defiled and left to crawl back to the camp.
A witness from Arabia testified before the Commission that73:
From 1965, the government started restricting people to three camps at the district
headquarters in Rhamu, Elwak, and Mandera. All the people from Arabia were restricted
to Mandera camp. Within the camps there was relative safety, but hard labour and
torture was common. People outside the camp were treated like wild animals. People
stayed in the camps for up to three-and-a-half years, many died out of abuse and
starvation. Rape of women was common, and many were raped: BAE (initials) was raped

70
71
72
73
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by more than 30 soldiers while she already had one child, thereafter, she became barren.
SM was raped and died on the spot. GH, DM and NM were raped but survived.
Women were publicly raped in full view of everyone - women, men, children - contrary
to Islamic law, human dignity, and Somali culture. After beatings, torture, and rapes, no
medication was given to people. Men’s testicles were squeezed. They were tied with
ropes meant to clean rifles, many died. Women’s breasts were tied with rubber bands.

63.

Pregnant women were not spared, as one witness who was seven months pregnant
when she was violated described her harrowing experience:
I could not comprehend how that askari [army officer) caught me and beat me with
the gun butt. I did not understand what this person was doing, but he tore my clothes
and threw them away. I was naked as he did his job. I ran home completely naked
and then found my husband with some homeguards. When my husband came to me
I was crying and he asked me why I was crying…the two officials held me, but only
one raped me. They really messed me up me…they beat me on my private parts when
I was removing the clothes. I fell down and then they lay on me as I faced upwards.
He held me down viciously. I was in a state of shock. Then he just raped me and went
away… Even when I delivered, the child was sick; I stayed with him for two weeks...
he had a bullet wound. He could not survive. The child died... a very beautiful baby,
brown just like an angel.74

64.

The Commission received testimonies that pointed to sexual slavery during the
Shifta War. According to the witness, the army detained and raped most of the
women in an operation to flush out supporters of the militia. As one witness
testified:
The army took us away. They killed some. They took 15 women and another six. They
took us to a place called Ndhidh Adhani for 15 days. One soldier held my right hand
and the other one held my left leg. They just raped us. They did not care whether some
of us were dead, they just raped us for six hours until midnight. At some moment
they left us for a minute and then others came and raped us. For the first five days,
four people were unable to wake up, and one died. Two of the women miscarried.
They took nine women from there. They were all sick. They could not even sit properly
because they had been raped so badly. Twenty women were not able to give birth
again. They torched all our houses and for five days, they raped us. The mothers of
nine of the children were so sick, because they had been raped. They were left there
because they could not walk. They were not dead, but because they could not walk
and the men could not carry them, they left them there. We have never had somebody
to tell their story to. We lost everything. All the Sakuye women were raped. All women
were raped and most of them died.75

74 TJRC/Hansard/In- Camera Hearing/Women/Isiolo/ 10 May 2011/p. 12-13.
75 TJRC/Hansard/ Public Hearing/Moyale/ 30 April 2011/p. 30.
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65.

A witness from Moyale narrated another account:
We were 18 women and I can even show you the houses where we were put. The soldiers
locked the doors of the houses and took us as their wives. The suffering we underwent
was enough and the men were beaten up. They were bleeding everywhere and they
were even vomiting. They were stepped on as they lay on their stomachs. They were also
injured on their private parts.76

66.

Similar meticulous planning for execution of mass rapes was evidenced in
testimony from victims in the context of the 1984 army operation in Wagalla,
Wajir, in what later became known as the Wagalla Massacre.77 The Commission
heard numerous witness testimonies that reveal consistent and persistent
patterns of sexual violence against women by the army.

67.

The testimonies point to meticulous planning of the operation to round up men
and separate them from the women and thereafter sexually violate the women.
Witnesses testified that all men were rounded up as early as 5.00am to 6.00am.
In the initial phase, only men were targeted. They were thrown into government
Land Rovers and lorries. Finally, after all the men had been taken to the airstrip,
the security forces started gathering the women and girls. They were duped into
believing that they were going to be reunited with their men. The women and
girls were led to isolated locations in the forests and were repeatedly gang raped
at gunpoint. It did not matter whether a woman was pregnant or was on the
verge of delivery. Women’s testimonies revealed many abortions, still births, and
pre-term deliveries, where the babies ultimately died. This went on, according to
the survivors, for four to five days:
No woman was spared. They did not care whether some were pregnant. They did not
care when some women told them they were about to give birth. They did not care
that some women were old. Every soldier came. They were so many soldiers. They were
uncountable. By then I was nine months pregnant. They raped me again and again until
my unborn child came out.78

68.

Another witness testified of how her private parts had been cut and her breasts
mutilated:
I was traumatised because I know seven men who raped me at the time. I am the one
who lost the baby. I am the one who was raped. There is an injury in my private parts.
They brutalised my breasts. You can see where there are cuts. This is the place he put his
finger as he held me so tightly and they made a hole because of the injury. I am at times
unable to walk. I have to sit on my bed and stay in the house because of what happened
then. We were not able to give birth ever after or get a husband. The men who were
maimed could not be able to marry wives.79

76
77
78
79
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The soldiers locked the doors of the houses and took us as
their wives. The suffering we underwent was enough and the
men were beaten up.
Sexual violence during the Mount Elgon conflict and security operation
69.

The roots of the conflict in the Mount Elgon region as well as the formation of the
SLDF have been discussed in detail elsewhere in this report. Of importance to this
section are the high cases of sexual violence that were witnessed during and after
the conflict. Sexual violence in Mt Elgon, was committed by both the members of
the SLDF as well as by the SSAs who were later deployed in the area to quell the
violence and restore order.

70.

At the beginning of the conflict, the SLDF initially targeted and sexually violated
women from the communities they sought to evict, especially non-Sabaots,80 but,
as the Commission learnt, they also attacked people from their own community,
who they felt either did not cooperate with them (in terms of surrendering their
boys to the militia, supplying food and money) or were informing the SSA of their
activities. MK testified to this fact. Although she was Sabaot, she was still gang-raped
by Sabaot men who she likened to being the age of her own children. This was after
her daughter-in-law was killed because her son, who had been forced to join the
SLDF, had fled and left the armed militia group. She described her experience thus:
At one time the [rebels] came home and took me to the forest. So many bad things were
done to me. I am a mother but they asked me very many questions. They removed my
clothes and asked why I was talking to the DC. Those were small children the age of my
children. Some of them are even friends to my children. They removed my clothes and
others made bad comments. They remarked that since I talk to the Government I will see.
They told me that in Sabaot women have no say.81

71.

The Commission heard testimonies of women who had been brutally raped by
SLDF members and were also subjected to other cruel and degrading treatment.
The SLDF informed their victims that they were being ‘punished’ for various wrongs
and many witnesses testified to have been sexually violated as a punishment for
allegedly referring to the SLDF as Janjaweed instead of ‘police officers’. Hellen
Nakam, who was three months pregnant at the time of the assault, shared her
harrowing experience at the hands of the SLDF:

80 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Mt. Elgon/ 24 May 2011/p. 33.
81 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women’s Hearing/ Bungoma/ 9 July 2011/; TJRC/ Hansard/ In-Camera Hearing/ Bungoma/ 10 July 2011/p. 32.
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TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Mt. Elgon/24 May 2011/p. 28-30

It was in 2007 and I was from Kimaswa, going to Chemses. I was going to collect firewood. After collecting firewood on my way to Kimaswa, I met two people. They told me to
take the firewood off my head and put it down. They then asked me where I was coming
from. I told them I was from collecting firewood and was going home. They asked me: “Do
you know the mistake you have made?” I told them I did not know. Then they asked again:
“You do not understand?” I told them I did not know. They told me to sit down. I refused to
sit down. I asked them: “Why are you telling me to sit down and I am supposed to go home?
I am going home and I am late. I am going to cook for my children”. They then said: “We are
telling you to put down your firewood.” They kicked my legs and I fell down. I fell down with
the firewood. They then asked me: “Do you know the mistake you are making?” I told them:
“I do not know the mistake I was making” They then asked me: “Why are you calling us Janjaweed?” I asked: “When did I call you Janjaweed?” They said: “If you say you live in Kimaswa,
when you see us passing, you call us Janjaweed” I told them I had not called them Janjaweed.
They then told me not to call them Janjaweed, but askaris. I told them I had not called them
Janjaweed at all. They then said: “Let us go; we will talk as we go.” I stood up and tried to take
my firewood. When I was bending to take the firewood, one person came from behind and
kicked me. I was surprised and asked: “Why are you beating me and I have made no mistake?”
He told me: “Today, you are going to speak. Let us go.” We just followed the same route. I was a
little bit afraid. He asked me: “We askaris are protecting you and you people living in Kimaswa
are calling us Janjaweed.” I said I had not called them Janjaweed. We continued walking. They
were beating me from behind, kicking me and stepping on me. When we reached a place
called Upper Kipsis in a forest somewhere, they started beating me. It was in the forest and
they beat me thoroughly. They said that I had called them Janjaweed. They were slapping
me, kicking me and using sticks. When I fell, they did not care. I tried to cry but there was no
help. They could not even hear my cry. They said we were giving them funny names yet they
were giving us protection. When I looked up the hill, I saw four other people. They were just
standing pointing at me. They then said: “You woman, come here; why are you looking at us?”
They were dressed well. They covered their faces and legs and you could not identify them.
You could only see their eyes. They were asking me so many questions. They asked me if I was
denying that I had not called them Janjaweed. I told them I had not called them so. They said:
“Today, you will be beaten until you talk”. It went on like that. They really beat me to say why
we were calling them Janjaweed, yet they were askaris. I never talked.
Those who were there with guns came with rags, blindfolded and tied me up. It was a
very heavy rug. In that rug, there was some blood. When I was trying to spit out that blood,
they told me I had to swallow it. I swallowed it and then they told me to go. As we were going, I could not see because they had blindfolded me. I was sucking blood whose source I
did not know. They told me just to swallow it and if I vomited, they would beat me. They held
my hands and they continued beating me. When we reached some places, I could not pass
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because they held my hands. When we reached a place I could walk, they let me walk. They
kept beating me and I kept falling and standing up.
We reached some place and another one came from nowhere. He kicked my legs and I
fell down. They had their own objective. They then started raping me. I can remember very
well that they were four men. I tried to cry and asked them why they were doing that. I asked
them: “Why are you doing this to me. I am just a woman?” Then they said: “It is you we are going to face now”. After finishing, they woke me up. I could not even see where I was or where
I was going. We went on with the journey. They continued kicking me and beating me. They
took me to the upper part of the forest. There they beat me up thoroughly and then dumped
me. I asked them why they wanted to kill me for something I did not know. They told me what
was killing me was calling them Janjaweed, yet they were security officers protecting us. I
asked them: “Is that the only reason you want to kill me?”They went on beating me, slapping
me, stepping on me, hitting me with sticks and I fell down. There were some stones they had
arranged. They told me: “Walk on these stones on your knees”. I crawled on them to and fro.
They then ordered me: “Stand up!...run up to there, to and fro”. At that time they had beaten
me up so thoroughly that I could not walk. I tried to run to and fro, adjusting my speed. They
told me not to run slowly. They were speaking in the Sabaot language.
After one hour, they told me to stand up and ordered me: “Come here!” I went to where
the commander was. The other one came, kicked me on my back and said: “When you go to
the leader, you run. When you are going to the commander you cannot walk. You have to
run!” I ran. He asked me, “do you know your mistake?” and I told him: “I do not know what I
have done”. They then told me: “Tell us how the security officers arrested you and how they
brought you here and what brought you here”. I told them the people got me on my way to
the Kibuk Catholic church in Kapsokwony carrying firewood home and told me to sit down. “I
obeyed and later they asked me why I was calling them Janjaweed. He asked: “Is it only that?”
Then the other person said that is the reason why they had arrested me. He then said: “Go
discipline her and let her go”.
From there I was seriously assaulted. They tied up my hands and ordered me to go with
them. As we were going, another one came and kicked me and I fell down. They then went
on with their business. They put me down and started raping me again. They really raped me
there. I was molested, assaulted and traumatized. They told me that they wanted to finish me.
I told them that even if they killed me I knew I have no mistake before God. I told them I did
not know anything about what they were accusing me of doing. I had done nothing. They said:
“This lady is supposed to be killed”. I told them that even if they killed me, I had made no mistake. At that time I was tired and I could not see anything. After raping me for almost an hour, I
tried to cry, but no one could hear my cry. They were almost five men raping one woman.
It was now almost 11.00pm they left me there and went away without removing the blindfold from my eyes. I was tied up, my body was full of pain and I could not even walk. I just sat
there and after an hour they came back again. When they came back, they asked me: “Can you
walk up to home?” I told them I could not walk. Then one said I should be blindfolded. When
I tried to look, I could not see far. I felt like a blind person. I knew that was my day to die. They
left me there and went.
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I just sat there and after some time I tried rolling down and hid myself in the forest where
I could hold onto a tree. Soon, I heard them coming from far. They were coming back again.
When they came back, one of them asked: “If we take you to Kipsis church, can you walk home
or will you die now?” When I heard about death I told them to take me to Kipsis church and
I would reach home. There is something else I am forgetting; when I fell down, another one
came from nowhere and urinated on me and asked me to drink it since there was no water.
He forced me to swallow the urine. I swallowed it. Another one said; “Then give her ugali to
eat”. That meant the long call (excreta). The other one said, “Do not give her ugali, that water is
enough for her”

72.

A Kenyan refugee narrated how for many years, since 1991 she had suffered at
the hands of the SLDF. She said in 1991 she was abducted and forced to marry a
Sabaot man with whom she had two children. Later, the SLDF decided it was time
to circumcise all non-Sabaot women married in their community. She then fled to
Uganda to avoid circumcision and to join his father and siblings who had fled there
earlier. Unfortunately, the SLDF traced her and executed her father and brothers as
punishment for her action. She was then gang-raped and while naked, her father’s
lifeless body was placed on top of her. She was again attacked during the violence
after the 2007 elections. She further narrated how one of her daughters too was
married off to an old man by the SLDF and that she had no idea whether she was
dead or alive.82

73.

The Commission heard that the SLDF also extorted money from residents, which
they termed as payment for the ‘security’ that they were providing to them as
‘police officers’. In some cases, those who paid were spared from the attacks, while
in others the SLDF took the money and still proceeded to rape the women. One
witness recalled:
They told me to give out all the money that I had in the house. I told them to go and take
the money from a box. My brother had given me the money. Then I started screaming and
asking them why they were killing my brother. They turned on me. They started cutting
my hands and I fell down. One knelt on me and raped me. The others, about four of them,
also raped me and continued until I was badly mutilated and my ears stopped functioning.
It reached a point when I could not feel the pain anymore. My children were screaming
outside and the assailants left. I slept where they raped me until dawn. My brother’s body
lay next to me. Then my landlord came.83

82 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera/Kiryandongo/1 November 2011/p. 7-8.
83 TJRC/ Hansard/ In-Camera Hearing/ Bungoma/ 10 July 2011/p. 24; See also TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Bungoma/10 July
2011/p.14.
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According to evidence received by the Commission, pregnant women were not
spared. A witness confirmed that indeed ‘women were abducted and raped. Many
miscarried, while others were killed. They were stepped on until the foetuses came
out.’84 Another witness recounted:
I was seven months pregnant and after I was cut, I lost consciousness. I did not know what
was going on for a while. When I came to, they took me to the forest in Kopsiro and asked me
whether I had identified them. I told them: “No.”
Two of them raped me and after that, I was told that in case I identified them, my life was in
danger. I just kept quiet and did not say anything. It was 8.00pm when this was happening
and it was up to 3.00am when I was released.85

75.

There seemed to have been nowhere to hide as even those who tried were either
caught during flight or at their hiding places and subjected to sexual violence, as
witness explained:
Everybody had run away and I was trying to hide myself but one day, they came for me. They
banged on my door, flung it open and beat me up. They threatened to kill me. They took me
to the forest and raped me until the next morning. I lost consciousness, my body was swollen
and I could not walk.86

76.

Men were also targeted. A witness testified how her husband was executed, his
body dismembered and his genitals chopped off.87

77.

In 2008, the government launched a joint military and police operation, dubbed
‘Operation Okoa Maisha’ (Operation Save Lives) to suppress the activities of the SLDF
and restore normalcy in the Mt Elgon region. The Commission heard of accounts of
various violations meted out by SSAs involved in the security operation, including
rape, torture, murders and enforced disappearances. Given the challenges faced
by victims of rape to report the violations, including fear and stigma, it is very likely
that the actual numbers of cases of sexual violence were higher.

78.

The many incidents of sexual violence were horrific, including gang rapes and rapes
with objects. The SSAs are said to have employed torture, on both men and women,
as a tactic to force the residents into confessing of their alleged membership and
involvement in the activities of the SLDF, as well as to get information and generate
intelligence reports. The Commission heard from a victim whose children were
bombed. She narrated how the SSAs came to her house looking for her husband

84 TJRC/ Hansard/Women’s Hearing/ Mt. Elgon/24 May 2011/p.2;
85 TJRC/ Hansard/ In-Camera Hearing/ Bungoma/ 10 July 2011/p.14; See also TJRC/ Hansard/Women’s Hearing/ Mt. Elgon/24 May
2011/p. 2.
86 TJRC/ Hansard/Women’s Hearing/ Mt. Elgon/24 May 2011/p.16.
87 TJRC/ Hansard/Women’s Hearing/ Mt. Elgon/24 May 2011/p.3
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who had earlier fled. When they could not find her husband, the police officer took
her to the police where they tortured her. She described her experience:
There were four policemen who were guarding us. One of them came and asked: “Why
are you leaving this one? She has hidden her husband. We want her husband”. They
put me in the position women take in a labour ward. I was still bleeding because I had
delivered a baby very recently. They inserted a bottle of beer into my private parts and
said: “That is not enough.” The policeman came and shot me. I was kept in from March
to August. Human rights officials heard rumours that there was a woman who had been
arrested, and who had been tortured. They looked for me. When they found me, they took
away my child. During the period March to August, the child went blind. They took me
to Kakamega, where six white men removed the bottle from my stomach. All this was
happening to me when my husband was away. My children could not go to school. They
could not make it home. They got lost. The baby I had was only one month old. The child
is mentally disturbed.88

79.

Men also testified to being sexually violated, some of which took place in the
context of other violations, including torture and assault as the SSAs sought to
obtain information that would enable them arrest the members of the SLDF. One
man recalled:
On 20 June 2008, I met some army men at Chesikaki. They grabbed me and started to
beat me up as they stepped on me and slapped me. They took my ID card and looked at
it and when they saw that I was from Chwele, they stopped beating me. They asked me
where the militia could be found. They had kicked me hard on my genitals and I doubt
whether I can ever procreate.89

80.

Men were also sodomised and evidence emerging from witness testimonies
reveals a picture of coordinated sodomy committed on men of all ages, by both
the militias and the government security forces, when men refused to cooperate
or when they refused to confess to false allegations. The majority of the individuals
who reported male sodomy were women talking on behalf of their relatives and
acquaintances. Indeed, very few men came forward to report sodomy on their
person. MNM, a female, informed the Commission that while detained in the police
cells, she saw men being sodomised by the police. She said:
They told an 80-year-old man [to bend down]. The old man bent down, and they
started to sodomise him. The sodomising went on the whole night. In the morning, at
10.00am he was left for 15 minutes. before the ordeal continued again. Another one was
��
mistreated [sodomized] in a similar way. 90

88 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Bungoma/ 9 July 2011/p. 31.
89 IMLU Double Tragedy: Report on Medico-Legal documentation of torture and related violations in Mt Elgon: Operation Okoa
Maisha (2008) 12.
90 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women’s Hearing /Bungoma/9 July 2011/p. 31.
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81.

Though the conflict in Mt Elgon pitted two communities against each other, the
women were united in their joint experiences of horrific sexual violence, either by
the militia group or the army in an operation that did not live up to its billing of
‘Okoa Maisha’ (saving lives) as far as the women are concerned. The Commission’s
women-only hearings in Kapsokwony and in Bungoma had women from the
respective communities. They appealed to each other to extol the men in their
lives (children, husbands) not to resort to conflict to resolve disputes, as it was
evident from their experiences that there were grave consequences for women
where conflict arises.

82.

The Commission also heard of cases where school-going girls were impregnated
by the SSAs91 as well as cases of pregnant women being beaten up viciously until
they miscarried or their unborn children died while in their wombs.92

Chapter SIX

Sexual violence during ethnic and political violence
83.

As indicated elsewhere in this report, since the onset of the multi-party politics in
the 1990s, Kenya’s elections have been marred by episodes of violence. A witness
from Laikipia confirmed this and stated as follows:
I would like to say that women are raped by force. These incidents started in 1992.
The problem began during the elections. That was when the women were kicked out
of their shambas, their houses burnt and all their property sold. The women ran away
and came to live in Rumuruti town. We have rented houses in Rumuruti. Our young
girls and women were raped in front of their husbands, which is a taboo in Kikuyu
culture. For women to be raped together with their children in front of their husbands
is a bad omen. Our husbands were killed and women remained without husbands.93

84.

Indeed, data received by the Commission through interviews, statements and oral
submissions revealed clear patterns of consistent and widespread sexual violence
targeting women and men during the electioneering period as well as during
ethnically and politically-instigated conflict that have over time characterised
Kenya’s elections. Of the total 1 104 statements received by the Commission in
regard to sexual violence, nearly a quarter (255) was committed in the context of
political/ethnic clashes.

85.

The alleged perpetrators of sexual violence in the context of ethnic and political
violence included members of organized militia groups, individual perpetrators
and state security agents deployed to quell the violence in areas experiencing

91 TJRC/ Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/ Bungoma/10 July 2011/p.16.
92 TJRC/Hansard/ Women’s Hearing/ Mt. Elgon/ 24 May 2011/p. 20.
93 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Rumuruti/15 November 2011/p.11.
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ethnic aggression. Witnesses testified how, at the height of the violence, sexual
violence was used to intimidate, degrade, humiliate, discriminate against and
control those belonging to particular ethnic communities or ‘tribes’ perceived to
be in support of the ‘wrong’ side of the political divide.
86.

There were cases of sexual violence starting as early as during the campaign
period. Instances of aspirants for various political offices, especially women, being
subjected to sexual violence with the intention of instilling fear and intimidating
them into dropping their political bids in favour of their opponents were reported.
A lady vying for a councillor’s position in 2007 narrated how she and her family
were attacked when she declared her candidature.
I know that most of you know what happened to me in February 2007 when I declared
that I wanted an elective post as a councillor. On 17 March 2007, people attacked us
at night when I was with my husband and my children. Suddenly there was a lot of
light in the house. We do not have electricity in the house. My husband woke me up
because he thought they were the police. Soon our windows were smashed and they
called out my name. I did not answer back because I was in shock. My husband asked
them whether they wanted money. They said that they had come to kill [me]. He asked
them why they wanted to kill me and they said that [I was] troubling men. I wondered
which men I was troubling. They asked me why I wanted to be a councillor yet I am
employed. I told them that it is not me but the people who wanted me to be a leader.
I told them that I did not want it because I am comfortable where I was. They then
started cutting the grilles on the window. My husband gave them the money he had in
the house. At that time we were selling dairy milk and had a shop. It was on a Sunday
and so we had not taken the money to the bank. He gave them the money. They took
my golden watch which I had been given by a mzungu (white) colleague. I knew that
they knew me because they asked for that golden watch. One of them shot at me with
an arrow. The arrow went through the wall and the mark is still there even today. They
asked for my handbag and I gave it to them. One of them suggested that they leave
because I was not proud. Then another one asked what they were going to say. That
is when I realized that they had been sent. They managed to enter the bedroom and
said that they wanted to kill me. I went near the cross and prayed. One of them came
and kicked me and I fell down. Even up to today I am still affected. They beat me up
and raped me.94

87.

Whereas there were many victims who were sexually violated in the previous
years, many of the cases reported to the Commission related to events following
the 2007 elections, either because they were the most painful ones, or because
the events were still fresh in the victims’ minds. Witnesses indicated that while

94 TJRC/Hansard/ Women Hearing/Kitui/2 December 2011/p.4-5; See also TJRC/Hansard /Women Hearing/ Mt. Elgon/ 24 May
2011/p. 2.
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the threats of violations were issued before the elections, it is not until the results
of the 2007 elections were announced that all hell broke loose. The Commission
heard of how groups of young men moved from village to village, homestead to
homestead attacking people, looting and destroying property and gang-raping
women and children and in some cases men. A 61-year-old Kenyan refugee
narrated how she was gang-raped and sodomized by a gang of ten men in front
of her ageing and ailing father at the height of the violence. She later learnt
that the attackers had infected her with a sexually transmitted disease.95 The
experiences that the victims went through were horrific as demonstrated by
their testimonies.

TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/ Women/ 22 February 2012/p. 2- 3.
On 27 December 2007 I went to vote, just like everybody else. I went back to my rental
house, where there were people seated in groups saying that whoever wins the election –
either Raila Odinga or Mwai Kibaki – there would be violence. So, I did not know whether
they were just talking or whether it was a serious thing or a joke. I went to my house. The
next day, there was a lot of noise that was not ordinary. On 29 December I did not leave
my house because they started burning down structures in the vicinity. They started going round in large groups, walking in mobs of over 200 armed with weapons. On the 30th,
when the election results were announced, violence erupted. The mobs started burning
everything as they went round the area. I could see smoke from our compound and since
there was a perimeter wall, I did not think they could break in. I thought I was in a safe
place. On the 31st at 8.30pm, they came, brought down our perimeter wall and entered
the compound. When they entered, the first building they broke into was the bungalow. I
could see them through the window. When they came into the house, they started carrying away property, including electronics. They came into our rental houses. Before reaching the tenants’ houses, in the compound, there were were some cows. They started slashing the cows alive. I saw a man slash the leg of a cow while it was still alive! They did not
kill it first. He cut off the leg and carried it on his shoulders and went away, saying that it
was his right. They were chanting the song with the refrain: “Haki yetu! Haki yetu! (“Our
right! Our right!” When they got to my house, before I could open it, they knocked very
hard and barged in. The person I met at the door hit me on the head with a metallic rod - a
long crowbar with thorns and some broken bottles attached to it. When I tried to resist
the impact, I did not know where the bottle came from or whether I fell on it. While still at
the door, I struggled with a large group of people trying to force their way in. When they
overwhelmed me, they started carrying out the electronics. There were others outside and
soon I was pulled out and dragged to a corner near a mango tree. They started raping me
there. Before they started stripping me, one man stepped on my stomach and ripped off
my underwear and all my clothes off using a panga. They did not have time to remove my
clothing; they just ripped them off using the panga at once.
95 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Kiryandongo/I November 2011/p.19.
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Another man sat on my chest; another held my hand and another the other hand. One
man held my leg and another the other leg. I felt the first one start to rape me and when
the others followed, I lost consciousness, incapacitated by the despicable act. When they
had finished doing what they were doing, I was left there for dead and they set the house
on fire. They burned everything that was in the compound and left me there lifeless. When
I regained consciousness, I could not tell how long I had been there.
I woke up and I could feel that I had been raped. I could hear my name being called out
from a distance. I could hear the voice and I was totally confused. I stood up and I could not
sit down. I felt very wet, but the wetness was stinging. I did not know whether it was acid or
water that had been poured on me. I could not really tell what kind of fluid that was. When
I tried to sit, I felt tightness between my legs. That is when I found out that – I put my hand
down to check – they had inserted a metal rod into my private parts. There were these
twisted metallic rods used in the construction of buildings that was almost 30 centimetres
long. They had pushed it into my private parts after raping me. I pulled out the metal hard
and it came out. I struggled to stand up and I gained some strength and I could see fire all
around me. I felt as if I had also been set on fire. I could not see anyone around and there
was no one to cry out to. I was just alone. I went through the opening on the perimeter wall
and went near the road where there is a Catholic church. I went in and I started pouring
water on myself because I felt like I was burning. After a few hours – I did not know what
time it was because it was just at night – I jumped over the church fence again and entered
a shack. I was naked when I tried to splash water on me. I lost a lot of blood from my head
as I walked. I entered the kiosk and slept there until morning. Some women were walking
past. They saw me and they could not recognise me. They thought I was a mad person.
One lady pitied me she stopped and gave me a leso to cover myself.96

88.

A witness from Naivasha also recalled her harrowing experience:
After five minutes, a gang of people ran into the house. When they entered, they told
me to give them money. I told them I did not have any. They told me that I had to give
them money from what I had sold and they threw me to the chair. One covered my eyes,
blindfolding me, and the other held my hands back. When I was almost sure that they
wanted to kill me, I directed them to where the money was – that was around KSh6 000;
I directed them to the money which was under the cushion in the seat. They told me:
“Even if you give us the money, we will still do anything that we want to do with you.”
When I was almost sure that there was nothing else--- I was dressed in trousers; so they
tore it. After tearing down my trousers, I called upon God and told him: “God, we have
been told that we are not wanted here and it has come a time when, maybe, I have to
die. It is okay.” I took some time and prayed to God that short prayer, but I still told God:
“I do not know where my children are.” While I was still saying my short prayer, one man
came and held me; the second and the third came and held me too, and they raped me

96 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/ Women/ 22 February 2012/p. 2- 3.
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in turns; the first one, the second one, the third one and then when the fourth person
raped me too, I lost consciousness.97

89.

The Commission also heard sad stories of how people were attacked during flight.
A witness narrated how she tried to flee from Eldoret when the violence erupted
following the announcement of the results of the presidential elections. She narrated
how, together with her two daughters, they boarded a vehicle bound for Uganda. On
the way, their vehicle was stopped by rowdy youth who had barricaded the road.

90.

Together with other passengers, they were ordered out of the vehicle and that it
when they were sexually violated. Here is her testimony:
On our way, we found a tree that had been cut lying across the road. There were people
there who removed our driver from the vehicle and asked him why he was transporting
us. He said that he was helping us. He was asked his tribe. He spoke in a language that
they could understand. They told him to go under the vehicle. They took me and my
two girls in the forest where we stayed for a week. Nobody could help us... When I later
asked people, they told me it is called Kamwiki. It was already evening. They raped me.
They also raped my children. When they raped my elder child, I told them that instead
of killing my child they should kill me. We found two women in the forest. I could only
identify the one who spoke in the Kisii language. When I started talking, they took the
bottle and put it inside my private part and left me for dead. I tried to help myself. I
crawled to the road for two days. I found army officers on the road. They were trying to
remove stones placed on the road. I told them what had happened to me. They called
a woman who was in army uniform to help me. They tried to remove the bottle and
I started bleeding. Before then I had given them my statement. They took me to the
police station where I suffered a lot. The policeman I found there was a Nandi OCS and
the woman policeman too. I had left my children in the forest. I spent the night there
at the police station. A convoy of vehicles arrived there and people realized that I was
bleeding all over the place. I could not rise. They called a doctor who stitched me up. I
did not have enough energy. I told the police to help me find my children, although I
believed they were dead. I took the police to the forest. We found my daughters. They
did not have clothes on. They were covered in blood. When the police checked their
bodies, they said the girls were not dead. They also found another woman in the forest.98

91.

Other witnesses narrated how they fled on foot from their homes but were caught
by groups of young men who were patrolling the streets looking for people from
particular ethnic communities to attack. Many such witnesses were attacked
before they could get to safer areas where other people fleeing their homes had
gathered. The victims were also attacked as they fled:

97 TJRC/ Hansard/ In-Camera Hearing/Men/ Naivasha/ 27 September, 2011/ p. 14.
98 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Women/ Kiryandongo/1 November 2011/p.2.
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We started the journey at around 8.30pm, just walking slowly. We went out through the
sewerage system looking for a roadside sanctuary to hide from the oncoming mob. We
used a panya route [unofficial route] to Ponda Mali and went to Eliza’s house. There was a
trench. We heard shouting from a mob of people coming towards us. We were shocked.
We decided to look for a place to hide, so that they could pass and we continue with our
journey. Afraha Stadium was very far away from where we were living. We were forced to
go there because we did not have any other option. We had to look for a way of getting
there. Mama Saddam had one child. I had five children. We were walking together. As we
looked for a place to hide, we realised the crowd was moving towards where we were.
I told the others: “We have to go to the other side and hide, so that these people can
pass.” I was in the front, so I jumped over the trench to the other side. Among those in
the crowd were people who were smoking bhang. When I jumped over the trench, they
noticed us. Those smoking bhang came and grabbed me. I screamed. Mama Saddam was
behind with the children. They could not come over because I was already screaming. The
children got into the trench but Mama Saddam did not run away. The men started beating
me up. I hit my head on a stone. Those were the people who raped me. I can identify them.
They were three. They took turns on me, one after the other.99

92.

Some of the witnesses informed the Commission that they were sexually violated
at their places of hiding before they got to safer areas. In some of those cases, the
victims were sexually violated together with or in the presence of their children and
spouses, an act that was not only painful and traumatizing, but also humiliating.
A witness described how he was assaulted and made to watch as their attackers
raped his wife.100 Another recounted her experience:
On that day at around 9.00pm, we heard voices on the road. One was supposed to have
eaten by 4pm so that when darkness came, they could go into hiding. I took my children
and we ran to a banana plantation. We stayed there for a long time until those people
found us. They were three men who raped me in turns. They raped me in front of my
children [and] threatened to kill them. I screamed.101

93.

Some of the attackers pretended to assist their victims, only to sexually assault
them. A witness stated how persons pretending to offer her ride to a safer area
at the height post-election violence (PEV), gang-raped her for belonging to the
‘wrong tribe’ and for supporting ‘the wrong political side.’ She testified before the
Commission as follows:
When I boarded the vehicle, I felt apprehensive. Looking around, courtesy of the light they
had somehow put on, I saw some machetes, bows, arrows, axes and some sharp knives. I felt
fear inside me and asked them: “Are you sure that you will go home as you had said? They
told me: “Yes, we will go home.” So, we continued travelling until we reached a place where

99 TJRC/Hansard/Women Hearing/Kisumu/ 16 July 2011/p.15; See also TJRC/Statement/ 03897.
100 TJRC/Statement/07884/p.7.
101 TJRC/Statement/06932/p.7-8; TJRC/Statement/05103.
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they diverted towards the forest. I asked them: “Why have you diverted towards the forest?”
They told me that they were going to get some charcoal and mix it with the potatoes for
their customers. They told me not be afraid and that they would still go home. A man sat
on the driver’s seat, behind I was with three young men who had the machetes, axes, bows
and arrows. After diverting into the forest, they drove for a distance and stopped the vehicle.
They asked me: “Mama, are you aware that you are the people who said “kazi iendelee”? (let
the work continue, in relation to one of the candidate’s campaign slogan) I asked him: “What
does that mean?” They told me that they did not have bad intentions but stressed: “You are
the people who said that Kibaki continues with his job. We are going to start that job on
you.” I felt extreme fear in me. They ordered me out of the vehicle. I disembarked. They told
me to give them everything I had in my pocket. I had been given the money and I had my
fare. One of the gentlemen held a machete. He tore my skirt and petticoat. He used a knife
to cut my clothes. They then told me that I had to remove my coat or they would kill me. That
was when they took me to a secluded place. They dragged me. I had already given them my
mobile phone and the money. It is such a long and sad story because they just wanted to
accomplish their intentions. They were young men, almost the age of my children. That is
the sad story. I kept crying from around 7.00pm to 6.00am in morning, until I had lost energy.
I told them: “Just take me back to the road and get me a vehicle to take me home” but they
would not listen. As I continued talking, one of the young men hit my front teeth with a fist
and told me to shut up, and that if I wanted to die, then it was okay. Others held my legs,
dragged them to their shoulders and raped me repeatedly. They lifted up my hands without
shame. Every time I tried to talk, they would hit me. All the time, I prayed to God to give me
energy, perseverance and humility. I prayed to God not to let them kill me. They raped me
until morning. At around 6.00am, they thought that I was dead because I had lost a lot of
energy. They cut some leaves from the tree branches and covered me. I stayed still because I
had lost all the energy. My legs were weak. They were almost numb. I was naked. They raped
me severally and threatened me with their machetes and sharp knives. At around 6.00am
they covered me with twigs, thinking that I was already dead.102

94.

Initially, women were targeted for sexual violence but as their testimonies indicated,
men and boys were also sexually violated, although very few came forward to report.
A witness narrated how he was sexually violated and told the story of a woman she
knew who too was sexually violated in his presence:
When we were registering as voters, we heard rumours that we were supposed to go
back to Nyeri: “You Kikuyu must go back to Nyeri.” However, when the voting began in
December, there were many things that we could not understand. We were told that our
ashes would not fill a single pick up. We did not understand that. When we went home
after voting, we heard that some houses had been burnt, but ours were not. Our subchief came to tell us that trouble had been stirred up but that none will befall us. He tried
his best. We were at the boundary of two sub-locations. However, on the second day, we
were surrounded. The women had run away and only men had been left behind. There

102 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/ Women/Naivasha/ 27September 2011/ p. 5-6.
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were two Kikuyu families remaining. We were surrounded and attacked. They entered our
homes and freed the goats and the cows. They divided the animals among themselves in
my full view. I was told that I will never eat again any other day. I was told that if I ate, then
it will be either in Nyeri or in heaven. They beat me up and then divided my household
goods. They then torched the house. They told me to move away. My home borders a small
forest. When I was there they brought me a girl who resided at my neighbour’s. She had
been caught while running away. She was stripped naked and so was I. They took away
my Muslim kanzu and put it in the fire. They took away the other things. I was shocked
to see them even take my underwear. They told me to move near a trench where the girl
was. They took the girl and prepared her. They raped her and then they told me it was my
turn to do it. I felt very sorry. I knew the girl’s sister was married to my own son. I told them
that I was sick with HIV/Aids. I told them that I would infect the girl and she would in turn
infect them. They became furious. They beat me to the ground and told me to kneel down.
The others went away. Only eight men remained and I was still stark naked. I was worried
when they used me like a woman. All of them sodomized me. The one who told me that
I will never eat again stepped on my forehead. The footmarks of his shoes are still on my
forehead. The other one brought a mattock – (a presumed symbol of ODM). He also had a
piece of metal. He started knocking down all my teeth. I was lying on my right side which
had a few teeth remaining out of the 28 that I had. They knocked down all of them until I
remained with only three teeth. I then lost consciousness. They thought I was dead. They
dragged me and put me in a trench. I do not know what happened after that.103

95.

A Kenyan refugee shared with the Commission how he was attacked by a group
of 18 youths who all sodomised him and infected him with HIV/AIDs.104 Men were
targeted for forced circumcision and in other cases, mutilation of the genitals at
the height of the 2008 PEV. Witnesses informed the Commission how angry youth
attacked their spouses and mutilated their genitals, ultimately killing them.105

96.

Whenever violence erupts in any part of the country, SSAs are always deployed
to restore law and order. Unfortunately, as has been mentioned elsewhere in this
report, SSAs have themselves been accused of gross violations of human rights.
They are said to attack people not only in their homes, but also as they flee the
violence. They have been accused of, as supported by the testimonies below,
looting property, assaulting and subjecting both men and women to sexual
violations. Evidence received from witnesses indicated that sexual violence by the
SSAs was brutal and depraved, and that victims included children and pregnant
women. A witness from Kapsoit testified how she was raped, even though she was
only two weeks from delivery, by people she identified as GSU officers. Not only
did they sexually assault both her and her friend, the officers also robbed them

103 TJRC/ Hansard/ In-Camera Hearing/Men/Naivasha/ 27th September, 2011/ p. 3-4.
104 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearings/Men/Kiryandongo/2 November 2011/p. 9.
105 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Women/Kericho/ 20 September 2011/p. 4.
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of their money and ransacked the house. They then proceeded to neighbouring
houses and raped all the women they came across. She testified that in that one
day, at Kapsoit Centre, they raped every woman they encountered until they left
the village at 5.00pm:
When our then MP was killed on 1 February, 2008, these people came and attacked us at
Kapsoit, where I was residing. Our local MP was David Too and the people who attacked
us were General Service Unit (GSU) personnel. They arrived on 1 February, 2008 at about
1.00pm. When they entered the house, they ordered us to undress. At that time I was
pregnant and had only two weeks before delivery. They started raping us. As one was
raping me, the other one tried to restrain him and warn him that I was too pregnant,
but he still continued. Four of them jointly raped my friend. After they had completed
the rape, they stayed in the house and continued assaulting us for about two hours.
When they were through, they asked for our phones. They also asked us to surrender
any money that we had. I had KSh10 000 and my friend had KSh 5,000. They ransacked
the house and ensured that they got the money. They commanded us to shut the door,
went to the neighbour’s house and raped her brutally. We lived in a plot which had
about ten houses and they invaded all of them and brutally raped any woman they
found there. From our plot they went to the next plot. At Kapsoit trading centre they
virtually raped any woman they found in their houses. They did not spare any woman.
Where they found men, they commanded them to carry any items they found there,
including the rocks that had been used to barricade the road. Eventually, they left at
about 5.00pm. We suffered greatly. They have damaged our reputation.106

97.

The Commission heard of similar accounts of police terrorizing citizens while
pursuing those suspected of involvement in ethnic and politically-motivated
conflict. A witness in Kwale recounted the violence meted out on her and her
family by the police in August 1997:
As I stand before you, I was raped. I have a beautiful daughter aged twelve years now
in Class 8 and I do not know whether she is a Kamba or a Luo but l really love her. I
cannot hate that girl because she is innocent... On 30th August, I woke up without any
problem. I used to live in Likoni but my home is in Tiwi. So I left Likoni for Tiwi. I did not
know that Likoni police station had been attacked. On the second day as I was going to
Likoni, when we got to Jamaa, our vehicle was stopped. The GSU told us to come out.
We alighted from the matatu and the women were asked where their husbands were. I
told them that I left my husband at home in Likoni. I started quarrelling with them and
they told me that I have a big mouth and I should tell them where the guns were. At
that time, Shonda was just a forest without any developments. I was taken there and
I was really raped. They left me there. I struggled and went to the road. I went home
in Likoni. On getting there, I found my mother and her in-law crying and my first-born
child who was seven years at the time told me that policewomen had gone and stripped

106 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/ Women/ 20 September 2011/p. 20-21.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

743

Volume IIA

Chapter SIX

their grandmother. I was then told that they had been raped. My grandmother had not
slept with a man for ten years since my grandfather died. My father was coming from
work; [he] was arrested and told to produce guns. My father died of stomach cancer and
one part of his body was paralyzed. Those people beat me up thoroughly and my dad
died when he could not even make love to a woman. He was beaten and got injured.
We struggled and went back to Tiwi and people started getting sick. My mother had
diarrhoea and my grandmother kept asking her whether she had been raped. It was
bad and in 2006 my grandmother passed on and my mother on seeing her condition
went to the hospital. There was no security at the time and there was a woman who
went to the police station to report that she had been raped. She was told to repeat the
act practically. That was our government and those were our own policemen. I took my
mum to hospital and she was found to be HIV positive and now she is on ARVs and I am
with her at home.107

Sexual Violence in the Context of Interrogation
98.

Over the years, there have been allegations of torture being used by SSAs as a
tool of interrogation in places of confinement as well as in police stations. The
Commission heard that in such situations, sexual violence was employed and
was aimed at extracting information from persons. In his testimony, George
Walikhu Marakali narrated how he was tortured and pressurised to confess of his
involvement in the FERA movement. He indicated how sexual violence was also
employed in the course of the interrogation:
It [torture] went on day after day, but they did not get what they had expected of me.
When it reached that level, on one occasion after beating me and taking me through
the same cycle, they decided to use another technique. While naked, I was made to put
my legs apart and they tied my private parts. They tied the testicles, I am not ashamed
to say this because it happened and they started pulling. They said they would bring an
end to my life if I was not going to say anything. As they kept pulling, I cried out and the
more I cried, the more they pulled.108

99.

Mzee Jocktan Wepukhulu Mayu confirmed to have been subjected to sexual
violence during his confinement at the Nyayo House torture chambers. He stated
as follows:
In that chamber, I was taken for only one day and beaten thoroughly. They messed up
my private parts. As I speak here, I am not a real man; I am like a child. I was asking them
why they were torturing me like that. I even pleaded with them to kill me instead of
torturing me.109

107 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Kwale/ 24 January 2012/p.11-12.
108 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ Mt Elgon/ 24 May 2011/p. 6.
109 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/ Mt. Elgon/ 24 May 2011/p.20.
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100. Another witness stated that between 1994 and 1994, he was arrested and kept on
being moved from Nyati House to Nyayo House. He shared how he was subjected
to degrading treatment and torture, by both female and male interrogators drawn
from the Special Branch, during the period of confinement. Here is his testimony:
The female officers tortured me. They would ask me to remove my clothes. Upon getting
to my underwear, they would tell me to remove everything. I told them I could not remove
my underwear because there were women officers around. They then told me that I am
married and the wife is like one of them. They asked me if I was afraid of removing my
clothes before my wife. I told them that I was not afraid, but they were strangers to me.
They hit me with a piece of wood on my joints, forcing me to remove my underwear. They
would then start torturing me. I was kicked in the chest and stomach. My private parts
were burned with a cigarette butt and I have the scars to show for it. When I was kicked in
the stomach, I started bleeding. I get stomach aches which lead to bleeding. I still bleed
since then through the front part of my private parts. I experience the pains.110

101. A witness informed the Commission of how he had been wrongly accused of
participating in the death of a resident in his home area, his tribulations during
custody and subsequent release for lack of evidence. He stated thus:
I had gone to Kopokogh in Pokot North. When I came back to my home in Kishaunet in
West Pokot, my brother Taraiat Yokomoi told me that all people who went for safari from
the village [were] alleged to have killed somebody at Pkopoch near Kishaunet. Police
arrested me at Makutano and took me to Kapenguria. Christopher and I (who had gone
for safari) were beaten four times per day, 8am, 11am, 2pm and 4 pm, for two months.
After the second month, they made us stand. They tied both our testes tightly together.
They beat us until we fell down. They then pulled the rope and beat our testes with
rungus (clubs). They released us after one week for lack of evidence.111

102. Other witnesses stated of their untold suffering at the hands of police officers. One
witness shared his testimony:
On 24 June 1984, at the home of the former minister Lotodo Loile, Kenyan askaris came
at 7am in the morning. They shot dead William (the tractor driver) then came to me.
They beat up me to near death. They knocked me with guns. They used needles to prick
my testis. They inserted gun nozzles into my anus. They raped the wife of Kangarop
and raped Lotodo’s wife. They then took my money, KSh50,000. They kicked my chest
and underarm. They kicked me in the mouth. I lost three lower teeth. One upper tooth
is visibly brown and loose. They threw me into a vehicle and drove me to Kitale. They
remanded us with Lukwo, Lumunyan and others. They beat us under the palms of our
feet and bodies for one week. I did not know at that time. We were told that they were
searching for Lotodo (former minister).112
110 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Men/Kiryandongo/2 November 2011/p. 2,3 and 5.
111 TJRC/Statement/04856.
112 TJRC/Statement/04860.
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Sexual Violence during Forced Evictions
103. Kenya has over the years witnessed a number of forced evictions. Private developers,
public institutions as well as powerful and influential individuals are said to be
behind most of the evictions in Kenya and are said to rely on hired groups of youths
and state security agents to carry out the evictions. In some cases, persons carrying
out the evictions are said to have used their political connections to target groups
of squatters and poor people to deprive them of their land, usually ancestral
land. The Commission heard of other cases where such evictions took a political
dimension, with victims being targeted for their perceived political affiliations.
104. Such evictions have been characterized by the torching of settlements to pave the
way for subsequent developers, non-compensation of evicted families, the failure
to issue eviction notices to allow people time to vacate the land and massive
wanton destruction of property. Victims and witnesses told the Commission that
in most cases, sexual violence was used to precipitate the evictions of groups of
people or given communities.
105. Heartbreaking stories were heard from women and girls from Trans Mara District
who, through a memorandum, narrated how on the morning of 2 February 1989
they were attacked by a ‘heavy contingent of paramilitary personnel in riot gear’
who ‘seemed to have been given the authority to do as they wished.’113 They
described the period when the violations took place as:
during the one-party dictatorship, when individuals were more powerful than
institutions; such that an individual's word was law. This was witnessed when a powerful
minister is recorded to have said that the monkeys (Kuria people) must vacate the forests
in Trans Mara, and it happened.114

106. On that fateful day, the police officers are said to have, in addition to torching
peoples’ houses and granaries, looting and destroying property (including shooting
animals), whipping peoples’ husbands and sons, subjected women and girls to
horrifying sexual violations. The Commission heard accounts of how women were
raped and also forced, at gunpoint, to torch their neighbours’ houses. One woman
narrated the events of that fateful day as follows:
It was early in the morning when we heard a lot of cries from the outside. My husband
had gone out earlier and never returned. l had been suckling my 21-day-old baby girl.
Clad in a leso, I tip-toed to the door, and just as I opened to see what was happening, I
113 TJRC/Memo/M1496/p.3.
114 TJRC/Memo/M1496/p.5.
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was pushed back and told that I am a criminal. I protested and told them that I am a suckling
mother, and in terror, I demonstrated to them by actually showing them the overflowing milk
from my breasts. Sizing me up, the police officer who had been joined by others dragged
me out of the house and led me to a thicket. Two of them raped me, and pulled me up and
led me to a nearby homestead where I was given a match box to set the homestead on fire.
Painfully I did it. They led me to some shrubs and raped me again in turns. They pulled me up.
Then they led me to set yet other homesteads on fire. I did it. I set on fire a total of about six
homesteads. They dragged me to another shrub and yet another one, then so many of them,
went into me, raping me in turns, a total of about 14 of them. As another one prepared to
mount onto me, he exclaimed about there being so much blood coming out from my private
parts, and human faeces from my rear. They quickly walked away leaving me for dead. When
I regained consciousness, I was in Ntimaru, being attended to by a local medical officer.115
On learning of my rape, my husband took off and it was after 3 years that he came back to
me. I now have a chronic back pain. My self-esteem is gone. I hardly have any friend, as my
pride was vandalized on that fateful day, perpetrated to me by them who were supposed to
be my protectors.116

107.

The Commission also heard of cases where ‘prominent persons’ used state security
agents to evict people from their’ land’ during which women and girls were targeted
for sexual violence to not only force their respective families to vacate the land,
but also into humiliating them.117 Through a memorandum submitted to the
Commission by the Ilkarekeshe Group Trust, the Commission heard of how, during
evictions, organized by the area councillor, men were chased from their home and
women and children rounded up by SSAs drawn from the Administration Police and
General Service Units. The SSAs are then said to have gone ahead to gang-rape the
women and the children.118 This is said to have gone on for three consecutive days.
Many women stated that they miscarried after the incident, while others fell sick.

108. An even more heartbreaking case of sexual violence during forced evictions was
heard from the residents of the Mwakini farm in Kitui County. Evidence received
by the Commission indicated that on many occasions between 2001 and 2004, Mr
Nganda Nyenze, a brother to Hon Mwanzia Nyenze, a former Member of Parliament,
is said to have formed and commanded a militia group/gang called the ‘Ndeteleka
Group’. 119 He is said to have used the armed gang to threaten and forcefully evict
people, said to have been originally from Machakos, from the Mwakini Farm, under
115
116
117
118
119

TJRC/Memo/M1496/p.3-4.
TJRC/Memo/M1496/p.4.
TJRC/ Statement/43350/p. 9.
TJRC/Memo/M1131.
‘It was a group of men who were sent by the Minister Hon. Mwanzia Nyenze to forcibly evict the squatters at Mwakini in 2001 to 2004
and were under the command of his brother Nganda Nyenze. See -TJRC/Statement/43269/p.9;TJRC/Statement/43269;TJRC/
Statement/35254/p.8;TJRC/Statement/43316;TJRC/Statement/43317;TJRC/Statement/43318;TJRC/Statement/43350;TJRC/
Statement/43319;TJRC/Statement/43320;TJRC/ Statement/43350/p. 8.
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what was known as the ‘Kavamba Operation’. Apparently, the evictions were meant
to pave the way for the resettlement of ‘his voters’ from Kitui.120
109. Mr Nganda Nyenze is said to have personally supervised not only the evictions and
destruction of property, but more disturbing, the sexual violation of the residents
in a bid to evict them from Mwakini Farm. Mr Nyenze would then oversee the subdivision and allocation of such land to other people from Kitui, including members
of his gang.
110. Witnesses and victims confirmed that he drove his own ‘Canter’ lorry (registration
number KAA 197X)’121 that he used to ferry the gang to areas he wanted them to
attack.122
111. The testimonies received indicate the magnitude of sexual violence meted against
the squatters, under the supervision, command and sometimes the participation
of Mr Nyenze. One victim narrated how she was raped in the presence of her family
and other people known to her:
They came and told me to kneel down. I knelt down. They hit me with a rungu. They told
me to stand up, which I did. They told me to remove my shoes and I did that. They put a
thorn on the ground and told me to step on that thorn. I did that. From there, they got
hold of me. They raised my legs up. My head was down. They took an arrow and shot
me in my right leg. Two of them took hold of me and pushed my head to the floor. One
raped me when I was lying upside down.
From there I lost consciousness. I left that place on 7 July, 2001. I went to Ndolo police
station and reported the incident. They recorded the statement. They wanted me to
bribe them. I told them I did not have a bribe. I went to Kabati Hospital where I was
treated. When I went back home, those people came again with a vehicle. They carried
all my property like maize and also a plough. When they were raping me, my children
were in front of me. These three men came to torture me again. They made a circle and
raped me again when my child was only three months old. 123

112.

120
121
122
123
124
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Victims claimed that the violations were carried out with the blessings of Hon Mwanzia
Nyenze, who is also said to have taken no action despite the victims informing him
of his brother’s and his brother’s gang’s activities.124 Some witnesses confirmed that
even the state security organs in the area were compromised. One witness indicated
that his hopes of having his claims against Nganda and his gang investigated were

TJRC/Statement/43271/p. 14.
TJRC/ Statement/43270/p. 9.
TJRC/Statement/43266/p. 11.
TJRC/Hansard/ Women Hearing/ Kitui/ 2 December 2011/ p. 25; TJRC/ Statement/43286.
TJRC/Statement/43269/p. 9.
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thwarted when he was informed by the then Kitui Officer Commanding Police
Division (OCPD) that he was under instructions from Hon Mwanzia Nyenze not to
handle any complains relating to the evictions at Mwakini Farm.125
113. The Commission also heard of how sexual violence was used as a warning on
impending evictions and required the residents to vacate the land. One victim
testified:
Nganda Nyenze came with a lorry full of men, I was in my shop, they took me outside beat
me and raped me, they were more than 10 but I can’t know their names, when I scream[ed]
Nganda came and assisted me to get up, asked who I was and I told [him]. He told me to go
home and tell my husband to choose either to leave the land or lose his head.126

114. Victims of the sexual violence informed the Commission of how the gang of
between 30 to 40 men descended on the village and started demolishing peoples’
houses and destroying anything they found in their way. The gang then, under the
instructions and supervision of Mr Nganda Nyenze, proceeded to commit sexual
violations on the residents. A victim described one incident:
A gang of men came to my house on 15 June 2004 at around 10.00pm. Armed with pangas
[swords], rungus [clubs], catapults and whips and because it was night time, the door was
locked. They kicked it open and entered and started beating everybody in the house. My
husband was dragged outside and the children and three men raped me in turns.127

115. The victim indeed confirmed that Mr Nganda Nyenze was one of three men that
raped her. She stated as follows: ‘I was raped by three men while the others were
fighting my husband and children. Nganda Nyenze was the first and he said he eats
what is hot before it gets cold, but as for the other two, I do not know their names.”128
Yet another victim described the events thus: “The thugs came at midnight and six
men entered my house, stripped me naked, raped me in turns and kicked one child
Vaati Mutindi until he excreted. Mr Nganda Nyenze was the commander. He was
the one even ordering the others to rape me.129
116. A witness informed the Commission how humiliating it was to have his family
members sexual violated in his presence. He stated: ‘It was a bad show to have my
wife, my daughter-in-law and my own daughter to be raped in front of me and the
children’. 130 He further confirmed that ‘many other community members of the
125
126
127
128
129
130
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Katoteni were either beaten or raped.’131 According to yet another victim:
The gang of eight men came to my house. They ordered me to go with them to Kiunga
shopping centre. There the men and others, also victims who I know very well, stood
in a circle. I was taken in the middle, stripped naked and raped by two men in front of
all the others. They said their work was to rape (rapists)... I was very much humiliated
[having] been raped in front of people I know. Nganda Nyenze and Mumo Muvali raped
and tortured me in front of other people.132

117. One victim described what he went through: “Nganda Nyenze, brother to former
MP Hon Nyenze took hold of my hand and showed me a place to sit and in front of
the people stripped me naked. Kisunza Ngondi [held] my penis and informed me
to write in the ground with it. They wrote numbers from 1 to 20. My hands were
also tied up”.133 Another victim informed the Commission how a member of the
gang ‘forced a panga (sword] to enter into [her] vagina’134

Sexual Violence by the British Royal Army
118. Kenya has been host to British Soldiers who have been conducting military
training exercises on its soil. The presence of these soldiers in Kenya is based on
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Co-operation between the
Government of Kenya and the Government of Britain. Major General Nkaissery,
a former Assistant Minister in the Ministry of State for Defence, once confirmed
this and further informed the Kenyan Parliament that the first MoU was signed
in 1980 and has been reviewed by the two parties every five years.135 During the
period of their stay in Kenya, British soldiers have been accused of rape of women
from the pastoralist communities, especially the Samburu and Maasai, living near
the training camps. The most horrific allegations of rape is said to have in October
1997 at Archers Post where 30 women were gang raped by British soldiers, often at
knife-point and sometimes inside the victims’ own manyattas.
119. Witnesses testified, before the Commission, of being preyed on by British soldiers
as they went about their daily chores of fetching firewood and water136 as well as
grazing.137 They indicated that at the time of the attack, they were vulnerable as
131
132
133
134
135

TJRC/Statement/35254/p. 21.
TJRC/ Statement/43286.
TJRC/Statement/43266/p. 8.
TJRC/Statement/43269/p. 8.
Kenya National Assembly/ Official Documents/Hansard/ 4 November 2010(P)/p. 43-48 available at <http://www.bunge.go.ke/index.
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136 TJRC/Statement/07362.
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they would be walking or grazing alone.138 A witness shared her experience thus:
I was from town going home carrying food and money. Suddenly two men came
from behind me, threw me to the ground and raped me. I was three months
pregnant. I miscarried.139

120. Mr Michael Lolwerikol, a male community leader, confirmed that indeed rape
and other sexual violations had been committed against the Samburu women by
British soldiers. He further testified about the effects the violations had on victims
and on the community:
Rape and other sexual offences committed mainly by the British soldiers and other
armed personnel who roam this area during these trainings has caused untold sufferings,
fear and despondency among the local residents, especially women who can no longer
herd, go to fetch water, firewood or perform other domestic issues for fear of attack.
Those children who have been born out of wedlock culturally have been isolated by the
indigenous community. The victims in one way or another have also been isolated.140

121. The Kenyan government has done nothing to either protect the local women or
to ensure accountability of the perpetrators. On 1 September 2010, Honourable
Lekuton, the then Member of Parliament for Laisamis, sought a ministerial
statement from the then Minister of State for Defence on issues surrounding the
British Army training in Samburu East constituency including allegation of rape
said to have been committed by the British Soldiers. The responses provided, by
the minister on 4 November 2010, were inadequate and evasive of the questions
raised. Of concern, was the Minister’s denial of any knowledge of women who
had been raped despite him being confronted with evidence and it being public
knowledge that the victims of sexual violence had filed a case against the said
British soldiers in Britain.141
122. In a written response to the Commission, the British High Commission confirmed
having received such complaints, carried out investigations, and added that the
Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs was briefed on the findings of the investigations
on 13 December 2006. The British High Commission further confirmed that a day
after the Kenya government was briefed on the result of the investigation, local
and international media outlets were also briefed.142 The Investigations conducted
by the British government recorded a total of 2,189 cases of alleged rape by British
138
139
140
141
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soldiers. Two complaints were dismissed after the complainants confirmed their
consent to sexual intercourse. The investigations found that ‘[t]here were some 281
cases where there might have been one or more viable line of enquiry that could
have, if exploited, led to the identification of the offender’. These, it was stated,
included 68 cases where it was alleged that a total of 69 children had been born as
a result of rape.
123. Although the British High Commission acknowledged that the existence of mixed
raced children were indication of sexual relations, they did not directly admit that
their soldiers were liable for rape. All it stated was that:
Whilst these children represented a valuable source of DNA to assist investigators,
the possibility of identifying a suspect through the use of DNA was judged to be
exceptionally remote. Moreover, even if evidence of paternity could be found, it would
not mean that rape had occurred.

124. It is clear that the British government, though claiming to have conducted
the investigations into the allegations against their soldiers, had no genuine
commitment to punish its soldiers for their conduct. It neither conducted DNA
tests nor or followed up on the 281 cases which had ‘a viable line of inquiry’. Further,
the failure of the Kenya government to follow up on the issue and seek redress on
behalf of its citizens was and remains a betrayal of its own citizens and a failure to
guarantee the security of its citizens. Indeed, the Commission received testimony
pointing to the fact the government could be complicit in shielding British soldiers
and the British government from any form of accountability. The Commission
received statement from Martyn Day, a British lawyer who sought to investigate
these cases of behalf of the victims. His efforts were frustrated by state operatives.
When the British Government closed its investigations into the alleged rape cases,
he tried to locate the documents relating to the cases but he was informed by
Kenyan state operatives that they were missing:
Following the closure of the RMP investigation I tried to locate those original documents
and was they have gone missing. I met with the head of CID in Nairobi to ask that they
track them down. He told me they were last seen with the Office of the President but
now could not be located.143

143 Witness Statement of Martyn Day Jeremy.
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Impact of Sexual Violence on Victims and their
Families
125.

There are a number who suffered gender-based violence and have gynaecological
complications. They cannot treat themselves because it is too costly and others
tested HIV positive as a result of the rape. A number of them are traumatized and
depressed. Some of them have been abandoned by their spouses who witnessed
the crime. Others have been thrown out of their homes because they are not Luo.
They got married into the Luo community but the Luo did not welcome them
anymore and they have nowhere to go. So, they have become squatters. Those who
live with their husbands do not share any intimacy but it is convenient to pretend
that they are both husband and wife. So, a number have been left alone to look after
their children. They are humiliated by the community and are reminded about their
status. When they are unable to pay school fees and they plead for their children
to continue with school, they are told off by teachers. When they default in rent,
their landlords break down their doors. Some of their children have gone to the
streets which are considered a better option than starvation at home. Meanwhile,
communities lecture them about moving on and to stop saying that they are IDPs.144

126. The impact of sexual violence, whether in times of peace or conflict has both
physiological and psychological consequences, leaving survivors with specific
emotional and physical scars that subsequently affect virtually every area of their
lives. Over and above the impact on the individual, families and communities also
affected. Families are affected by the death of the victim from consequences of
sexual violence; or where the victim’s health is severely compromised; by break-up
of the family either due to abandonment of the spouse or inability to have children
because of the sexual violence and inability to be economically productive and
sustain a livelihood because of consequences of the sexual violation.
127.

The consequences, (for example, physical scars, stress and shame and inability to be
economically productive) are hardly experienced individually and often they come
together as a toxic cocktail that debilitates the victim. Thus while the effects will be
expounded in their respective categories below, the victims often do not experience
them in neatly outlined categories as demonstrated by their testimonies. Inability to
receive help or treatment in regard to a specific consequence, (for example, medical
treatment for physical scars), often compounds another consequence such as shame
and stigma and hence the consequences work to negatively reinforce each other.

144 TJRC/Hansard/Women Hearing/Kisumu/ 16 July 2011/p. 6.
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Deaths
128. Victims, particularly women, testified of other victims they knew of who had died
as a result of sexual violations. These victims were also witnesses to the deaths
as they were jointly assaulted with those who succumbed to their injuries and
died. In some cases, the victims died immediately following the assault, whereas
in others, the death followed some time after. In some instances where victims
died, the victims had been pregnant and the death was immediately preceded
by a miscarriage resulting from being sexually assaulted. In the Dabel region of
Moyale, nearly all the women were raped in a single attack by army personnel
and most pregnant women died as a result of miscarriages.145 The Commission
also heard of at least two separate accounts in which up to 20 women died as
a result of one incident in which there were sexual violations.146 A witness from
Wajir testified that:
Twenty women who were raped died. I saw them with my own eyes. Any woman who
struggled died. If they did not die the same day, they died the following day.147

Physical Scars
129. The Commission heard that due to the brutality with which the violations took
place, many of the victims suffered both internal as well as external physical injuries.
A witness who was injured during violation, and which injuries the Commissioners
confirmed to exist, stated as follows:
I am traumatized because I know seven men who raped me at the time. I am the one
who lost the baby... I am the one who was raped. My womb came out and it is torn.
...Look at this injury on my hand. Even look at my leg, my muscle is cut. I can show you
my body and how I was injured physically. I was taken to an open space and all of them
came all over. They were not expecting me to live again because my brothers were not
there to help me and they feared no one. There is an injury in my private parts. They
hit me all over and my eyesight is not so good. They brutalized my breasts. You can see
where there are cuts. You can look at it if you want to see. This is the place he put his
finger where he was holding me so tight and they made a hole because of the injury.
You can see all over me. I am wearing a charm to make my neck straight otherwise it will
break. I feel like the burden is too much.148

130. Another victim of sexual violence, at around the time of the Wagalla Massacre,
confirmed that she saw two women being raped by soldiers in her presence, with
one who was pregnant at the time having her stomach stepped on, resulting in a
145
146
147
148
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miscarriage. The victim was also raped by the soldiers and described the effect of
the violations as follows:
my heart is full of pain because of the way I was tortured by the policemen. Up to now, I
cannot even walk properly. If you look here, all the scars have started swelling and even
the doctors are unable to treat me and now I am just waiting for my time to die.149

131. Another victim informed the Commission of how her health deteriorated after the
rape ordeal:
Since then I have had problems. When they took an X-ray, they found that the rape
case affected my uterus. They somehow altered my uterus because I have severe pain.
After the X-ray, they found out that my uterus was damaged and that is why I have so
much pain in my body. I cannot walk properly because even when I was coming, I had
to board a boda boda or motor bike when we reached the stage. Since then I cannot
do anything because my bones ache, I have backache and a lot of pain in my body;
the muscles and the lower abdomen. I really do not know what they did to me during
the encounter.150

Health
132. Health consequences resulting from sexual violence include death, superficial
and permanent scars, stress, hypertension, physical pains and aches and mental
trauma. Other health effects include pregnancy,151 miscarriage, mutilated genitals,
incontinence, sexually transmitted infections including the HIV virus, sexual
dysfunction and infertility due to damaged reproductive organs. The health
consequences were sometimes compounded by inability to get treatment,
especially from the government health facilities. Victims recounted how they were
rudely turned away from hospitals when they stated the context in which they
were violated. The Commission heard such accounts in testimonies from victims of
the Shifta War and victims from the 2007-08 post-election violence.
133. In regard to victims in the Shifta War, the government, through denial of medical
services, was also denying that there were victims, particularly in relation to
violations committed by state security agents. For the PEV IDPs who had initially
received free medical treatment upon production of registration cards identifying
them as such, they were turned away after the government’s ‘Operation Rudi
Nyumbani’ (Operation Return Home). The health facilities said the government
had resettled all IDPs, so there was no longer need for free treatment for IDPs. Such
reasoning was obviously fatally flawed on several grounds, not least the fact that
149 TJRC/Hansard/Women Hearing/Wajir/19 April 2011/p. 8.
150 TJRC/Hansard/ In-Camera Hearing/ Women/ 27 September 2011/p. 9.
151 TJRC/Statement/00578.
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being resettled did not mean that you were healed of all health complications and
not in need of further treatment.
134. A victim of sexual violence in the PEV context testified as to how she did not even
attempt to seek medical treatment since she was sure it would not be forthcoming
from a government hospital. Government service providers such as doctors and
nurses were not seen to be impartial:
After the ordeal, I did not go to hospital; there was no hospital. Even if we went
to hospital, they would tell us ‘mlisema kazi Iendelee’ [you had said that the work
should continue, that it is the incumbent to remain] so, we were not given any
assistance.152

135. Many victims testified before the Commission of the health-related complications
they suffered and were sometimes still living with following sexual violations.
These included injuries and spontaneous abortions following rape,153 the inability
to subsequently have children154 as well as incontinence. One victim stated:
I cannot urinate properly. I cannot sit properly and I cannot even go for a long call
normally. I do not think any of the women you see here gave birth since that day. I have
also never given birth. …When you walk, you cannot control your urine. How then can
you give birth to a baby? Even when you sleep at night, you cannot control your bladder.
You urinate like a child. The truth is in front of you and since then, every morning, I have
to change my clothes.155

136. A lady who was sexually violated during the evictions at the Mwakini Farm informed
the Commission that as a result of the violation ‘sometimes during [her] long calls
[she] pass[es] pus’ and that she is now forced to walk using a walking stick since her
���
legs ache. 156
137. Incidents of miscarriages following rape were sometimes followed by deaths of
the victims and the Commission heard about this particularly in Moyale and Wajir
where mass rapes were conducted in the context of the Shifta War and Wagallla
Massacre respectively.157
138. The Commission heard from a woman who exemplified the multiple health and
social consequences that victims of sexual violence have to bear:
I was also a victim; I had just come out of labour and others who were pregnant gave
birth prematurely. I can remember that no woman or girl was spared. I cannot urinate
152
153
154
155
156
157
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properly and I cannot even go for a long call normally. I do think any of the women
you see here gave birth since that day. I have also never given birth....When you walk,
you cannot control your urine. How then can you give birth to a baby? Even when you
sleep at night, you cannot control your bladder. You urinate like a child. The truth is in
front of you and since then, every morning, I have to change my clothes.158

139. A victim, who had been gang-raped by about 14 police officers, during forced
eviction in Trans Mara District stated that immediately after the violation ‘so much
blood [was] coming out from [her] private parts, and human faeces from [her] rear
and that she now suffers from ‘chronic back pains’.159 Victims of sexual violence
during the evictions at the Mwakini Farm shared similar experienced. In explaining
how the sexual violation impacted on their lives, one victim stated: “Three men
raped me, kicked me in the bladder which even today has a problem because
it cannot hold the urine.’160 Yet another stated:” After the rape, I suffer a lot. My
bladder cannot hold urine, my hips are painful and my shoulders ache.”161
140. The Laikipia Paralegal Association shared how victims of rape by the British military
in Laikipia and Samburu were ostracised by their husbands following the rapes
and have also been unable to conceive as a result:
As we speak now, there are some women who have not had children due to the injustices
of rape. There are women who have been divorced by their husbands because they were
raped by the British Army soldiers.162

141. A Kenyan refugee living in Kiryandongo, Uganda, informed the Commission that
following the sexual violation that she was subjected to, she sustained injuries on
her pelvic bones as well as on her spinal cord, which injuries have confined her to
a wheelchair.163

HIV and sexually transmitted infections
142. Sexual violence contributes to increased transmissions of HIV. Victims testified
before the Commission of how they got infected with HIV,164 or in some cases,
infected their attackers, following a sexual assault:
Very many women here are HIV positive as a result of the raping during the post-election
violence. You know that there is nothing that you can pay to a woman who has been
raped. Even if it is your husband, he cannot agree that you are his wife or accept you
back. So, women are really suffering. As a mother, if you were raped, even if you are HIV
158
159
160
161
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163
164

TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/ 19 April 2011/p. 2.
TJRC/Memo/M1496/p.4.
TJRC/ Statement/43350/p. 8.
TJRC/ Statement/43350/p. 20.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Rumuruti/14 November 2011/p. 44-45; TJRC/Statement/07368.
TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Kiryandongo/1 November 2011/p. 6.
TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera/ Women/Naivasha/ 27 September 2011/ p. 16; TJRC/ Hansard/ In-Camera Hearing/ Bungoma/ 10 July
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November 2011/p.19.
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negative, a man cannot accept you back. Even if you were not raped, but that word has
spread and it is just general that women were raped.165 HIV/AIDS has become rampant
here. Children and women are sick and there is nothing that we can do. Many have
been raped, mothers get babies from rape, families have broken down and many do
not have places to live.166

143.

Victims who sought and received medical treatment following the sexual assault,
were able to get either anti-prophylaxis medication or anti-retroviral drugs as
applicable.167 However, victims who were unable to seek medical treatment could
still be living with infections they contracted and this could in turn be transmitted to
children they would conceive. The Commission heard of the difficulties experienced
by Kenyan refugees in Kiryandongo, Uganda, who contracted HIV/AIDs during the
2008 post-elections violence. They informed the Commission that the Ugandan
government prioritised their own citizens in the distribution of ARVs. Accordingly,
many Kenyan refugees had to wait for long before accessing medication, which
contributed to the deterioration of their health, and death of some of them.168

144. Sexual violence, particularly in situations of conflict, was accompanied by other
violations such as destruction of property. Victims testified that even though
they were receiving medication for the HIV contracted from their sexual assault,
they were still in ill health because of inadequate food and nutrition. Where their
property was destroyed and livelihood affected alongside the sexual attack,
they had been unable to economically recover and in some cases, were in near
destitution. This therefore negatively impacted on their management of their HIV
status. One witness put it thus:
Two boys raped me. They raped me for more than an hour. After five months, I got sick. I
was taken to Moi Referral Hospital in Eldoret for further tests and treatment. After doing
several tests, they discovered I was HIV positive. My business went down. Everything
was looted. I became very poor to the extent of finding it hard to fend for my two young
children. In my current status I need a lot of food. I do not have the energy to cultivate my
shamba.169

Psycho-social impact
145. The immensely personal nature of this type of violation, undoubtedly influenced by
socio-cultural conservative norms in regard to the female body, sex and sexuality,
contributes significantly to the negative psycho-social effects experienced by
survivors of sexual violence.
165
166
167
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Many witnesses had never spoken about their experience, let alone received
counselling for the same. They often spoke for the first time about their experiences
when they recorded a statement with the Commission or testified during the
hearings. As one witness put it, they often felt shame which caused them to bear
their pain in secrecy:
For me, I had not told anyone about the encounter because I thought it was quite
embarrassing to do so. I had not told anyone, including my children or my mother.170

147. The pain that women had borne, sometimes for decades as in the case of the Shifta
War and the Wagalla Massacre, was evidenced as many broke down and cried as
they testified. In a number of instances, women wailed and sometimes screamed
as they bravely opened the door into the brutality they had experienced and in
doing so, broke down a wall of silence and shame that had been built over years.
Witnesses described fear, despair, shame, emotional trauma, post-traumatic stress,
hopelessness and depression that they experienced and continue to experience.
Psychologists and counsellors working with the Commission identified many
witnesses living with these consequences. As evidenced in testimonies earlier in
this chapter, witnesses stated that they had lost the will to live and some even
shared that they had suicidal thoughts. One witness stated: ‘I was traumatized,
depressed and stressed and even to date I fear men.’171
148. The memorandum by People for Rural Change Trust (PRCT) on behalf of Kuria
women, sexually violated by state security agents who forcibly evicted them,
provides details on the impact of sexual violations had on the victims/survivors:
One of the raped victims confessed to having [lost] interest in sex and any sexual
advances would greatly traumatize her. There were deep psychological wounds by the
primary victims and men, (secondary victims) whose wives had been raped; the victims’
diminished self-esteem; hopelessness; broken dreams/marriages, with husbands
remarrying;…medical expenses incurred by the victims/families; one of the rape victims
was cast away and had nowhere to go, being forced to live in the swampy ground in
Kwiho Division; cases of conception and giving birth to children as result of rape, like
witnessed in the case where a woman give birth to a half-caste between a Kuria and
Somali; and the virginal pain experienced by the victims.172

149.

Additional psychological trauma was occasioned on victims of sexual violence in
their quest for justice, where the few who attempted to report were either verbally
abused at police stations or faced with otherwise uncooperative or disinterested
officers. In some cases, victims continued to encounter their attacker(s) in their
communities, resulting in feelings of fear and anger at the lack of accountability for
the perpetrator’s actions.

170 TJRC/Hansard/In-Camera Hearing/Women/Naivasha/ 27 September 2011/p. 15.
171 TJRC/Statement/43350/p. 21.
172 TJRC/Memo/M1496/P. 4
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Social stigma
150.

The prevailing conservative religious and socio-cultural norms towards sex and
sexuality perhaps inform stigma and shame around rape and other sexual violence.
However, this conservativeness is completely in contradiction to the brutality of
acts of sexual violence that the Commission heard about. Norms that dictate sex
as a private act between spouses are shattered by rape and other sexual violations.
It is this ‘shame’ and fear of embarrassment, as indicated elsewhere in this chapter,
that prevented many from reporting the violation, and this is deeply rooted in
cultural customs that treated sexual violations lightly. For example, compensation
was offered for acts of sexual violence and this was sometimes propagated by the
Judiciary as was evidenced in Eliud Mamati v Milia Makaya d/o Daruna173 where the
judge ordered that the parents of a schoolgirl (a child) be paid two heifers by her
teacher as ‘pregnancy compensation’.

151.

In the wake of the 2007/2008 post-election violence, many marriages were broken
after women who were raped were ostracised and abandoned by their husbands,
especially when they conceived as a result of the rape. Girls were also forced out
of school because of forced pregnancies following rapes and gang rapes. Although
the woman is the victim of the crime, men (husbands and fathers) also consider
rape as an assault on them and in some instances, something they would have
to be ‘cleansed’ of. Such sentiments were shared by women from the Samburu
community who had been sexually violated by the British soldiers. They indicated
that discussion of rape being a taboo, they could not share that they had been raped,
since that would result to the victims and their mothers being kicked out of their
homes, and bring embarrassment to the victims’ fathers since, culturally, no young
Samburu man would be willing to marry a victim of rape. Witnesses revealed that
whenever information on violation was leaked, victims would be ostracised from the
community or forced to marry an old man. No wonder many of the victims never
reported about being sexually violated or sought treatment.

152. Social stigma is also compounded by hostile, indifferent or grossly curious attitudes
of service providers such as law enforcement authorities and health workers when
victims report sexual violence. For both male and female victims, there is shame in
reporting the act as they are made to feel that they are somehow to blame for what
happened to them. In a society that promotes the male norm as being macho,
male victims feel and are made to feel emasculated by sexual violence. Women
on the other hand are made to feel that they were somehow complicit in what
happened to them.
173 High Court of Kenya, at Kisumu, 5 December 1917, Civil Appeal No. 47 of 1916.
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153. It is not uncommon for the character of a victim of sexual violence to be impeached
in court particularly in regard to the clothes she was wearing when raped. Whether
women conceived or not, as a result of being raped, they were still shunned. This
social exclusion is devastating for women - particularly in nomadic and pastoral
communities where communal ties are very strong. In these communities, families
live and travel together in search of water and pasture and assets such as livestock
are jointly owned. In these communities, there is strong male preference in access
to entitlements such as education for children. Accordingly, when women are
abandoned, with little or no education, no property or means to a livelihood, the
message being communicated to them is that they might as well be dead, as far as
the community is concerned. A witness in Wajir testified to this:
We were stigmatized and we were told that we were “the rape women”. We did not get
married and event the daughters we bore before are also stigmatized. They are suffering
because of that. I feel like I am not living.”174

154. The deep stigma that victims of sexual violence feel and face has been attributed
once again, to patriarchal norms, particularly in regard to values such as chastity.
ACCORD International informed the Commission that:
We are dealing with African patriarchal societies where things like chastity are over
rated - to the point [that] even when I am violated [as a woman], I am supposed to
remain chaste. So, there is a contradiction and paradox there. What happens to this
woman or girl who becomes a sex slave or who is abducted or is gang-raped in front
of her family? The natural response to that family and that community is actually to
ex-communicate her or to stigmatize her in such a way that her normal life cannot
continue.175

155. The Commission found that prevailing cultural beliefs also betray women and
girls, forcing them into silence when they are violated. Silence in the face of rape
is deemed to reduce the impact of stigma, and to enable a girl to qualify for
marriage in the traditional way. This perspective is supported by a narration by a
witness:
Bukusu women have been silenced by the community. Even when you are raped, you
cannot even tell your mother because if you tell her, she will tell your father and you will
be beaten, and yet it is you who has been violated. You will stay with bitterness until you
get high blood pressure because you will be stigmatized. They will be saying: “This one,
do not marry her because she was raped when she was 10 years old”. Because we fear
the stigma, you just die with your high blood pressure. Even when your husband beats
you or brings another woman to your bed, yours is just to shut up your mouth and keep
quiet. Is this good? Why are you allowing this?176
174 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/ Wajir/19 April 2011/p.2-4.
175 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearings/Women/08 February 2012/p. 48.
176 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Bungoma/9 July 2011.
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Breakup of families
156.

The Commission learnt that abandonment by spouses was a common consequence
of the stigma attached to rape survivors. Women narrated how their spouses left
them upon learning that they had been sexually violated. Men too indicated that as a
result of sexual violence, some of them became impotent, a fact that they blamed for
their spouses’ infidelity and in some cases desertion. In one incident, upon sensing
danger to her life and that of her family, one woman advised her husband to flee. She
did not flee as she was pregnant and she thought on account of that fact, she would
not be harmed. However, she was still gang-raped by GSU officers despite being
seven months pregnant. Her husband who survived an attack, on her advice to flee,
subsequently abandoned her on learning that she was raped and he subsequently
remarried.177 Another woman described how she and other women who found
themselves as IDPs in one camp saw their husbands abandon them on learning that
they had been raped:
I have gone to hospital and was treated. I was tested and I am positive and the person
who attacked me and his wife have already died. When my husband heard about what
happened, he left me. He rejected me completely. He was asked ‘What are you going to
do?’ and then he rejected me. It’s not just me. I see many women in the camp who have
separated from their husbands. As soon as our husbands found out that we had been
raped, they left us.178

157. A victim of sexual violence that took place during the eviction of Kuria people in
Trans Mara too stated that when her husband learnt that she had been raped, he
took off and only returned three years later.179 The same fate befell victims of sexual
violence during the evictions at Mwakini Farm. In explaining how the violation had
affected her, a witness recalled:
My husband left me after the ordeal and said that he cannot stay with a wife who had
been raped by other men in front of him.’180

158. Male victims also narrated how they had been rendered impotent as a result
of being sodomised or castrated.181 The testimony by a witness who had been
sodomised, demonstrates the indignity attached to the violation as well as the
strain it had on the victims’ marriages:
I need treatment to go back to my manhood. I am not very old. I last talked to my wife
in 2007 and I have never dealt with her [had sexual intercourse]. Even if she comes near
me, I do not have any feelings for her...What I used to give her then, I cannot give her
177
178
179
180
181
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now. I am like a cripple in my body.... I have been unable to stand for about eight months
because of my waist and legs. Something bad happened to me. The woman I am living
with, if I cannot satisfy her, will move out and I will be left alone. I have become useless.182

159. This was also the case for the victims who were castrated by the military officers
during the security operations. As one witness, indicated, he could not sire children
after the violation and that affected his marriage as well as their right to found a
family.183 Another stated as follows:
My family disintegrated, my wife left me. I lost self-confidence and ability to provide for
my family, I do not meet or mix with my age-mates again for fear of stigma.184

160. Similarly, a male Kenyan refugee shared narrated the effect sexual violation has
had in his life as far as entering into a relationship and founding a family, stating:
I came here [Kiryandongo] in 2008 and could not marry. I stayed until 2009 when I met
a Kenyan woman whom I married. After marrying her, when she knew that I had been
sodomised and had that injection, she left me. That is very painful and it still affects me.
I have peace but I do not know where my life is heading to. I have never been treated
since I suffered that injustice.185

161. The victims of rape in the Samburu community who conceived children had to
choose between keeping the child and being shunned together with the child or
shunning the child in order to be re-accepted into the community. The fact that
the women were victims in the attacks is overlooked by the community leaders as
the consequence of the attack is what mattered, that is that husbands and fathers
felt they had been defiled and emasculated.
162. Many victims abandoned their mixed-race children. In 1990, a number of the women
who had been shunned and abandoned by their husbands and community, came
together and began a women-only village. They called it Umoja, meaning unity.
Umoja village has grown to take on more members (women and children only) and
it is now a refuge for women who are escaping domestic violence, those shunned
as a result of sexual violence they have faced, children who have been abandoned
and girls escaping from undergoing female genital mutilation (FGM).186 These
women instituted a case with a British lawyer to bring to justice the British Army
for acts of sexual violence, alongside other atrocities, including deaths resulting
from explosions of ordinances negligently left lying around.
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Socio-economic impact
All I want is for my children to get food and I do not even have money for school fees. I
have become like a beggar and I just beg from people.187

163. Many victims of rape testified of their inability to financially provide for themselves
following the sexual violation they faced. This was either because their livelihood
was destroyed in the incident that also resulted in their violation; or because of
health consequences following their attack, they were unable to work and fend
for themselves;188 or because their husband or partner who was their primary
breadwinner, abandoned the victim and her children after finding out that she had
been attacked; or a combination of all or some of these factors. Victims therefore
spoke of being unable to cater for their needs as well as for their children.
164.

As a result of a largely patriarchal society, many women are marginalized and
disenfranchised even in times of peace. Following conflict, this status is only
heightened, especially where the male breadwinner is killed or in the case of sexual
violence, abandons his wife upon learning of how she was violated. Many women are
economically and socially dependent on men and thus when left alone as the sole
breadwinners, they are left vulnerable and to fend for themselves in a society that
recognises and supports the role of men as the breadwinners. Thus when women
find themselves abandoned by their spouse after being raped, they resort to ‘survival
sex’189 where they trade sex for basic commodities in order to survive.

165. A witness recounted the experiences of women in her region, who having been
abandoned by their husbands, or even widowed during the conflict, resorted to
trading sexual favours out of desperation:
I am talking in pain because the women are destitute and they are poor. They do not have
anything and can endanger their lives to get food for the day. They do not care about
the next day. If they are told; “I will give you something in exchange for sex”. They can
endanger their lives. So I am requesting that these women be empowered economically.
If there is a way they can be given jobs, let them have something that can support their
life so that they can bring up their children because many of them are now abandoning
their children.190

166. As indicated earlier, some of the victims of sexual violence got pregnant from the
violations and were therefore forced to care for children that they had not planned
for. Most of the victims confessed to facing financial strain as a result of this
187
188
189
190
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punishing and unforgiving situation.191 Socio-economic and cultural dependence
on family and family ties led women to make inconceivable choices of, either
abandoning the children they bore as a result of the sexual violation, or reuniting
with their families.
167. This was particularly the case where the children took on distinctive features
of the attackers, for example hair texture or skin colour that was different from
the community of the mother. The Commission heard about such incidents
particularly in North and Upper Eastern region, where the primarily Cushitic
women bore children with non-Cushitic features. In Samburu region too, there
were testimonies of primarily Nilotic women bearing mixed-race children following
rapes by Caucasian British Army officers. The children have grown up knowing they
are different from the rest of the community and have been shunned as a result,
missing out on basic humanitarian services including education and access to
health.
168. The Commission also heard from women who suffered economic loss as a result
of conflict or displacement that affected their business. This loss was compounded
by oppressive debt collection practices by some micro-lending institutions192. A
witness in Narok narrated the challenges they were facing in the wake of losing
their businesses but still being required to repay their loans without concessions
from the financial institutions:
Fellow women, let me tell you that we have a problem. We are being asked to pay
back the loan. Some women became sick due to stress. Others suffered from high
blood pressure. Three women have died from high blood pressure, because the Kenya
Women Finance Trust (KWFT) has kept on telling us that they could have us arrested
because of the loan we owe them. Some of us ran away. We do not have money with
which to repay the loans, because everything was burnt down, but the KWFT do not
want to know that. They just want their money back. We do not have anything to do.
We do not have anybody to look after us. When they started tracing us in connection
with the loan, we went to the DC and explained our problem. We told him that some
of the women had died and asked what we could do? He gave us a letter and told me:
“Take this letter to the officers of KWFT.” We took the letter to them. They said: “He
wants us not to harass them! How are they going to pay?”We do not have any means
of paying back the loan.193

191 TJRC/Statement/00578/p.22.
192 Kenya Women Finance Trust was severally mentioned. Kenya Women Finance Trust was invited to respond to the allegations
made but they did not appear or respond.
193 TJRC/Hansard/Women’s Hearing/Narok/30 September 2011/p.16.
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